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(&& 


FULL  OFFICIAL  HISTORY 

OF 

THE  WAR  WITH   SPAIN 

WRITTEN  OVER  THE  WIRES  IN  THE  DISCHARGE  Oh  PUBLIC  DUTY 

By  the  Highest  Authorities  of  the  Government,  Heads  of  Departments  and  Bureaus 

of  State,  War  and  Navy,  Cabinet  Secretaries,  the  Adjutant  General,  the 

Commanders  of  Fleets  and  Armies  in  Active  Service,  and  the 

PRESIDENT   OF  THE   UNITED   STATES 


THE  EARLIEST  EXAMPLE  OF  HISTORICAL  WORK  WROUGHT  FROM  THE  RECORDS  AUTOMATICALLY  AUTHENTIC, 
OF  THE  INNER  TRUTHS  OF  WAR,  WITH  I^HE  LATEST  FACILITIES  OF  SCIENTIFIC  INVENTIONS 


The  Figures  Touched  u-ith  Life  and  the  Scenery  with  Colors 


BY  MURAT   HALSTEAD 

>i 

Author  of  "The  Story  of  the  Philippines,"  "Our  New  Possessions,"  "History  of  American  Expansion,"  'The 
Story  of  Cuba,"  "Our  Country  in  War"  "The  White  Dollar,"  "The  Life  of 
William  McKinley/'  "The  Conventions  of  18(>0,"  etc. 


Superbly  Illustrated  with  Half-tone  Engravings,  Made  from  Many  Photographs  Taken  by  Signal  Service 

Photographers  Expressly  for  This  Work;  and  by  Reproductions  of  Official  Maps  and 

Plans  of  Battles,  Campaigns,  Fortifications  and  Ships,  Prepared  by  the 

War  and  Navy  Departments  of  the  United  States. 


SOLD    BY    SUBSCRIPTION    ONLY 


1899: 

C  F.  BEEZLEY  &  CO. 

CHICAGO 


COPYRIGHTED,  1899,  BY 

H.  L.  BARBER, 
CHICAGO,  U,  S.  A. 


The  engravings  in  this  volume  were 
made  from  original  photographs  and 
are  specially  protected  by  copyright. 
Notice  is  hereby  given  that  any  per 
son  or  persons  guilty  of  reproducing 
them  or  infringing  upon  the  copy 
right  in  any  way  will  be  dealt  with 
according  to  law. 


Juscxnbcrt 

to   tfjc 

History  ^Takers  of  tfye  Uniteb  States, 
fye  Presibent,  O)e   (Cabinet,  O)e   (Congress 

anb  tfye 
(Officers  anb  (Enlisteb  IHen 

of  tyc 

(Zmerican  Ctrnty  anb  Har>ij, 
IPE?ose  Deebs  Officially  IDrttten 

3n  Ctction 
Ctrc  Kecorbcb  in  tEfyese  Pages, 

(£btteb  by  tfye   Clutl)or; 
CT  IPar  for  l}umanity  in  t^e 

Hamc  of  Ciberty 

Became  (Due  of  Beneficent  Conquest, 
osing  Duties  of  Emancipation  anb  Dominion, 
Ctbbing  to  tfyc  Broab  £anbs  of  tl)e  ^ree, 

Spanning  t(?e  Continent, 
(Tl?c  3slanbs  of  tl^e  Southern  Seas, 
IPfyile  tl?e  Energy  of  tl?e  Conquerors 

It) a s  illcrctful  to  t{?e  Panquisf^eb 

tl)e  Startling  Strokes  of  Conclusive  Dictory 

Brought  t^c  Swift  Keturn 

(Df  tl)c  Security  of 

Peace. 


402 


THE    PUBLISHERS'    PREFACE. 


The  Full  Official  History  of  the  War  with  Spain  is,  in  essentials,  com 
posed  exclusively  of  material  for  which  the  highest  authorities  of  the  govern 
ment  of  the  United  States  are  responsible.  The  trite  way  to  impart  to 
biography  its  greater  charm  is  to  use  the  words  of  the  person  portrayed,  and 
the  better  way  to  write  history  is  in  the  authoritative  language  of  its  makers. 

Modern  inventions  have  afforded  such  facilities  for  communication 
between  capitals  and  camps,  the  departments  of  war  and  navy,  and  the  com 
manders  of  armies  and  fleets  in  action,  that  there  is  centralization  of  supreme 
command,  and  the  work  of  war,  as  well  as  of  diplomacy,  is  absolutely  in  the 
hands  of  the  Great  Officer,  charged  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States 
with  the  command-in-chief  of  our  armed  forces,  naval  and  military.  This 
wise  provision  of  the  republican  form  of  government  significantly  subordinates 
all  generals  and  admirals  to  the  Chief  Magistrate  of  the  nation,  conclusively 
as  the  colonel  of  the  regiment  is  the  superior  of  the  captains  of  the  companies 
that  compose  it. 

When  the  flag  of  this  country  flies  over  the  White  House,  the  President 
is  there  in  the  discharge  of  public  duty,  and  near  the  executive  mansion, 
westward,  in  an  immense  building,  are  grouped  the  departments  of  State, 
War,  and  Navy,  through  which  our  government  comes  in  contact,  whether  in 
peace  or  war,  with  the  nations  of  the  earth.  Thus  within  a  small  space  are 
gathered  the  executive  offices  and  appliances  of  the  American  people. 

The  wires  in  the  White  House  place  the  President  in  touch  with  all  the 
departments  represented  in  his  Cabinet  and  joined  to  the  wonderful  web  spun 
round  the  world,  over  which  is  wrought  the  mighty  magic  of  telegraphy;  and 
in  the  recent  war  the  defense  of  our  coast,  and  the  offense  of  our  ships  and 
battalions  in  the  Indies,  East  and  West,  the  President  was  constantly  in  swift 
and  sure  communication  with  the  front — and  no  word  of  his  is  found  that  did 
not  command  and  cheer  the  advance  and  testify  his  courage  and  vigilance. 


14  THE  PUBLISHERS'  PREFACE. 

The  intelligence  of  the  world's  business  day  by  day — the  order  and  reports 
of  affairs,  large  and  small,  flash  continually  on  the  wires,  and  from  the  begin 
ning  of  history  there  has  been  no  material  of  and  for  it,  comparable  with  the 
dispatches  reduced  to  writing  at  both  ends  of  the  lightning  lines.  Never  in" 
all  the  countless  experiences  of  mankind  was  the  story  of  a  war  recorded  and 
made  definite  and  certain  by  the  leading  actors  in  it  as  in  our  combat  with 
Spain  that  began  and  was  fought  to  a  finish  in  the  year  1898.  It  was  the 
first  case  of  the  kind,  and  this  book  is  in  a  striking  degree  the  fruit  of  it.  All 
enlightened  peoples  participated  in  our  current  information,  but  the  gen 
eral  dependence  was^on  formal  reports — statements  in  greater  part  always, 
and,  as  a  rule,  prepared  entirely  for  the  public  by  officers  for  their  superior 
officers,  or  writers  of  features  for  the  press,  according  to  the  colors  or  the 
theories  that  the  proprietorship  of  the  papers  preferred. 

The  inner  truths,  passing  clouds,  transient  impressions,  local  atmosphere, 
the  very  tints  of  the  scenery,  were  in  the  private  and  confidential  telegrams, 
official  and  pertinent  as  possible — words  of  command  and  of  explanation, 
admonition  and  suggestion,  that  passed  between  the  President,  the  Cabinet 
Secretaries,  the  Heads  of  Bureaus,  the  Adjutant-General,  and  the  Generals 
and  Admirals  Commanding.  These  were  incessantly  interchanged,  and  will 
be  forever  the  highest  authority  as  to  the  points  contested.  It  is  what  a  man 
wrote  on  the  spot,  the  immediate,  unrevised  impression,  that  will  be  called 
forth  to  settle  disputes.  Each  dispatch  is  a  flash-light  of  the  scene  as  it  was 
—with  every  attribute  and  incident  of  verity.  There  are  thousands  of  them  in 
the  reports  of  the  War  and  Navy  Secretaries,  and  in  the  bureaus  and  in  the 
Adjutant-General's  office  especially,  filling  bulky  volumes,  and  given  to  the 
public  with  unprecedented  candor.  Such  a  thing  as  this  library  of  revelations 
of  bottom  facts,  no  matter  whom  they  helped  or  hurt,  never  before  was  pre 
sented  to  the  people.  The  volumes  printed  from  "bales  of  telegrams,  inestima 
ble  as  evidence  and  incontestable,  are  supported  by  marvels  of  photograph}'. 
The  kodaks  had  the  effect  upon  ships  and  armies  in  activity  of  the  kinetoscope. 
It  is  aptly  stated  in  the  title-page  of  this  book  that  there  is  in  The  Official  His 
tory  of  the  War  with  Spain,  automatic  accuracy.  There  is  the  truth,  the 
whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  told  infallibly  by  the  greatest  energies 
and  illuminants  of  the  universe,  electricity  and  sunshine. 

The  author's  embarrassment  was  the  excessive  riches  of  the  matter  with 
which  the  astonishing  official  publications  are  filled,  surpassing  all  example 


THE    PUBLISHERS'     PREFACE.  15 

alike  in  quality  and  quantity.  He  has  brought  to  his  unprecedented  task  of 
the  presentation  in  popular  form  of  this  Full  Official  History,  the  expert  train 
ing  of  long  and  laborious  journalism. 

The  Official  History  of  the  War  with  Spain  is  the  first  of  its  kind  among 
historical  volumes — because  the  appliances  of  modern  invention  affording  the 
facilities  have  not  existed  and  been  employed  through  other  wars;  and  as 
surely  as  it  is  the  earliest  of  the  official  character  it  bears,  it  is  the  forerunner 
of  the  war  books  that  tell  the  truth  in  the  future — in  which  the  instrumentali 
ties  of  our  advanced  civilization  will  make  conspicuous  the  sacred  veracity  of 
history;  when  the  fiction  that  betrays  and  the  formalities  that  obscure  will  be 
eliminated  from  the  established  record  of  deeds  great  and  good;  and  the 
measure  in  which  men  accomplish  them,  so  that  there  will  be  gain  and  glory 
through  the  solid  simplicity  of  faultless  justice. 

The  imperfections  of  the  historical  work  are  admitted,  but  the  surpassing 
excellence  of  the  material  embodied  is  manifest  in  these  pages. 

THE    PUBLISHERS 


vAi'WvV  |S"rt 
ILL.ENC.CO.         >(n/U        M 

•vi,'^;; 


PRESIDENT  McKINLEY  AND  HIS  CABINET. 


MURAT  HALSTEAD,  THE  AUTHOR 


'Vo. 


THE  AUTHOR'S   PREFACE. 


In  modern  wars  the  relations  between  the  staff  correspondents  of  the 
newspapers,  and  the  staff  officers  of  the  armies  engaged,  have  been  under 
stood,  by  those  who  have  knowledge  of  the  administration  of  the  Press  and 
that  of  the  military  establishments,  as  full  of  difficulty;  and  there  has  been  no 
approximation  to  a  satisfactory  solution  of  the  embarrassments  found  in  the 
course  of  our  recent  experiments.  One  of  the  vital  matters  when  nations  lift 
the  sword  against  each  other  is  to  restrict  the  circulation  of  intelligence,  and 
the  incessant  increase  of  wires  whose  business  is  to  convey  news  over  conti 
nents  and  under  seas,  magnifies  the  problem  of  the  adjustments  of  military 
necessities  and  the  rights  of  the  people  represented  by  the  Press.  Inferior  as 
Spain  was  in  resources  to  the  United  States,  the  fact  that  for  some  weeks  she 
knew  the  movements  of  our  ships,  and  we  were  largely  mystified  as  to  the 
location  of  her  squadrons,  placed  us  at  a  disadvantage.  If  there  had  been 
equality  in  the  naval  strength  of  the  belligerents,  the  one  where  the  current 
intelligence  was  irrepressible  would  have  been  exposed  to  dangers  in  the  dark, 
from  which  the  one  capable  of  suppressing  the  swift  diffusion  of  truth  would 
have  been  exempt.  As  it  was,  we  credited  the  Spaniards  with  greater  activities 
than  they  undertook,  and  felt  unwarranted  apprehensions  of  aggressive  adven 
tures  on  their  part.  The  maneuvers  of  Cervera's  fleet  of  swift  cruisers  for  a 
time  caused  great  perplexities.  It  was  not  absolutely  ascertained  for  some 
time  that  Cervera  was  in  Santiago  harbor.  We  were  slow  in  making  out  that 
his  supplies  were  so  scanty  he  was  constrained  to  go  there  as  a  refuge,  instead 
of  making  the  port  of  Gienfuegos,  and  having  railroad  connection  with 
Havana.  A  rumor  of  Spanish  cruisers  detained  our  troops  when  embarked  at 
Tampa  for  Santiago.  There  were  Spanish  gunboats  on  the  Pacific  Ocean 
thought  capable  of  attacking  some  of  our  transports,  and  Admiral  Dewey  was 
watchful  more  than  three  months  to  prevent  attempts  of  the  Spaniards 
at  Manila  to  attack  his  ships  with  torpedoes.  Once  he  had  news  that  a 

19 


20  THE    AUTHOR'S    PREFACE. 

superior  Spanish  fleet  was  in  the  Red  Sea  on  the  way  to  the  Philippines.  It 
was  known  in  Spain  better  than  in  the  United  States  that  General  Merritt  was 
on  the  Newport  with  three  tons  of  gold  coin,  and  that  our  transports,  with 
more  than  a  thousand  men  on  each,  were  steaming  westward  on  the  twentieth 
parallel  of  latitude.  Cervera's  fleet  was  expected  to  sail  from  the  Cape  Verde 
Islands  to  intercept  the  Oregon,  which  ran  out  of  her  way  eastward  of  the 
West  Indies  and  appeared  off  the  coast  of  Florida.  If  we  should  have  war 
with  a  power  whose  sea  force  is  strong  as  our  own,  on  either  or  both  our 
ocean  fronts,  there  would  be,  for  the  sake  of  fair-play  for  public  safety,  an 
imperative  requirement  that  the  Press  should  not  publish — that  the  wires 
should  not  carry — information  of  the  movements  of  our  ships  of  war.  Gen 
eral  Sherman  said  the  attack  upon  his  left  wing  by  Johnston  in  North  Caro 
lina,  when  on  his  way  from  Savannah  to  Washington,  was  caused  by  an  item 
in  the  shipping  news  of  the  New  York  Tribune,  that  a  ship  loaded  with  forage 
had  cleared  for  Newberne.  It  is  not  wise,  however,  for  military  or  naval 
commanders  to  regard  the  items  the  papers  contain  from  day  to  day.  The  fact 
that  four  ships  of  war,  believed  to  be  American,  were  seen  from  the  coast  of 
Luzon  was  stated  in  a  Manila  paper  on  the  day  before  Dewey  surprised  those 
who  were  presumably  defenders  of  the  harbor. 

The  Press  of  the  United  States  largely  took  very  extraordinary  attitudes 
with  respect  to  the  war  of  our  country  with  Spain.  It  was  the  belief  of  sev 
eral  great  journals  and  journalists  that  they  must  be  held  accountable  for  the 
state  of  hostilities.  They  assumed  airs  of  authority  as  to  its  management, 
its  objects ;  and,  as  General  Halleck  wrote  on  the  back  of  a  letter  of  good 
advice  from  an  able  editor,  "Halstead  M.  writes — how  this  war  should  be 
carried  on."  The  Press,  in  its  most  ostentatious  illustrations  of  public  policy, 
gave  as  much  prominence  to  views  as  to  news,  and  pursued  the  cultivation 
and  vindication  of  theories  with  even  greater  warmth  and  energy  than  they 
gathered  and  displayed  from  day  to  day  the  incidents  of  intelligence  that 
were  of  the  nature  of  information  about  the  conduct  of  hostilities.  In  no  war 
that  ever  took  place  did  the  Press  go  so  expensively  into  the  enterprise  of 
reporting  the  current  history,  through  special  representatives,  employ  so  many 
young  men  of  courage  and  talent  as  historians  on  the  spot,  as  in  this  Spanish- 
American  combat  of  three  and  one-half  months.  The  sums  of  money  spent  in 
newspaper  enterprise  were  enormous.  The  expense  account  of  the  Asso 
ciated  Press  was  unexampled.  Several  newspaper  proprietors  employed 


THE  AUTHOR'S  PREFACE.  21 

steamers  for  their  personal  convenience  and  to  supply  newspaper  service  such 
as  never  before  was  imagined.      It  is  said  the  foundation  of  the  fortune  of  the 
Rothschilds  was  much  augmented  by  the  success  of  a  representative  of  the 
house,  who  witnessed  the  ruin  of  Napoleon's  army  at  Waterloo,  and  had  luck 
in  catching  a  boat,  landing  in   England,  hastening  to  London  and  using  his 
knowledge  in  the  market.      If  the  fashion  of  last  summer  is  to  prevail,  the 
time  will  come  when  the  war  correspondents  will  be  a  factor  in  the  physical 
force  of  armies  in  the  midst  of  operations;  and  when  there  are  contentions  as 
to  supremacy  in  "sea  power,"  the  private  yachts  of  the  newspapers,  and  the 
spectators,   may  outnumber  the  battleships  and  their  crews.     After  all  the 
prodigious  effort  and  extravagance  of  the  Press  to  assist  in  various  ways  and 
with  a  variety  of  means  to  carry  on  the  late  war,  and  shape  it  according  to 
their  policy,  the  general  result  is  not  symmetrical.     There  are  many  imposing 
fragments,  but  they  are  at  once  colossal  and  sinister,  not  an  edifice — not  a 
structure  with  cornerstones  and  walls  that  reveal  an  architect,  but  a  Stone- 
henge,   massive    yet  fragmentary, — features    stalwart  without   sequence  but 
significant, — a  stoneyard  clogged  with  roughly-cut  pillars  and  chips  of  rock 
that  need  the  hammer  and  chisel  and  mortar.      It  is  not  a  case  of  building 
wiser  than  the  builders  knew,  but  of  not  working  on  the  straight  pursuit  of 
truth, — not  building  according  to  knowledge.     There  has  been  an  indulgence 
in  personalities  and  conceits,  in  phantoms,  the  very  vanities  of  morbid  fancies. 
There  has  been  in  the  work  of  the  Press  mechanical  obstacles  not  over 
come — wasteful  haste  in  slamming  at  the  world  daily  chapters  constructed  not 
to  enlighten  but  to  startle — not  to  lay  each  day  a  brick  of  fact — but  to  erect  a 
tower  of  Babel,  no  matter  if  it  leaned  like  that  of  Pisa,  or  tottered  to  ruin 
before  the  design  was  achieved — the  whole  subordinated  to  the  principle  that 
accuracy  is  not  so  important  as  precedence — that  no  matter  about  the  yester 
days,  the  great  day  is  always  this  afternoon  or  to-morrow.     The  magazines 
have  been  picture  galleries,  many  of  the  paintings  brilliant — some  splendid 
strokes  with  pen  and  pencil;  but  one  would  not  go  to  the  galleries  of  Ver 
sailles, — rather  to  the  libraries  and  official  records  and  the  files  of  newspapers 
that  tell  their  respective  stories  in  a  representative  way,  for  the  history  of 
France.     The  certainty  that  the  history  of  the  war  of  the  United  States  and 
vSpain  in  1898  has  not  been  written  as  a  whole  and  in  due  proportion,  has  been 
for  some  time  obvious  to  observers  of  experience,  and  students  faithful  to 
facts. 


22 


THE    AUTHOR'S    PREFACE. 


The  task  of  historical  writing  has  been  remarkably  simplified  by  the  open 
door  policy  of  the  President  and  his  Cabinet,  in  officially  telling  the  people 
"the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,"  the  secrets  of  a  war 
in  its  evolution  in  the  drift  of  events  at  first  glacial,  then  torrential,  "shooting 
Niagara"  into  the  whirlpool,  in  the  course  of  preparations  and  plans,  the  con 
duct  of  campaigns,  the  talk  over  wires  from  battle-fields  to  the  White  House 
and  the  War  Department — all  this  never  until  now  has  been  so  unreservedly 
placed  before  the  world.  It  does  not  seem  to  be  in  the  way  of  the  newspapers 
to  go  back  and  enrich  their  columns  with  the  sweeping  confidences  that  the 
government  of  the  people  has  made  to  the  people — but  it  seems  that  the  task 
of  writing  a  Full  Official  History  of  the  War  with  Spain  is  distinctly  in  the  line 
of  the  work  of  one  who  has  had  the  training  of  many  years  in  the  valuation 
and  presentation  in  condensed  and  consecutive  form,  of  the  news  of  the 
times.  It  is  this  precisely  that  the  author  of  this  volume  proposed  in  the 
beginning  of  his  task,  gaining  confidence  in  the  accomplishment  of  it,  which 
is  as  attractive,  he  feels,  as  he  hopes  it  may  be  useful — as  the  treasures  stored 
in  the  ample  and  open  official  records  are  revealed  rich  in  the  golden  ore  of 
history — imperishable  in  truthfulness  and  excellent  in  testimony — that  our 
country  in  the  expansion  of  victory  is  supported  by  the  might  of  its  manliness 
and  the  grace  of  its  womanliness,  going  to  the  front  accepting  a  call  of 
duty,  gaining  land  for  the  people — providing  the  resources  of  all  climes  for 
the  hereafter  of  the  Republic  that  is  stronger  for  order  than  monarchy — with 
a  freedom  that  is  fairer  than  the  anarchies  that  the  broods  of  oppression  con 
ceive — lifting  up  for  the  children  of  the  people  the  flag  of  the  free,  all  the 
brighter  because  it  floats  over  the  Indies,  Asiatic  and  American,  and  the 
Hawaiian  and  Aleutian  archipelagoes — and  above  all  this  the  radiant  atmos 
phere  of  the  righteousness  that  exalts  men  and  nations. 

MURAT  HALSTEAD. 


INTRODUCTION. 


Since  Spain  lost  her  colonies  on  the  American  continents  it  has  been  in 
evidence  that  she  must  lose  her  islands,  unless  the  character  of  her  govern 
ment  and  people  should  be  so  changed  as  to  radically  reform  her  colonial 
system.  The  wars  of  independence  by  Mexico,  Peru,  Chili,  Argentina,  and 
the  central  and  northern  South  American  States,  were  caused  by  like  griev 
ances  and  marked  by  the  same  characteristics.  The  tedious  tragedies  of  the 
redemption  from  Spanish  misrule  southwest  of  us  have  common  distinctions, 
kindred  features,  familiar  paths  trampled  with  bloody  footsteps,  marking  the 
march  of  destiny — the  trail  of  the  serpent  over  all!  Spain,  not  unaware  of  her 
fatality,  but  without  ability  to  change  her  course,  has  long  consciously  con 
fronted  the  doom  that  has  overtaken  her.  It  was  the  foreshadowed  misfortune 
in  Cuba  that  embittered  the  Spaniards,  who  could  read  on  the  map  that  dis 
plays  the  West  Indies  and  the  Atlantic  and  Gulf  coast  of  the  United  States, 
the  inevitable,  irresistible  attraction  of  gravitation  of  the  bulk  of  the  conti 
nent  for  the  islands  of  the  seas  southeast.  As  certainly  as  we  shall  dominate 
the  Gulf,  and  have  won  and  maintained  with  the  sword,  all  from  the  keys  of 
Florida  to  the  mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande,  the  great  island  of  Cuba  will  be 
Americanized  and  our  possession,  the  other  Indies  will  be  leagued  with  her, 
and  accept  our  protection,  glad  to  be  our  dependencies — this  by  the  processes 
of  the  principles  of  our  dominion  and  the  growth  of  our  homes.  In  due  time 
it  will  be  as  evidently  the  order  of  nature  and  the  course  of  empire,  that  we 
shall  supersede  European  influences,  and  wield  the  sovereignty  of  peace  over 
the  islands,  that  were  the  prizes  of  the  living  Western  nations  of  the  older 
civilization  beyond  the  Atlantic  for  three  centuries,  as  that  we  have  acquired, 
assimilated  and  Americanized  the  Mississippi  valley  and  the  Pacific  slope ;  and 
the  great  Republic  as  an  armed  nation  will  be  an  empire  of  peace.  We  shall 
not  permanently  have  the  enmity  of  Spain  because  we  have  gained  the  islands 
she  has  lost.  If  she  had  wisely  administered  the  government  of  her  depend- 

23 


24  INTRODUCTION. 

encies  she  would  have  sustained  the  position  they  once  gave  her  of  the  fore 
most  of  the  kingdoms,  but  the  fact  that  neither  the  people  of  Spain  nor  the 
colonies  had  rights  the  crown  was  bound  to  respect,  caused  the  combination 
of  greed  and  cruelty,  corruption  and  tyranny,  that  has  wrought  the  downfall 
of    Spain  abroad  and   her    decline  at   home.     The  peninsula  is  still  rich  in 
resources,  and  the  people,  in  ceasing  to  waste  their  energies  in  the  oppression 
of  others,  may  teach  themselves  the  lessons  of  orderly  liberty,  that  will  restore 
their  country  to  the  prosperity  that  has  perished  and  the  dignity  that  disap 
peared  when  pride  became  pretension.     The  Spanish  people,  carried  into  a 
war  that  was    hopeless,   have  not  been   found  lacking  in   devotion   to  their 
country,  and  the  honor  of  the  Spanish  arms  has  been  upheld  by  the  valor  of 
their  soldiers,  when  their  ranks  were  so  steadfast  that  it  conferred  glory  upon 
the  American  army  that  overcame  them ;  and  the  chivalry  of  Cervera  will  be 
held  in  honorable  remembrance  by  the  generous  manhood  that  overmatched 
him  and  rescued  his  slaughtered  sailors  from  their  burning  and  sinking  ships. 
More  than  once  Cuban  influences  have  profoundly  impressed  the  politics  of 
the  great  organizations  through   which  the  American  people  govern   them 
selves.     The  commanding  votes  m  the  government  of  the  Union  of  our  States 
were  once,  in  the  words  of  Abraham  Lincoln,  "half  free  and  half  slave"  ;  and 
the  States  involved  in  the  peculiar  domestic  institution  were  dominated  by  its 
influences.     The  issue  was  made  that  the  slave  system  must  hold  the  balance  of 
power  in  the  Senate,  if  nowhere  else,  and  by  consolidated  force  prevent  the 
predominance  of  the  free  States  by  holding  in  one  of  the  essential  factors  of 
the  government,  a  veto  power.     Cuba  was  wanted,  as  Texas  and  California 
were,  in  this  interest.     In  the  case  of  the  great  State  on  the  Gulf  and  the  great 
State  on  the  Pacific,  the  increase  of  territory,  the  extension  of  our  boundaries, 
profited  the  cause  of  the  larger  liberty.     The  foundations  of  the  Republic  were 
broadened,  even  the  urgency  of  the  slave  propaganda  magnifying  the  area  of 
freedom.      It  was  in  the  interest  of  possessing  Cuba  to  preserve  the  balance 
that  the  power  identified  with  slavery  might  not  be  successfully  assailed  in  the 
States,  that  the  claim  the  constitution  carried  slaves  into  the  territories,  until 
forbidden  by  State  sovereignty  thereon  founded,  was  made,  that  the  Ostend 
conference  was  called  and  the  manifesto  bearing  that  name  promulgated  by 
the  assembled  American  ministers,  to  Spain,  France  and  England, — and  the 
influence, of  the  very  able  Mr.  Soule,  of  Louisiana,  turned  the  tide  in  the  Cin 
cinnati    National   Convention    of   the  Democracy  in   1856,   from    Douglas   to 


INTRODUCTION.  25 

Buchanan,  making  incalculable  changes  in  the  history  of  the  country  so  far  as 
incidents    and    individuals    are    concerned.       The   direction   of    the    general 

£*t 

movements  of  mankind,  it  is  safe  to  say,  must  have  been  about  the  same, 
though  possibly  varying  widely  in  time,  place  and  circumstance.     Humanity 
does  not  stagnate,  though  there  are  centuries  that  are  as  years.     The  Ostend 
Conference,  though  composed  of  men  of  high  place  in  diplomatic  functions, 
did  not  partake  of  the  nature  of  the  proceedings  of  diplomacy.     If  the  motive 
of  the  meeting  was  to  open  negotiations  with  Spain  for  the  purchase  of  Cuba, 
the  words  employed  were  too  pungent.     If  the  purpose  was  to  provoke  war 
the  expression  was  awkward.     Spain  was  not  seriously  influenced  beyond  an 
agitation  that  was  effusive  in  lofty  language.     It  was  the  United  States  that 
was  deeply  disturbed.     Filibustering  in  the  name  of  Cuban  liberties  became 
a  romantic  occupation   of  American   adventures,   some    of  which   were   con 
ducted   and   advertised   as   festivals.     The   sailing   of    the   ill-fated    Critten- 
dcn  expedition  from  New  Orleans  was  without  shadow  of  concealment,  and 
the  Spaniards  were  especially  well-informed.     Spanish  spies  are  believed  to 
have  largely  personally  conducted  the  enterprise.     The  Virginius  affair  was 
flagrant,  and  resulted  in  an  execution  at  Santiago  that  was  a  massacre.     There 
never  was,  however,  any  rational  question  as  to  the  character  of  the  filibuster 
ship.     The  scene  of  this  tragedy  has  witnessed  a  desperate  battle,  in  which  the 
blood  of  a  thousand  American  soldiers  was  shed,  the  surrender  of  a  Spanish 
army;  and-  those  rugged  hills  and  rocky  shores  were  shaken  by  a  cannonade 
that  destroyed  a  Spanish  fleet.     The  place  of  the  sacrifice  is  under  the  Stars 
and  Stripes!     It  has  been  known  in  Spain  for  half  a  century  that  the  United 
States  would  pay  liberally  for  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico,  but  the  Spanish  cabinets 
have  been  too  sensitive  about  the  public  opinion  of  the  country,  made  danger- 
l|     ous  to  rulers  by  Carlists  and  anarchists,  to  transact  business  on  its  merits. 
The  masses  of  Spaniards  were  not  informed  of  the  power  of  the  American 
nation.     In  this  they  have  been  accompanied  by  the  bulk  of  the  people  of 
other  nations,  whose  average  enlightenment  it  would  perhaps  be  discourteous 
to  doubt.     It  must  be  confessed,  however,  that  Americans  have  not  thoroughly 
measured  and   comprehended    themselves,   though  it  has  often  been  in   the 
minds  of  our  people  that  such  armies  as  were  put  into  the  field  by  the  Nation 
and  the  Confederacy,  a  generation  ago,  would,  all  marching  one  way,  be  equal 
to  self-defense,  no  matter  how  large  the  coalition  against  us,  and  competent  to 
conquer  a  bigger  world  than  Alexander  overcame. 


26  INTRODUCTION, 

Cuba  as  a  Spanish  possession  represented  the  worst  form  of  European 
dominion  in  the  Americas,  and  the  growth  of  a  great  nation  in  North  Amer 
ica,  defiantly  independent  of  the  great  Powers  of  Europe,  was  an  increasing 
threatening  of  the  inheritance  of  the  mediaeval  monarchy  that  held  the  fairest 
of  American  islands  situated  within  a  few  hours  of  our  shores,  that  as  our 
influence  augmented  in  proportion  to  our  power,  the  airs  and  the  water,  the 
winds  and  the  waves,  would  waft  in  unison  the  magnetic  doctrine  that  the 
lands  of  America,  whether  drained  by  vast  rivers  or  surrounded  by  seas, 
should  be  the  property  of  America.  Cuba  and  the  United  States  had  attrac 
tions  for  each  other,  and  while  there  was  obvious  the  reciprocity  of  nations, 
there  was  a  racial  antagonism — an  effervescence  of  contentious  civilization — a 
repulsion  of  conditions  and  friction  of  characteristic  institutions. 

If  it  had  not  been  for  Cuban  politics  Stephen  A.  Douglas  would  have  held 
the  Democratic  party  together,  deferring  the  time  for  the  summons  to  arms 
to  fight  out  the  "irrepressible  conflict"  ;  and  then  our  great  heroes  and  states 
men  would  have  had  other  names  than  those  now  of  highest  fame,  names 
now  not  known,  for  it  is  the  personal  genius  of  republican  government  that 
great  men  are  developed  by  events,  and  are  representatives  of  the  masses,  and 
revealed  by  movements  they  do  not  originate  and  that  widen  into  magnitude 
like  streams  running  riverward. 

Cuba,  in  the  mouth  of  the  Mediterranean  of  our  hemisphere,  wras  a  vol 
cano.  The  explosion  of  the  Maine  in  the  harbor  of  Plavana  was  an  indigenous 
eruption.  It  was  in  the  chemistry  of  the  conditions.  Repeatedly  we  were 
on  the  verge  of  war.  Hostilities  between  the  United  States  and  Spain  were 
for  half  a  century  a  question  of  time.  During  the  administration  of  Millard 
Fillmore,  we  were  so  near  a  collision  with  England  and  France  about  Spanish- 
Cuban  affairs  that  there  was  a  state  paper  from  the  pen  of  John  J.  Critten- 
den,  of  Kentucky,  that  even  yet  has  the  alarm-bell  ring  in  its  sentences.  We 
quote  from  Mrs.  Chapman  Coleman,  the  daughter  and  biographer  of  Mr. 
Crittenden: 

"In  1851  Mr.  Webster  was  Secretary  of  State  and  Mr.  Crittenden 
Attorney-General  in  Mr.  Fillmore's  cabinet.  Mr.  Webster's  health  failed, 
and  he  was  compelled  for  awhile  to  withdraw  from  Washington,  and  during 
this  vacation  Mr.  Crittenden  was  Acting  Secretary  of  State.  At  that  time  an 
expedition  of  about  five  hundred  men  escaped  from  New  Orleans,  and  landed 
upon  the  island  of  Cuba.  They  were  soon  captured,  and  many  of  them 


INTRODUCTION.  27 

executed,  and  M.  Sartiges,  Minister  of  France,  communicated  to  the  United 
States  government  that  the  French  government  had  issued  orders  to  its  ships 
of  war  to  prevent  by  force  any  adventurers  of  any  nation  from  landing  with 
hostile  intent  on  the  island  of  Cuba.  The  British  government  gave  notice 
also  to  the  State  Department  that  it  had  issued  similar  orders  to  its  naval 
force.  The  following  is  the  letter  addressed  by  Mr.  Crittenden  (then  Acting 
Secretary  of  State)  to  M.  Sartiges.  A  distinguished  gentleman  who  has  occu 
pied  a  high  position  in  this  government  has  written  to  me  that  this  diplomatic 
letter  was  pronounced  perfect  in  tone  and  style,  and  would  compare  favorably 
with  any  paper  which  had  ever  emanated  from  the  State  Department: 

4 'Department  of  State,  Washington,  October  22,  1851. 
"The  undersigned,  Acting  Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States,  has 
the  honor  to  remind  M.  de  Sartiges,  Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Minister 
Plenipotentiary  of  the  French  Republic,  that  in  the  interview  which  he  had 
with  him  on  the  8th  instant,  he  stated  that  he  might  have  occasion  to  address 
him  in  writing  on  the  subject  of  the  information  which  M.  de  Sartiges  then 
communicated,  that  the  French  government  had  issued  orders  to  its  ships  of 
war,  then  in  the  West  Indies,  to  give  assistance  to  Spain,  and  to  prevent  by 
force  any  adventurers  of  any  nation  from  landing  with  hostile  intent  on  the 
island  of  Cuba.  Having  imparted  that  information  to  the  President,  the 
undersigned  has  now  the  honor,  by  his  direction,  to  address  M.  de  Sartiges  in 
regard  to  it." 

We  quote  the  paper  in  part  : 

**M.  de  Sartiges  is  apprised  that  a  few  days  prior  to  the  interview 
adverted  to  the  charge  d'affaires  of  her  Britannic  Majesty  had  given  to  this 
Department  official  notice  that  his  government  had  issued  similar  orders  to  its 
naval  forces.  The  President  had  regarded  this  as  a  matter  of  grave  impor 
tance,  but  its  gravity  is  greatly  increased  by  the  concurrence  and  cooperation 
of  France  in  the  same  measure.  It  cannot  be  doubted  that  those  orders  have 
been  occasioned  by  the  recent  unlawful  expedition  of  less  than  five  hundred 
men,  which,  having  evaded  the  vigilance  of  this  government,  and  escaped 
from  New  Orleans,  were  landed  by  the  steamer  Pampero  upon  the  island  of 
Cuba,  and  were  soon  captured,  and  many  of  them  executed. 

"The  geographical  position  of  the  island  of  Cuba  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico, 


'  .          INTRODUCTION. 

lying  at  no  great  distance  from  the  mouth  of  the  River  Mississippi,  and  in  the 
line  of  the  greatest  current  of  the  commerce  of  the  United  States,  would 
/  become,  in  the  hands  of  any  powerful  European  nation,  an  object  of  just 
jealousy  and  apprehension  to  the  people  of  this  country.  A  due  regard  to 
their  own  safety  and  interest  must,  therefore,  make  it  a  matter  of  importance 
to  them  who  shall  possess  and  hold  dominion  over  that  island.  The  govern 
ment  of  France  and  those  of  other  European  nations  were  long  since  officially 
apprised  by  this  government  that  the  United  States  could  not  see  without  con 
cern  that  island  transferred  by  Spain  to  any  other  European  state;  President 
Fillmore  fully  concurs  in  that  sentiment,  and  is  apprehensive  that  the  sort  of 
protectorate  introduced  by  the  orders  in  question  might,  in  contingencies  not 
difficult  to  be  imagined,  lead  to  results  equally  objectionable. 

"The  system  of  government  which  prevails  most  generally  in  Europe  is 
adverse  to  the  principles  upon  which  this  government  is  founded,  and  the 
undersigned  is  well  aware  that  the  difference  between  them  is  calculated  to 
produce  distrust  of,  if  not  aversion  to,  the  government  of  the  United  States. 
Sensible  of  this,  the  people  of  this  country  are  naturally  jealous  of  European 
interference  in  American  affairs.  And  although  they  would  not  impute  to 
France,  now  herself  a  republic,  any  participation  in  this  distrustful  and 
unfriendly  feeling  towards  their  government,  yet  the  undersigned  must  repeat 
that  her  intervention  in  this  instance,  if  attempted  to  be  executed,  in  the  only 
practicable  mode  for  its  effectual  execution,  could  not  fail  to  produce  some 
irritation,  if  not  worse  consequences.  The  French  cruisers,  sailing  up  and 
down  the  shores  of  the  United  States  to  perform  their  needless  task  to  pro 
tect  Cuba  and  their  ungracious  office  of  watching  the  people  of  this  country  as 
if  they  were  fruitful  of  piracies,  would  be  regarded  with  some  feeling  of 
resentment,  and  the  flag  they  bore — a  flag  which  should  always  be  welcome 
to  the  sight  of  Americans — would  be  looked  at  as  casting  a  shadow  of 
unmerited  and  dishonoring  suspicion  upon  them  and  their  government.  The 
undersigned  will  add  that  all  experience  seems  to  prove  that  the  rights,  inter 
ests,  and  peace  of  the  continents  of  Europe  and  America  will  be  best  pre 
served  by  the  forbearance  of  each  to  interfere  in  the  affairs  of  the  other. 
The  government  of  the  United  States  has  constantly  acted  on  that  principle 
and  has  never  intermeddled  in  European  questions.  The  President  has 
deemed  it  proper  to  the  occasion  that  his  views  should  be  fully  and  frankly 


INTRODUCTION.  29 

presented  for  the  friendly  consideration  of  M.  de  Sartiges  and  his  govern 
ment,  in  order  that  all  possible  precautions  may  be  used  to  avert  any  mis 
understanding,  and  every  cause  or  consequence  that  might  disturb  the  peace 
or  alienate,  in  the  least,  the  sentiments  of  confidence  and  friendship  which 
now  bind  together  the  republics  of  the  United  States  and  France.  The 
undersigned  avails  himself  of  this  occasion  to  offer  to  M.  de  Sartiges  the 
assurance  of  his  very  distinguished  consideration. 

"JOHN  J.  CRITTENDEN." 

•T 

Spanish  diplomacy  had  been  at  work  with  England  and  France,  and  en- 
| 

'gaged  them  to  interference  with  the  United  States  filibusters.  Spain  had  man 
aged  to  persuade  the  governments  of  the  two  countries  that  she  was  engaged 
in  the  abolishment  of  the  slave  trade,  and  that  this  was  preparing  the  way  for 
emancipation,  while  the  United  States  was  a  slave  power  and  wanted  the 
extension  of  slavery,  as  was  witnessed  by  the  enterprise  of  lawless  expedi 
tions.  Mr.  Crittenden's  vigorous  protest  was  presently  followed  by  a  notifi 
cation  from  England  and  France  that  the  dangerous  orders  had  been 
revoked.  It  requires  only  the  simple  recitation  of  the  facts  to  demonstrate 
that  the  triple  alliance  of  the  powers  most  interested,  traditionally,  his 
torically,  politically  and  commercially,  in  the  West  Indies  against  the  United 
States,  was  a  most  grave  affair.  Hardly  less  so  was  the  Blacjcjila«4frrt!ase, 
that  culminated  in  a  war  message  from  President  Franklin  Pierce — appended : 

XXXIIId  Congress,  ist  Session.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  76. 

MESSAGE    FROM    THE    PRESIDENT    OF    THE    UNITED    STATES, 

Transmitting  a  Report  in  Reference  to  the  Seizure 
of  the  "Black  Warrior." 

March  15,  1854. 
To  the  House  of  Representatives: 

In  compliance  with  the  resolution  of  the  House  of  Representatives  of  the 
zoth  inst.,  I  herewith  transmit  a  report  containing  all  the  information 
received  at  the  Department  in  relation  to  the  seizure  of  the  Black  Warrior,  at 
Havana,  on  the  28th  ultimo. 

There  have  been,  in  the  course  of  a  few  years  past,  many  other  instances 
of  aggression  upon  our  commerce,  violations  of  the  rights  of  American  citi 
zens,  and  insults  to  the  national  flag,  by  the  Spanish  authorities  in  Cuba,  and 


3c  INTRODUCTION. 

all  attempts  to  obtain  redress  have  led  to  protracted  and  as  yet  fruitless 
negotiation. 

The  documents  in  these  cases  are  voluminous,  and,  when  prepared,  will 
be  sent  to  Congress. 

Those  now  transmitted  relate  exclusively  to  the  seizure  of  the  Black 
Warrior,  and  present  so  clear  a  case  of  wrong  that  it  would  be  reasonable  to 
expect  full  indemnity  therefor,  as  soon  as  this  unjustifiable  and  offensive  con 
duct  shall  be  made  known  to  her  Catholic  Majesty's  Government;  but  similar 
expectations,  in  other  cases,  have  not  been  realized. 

The  offending  authority  is  at  our  doors,  with  large  powers  for  aggression, 
but  none,  it  is  alleged,  for  reparation.  The  source  of  redress  is  in  another 
hemisphere;  and  the  answers  to  our  just  complaint,  made  to  the  home 
government,  are  but  the  repetition  of  excuses  rendered  by  inferior  officials  to 
their  superiors,  in  reply  to  representations  of  misconduct.  The  peculiar  situ 
ation  of  the  parties  has  undoubtedly  much  aggravated  the  annoyances  and 
injuries  which  our  citizens  have  suffered  from  the  Cuban  authorities,  and 
Spain  does  not  seem  to  appreciate,  to  its  full  extent,  her  responsibility  for  the 
conduct  of  these  authorities.  In  giving  very  extraordinary  powers  to  them 
she  owes  it  to  justice,  and  to  her  friendly  relations  with  this  government,  to 
guard  with  great  vigilance  against  the  exorbitant  exercise  of  these  powers, 
and,  in  case  of  injury,  to  provide  for  prompt  redress. 

I  have  already  taken  measures  to  present  to  the  government  of  Spain  the 
wanton  injury  of  the  Cuban  authorities,  in  the  detention  and  seizure  of  the 
Black  Warrior,  and  to  demand  immediate  indemnity  for  the  injury  which  has 
thereby  resulted  to  our  citizens. 

In  view  of  the  position  of  the  island  of  Cuba,  its  proximity  to  our  coast, 
the  relations  which  it  must  ever  bear  to  our  commercial  and  other  interests,  it 
is  vain  to  expect  that  a  series  of  unfriendly  acts  infringing  our  commercial 
rights,  and  the  adoption  of  a  policy  threatening  the  honor  and  security  of  these 
States  can  long  consist  with  peaceful  relations. 

In  case  the  measures  taken  for  amicable  adjustment  of  our  difficulties 
with  Spain  should  unfortunately  fail,  I  shall  not  hesitate  to  use  the  authority 
and  means  which  Congress  may  grant,  to  insure  the  observance  of  our  rights, 
to  obtain  redress  for  injuries  received,  and  to  vindicate  the  honor  of  our 
flag. 

In  anticipation  of  that  contingency,  which  I  earnestly  hope  may  not  arise, 


INTRODUCTION.  31 

I  suggest  to  Congress  the  propriety  of  adopting  such  provisional  measures  as 
the  exigency  may  seem  to  demand.  FRANKLIN  PIERCE. 

Washington,  March  15,  1854. 

This  message  is  one  of  the  most  trenchant  that  has  emanated  from  our 
Executive  Department  of  the  Government.  It  is  a  plain  suggestion  to  Con 
gress  to  give  the  President  authority  to  make  war  on  Spain.  It  did  not  have, 
the  desired  effect,  as  it  produced  comparative  peace.  It  is  another  illustration 
that  the  United  States  has  long  been  subjected  to  the  inconvenience  of  a 
house  on  fire  next  door.  There  was  a  time  in  the  course  of  the  negotiations 
in  the  A^rgirnus  case  that  President  Grant  assembled  a  powerful  fleet  at  Key 
West.  This  was  so  soon  after  the  war  of  the  sections  and  states  that  we  had 
a  strong  array  of  war  ships. 

We  quote  from  the  report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  1874,  page  9,  the 
official  record  of  the  mustering  of  a  squadron  at  Key  West,  to  promote  Span 
ish-Cuban  negotiations.  Here  is  a  passage  of  Secretary  Robson's  report: 

"The  North  Atlantic  Station. — At  the  date  of  the  last  report  the  whole 
available  force  of  the  navy  which  could  be  put  afloat  on  the  Atlantic  Ocean 
was  under  orders  to  reinforce  this  station.  In  addition  to  the  regular  force  as 
stated  in  the  last  report,  every  available  wooden  and  iron-clad  ship  in 
ordinary  was  dispatched  as  rapidly  as  it  could  be  put  in  order  and  properly 
manned  and  organized.  The  Lancaster  and  the  Ticonderoga  were  recalled 
from  the  South  Atlantic,  and  the  whole  European  fleet  from  the  Mediter 
ranean,  and  ordered  to  concentrate  at  Key  West.  The  force  thus  concen 
trated  on  the  Station  consisted  of  the  Franklin,  Minnesota,  Wabash,  Colorado, 
Lancaster,  Brooklyn,  Congress,  Worcester,  Alaska,  Ticonderoga,  Canan- 
daigua,  Shenandoah,  Juniata,  Ossipee,  Wachusett,  Powhatan,  Wyoming, 
Kansas,  Shawmnt,  Sangus,  Mahopac,  Manhattan,  Ajax,  Canonicus,  Dictator, 
Despatch,  Pinta,  Fortune,  and  Mayflower;  and  Rear-Admiral  Case,  as  senior 
officer  present,  assumed  command,  in  pursuance  of  orders  to  that  effect,  Jan 
uary  3,  1874,  the  date  of  his  arrival  at  Key  West.  Rear-Admiral  Scott 
remained  in  command  of  a  division. 

"The  causes  which  led  to  this  concentration  of  force  were  generally  and 
briefly  alluded  to  in  my  last  report,  and  it  may  now  be  proper,  in  order  to 
complete  the  record  of  the  action  of  the  navy  in  connection  with  the  Virginius 
affair,  to  recite  the  more  prominent  of  the  proceedings  in  relation  thereto  in 
\vi  jch  it  took  part." 


32  INTRODUCTION. 

It  was  while  the  American  fleet  of  thirty  ships  of  war  was  at  Key  West 
that  the  proceedings  in  the  case  of  the  Virginius  were  closed  by  the  agree 
ment  of  Spain  to  surrender  the  captured  ship,  a  filibuster  taken  on  the  high 
seas,  to  salute  the  American  flag  restored  to  her,  and  pay  an  indemnity.  The 
United  States  at  this  time  had  not  resumed  specie  payments  or  established 
high  credit,  while  the  great  fleet  at  Key  West  was  enough  to  shake  the  stock 
market  and  alarm  men  of  business  in  general,  and  President  Grant  was  not 
moved  by  the  demand  that  Spain  should  have  been  attacked.  Spain  was 
stronger  then  than  now  in  her  European  relations,  though  suffering  from 
home  disorders. 

The  chapter  of  this  volume  that  is  of  "The  American  Minister  in  Madrid" 
refers  particularly  to  the  period  of  General  Sickles  and.  General  Gushing. 
The  latter  was  a  man  of  genius  in  literature  and  law,  the  former  a  man  of 
affairs  who  made  the  closest  approach  to  doing  business  with  the  Spaniards, 
proposing  the  purchase  of  the  Spanish  rights  in  the  West  Indies,  and  suggest 
ing  that  we  might  pay  $125,000,000.  It  was  believed  in  Madrid  at  the  time 
that  Marshal  Prim,  the  Spanish  Premier,  was  about  to  sell  Cuba  and  Porto 
Rico,  asking  for  the  two  islands  $200,000,000,  and  it  is  the  opinion  of  General 
Sickles  that  Prim's  assassination  was  on  that  account.  The  influence  behind 
the  assassins  was  so  strong  that  they  were  protected.  The  act  of  murder  is 
not  attributed  to  a  patriotic  emotion,  but  to  the  resentment  of  a  corrupt  circle 
that  Cuba  should  not  be  retained  for  the  harvesting  of  plunder  by  favorites. 
Prim  was  the  foremost  man  of  his  time  in  his  country. 

Many  Spaniards  knew  when  rushing  into  war  with  us  their  country  would 
be  better  off  to  sell  Cuba  than  to  exhaust  all  resources  in  a  hopeless  combat, 
and  yet  they  did  not  know  the  weakness  of  their  country.  The  swift  destruc 
tion  of  their  fleets  and  the  surrender  of  the  armies  were  stunning  surprises. 
The  military  government  of  Cuba  under  Gomez,  with  a  civil  accompaniment 
of  inferior  consideration,  embarrassed  all  advances  to  Spain  looking  to  the 
relinquishment  of  Cuba,  because  the  Cubans  were  in  the  way,  and  the  Gomez 
policy  of  destroying  industries  to  deprive  the  Spaniards  of  revenue  to  carry  on 
the  war,  and  recruit  the  insurgent  forces  by  annihilating  the  chances  of  peace 
ful  occupation,  impoverished  Cubans,  so  that  they  could  have  no  credit  unless 
their  bonds  were  guaranteed  by  the  United  States;  and  that  could  not  be  done 
on  a  basis  of  bloody  ashes.  Cuban  combinations  were  meant  to  force  this 
country  to  make  war  upon  Spain,  and  while  they  were  being  worked,  that 


INTRODUCTION. 


33 


accommodation  should  be  impracticable,  the  blowing  up  of  the  Maine  made 
peaceful  solution  impossible,  and  with  the  inflammatory  conditions  excited, 
the  inevitable  conflict  was,  to  our  disadvantage,  for  the  moment  precipitated, 
when  the  situation  was  not  more  serious  than  when  there  were  Cuban  crises 
during  the  administrations  of  Fillmore,  Pierce  and  Grant. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


Publisher's  Statement 13-!  5 

Preface 19-22 

Introduction 23-33 

List  of  Illustrations 43-5° 

List  of  Maps,  Charts,  Plans,  Drawings,  etc 51-52 

CHAPTER    I. 

THE   ORIGIN    OF    THE   WAR    BETWEEN   THE    UNITED    STATES   AND    SPAIN. 

American  Good  Will  for  Spain — The  Situation  in  1869 — The  Sickles  and  Prim  Negotiation 
—Prim  Willing  to  Sell  Cuba— "The  Honor  of  Spain"— Diplomatic  Papers  That 
Should  Be  Studied — Spain  Sends  an  Army  to  Cuba — The  Valmaseda  Proclamation — 
The  Wrongs  of  Cuba — We  Must  Find  the  Real  People  of  Cuba 53-73 

CHAPTER   II. 

THE   AMERICAN    MINISTER   TO    SPAIN    IN    OUR    CENTENNIAL   YEAR    FEARED  WAR. 

A  Remarkable  Correspondence — Suggestive  of  the  Doom  of  Spanish  Rule — The  Gradual 
Approaches  of  the  Spanish  War — A  Circular  Claiming  the  Cuban  Rebellion  Was 
Crushed — Gushing  as  Master  of  Ceremonies — General  Grant's  Personality  .  .  .  74-97 

CHAPTER   III. 

THE   OLD,  OLD    STORY    IN    SPAIN. 

European  Newspaper  Comment  on  the  Cuban-Spanish-American  Situation  Twenty-two 
Years  Ago — Not  Much  New  in  Later  Commentary — "Stable  Government"  Not  a  New 
Phrase — Cuban  Troubles  Those  of  Inheritance — Disastrous  Influences  of  the  Rebel 
Policy  of  the  Torch — Suggestion  of  Bombardment  of  Our  Cities  by  Spaniards  .  .  98-113 

CHAPTER   IV. 
THE  TEN  YEARS'  WAR  IN  CUBA. 

The  Stir  about  it  in  Europe — The  Money  Resources  of  Spain  Stated  by  Minister  Gushing 
— Europe  against  Our  Intervention  in  Cuba — The  Filibuster  Hostility  to  President 
Grant — The  London  Times  on  Hamilton  Fish — A  Minister  Promises  Too  Much .  .  114-130 

CHAPTER  V 

THE   DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO   THE    SPANIARDS    OF   THE    PENINSULA   AND    OF    CUBA. 

Some  Testimony  That  Is  Not  Partial  to  Cuban  Insurgents— Caleb  Gushing  on  Inherent 
Spanish  Character — More  Than  One  Kind  of  Our  Naturalized  Citizens — A  List  of 
Them  and  of  Claims — Conflicting  Testimony  as  to  Cuban  Armies — Two  Picturesque 

Witnesses 131-175 

34 


GENERAL  NELSON  A.  MILES,  COMMANDER  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  ARMY. 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS.  37 

CHAPTER  VI. 

THE   TWO    SORTS    OF    SPANIARDS    IN   CUBA. 

The  Food  Supplies  in  Cuba — Introduction  of  the  Torch  by  the  Insurgents — Garcia's  Fine 
Army  with  an  Engineer  Corps — The  Double  Tax  on  Sugar-Making — Spanish  Methods 
of  Making  War — The  Policy  of  Annihilation — A  Government  in  Light  Marching 
Order 176  193 

CHAPTER   VII. 

GENERAL  LEE*S  CONSUL-GENERALSHIP  IN  CUBA. 

The  Conservative  Administrations  of  Grant,  Cleveland  and  McKinley — A  Variety  of 
"American  Citizens"  in  Havana — Judicious  Discrimination  of  Consulate  Authorities 
— A  Young  Man  Who  Gave  Himself  Away — The  Brave  Stand  of  the  President  against 
Bulling  the  Market  for  Bonds  Issued  on  a  Basis  of  Bloody  Ashes 194-205 

CHAPTER    VIII. 

THE   ACTUAL    EXPERIENCE   AND    SENTIMENTS    OF    THE    PEOPLE    OF    CUBA. 

Two  Parties  of  Malignants — The  Firm  Stand  of  the  President  at  the  Beginning  of  the 
War — A  Study  of  the  Historical  Truth  of  the  Situation — The  President's  Language 
Contrasted  with  That  of  the  Fire  Bugs — Extreme  Views  of  Senators  Davis,  Daniel, 
Foraker,  and  Others — The  Fury  of  the  War  Party — Cuban  and  Spanish  Desperadoes 
—The  Massacre  of  the  Maine — The  Findings  of  the  Courts — List  of  the  Lost  on  the 
Ship 206-228 

CHAPTER   IX. 

THE    SAN    DOMINGO    TORCH    IN   AID    OF    THE    CUBAN    REBELLION. 

The  Policy  of  Maximo  Gomez,  and  the  Famine  in  Cuba — The  Reports  of  American 
Consuls  in  Cuba  on  the  Cane  Burning  and  Its  Relation  to  the  Starvation  of  the  People 
--The  Agent  of  the  Cubans  in  Arms  Justified  Barbarism — The  Testimony  of  Our 
Consuls  that  the  Gomez  Policy  was  the  Cause  of  the  Death  of  Thousands— Direct 
Evidence  of  Blackmail  Taxes,  and  the  Anxiety  of  Cuban  People  to  Be  Annexed  to  the 
United  States — The  Desperado  Orders  by  Gomez  before  Weyler  Came  to  Cuba  .  .  229-243 

CHAPTER    X. 

THE    WAY    THE    WAR    BUSINESS    WAS    HANDLED. 

The  Declaration  of  War — The  President's  Call  upon  Congress  to  Take  Action — Fit  and 
Few  Words — The  Constant  Scramble  in  Congress  for  the  Cuban  Ghost-Dance  Govern 
ment — The  Official  Text  of  the  President's  War  Proclamations— The  Navy  Had  First 
to  Take  Command  of  the  Seas— The  Timely  Dispatches  from  the  Navy  Department- 
Making  Ready  for  War — Major-General  Miles  and  His  50,000  Cubans  ....  244-274 

CHAPTER    XL 

THE    STORY    OF    DEWEY'S    SPLENDID    VICTORY    TOLD    BY    THOSE    WHO    WON    IT. 

The  Battle  of  Manila  Bay— Confidential  Information  from  Madrid,  Showing  Spanish  Con 
fidence  in  Their  Navy— Rapid  Exchange  of  Cables  between  Dewey  and  Long- 
Energetic  Inquiry  in  the  Navy  Department— Everything  Rushed  from  the  Start — 


38  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

Dewey's  Masterly  Movements  and  Immortal  Victory — The  Official  Reports  Full  of 
Stories  of  the  Battle  That  Will  Be  News  to  the  People — Details  of  Uncommon  V^alue 
—Spanish  Official  Report  Exceedingly  Interesting — Admiral  Montejo  was  not  Sur 
prised,  but  Fired  First — The  Celebrated  Breakfast  Caused  by  a  False  Alarm  .  277-308 

CHAPTER  XII. 

AFTER   THE   MAY-DAY    BATTLE   IN   MANILA   BAY. 

Dewey's  Cables  During  the  Time  He  Held  the  Harbor  with  the  City  of  Manila  under  His 
Guns — Dispatches  Full  of  History  and  Rich  in  Personal  Characteristics — Authentic 
Information  from  the  Inside — The  Official  Story — Dewey's  Unfavorable  Opinion  of 
Cubans — Capture  of  the  City — Trouble  with  Aguinaldo — Our  Ships  and  Crews  .  309-328 


CHAPTER    XIII. 

THE   OBJECT   LESSON    OF    THE   VOYAGE   OF   THE   OREGON. 

The  People  Instructed  for  the  Army  by  the  Experience  of  the  Navy— The  Run  from 
Washington  State  to  Florida— Splendid  Spirit  of  the  Men— The  Fearful  Storm  in  the 
Straits  of  Magellan— The  Threat  of  Destroying  a  Spanish  Torpedo  Boat  at  Rio — The 
Finish  Alone  and  in  Good  Form,  and  Famous  the  World  Over 329-338 

CHAPTER    XIV. 

THE  REPORT  OF  THE  SECRETARY  OF  WAR. 

Putting  the  Army  into  the  Combat — The  Plans  of  Campaign — The  Proposed  Waiting  and 
Equipping  Policy  of  the  Major-General  Commanding — His  Strange  Confidence  in  the 
Cuban  Story  of  an  Army  of  50,000  Rebels  to  Help  Us — Reasons  Why  We  Could  Not 
Wait  Six  Months  after  Declaring  War  before  Striking  Decisively  with  the  Army  341-352 

CHAPTER  XV. 

THE    EARLY    CORRESPONDENCE   OF   THE    DEPARTMENT    OF   WAR. 

Activity  in. the  War  Department  before  the  Declaration  of  War — The  Precautionary  Policy 
of  the  Major-General  Commanding — Differences  of  Opinion  in  High  Places  about  an 
Early  Invasion  of  Cuba — Importance  of  Healthful  Camps — The  Dangers  of  Water 
Supplies — The  Inside  History  of  a  Troubled  Time — Shafter's  Sagacity  as  to  the 
Importance  of  a  First  Engagement — The  Demand  fora  Competent  Army  Enforced.  35  3-367 

CHAPTER    XVI. 

THE    PHANTOM    FLEETS    OF    SPAIN    IN    CUBAN   WATERS. 

Admiral  Cervera  Sailed  into  the  Unknown,  and  Became  a  Mystery  and  a  Menace— He 
Appeared  and  Disappeared,  and  Was  at  Last  Found  at  Santiago  by  Commodore 
Schley— Imperative  Demands  for  Information  Answered — The  Orders  of  General 
Shafter  and  Plans  of  General  Miles — Dramatic  Scenes  at  Tampa — Just  as  the  Great 
Fleet  Was  Sailing  Another  Spanish  Hoodoo  Fleet  Was  Announced— After  All,  a 
Prosperous  Voyage  and  Easy  Landing 368-383 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS.  39 

CHAPTER   XVII. 

THE    SHARP    STRAIN    OF   THE    STRUGGLE   AT    SANTIAGO. 

General  Miles  as  a  Loyal  Soldier — Shafter's  Fine  Voyage  and  Safe  Landing — The  First 
B'ood  in  Battle — Rush  of  Supplies  and  Reinforcements  to  the  Army — Alger  Wants 
Shafter  to  "Get  a  Good  Ready"— Why  Siege  Guns  Were  Not  Unloaded— Work  Cut 
Out  for  the  Regulars — Parallel  \vth  the  British  Siege  of  Havana— The  Sword  Had  to 
Be  Swift  to  Save  from  Pestilence 384-399 

CHAPTER   XVIII. 

THE    FIELD    FIGHTING    FOR    SANTIAGO. 

The  Supreme  Test  of  American  Valor — The  Thin  but  Steady  Regular  Line,  and  the 
Essential  Assistance  by  the  Foremost  Volunteers — The  Whole  Story  from  the  First 
Skirmish  to  the  Last  Assault  Told  in  War  Office  Dispatches  far  More  Interesting 
than  the  Formal  Reports  of  the  Officers  and  More  Sensational  than  the  Lurid  Chap 
ters  in  the  Journals — Their  Publication  an  Admirable  Example  of  the  Candor  of  the 
Authorities — An  All -Night  Watch  for  News  at  the  White  House — Shafter's  Memor 
able  Third  and  Fourth  of  July 400-416 

CHAPTER   XIX. 

THE    STRANGE    STORY    OF    THE    SECRET    OFFICIAL    CIPHER    OF    SPAIN. 

The  Cables  That  Passed  Between  Sagasta,  Blanco,  Cervera,  Correa  and  Linares  During 
the  Crisis  of  the  Spanish  War  in  Cuba" — A  Diary  Telegraphed  from  Santiago  to 
Havana,  Giving  the  Inside  of  Spanish  Affairs  from  the  Attack  to  the  Surrender — Cer 
vera  Not  Well  Fitted  Out,  Forced  to  Flight,  Protesting  that  He  Was  Going  to  Destruc 
tion — The  Cables  Are  a  Gallery  of  Paintings  of  Spanish  Character  ....  417-453 

CHAPTER  XX. 

THE    SANTIAGO    SITUATION   AFTER    THE    SPANISH    FLEET   WAS    GONE. 

Cipher  Dispatches — Too  Much  Publicity — Shafter  Demands  the  Help  of  the  Navy,  and  is 
Supported  by  the  War  Department — He  Heard  Firing  at  Midnight  and  Hoped  it  Was 
Sampson — Garcia's  Men  Who  Were  Always  Going  to  Do  Something  To-morrow — 
"Terrible  Fight"  July  ist — Reinforcements,  Lighters  and  Tugs  Wanted — An  Ener 
getic  Rush  to  Aid  Shafter,  but  Not  by  the  Navy— Cable  Direct  to  Corbin— The 
Yellow  Fever  Appears — Preliminaries  to  the  Capitulation — The  President  Sticks  to  It 
that  Spaniards  Must  Unconditionally  Surrender — Fortunate  Arrival  of  Miles  in  the 
Blue  Rams 454-473 

CHAPTER   XXI. 

THE   LESSON    FOR    THE   COUNTRY    OF   THE    HILLS   OF    SANTIAGO. 

Value  of  the  Reports  of  the  Inspector-General — His  Keen  Suggestions  and  Brilliant 
Sketches  with  Expert  Information — Tribute  of  Breckenridge  to  Shafter — The  Volun 
teers  in  Camps— Chickamauga  as  an  Illustiation — The  Location  of  the  Wrongs  That 
the  Soldiers  Suffered  Unduly— We  Must  Build  Regiments  as  We  Do  Battleships— The 
Fault  cf  Poor  Preparation  Not  Personal — Let  Congress  for  the  Country  Mend  It  474-49 1 


40  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS 

CHAPTER   XXII. 

THE    DAY    OF    DOOM    FOR    CERYERA'S    FLEET. 

The  Cape  Verde  Squadron  Smashed,  Burned  and  Sunk,  and  Admiral  Sampson  Makes  a 
Present  of  the  Wrecks  to  the  Nation — The  Reports  of  the  Admiral  and  Commodore 
Schley — Their  Difference  in  Opinions,  Methods  and  Manners — Intensely  Interesting 
Extracts  from  Reports  by  Captains  and  Executive  Officers — A  Series  of  Startling 
Pictures — Admiral  Cervera's  Official  Lamentation — Extracts  from  the  Spanish  Diary 
of  Uncommon  Value — The  Story  of  Fugitives  from  the  Fleet  Who  Found  Their  Way 
to  the  Spanish  Trenches — Admiral  Omits  to  Improve  Opportunity  of  His  Life  .  .  492-520 

CHAPTER    XXIII. 

THE    SCENES    AND    SIGNIFICANCE    OF    THE    SURRENDER    OF    SANTIAGO. 

The  Appearance  of  General  Miles  at  Santiago — His  Moral  as  well  as  Military  Force — 
Spanish  Obstinacy  in  the  Negotiation  for  Capitulation — The  Iron  Hand  at  Washing 
ton—The  Practical  Question  Was  How  Much  Would  Victory  Cost  Us?— The  Spanish 
Case  Was  Hopeless — They  Sought  to  Save  their  Military  Honor — The  Scenes  and 
Terms  of  the  Surrender — An  Inspector-General's  Picturesque  Story — Telegrams  That 
are  Photographs — The  President's  Proclamation  of  Principles  and  Purpose  in  Cuban 
Government — Comparative  Proportions  of  Great  Surrenders 523-543 


CHAPTER   XXIV. 

THE    JOINT    WORK    OF    THE   ARMY    AND    NAVY    AT    MANILA. 

The  Reasons  Why  Admiral  Dewey  Remained  After  Destroying  the  Spanish  Fleet — \Vhy 
There  Was  Not  a  Slaughter  at  Manila  Like  That  at  Santiago— The  Old  Fort  That 
Was  the  Key  of  the  City — The  American  Army  Drove  the  .Spaniards  and  Dusted  the 
Insurgents  Out  of  the  Way — A  Very  Neat  Job — We  Did  Not  Make  War  on  the  Span 
iards  for  the  Sake  of  the  Tagalos 544-567 

CHAPTER   XXV. 

THE    PORTO    RICO    CAMPAIGN. 

The  Preliminary  Plans  and  Movements  of  General  Miles — Sharp  but  Courteous  Corre 
spondence  with  General  Shafter,  Closing  Cuban  Experiences — Place  of  Landing  in 
Porto  Rico  Changed  at  Sea — The  Progress  of  the  Campaign  Closed  by  the  Peace 
News — The  Constant  and  Conclusive  Success  of  the  American  Arms — Some  of  the 
Cablegrams  that  Passed  that  Remain  of  Interest 568-578 

CHAPTER   XXVI. 

AFTER    THE    FIGHTING    WAS    OVER    IN    CUBA. 

The  Casualties  at  Santiago — Haste  to  Ship  the  Spaniards  to  Spain  and  the  Americans 
North — The  Parting  of  the  Armies  That  Met  in  Bloody  Strife — Shafter's  Opinion  of 
Immunes — A  Curious  Proclamation  from  Spanish  Soldiers — 23,726  Spanish  Soldiers 
Surrendered — American  Volunteers  Begging  to  be  Plumed  to  the  Front  While  the 
War  Lasted,  and  When  It  Was  Over  They  Wanted  to  Go  Home 581-599 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS.  41 

CHAPTER   XXVII. 

THE    PUBLIC    OPINION    THAT    ADVANCED    THE    NAVY. 

The  Marvelous  Improvement  of  the  Artillery  on  Our  Ships  of  War — The  Splendid  Equip 
ment  of  the  Several  Vessels — Full  Particulars  of  the  Armament  of  All  Our  Ships — 
Vigilance  of  the  Ordnance  Bureau  to  Continue  Progress — The  Thirteen-Inch  Guns  to 
Be  Superseded  in  the  New  Navy  by  Twelve-Inch — Important  Recommendations — The 
Way  the  Navy  Was  Prepared  to  Win — Plans  for  Continued  Progress — The  Spanish 
Side  as  Seen  and  Described  by  One  of  Her  Officers — Hopes  and  Happenings  in 
Bombarded  Santiago — Service  of  Cervera's  Fleet — Mystery  of  the  Merrimac — Earth 
quake-Throwing  Vesuvius — German  Opinion — Work  of  the  Marines  ....  600-629 


CHAPTER    XXVIII. 

THE    ARMY    OF    THE    UNITED    STATES. 

Its  Organization  and  Numbers  Before  and  During  the  War — Strength  and  Location  of 
the  Several  Army  Corps — The  Distribution  of  the  Military  Forces  and  Their  Numbers 
— Casualties  During  the  War,  in  Cuba,  Porto  Rico  and  the  Philippines — Deaths  in  the 
Camps — The  Incidents  of  Hardship  and  the  Yellow  Scandals — Spanish  Account  of  the 
Valor  of  Their  Troops  and  Story  of  the  Conflict — Scarcity  of  Provisions—  Cruel 
Battles  of  El  Caney  and  San  Juan — Suffering  in  Santiago 630-657 


CHAPTER   XXIX. 

THE    INSURGENTS    OF    CUBA    AND    THE    PHILIPPINES    IN   ARMS. 

Our  Relations  With  and  Responsibilities  for  Them — The  Cuban  Soldiers  Found  on  the 
Pay  Roll — A  Military  Service  of  Importance  and  the  Only  One  Performed  by 
Armed  Cubans  in  Our  War — The  Spanish  Account  of  It — Cubans  Kept  3,500  of  the 
Best  Toops  of  Spain  Away  from  El  Caney — Testimony  Taken  at  Paris  by  the  Ameri 
can  Commission  of  the  True  Character  of  the  Philippines— General  Merritt,  General 
Greene  and  Major  Bell  State  the  Facts  658-667 


CHAPTER   XXX. 

THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE. 

The  Official  Terms  in  Which  the  Spaniards  Sued  for  Peace  and  Accepted  the  Demands 
of  the  Peace  Protocol  of  August  12 — "The  Demand  Strips  Us  of  the  Very  Last 
Memory  of  a  Glorious  Past" — The  Treaty  Commissioners  That  Met  in  Paris — Official 
Text  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace  of  December  10 — The  Spaniards  Contend  That  the 
Philippine  Insurgents  Constantly  Change  the  Status  Quo  and  that  the  Americans 
Must  Stop  Them — Contention  that  the  Transfer  of  Sovereignty  Meant  Transfer  of 
Debts — Protracted  Debate  Over  the  Cuban  Obligations — Claim  the  Capture  of  Manila 
Was  Not  Lawful — Insinuation  that  General  Merritt  Had  Heard  of  the  Protocol  Before 
Storming  the  Town — Spaniards  Able  and  Adroit — Americans  Firm  but  Courteous 
— The  Official  History  of  the  Preparation  of  the  Peace  Protocol — The  Part  Taken  by 
the  President — His  Strong  Hand  Felt  in  Paris 668-731 


42  TABLE    OF   CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER   XXXI. 

REVIEW    OF   THE    WAR    AND    THE    COMMISSION    ON   THE    CONDUCT    OF    THE   WAR    DEPARTMENT. 

Importance  of  a  Day  Lost  or  Gained— The  Protocol  Was  the  Treaty — Military  Com 
missions  to  Arrange  the  Spanish  Evacuation  of  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico — Appearance  of 
the  Cuban  Army — Narrow  Margins  on  Which  the  War  Was  Ended  so  Speedily — 
Inspiration  of  Dewey's  Victory — Energy  in  Following  It  Up — Outbreak  of  Criticism 
on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  as  Soon  as  It  Was  Over — The  Commission  of  Investigation 
Appointed  by  the  President — Extraordinary  Interest  in  the  Action  of  the  Commission 
and  Its  Authoritative  Report — Weaknesses  in  Systems  and  Persons  Not  Spared — 
Origin  and  Extent  of  the  Canned  Meat  Controversy — Fault  Found  in  High  Places 
— The  Army,  Regular  or  Volunteer,  of  and  for  the  People 732-751 

CHAPTER  XXXII. 

THE    OCCUPATION    OF    OUR    NEW    POSSESSIONS. 

The  Spanish  Peninsula  Too  Narrow  to  Sustain  the  Crown  System  Over  Continental 
Colonies — The  Loss  of  Her  Archipelagoes  Has  Been  the  Logic  of  Her  Experiences — 
Comparative  Expansion  of  England  and  the  United  States — Our  Magnificent  Growth 
Across  the  Continent  the  Greatest  of  National  Triumphs — Our  Arms  Around  the  World 
—Our  Bugle  Call  and  British  Drum-Beats  Following  the  Course  of  the  Sun— The 
Whispering  Wires  that  Unite  the  Nations — The  Malay  Revolt  Against  Liberty  for 
Tyranny — The  Ghastly  Demagogy  that  Meddles  with  the  Army — Pleasing  Prospects 
of  Our  Possessions  Except  the  Philippines — The  Aguinaldo  Conspiracy  and  Tagalo 
War — The  Motives  and  Malice  of  It — American  Arms  Without  Stain — Our  Soldiers 
Without  Reproach « 752-764 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS. 


Frontispiece — Government   Building  at  Washington,  Occupied  by  the   State,  War,  and 
Navy  Departments. 

i — President  McKinley  and  His  Cabinet 17 

2 — Murat  Halstead,  the  Author , 18 

3 —General  Nelson  A.  Miles,  Commander  of  the  United  States  Army 35 

4 — The  "Iowa,"  in  Command  of  Fighting  Bob  Evans 36 

5 — Queen  Regent  and  Boy  King  of  Spain 45 

6 — Stewart  L.  Woodford,  Minister  to  Spain  When  War  Was  Declared 46 

7 — Tablet  Commemorating  the  Execution  of  the  "Virginius"  Prisoners.      One   of   the 

Early  Causes  of  the  War  with  Spain 63 

8 — Admiral  Dewey  under  the  "Olympia's"  Big  Guns 64 

9 — Admiral  Dewey  and  Staff  on  the  "Olympia" 64 

10— The  Cathedral  at  Santiago 81 

n — Kiosk  in  Main  Plaza  at  Ponce,  Porto  Rico 82 

12 — The  Captain-General's  Palace  in  Havana 99 

13 — The  Plaza  in  Ponce,  Porto  Rico 100 

14 — Artillery  Wagon  Park,  Porto  Rico 100 

15 — Church  and  Palms  in  Juana,  Porto  Rico 100 

16 — Captain  Bethel  and  General  Ernst  Reconnoitering  in  Porto  Rico 100 

17 — The  Military  Hospital  in  Ponce,  Porto  Rico 105 

18 — Battery  B,  Fourth  Artillery,  in  Action  in  Porto  Rico 106 

19 — Fire  Department  Building,  Ponce,  Porto  Rico 106 

20 — On  the  Picket  Line  in  Porto  Rico 106 

43 


44  LIST    OF    ILLUSTRATIONS. 

PAGE 

21 — Catholic  Church  in  Ponce,  Porto  Rico 106 

22 — Leading  Cuban  Generals  Who  Commanded  Insurgent  Forces  in  Cuba 115 

23 — Military  Telegraph  Office  and  Barracks  at  Ponce,  Porto  Rico  116 

24 — Fortifications  of  San  Juan,  Porto  Rico 121 

25 — The  Quay,  San  Juan,  Porto  Rico 122 

26 — General  Blanco,  Who  Commanded  Spanish  Forces  in  Cuba 139 

27 — La  Perla  Theatre  in  Ponce,  Porto  Rico 140 

28 — A  Picket  Squad  of  Cuban  Soldiers 145 

29 — General  Castellio  and  Staff 145 

30 — Plaza  in  Santiago,  Cuba 146 

31 — Group  of  Native  Women  in  Ponce,  Porto  Rico 146 

32— Battery  F  of  the  Fifth  Artillery 155 

33 — A  Dwelling  in  Santiago 155 

34 — Effect  of  Torpedo  Explosion  in  "Vizcaya" 155 

35 — 5- 5-inch  Gun  and  Cartridge  on  "Vizcaya"  155 

36 — The  Major,  His  Adjutant,  Orderly,  and  Wife 156 

37 — Partial  View  of  Arsenal,  Facing  the  Bacoor,  in  Cavite,  Philippines 156 

38 — Cuadrilleros,  or  Rural  Guards,  in  the  Philippines ,  161 

39 — The  Princess  Promenade,  San  Juan,  Porto  Rico 162 

40— City  of  San  Juan,  Porto  Rico 179 

41 — Street  of  the  Cross,  San  Juan,  Porto  Rico 180 

42 — Market  Women  of  Porto  Rico  185 

43 — A  Porto  Rico  Country  House 186 

44 — Major-General  Fitzhugh  Lee,  Consul  at  Havana  When  War  Was  Declared 195 

45 — The  Sea  Wall  of  San  Juan,  Porto  Rico 196 

46 — Horses  Loaded  with  Maloja,  in  Matanzas,  Cuba 201 

47 — The  Yumuri  River  at  Matanzas,  Cuba 202 

48— The  United  States  Battleship  "Maine" 219 

49 — Captain  Sigsbee,  Who  Commanded  the  Ill-Fated  "Maine" 220 

50 — Funeral  of  the  Victims  of  the  "Maine"  Disaster 225 

51 — The  Court  of  Inquiry  into  the  Fate  of  the  "Maine,"  in  Session  226 

52— Quarter-Deck  of  the  U.  S.  S.  "Brooklyn" 235 

53 — Fire-room  of  the  U.  S.  S.  "Brooklyn"  236 

54 — A  Fruit  Vendor  in  Havana 241 

55 — Twelve-Inch  Breech-Loading  Mortars,  Weight  28,980  Pounds  Each 242 


: 


r/* 


QUEEN  REGENT  A.ND  BOY  KING  OF  SPAIN. 


STEWART  L.  WOODFORD,  MINISTER  TO  SPAIN  WHEN  WAR  WAS  DECLARED. 


LIST   OF    ILLUSTRATIONS.  47 

PAGE 

56 — The  Flying  Squadron 259 

57 — Admiral  Dewey  as  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Equipment,  United  States  Navy 260 

58 — Guns  Used  by  United  States  Infantry,  Breech  Closed 265 

59 — Guns  Used  by  United  States  Infantry,  Breech  Open 265" 

Co— United  States  Light  Artillery  at  Port  Tampa 266 

61— Artillery  Practice  at  Port  Tampa 266 

62 — Deck  View  of  the  U.  S.  S.  "Indiana"  275 

63 — Regiment  in  Heavy  Marching  Order  at  Camp  Alger 276 

64 — Admiral  Dewey's  Fleet  That  Won  the  May-day  Victory  in  Manila  Bay  281 

65 — Admiral  Dewey,  the  Hereof  Manila ". 282 

66 — Admiral  Montijo,  Commander  of  the  Fleet  That  Admiral  Dewey  Sunk  299 

67— Views  of  the  Navy  Yard  at  Cavite,  Philippines 300 

68— The  Arena,  Constructed  of  Bamboo,  in  Which  Bull  Fights  Are  Given  at  Manila 305 

69 — Views  in  and  around  Manila 306 

70 — Views  in  the  Philippines,  Mostly  in  and  around  Manila  315 

71 — Views  from  the  Philippines 316 

72 — Native  Method  of  Plowing — Scene  in  the  Province  of  Batangas,  Philippines 321 

73 — A  Country  Marriage  in  the  Philippines  322 

74 — Captain  Clark,  of  the  "Oregon,"  in  His  Office  339 

75 — The  "Oregon,"  the  Bulldog  of  the  Navy 340 

7 6 —Transport  "Newport,"  of  the  Philippine  Expedition,  Leaving  San  Francisco 345 

77--Regiment  Breaking  Camp  at  Camp  Alger 346 

78— United  States  Volunteer  in  Full  Marching  Order 355 

79— Model  of  Guns  Used  on  Aft  Decks 35^ 

So— Ten-Inch  Disappearing  Gun  Carriage,  Model  of  1896,  Buffington-Ctozier  System 356 

81 — Daiquiri,  Where  Our  Troops  Landed  in  Cuba 361 

82 — The  Beach  at  Daiquiri 3^}I 

83— The  Pier  at  Daiquiri 3^ 

84— A  Part  of  Daiquiri,  Cuba 3<>i 

85— The  Way  Milk  Is  Sold  and  Delivered  in  Havana ..  tfv 

86— Chart  Showing  Daily  Positions  of  the  American  Fleet  in  the  Campaign  Against  the 

Spanish  Squadron  in  Cuban  Waters 379 

Sy—Daily  Positions  of  the  Spanish  Squadron  in  Cuban  Waters,  Under  Admiral  Cervera....  380 
88— Third  Light  Artillery  Going  into  Camp,  on  Their  Way  to  the  Front,  Six  Miles  from 

Siboney 3^5 


48  LIST    OF    ILLUSTRATIONS. 

FAGE 

Sg — General  Hawkins,  Who  Led  the  Famous  Charge  of  the   First  Brigade  at  San  Juan, 

July  ist,  1898 386 

go — Capron's  Battery  in  Aetion  in  Their  Position  in  General  Lawton's  Division 395 

91 — Wounded  on  their  Way  to  Dressing  Plaee  at  the  Battle  of  San  Juan  396 

92 — Artillery  Men  Trying  to  Locate  the  Enemy's  Batteries  While  under  Fire 401 

93 — General  Wheeler  and  General  Sumner-in  the  Latter's  Headquarters  before  Santiago  402 

94 — The  Church  at  El  Caney  419 

95 — Scene  in  a  Field  Hospital  after  the  Battle  of  San  Juan 420 

96 — Bombproofs  Thrown  LTp  by  Rough  Riders  to  Protect  Them  from  Spanish  Shell  and 

Shrapnel  425 

97 — Colonel  Roosevelt's  Men  Cooking  Their  First  Dinner  at  Daiquiri ;  Fried  Bacon  and 

Hard  Tack  the  Menu 426 

98 — Grave  of  Captain  Wetherell,  Who  Fell  in  the  Famous  Charge  of  San  Juan  Hill 435 

99— "Oquendo,"  Starboard  Side,  Showing  Exit  of  Thirteen-Inch  Shell 436 

100 — "Oquendo,"  Starboard  Side,  as  Abandoned 436 

IOI — Views  of  the  Notorious  Prison  at  Santiago 441 

I02 — Cast  Iron  Projectiles  Used  in  the  Navy 442 

103— Petty  Officers  of  the  U.  S.  S.  "New  York" 443 

I04 — Stone  Fort  at  El  Caney.     Effect  of  Cannonading  459 

IO5 — Snap  Shot  of  General  Shafter  in  the  Field 460 

I0f, — American  Troops  in  Santiago.     Relief  of  the  Guard 465 

107 — Scene  on  the  Wharf  at  Santiago  de  Cuba 466 

IO3 — Crushing-Mill  on  a  Sugar  Plantation  in  Cuba 473 

I09 — Valley  of  the  Yumuri  River,  Cuba 47^1 

no — A  Group  of  Spanish  Prisoners  before  Santiago 481 

in — Col.  John  Jacob  Astor.  of  Astor  Battery  Fame,  near  Spanish  Trenches 482 

112 — The  Naval  Heroes  of  Santiago 499 

113 — W reck  of  "Reina  Mercedes,"  and  Estrella  Battery,  Santiago 500 

114— Admiral  Cervera,  Who  Commanded  the  Ill-Fated  Spanish  Fleet  at  Santiago 505 

1 15 — Side  of  the  "Cristobal  Colon"  after  the  Battle 500 

Ti6 — Bow  of  the  "Vizcaya."    After  the  Santiago  Battle 515 

117 — Forecastle  of  the  "Oquendo";  Showing  Sinking  of  Spar  Deck 516 

nS — "Vizcaya,"  after  the  Santiago  Battle,  Showing  the  Results  of  American  Gunners' 

Marksmanship 521 

119 — "Cristobal  Colon"  as  Finally  Abandoned 522 


LIST    OF    ILLUSTRATIONS.  49 

I'AGK 

120 — Santiago  de  Cuba,  North  Half,  as  Seen  from  the  Bay 539 

121 — Entrance  to  Harbor  at  Santiago  de  Cuba;  "Merrimac"  Shown  in  the  Foreground 540 

122 — Generals  Miles  and  Shafter  on  Board  Headquarters  Boat  "Seguranca" 545 

123 — Tree  Under  Which  Surrender  of  Spanish  Forces  at  Santiago  Was  Made 546 

124 — Major-General  Thomas  M.  Anderson  and  Staff,  in  Command  of  First  Division, 

Eighth  Army  Corps,  at  Manila  555 

125 — Rift  in  the  Jungles  that  Line  the  Coast  of  the  Philippines 556 

126 — Roadway  in  Botanical  Gardens,  Manila 556 

127 — The  Road  to  the  Cemetery  in  Tansa,  Province  of  Iloilo 561 

128 — Landscape  View  Showing  Beauty  and  Luxuriance  of  Vegetation  in  the  Philippines...  562 

129— United  States  Transports  in  the  Harbor  of  Ponce,  Porto  Rico  579 

130— The  Citadel  at  Ponce,  Porto  Rico 580 

131 — A  Corner  in  the  Market  of  Santiago,  Cuba 585 

132 — Head  of  Pack  Train  Leaving  San  Luis  for  Manzanillo 586 

133 — Sugar  Mill.  Scene  of  the  San  Luis  Riot  November  4,  1898 595 

134 — Soldiers  in  Insurgent  Army  of  Cuba 595 

135— The  Palace  of  Santiago,  Cuba 596 

136 — Effect  of  Eight-Inch  Shell  through  Port  Head  of  "Vizcaya"  601 

137 — Starboard  Side  of  "Vizcaya."  After  the  Battle 601 

138 — A  Cuban  Plowman 602 

13^ — Sword  Ordered  by  Congress  to  be  Given  Admiral  Dewey  as  a  Token  of  the  Nation's 

Gratitude finj 

140 — Bust  of  Columbus,  Found  on  "Cristobal  Colon."  Now  in  War  Department  at 

Washington  620 

141— Department  Headquarters  of  United  States  Army  at  Santiago 637 

142 — General  W.  F.  Randolph 638 

143 — Bob  Wrenn  and  Billy  Lamed 638 

144— Train  of  Pack  Mules 638 

145 — Sergeant  Dan  Hewitt,  Hero  of  Caloocan 638 

!46 — View  Inside  of  the  Trenches 655 

147 — Camp  at  Port  Tampa  655 

148 — Headquarters  in  the  Field 655 

149 — View  of  the  Trenches 655 

150 — Loading  Pack  Mules (>$(* 

151 — A  Cuban  Villa 650 


50  LIST    OF    ILLUSTRATIONS. 

PAGE 

152 — Placing  Guns  into  Position  656 

153 — Members  of  the  Ninth  Cavalry,  Colored 656 

154— The  Battlefield  of  San  Juan,  July  2,  1898 673 

155 — "Maria  Teresa,"  Showing  Hole  in  5.5-Inch  Gun  Shield,  Inner  View 674 

156 — The  American  Peace  Commissioners 681 

157 — The  Spanish  Peace  Commissioners 684 

158 — "To  George  Dewey,  with  the  Compliments  of  the  President,  Congress  and  the  People 

of  the  United  States"  691 

159 — Major-General  Thomas  M.  Anderson,  Commander  of  First  Division,  Eighth  Army 

Corps,    at  Manila.... 692 

160 — General  E.  S.  Otis  and  Staff  on  Porch,  Malacanan  Palace,  Manila 709 

161 — Malacanan  Palace  and  Pasig  River,  Manila 710 

162 — General  Otis  and  Staff  in  Dining  Room  of  Malacanan  Palace,  Manila 710 

163 — Signatures  of  American  and  Spanish  Peace  Commissioners  to  Treaty  of  Peace 727 

164 — Last  Joint  Session  of  American  and  Spanish  Peace  Commissioners  at  Paris 728 


MAPS,  CHARTS  AND  PLANS. 


PAGE 


i — Map  of  Santiago  and  Vicinity,  Showing  Intrenchments  and  Positions  of  the  Fifth 

Army  Corps,  U.  S.  Army,  and  Those  of  the  Spanish 403 

2 — Plan  Showing  Position  of  Both  Armies  before  Santiago,  July  3,  1898  408 

3 — Official  Diagram  Showing  Plan  of  Naval  Battle  off  Santiago,  July  3,  1898 493 

4 — Official  Sketch  Showing  External  Injuries  Sustained  by  the  "Brooklyn"  at  Santiago, 

July  3,  1898 495 

5 — Official  Sketch  Showing  External  Injuries  Sustained  by  the  "Iowa"  at  Santiago, 

July  3,  1898 495 

6 — Official  Diagram  Showing  Where  the  Spanish  Vessels  Were  Abandoned  off  Santiago, 

July  3,  1898 497 

7 — Official  Sketch  Showing  Damage  Done  to  Chain  Locker  by  a  Spanish  Shell,  July  3, 


1898 


501 


8 — Official  Plan  of  "Vizcaya,"  Showing  Approximate  Location  of  Hits  and  Probable  Size 

of  Projectiles : 503 

9 — Official  Plan  of  "Oquendo,"  Showing  Approximate  Location  of  Hits  and  Probable  Size 

of  Projectiles 503 

10 — Official  Plan  of  "Maria  Teresa,"  Showing  Approximate  Location  of  Hits  and  Probable 

Size  of  Projectiles 507 

ii — Official  Plan  of  "Cristobal  Colon,"  Showing  Approximate  Location  of  Hits  and  Prob 
able  Size  of  Projectiles 507 

12 — Plan  Showing  Stations  of  American  Fleet  at  Santiago  before  the  Battle,  July  3 518 

13 — Official  Map  Showing  Plan  [of  American  and  Spanish  Trenches  before  Manila  in 

August,  1898 , 557 

51 


52 


MAPS,    CHARTS   AND    PLANS. 


PAGE 


14 — Official  Map  Showing  Country  South  of  the  Pasig  River  and  West  of  the  Paranaque 
River,  in  Which  the  Military  Operations  before  Manila  Were  Conducted  in  August, 

1898 559 

15 — Official  Sketch  Showing  Positions  of  First  Brigade,  Second  Division,  Eighth  Corps,  in 

Operations  against  Manila,  August,  1898 563 

16 — Map  of  Porto  Rico,  in  Colors,  from  Latest  Government  Surveys 765 

17 — Map  of  Cuba,  in  Colors,  from  Latest  Government  Surveys 767 

18 — Map  of  Hawaii,  in  Colors,  from  Latest  Government  Surveys 769 

19 — Map  of  the  Philippine  Islands,  in  Colors,  from  Latest  Government  Surveys 771 


*  f  — •n''  ""  — *— """ ^7^-^"^'-       *~"^  • =^"     -*-:-;_  ,      - 

: . — ,///3*-*- 


CHAPTER    I. 

The  Origin  of  the  War  Between  the  United  States  and  Spain. 

American  Good  Will  for  Spain— The  Situation  in  1869— The  Sickles  and  Prim  Negotiation- 
Prim  Willing  to  Sell  Cuba— "The  Honor  of  Spain"— Diplomatic  Papers  that  Should  be 
Studied — Spain  Sends  an  Army  to  Cuba — The  Valmaseda  Proclamation — The  Wrongs  ot 
Cuba— We  Must  Find  the  Real  People  of  Cuba. 

More  than  four  centuries  after  the  discovery  of  the  West  Indies  by  Chris 
topher  Columbus,  there  was  in  the  celebration  of  that  event  in  the  vanished 
yet  memorable  White  City  at  Chicago,  a  revelation  to  the  nations  and 
people  accustomed  to  regard  us  as  a  mass  of  material  rudely  fashioned,  of  the 
advance  of  American  art  and  the  accomplishments  of  our  higher  civilization. 
There  was  also  manifest,  to  the  students  of  the  progress  of  mankind,  a  tre 
mendous  force  of  public  opinion,  and  an  augmented  excellence  in  character 
and  fervor  of  expression,  of  a  distinctive  national  character,  clean  cut  and 
glowing  with  public  pride  and  patriotism.  One  of  the  features  of  the  celebra 
tion  was  the  kindly  popular  sentiment  respecting  Spain,  and  a  regard  for  the 
people  of  the  peninsula  of  Europe  that  enters  the  Atlantic.  One  of  the 
treasured  and  consecrated  figures  shining  in  our  traditions  was  Isabella,  the 
friend  of  Columbus  (who  offered  to  pledge  her  jewels  that  he  might  sail  west 
ward  and  expand  the  area  of  cultivation  and  Christianity) — Columbus,  the 
first  of  our  heroes,  not  a  Spaniard,  but  one  who  gave  Spain  a  new  world  and 
his  ashes,  whose  incomparable  discoveries  became  august  through  the  ages  by 
the  misfortunes  that  "closed  his  illustrious  life  in  gloom.  The  pen  of  Wash 
ington  Irving  made  the  Alhambra  dear  to  Americans,  and  in  the  melldw 
^  splendor  of  his  pages  the  ancient  romantic  traditions  and  tragic  histories  of 
the  land  of  Cervantes  were  enriched  in  a  golden  atmosphere  like  that  of  the 

53 


54  THE    ORIGIN    OF    THE    WAR. 

masterpieces  of  Murillo.  The  descendants  of  Columbus,  coming  by  way  of 
Havana;  the  Princess  of  the  royal  reigning  house  of  Spain;  and  the  chosen 
ships  of  her  navy,  were  welcomed  to  our  shores,  homes  and  harbors,  and 
entertained  with  a  superb  hospitality,  so  profuse  that  the  fault  of  its  pomp 
was  forgiven  011  account  of  its  sincerity.  Almost  forgotten  were  the  stories  of 
Spain's  cruelties;  nearly  effaced  from  American  soil  the  crimson  of  her  foot 
steps.  The  olden  grandeur  of  Spain  was  for  the  youth  of  our  country  a 
fascinating  story,  half  history,  half  romance.  So  far  as  we  knew  how  far  we 
were  misjudged  by  Spain,  our  resentment  was  softened  by  remembrance  of 
her  fallen  fortunes,  and  compassion  for  austere  vanity  and  solemn  conceit  that 
was  content  with  ignorance.  We  were  even  hopeful  of  Spanish  Republican 
ism.  There  was  something  that  Whittier  sang,  "The  north  wind  told  to  the 
pines,  the  wild  duck  to  the  sea."  It  was  that  the  Lord  was  showing  signs  the 
slaves  should  sometime  be  free.  There  were  many  signs  that  the  day  was 
soon  coming  that  Cuba  should  be  free,  and  few  Americans  have  ever  doubted 
that  the  freedom  of  Cuba  meant  she  was  to  be  under  the  wing  of  the  Great 
Republic  of  the  North.  This  was  written  when  the  island  first  grew  green  in 
the  summer  seas,  and  the  Americas  emerged  from  chaos.  This  was  not  a 
secret  held  in  the  mind  of  Spain,  though  an  arrow  piercing  the  Spanish  heart. 
Secretary  of  State  Hamilton  Fish,  whose  grandson  fell  foremost  in  the 
charge  of  the  Rough  Riders  at  Santiago,  wrote  July  29,  1869,  to  General 
Sickles  at  Madrid  in  terms  that  equally  well  described  that  time  and  the  situa 
tion  in  1897.  The  official  synopsis  of  the  State  papers  describes  the  communi- 
jcation  of  Mr.  Fish  in  these  terms:  "The  insurrection  of  Cuba  is  causing 
great  devastation,  and  will  result,  if  continued,  in  the  destruction  of  the 
productive  capacity  of  the  island.  Reasons  why  the  United  States  have  a 
'  peculiar  interest  in  the  fortunes  and  prosperity  of  the  island.  Contest  one  for 
self-government  and  freedom.  Self-government  for  every  part  of  the  Ameri 
can  hemisphere  and  freedom  from  transatlantic  rule  a  growing  sentiment  in 
the  United  States.  This  has  been  recognized  by  other  powers.  Spain  may, 
with  honor,  recognize  it  and  treat  for  the  surrender  of  her  rights  in  Cuba." 

Marshal   Prim's  reply  on  behalf  of  Spain   was  that  he  recognized  the 
inevitable  termination  of  colonial  relations  in  America,  but  Spain  could  not 
be  reconciled  to  that  till  hostilities  ceased.     General  Sickles  replied  that  Spain 
was  not  asked  to  treat  with  insurgents,  but  with  a  friendly  power  and  olcf 
ally.     Prim  responded  that  the  United  States  might  be  assured  of  the  good 


THE    ORIGIN    OF    THE    WAR.  55 

faith  of  Spain,  but  that  the  insurrection  had  not  assumed  proportions  that 
could  require  a  government  to  treat  during-  hostilities.  The  insurgents  held 
no  port  or  ships,  and  had  no  army  that  offered  or  accepted  battle.  The 
language  of  Mr.  Fish  in  writing  to  Mr.  Sickles  at  this  juncture  was:  "It  can 
no  longer  be  a  question  of  national  dignity,  nor  can  the  proper  pride  or  the 
just  susceptibilities  of  a  great  power  refuse  to  consider  the  question  of  a 
voluntary  severance  of  past  relations  between  itself  and  distant  possessions. 
Spain  herself  was  one  of  the  first  of  the  great  European  powers  to  cede  volun 
tarily  its  distant  colonial  possessions,  for  she  transferred  Louisiana  to  France 
and  subsequently  ceded  Florida  to  the  United  States." 

The  Secretary  proceeded:  "The  strife  still  continues  in  Cuba.  It  has 
already  marked  its  track  by  devastation  and  ruin — towns  sacked,  houses 
burned,  plantations  destroyed,  and  lives  lost.  On  either  side  the  war  has 
been  one  of  desolation,  and,  if  continued,  must  result  in  the  entire  destruction 
of  a  large  part  of  the  productive  capacity  of  the  island  as  well  as  of  an 
immense  amount  of  property  and  of  human  life. 

"It  is  not  impossible  that  the  Cubans  may  be  conquered,  if  Spain  devotes 
her  whole  energies  to  the  work;  but  they  can  never  again  be  contented, 
happy,  faithful,  or  quiet  subjects  of  that  power.  Assuming  that  Spain  may 
eventually  subdue  the  present  insurrection,  she  will  find  herself  in  possession 
of  a  devastated  and  ruined  territory,  inhabited  by  a  discontented  people. 
The  enlightened  statesmen  of  Spain  cannot  fail  to  appreciate  that  the  feelings 
and  the  affections  of  the  entire  native  population  of  the.  island  are  not  only 
estranged,  but  they  are  deeply  hostile  to  the  continuance  of  Spanish  rule. 
Nor  can  they  fail  to  recognize  the  advancing  growth  of  that  sentiment  which 
claims  for  every  part  of  the  American  hemisphere  the  right  of  self-govern 
ment  and  freedom  from  transatlantic  dependence. 

"England,  bound  as  she  has  been,  to  the  traditions  of  the  past,  tenacious 
as  she  has  been  of  her  possessions,  and  conservative  of  all  her  rights  and 
interests,  has  recognized  the  force  of  this  feeling,  and  has  anticipated  events 
by  granting  self-government  to  her  North  American'  provinces.  Denmark, 
approving  the  policy  of  the  separation  of  colonies  from  the  parent  state,  is 
endeavoring  to  part  with  her  insular  possessions." 

The  example  of  Russia  in  selling  Alaska  was  pertinently  quoted. 

In  a  striking  picture  of  recent  conditions  the  fate  of  Porto  Rico  was  fore 
shadowed  by  Secretary  Fish  June  29,  1869:  "The  same  causes  which  have 


56  THE    ORIGIN    OF    THE    WAR. 

produced  the  present  convulsion  in  Cuba  exist  latent  in  Porto  Rico,  and  may 
be  fanned  into  flames  hereafter  should  free  government  and  a  system  of  free 
labor  be  brought  in  immediate  contact  with  that  island  by  establishing  them 
in  Cuba.  It  is  not  improbable,  therefore,  that  the  cabinet  of  Madrid  may 
think  it  wise  to  determine  the  political  condition  of  both  islands  at  the  same 
time." 

There  is  close  correspondence  between  the  situations  of  1869  and  of  1897 
in  the  relations  of  the  United  States  and  Spain,  respecting  the  final  disposition 
of  the  Cuban  question.  The  ten  years  of  civil  war  in  Cuba  had  been  in  prog 
ress  one  year  when  Secretary  Fish  sent  a  special  observer  and  negotiator  to 
Madrid  and  wrote  Minister  Sickles  to  propose  to  the  Spanish  government  the 
purchase  of  Cuba,  which  was  not,  it  should  be  well  remarked,  received  as 
intolerable  insolence,  but  as  a  business  affair  to  be  given  the  most  considerate 
attention.  The  Spanish  executive  authorities  were  cautious  and  sensitive, 
but  consoled  by  the  customary  diplomatic  flatteries,  and  after  shrinking  from 
the  attitude  of  expectant  but  favorable  attention,  resumed  the  use  of  tentative 
phrases,  suggesting  additional  offers  of  compensation,  always  saying  much  of 
the  essential  requirements  of  the  dignity  and  honor  that  must  be  at  all 
hazards  maintained.  Marshal  Prim,  after  stating  that  Spain  had  lost  Cuba 
practically,  and  desiring  to  know  how  much  would  be  paid  for  the  relinquish- 
ment  of  Spanish  sovereignty  over  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico,  discovered  and 
declared  that  his  colleagues  were  less  inclined  than  himself  to  entertain  that 
form  of  finding  a  solution  of  the  making  of  peace  in  Cuba  by  the  abandonment 
of  the  island.  The  Spanish  statesman  knew  that  Minister  Sickles  had  been  a 
factor  in  the  Ostend- Conference,  and  intimately  associated  with  the  influences 
that  made  James  Buchanan  President  of  the  United  States,  and  that  it 
could  hardly  be  accidental  Sickles  had  been  chosen  Minister  of  the  United 
States  to  Spain,  by  President  Grant,  who  looked  to  intervention  and  the 
annexation  of  Cuba,  and  whose  military  prestige  had  so  considerably  been 
manifested  in  our  international  affairs.  Two  telegrams  from  General  Sickles 
to  Secretary  Fish  signify  too  much  to  allow  omission : 

"August  i,  1869. — Communicated  to  Prim  informally  basis  of  convention. 
He  pressed  me  to  say  how  much  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  would  give.  I  said  I 
had  no  instructions,  and  suggested  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  millions  as 
probable.  Prim  said  Spain  might  arrange  preliminaries  with  United  States 
and  concede  autonomy  of  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  for  satisfactory  equivalent  as 


THE    ORIGIN    OF    THE    WAR.  57 

soon  as  hostilities  ceased.  He  promised  to  bring  the  whole  subject  before  the 
council  to-night." 

"August  6,  1869. — Prim  says  sudden  illness  of  Secretary  of  State  has 
delayed  reply." 

In  conversation  with  Senor  Silvela,  a  few  days  after  the  delay  on  account 
of  the  sudden  illness  of  the  Secretary  of  State,  Senor  Silvela  said  to  Minister 
Sickles:  "The  liberal  party  in  Spain  finds  itself,  to  its  own  infinite  regret, 
forced  into  a  seeming  sympathy  with  the  reactionary  party  in  Cuba;  and  the 
liberals  of  Cuba,  who  ought  to  be  its  firm  friends,  are  converted,  by  the 
fatality  of  the  situation,  into  its  bitterest  enemies.  There  is  no  sentiment 
dearer  to  the  hearts  of  the  liberal  leaders  than  that  of  freedom  to  all  men ;  yet 
they  stand  before  the  world,  in  this  Cuban  conflict,  as  opposed  to  self-govern 
ment  and  resisting  the  abolition  of  slavery."  He  considered  the  insurrection 
as  a  most  deplorable  misfortune  and  mistake,  both  for  Cuba  and  for  Spain, 
saying : 

"If  a  way  could  be  found  to  settle  all  these  questions  in  such  a  manner  as 
to  do  justice  to  Cuba,  without  infringing  upon  the  honor  of  Spain,  the  govern 
ment  would  be  greatly  gratified.  There  is  no  intention  or  desire  among  the 
liberals  of  Spain  ever  again  to  work  (exploiter)  the  island  of  Cuba  on  the  old 
selfish  system.  It  has  been  their  constant  hope  and  wish  to  grant  to  the 
Cubans  the  administration  of  their  own  affairs  and  the  full  fruits  of  their  own 
labor,  preserving  their  commercial  connections,  and  some  shadow  of  their 
political  relations." 

Before  the  utterance  of  these  somewhat  vague  but  pleasing  sentiments, 
marked  with  the  sonorous  cadence  of  the  diplomacy  of  Spain,  with  which  her 
decline  and  fall  as  a  great  nation  has  been  accompanied  from  the  beginning 
of  her  decadence  to  the  signing  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris,  the  Minister 
evaded  with  the  necessary  courtesies  the  line  of  business  conversation  in 
which  Marshal  Prim  had  indulged.  On  the  day  after  the  interview  of  General 
Sickles  with  the  Minister  of  State,  who  had  infinite  regrets  that  the  posi 
tion  of  the  liberal  party  was  so  painfully  involved  with  the  Cuban  insurrection, 
the  Minister  General  made  a  "prescribed  visit  of  ceremony"  to  Marshal  Prim, 
the  President  of  the  Council  of  the  Ministers  of  Spain,  and  the  Marshal, 
"with  much  animation  and  even  warmth  of  manner,  protested  that  Spain 
would  not  entertain  the  suggestion  of  an  armistice  with  the  insurgents,  nor 
consider  the  question  of  the  independence  of  Cuba,  while  the  insurgents  were 


58  THE    ORIGIN    OF    THE    WAR. 

in  arms  against  the  government;  that  Spain  would  grant  a  full  and  complete 
amnesty  as  soon  as  the  insurgents  laid  down  their  arms ;  and  that  being  done, 
the  whole  subject  would  be  open  for  consideration ;  that  he  was  disposed  to 
meet  the  question  frankly  and  practically;  that  perhaps  he  was  somewhat  in 
advance  of  the  views  of  his  colleagues,  but  he  had  no  doubt  they  were  unani 
mous  in  the  hope  that  the  influence  of  the  United  States  might  be  successfully 
exerted  to  relieve  the  question  from  the  embarrassments  which  now  sur 
rounded  it. "  He  added  that,  in  regard  to  emancipation,  Spain  would  prefer 
to  leave  that  matter  to  the  Cubans  themselves,  saying,  ''That  is  your  glory  in 
America,  the  reward  of  your  philanthropy,  and  we  do  not  wish  to  deprive  you 
of  it." 

The  Marshal  repelled  the  idea  of  a  conference  in  Washington,  in  wrhich 
Spain,  Cuba  and  the  Cubans  should  be  represented,  asserting  that  Cuba  could 
be  heard  only  through  the  deputies  elected  to  the  Cortes,  adding  that  Spain 
might  deal  with  the  United  States  but  not  with  Cuba.  The  next  day  Marshal 
Prim  notified  General  Sickles  that  Spain  "accepted  the  good  offices  of  the 
United  States."  This  was  on  impossible  conditions,  viz.,  that  the  Cuban 
insurgents  should  lay  down  their  arms,  Spain  to  give  amnesty  full  and  com 
plete,  Cubans  by  universal  suffrage  to  vote  on  the  question  of  independence, 
and  if  the  majority  were  for  it,  the  Cortes  consenting, — Cuba  should  pay  satis 
factorily,  guaranteed  by  the  United  States,  safe  conduct  through  Spanish  lines 
to  be  given  when  preliminaries  were  settled.  After  the  good  offices  of  the 
United  States  had  been  accepted  by  Marshal  Prim,  President  of  the  Council  of 
Ministers,  Senor  Silvela,  Minister  of  State,  was  restoied  to  health,  and  Gen 
eral  Sickles  says:  "I  expressed  my  regret  that  the  Spanish  government,  by 
choosing  to  treat  the  subject  as  a  purely  legal  question  to  be  settled  by  their 
own  forms  of  procedure,  had  apparently  closed  the  door  to  any  arrangement 
by  which  the  good  offices  of  the  United  States  could  be  made  immediately 
effective/' 

The  reply  of  the  Minister  of  State  was  with  great  animation,  and  he 
thought  the  view  Minister  Sickles  took  was  precisely  wrong — for  securing 
simultaneous  disarmament  and  amnesty  was  "a  great  step  in  advance,"  and 
then  Mr.  Silvela  "entered  upon  a  very  full  analysis  of  Article  108  of  the 
Spanish  Constitution."  The  American  Minister  did  not  follow  upon  that,  but 
pointed  out  that  a  "practical  view  should  be  taken,"  and  something  should  be 
done  speedily,  as  there  would  be  "complications  increasing  the  difficulties  of 


THE    ORIGIN    OF    THE    WAR. 


59 


reaching  an  accommodation."  Mr.  Silvela  referred  to  "the  present  temper 
and  spirit  of  the  Spanish  people,"  which  would  not  permit  haste.  This  was 
V  doubtless  true  then,  and  never  novel. 

This  is  the  Section  of  the  Constitution  of  the  Spanish  Monarchy — of  the 
transmarine  provinces : 

"Article  108. — The  Cortes  Constituyentes  shall  reform  the  present  sys 
tem  of  government  in  the  transmarine  provinces  when  the  deputies  of  Cuba  or 
Porto  Rico  shall  have  taken  their  seats,  in  order  to  extend  to  the  same,  with 
the  modifications  that  shall  be  deemed  necessary,  the  privileges  set  forth  in 
the  Constitution." 

The  memorandum  of  the  conversation  between  the  Spanish  Minister  of 
State  and  Minister  Sickles  August  10,  1869,  was  signed  by  Manuel  Silvela  and 
D.  E.  Sickles,  and  contained  passages  reporting  the  former,  whose  familiar 
flavor  soon  impresses  the  student  of  the  negotiations  that  they  proceed  to  "no 
thoroughfare."  We  quote  them  as  illustrative  of  the  fine  flowing  evasions  of 
the  literature  of  Spanish  diplomacy:  "After  the  revolution  of  September  had 
taken  place,  and  conformably  to  the  principles  thereby  proclaimed,  Spain 
would  already  have  given  all  constitutional  liberties  to  Cuba  if  the  unfortu 
nate  insurrection  of  Yara  and  the  cry  of  'Death  to  Spain,'  uttered  by  some 
Cubans,  had  not  alienated  the  sympathies  of  the  nation  and  obliged  the 
government  to  accept  the  impolitic  contest  to  which  it  was  provoked;  that  a 
good  proof  of  its  desire  to  settle  in  a  liberal  sense  the  question  of  the  Antilles 
is  shown  not  only  by  the  election  of  the  deputies  of  Porto  Rico,  who  are  to 
take  their  seats  in  the  Cortes  Constituyentes  at  their  next  session,  but  also  by 
the  io8th  Article  of  the  Constitution,  in  which,  notwithstanding  the  period  in 
which  it  was  adopted,  it  was  provided  that  the  concurrence  of  the  deputies  of 
that  province  is  necessary  to  fix  the  future  form  of  government  of  the  island. 

"In  view  of  these  indisputable  facts,  and  taking  account  of  and  appreci 
ating  the  traditional  pride  of  the  Spanish  people,  the  government  considers  that 
it  can  come  to  no  definite  decision  in  regard  to  the  political  situation  and 
future  government  of  the  island  of  Cuba,  until  the  insurgents  lay  down  their 
arms  and  cease  the  struggle. 

"This  being  done,  the  government  is  disposed  to  grant  a  full  and  gener 
ous  amnesty  to  the  insurgents,  and  when  quiet  is  established,  to  proceed  to 
the  freest  election  of  representatives  of  Cuba. 

"The  national  dignity  being  thus  preserved  intact,  and  it  being  practi- 


60  THE    ORIGIN    OF    THE    WAR, 

cable  to  comply  with  the  article  of  the  Constitution,  the  moment  will  have 
arrived  for  concerting  with  its  representatives  the  necessary  measures  in  rela 
tion  to  the  legal  future  of  the  island  of  Cuba,  submitting  them  to  the  indis 
pensable  approbation  of  the  Constituent  Cortes. 

"In  conclusion,  if  the  United  States,  by  their  natural  influence  in  America, 
are  able  to  contribute  to  the  cessation  of  the  effusion  of  blood,  in  the  pacifica 
tion  of  the  island  of  Cuba,  and  its  entrance,  by  the  election  of  its  deputies, 
into  the  exercise  of  its  rights,  the  government  of  Spain  cannot  but  be  grateful 
for  these  good  offices." 

Secretary  Fish,  August  i6th,  telegraphed  General  Sickles  to  "urge  accept 
ance  on  basis  proposed  by  the  United  States. "  These  were: 

1.  The  independence  of  Cuba  to  be  acknowledged  by  Spain. 

2.  Cuba  to  pay  to  Spain  a  sum,  within  a  time  and  in  a  manner  to  be 
agreed  upon  by  them,  as  an  equivalent  for  the  entire  and  definite  relinquish- 
ment  by  Spain  of  all  her  rights  in  that  island,  including  the  public  property  of 
every  description.     If  Cuba  should  not  be  able  to  pay  the  whole  sum  at  once 
in  cash,  the  future  payments,  by  installments,  are  to  be  adequately  secured 
by  a  pledge  of  the  export  and  the  import  customs  duties  under  an  arrange 
ment  to  be  agreed  upon  for  their  collection,  in  trust,  for  the  purpose  of  secur 
ing  both  the  principal  and  interest  of   those  installments  until   their   final 
discharge. 

3.  The  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  island  of  Cuba. 

4.  An    armistice    pending    the    negotiations    for  the  settlement  above 
referred  to. 

Secretary  Fish  telegraphed  that  the  Spanish  proposition  that  the  insur 
gents  should  lay  down  their  arms  as  a  preliminary  was  "incapable  of  attain 
ment,"  and  the  ascertainment  of  the  Cubans  by  a  vote  "impracticable  because 
of  the  disorganization  of  society,"  and  the  prevalent  terrorism,  "the  violence 
and  insubordination  of  volunteers."  The  will  of  the  majority  had  been 
"recognized  and  admitted." 

On  the  date  of  this  important  dispatch  of  Secretary  Fish  (August  16, 
1869),  General  Sickles  wrote  to  him  at  length,  marking  the  dispatch  "as  confi 
dential  for  obviously  prudential  reasons."  He  reported  General  Prim  as 
saying  some  of  his  colleagues  did  not  realize  as  he  did  "the  difficulty  of  carry 
ing  on  a  war  in  America,"  and  they  had  great  deference  for  the  popular 
sentiment  in  Spain,  which  would  sacrifice  blood  and  money  for  honor.  Mr. 


THE    ORIGIN    OF    THE    WAR.  61 

Silvela,  a  lawyer  and  leader,  inclined  to  a  purely  legal  view,  while  as  for  him 
self  he  would  say  to  the  Cubans,  "Go,  if  you  will;  make  good  the  treasure  you 
have  cost  us,  and  let  me  bring  home  our  army  and  fleet,  and  consolidate  the 
liberties  of  Spain."  The  Marshal,  President  of  the  Council,  added,  with 
much  animation,  that  the  great  difficulty  in  the  way  was  the  defiant  attitude 
df  the  insurgents;  that  here  was  the  mistake  of  the  United  States,  in  propos 
ing  an  armistice  and  asking  Spain  to  treat  on  the  basis  of  independence  with 
insurgents  with  arms  in  their  hands;  and  he  added,  emphatically,  "I  am  sure 
no  human  power  could  obtain  from  the  Spanish  people  the  most  insignificant 
concession  as  long  as  the  rebellion  maintains  its  footing." 

The  reply  of  General  Sickles  stated  the  case  with  uncommon  brevity  and 
force  in  these  words : 

"No  one  appreciated  more  highly  than  the  President,"  and  it  should  be 
remembered  the  President  was  General  Grant,  "the  elevated  tone  of  the  Cab 
inet  of  Madrid,  and  that  he  would  be  the  last  to  make  any  proposal  derogatory 
lo  the  honor  of  Spain ;  that  in  his  view  a  measure  that  would  stop  the  indis 
criminate  sacrifice  of  life  and  property  in  Cuba,  pending  negotiations  for 
ulterior  arrangements,  was  prompted  as  well  by  considerations  of  humanity  as 
of  policy;  that  Great  Britain  had  recognized  the  independence  of  the  United 
States  simultaneously  with  the  cessation  of  hostilities,  and  that  if,  as  I  was 
glad  to  be  assured,  the  future  relations  of  Cuba  to  the  mother  country 
admitted  of  adjustment  hereafter  on  the  basis  of  the  independence  of  the 
colony,  then  surely  some  means  might  be  devised  by  which,  without  offense 
to  Spain,  the  conflict  could  be  arrested  pending  tire  negotiations  with  the 
United  States,  a  friendly  power  offering  its  good  offices  to  promote  a  settle 
ment."  To  this  the  General  added  "with  emphasis"  that  there  was  a  "press 
ure  of  events,"  and  President  Grant  was  embarrassed  by  the  delay,  and  that 
"unless  Spain  was  prepared  to  forego  whatever  advantage  might  be  gained 
through  the  mediation  of  the  United  States,  prompt  action  was  necessary." 
General  Sickles  concluded  this  communication,  which  substantially  summarizes 
the  negotiations  of  this  interesting  period  of  our  Cuban  solicitudes  and  con 
troversies,  with  this  valuable  paragraph  of  personal  side-light: 

"Observe  the  duplex  form  the  negotiation  receives  in  the  Spanish 
Cabinet.  The  reserve  of  the  Minister  of  State  and  the  frankness  of  the 
President  of  the  Council  are  in  striking  contrast.  The  explanation  is  to  be 
found  as  well  in  the  solicitude  of  the  Minister  of  State  to  hold  a  position 


62  THE    ORIGIN    OF    THE    WAR. 

easily  defended  in  the  Cortes,  if  the  negotiation  fail,  as  in  the  characteristics 
of  the  men ;  one  deals  with  the  question  as  a  successful  revolutionary  leader 
wielding  almost  absolute  power,  the  other  purely  as  a  jurist  and  a  parliamen 
tarian." 

The  dispatch  of  General  Sickles  to  Mr.  Fish,  dated  Madrid,  August  20, 
1869,  has  unusual  historical  importance.  On  that  day  General  Sickles  had 
met  General  Prim  by  appointment,  who  said  he  was  ready  to  argue  upon  the 
basis  of  an  arrangement  contemplating  the  independence  of  Cuba,  but  that  he 
could  not  give  to  the  arrangement  the  sanctions  of  a  treaty,  nor  submit  the 
propositions  to  the  Cortes  for  their  ratification  while  the  insurgents  were  in 
arms;  he  said  he  had  no  doubt  that  whatever  might  be  the  result  of  the  con 
flict,  Cuba  would  eventually  be  free;  that  he  recognized  with  hesitation  the 
manifest  course  of  events  on  the  American  Continent  and  the  inevitable 
termination  of  all  colonial  relations  in  their  autonomy  as  soon  as  they  were 
prepared  for  independence;  but  that  no  emergency  and  no  consideration 
would  reconcile  Spain  to  such  a  concession  until  hostilities  ceased. 

The  American  Minister  reminded  the  President  of  the  Spanish  Council 
"that  Austria  had  transferred  Venice  to  France,  and  assented  to  its  imme 
diate  transfer  to  Italy,  before  peace  was  declared;  that  the  independence  of  all 
the  American  States  had  been  recognized  at  one  time  and  another  during  the 
progress  of  hostilities;  and  that  in  coming  to  an  agreement  with  the  United 
States  on  the  subject  Spain  would  not  treat  with  the  insurgents,  but  with  a 
friendly  power,  offering  its  good  offices  to  an  old  ally."  To  these  and  like 
amplifications  of  the  argument  the  President  of  the  Spanish  Council  replied 
with  great  earnestness*and  emphasis:  "Let  the  United  States  be  assured  of 
the  good  faith  and  the  good  disposition  of  Spain,  and  especially  of  the  frank 
ness  and  sincerity  with  which  the  President  of  the  Council  has  promised  to 
treat  with  the  Cabinet  at  Washington,  on  the  basis  of  the  independence  of 
Cuba,  as  soon  as  it  is  possible  to  do  so  consistently  with  the  dignity  and  honoi 
of  Spain;  formidable  as  the  insurrection  of  Cuba  may  become,  it  has  not  yet 
approached  the  proportions  of  any  of  those  conflicts  in  which  governments 
have  found  themselves  constrained  to  treat  during  hostilities.  The  Cuban 
insurgents  hold  no  city  or  fortresses;  they  have  no  port,  no  ships;  they  have 
no  army  that  presumes  to  offer  or  accept  battle ;  and  now,  before  the  period 
arrives  for  active  operations,  when  Spain  will  send  the  ample  reinforcements 
she  holds  in  readiness,  it  is  only  necessary  for  the  Cubans  to  accept  the  assur- 


ii 


^jV  Courtesy  of  Frank  ft.  Roberson. 
ADMIRAL  DEWEY  UNDER  THE  "OLYMPIADS"  BIG  GUNS. 


By  Courtesy  of  Frank  R.  Roberson. 
ADMIRAL  DEWEY  AND  STAFF  ON  THE  "OLYMPIA.1 


THE    ORIGIN    OF    THE    WAR.  65 

ance  of  the  United  States,  given  on  the  faith  of  Spain,  that  they  may  have 
their  independence  by  laying  down  their  arms,  electing  their  deputies,  and 
declaring  their  wish  to  be  free  by  vote  of  the  people." 

This  conversation  is  able  on  both  sides  and  sheds  a  strong  light  upon 
the  Cuban-Spanish  situation  for  a  quarter  of  a  century,  reaching  from 
the  time  since  the  Treaty  of  Paris  between  the  United  States  and  Spain 
was  signed. 

In  the  course  of  the  amplification  of  the  conversation  (August  20,  1869,  of 
General  Prim  and  General  Sickles),  the  Spanish  General  said,  "Between  the 
revolutionary  movements  by  which  the  Republics  of  the  Western  Continent 
gained  their  independence,  and  the  Cuban  insurrection,  there  was  a  vast 
difference."  In  the  examples  quoted,  "negotiation  was  resorted  to  after  cam 
paigns  had  been  fought,  and  battles  lost  and  gained;  they  had  armies  in  the 
field  and  organized  governments  supporting  them.  We  see  nothing  of  this  in 
Cuba;  only  mere  roving  bands,  who  fly  when  they  are  pursued,  and  who  have 
never  been  found  in  numbers  sufficient  to  give  or  accept  battle.  It  is  very 
possible  that  in  the  lapse  of  time  the  insurrection  may  become  more  formi 
dable;  it  may  raise  armies;  it  may  take  cities  and  fortified  places;  it  may 
demonstrate,  what  has  not  yet  been  in  any  way  demonstrated,  that  it  is  sup 
ported  by  the  majoiity  of  the  population  In  that  case  Spain  will  have  some 
thing  tangible  to  treat  with.  But  we  hope  to  avoid  all  this  bloodshed, 
disaster,  and  ruin  by  making  some  amicable  arrangement  now.  It  is  impos 
sible  for  us  to  treat  with  Cubans  now,  but  the  United  States,  when  once 
convinced  of  the  good  intentions  and  good  faith  of  the  Spanish  government, 
can  then  assure  the  Cubans  that  by  following  the  programme  I  have  indi 
cated,  they  can  have  their  liberty  without  firing  another  shot." 

The  reply  of  Mr.  Fish  by  telegram,  August  24,  was: 

"Washington,  August  24,  1869. — The  propositions  of  Spain  are  incom 
patible  with  any  practicable  negotiation.  The  representatives  of  the  insur 
rectionary  government  are  necessary  parties  to  a  negotiation.  Free 
communication  through  the  Spanish  lines  is  immediately  necessary. 

"The  United  States  cannot  ask  the  insurgents  to  lay  down  their  arms 
unless  the  volunteers  are  simultaneously  effectually  disarmed,  and  in 
faith  disbanded.  This,  if  practicable,  would  require  time.  We 
arrest  the  destruction  of  life  and  property,  and  to  stop  the  outrages  and  annoy 
ances  to  our  citizens.  An  armistice  would  effect  this  immediately,  and  the 


66  THE    ORIGIN    OF    THE    WAR. 

terms  of  the  compensation  to  be  made  to  Spain  by  Cuba  could  then  be 
arranged  between  them  under  the  mediation  of  the  United  States. 

"You  may  say  that  we  deem  an  armistice  indispensable  to  the  success  of 
any  negotiation.  Spain  may  in  honor  grant  this  at  the  request  of  the  United 
States,  and  in  deference  to  the  wishes  of  a  friendly  power,  whose  good  offices 
she  is  willing  to  accept.  This  being  done,  negotiations  can  immediately  be 
opened  that  will  probably  result  in  peace,  and  her  receiving  a  fair  compensa 
tion." 

This  dispatch  might  have  closed  the  negotiation,  though  there  was  a 
great  deal  more  correspondence.  There  was  a  resulting  difficulty  then  as  later 
and  now  in  the  intangibility  of  the  ostentatious  Cuban  government.  It  was 
unfortunate  that  there  was  on  both  sides  a  strained  sense  of  the  necessity  of 
much  formality,  and  there  were  far-reaching  consequences  that  could  net  be 
measured  with  exactness  and  weighed  as  fixed  and  determining  events  for 
many  days.  The  Spaniards  might  have  recognized  as  something  sufficiently 
formidable  to  demand  their  business  as  well  as  distinguished  consideration, 
the  bands  of  guerrillas  who  were  so  desperate  and  tenacious  that  a  treaty  was 
made  with  their  leaders  nine  years  later.  Statesmanship  in  Spain  could  have 
saved  the  desolation  of  the  island  and  the  infliction  of  frightful  calamities 
upon  a  million  people  who  were  innocent  of  political  crime  and  of  military 
belligerency.  Spain  did  not  close  the  ten  years'  war  without  negotiating 
with  insurgents  who  did  not  put  up  their  arms,  and  the  vain  presumption  that 
caused  long  delay  cost  her  dearly. 

The  words,  "honor  of  Spain,"  that  stood  there  obstructive,  were  often 
unrealities.  The  Spanish  excitement  about  the  rumors  that  the  Cubans  would 
be  recognized  as  belligerents  was  not  called  for.  They  would  themselves 
more  than  their  enemies  have  been  gainers  by  the  acknowledgment  of  the 
United  States  that  the  Cubans  were  belligerents.  If  the  claim  of  the  Spanish 
Premier  that  there  was  a  vast  difference  between  the  Cuban  revolt  and  the 
revolutions  that  resulted  in  the  independent  States  established  in  Spanish 
America  was  a  detail  in  part  true,  then  there  should  have  been  no  objec 
tion  to  overlooking  it.  The  grievances  of  the  people  of  Cuba  are  the  same  as 
those  of  the  Mexicans  and  the  Central  and  Southern  Americans;  and  there 
sTfrnds  the  poetic  record  that  "freedom's  battle  once  begun,  bequeathed 
from  bleeding  sire  to  son,  though  baffled  oft,  is  always  won."  The  decision 
of  the  United  States  government,  U.  S.  Giant,  President,  and  Hamilton  Fish, 


THE    ORIGIN    OF    THE    WAR.  67 

Secretary  of  State,  pronounced  against  the  concession  of  belligerency  to  the 
Cubans,  was  on  the  grounds  generally  that  the  Spaniards  rested  their  protest 
upon.  The  impossible  issue,  according  to  the  correspondence,  was  imaginary. 
The  study  of  our  diplomatic  correspondence,  however,  fails  to  be  convincing 
that  the  government  of  the  United  States  left  nothing  undone,  to  deal  with 
Marshal  Prim,  taking  him  at  his  word  that  for  a  sum  of  money  not  extortionate 
or  extravagant,  the  Cubans  might  have  had  their  liberties  under  the  protective 
possession  of  the  United  States  without  firing  a  gun  after  September,  1869. 
In  the  twenty-nine  years  that  have  passed,  Cuba,  no  matter  how  made  free, 
would  have  been  Americanized  and  ours — and  the  most  prosperous  island  in 
the  world,  instead  of  the  most  desolate  and  horror-haunted. 

Mr.  Fish,  September  i5th,  telegraphed  the  Minister  of  Spain:  "Omit 
ting  the  plebiscite,  can  the  President  of  Council  give  assurance  that  if  the 
United  States  induced  the  insurgents  to  lay  down  arms,  and  deputies  to  the 
Cortes  be  elected  by  Cuba,  that  the  Cortes  will  grant  independence?  The 
plebiscite  is  impracticable,  because  in  the  present  circumstances  and  conditions 
of  the  island  a  popular  vote  can  be  no  indication  of  the  popular  will." 

There  is  an  abiding  embarrassment  in  Cuba,  in  the  lack  of  means  to 
record  reliably  the  popular  will.  The  telegram  of  the  i5th  approached  the 
practical  too  nearly  to  be  accepted  as  possible,  but  on  September  25th  a 
dispatch  from  the  Minister  at  Madrid  catalogued  the  following  fair  promises: 

"Resume  of  interview  last  evening  with  President  of  Council: 

"Plebiscitum  not  insisted  upon.  Election  of  deputies  required  by  consti 
tution;  indispensable  preliminary  to  independence.  Measures  already  taken 
to  disarm  volunteers  simultaneously  with  cessation  of  hostilities.  Severe  and 
positive  order  given  to  stop  the  scandalous  execution  of  captives  and  like 
cruelties.  General  de  Rodas  promises  to  do  so  at  all  hazards. 

"A  decree  will  be  promulgated  forthwith  for  the  gradual  abolition  of 
slavery.  Government  will  proceed  with  liberal  reforms  without  waiting  for 
termination  of  war." 

•But  at  this  hopeful  opening  Spain  insisted  that  our  offer  of  mediation 
should  be  withdrawn,  for  "the  Spanish  Cabinet  distinguish  between  mediation 
and  good  offices.  To  prevent  recognition  of  belligerents  they  seem  anxious 
to  hold  us  to  our  offer  of  good  offices,  while  declining  mediation  as  long  as 
there  is  hope  of  suppressing  insurrection." 

October   i,  1869,  the  Spanish  Cortes  met.     The  United  States'  offer  of 


68  THE    ORIGIN    OF    THE    WAR. 

"good  offices"  was  withdrawn,  and  Mr.  Silvela  wrote  to  General  Sickles  that 
the  Spanish  government  would  not  have  consented  to  the  independence  of 
Cuba,  because,  even  if  they  had  wished  it,  it  was  "not  within  their  compe 
tence  to  consent  to  a  dismemberment  of  the  territory  of  this  monarchy,  with 
out  the  permission  and  the  authorization  of  the  Cortes;  but  the  Cortes,  far 
from  permitting  and  authorizing  this,  manifested  by  a  unanimous  resolution  of 
their  permanent  commission  that  they  were  ready  to  lend  their  entire  support 
to  the  government,  in  an  elevated  and  dignified  policy  in  the  Cuban  question, 
calculated  to  preserve  the  integrity  of  the  territory  and  the  national  honor. ' ' 

September  nth  Secretary  Fish  telegraphed  the  Minister  of  the  United 
States  to  Spain : 

"We  hope  there  is  no  truth  in  the  rumor  that  Spain  is  about  to  send 
additional  troops  to  Cuba.  It  would  exhibit  a  want  of  confidence  in  the  pend 
ing  negotiation  that  might  compel  the  withdrawal  of  the  offer  of  this  govern 
ment  to  attempt  a  reconciliation.  It  might  prolong  the  struggle,  and  the 
destruction  of  life  and  property,  with  questionable  influence  on  the  result.  It 
certainly  would  embarrass  the  negotiations." 

The  Secretary  requested  to  be  advised  of  the  sending  of  additional  Span 
ish  troops  to  Cuba.  The  answer  to  this  dispatch  was  in  the  form  of  a  news 
paper  publication  as  follows,  correctly  described  by  Mr.  Sickles  in  transmitting 
a  translation  as  an  "interesting  document." 

(From  the  Gaceta,  December  5,  1869.) 

"The  President  of  the  Council  said:  'Last  Saturday  Senor  Navarro  y 
Rodrigo  addressed  certain  inquiries  to  the  minister  of  war  which  I  could  not 
answer  immediately.  I  said,  however,  that  there  had  gone  to  Cuba  thirty- 
thousand  men,  and  to-day  I  will  read  a  statement  of  land  and  sea  forces,  and 
of  the  material  which  has  gone  to  Cuba  since  the  revolution,  because  this 
proves  the  vitality  and  energy  of  the  government  and  of  all  Spain  exercised 
in  the  preservation  of  the  island  of  Cuba. 

"'The  first  forces  which  went  there  were  771  volunteers;  then  5,400 
men  of  the  regular  service ,  afterwards  the  series  of  battalions  which  were 
asked  for  by  General  Dulce*  (may  he  rest  in  peace!);  1,000  went  from  Baza, 
1,000  from  Chiclana,  1,000  from  San  Quintin,  and  1,000  from  Simancas,  who 
were  so  thoroughly  equipped  that  they  were  about  to  take  the  field  imme 
diately  on  their  arrival.  Since  that  the  successive  departures  have  reached  a 

*  Driven  from  Cuba  by  the  Volunteers 


THE    ORIGIN    OF    THE    WAR.  6; 

total  of  20,966  of  the  army  of  the  peninsula;  of  marines,  2,600;  of  recruits, 
i,  371 ;  and  of  volunteers,  9,563;  which  gives  a  total  of  34,500  men,  according 
to  the  accompanying  statement.  I  would  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  this 
immense  sum  would  represent  a  great  effort  for  any  nation  whatever. 

"  'There  have  gone  also  14  ships  of  war,  among  them  two  iron-clad 
frigates;  a  complete  equipment  for  a  regiment  of  mountain  artillery,  with  24 
pieces,  24  caissons  for  artillery  of  8  centimeters  bore;  20  Krupp  steel  guns, 
of  8  centimeters  bore;  4,000  projectiles  for  the  same;  5,000  kilograms  of 
powder;  7,400,000  cartridges  of  14^  caliber,  model  of  1857  and  1859;  1,000,- 
ooo  metallic  cartridges  for  needle  guns;  10,500,000  caps;  15,000  kilograms  of 
lead;  9,600  carbines,  model  of  1857;  3,600  muskets,  model  of  1859;  8,000 
Enfield  rifles;  3,oooBerdan;  500  short  carbines;  1,000  lances;  2,000  sabers. '' 

Estimate  of  the  Spanish  forces  composing  the  "Army  of  Cuba,"  compiled 
from  the  statement  published  in  La  Iberia  of  December  26,  1869,  and  from 
semi-official  sources  of  information.  The  strength  of  battalions,  batteries, 
and  squadrons  conforms  to  the  regulations  of  the  Spanish  service: 


INFANTRY. 

Eight  regiments  of  infantry  of  the  line,  two  bat 
talions  of  eight  hundred  each 12,800 

Twenty-five  battalions  of  light  infantry,  one  thou 
sand  each 25,000 

Two    battalions   of    the    guard — all    veterans — one 

thousand  each 2,000 

Two  battalions  of  militia  (estimated) 1,600 

Eleven  battalions  of  infantry,  organized  in  Cuba 
(estimated  to  be  of  the  same  strength  as  penin 
sular  light  infantry)  11,000 

52,400 

ARTILLERY. 

One  regiment,  two  battalions  of  four  batteries  each 

— eight  companies 1,000 

One  regiment  of  mountain  artillery,  t\vo  battalions 

of  four  batteries  each — eight  companies     .     .     .       1,000 

2,000 


70  THE    ORIGIN    OF    THE    WAR. 

Field  artillery  being  organized,  force  not  stated. 

CAVALRY. 

Twenty-five  squadrons — fifty  companies  of  one  hundred  and 

fifty  each  (full  strength  in  Spanish  army)      .     .     .     .     .        7,500 

ENGINEERS. 

One  battalion — ten  companies  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  each        1,500 

MARINES. 

Four  battalions   . 


Beside  these  forces  in  the  field,  there  are  more  than  forty 

thousand  volunteer  troops  doing  garrison  duty       .     .     .      40,000 


Grand  total 107,400 

RECAPITULATION. 

Infantry,  fifty-six  battalions 52,000 

Artillery,  four  battalions,  sixty-four  guns 2,000 

Cavalry,  twenty-five  squadrons 7,5°° 

Engineers,  one  battalion  . 1,500 

Marines,  four  battalions 4,000 

Volunteers  doing  garrison  duty 40,000 

Total 107,400 

Responding  to  these  figures,  correctly  described  as  "interesting,"  Secre 
tary  Fish,  January  26,  1870,  made  the  following  very  interesting  and  pertinent 
statement  and  suggestion : 

"The  public  interest  felt  in  the  United  States  in  the  Cuban  struggle  has 
decreased  since  the  flagrant  violations  of  laws  by  the  agents  of  the  insurgents 
became  known,  and  alienated  the  popular  sympathy. 

"Had  the  Cuban  Junta  expended  their  money  and  energy  in  sending  to 
the  insurgents  arms  and  munitions  of  war,  as  they  might  have  done  con 
sistently  with  our  own  statutes  and  with  the  law  of  nations,  instead  of  devoting 
them  to  deliberate  violation  of  the  laws  of  the  United  States;  and  had  they, 
in  lieu  of  illegally  employing  persons  within  the  dominion  of  the  United  States 


THE    ORIGIN    OF    THE    WAR.  71 

to  go  in  armed  bands  to  Cuba,  proceeded  thither  unarmed  themselves  to  take 
personal  part  in  the  struggle  for  independence,  it  is  possible  that  the  result 
would  have  been  different  in  Cuba,  and  it  is  certain  that  there  would  have 
been  a  more  ardent  feeling  in  the  United  States  in  favor  of  their  cause,  and 
more  respect  for  their  own  sincerity  and  personal  courage." 

But  the  Secretary,  as  if  forese'eing  the  emergency  that  confronted  Presi 
dent  McKinley,  twenty-eight  years  after,  remarked  over  the  contention 
regarding  the  belligerency  demanded,  for  and  against: 

''Should  Spain,  after  her  great  and  exhaustive  effort,  fail  to  restore  a  state 
of  peace  on  the  island,  the  President  must  reserve  to  himself  a  complete 
liberty  of  action  in  that  event." 

The  favored  Spanish  method  of  putting  down  rebellion,  the  knowledge  of 
which,  no  doubt,  caused  the  inquiries  of  Secretary  Fish  about  troops  from 
Spain  to  pacificate  Cuba,  is  found  in  the  following  proclamation  of  evil  fame: 
(From  the  Diario  de  la  Marina,  April  29,  1869 — Translation.) 

"The  Redactor  (of  St.  Jago  de  Cuba),  in  its  number  of  2ist  instant,  pub 
lishes  the  following  important  proclamation  of  General  Count  Valmaseda: 

"Inhabitants  of  the  country!  The  reinforcements  of  troops  that  I  have 
been  waiting  for  have  arrived;  with  them  I  shall  give  protection  to  the  good, 
and  punish  promptly  those  that  still  remain  in  rebellion  against  the  govern 
ment  of  the  metropolis. 

"You  know  that  I  have  pardoned  those  that  have  fought  us  with  arms; 
that  your  wives,  mothers,  and  sisters  have  found  in  me  the  unexpected  pro 
tection  that  you  have  refused  them.  You  know,  also,  that  many  of  those  I 
have  pardoned  have  turned  against  us  again. 

"Before  such  ingratitude,  such  villainy,  it  is  not  possible  for  me  to  be  the 
man  that  I  have  been;  there  is  no  longer  a  place  for  a  falsified  neutrality;  he 
that  is  not  for  me  is  against  me,  and  that  my  soldiers  may  know  how  to 
distinguish,  you  hear  the  order  they  carry: 

"  i st.  Every  man,  from  the  age  of  fifteen  years,  upward,  found  away  from 
his  habitation  (finca),  and  does  not  prove  a  justified  motive  therefor,  will  be 
shot. 

"2d.     Every  habitation  unoccupied  will  be  burned  by  the  troops. 

"3d.  Every  habitation  from  which  does  not  float  a  white  flag,  as  a  signal 
that  its  occupants  desire  peace,  will  be  reduced  to  ashes. 

"Women  that  are  not  living  at  their  own  homes,  or  at  the  house  of  their 


72  THE    ORIGIN    OF    THE    WAR. 

relatives,  will  collect  in  the  town  of  Jiguani,  or  Bayamo,  where  maintenance 
will  be  provided.  Those  who  do  not  present  themselves  will  be  conducted 
forcibly. 

"The  foregoing  determinations  will  commence  to  take  effect  on  the  i4th 
of  the  present  month.  EL  CONDE  DE  VALMASEDA. 

"BAYAMO,  April  4,  1869." 

This  proclamation  offered  an  ample  reason  for  the  objection,  which  was 
regarded  as  somewhat  obstinate,  of  the  insurgents  to  throw  down  their  arms, 
if  promised  by  Spain  "simultaneous  amnesty."  However  "liberal,"  accord 
ing  to  their  views,  the  Spanish  ministers  and  commanding  officers  in  the  army 
might  be,  there  were  many  things  that  displayed  the  implacable  temper  of 
the  populace  of  Spain,  and  of  the  Spanish  volunteers  in  Cuba.  The  spirit  of 
the  volunteers  was  shown  in  deposing  Captain  General  Dulce  June  2,  1869. 
Mr.  Hall,  consul  at  Matansas,  reported  the  governor  of  that  important  juris 
diction  thrown  out  by  the  volunteers  because  he  was  a  friend  of  Dulce  and 
refused  to  deliver  up  to  them  an  insurgent;  and  it  appeared  to  be  a  part  of 
their  programme  to  displace  every  Cuban  holding  any  official  position  what 
ever,  as  also  every  "peninsular"  Spaniard  whose  family  connections  might 
lead  him  in  any  way  to  sympathize  with  the  natives  of  Cuba.  These  incidents 
identify  the  character  of  the  Cuban  insurrection  with  the  movements  in  con 
tinental  colonies.  Mr.  Plum,  Consul  at  Havana,  wrote  Mr.  Fish,  two  days 
after  the  deposition  of  Dulce: 

"On  the  2d  instant,  a  captain-general  of  Cuba  was  displaced  from  his 
command  by  the  resident  Spaniards  of  the  island.  This  event,  without 
precedent  here,  opens  an  epoch  in  the  history  of  this  Spanish  possession. 
Some  fifty  years  ago  a  similar  event  occurred  in  Mexico.  An  insurrection  had 
been  for  some  time  in  progress  there,  and  either  induced  by  the  course  of 
events  at  home,  or  from  dissatisfaction  at  the  conduct  of  the  war,  the  resident 
Spaniards  deposed  the  viceroy.  A  new  viceroy  was  sent  out,  but  arrived  too 
late,  and  no  other  representative  of  the  mother  country  ever  succeeded  to  the 
place.  The  resident  Spaniards  there,  as  soon  as  they  cut  loose  from  entire 
obedience  to  the  home  authorities,  turned  the  scale  in  favor  of  independence." 
The  core  of  the  subject  was  stated  by  Mr.  Plum,  describing  the  business  men 
of  the  island:  "They  incline  to  the  idea  of  taking  the  management  of  affairs 
here,  in  the  name  of  the  mother  country,  more  or  less  in  their  own  hands. 
They  are  residents,  identified  to  a  great  extent  with  the  prosperity  of  the 


THE    ORIGIN    OF    THE    WAR. 


73 


island,  having  their  business  and  their  property  here,  and  as  the  island  has 
to  pay  its  own  expenses,  contributing1  largely,  many  of  them,  to  the  burden 
of  the  support  of  the  war,  both  by  their  money,  and  now  by  their  time  as 
volunteers.  They  desire  to  see  the  war  ended,  and  to  have  the  former  tran 
quillity,  upon  which  their  prosperity  depends,  restored.  They  may  believe, 
especially  as  liberal  institutions  are  urged  in  Spain,  that  they  have  as  full 
right  and  are  as  capable  to  manage  the  affairs  of  the  island,  of  which  they 
are  the  loyal  residents,  as  officials  without  any  local  interests  or  responsibili 
ties,  sent  out  from  home  to  make  their  fortunes  from  the  public  revenues,  not 
in  commerce  and  industry,  here.  Yet,  until  now  the  resident  Spaniards  in 
business  or  having  property  here  have  had  little  more  chance  than  the  native 
Cubans  to  participate  in  the  government  of  the  island.  All  the  offices,  mainly, 
have  been  rilled  by  frequently  renewed  officials,  sent  out  for  the  purpose  from 
Spain.  The  consequence  has  been  that  the  public  burdens  are  felt  to  be 
unnecessarily  increased,  and  now  the  feeling  has  been  engendered  that  the 
military  operations  against  the  insurrection  have  not  been  energetically  con 
ducted  by  those  who,  if  they  fail  here,  not  having  any  identification  with  the 
island,  simply  return  home  to  the  mother  country,  leaving  the  Spanish  resi 
dents  to  their  fate,  or,  in  some  instances,  it  may  be  believed  that  these  officials 
have  been  too  lenient,  or  have  inclined  too  much  in  favor  of  the  insurrection, 
which,  if  it  is  successful,  would  place  the  control  of  the  island  in  native  Cuban 
rather  than  resident  Spanish  hands." 

It  is  in  these  men,  not  of  the  Spanish  residents,  the  volunteers  or  the 
professional  rural  insurgents,  that  the  United  States  will  find  the  people  of  Cuba 
capable  of  political  organization  and  policy.  It  should  be  the  popular  under 
standing  in  this  country  that  there  is  a  distinction  between  the  people  of  Cuba 
and  the  representatives  of  the  New  York  Junta,  a  community  of  Cubans  who 
should  not  be  allowed  to  monopolize  the  patriotism  of  the  island  or  to  have 
exclusive  charge  of  its  resources. 


CHAPTER    II. 

The  American  Minister  to  Spain  in  our  Centennial  Year  Feared  War. 

A  Remarkable  Correspondence— Suggestive  of  the  Doom  of  Spanish  Rule— The  Gradual 
Approaches  of  the  Spanish  War — A  Circular  Claiming  the  Cuban  Rebellion  was 
Crushed — Gushing  as  Master  of  Ceremonies — General  Grant's  Personality. 

Mr.  Gushing  attached  the  greatest  importance  to  the  meeting  of  General 
Schenck  and  Lord  Derby,  even  disturbing  Secretary  Fish  with  a  lurid  dream 
of  war,  if  England  did  not  stand  shoulder  to  shoulder  with  us.  This  was  a 
matter  evidently  in  which  Mr.  Gushing  took  his  intellectual  exercises  too 
seriously.  He  conferred  fully  with  the  British  Minister  to  Spain,  on  the  even 
ing  of  December  5,  1875,  and  the  Minister,  whose  words  were  expected  to 
be  so  momentous,  was  found  of  the  opinion  that  "the  present  is  a  very 
unfavorable  moment  for  attempting  intervention,  friendly  or  other,  between 
Spain  and  the  insurgent  Cubans.  People  in  Spain  are  now  animated  and 
hopeful  as  to  both  civil  wars,  in  view  of  the  large  reinforcements  recently  sent 
to  Cuba,  of  the  pacification  of  Valencia  and  Cataluna,  and  of  the  extensive 
military  preparations  for  moving  on  the  positions  of  the  Vasco-Navarrese. 
Spain  needs,  he  thinks,  to  be  left  to  try  the  experiment  of  the  operations  of 
this  winter.  They  are  not  likely  to. succeed,  at  least  not  in  Cuba;  and  if 
interfered  with  now,  she  will  attribute  the  failure  which  is  to  come  not  to  her 
own  weakness  or  the  strength  of  the  insurgents,  but  to  the  disturbing  action 
of  the  United  States.  But,  left  to  herself,  and  thus  failing,  she  will  then  feel 
discouraged  in  proportion  as  she  now  feels  exalted,  and  will  be  in  the  mood 
to  listen  to  judicious  counsels,  whether  coming  from  the  United  States  or 
from  Great  Britain. 

"These  remarks  of  Mr.  Layard  could  not  fail  to  impress  me,  and  so  much 
the  more,  in  consonance  as  they  were  with  the  views  expressed  in  my  note  of 
the  3oth  of  October. 

"The  impression  which  Lord  Derby's  observations  to  General  Schenck 

74 


THE    AMERICAN    MINISTER    TO    SPAIN.  75 

make  on  my  mind  is  that  of  a  disposition  on  the  part  of  the  British  govern 
ment  to  aid  us  in  a  mediatory  form  rather  than  as  a  cooperator  in  the  exercise 
of  forcible  pressure  on  Spain. 

"Our  advance  to  Great  Britain  in  the  present  question  insures  good  offices 
at  least,  and  may  go  further." 

Nothing  turned  out  precisely  as  Mr.  Gushing  feared  and  prophesied,  but 
there  was  no  effacement  of  his  superb  complacency,  and  no  abatement  in  the 
course  of  his  admirable  confidence.  January  4th  he  wrote  in  his  international 
capacity  to  the  State  Department: 

"Speculation  is  active  as  to  the  ultimate  question  of  what  the  United 
States  will  do  if  left  alone  by  other  powers — whether  the  President  will  inter 
vene  by  force,  and  if  so,  whether  in  armed  alliance  with  Spain,  or  whether  in 
arms  against  her  and  in  aid  of  the  insurgents,  which  it  is  assumed  would  be 
war.  Observation  of  what  is  going  on  at  the  present  time  in  Constantinople 
respecting  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  and  what  occurred  there  formerly  in  the 
matter  of  Greece,  leads  many  persons  to  anticipate  the  development  of  a 
similar  series  of  incidents  at  Madrid  as  respects  Cuba." 

Nothing  in  the  newspapers  escaped  Mr.  Gushing.  The  journals  of 
Madrid,  Paris,  London  and  New  York  were  searched  with  ceaseless  assiduity. 
One  day  Mr.  Gushing  reviewed  the  London  Times,  the  next  the  Madrid 
sheets  were  scrutinized  and  annotated.  The  Galignani  Messenger  and  the 
Havas  Agency  were  mustered  in  and  reviewed.  Even  the  dispatches  from 
Philadelphia  to  the  London  Times  could  not  escape,  and  at  last  the  Minister 
appeared  as  a  New  York  newspaper  expert  in  the  paragraph  annexed : 

"A  letter,  purporting  to  be  addressed  from  Madrid  to  the  New  York 
Herald  of  the  isth  ultimo,  puzzles  me.  Supposing  that  the  pretense  of  inter 
view  with  Mr.  Canovas  del  Castillo  and  Mr.  Ruiz  Gomez,  two  of  the  Spanish 
gentlemen  plainly  alluded  to,  is  fictitious,  yet  the  fact  remains  that  although 
the  Herald  has  a  correspondent  here,  yet  he  did  not  arrive  until  after  the 
date  of  this  letter;  and  no  American  has  been  here  capable  of  entering  so 
minutely  or  intelligently  into  the  question  at  issue.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is 
not  easy  to  suppose  (although  it  is  possible)  that  with  the  aid  of  some  Span 
iard  of  considerable  political  and  juridical  experience,  such  as  are  continually 
passing  between  Spain  and  Cuba,  the  letter  may  have  been  got  up  in  New 
York. 

"On  the  whole,  although  the  letter  contains  errors  of  fact  and  of  language 


76  THE    AMERICAN    MINISTER    TO    SPAIN. 

which  a  Spaniard  of  the  instruction  of  Mr.  Ruiz  Gomez,  for  instance,  would 
not  have  committed,  still  the  matter  of  the  letter  may  have  been  prepared 
here  by  some  Spaniard  of  intelligence  desirous  of  thus  making  his  views 
known  to  the  people  of  the  United  States,  and  sent  to  New  York  to  be  worked 
into  its  present  shape  in  the  office." 

Of  course,  it  is  improbable  that  Mr.  Gushing,  in  the  plenitude  of  his 
labors,  could  have  dictated  the  production  of  the  mysterious  letter  that  puzzled 
him,  but  it  is  not  impossible.  The  facilities  of  journalism  are  equal  to  inven 
tions  even  more  involved  than  this  presumption. 

Speedily  Mr.  Gushing  quoted  "the  Epoca  ministerial  journal,"  and  El 
Cornista,  El  Tempo,  The  Cologne  Gazette,  and  the  Presse  of  Vienna,  took 
turns  of  examination  along  with  New  York  and  London  papers,  and  January 
8  and  10,  1876,  the  annexed  papers  were  produced: 

(Mr.  Gushing  to  Mr.  Fish.) 

"Legation  of  the  United  States,  Madrid,  January  8,  1876.  —  Sir:  The 
ministerial  journals  of  last  evening  continue  to  rejoice  over  the  tenor  of  the 
communique  of  the  Marquis  de  Molins,  reported  in  my  No.  748,  of  the  4th 
instant. 

"They  now  publish  a  variation  by  way  of  New  York  and  London,  as 
follows : 

"  'The  [American]  government  admits  having  sent  to  the  European 
Powers  a  circular  respecting  the  affairs  of  Cuba. 

"  'It  denies  having  proposed  a  confederation  of  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico 
under  a  Spanish  governor,  but  it  does  not  publish  the  text  of  the  circular. ' 

"All  this,  pursue  the  journals  in  question,  is  nothing  but  the  document 
so  coldly  received  by  the  Powers  to  which  it  was  read  by  the  representatives 
of  the  United  States. 

"But,  nevertheless,  in  the  very  same  journals  appears  the  following  tele 
graphic  item,  which  seems  likely  to  put  a  new  face  on  things,  namely: 

"  'Berlin,  January  7. — It  is  positively  asserted  that  the  German  govern 
ment  shows  itself  favorable  to  the  American  circular  relative  to  Cuba,  in  conse 
quence  of  the  injuries  which  the  present  situation  of  the  island  involves  to  the 
commerce  of  Germany. ' 

"I  hear  nothing  further  as  to  the  alleged  intentions  of  Great  Britain. 

"I  have,  etc.,  C.  CUSHING. 

"P.  S. — Since  the  above  dispatch  was  written  the  London  Times  has  come 


THE    AMERICAN    MINISTER    TO    SPAIN. 

to  hand,  containing  a  telegram  from   Vienna,  which  is  annexed.     It  is  con 
fused,  illogical,  and  incorrect,  like  all  such  telegraphic  reports. 

"If  'Cuba'  is  a  European  question,  of  'incalculable  consequences,'  as 
the  telegram  asserts,  then  you  had  good  cause  to  consult  Europe,  and  Europe 
has  good  cause  to  act  in  the  premises." 

(Mr.  Cushing  to  Mr.  Fish.) 

"Legation  of  the  United  States,  Madrid,  January  10,  1876. — Sir:  I  annex 
translation  of  an  article  from  the  Cronista,  a  serious  ministerial  paper, 
containing  a  very  formal  semi-official  denial  of  the  alleged  concurrence 
of  Germany  in  the  suggestion  by  the  United  States  of  intervention  in  Cuba. 

"There  is  report  here  of  the  capture  of  a  German  vessel  charged  with 
supplying  arms  to  rebels  in  the  Filipinas.  Count  Hatzfeldt  informs  me  that 
he  has  no  information  respecting  the  affair,  but  apprehends  it  will  be  the 
occasion  of  unpleasant  controversy. 

"I  annex  translation  of  an  article  on  the  subject  from  a  ministerial  jour 
nal  of  respectability,  the  Tiempo. 

"I  have  the  honor,  etc.,  C.   CUSHING." 

(Translation    of    article  from    El  Cronista  of  January  8,    1876.) 

"A  dispatch  of  the  Agencia  Fabra  from  Berlin,  which  we  published  yes 
terday,  as  did  our  contemporaries,  gave  news,  which  would  be  grave  if  true, 
that  the  German  government  showed  itself  favorable  toward  the  American 
circular  referring  to  Cuba,  because  of  the-  damage  brought  upon  German 
commerce  by  the  condition  of  the  island. 

"Duly  informed,  we  are  able  to  assert  that  the  statement  referred  to  is 
not  true,  and  that  the  Cabinet  of  Berlin  continues  to  express  the  greatest 
sympathies  for  our  country. 

"The  circular  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  has  not  met  with 
a  favorable  reception  from  any  European  power." 

(Translation   of   article    from   El  Tiempo  of    January  8,  1876.) 

"We  again  call  the  attention  of  the  government  toward  our  possessions  in 
the  Philippine  Archipelago.  We  know  that  the  enemies  of  Spanish  integrity 

frest  not,  although  their  affairs  in  London  have  recently  assumed  a  bad  aspect, 
and  that  the  English  government  looks  upon  them  with  suspicion. 
"Upon  that  immense  network  of  islands  of  Oceanica  belonging  to  Spain 
they  have  fixed  their  vision.     They  do  not  overlook  that  these  offer  excellent 


78  THE    AMERICAN    MINISTER    TO    SPAIN. 

positions,  and  they  will  take  advantage  of  every  opportunity  to  snatch  some 
one  of  the  rich  pearls  of  so  precious  a  jewel. 

"There,  more  than  anywhere,  will  they  direct  their  efforts,  because  else 
where  they  will  find  immediate  opposition  from  first-class  powers.  If  there 
be  vigilance,  more  than  sufficient  is  Spanish  patriotism  against  all  conspir 
acies,  native  or  foreign ;  and  not  for  a  moment  do  we  doubt  that  there  will  be 
such  (conspiracies),  as  is  proved  by  the  news  which  gives  rise  to  these  lines." 

Mr.  Gushing' s  frequent  translations  from  Spanish  papers  were  full  of 
information,  and  certainly  gave  the  Secretary  of  State  the  phases  of  the  public 
opinion  of  Madrid,  and  so  clear  were  they  that  they  lighted  up  later  events. 

The  Epoca  of  Madrid,  January  14,  1876,  said  of  the  Cubans:  "The  only 
thing  we  know  for  certain  is  that  the  religion  of  the  insurgents  is  idolatry, 
which  must  be  very  gratifying  for  the  traitors,  who,  in  order  to  escape  merited 
chastisement,  go  to  swell  the  ranks  of  the  rebels."  And  here  is  an  editorial 
article  from  El  Cronista,  Madrid,  January  14,  1876:  "The  right  which  is  now 
the  right  of  Spain  in  the  affairs  of  Cuba  is  so  clear  and  so  patent  that  it  could 
not  fail  to  have  been  recognized,  even  though  shamefacedly  and  in  private 
circles,  by  the  President  of  the  United  States,  General  Grant.  We  were  right 
in  asserting,  as  we  have  repeatedly  done,  that  the  parliamentary  curvets 
(excarceos)  of  the  government  of  the  American  Republic  with  respect  to  the 
question  of  Cuba,  obeyed,  rather  than  its  own  opinions,  electoral  machina 
tions,  and  the  pressure  of  the  filibuster  element,  so  numerous  in  the  United 
States. 

"We  say  this  apropos  of  an  important  piece  of  news  which  we  received 
to-day  by  the  Cuban  mail.  A  Habana  paper  publishes  correspondence  from 
New  York,  in  which  it  is  positively  said  that  the  President  of  the  United 
States  has  declared  in  private  circles  that  he  considers  the  independence  of 
the  island  of  Cuba  as  impossible,  and  that  its  annexation  to  the  United  States 
would  cause  immense  injuries  to  the  country. 

"The  island  of  Cuba,  not  being  able  to  govern  itself  well  as  an  independ 
ent  and  sovereign  State,  could  still  less  do  so  as  an  autonornic  semi-State,  and 
in  such  circumstances  it  were  in  every  way  impossible  for  Spain  to  reserve  to 
herself  a  protectorate  which,  without  positive  benefit  to  Cuba,  would  drag  the 
mother  country  into  the  most  serious  complications  within  and  without  this 
territory. 

'''To   prove  this  absolute   impossibility   so    many   considerations   throng 


THE    AMERICAN    MINISTER    TO    SPAIN.  79 

to  the  subject  that  it  is  no  small  task  to  select  the  prominent  ones.  In  the 
island  of  Cuba  there  exists  an  immense  majority  which  does  not  desire  separa 
tion,  which  does  not  desire  annexation,  which  does  not  desire  autonomy, 
which  wishes  to  keep  on  in  the  same  conditions  as  those  in  which  they  have 
lived  with  respect  to  the  mother  country.  In  the  island  of  Cuba  there  exists 
a  slender  minority  which  is  split  up  into  'independents,'  'annexationists, ' 
and  'autonomists.'  The  immense  majority  reject  autonomy,  which  would 
weaken  their  ties  with  the  mother  country.  The  independents  and  the  annex- 
ationists  are  not  content  with  autonomy,  which  does  not  satisfy  their  aspira 
tions.  The  autonomists  would  be  the  only  ones  left  satisfied,  but  they  are  so 
few  in  number  that  they  would  lack  moral  and  material  strength. 

"The  Eco  de  Cuba,  then,  is  right:  the  Great  Antilla  is  not  fitted  to  be 
anything  save  what  it  has  been  hitherto.  Thus  it  is  that  the  right  of  Spain  is 
supported  by  every  kind  of  reason  based  upon  expedience.  Therefore,  in 
spite  of  all  the  efforts  of  the  ambitious  ojalateros  (sans-culottes)  of  New  York, 
and  in  spite  of  the  misdeeds  of  the  criminals  of  the  Managua,  the  island  of 
Cuba  will  continue  to  be  a  Spanish  province." 

Mr.  Gushing  had  a  conversation  with  the  Spanish  Minister  of  State,  who 
said  that  "the  United  States  could  desire  nothing  in  the  sense  of  peace,  good 
government,  or  liberty  in  Cuba,"  that  the  Spanish  government  did  not  want 
more  than  we  desire.  This  made  an  impression  upon  Mr.  Cushing's  mind, 
that  may  or  may  not  have  been  intended,  nevertheless,  it  seemed  to  him  that 
"the  inner  thought  behind ^he  words"  was: 

"If  the  United  States,  whether  by  the  use  of  their  naval  squadron 
or  by  landing  troops,  intervene  by  force  to  prevent  Spain  from  subduing 
the  insurrection  in  Cuba,  that  is  war,  and  Spain  must,  of  necessity,  fight,  at 
whatever  cost  and  ultimate  loss,  or  cease  to  hold  up  her  head  as  an  independ 
ent  nation  in  Europe  or  America. 

"But  if  the  view  of  the  United  States  is  to  act  by  mediation  in  behalf  of 
the  insurgents,  to  induce  them  to  lay  down  their  arms,  to  make  acceptable 
terms  for  them,  to  secure  the  execution  of  these  terms,  to  provide  for  the 
introduction  of  good  government  and  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  officious 
concert  or  in  formal  treaty  with  Spain,  then  Spain  is  ready  to  meet  the  United 
States  half-way  in  such  action,  to  receive,  and  even  invite,  their  interposition 
in  the  affairs  of  Cuba. 

"The  impression  on  my  mind  to  this  effect  was  so  strong  as  to  half  tempt 


8o  THE    AMERICAN    MINISTER    TO    SPAIN. 

me  to  say,  'Will  you  then  accept  our  mediation?'  But  I  restrained  myself,  in 
the  doubt  whether  my  present  instructions  would  justify  me  in  thus  committing 
the  United  States. 

''I  limited  myself,  therefore,  to  thanking  him  cordially  for  the  frankness 
and  friendliness  which  seemed  to  inspire  what  he  said,  and  to  assure  him  that 
I  would  lose  no  time  in  communicating  the  same  to  you,  as  nearly  as  possible 
in  his  own  words,  and  regretting  that  no  mere  written  report  could  do  justice 
to  the  impressiveness  of  oral  representation. 

"He  then  referred  briefly  to  the  mere  robber  character  of  what  there  is 
now  in  insurrection  in  Cuba,  composed  of  scattered  parties  of  negroes  and 
mulattoes,  without  the  slightest  pretension  to  any  government — directed,  so 
far  as  they  had  any  general  direction,  by  foreigners,  mere  desperado  adven 
turers,  without  right  or  stake  in  the  country  (I  interrupted  him  here  to  say 
there  were  no  citizens  of  the  United  States  among  them,  to  which  he  assented, 
and  then  continued),  engaged  in  mere  plunder  and  incendiarism,  not  in  war — 
the  worst  form  of  that  tendency  to  guerrilla  hostilities  in  the  place  of  the 
regular  warfare  which  the  Spaniards  inherited  from  their  remote  Celtiberian 
progenitors,  and  which,  if  one  of  the  glories,  was  not  the  less  one  of  the 
national  calamities,  of  Spain. 

"But  of  all  this,  he  said,  the  President's  message  showed  that  we  in  the 
United  States  had  a  clear  conception;  and  he  added  that  neither  such  bad 
foreigners  as  Maximo  Gomez  in  the  Managua,  nor  worse  Spaniards  like 
Miguel  Aldama  in  New  York,  could  ever  make  oi  Cuba  any  better  republic 
than  Hayti;  and  that  appeared  to  be  their  only  purpose — to  ruin  where  they 
could  not  rule. 

"It  was  impossible  for  me  conscientiously  to  contradict  these  apprecia 
tions,  and  therefore,  I  could  but  listen  attentively,  and,  when  he  had  con 
cluded,  take  leave,  assuring  him  that  he  would  be  informed  at  once  when  my 
expected  instructions  should  arrive  in  Washington. 

"The  concluding  remarks  of  Mr.  Calderon  y  Collantes  suggest  to  me 
some  considerations,  which  you  will  permit  me  to  subjoin  by  way  of 
commentary. 

"The  Spaniards  have  great  qualities,  as  many  a  page  in  their  history 
demonstrates,  but  they  have  also  the  defects  of  those  qualities;  and  my  dis 
patches  have  not  been  sparing  in  the  exhibition  of  those  defects,  such  as 
intolerance  of  opinion,  exaggerated  individualism,  ill-regulated  ambitions, 


THE    AMERICAN    MINISTER    TO    SPAIN.  cS3 

dispositions  to  pronunciamentos,  insurrection,  civil  war,  and  especially  guer 
rilla  warfare." 

No  man  of  his  generation  exceeded  Mr.  Gushing  in  knowledge  of  the 
current  history  of  the  world,  and  his  intimate  acquaintance  with  the  Spanish 
language  and  people  gives  what  he  had  to  say  as  Minister  to  Spain  during  the 
closing  years  of  General  Grant's  administration  a  force  and  sharpness  of  appli 
cation  having  much  more  than  official  weight,  and  his  papers  are  full  of 
matter  in  which  the  interest  abides.  The  way  the  desperate  antagonism  in 
Cuba  between  the  peninsular  and  Cuban  Spaniards  arose  is  thus  sketched  by 
Mr.  Cushing: 

''When  the  insurrection  in  French  Santo  Domingo  put  an  end  to  the 
cultivation  of  sugar  and  coffee  there,  that  cultivation  passed  to  Cuba;  it  flour 
ished  there,  with  the  consequent  development  of  slavery  and  the  slave  trade; 
how  overflowing  wealth  ensued,  and  with  it  came  ill-directed  education, 
unwholesome  ambitions,  and  traitorous  plots  of  annexation  to  the  United 
States,  not  for  the  promotion  of  liberty,  but  for  the  security  of  slavery;  how, 
thereupon  and  therefore,  came  acts  and  measures  of  angry  repression  on  the 
part  of  Spain. 

"If  the  Cuban  emigrants  in  the  United  States  are  a  proper  sample,  as 
they  possibly  may  be,  of  the  better  Cuban  Spaniards,  what  are  we  to  think  of 
those  of  average  or  inferior  degree? 

"While  those  emigrants  have  made  themselves  ridiculous  in  spending  their 
time  in  quarreling  with  one  another  in  the  newspapers  and  in  public  meetings, 
instead  of  fighting  the  common  enemy  in  the  field,  they  have  rendered  them 
selves  odious  by  their  systematic  violation  of  the  law  of  the  land  of  their 
asylum,  and  the  acts  of  fraud  and  perjury  which  that  implies,  and  by  their 
frantic  hostility  to  the  government  of  the  United  States. 

"Meanwhile,  we  see  what  the  insurgents  at  home  are,  after  six  years' 
experience — incapable,  as  the  President  so  clearly  shows,  of  independence, 
un\vorthy  even  of  the  concession  of  belligerence. 

"If  the  emigrants  in  the  United  States  were  now  in  Cuba,  if  the  insur 
gents  in  arms  were  to  lay  down  their  arms,  could  they  and  the  rich  sugar- 
planters  and  merchants  of  the  seaports  of  the  western  part  of  the  island,  with 
or  without  anterior  solution  of  the  slavery  question,  live  in  peace  together  as 
a  republic  based  on  free  popular  suffrage,  which  is  the  only  intelligible  con 
ception  of  a  republic?  To  me  it  seems  impossible.  To  say  nothing  of  San'vj 


84  THE    AMERICAN    MINISTER    TO    SPAIN. 

Domingo,  we  may  look  to  the  case  of  Jamaica,  where,  without  any  civil  war 
to  embitter  men  against  one  another,  with  generously  regulated  emancipa 
tion,  with  a  colonial  policy  just,  nay,  amicable  and  even  kind,  it  has  been 
found  impossible  to  maintain  the  existence  of  well-ordered  society  except  by 
the  constant  exercise  of  paternal  authority  on  the  part  of  the  metropolis. 

"All  which  leads  me  to  the  conclusion  that  the  United  States  would  have 
an  immense  task  on  their  hands  in  undertaking  the  pacification  of  Cuba  alone 
and  by  hostile  force,  inferring  the  necessity  not  only  of  a  fleet  and  an  army  of 
operations,  but  also  of  occupation  to  keep  the  peace,  but  might  well  con 
tribute  efficiently  to  the  result  in  cooperation  with  Spain." 

In  February,  1876,  Mr.  Gushing  wrote:  "The  concentration  of  ships  of 
war  at  Port  Royal  impresses  the  Spaniards  as  a  menace  against  Spain. 
They  say :  'We  have  not  made  any  naval  demonstrations  in  the  waters  of  the 
Antilles;  we  have  done  nothing  to  call  for  defensive  preparations  on  the  part 
of  the  United  States, .and  we  are  unable  to  account  for  these  naval  prepara 
tions  of  theirs  unless  intended  for  the  invasion  of  Cuba  in  aid  of  the  insurgents, 
in  imitation  of  the  action  of  Navarino. ' 

"Their  suspicions  in  this  respect  stand  greatly  in  the  way  of  more  friendly 
diplomatic  negotiation  in  the  sense  of  mediation. 

"Now,  as  to  the  naked  question  of  intervention  or  mediation  in  Cuba,  the 
only  foreign  minister  here  who  speaks  to  me  in  a  helpful  spirit  is  Mr. 
Layard. " 

Mr.  Gushing  did  not  seem  to  see  that  "mediation"  was  a  dream.      How 
ever,  it  is  clear  that  the  policy  of  the  most  able  Minister  was  severely  against 
intervention,  and  he  no  doubt  felt  the  necessity  of  an  affirmative  policy. 

Through  Mr.  Layard,  the  British  Minister,  appeared  in  1876,  as  through 
other  representatives  of  English  policy  in  1897,  the  sympathy  of  the  Empire 
of  Great  Britain  with  our  tentative  as  with  our  finally  positive  measures  of 
intervention  in  Cuba.  La  Politica,  Madrid,  February  4,  1876,  contained  a 
long  editorial  on  "American  Affairs,"  referring  especially  to  the  agitation  in 
Europe  caused  by  the  policy  of  President  Grant  to  invite  European  coopera 
tion.  The  government  of  the  United  States,  "having  passed  to  its  represent 
atives  in  Europe  a  note  to  the  end  that,  without  having  a  copy  of  it,  may  be 
read  to  the  European  Ministers  of  Foreign  affairs." 

The  effect  of  this  note  was,  La  Politica  explains,  "to  discover  immediately 
the  impression  that  would  be  produced  by  its  interference,  direct  or  indirect, 


THE    AMERICAN    MINISTER    TO    SPAIN.  £5 

in  the  relations  of  Spain  with  her  Antillean  province."  The  Spanish  journal 
accuses  American  filibusters  of  responsibility  for  the  insurrection  in  Cuba 
and  provinces : 

''When  all  the  combustibles  have  been  accumulated  for  a  conflagration, 
and  the  blaze  has  been  kept  knowingly  stirred  up,  it  is  a  rare  sight  to  see 
those  who  have  done  all  this  lamenting  the  ravages  of  that  fire,  shrinking 
appalled  from  its  horrors,  and  clamoring  before  Europe  for  the  rights  of 
humanity. ' ' 

After  further  sarcasm  of  the  sort  comes  this: 

"What  remains  besides  that  which  has  been  set  forth  to  serve  as  a  sup 
port  to  the  United  States  in  order  to  pretend  to  the  direct  or  indirect  inter 
vention  which  they  propose?  In  our  conception,  it  has  for  its  basis  no  other 
thing  than  the  eternal  tendency  which,  from  the  beginning  of  the  century  and 
from  one  motive  or  another,  has  been  ever  manifested  by  the  partisans  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine — a  policy  which  served  to  rend  from  Mexico  the  greater 
part  of  her  territory;  a  policy  which  has  ever  been  sought  to  deprive  Spain 
of  the  brightest  jewel  of  her  crown,  of  the  jewel  which  symbolizes  a  world  of 
memories  for  the  nation  which  discovered  America. 

"The  notes  of  Mr.  Henry  Clay  to  Mr.  Everett,  in  1825,  to  the  end  that 
Spain  should  conclude  the  wars  of  Mexico  and  Colombia  for  the  sake  of 
humanity;  subsequently  those  of  Mr.  Buchanan  to  Mr.  Saunders,  Minister  in 
Madrid,  for  the  purchase  of  Cuba  for  one  hundred  millions  of  dollars,  recom 
mending  him  to  get  it  as  cheap  as  possible;  the  mission  of  Mr.  Soule;  the 
Ostend  Conference;  the  refusal  of  the  United  States  to  subscribe  the  compro 
mise  with  England  and  France  to  guarantee  to  Spain  the  possession  of  the 
island  of  Cuba,  and  a  thousand  other  antecedents  which  we  might  evoke,  if 
the  scope  of  this  article  permitted  us  to  do  so,  are  the  key  to  explain  this 
stroke  of  humanity  with  which  the  United  States  present  themselves  before 
Europe,  soliciting  its  moral  cooperation  to  end  the  war  in  Cuba." 

The  conclusion  of  this  article  is  the  same  as  the  last  communication  from 
the  Spanish  Minister,  DuPuy  de  Lome— that  "what  is  undoubtedly  indis 
pensable  as  a  measure  of  salvation  is  that  this  insensate  insurrection  in  Cuba, 
which  gives  rise  to  so  many  conflicts,  be  terminated  as  soon  as  possible. ' ' 

The  30,000  soldiers  Spain  had  sent  tc  Cuba  to  crush  the  rebellion  here 
referred  to,  and  the  sum  of  the  need  of  Spain  was  to  make  an  end  of  the 
insurrection  by  crushing  military  forces.  And  yet  the  war  dragged  on  two 


86  THE    AMERICAN    MINISTER    TO    SPAIN. 

years,  and  terminated  in  a  treaty  with  the  insurgents,  who  were,  according  to 
Spanish  report,  well  convinced  with  hard  cash  that  the  time  had  arrived  to  be 
pacificated. 

The  question  most  discussed  in  Madrid,  Mr.  Gushing  stated  in  a  letter 
dated  February  18,  1876,  was  as  to  the  kind  of  "intervention"  the  United 
States  meant  to  make  in  the  affairs  of  Cuba  and  Spain,  whenever,  if  they  did 
ever  intervene,  and  he  said : 

"In  this  connection  there  is  much  comment  on  the  line  of  action  pursued 
by  the  intervening  powers  in  the  matter  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  as  being 
the  reverse  of  that  pursued  by  the  same  powers  in  the  matter  of  Greece, 
seeing  that  in  the  latter  case  the  demonstration  of  force  was  against  Turkey 
and  in  favor  of  her  rebels;  while  in  the  former  it  is  against  the  rebels  and  in 
favor  of  Turkey,  as  manifested  by  the  concentration  of  Austrian  troops  in 
Croatia  and  of  a  fleet  of  the  allies  off  Ragusa,  in  the  avowed  purpose  of  com 
pelling  the  impenitent  and  persistent  insurgents  to  accept  the  terms  of  reform 
arranged  at  Constantinople. ' ' 

That  is  to  say,  the  Spaniards  wanted  to  know — so  diplomatic  were  our 
forms  of  expression,  as  Mr.  Gushing  modulated  them,  that  Spain  wanted  to 
know  whether  the  threatened  intervention  was  to  be  on  her  behalf  or  for  the 
Cubans.  At  this  time  the  Spanish  Minister  of  State  sent  a  diplomatic  circular 
to  the  Powers  of  Europe  and  the  United  States,  giving  the  following  account 
of  the  beginning  of  the  insurrection,  that  is  now  popularly  characterized  as 
the  ten  years'-war: 

"The  first  cry  of  insurrection  was  raised  at  Yara,  an  unimportant  town 
situated  in  the  eastern  department  of  the  island,  on  the  nth  day  of  October, 
1868,  immediately  after  the  receipt  of  the  news  of  the  revolution  begun  at  Cadiz 
on  the  1 7th  of  September,  and  consummated  at  Madrid  on  the  2Qth  of  the  same 
month.  The  leaders  of  the  rebellion  availed  themselves  of  the  preparations 
which  they  had  doubtless  prevkmsly  made,  and  of  the  favorable  circumstance 
that  the  government  had  not  more  than  7,500  troops  all  told  on  the  island  at 
the  time,  and  that,  too,  for  a  territory  peopled  by  1,400,000  inhabitants,  and 
having  an  area  of  12,000  square  miles,  including  the  keys  and  the  adjacent 
islands.  The  flag  of  the  independence  of  the  island  was  not  raised  at  the 
outset,  much  less  that  of  annexation  to  any  other  State.  The  only  cries 
were,  'Hurrah  for  Prim!'  that  general  being  there  regarded  as  the  leader  of 
the  Spanish  revolution,  and  'Hurrah  for  the  revolution!'  Thus  it  was  that 


THE    AMERICAN    MINISTER    TO    SPAIN.  87 

many  joined  in  the  insurrection  who,  while  really  loving  Spain,  thought  that 
the  only  object  had  in  view  was  a  political  change,  and,  subsequently  repent 
ing  when  they  became  aware  of  the  tendency  which  the  enemies  of  the  country 
were  seeking  to  give  to  the  movement,  voluntarily  took  tip  arms  against  it." 

The  Spanish  circular  admits  that  the  movement  in  Cuba  for  secession 
carried  away  a  part — not  the  greater  part — of  the  white  population,  "espe 
cially  the  unreflecting  and  rash  youth,"  but  the  secession  movement  was 
disguised  as  a  "desire  of  securing  reforms" — but  it  became  evident  this  was  a 
pretext.  The  contest  was  carried  on  with  a  certain  regularity,  both  parties 
respecting  property,  until  the  insurgent  leader  and  soldiers  became  barbarous 
in  their  methods. 

However,  at  this  time — February,  1876 — after  eight  years'  war,  "of  the 
leaders  of  the  secession  movement,  Cespedes,  the  Agramontes,  Cavada, 
Donato,  Marmol,  Castilla,  Mola,  the  Betancourts,  the  Angueros,  Jesus  del 
Sol,  Bembeta,  Salome  Hernandez,  Marcono,  Inclan,  Goicuria,  Rosas,  and 
others,  all  of  whom  were  Cubans,  and  really  opposed  to  Spain,  not  one  is  now 
living.  Of  those  who  have  succeeded  them  in  the  command  not  a  single 
one  is  a  Cuban.  Maximo  Gomez,  the  principal  one,  and  Modesta  Diaz,  the  next 
in  importance,  are  Dominicans;  Rulof  is  a  Pole;  the  person  known  by  the  nick 
name  of  'el  Inglesito'  is  an  Englishman;  and  the  rest,  who  are  now  few  in 
number  on  account  of  the  great  diminution  of  the  insurgent  forces,  are 
adventurers  from  various  countries,  without  antecedents,  and  having  no  inter 
est  in  the  island.  The  same  may  be  said  of  almost  all  the  insurgents.  Their 
forces  now  consist  of  negroes,  mulattoes,  Chinese,  deserters  from  the  bat 
talions  which  were  formed  provisionally  in  Santo  Domingo  during  our  brief 
rule  there,  and  a  few  independent  bodies  \vhich  were  formed  in  Spain  during 
the  most  disorderly  period  of  the  revolution,  and  which  wrere  larely  composed 
of  the  most  turbulent  elements  of  the  country,  and  it  may  be  confidently 
asserted  that  there  are  to-day  not  more  than  eight  hundred  white  natives  of 
Cuba  with  arms  in  their  hands  in  the  insurgent  ranks." 

Here  is  manifested  the  Spanish  policy  which  has  been  pursued  to  the 
present  hour,  to  convince  the  great  Powers  of  Europe  that  the  release  of  Cuba 
from  Spanish  rule  was  necessarily  to  make  of  the  island  a  greater  San  \ 
Domingo — and  it  is  due  the  truth  to  say  the  way  the  insurgents  carried  on  the 
war  that  was  resumed  by  Marti  and  Gomez,  has  countenanced  the  malignant 
representation  by  the  Spaniards.  The  destruction  of  the  agricultural  indus- 


88  THE    AMERICAN    MINISTER    TO    SPAIN. 

tries  of  the  island  was  not  in  the  interest  of  liberty,  damaged  Spaniards  less 
than  Cubans,  and  was  barbaric,  very  largely  accountable  for  the  famine,  and 
chargeable  with  much  of  the  hideous  suffering  of  the  innocent  in  the  camps  of 
the  reconcentrados.  The  diplomatic  circular  of  Spain  goes  on  to  say  that  the 
insurgents  were  destroyers,  while  the  Spaniards  were  preservers,  and  that  it 
would  be  a  "great  error  to  suppose  that  the  Cuban  emigrants  to  the  United 
States,  who  took  good  care  to  keep  out  of  harm's  way  themselves,"  would  be 
able  to  constitute  a  government.  Those  insurgents  who  were  brave  enough 
to  face  death  on  battlefields  had  fallen  or  surrendered. 

In  this  circular  the  naval  and  land  forces  of  Spain  were  set  forth — '  'forty- 
five  vessels  of  all  classes,  with  a  nominal  force  of  4,770  horses,  135  cannon, 
and  2,426  seamen,  55  battalions,  6  regiments  of  cavalry,  2  of  artillery,  i  of 
light  field  troops,  i  company  of  naval  mechanics,  3  regiments  of  civil  guards-, 
men,  i  sanitary  brigade,  i  battalion  of  engineers,  33  companies  of  skirmishers, 
2  squadrons  of  dragoons,  and  i  transport  brigade,  making  altogether  a  total 
of  273  chiefs,  3,054  officers,  68,115  soldiers,  8,478  horses,  462  mules,  and  42 
pieces.  Since  the  foregoing  enumeration  was  made,  moreover,  10,370  men 
ha  ye  embarked  for  the  island. 

"There  are  also  the  volunteer  bodies,  consisting  of  natives  of  the  Penin 
sula  and  Cubans,  amounting  to  upward  of  fifty  thoiisand  men.  These  last 
figures  are  official  and  irrecusable,  and  show  what  is  the  true  spirit  of  the 
island  and  its  adhesion  to  the  mother  country;  for  while  the  Cubans  who  are 
fighting  for  the  insurrection  are  less  than  one  thousand  in  number,  those  who 
have  voluntarily  taken  up  arms  against  it  number  more  than  forty  thousand.  " 

The  volunteers  in  Cuba  have  all  the  while  been  Peninsular  Spaniards, 
given,  by  the  policy  of  discrimination  against  Cuban  Spaniards,  places  that 
should  be  filled  by  the  natives  of  the  island.  This  has  been  one  of  the  most 
odious  forms  of  oppression.  At'this  point  in  the  circular  there  was  an  effort 
to  explain  "one  fact"  that  might  seem  incomprehensible  to  those  not  familiarly 
acquainted — and  that  "the  duration  of  the  contest,  in  spite  of  the  disparity 
existing  between  the  forces  of  the  contending  parties."  As  this  is  a  matter 
that  has  perplexed  Americans  from  the  beginning  of  the  Cuban  conditions 
that  interested  them,  we  are  sure  the  official  explanation  of  that  mystery  will 
be  read  with  exceedingly  great  interest. 

The  Spanish  Minister  of  State  said:  "Cuban  rebels  are,  for  the  most 
part,  negroes  and  mulattoes,  who  do  not  experience  the  ordinary  necessities  of 


THE    AMERICAN    MINISTER    TO    SPAIN.  S9 

civilization.  They  are  able  to  live  in  the  jungles  and  deserts  of  the  rslatul, 
and  thence  fall  upon  estates  and  other  property  like  birds  of  prey,  pillaging 
and  applying  the  torch  of  the  incendiary.  They  live  on  the  fruits  of  the 
country,  such  as  the  plantain  and  others  which  grow  spontaneously  in  that 
fertile  soil.  Salt,  and  hogs  and  other  animals  are  so  numerous  that  they  are 
everywhere  met  with,  and  serve  as  food."  There  is  a  considerable  amount  of 
truth  in  this,  but  the  prominence  given  the  "negroes"  is  exaggerated.  It  is 
true,  ho\veve<,  that  the  black  men  in  the  insurgent  forces  endured  the  hard 
ships  of  guerrilla  warfare  in  the  Cuban  jungles,  in  a  greater  proportion  than 
their  white  compatriots,  so  that  when  the  American  army  landed  in  Santiago, 
were  in  the  eastern  province  of  the  island,  the  numbers  of  white  Cuban  sol 
diers  were  a  small  percentage,  the  whites  generally  finding  occupation  as 
officers.  And  the  explanatory  fact  is  mentioned  in  the  circular. 

"The  Baracoa  district,  having  an  extent  of  ninety  miles,  had  but  forty-two 
inhabitants,  while  there  was  about  the  same  number  in  Las  Tunas  and  the 
territory  which  separates  the  Mayari  district  from  Guantanamo.  The  aver 
age  number  of  inhabitants  to  the  square  geographical  league  throughout  the 
island  is  350.  It  is  not,  therefore,  to  be  wondered  at  that  the  insurgents 
should  be  able  to  sustain  themselves  as  nomadic  tribes  in  a  country  of  such  a 
character — uncultivated,  almost  a  wilderness,  extremely  broken  and  moun 
tainous,  and  covered  with  immense  forests  which  cannot  even  be  set  on  fire 
by  reason  of  their  constant  and  extraordinary  humidity.  Thus  it  is  that  they 
have  never  been  able  to  establish  even  the  shadow  of  a  government." 

There  is  a  good  deal  of  explanation  in  this,  but  it  does  not  cover  the 
whole  ground  of  the  mysterious  incompetency  of  100,000  Spanish  troops  in 
Cuba  to  overcome  the  bands  of  guerrillas  led  by  Garcia  in  the  eastern  or  more 
revolutionary  end  of  the  island.  The  circular  we  have  been  quoting  con 
tinues:  "If  the  insurgents  were  regular  troops  and  carried  on  a  civilized 
warfare,  the  contest  would  long  since  have  been  ended  by  two  or  three 
battles.  The  matter,  however,  becomes  one  of  much  greater  difficulty  when 
they  avoid  all  fighting  save  from  an  ambuscade,  and  run  and  hide  when  they 
see  our  troops,  in  order  to  meet  again  in  their  lurking  places  when  the  danger 
is  past.  It  is  thus  seen  why  it  has  never  been  possible  to  entirely  destroy 
the  so-called  palenques,  or  bands  of  fugitive  negroes,  who  have  fled  from  the 
estates,  and  who  seek  refuge  in  the  aforesaid  Baracoa  district." 

It  was  many  years  after  this  that  Maximo  Gomez  made  a  march  of  five 


9o  THE    AMERICAN    MINISTER    TO    SPAIN. 

hundred  miles  through  the.  island,  burning  cane  fields,  and  the  inconsiderate 
boast  of  the  insurgents  was  that  the  red  skies  displayed  the  progress  of  the 
army  of  liberation.  It  was  an  unhappy  association  that  the  cause  of  freedom 
should  have  been  identified  to  that  extent  with  a  raid  of  devastation. 

The  ministerial  circular  continued:  "In  the  western  department  there 
were  and  still  are — for,  far  from  diminishing,  their  number  was  increased  dur 
ing  the  war — 1,070  sugar  estates,  while  in  the  central  department  there  were 
but  1 02, and  in  the  eastern  200.  The  quantity  of  sugar  produced  in  the  first- 
named  department  amounted  to  500,000,000  kilograms,  which  quantity  has 
also  been  increased,  while  that  of  the  second  only  amounted  to  17,000,000,  and 
that  of  the  third  to  35,250,000  kilograms.  The  quantity  of  tobacco  produced 
in  the  western  department  is  44,000  quintals,  in  the  central  department  only 
5,500,  and  in  the  eastern  252,000.  It  must  be  remembered  that  in  the  terri 
tory  comprise.!  between  Pinar  del  Rio  and  Guanajay,  in  the  first  of  those 
departments,  the  exquisite  tobacco  known  as  that  of  La  Vuelta  de  Abajo  is 
exclusively  produced.  The  price  of  this  tobacco  is  constantly  increasing,  and 
is  much  higher  than  that  produced  in  the  eastern  department,  which  is  a 
second-class  article.  The  quantity  of  coffee  produced  in  the  western  depart 
ment  amounts  to  3,750,000  kilograms,  and  that  of  the  central  department  to 
3,750,  and  that  of  the  eastern  to  5,000,000.  Finally,  the  value  of  the  cattle  of 
all  kinds  in  the  western  department  is  2,000,000  pesetas,  or  §4,000,000;  in  the 
central  and  eastern  departments,  $1,000,000  each.  It  is  therefore  seen  that 
the  real  wealth  and  the  bulk  of  the  population  of  the  island  of  Cuba  are  in  the 
western  department,  which  has  scarcely  suffered  at  all  front  the  insurrection, 
and  which,  for  the  most  part,  has  remained  perfectly  tranquil." 

All  this  official  appeal  to  the  Powers  of  Europe  has  been  proven  by  events 
to  have  been  utterly  inadequate.  The  war  was  carried  into  the  extreme 
eastern  end  of  Cuba.  Maximo  Gomez  was  at  a  point  on  the  coast,  west  of 
Havana,  when  Captain-General  Weyler  landed,  from  which  he  could  see  the 
Morro  Castle  light,  and  counted  the  guns  of  the  salute. 

Secretary  Fish  was  constant  in  urging  Mr.  Gushing  to  force  upon  the 
Spaniards  an  impression  of  the  danger  of  American  "intervention."  That  he 
was  influenced  in  this  instance  by  the  personal  views  of  President  Grant 
there  is  inner  evidence — and  yet  it  has  been  a  part  of  the  filibuster  creed  to 
hold  that  General  Grant  was  too  careful,  and  to  assert  that  his  conservation 
comprehended  caution  in  the  extreme.  There  is  a  close  parallel  between  the 


THE    AMERICAN    MINISTER    TO    SPAIN.  91 

bearing  of  President  Grant  and  that  of  President  McKinley  in  the  earnestness 
with  which  each  sympathized  with  the  Cuban  cause.  Grant  failed  to  discover 
a  public  duty  in  the  recognition  of  either  the  independence  of  the  Cuban 
insurgents'  Republic,  or  the  belligerent  rights  of  an  organization  that  had  no 
ports  and  no  courts  or  fixed  places  of  official  residence  or  certainty  of  areas  of 
authority. 

Mr.  Gushing  found  it  necessary  to  explain  repeatedly  why  he  did  not 
press  the  impending  intervention,  and  his  first  point  was  that  no  Power  in 
Europe  would  join  with  us.  England  had  limited  her  cooperation  to  "good 
offices."  Lord  Derby  wanted,  in  his  talk  with  General  Schenck,  "postpone 
ment  of  definite  action,"  and  repelled  in  various  forms  of  expression  the  idea  of 
any  pressure,  and  he  instructed  the  British  Minister  to  Spain  that  there  should 
be  "no  thought  of  mediation"  until  after  Spain  had  been  further  unsuccessful 
in  trying  to  suppress  the  Cuban  insurrection  with  her  own  forces.  Charged 
by  Secretary  Fish  with  evading  the  great  question  of  intervention  by  confin 
ing  talk  to  "our  particular  griefs,"  Mr.  Gushing  stated  the  Spanish  Minister 
introduced  and  dwelt  upon  our  "private  griefs,"  and  did  so  evidently  to 
evade  the  general  question  of  the  condition  of  Cuba  as  distinguished  from  our 
affairs.  Mr.  Gushing  did  not  think  it  a  convenient  occasion  "then  and  there 
to  push  him  on  the  question  of  intervention."  Mr.  Gushing  had  supposed 
there  was  to  be  no  pressure  for  intervention  until  it  was  known  what  action 
the  Powers  would  take.  "Why  else  invoke  their  moral  support?" 

Mr.  Gushing,  at  this  point  having  concluded  his  defense  for  not  pushing 
intervention,  advanced  aggressively  to  the  instruction  of  the  State  Depart 
ment  in  these  embattled  paragraphs: 

"The  interests  of  Spain  and  of  the  United  States  in  Cuba  are  identical. 
At  present  we  derive  great  net  benefits  from  it;  she,  none.     The  imminent 
.Destruction  of  its  productiveness  would  be  alike  disastrous  to  her  and  to  us. 

"She  is  willing  enough  to  confide  in  us  if  we  will  let  her.  The  proof  of 
that  is  to  be  found  not  in  profession  (although  that  we  have),  but  in  the 
analysis  of  the  diplomatic  relations  of  Spain  with  other  powers,  contained  in 
previous  dispatches.  In  fine,  whatever  causes  of  grief  or  jealousy  she  has 
against  us,  she  has  greater  against  others.  Nevertheless,  she  is  now  anxious 
and  suspicious  with  regard  to  the  United  States.  She  knows  that  thousands 
of  bad  Spaniards  (called  Cubans),  having  a  holy  horror  of  the  smell  of  gun 
powder,  have  fled  to  'snug  harbor'  in  New  York,  Key  West,  and  New 


92  THE    AMERICAN    MINISTER    TO    SPAIN. 

Orleans,  have  been  dedicating  themselves  there  for  years,  by  distribution  of 
bonds,  by  speeches,  newspapers,  solicitations,  exaggerated  claims,  violations 
of  law,  and  in  every  other  possible  way,  to  the  task  of  embroiling  the  two 
governments  in  war,  and  are  the  efficient  authors  of  all  our  troubles  with  her, 
directly  or  indirectly,  including  the  tragedy  of  the  Virginius. 

"I  dread  emigrant  rebels.  How  fatal  were  the  French  emigres  to  Prussia 
in  the  early  years  of  the  French  Revolution!  How  frequently  the  Jacobites 
involved  France  in  fruitless  hostility  with  England!  How  the  refugee  Poles 
lured  Napoleon  I.  to  his  destruction  by  Russia,  and  refugee  Mexicans 
Napoleon  III.  to  the  commencement  of  his  destruction  in  America!  I  do  not 
yet  forget  the  picture  of  the  disastrous  intrigues  of  the  rebel  emigrants  of  the 
Greek  Republics,  more  prejudicial  to  their  friends  than  to  their  enemies,  as 
drawn  by  the  masterly  hand  of  Thucydides,  or  of  those  of  the  Italian 
Republics,  so  graphically  described  by  Guicciardini  and  Machiavelli. 

"God  forbid  that  these  dishonored  men,  who  prate  of  the  independence 
of  Cuba,  without  manliness  or  courage  to  fight  for  it,  preferring  the  safer 
occupation  of  trading  in  bogus  bonds  and  calumniating  the  President  and 
yourself,  should  succeed  in  making  our  country  the  instrument  of  their 
rancorous  hatred  of  their  own  country,  Spain. 

"In  this  connection,  be  it  remembered  that  the  President's  message 
asserts  the  absolute  non-existence  in  Cuba  at  the  present  time  of  the  essential 
elements  of  an  independent  State,  and  thus  proclaims  this  fact  to  the  world. 
"Then,  Spain  is  told  every  day,  by  leading  newspapers  of  the  United 
States,  that  the  object  of  our  naval  preparations  is  to  force  the  hand  of  Con 
gress  and  of  the  people  by  producing  some  casus  belli  for  electoral  purposes ; 
and  although  nobody  really  believes  what  newspapers  say,  yet  they  have  their 
effect  in  the  propagation  of  mischievous  irritations  and  dangerous  suspicions, 
as  so  well  exposed  in  the  late  remarkable  speech  of  Prince  Bismarck  in  the 
German  Reichsrath. 

"I  meet  all  these  things  as  well  as  I  may  by  pointing  to  the  kindly  assur 
ances  contained  in  your  note  of  November  5,  in  the  President's  message,  and 
in  sundry  special  dispatches,  such  as  your  No.  281,  notwithstanding  their 
being  dispatches  of  complaint  against  acts  or  omissions  of  the  Spanish  govern 
ment. 

"But  the  obstacles  which  thus  far  it  has  been  impossible  for  me  to  get 
over  are  in  the  insolent  assumption  of  the  knots  of  Spanish  traitors  in  New 


THE    AMERICAN    MINISTER    TO    SPAIN.  93 

York  and  Paris,  who  presume  not  only  to  dictate  to  Spain,  but  also  to  the 
United  States,  and  in  the  impracticable  character  of  the  Dominican  chiefs  of 
the  insurgents  in  Cuba. 

"If  you  can  answer  for  them,  there  is  no  hope  for  peaceful  and  har 
monious  action  between  the  two  nations,  to  the  end  of  peace,  emancipation, 
and  good  government  in  Cuba,  by  the  mediation  of  the  United  States,  with 
or  without  the  aid  of  Great  Britain  or  Germany. 

"As  for  these  European  powers,  suffer  me  to  say,  'Timeo  Danaos  et  dona 
ferentes. '  ' 

Mr.  Gushing  saw  the  Russian  Minister,  who  was  polite  and  vague  and  not 
informed,  but  "he  spontaneously  offered  good  offices  and  friendly  advice,  if 
this  course  should  be  in  accordance  with  the  wishes  of  the  Emperor;"  not,  Mr. 
Gushing  added,  a  very  satisfactory  reservation.  This  diplomat  was  "profuse 
/in  the  utterance  of  courtier  expressions,  and  in  professions  of  sympathy  with 
the  United  States;"  and  yet  he  represented  to  others  that  the  United  States 
was  pressing  Spain  as  a  means  of  forwarding  private  claims!  That,  of  course, 
was  his  ignorance.  March  i,  1876,  Mr.  Fish  wrote  Mr.  Gushing:  "Discovery 
and  long  occupation  have  made  the  island  of  Cuba  a  possession  of  Spain,  and 
the  United  States  has  no  desire  to  disturb  the  relations  which  result  there 
from.  Part  of  the  territory  of  the  one  power,  it, is.  the  seat  of  immense  trade 
for  the  other.  But  it  has  been  found  up  to  the  present  time  impossible  to 
conquer  a  peace  by  force  of  arms,  and  every  suggestion  that  amnesty,  reform, 
and  the  certainty  of  good  government  might  be  effective  where  force  has 
failed  has  been  repelled.  More  than  six  years  ago  such  was  the  condition  of 
affairs,  and  it  remains  the  same  to-day." 

Mr.  Gushing  wrote  March  2d  that  the  President's  message  had  a  salutary 
effect,  that  Spain  "has  been  made  more  pliant  by  the  confidence  in  the 
message  of  the  disinterestedness  of  our  government  and  in  our  recognition  of 
the  non-existence  in  Cuba  at  the  present  time  of  the  necessary  elements  of 
independence."  And  Spain  longed  to  have  peace. 

Mr.  Gushing  sent  March  yth  a  summary  of  the  criticisms  of  the  Spanish 
Press  in  these  terms: 

"Much  is  said  of  the  discreditable  character  and  acts  of  the  pretended 
directors  of  the  rebellion  in  New  York,  who,  it  is  charged,  are  mainly  occu 
pied  in  criminal  intrigues  against  the  peace  of  the  United  States. 

"It    is   alleged    that    most   of    the    reclamations    put    forward    by   the 


94  THE    AMERICAN    MINISTER    TO    SPAIN. 

United  States  are  for  slave  property,  to  the  discredit  of  our  emancipation  pro 
fessions. 

"Much  is  alleged  as  to  the  dishonest  character  of  the  citizenship  of  the 
claimants;  most  of  them  Spaniards  of  recent  naturalization,  few  of  whom, 
it  is  said,  ever  had  bona  fide  residence  in  the  United  States. 

"The  Minister  of  State  has  more  than  once  alluded  to  this  point  in  terms 
the  more  disagreeable  for  being  founded  on  truth." 

On  July  n,  1876,  Mr.  Gushing  administered  "some  observations  of  a 
consolatory  tendency"  to  Secretary  Fish,  "in  reference  to  the  non-success  of 
your  earnest  efforts  to  meliorate  the  condition  of  things  in  Cuba.  First, 
-neither  party  to  the  contest  in  Cuba  was  disposed  to  listen  to  the  counsel  of 
wisdom  and  friendship."  The  true  cause  and  character  of  maladministration 
in  Cuba  was  that  "the  governors  are  incapable  of  conducting  and  the  governed 
equally  incapable  of  receiving  good  government.  They  are  all  Spaniards 
alike,  as  General  Prim  so  often  said,  whether  you  call  them  Peninsulars  or 
Cubans.  And  (to  say  nothing  of  the  colored  population)  it  is  not  the  best  of 
the  Spaniards,  Creole  or  Peninsular,  which  constitutes  the  population  of  Cuba. 
Have  there  been  rebellions  in  Cuba,  guerrilla  warfare,  burnings,  sacking  of 
towns,  military  executions,  deportations,  embargo  of  private  property,  banish 
ments,  suspension  of  suffrage,  arbitrary  domination  of  captains-general?  So 
all  these  things  have  been  occurring  in  Spain.  She  has  had  nought  else  for 
more  than  sixty  years  but  alternations  betwixt  anarchy  and  despotism.  The 
few  periods  of  comparative,  but  transient,  tranquillity  she  has  enjoyed  during 
the  reign  of  Queen  Isabel  were  due  to  the  mere  usurpation  of  two  great 
generals,  Narvaez  and  O'Donnell,  to  whose  administrations  of  the  sword  men 
look  back  now  as  to  the  halcyon  days  of  Spain.  Since  the  dethronement  of 
Queen  Isabel — that  is,  during  the  very  period  of  the  civil  war  in  Cuba — there 
has  not  only  been  civil  war  in  Spain,  but,  simultaneous' there  with,  a  rapid 
succession  of  provisional  and  experimental  governments,  each  destitute  of 
inherent  stability,  and  every  one  of  which  subsisted  only  by  means  of  irre 
sponsible  dictatorships,  except  that  of  King  Amadeo  alone,  who  fell  simply, 
as  men  say,  because  he  was  the  only  man  in  Spain  scrupulously  faithful  to  his 
oath  and  obstinately  adhesive  to  the  constitution  of  the  country. 

"And  yet,  constitutionally  honest  as  he  was,  his  ministers  betrayed  him 
and  assassins  (not  yet  punished)  fired  on  him  on  a  bright  moonlit  evening  in 
one  of  the  most  frequented  and  brilliantly  lighted  streets  of  Madrid.  Possibly 


THE    AMERICAN    MINISTER    TO    SPAIN.  95 

if  Prim  had  not  been  assassinated  in  the  street  (by  men,  they  also  not  yet 
punished),  Spain  might  have  been  saved  from  her  extremest  days  of  mkery, 
the  cantonal  insurrection,  but  that  is  doubtful,  since  the  misfortunes  of  Spain 
and  of  Cuba  are  conditions  of  the  national  character,  as  manifested  alike  in 
Spain  and  in  all  Spanish  America. 

"For,  let  me  repeat,  the  governors  and  the  governed,  all  the  same  in 
race,  and  with  defects  aggravated  in  the  latter  by  tropical  life  and  by  associa 
tion  with  slaves,  are  at  least  equally  to  blame  for  the  calamities  of  Cuba. 

"In  fine,  looking  at  the  subject  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  interests  of 
the  United  States,  which  alone  is  of  account  in  the  face  of  a  civil  contest 
where  both  parties  are  deaf  to  the  counsels  of  friendship  and  to  considerations 
of  sympathy  and  humanity,  it  seems  to  me  that  we  have  much  to  lose  and 
nothing  to  gain  by  compromising  ourselves  in  the  matter  of  Cuba,  it  being 
superabundantly  evident  that,  whether  as  to  Lopez  and  his  companions  laboring 
professedly  to  betray  their  country  to  a  foreign  nation  for  the  promotion  of 
slavery,  or  in  case  of  Aldama  and  his  associates,  laboring  to  betray  it  to  the 
same  nation  for  the  gratification  of  personal  resentment  and  ambition,  they  all 
have  but  one  thought  as  respects  us,  namely,  to  make  a  cat's  paw  of  our  gov 
ernment,  while  ready  to  emulate,  on  the  earliest  possible  opportunity,  the 
'sublime  ingratitude' of  Schwartzenberg.  C.  GUSHING." 

This  formidable  indictment  of  Spain  and  Spaniards  is  made  the  more 
tremendous  by  the  proof  in  the  Madrid  dispatches  of  the  author  that  he  was 
not  a  partisan  of  the  Cuban  insurgents,  but  distrusted  them  and  was  high- 
tempered  against  their  representatives  in  the  United  States.  As  to  "inter 
vention"  in  Cuba,  it  was  never  perfectly  defined  until  President  McKinley  did 
it,  in  his  message  so  coldly  received  by  the  warlike  element  in  Congress, 
when  he  calmly  stated  the  situation  in  which  it  would  be  necessary  to  "inter 
vene  with  force,"  and  intervention  with  force  is  war — and  was  war. 

Of  course,  there  was  no  change  in  the  Spanish  system.  Mr.  Gushing  by 
mail  mentioned  that  the  Spanish  Minister  of  State  said  he  would  not  have 
consented  to  leave  the  post  of  minister  of  grace  and  justice,  which  best  suited 
him  as  a  lawyer  and  a  magistrate,  and  to  take  that  of  state,  which  was  out  of 
the  line  of  his  lifetime  pursuits,  "save  only  in  the  hope  of  being  able  to  cooper 
ate  with  me  in  healing  all  differences,  in  order  to  do  which  he  counted  much 
on  our  long-standing  personal  friendship  and  mutual  confidence;  that  he  had 
carefully  read  and  considered  the  contents  of  your  No.  266,  and  must  confess 


<;6  THE    AMERICAN    MINISTER    TO    SPAIN. 

that  the  United  States  had  good  reason  to  complain,  not  only  of  unjustifiable 
acts  on  the  part  of  the  local  authorities  of  Cuba,  but  of  the  delays  and  half- 
measures  of  the  Spanish  government  to  accord  redress ;  that  the  local  admin 
istration  of  Cuba,  civil  and  military  alike,  had,  in  his  conception,  been  greatly 
injurious  to  the  interests  of  Spain  herself,  even  more  than  to  the  United 
States;  that,  as  a  jurist,  he  repudiated  on  principle  the  sequestration  of  the 
property  of  foreigners  in  Cuba;  that  if  the  Spanish  note  of  the  i5th  ultimo 
should  prove  acceptable  to  the  President  as  a  basis,  he  should  be  prepared  to 
take  up  each  individual  grief  as  presented,  and  consider  and  decide  promptly; 
that  while  not  able  conscientiously  to  admit  that  by  the  letter  of  the  treaty 
civil  courts  were  stipulated  for  to  the  exclusion  of  military,  yet  he  was  ready 
so  to  arrange  the  ground  of  controversy  in  that  relation  as  to  put  an  end  to  all 
reasonable  complaint  in  the  premises  on  the  part  of  the  United  States. 

"I  could  but  declare  the  high  gratification  it  afforded  me  to  receive  from 
his  lips  the  communication  of  these  just  and  elevated  statements,  which  it 
would  be  my  pleasure  to  transmit  immediately  to  my  government." 

Mr.  Gushing  could  not  fail  to  exercise  his  brilliant  imagination  on  the 
international  aspects  of  the  questions  arising  in  our  relations  with  Spain; 
he  quoted  an  article  in  the  Epoca  newspaper  that  seemed  to  be  inspired  by 
the  government,  and  set  it  forth  in  a  series  of  flashing  fancies  as  follows: 

"The  definite  references  of  the  Epoca  to  my  interview  with  Mr.  Calderon 
y  Collantes  on  the  soth,  and  to  the  telegrams  received  from  Mr.  Mantilla, 
sufficiently  show  that  the  Epoca  received  its  information  from  some  member 
of  the  government. 

"I  have  never  mentioned  the  contents,  date,  or  even  existence  of  your  No. 
266  to  anybody  except  Mr.  Calderon  y  Collantes,  not  even  to  Mr.  Layard, 
until  he  came  to  speak  to  me  concerning  it,  on  the  ist  instant,  by  telegraphic 
direction  from  Lord  Derby,  as  reported  in  another  dispatch. 

"Of  course,  all  which  the  Epoca  says  of  the  contents  of  that  note  must 
have  been  derived  from  the  government. 

"Four  things  are,  it  seems  to  me,  worth  noting  in  that  article: 

"ist.  In  speaking  of  your  No.  266,  it  undertakes  to  characterize  the  first 
part,  devoted  to  the  exposition  of  particular  grievances,  but  makes  no  allusion 
to  the  second  part. 

"2d.  It  gives  quite  a  novel  turn  to  the  question  of  intervention  and  the 
relations  of  Great  Britain  to  that  subject,  supposing  it  to  be  on  the  part  of 


THE    AMERICAN    MINISTER    TO    SPAIN. 


97 


some  'great  continental  Power'  between  the  United  States  and  Spain.  I  have 
no  knowledge,  nor  any  ground  of  conjecture  even,  as  to  what  Power  is  thus 
intended.  Is  it  Germany?  Or  France?  Or  Russia? 

"3d.  The  Epoca  seems  to  put  forward  the  article  of  the  Herald  by  way 
of  insinuating  the  opposition  of  Great  Britain  to  any  positive  action  of  ours  on 
the  side  of  Cuba. 

"4th.  It  is  observable  that  the  Epoca,  thus  inspired  by  the  government, 
does  not  speak  excitedly,  or  otherwise  betray  signs  of  irritation  on  the  part  of 
the  government  on  occasion  of  the  suggestion  of  our  possible  intervention,  ex 
nomine,  as  intimated  in  your  instructions,  and  also  expressly  in  the  oral 
>t:itement  made  by  me  to  Mr.  Calderon  y  Collantes. " 

Secretary  Fish  was  constant  and  strong  in  urging  Mr.  Gushing  to  force 
upon  the  Spaniards  an  impression  of  the  danger  of  American  "intervention." 
That  he  was  influenced  in  this  insistence  by  the  personal  views  of  President 
Grant  there  is  inner  evidence,  and  yet  it  has  been  a  part  of  the  filibuster 
creed  to  hold  that  General  Grant  was  too  careful,  and  to  assert  that  his  con 
servatism  comprehended  caution  in  the  extreme. 


CHAPTER    III. 

The  Old,  Old  Story  in  Spain. 

European  Newspaper  Comment  on  the  Cuban-Spanish-American  Situation  Twenty-two  Years 
Ago — Not  Much  New  in  Later  Commentary — "Stable  .Government"  Not  a  New  Phrase— 
Cuban  Troubles  Those  of  Inheritance — Disastrous  Influences  of  the  Rebel  Policy  of  the 
Torch — Suggestion  of  Bombardment  of  Our  Cities  by  Spaniards. 

Considerable  agitation  was  produced  in  the  diplomatic  circles  of  Europe 
by  the  steady  pressure  of  Secretary  Fish  with  his  instructions  to  Minister 
Cushing  to  bring  the  Spaniards  to  conclusions.  Repeatedly  the  Secretary 
had  to  qualify  the  forms  of  expression  of  the  several  ministers  intrusted  with 
copies  of  the  formal  paper.  Mr.  Baker  was  admonished  that  he  had  been  too 
strenuous  in  St.  Petersburg  in  making  the  most  of  a  prince's  politeness,  and 
explained  that  he  quoted  the  Russian  Prince  Gortchakoff  by  an  almost 
unconscious  recollection.  Mr.  Orth,  at  Vienna,  over-played  his  part  a  shade, 
and  a  supplementary  direction  was  that  he  should  not  require  a  reply  in 
writing  to  his  suggestive  communication.  The  Vienna  Presse,  of  January  5, 
1876,  contained  this  expression  of  Austrian  pulchritude: 

"North  America  labors  vigorously  and  incessantly  to  make  the  Cuban 
question  an  international  one,  and  to  elevate  it  to  the  position  of  a  burning 
one  before  the  Spanish  arms  can  succeed  in  making  it  disappear  from  the 
world.  To-day  it  is  announced  by  telegram  from  New  York  that  the  note  of 
the  government  of  the  United  States  to  the  Powers  relative  to  Cuba  proposed 
the  union  of  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  under  one  Spanish  governor-general.  The 
European  diplomacy,  which  was  enlightened  with  the  hearing  of  the  extraor 
dinarily  long  American  document — a  copy  of  the  same  was  not  left — might 
be  not  disagreeably  astonished  to  learn  what  actually  might  be  the  small 
meaning  of  the  long  discourse.  The  omission  of  every  conclusion  in  the 
document  of  Mr.  Secretary  Fish  was  until  now  everywhere  remarked;  he  had 
hitherto  excused  the  European  governments  from  the  duty  of  giving  an 

98 


THE    OLD,    OLD    STORY    IN    SPAIN.  101 

answer  to  the  Washington  Government,  and  the  Madrid  government  did  not 
this  time  require,  as  with  the  message  of  President  Grant,  to  answer  with  a 
formal  memorandum.  Substantially,  the  long  and  short  of  the  American  note 
was  to  the  effect  that  the  insurrection  in  Cuba  must  come  to  an  end.  It  was 
careful  to  represent,  in  constantly  recurring  phrases,  that  no  individual  inter 
est  of  any  kind  had  actuated  the  United  States,  who  positively  had  not  the 
least  thought  of  appropriating  the  Pearl  of  the  Antilles." 

As  there  was  a  Carlist  war  on  hand,  it  did  not  seem  to  the  European 
governments  a  striking  opportunity  to  be  especially  urgent  in  demands  that 
Spain  should  mend  her  ways  in  Cuba.  There  was  at  feast  propriety  in  the 
precedence  of  home  rule.  The  edge  of  the  policy  set  forth  by  Mr.  Fish  was 
that  Spain  should  make  a  finish  of  the  Cuban  war  by  abandoning  the  attempt 
to  conquer  the  island,  if  military  success  was  impracticable.  Precisely  the 
contention  of  the  Secretary  was  the  thing  not  possible  for  Spain — and,  there 
were  many  insinuations  abroad  that  President  Grant  was  playing  for  a  third 
term  by  contriving  a  war  with  Spain.  The  London  Times,  January  24,  1876, 
put  in  this  weighty  observation  apropos  of  the  stirring  communications  of 
Mr.  Fish: 

"This  remarkable  correspondence  can  hardly  fail  to  excite  American 
politicians,  not  because  there  is  likely  to  be  any  difference  of  opinion  in  the 
United  States  as  to  the  iniquities  of  Spain,  but  because  the  policy  of  inviting 
the  cooperation  of  the  European  powers  is  a  bold  departure  from  the  political 
traditions  of  the  United  States.  The  invitation  has  not  been  addressed  to 
Great  Britain  alone,  but  also  to  the  governments  of  France  and  Italy,  and  to 
the  three  Empires.  This  is  manifestly  an  abandonment  of  .the  'Monroe 
Doctrine,'  which  has  so  long  controlled  American  policy,  and  has  discon 
nected  it,  at  all  events  in  theory,  from  the  general  web  of  political  interests 
throughout  the  civilized  world.  To  exclude  from  the  American  continent  not 
only  every  advance  by  annexation  or  colonization  of  the  monarchical  powers 
of  Europe,  but  every  direct  influence  of  those  governments  for  good  or  evil, 
was  in  substance  the  political  dogma  which  takes  its  name  from  President 
Monroe.  This  monstrous  pretension  at  the  time  when  the  Democratic  party 
and  the  slave  power  were  in  close  alliance  had  nearly  assumed  an  aggressive 
form,  and  if  events  had  not  checked  and  rebuked  it,  would  probably  have 
tempted  the  Union  into  a  ruinous  filibustering  policy. 

"The  civil  war  prevented  the  United  States  from  actively  asserting  the 


102  THE    OLD,    OLD    STORY    IN    SPAIN. 

Monroe  Doctrine,  though  the  intervention  of  France,  England,  and  Spain  in 
the  affairs  of  Mexico,  excited  vehement  protests  on  the  other  side  of  the 
Atlantic.  But  Mr.  Fish's  invitation  to  the  European  powers,  recognizing,  as 
it  does,  the  fact  that  the  nations  of  Europe  have  interests  to  watch  and  defend 
on  the  American  continent,  marks  very  distinctly  the  progress  of  the  people  of 
the  United  States  in  political  good  sense.  It  is  sheer  folly  for  any  country, 
however  powerful  and  however  confident  in  its  destiny,  to  take  upon  itself  to 
wall  off  half  the  world,  and  say  to  the  commonwealth  of  nations,  'You  have 
nothing  to  do  with  all  on  this  side. '  The  claim  is  as  inadmissible  as  that  of 
the  Holy  See  to  partition  the  unknown  lands  of  the  East  and  the  West 
between  Spain  and  Portugal." 

The  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  January  25,  1876,  editorially  called  attention  to 
the  statement  that  Mr.  Fish  communicated  the  substance  of  his  instructions 
"on  the  eve  of  the  November  elections,"  and  presented  an  essay  dwell 
ing  with  varied  application  upon  the  difficulties  of  the  establishment  of  a 
"stable  government"  in  Cuba. 

It  has  not  been  forgotten  that  at  the  time  President  McKinley  used  the 
phrase,  "stable  government,"  the  members  of  Congress  distinguished  for 
high  temperature  held  that  it  was  fatally  lacking  in  propriety,  because  the 
word  "government"  was  not  qualified  by  "Republican  form,"  which  was  the 
only  sort  of  thing  we  could  endure.  We  quote  the  Pall  Mall  Gazette : 

"Whatever  force  there  may  prove  to  be  in  the  plea  that  General  Grant 
must  be  elected  President  a  third  time  in  order  to  carry  on  a  war  with  the 
Vatican,  there  is  seemingly  no  popular  conviction  that  it  is  worth  while  to 
provoke  a  war  with  Spain  in  order  to  overcome  the  prejudice  against  a  third 
term.  It  does  not  indeed  require  any  keen  political  acumen  to  detect  the 
difficulties  which  surround  both  the  alternatives  suggested  in  Mr.  Fish's  dis 
patch.  It  is  a  cheap  exercise  of  international  officiousness  to  hope  that  Spain 
may  spontaneously  adopt  measures  for  the  organization  of  a  stable  and  satis 
factory  system  of  government  in  Cuba,  but  if  Mr.  Fish  had  to  state  in  words 
what  the  measures  in  question  should  be,  the  impossibility  of  framing  them 
would  be  at  once  apparent.  If  Spain  succeeds  in  putting  down  the  insurrec 
tion,  a  stable  government  of  a  certain  kind  may  be  established.  If  the 
United  States  go  to  war  and  annex  Cuba,  a  stable  government  of  a  certain 
kind  may  be  established. 

"But  to  talk  of  a  stable  government  in  an  island  in  which  the  passions 


THE    OLD,    OLD    STORY    IN    SPAIN.  103 

excited  by  quarrels  of  race,  of  color,  of  social  position,  have  raged  with 
scarcely  any  restriction  for  more  than  five  years,  while  proclaiming  in  the 
same  breath  the  impropriety  of  these  passions  being  subdued  by  the  hand  of 
any  external  power,  is  to  use  words  which  have  no  meaning.  The  concession 
of  independence  to  Cuba  might  mean  peace  as  between  the  mother  country 
and  her  emancipated  colony,  but  it  would  not  mean  peace  in  Cuba  itself.  On 
the  contrary,  it  would  only  mean  war,  renewed  with  greater  determination,  and 
conducted  with  greater  fierceness,  between  the  insurgents  and  that  part  of 
the  population  which,  as  Mr.  Fish  very  truly  puts  it,  'has  sustained  and 
upheld,  if  it  has  not  controlled,  successive  governors-general.'  How  this  con 
flict  would  end  we  do  not  pretend  to  say,  but  is  safe  to  predict  that  while  it 
lasted  it  would  be  characterized  by  }ret  greater  atrocities,  and  inflict  yet  greater 
annoyances  on  foreign  residents  than  the  war  which  has  gone  on  so  long. 

"After  a  time  the  exhaustion  of  resources  and  the  partial  extermination 
of  the  fighting  population  would  bring  active  hostilities  to  an  end ;  but  the 
•  experience  of  West  Indian  and  South  American  independence  does  not  make 
their  subsequent  resumption  at  all  unlikely.  It  is  to  create  this  sort  of 
wilderness  within  sight  of  the  United  States  that  the  American  people  were 
invited  to  run  the  risk  of  a  war  with  Spain.  For  that  a  war  with  Spain 
involves  very  grave  risk  to  the  United  States  is  undoubted.  At  the  outset  of 
a  contest  which  can  only  be  carried  on  at  sea,  the  comparative  wealth,  num 
bers,  and  resources  of  the  combatants  go  for  little,  except  so  far  as  they  are 
embodied  in  actual  ships. 

"The  power  of  Spain,  such  as  it  is,  is  so  embodied;  the  power  of  the 
United  States  is  not;  and  it  is  at  least  possible  that  the   first  act  of  a  war 

between  the  two  countries  might  be  the  bombardment  of  every  American 

tf 

seaport.     It  does  credit  to  the  good  sense  of  the  American  people  that  they 

have  not  cared  to  run  this  risk  for  the  doubtful  benefits  of  annexing  an  island 
which  they  do  not  want  and  being  ruled  for  four  years  longer  by  General  Grant. ' ' 
The  recklessness  of  a  large  portion  of  this  utterance  does  not  remove  the 
pertinence  of  the  discussion  of  the  troublesome  responsibilities  attendant  upon 
governing  Cuba — even  after  the  Spanish  have  departed,  and  when  the  chances 
of  the  bombarcjment  of  our  ports  seem  to  be  very  remote.  We  have  Cuba 
under  the  American  flag,  and  it  is  there  the  symbol  first  of  order,  for  the  state 
of  the  country  demands  the  direct  care  of  the  military  method  of  preserving 
the  peace  of  society. 


,o4  THE    OLD,    OLD    STORY    IN    SPAIN. 

The  domination  of  Spain  in  Cuba  for  four  centuries  and  six  years  has 
stamped  upon  the  people  characteristics  that  will  not  for  a  long  time  cease 
from  troubling,  and  the  first  installment  of  difficulty  comes  in  the  extravagant 
presumption  of  the  insurgents,  who  have  throughout  the  warfare  that  the 
Spaniards  have  been  too  sluggish  to  suppress,  failed  utterly  in  candor  with 
the  friends  of  the  freedom  of  Cuba,  and  they  have  with  system  grievously 
falsified  the  situation.  The  cause  of  Cuba  would  have  been  far  better  pre 
sented  if  the  truth  had  been  told,  but  sensations,  red  and  yellow — the  colors  of 
Spain — were  in  endless  demand  by  those  engaged  in  the  preparation  of 
bulletins,  the  primary  purpose  of  which  was  to  bring  on  war  between  the 
United  States  and  Spain,  assuming  that  we  would  conquer  the  island  and  turn  it 
over  to  the  first  comers  claiming  to  have  provided  a  Republican  Cuban  govern 
ment.  It  is  fortunate  that  we  are  pledged  to  give  Cuba,  as  the  first  fruits  of 
victory,  a  "stable  government."  Stability  is  the  first  necessity.  The  only 
way  of  redeeming  the  promise  of  stability  is  through  military  government, 
and  that  must  continue  until  we  have  discovered  the  constituency  of  a 
"stable  government."  It  was  the  policy  of  Maximo  Gomez  to  annihilate 
the  two  great  industries  in  Cuba — sugar  and  tobacco  production — and  he  did 
it  ruthlessly,  that  the  Spaniards  might  be  impoverished.  In  a  greater  degree 
he  has  made  the  Cubans  poor.  He  desired  to  combine  with  the  desolation  of 
the  cane  and  tobacco  fields  the  abolishment  of  peaceable  occupation,  so  that 
the  laboring  men  could  be  driven  to  fight  with  him.  The  disorganization  of 
civilization  was,  with  this  stroke  of  barbarism,  made  complete.  Notwith 
standing  the  armies  under  Gomez  declined  in  numbers  and  active  service,  and 
he  has  been  more  and  more  cautious  in  actual  warfare,  content  to  hold  areas 
of  tropical  wilderness  by  scattered  squads  with  a  system  of  speedy  dispersion 
and  concentration.  Maceo  was  hard  pressed  in  Pinar  del  Rio,  west  of  Captain- 
General  Weyler's  trocha,  and  for  months  had  maintained  against  great  odds, 
with  high  courage  and  consummate  address,  a  combat  in  the  theretofore 
un violated  Paradise  of  tobacco,  hoping  for  the  return  of  Gomez  from  the 
east,  where  after  his  wonderful  westward  march  he  receded  to  the  mountains 
and  swamps,  in  whose  shelter  it  was  the  explanation  of  friends  that  he  was 
gathering  a  host  of  freedom  to  swoop  down  upon  Havana,  after  the  manner 
of  many  Key  West  bulletins,  relieving  Maceo  from  the  strain  of  a  situation  of 
desperate  hardihood.  The  more  certain  it  was  that  Gomez  could  only  move 
from  one  obscure  retirement  to  another,  the  wilder  grew  the  Key  West  music 


THE    OLD,    OLD    STORY    IN    SPAIN,  107 

on  the  wires  announcing  the  invincible  hero  proceeding  by  forced  marches  on 
the  way  to  Havana,  which  certainly  he  would  assault  in  a  few  days!  This 
methodical  fabrication  was  in  its  nature  the  same  discovered  in  the  official 
Spanish  dispatches.  The  truth  was  not  valued  on  either  side.  Maceo  fell  in 
a  skirmish  after  he  had  crossed  Weyler's  trocha  and  met  four  hundred  men 
who  were  advised  of  his  coming.  He  was  not  "lured"  by  the  Spaniards 
under  a  flag  of  truce  and  assassinated,  as  stated  with  all  the  pomp  of  fiction. 
He  rode  up  to  the  firing  when  a  Spanish  column  was,  not  unexpectedly, 
encountered,  and  was  killed  by  a  Mauser  bullet  through  the  neck.  The  story 
of  his  betrayal  and  murder  was  frantically  worked,  in  the  hope  that  Ameri 
cans  might  be  exasperated  to  madness  and  rushed  headlong  into  war.  The 
Spanish  falsehood  for  this  incident  was  that  there  was  a  "battle"  in  which 
the  soldiers  of  Spain  were  most  brave  and  that  the  rebels  were  routed,  Maceo 
falling  in  the  midst  of  the  affray.  The  "battle"  was  a  skirmish-line  affair, 
over  in  a  few  minutes,  and  Maceo 's  men,  recovering  his  body,  gave  it  secret 
burial.  With  his  fall  the  aggressive  impulse  of  the  insurgents  ceased,  with 
the  exception  of  the  operations  conducted  in  the  eastern  provinces  by  General 
Garcia.  There  was  no  intermission,  however,  in  the  triumphant  chapters  of 
militant  Cuban  literature,  transmitted  from  Key  West.  The  Cuban  army,  as 
it  appeared  when  the  American  army  landed  in  Cuba,  was  not  what  had  been 
represented,  and  it  was  evident  that  there  had  been  deliberate  deception 
carried  on  by  the  Cuban  Bureau  of  Intelligence,  specially  provided  for  its 
effect  upon  the  American  people.  However,  the  Gomez  policy  had  been 
successful  in  stopping  work  in  the  fields,  and  the  "troops"  of  the  Cuban 
government  were  willing  to  receive  rations  from  the  American  army  of 
liberation,  but  they  were  resolute  to  retain  their  arms  until  they  could  find  a 
paymaster;  and  they  will  not  go  into  another  rebellion  while  their  names  are 
on  a  payroll.  It  is  their  misfortune  that  under  the  guidance  of  Gomez  they 
destroyed  the  industries  of  their  country  that  Spain  might  be  harmed,  but 
made  themselves  poor  indeed. 

When  the  ten  years'  war  in  Cuba  began  in  1868,  there  were  less  than 
seven  thousand  Spanish  regulars  on  the  island,  and  after  reinforcements,  one 
hundred  thousand  strong,  had  been  sent  across  the  Atlantic,  neither  the 
military  nor  the  civil  administration  of  Spain  in  the  last  of  her  great  provinces 
had  been  improved.  The  sharpest  offense  that  could  be  given  the  Spaniards 
was  to  propose  as  a  tentative  alternative  that  the  insurgents  should  have 


loS  THE    OLD,    OLD    STORY    IN    SPAIN. 

rights  as  belligerents,  and  yet  the  greatest  army  any  nation  ever  transported 
three  thousand  miles  was  year  after  year  unable  to  report  decisive  progress  in 
campaigns  of  pacification.  There  was  not  a  public  man  in  Spain  who  did  not 
know  that  the  one  thing  needful  to  the  Spanish  cause  in  Cuba  was  military 
success,  and  there  was  an  army  of  regulars  that  should  number  nearly  or 
quite  one  hundred  thousand,  with  firemen,  policemen  and  volunteers  nearly 
fifty  thousand,  and  a  swarm  of  gunboats  and  ships  of  war  forming  a  coast 
guard;  and  yet  there  were  no  results  from  the  presence  of  this  immense 
array  which  was  consuming  the  life  of  Spain.  The  Spanish  Cabinet  and 
diplomatic  representatives  prayed  for  military  success  to  build  a  hope  upon, 
but  the  only  victories  for  the  Spaniards  were  the  extension  of  deserts,  the 
spread  of  famine,  and  the  stalking  abroad  of  pestilence.  The  distance  from 
Spain  to  Cuba  was  greater  than  the  fleets  or  legions  of  the  Romans  covered, 
and  the  British  armies  that  crossed  the  Atlantic  in  the  attempted  subjugation 
of  the  thirteen  revolted  colonies,  never  showed  fifty  per  cent  of  the  numerical 
strength  of  the  Spaniards  of  the  regular  army  in  Cuba.  The  Spanish  volun 
teers  were  additional,  and  yet,  until  in  the  final  strife  that  preceded  the 
armed  intervention  of  the  United  States,  the  western  provinces  of  Cuba  were 
not  seriously  molested,  and  the  sugar  and  tobacco  crops  up  to  that  time 
increased.  It  is  only  in  the  studies  of  Spanish  character,  both  in  the  penin 
sula  and  the  island,  by  Caleb  Gushing,  our  Minister  to  Spain  in  the  closing 
years  of  Grant's  administration,  that  the  phenomenon  of  the  inability  of  the 
Spanish  forces  to  take  a  vigorous  initiative  is  explained.  The  military 
capacity  of  the  Spanish  race  has  in  modern  times  been  almost  exclusively 
defensive.  The  side  that  has  the  privilege  of  ambuscades  and  can  pursue  the 
strategy  and  the  tactics  of  evasion,  elusion  and  procrastination  is  unconquer 
able,  except  by  soldiers  of  a  tougher  fiber  and  a  more  alert  and  determined 
spirit  in  advancing  upon  concealed  foes  than  themselves.  The  Cubans 
could  no  more  fight  battles  with  Spanish  regulars  in  the  open  field  than  the 
Spaniards  could  fight  the  French  in  regular  order  in  the  warfare  with 
Napoleon.  Wellington  found  his  Spanish  allies,  during  the  Peninsular  war, 
uncertain  and  fantastic,  as  the  American  generals  discovered  the  Cubans, 
who  emerged  from  the  swamps  and  mountains  when  Shafter's  divisions  were 
climbing  the  hills  of  Santiago,  alternately  scorched  and  drenched,  and 
stricken  with  ghastly  fevers.  It  turned  out  that  the  Spaniards,  ineffectual  in 
attacking  the  Cuban  guerrillas  in  familiar  fastnesses,  when  intrenched 


THE    OLD,     OLD    STORY    IN    SPAIN.  109 

behind  entanglements  of  barbed  wire,  were  keen  and  steady  as  defenders, 
standing  up  to  their  work  manfully;  but  their  courage  in  resisting  assaults 
was  no  more  testimony  that  their  colonial  system  was  not  disastrous  infamy, 
than  the  success  of  the  Cubans  in  bushwhacking  was  evidence  that  they  had 
organized  a  Republic  and  should  resume  the  art  of  government  where  the 
Spaniards  left  it. 

All  there  was  of  the  Cuban  question  that  concerned  us  was  thrashed  over 
during  the  ten  years'  war,  1868-78.  Out  of  a  hundred  thousand  men  the 
Spaniards  then  had  in  Cuba,  they  lost  seventeen  thousand  from  sickness  in 
1877,  and  the  next  year  treated  with  the  armed  insurgents,  bribing  some, 
cajoling  others,  promising  all  things  with  a  broad  profusion  that  was  proof 
they  attached  no  value  to  their  words.  There  was  peace  for  a  few  years — 
that  is,  there  were  intrigues  in  place  of  skirmishes,  when,  as  has  been  the 
stated  custom  in  the  stories  of  Spanish  colonial  conflicts,  the  stipulations  of 
reformation  without  performance  having  run  their  course,  hostilities  were 
resumed  at  the  old  stands  in  the  well-known  ways,  with  the  usual  Junta  in 
New  York,  and  the  regular  equipments  all  around.  This  time  the  brain  that 
organized  the  customary  outbreak  was  in  a  civil  capacity  Jose  Marti,  with 
Maximo  Gomez  as  the  military  chieftain,  supreme  in  general  direction,  and 
Antonio  Maceo,  a  soldier  of  personal  daring  and  many  high  qualities.  Early 
in  the  conflict  Marti,  exposing  himself  to  encourage  followers,  was  slain,  and 
within  two  years  the  two  Maceos,  plunging  into  desperate  situations, 
perished.  The  chieftains  of  the  insurgents  invaded  eastern  Cuba  in  small 
boats,  finding  their  way  from  Hayti  to  appointed  Cuban  coves,  where  friends 
awaited  them,  and  it  was  not  long  before  the  development  that  a  revolt  against 
the  Spaniards  of  the  Peninsula,  of  a  more  sanguinary  and  destructive  nature 
than  ever,  had  been  encountered.  The  constant  cry  of  the  Spanish  through 
the  years  of  bloody  contention  was  that  the  Cuban  rebels  would,  if  it  was  in  • 
their  power,  make  of  the  splendid  island  an  enlarged  San  Domingo — and  the 
horrors  of  French  experience  were  recited  to  terrorize  all  who  were  unwilling 
to  accept  barbarism  as  freedom.  The  Spanish  cartoons  on  display  in  Havana 
always  represented  the  rebellion  as  personified  by  a  black  man,  uncouth  and 
horrid,  torch  and  knife  in  hand,  grossly  threatening  Cuba  drawn  as  a  beauti 
ful  white  woman;  Uncle  Sam — an  unwieldy  hog  with  snout  and  tail,  a 
starry  hat  and  striped  coat-tails  and  trousers — instigating  the  black  monster  to 
violence.  It  was  the  Gomez  policy  to  accept  this  issue  by  the  use  of  the 


no  THE    OLD,    OLD    STORY    IN    SPAIN. 

torch,  and  the  war  took  on  a  dreadful  aspect,  in  widespread  plantation  fires 
rolling  westward,  the  fiery  clouds  of  conflagrations  consuming  the  cane  fields 
and  mills,  and  finally  the  tobacco  houses  stored  with  leaves  precious  as  fine 
gold.  The  insurgents  burned  the  better  houses  and  laid  waste  the  areas  of 
black  and  red  sugar  and  tobacco  land,  whose  cultivation  had  yielded  mar 
velous  opulence.  In  turn  the  Spaniards  burned  the  humbler  dwellings  and 
the  villages  they  could  not  garrison.  The  Cubans  were  accomplished  horse 
men,  and  domestic  animals  and  the  fruit  trees  afforded  the  shifty,  irregular 
cavaliers  food  supplies.  The  Spaniards  slaughtered  the  horses  and  cattle  they 
could  not  ride  or  drive  away,  and  the  sheep  and  pigs  it  was  inconvenient  to 
capture  and  hold  in  pens  were  massacred.  On  both  sides  there  was  infuriated 
savagery,  and  the  wretched  camps,  where  famine  and  pestilence  made  war 
most  hideous,  were  the  result.  The  responsibility  rested  upon  both  parties 
to  the  interminable  conflict  of  barbarities.  Weyler  and  Gomez  were  the 
representative  men  of  this  diabolical  warfare.  More  and  more,  the  people  in 
Cuba  of  intelligence  equal  to  understanding  that  there  must  be  order  before 
prosperity  could  be  restored,  and  that  authority  must  be  found  and  applied, 
not  committed  to  the  everlasting  confusion  and  reprisals  of  the  partisans  of 
vengeance,  before  the  restoration  of  hopefulness  would  be  rational,  were 
persuaded  and  convinced  that  with  the  people  of  the  United  States  and  their 
army  and  navy  must  rest  the  responsibility,  and  in  them  be  found  the 
capacity  for  saving  jurisdiction.  The  Cuban  Republic,  if  the  island 
should  be  turned  over  to  the  Key  West  and  New  York  colonies,  and  the 
bands  that  are  in  arms  looking  for  money  that  they  may  continue  to  be  an 
army,  and  play  the  part  the  Spaniards  have  played  out,  would  make  the 
fruition  of  American  sacrifices  the  extension  of  unmitigated  San  Domingo 
terrors.  It  is  the  first  obligation  of  the  United  States  in  possession  of  Cuba, 
to  American  civilization,  to  use  the  force  necessary  to  prevent  this  consum 
mation,  most  devoutly  to  be  deprecated,  and  the  fact  should  be  fearlessly 
presented,  discussed  without  hesitation,  declared  without  the  shadow  of 
misgiving,  that  the  correct  policy  of  our  country  is  and  always  has  been  that 
of  the  ultimate  annexation  of  Cuba.  The  island  wants  American  rule,  and 
not  a  continuance  of  the  Spanish  styles  of  tyranny,  corruption  and  spoliation, 
whether  direct  or  indirect.  We  did  not  make  war  in  Cuba  for  our  health,  and 
in  the  island  of  the  palm  and  the  orange,  coffee  and  cane,  tropic  woods  and 
iron  ores,  of  fruits  and  flowers,  birds  and  fishes  of  surpassing  beauty  and 


THE    OLD,    OLD    STORY    IN    SPAIN.  in 

utility,  the  government  must  change  hands  actually  and  the  wholesome  heal 
ing  American  influences  prevail  through  stable  government  under  the  law 
sustained  by  the  American  people,  armed  and  puissant. 

The  correspondence  of  our  State  Department  has  for  a  generation  been 
unnecessarily  littered  with  disavowals  of  the  logic  of  history  and  the  teachings 
of  geography  on  this  subject  of  the  occupation  and  possession  of  Cuba  by  and 
for  ourselves.  We  would  at  any  time  have  paid  Spain..  .one  hundred  millions 
of  dollars  for  the  island,  and  twenty-five  millions  for  Porto  Rico~~an3^  the 
actual  trouble,  deeper  than  any  other  in  embarrassing  the  negotiations,  has 
been  the  necessity  of  providing  a  large  margin  for  the  jniddleman.  It 
would  be  a  strange  official  transaction  in  Spain,  and  one  certain  to  decline  and 
;  perish  by  the  way,  if  there  were  not  a  reserved  fund  amounting  to  a  large 
•percentage  for  the  gentlemen  who  took  the  risks  of  the  delicate  antecedent 
manipulations.  The  Cuban  Republic  —  that  is,  the  civil  side  of  the  guerrilla 
war  —  lost  the  opportunity  to  gain  the  first  foothold  and  title  to  the  island, 
and  finance  the  rebellion  when  under  the  Gomez  policy,  of  destroying  Spanish 
resources  by  desolating  Cuban  plantations;  the  credit  of  the  country  itself, 
with  all  its  wealth  of  plantations,  was  annihilated.  Cuba  might  have  been 
purchased  by  Cubans,  if  the  war  had  not  been  made  a  sacrifice  of  civilization. 
Cuba,  with  the  sugar  and  tobacco  fields  preserved,  would  have  been  good  for 
a  loan  of  $150,000,000,  at  6  per  cent^  The  customs  of  the  two  principal  ports 
guaranteed  in  the  hands  of  American  appointees  for  the  interest  on  the  bonds 
•  —  $100,000,000  purchase  money,  and  the  $50,000,000  judiciously  distributed,  it 
is  demonstrated  that  the  Cubans  by  themselves  could  never  have  freed  them 
selves.  Whatever  good  there  was,  or  harm,  in  extinguishing  the  $150,000,000 
scheme  belongs  to  the  torches  of  Gomez,  but  in  the  fires  of  the  plantations 
were  consumed  the  one  opportunity  for  the  Republic  of  Cuba  to  become,  in 
the  language  that  so  often  rings  around  the  walls  of  the  halls  of  Congress, 
one  of  the  nations  of  the  earth.  TKp_jpQnrorpr|tq__  "hnrnflfi  ^ftJT  ahilif  to 


establish,  a  stable  government.  We,  the  people  of  the  United  States,  only, 
have  the  will  and  the  power  to  dispose  of  the  sovereignty  of  Cuba,  and  the 
duty  of  our  destiny  confronts  us  upon  that  line,  and  imposes  upon  us  the 
accomplishment  of  the  purposes  of  the  war,  upon  which  we  entered  with 
generous  sentiments,  unprepared  save  in  the  reserved  forces  of  our  inherent 
strength  —  the  war  which  we  conducted  speedily  to  a  triumphant  and  glorious 
conclusion. 


ii2  THE    OLD,    OLD    STORY    IN    SPAIN. 

During-  the  twenty  years  following  our  centennial  celebration  of  the 
declaration  of  our  independence,  when  we  were  seeking  in  the  courts  of 
Europe  cooperation  in  demanding  of  Spain  actual  concessions  that  would 
prevent  her  exhaustion  in  a  struggle  that  the  character  of  her  people  made 
them  incapable  of  conducting  to  success — or  to  terminate  at  all — the  prestige 
of  the  Spaniards  as  a  nation  has  declined,  while  our  advancement  has  been 
incessant,  and  conspicuous.  The  statistics  of  our  progress  have  notified  all 
whom  it  might  concern  that  here  was  one  of  the  great  Powers,  and  that 
when  she  came  to  the  front  there  would  be  none  to  dispute  her  right  to  be 
heard  at  the  ends  of  the  earth,  and  at  the  opening  and  closing  of  great  ques 
tions.  The  Spanish  people  should  not  be  decried,  but  rather  there  ought  to 
be  free  affirmation  that  they  made  extravagant  sacrifices  for  Cuba  of  the 
young  men  of  the  country,  and  called  upon  the  last  scrap  of  credit — indeed,  of 
everything  but  her  incompetent  pride  and  prejudice — to  save  the  province. 
Spain  was  the  less  reasonable  because  dealing  with  her  children.  The  quali 
ties  of  those  in  the  name  of  liberty  insurgents  were  the  same  possessed  by 
the  oppressors  whose  perpetual  outcry  was  of  the  dignity  and  honor  of  Spain, 
both  of  which  were  perverted  from  the  ways  of  wisdom  in  \vhich  were  alone 
the  paths  of  peace.  Spain  had  not  appreciated  human  decadence,  or  esti 
mated  the  proportiofra  of  our  pi^a-ft-tic  copgnlidation  of  force.  She  counted  a 
great  army  and  many  ships  of  war,  and  in  the  course  of  her  many  years  of 
strife  in  Cuba  she  had  relied  upon  bulk  and  severity,  not  upon  the  keenness 
of  weapons  and  the  relentless  energies  that  strike  quickly  and  pursue  without 
sleep  a  fixed  purpose  to  the  end.  The  Spanish  armies  were  handled  in 
columns,  like  droves  of  patient  cattle.  The  men  were  excellent  soldierly 
material,  but  there  was  the  taint  of  corruption  in  every  detail  of  the  manage 
ment,  and  the  marches  to  and  fro  were  without  a  common  purpose,  or  a 
special  object.  The  Spanish  soldiers  were  not  instructed  to  go  into  the  fire, 
to  penetrate  the  hearts  of  ambuscades  with  rushes  of  steel.  They  were  not 
equipped  for  mobility,  and  the  fairest  of  islands,  with  the  gift  of  beauty  and 
endowment  of  riches,  was  ill  provided  with  roads,  a  deadly  disability  for 
Spanish  columns.  Finding  themselves  at  last  committed  to  war  with  the 
United  States,  and  presently  realizing  that  they  were  overmatched,  the  Span 
ish  statesmen  remembered  the  diplomatic  situation  of  twenty  years  before, 
when  no  court  in  Europe  countenanced  President  Grant's  administration  in 
putting  a  pressure  upon  Spain  to  part  with  Cuba,  except  upon  the  condition  of 


THE    OLD,    OLD    STORY    IN    SPAIN.  113 

an  impossible  conquest  of  the  island  for  herself.  It  was  the  last  reliance  of 
the  Spaniards  that  there  would  be  European  intervention  to  fix  limitations 
upon  our  ambitious  aggrandizement.  When  Spain  sued  for  peace  she  soon 
became  conscious  that  the  world  was  changed.  She  had  expended  herself 
upon  her  own  faults  in  Cuba,  and  had  to  surrender  islands  as  she  had  given  up 
continents.  It  was  for  her  an  old  story.  The  Powers  that  were  aloof  when 
Secretary  Fish  pleaded  so  ably  and  with  perseverance  for  intervention  in  the 
name  of  peace  in  Cuba,  and  gave  Spain  two  decades  to  adjust  the  affairs  that 
she  claimed  as  her  own,  refused  to  intervene  in  behalf  of  Spain  beaten  down, 
and  there  was  something  more  than  the  wreck  of  her  fleets  and  the  captivity 
of  her  armies  or  the  poverty  of  her  treasury.  She  was  primarily  accountable 
for  the  elements  of  discordance  that  brought  woe  and  ruin  upon  the  island 
and  humiliation  upon  the  peninsula,  and  the  cruelties  of  the  system  of  warfare 
pursued  on  both  sides  were  her  own.  Even  more,  it  was  the  fault  of  the 
misgovernment  of  Spain  at  home  and  abroad  that  the  world  was  shocked  by 
incidents  of  atrocity  incredible  with  other  surroundings,  from  the  individual 
ferocities  of  slaughter  and  the  vengeful,  remorseless,  cowardly  executions,  to 
the  massacre  of  the  crew  of  the  Maine!  The  consensus  of  human  judgment 
had  declared,  after  four  hundred  yearSj  the  execution  of  sentence  of  death 
upon  the  colonial  system  of  Spain. 


CHAPTER    IV. 

The  Ten  Years'  War  in  Cuba. 

The  Stir  About  It  in  Europe — The  Money  Resources  of  Spain  Stated  by  Minister  Gushing- 
Europe  Against  Our  Intervention  in  Cuba — The  Filibuster  Hostility  to  President 
Grant — The  London  Times  on  Hamilton  Fish — A  Minister  Promises  Too  Much. 

The  Senate  of  the  United  States,  March  24,  1896,  requested  the  State  De 
partment  to  furnish  the  papers  relating  to  the  "mediation"  or  "intervention"  of 
the  United  States,  between  November  5,  1875,  and  "the  date  of  the  pacification" 
of  Cuba  in  1878.  The  resolution  called  for  the  letter  of  the  Secretary,  Hamil 
ton  Fish,  to  Minister  Caleb  Gushing,  of  the  date  of  November,  1875,  and  all 
notes,  dispatches,  and  telegrams,  so  far  as  compatible  with  the  public  inter 
est.  Mr.  Fish  said  that  when  Mr.  Gushing  departed  for  Madrid,  apart  from 
the  generally  unsatisfactory  state  of  things  in  Spanish  relations,  there  were 
several  prominent  questions  unadjusted,  the  settlement  of  which  was  deemed 
necessary  before  affairs  with  Spain  could  be  established  in  a  satisfactory  way. 
Among  these  questions,  Mr.  Fish  said  some  arose  from  the  embargo  and  con 
fiscation  of  estates  of  American  citizens  in  Cuba  in  violation  of  treaty  obli 
gations,  and  the  claims  arising  out  of  the  capture  of  the  Virginius,  including 
the  trial  and  punishment  of  General  Burriel.  It  had  not  been  pretended,  so 
far  as  the  Secretary  was  aware,  that  any  legal  justification  for  these  wrongs 
had  been  attempted  on  the  part  of  the  authorities  of  Spain,  or  that  the  pro 
ceedings  in  Cuba  were  defended  or  upheld. 

On  the  contrary,  pursuant  to  the  decree  issued  by  the  government  on  the 
i2th  of  July,  1873,  the  illegality  and  indefensible  character  of  the  acts  were 
admitted,  "and  the  embargoes  ordered  to  be  removed  and  the  property 
restored.  This  decree  was  at  first  received  in  Cuba  with  calm  indifference, 
not  even  published  or  adverted  to,  and  the  proceedings  of  the  authorities  were 
in  no  notable  respect  changed  thereby." 

This  shows  the  protracted  power  of  the  inertia  of  Spain.  Mr.  Fish  cited 
in  this  connection  specimen  cases,  and  the  promises  of  the  Spanish  Ministers, 

114 


THE    TEN    YEARS'  WAR    IN    CUBA.  117 

unperformed,  and  the  Secretary  remarked  the  simple  mention  of  the  facts,  of 
"the  promises  made  and  repeated,  the  assurances  given  from  time  to  time,  that 
something  should  be  done,  the  admission  of  the  justice  of  the  demands  of  this 
country,  at  least  to  the  extent  of  expressing  regret  for  these  wrongs  and 
promising  redress,  followed  as  they  have  been  by  absolutely  no  performance, 
and  no  practical  steps  whatever  toward  performance,  need  no  extended  com 
ment."  He  added: 

"In  the  cases  of  embargo  and  confiscation,  not  only  have  wrongs  been 
long  since  done,  but  continuing  and  repeated  wrongs  are  daily  inflicted.  The 
authorities  of  Spain  in  Cuba,  during  all  this  time,  have  been  and  are  using  the 
revenues  of  the  confiscated  or  embargoed  estates,  appropriating  much  of 
the  property  itself,  and  in  some  cases  executing  long  leases,  or  actually  mak 
ing  sales,  either  on  the  allegation  that  taxes  were  due  or  without  any  excuse 
whatever. 

"In  the  cases  of  arrest  and  punishment,  citizens  of  the  United  States,  in 
like  manner,  have  undergone  punishment  because  the  authorities  of  -Spain  do 
not  meet  the  issue  and  decide  the  question."  This  ought  to  have  been  like  a 
live  coal  on  the  Spanish  back,  but  there  were  no  results. 

After  referring  to  the  Virginius  case,  and  the  payment  of  a  sum  of 
money  by  Spain,  settling  claims  of  English  and  American  citizens,  the 
Secretary  added  impressively: 

"I  regret  to  say  that  the  authorities  of  Spain  have  not  at  all  times  appre 
ciated  our  intentions  or  our  purposes  in  these  respects,  and,  while  insisting 
that  a  state  of  war  does  not  exist  in  Cuba  and  that  no  rights  as  belligerents 
should  be  accorded  to  the  insurrectionists,  have  at  the  same  time  demanded 
for  themselves  all  the  rights  and  privileges  which  flow  from  actual  and 
acknowledged  war. 

"It  will  be  apparent  that  such  a  state  of  things  cannot  continue.  [But 
they  did  nearly  twenty-three  years,  long  after  the  honorable  career  of  Mr. 
Fish  had  terminated. — Editor.}  It  is  absolutely  necessary  to  the  maintenance 
of  our  relations  with  Spain,  even  on  their  present  footing,  that  our  just 
demands  for  the  return  to  citizens  of  the  United  States  of  their  estates  in 
Cuba,  unincumbered,  and  for  securing  to  them  a  trial  for  offenses  according 
to  treaty  provisions  and  all  other  rights  guaranteed  by  treaty  and  by  public 
law,  should  be  complied  with. 

"Whether  the  Spanish  government,  appreciating  the  forbearance  of  this 


uS  THE    TEN    YEARS'    WAR    IN    CUBA. 

country,  will  speedily  and  satisfactorily  adjust  the  pending  questions,  not  by 
the  issue  of  empty  orders  or  decrees  without  force  or  effect  in  Cuba,  but  by 
comprehensive  and  firm  measures  which  shall  everywhere  be  respected,  I 
anxiously  await  further  intelligence. 

"Moreover,  apart  from  these  particular  questions,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
President  the  time  has  arrived  when  the  interests  of  this  country,  the  preser 
vation  of  its  commerce,  and  the  instincts  of  humanity  alike  demand  that  some 
speedy  and  satisfactory  ending  be  made  of  the  strife  that  is  devastating  Cuba. 

"A  disastrous  conflict  of  more  that  seven  years'  duration  has  demon 
strated  the  inability  of  Spain  to  maintain  peace  and  order  in  an  island  lying  at 
our  door.  Desolation  and  destruction  of  life  and  property  have  been  the  only 
results  of  this  conflict. 

"The  United  States  sympathizes  in  the  fact  that  this  inability  results  in  a 
large  degree  from  the  unhappy  condition  of  Spain  at  home  and  to  some  extent 
from  the  distractions  which  are  dividing  her  people.  But  the  fact  remains. 
Added  to  this  are  the  large  expanse  of  ocean  separating  the  peninsula  from 
the  island  and  the  want  of  harmony  and  of  personal  sympathy  between  the 
inhabitants  of  the  territory  of  the  home  government  and  those  of  the  colony, 
the  distinction  of  classes  in  the  latter  between  rulers  and  subjects,  the  want  of 
adaptation  of  the  ancient  colonial  system  of  Spain  to  the  present  times  and  to 
the  ideas  which  the  events  of  the  past  age  have  impressed  upon  the  peoples 
of  every  reading  and  thinking  country." 

The  aggravations  of  the  case  of  Spain  in  provoking  the  United  States  to 
take  summary  methods  have  not  been  stated  with  greater  force  than  in  these 
quiet  sentences.  There  are  two  other  passages  necessary  to  complete  the 
statement  of  facts,  with  the  calm  solidity  that  bears  down  opponents,  with 
the  inherent  moderation  that  shows  the  weaknesses  of  the  exaggeration  that 
impairs  the  integrity  of  true  strength.  The  note  of  Mr.  Fish  to  Mr.  Gushing 
was  duplicated  to  General  Schenck,  Minister  of  the  United  States  to  England, 
who  was  instructed  to  read  it  to  Lord  Derby,  and  Gushing  was  directed  to 
wait  for  the  result  of  the  effort  to  obtain  the  cooperation  of  England.  Mr. 
Gushing  was  of  the  judgment  that  this  letter  of  instructions  from  Secretary 
Fish  was  dangerous,  and  might  result  in  war.  To  this  effect  he  wrote  a  letter 
and  sent  a  telegram  November  25th,  saying  in  the  letter  he  "almost  wished" 
his  instructions  "were  less  specific."  He  said  the  condition  of  Spain  was  a 
temptation  to  her  to  go  to  war. 


THE    TEN    YEARS'    WAR    IN    CUBA.  119 


Many  of  the  most  thoughtful  men  in  Spain,  he  affirmed,  really  longed  for 
a  foreign  war  as  the  only  efficient  remedy  for  the  domestic  dissensions  that 
distracted  the  country. 

"Moreover,  the  statesmen  of  the  country  foresaw  that  on  the  close  of  the 
war  in  the  North  (the  Carlist  conflict),  which  cannot  fail  to  come  in  the  course 
of  the  winter  or  early  in  the  spring,  there  will  be  an  army  of  two  or  three 
hundred  thousand  men  to  dispose  of,  with  its  officers,  who  will  be  but  too 
much  disposed  to  dominate  in  public  affairs  and  push  the  civilians  into  the 
background."  In  addition  to  which,  there  was  a  multitude  of  "unthoughtful 
men,  proud,  angry,  resentful,  who  would  gladly  rush  into  a  war  with  the 
United  States."  Finally,  there  were  "the  mercenary,  the  ambitious,  the 
declasses  and  the  bad,  to  whom  war  presents  the  usual  attractions.  'Multis 
utile  bellum,'  says  Sallust." 

More  than  this,  Mr.  Gushing  declared:  "It  is  the  received  opinion  in 
Spain  that  for  the  commencing  period  of  a  war  she  has  a  more  efficient  navy 
than  ours,"  and,  "In  these  circumstances,  if  Great  Britain  declines  to 
cooperate  with  us,  Spain  will,  at  the  least,  despatch  to  Cuba  at  once  a  large 
fleet  laden  with  troops,  there  to  await  the  eventualities  of  diplomacy,  anc! 
she  may  break  off  relations,  with  a  hostile  appeal  to  the  European  Powers." 

In  his  telegram  of  November  25th,  General  Gushing  said  of  the  mission  of 
General  Schenck  to  sound  Lord  Derby,  that  if  England  joined  us  Spain  would 
"succumb  in  sullen  despair,"  but  if  England  stood  off  Spain  would  think  she 
had  the  sympathy  of  Europe,  especially  as  by  her  note  of  the  i5th  she  had 
gone  to  "the  ultimate  point  in  satisfaction  of  each  of  the  particular  griefs  of 
the  United  States."  Mr.  Gushing  urgently  pressed  the  Secretary,  "in 
proportion"  as  he  "desired  peace,"  to  give  explicit  and  specific  replies  in 
regard  "to  certain  most  needful  instructions  he  would  ask  for  by  telegraph  if 
a  negative  answer  came  from  Great  Britain."  In  case  of  that  negative 
answer,  Gushing  cabled:  "There  will  be  war,  and  a  popular  though  desper 
ate  one  on  the  part  of  Spain,  unless  she  can  be  convinced  that  the  real  and 
true  object  of  the  contemplated  measure  is  to  prevent  war,  as  I  understand  it 
to  be  intended.  But  to  ward  off  war  will  exact  the  steady  exercise  of  all  my 
personal  influence  here  (which  my  colleagues  tell  me  is  great),  and  will  require 
that  influence  to  be  efficiently  backed  by  my  government  both  here  and  at 
Washington.  I  am  to  'obey  orders  though  it  break  owners,'  as  the  shipmasters 
say." 


i2o  THE    TEN    YEARS'    WAR    IN    CUBA. 

The  Spanish  note  to  Mr.  Gushing  contained  proposals  for  adjustment  for 
existing  differences  between  the  United  States  and  Spain.  Its  substance  was 
telegraphed  to  Mr.  Fish  by  Mr.  Gushing  November  16,  1875.  It  had  no 
reference  to  mediation  or  intervention  by  the  United  States  in  the  affairs 
of  Cuba. 

November  27th,  Gushing  was  telegraphed  that  in  consequence  of  his 
telegram  Schenck  was  instructed  to  delay  the  reading  of  the  Gushing  instruc 
tions  to  Derby!  and  the  Secretary  said  the  instruction  was  "not  intended  to  be 
minatory  in  any  sense,  but  in  the  spirit  of  friendship." 

Mr.  Gushing  was  a  man  of  extraordinary  range  of  information  and  a 
faculty  of  literary  expression  very  rare.  His  paper  addressed  to  the  State 
Department  on  the  financial  situation  of  Spain  is  an  excellent  example.  We 
quote  in  full : 

"Madrid,  November  26,  1875. — The  finances  of  Spain  are  in  a  very  bad 
condition,  simply  for  want  of  credit  in  the  stock  market  of  Europe. 

"Nevertheless,  she  is  enabled  to  carry  a  large  floating  debt  by  loans  on 
short  time,  say  six  months  or  a  year,  and  to  renew  the  bonds  as  they  fall  due 
by  merely  adding  the  interest  to  the  mass  of  such  floating  debt. 

"But  she  has  considerable  resources  in  reserve  for  times  and  occasions  of 
desperation. 

"ist.  The  Bank  of  Spain  possesses  a  large  metallic  fund  which  the 
government  could  and  would  seize  upon  in  such  emergency,  in  imitation  of 
what  Great  Britain  did  in  wars  of  the  French  Revolution. 

"2d.  There  is  really  much  wealth  in  the  country,  and  it  would  be  drawn 
forth  in  a  war  with  the  United  States.  Patriotic  gifts  would  come  in,  forced 
loans  would  be  submitted  to,  and  the  domestic  capitalists  would  more  freely 
advance  to  the  government. 

"3d.  Spain  might  recur  to  forms  of  credit  which  all  other  nations  resort 
to  in  the  last  necessity,  as  we  ourselves  did  in  the  legal-tender  act.  The 
process  would  begin  with  indefinite  issue  of  bills  of  the  Bank  of  Spain  in  the 
whole  country,  instead  of,  as  now,  in  the  province  of  Madrid  alone ;  and  would 
extend  to  the  issue  of  treasury  notes  or  certificates.  To  be  sure,  such  action 
would  speedily  raise  the  price  of  gold,  but  not  to  a  higher  point  than  it 
reached  with  us  in  similar  circumstances. 

"Meanwhile,  .the  augmented  circulation  would  serve,  as  it  did  with  us,  to 
prompt  new  enterprises,  and  thus  add  to  the  actual  productive  resources  of 


THE    TEN    YEARS'    WAR    IN    CUBA.  123 

the  country,  not  only  in  industries  dependent  on  war,  but  in  mines  and  in 
undeveloped  agriculture,  to  the  ultimate  advantages  of  Spain. 

"The  Spaniards  are  a  people  preeminently  sober  in  food  and  drink, 
economical,  and  enduring  under  privations  and  hardships — as  you  may  infer 
from  the  wages  of  labor,  which  vary  according  to  the  quality  from  two  to 
three  or  four  pesetas  a  day,  where,  in  the  United  States,  similar  labor  would 
be  reckoned  at  the  same  number  of  dollars.  Hence,  armies  are  contentedly 
supported  here,  and  always  have  been,  so  cheaply  as  to  constitute  a  real  addi 
tion  to  the  relative  military  resources  of  Spain.  The  contrast  in  this  respect 
between  Spanish  and  English  soldiers  struck  the  Duke  of  Wellington. 

"I  note  these  facts  as  being  material  and  important  in  the  present 
question.  That  is,  we  must  not  confide  in  a  deficiency  of  financial  resources 
standing  in  the  way  if  Spain  be  hard  pushed  and  stirred  up  to  make  sacrifices 
in  case  of  a  war  with  the  United  States. 

"And  the  finances  of  Spain  are  not  in  a  much  worse  condition  than  they 
were  in  the  time  of  Charles  V.  and  his  successors  of  the  Austrian  dynasty. 
Great  loans  were  rarer  then  than  now.  Spain  relied  much  on  wealthy  Jews 
for  anticipations,  although  Jews  and  Gentiles,  in  the  matter  of  money  lending, 
incurred  hazards  quite  in  proportion  to  the  profits,  as  illustrated  in  the  hard 
ships  of  the  Jews  in  Spain  and  the  case  of  Jacques  Coeur  in  France.  In  truth, 
the  Fuggers  of  Augsburg  are  among  the  few  houses  of  that  class  which 
remain  to  this  day.  Hence  the  terrible  financial  straits  which  the  Philips — 
II.,  III.,  and  IV. — were  constantly  suffering  in  Spain.  Nevertheless,  they 
sustained  great  wars  all  over  the  world. 

"I  add  that,  according  to  telegrams  received  from  Havana,  the  mission  of 
Mr.  Rubi  has  already  produced  important  results,  so  that  he  is  able  to  make 
assurance  of  having  equalized  the  revenue  and  the  expenditures  and  of  under 
taking  to  pay  regularly  all  current  obligations  after  the  ist  of  January. 

"I  have,  etc., —  C.   GUSHING." 

Of  this  it  is  now  to  be  remarked  that  Spain  has  exhausted  all  these 
resources,  and  if  it  is  the  opinion  of  that  country  that  the  honor  of  the  nation 
is  saved,  there  should  be  no  disputation  of  that  consolation. 

Mr.  Gushing  reports  his  interview  with  the  Spanish  Minister  of  State  on 
November  3oth,  saying,  "A  little  to  my  surprise,  he  took  the  whole  matter 
very  coolly,"  notwithstanding  possible  "intervention"  was  expressly  men 
tioned.  The  Minister  of  State  said  Spain  was  not  in  a  hurry  to  go  to  v;;ir 


i24  THE    TEN    YEARS'    WAR    IN    CUBA. 

with  the  United  States,  and  was  assured  the  United  States  was  not  in  a 
hurry  to  go  to  war  with  Spain.  In  his  remarks  to  the  Spanish  Minister  of 
State,  Mr.  Gushing  said:  "In  the  hope  that  the  contents  of  the  Spanish  note 
maybe  satisfactory,  the  President  desists  from  the  concrete  purpose  expressed 
in  the  dispatch  of  the  5th  and  substitutes  a  proposition  which  is  merely  expect 
ant.  Meanwhile,  I  am  charged  in  the  first  place  to  explain  to  you  confi 
dentially  what  will  be  the  actual  text  of  the  message.  The  President  will 
discountenance  the  concession  of  the  recognition  of  either  independence  or 
belligerence  to  the  insurgents  of  Cuba;  he  will  allude  to  the  injuries  inflicted 
upon  the  United  States  and  on  their  citizens  by  the  prolonged  struggle  in 
Cuba,  and  the  absence  as  yet  of  clear  indications  of  its  termination;  he  will 
intimate,  as  an  ulterior  necessity,  intervention,  unless  positive  results  be  soon 
reached,  but  he  will  abstain  from  advising  it  at  present. 

"I  am  instructed  to  deliver  to  you  a  copy  of  the  said  dispatch  of  the  5th 
instant,  written  before  the  delivery  to  me  of  the  Spanish  note,  and,  as  is  to  be 
supposed,  without  knowledge  of  the  intention  of  the  government  of  His 
Majesty. 

"This  dispatch  is  not  conceived  in  any  minatory  sense,  but  on  the  con 
trary,  in  a  spirit  of  friendship,  as  a  notice  of  a  pressing  necessity,  which  may 
force  the  President  in  given  circumstances  from  which  he  desires  to  save  him 
self  and  desires  Spain  to  aid  him  in  escaping  them." 

This  is  an  entertaining  example  of  Mr.  Cushing's  views  for  obeying  the 
letter  of  his  instructions,  and  imparting  to  his  conversation  a  spirit  of  concilia 
tion  in  contradiction  of  the  administration  of  the  State  Department.  He 
certainly  succeeded  in  conveying  the  intimation  of  intervention,  and  the  fact 
of  the  impatience  of  President  Grant,  in  terms  so  gentle  that  there  was  no 
agitation.  Mr.  Gushing  knew  well  the  current  ideas  of  the  Spaniards,  their 
understanding  that  they  had  a  navy  superior  to  ours  in  the  seventies,  and  the 
ultimate  capacity  of  the  government  to  find  money  for  war  purposes,  but 
there  had  not  been  within  the  range  of  his  observation  any  experience  that 
would  warrant  the  anticipation  of  public  opinion  on  the  Peninsula  for  giving 
up  the  distant  colonies.  But  with  all  his  versatile  astuteness,  Mr.  Gushing 
could  send  this  effusive  telegram : 

"Madrid,  December  4,  1875. — Brief  important  interview  with  Minister  of 
State.  He  takes  office  solely  in  the  hope  of  settlement  with  us;  has  carefully 
read  your  266;  admits  our  grievances;  is  opposed  in  principle  to  sequestra- 


THE    TEN    YEARS'    WAR    IN    CUBA.  125 

tion  of  property  of  foreigners;  condemns  the  delays  of  redress;  will  take  up 
and  promptly  settle  each  case;  will  remove  all  cause  of  complaint  as  to 
treaty;  reprobates  conduct  of  local  authorities  in  Cuba  as  more  injurious  to 
Spain  than  to  the  United  States.  GUSHING." 

The  filibuster  opinion  that  President  Grant  and  his  Cabinet  were  guilty 
of  a  conservation  touching-  closely  timidity  toward  the  Spaniards  for  their 
misdemeanors  in  Cuba,  has  had  such  free  course  that  it  has  in  some  degree 
affected  the  popular  intelligence  and  caused  discoloration  and  distortion  of 
affairs.  The  truth  is  President  Grant  did  not  respect  the  style  of  war-making 
of  the  champions  of  the  Cuban  cause  with  whom  he  came  in  contact.  He 
understood  perfectly  that  it  was  the  policy  of  the  insurgents  in  Cuba  to  cause 
by  any  means  war  between  the  United  States  and  Spain  and  repay  this 
country  with  a  supercilious  show  of  gratitude — the  leaders  in  the  war  out  of 
the  island  to  assume  the  prerogatives  and  largely  resume  the  methods  of  the 
peninsular  Spaniards,  so  that  the  difference  between  the  government  over 
thrown  and  that  established  would  be  the  sort  of  reform  the  fox  referred  to 
when  he  asked  that  the  old  swarm  of  fleas  be  allowed  to  remain,  for  the  fresh 
ones  would  be  the  greater  bloodsuckers.  The  filibuster  expeditions  were 
arranged  and  expected  to  cause  the  United  States  to  rush  into  war.  The 
demand  for  belligerent  rights  was  expressly  to  increase  the  chances  of  conflict. 
This  story  is  a  generation  old.  It  has  been  duplicated  within  recent  years, 
and  the  game  was  being  played  with  ever  augmenting  audacity,  when  the 
catastrophe  of  the  Maine  influenced  public  opinion  and  the  hour  struck  for  the 
settlement  long  deferred.  The  demand  that  the  Maine  should  be  sent  to  the 
harbor  of  Havana  was  started  by  those  who  hoped  something  would  happen  to 
make  trouble,  and  the  Spaniards,  infatuated  with  their  own  animosities  and 
verbose  imbecility,  played  to  the  hand  of  the  insurgents,  for  the  lapse  of  time 
had  taught  them  folly  only;  and  when  some  of  them  were  able  to  comprehend 
the  power  of  the  United  States  they  thought  of  two  things — the  very  small 
army  of  this  country,  the  inefficiency  of  our  military  systems  for  the  speedy 
mustering  of  our  strength  in  the  field,  the  deficiency  of  our  docks  for  handling 
war  ships  and  the  slight  our  demagogues  had  put  upon  both  army  and  navy. 
Our  immense  reserve  of  public  spirit  was  not  at  all  comprehended.  The 
Spaniards  had  deceived  themselves  as  to  our  character.  They  really  believed 
we  were  not  a  warlike  people.  They  forgot  that  we  had  taken  grand  lessons 
of  war  in  fighting  each  other — had  kept  for  four  years  an  unparalleled  war 


J26  THE    TEN    YEARS'    WAR    IN    CUBA. 

school.  Of  course,  there  were  Spaniards  not  so  stupid  as  to  suppose  we  should 
be  unable  to  get  upon  our  feet,  with  old  boys  enough  to  teach  the  young  ones 
—but  Spain  felt  herself  after  all  her  experiences  of  ill-fortune  a  great  Euro 
pean  power,  and  had  faith  that  we  would  be  called  to  account  by  the  same 
combination  of  monarchs  that  throttled  poor  Greece,  while  Turkey  reduced 
the  plethora  of  the  Greeks  by  blood-letting.  The  difference  between  life  and 
death  in  nations  was  not  appreciated  by  the  moribund.  The  Spaniards  read 
in  the  modern  diplomatic  history  of  their  country,  took  courage  from  the 
attitude  of  the  great  monarchies  when  President  Grant  had  them  sounded  as 
to  "intervention"  by  the  United  States  in  the  affairs  of  Cuba.  Then  none 
were  pronounced  in  our  favor,  and  the  whole  trend  of  monarchial  opinion  was 
against  our  policy,  which,  though  well  guarded  in  civil  language,  meant  that 
the  young  American  giant  was  ascertaining  his  strength,  and  proposing,  per- 
,i  haps  deeply -innocent  but  probably  after  meditation,  the  disturbance  of  the 
old  scales  in  which  the  balance  of  power,  understood  to  be  the  higher  law  of 
the  military  nations,  had  been  adjusted.  Only  the  very  well  informed  in  this 
country  had  a  realizing  sense  of  the  persistent  push  of  the  purpose  of  inter 
vention  in  Cuba  if  peace  was  not  restored  that  took  place  in  our  centennial 
year.  That  was  the  epoch  in  which  we  were  incomparably  engaged  in  cele 
brating  ourselves  and  at  the  same  time  the  State  Department  was  hard  at 
work,  and  the  courts  of  Europe  incessantly  but  quietly  advised  of  our  tend 
encies  to  put  forth  our  hands  and  stop  the  desolation  of  the  noblest  of 
American  islands  lying  in  a  commercial  and  military  sense  at  the  mouth  of  the 

.  Mississippi,  whose  valley  is  the  heart  of  America.  The  Spaniards  wanted  to 
know  whether  we  would  interfere  for  or  against  the  insurgents,  who  no  more 
then  than  now  had  commanded  the  admiration  of  competent  witnesses,  and 
deserved  a  good  deal  of  what  Mr.  Gushing  said  of  them,  because  they  and 
their  peninsular  Spaniards  had  so  many  faults  in  common.  How  very  much 
this  article  from  the  Evening  Standard  of  London,  January  29,  1876,  reads  as 
if  it  might  have  appeared  two  years  instead  of  twenty-two  years  ago : 

*V^  "The  Cuban  insurrection  is  as  long-lived  as  the  Carlist  revolt.  There  is 
no  calculating  the  amount  "bT"bTo"od"aird  treasure  wfticirhave  been  drawn  from 
the  mother  country  to  restore  quiet  to  the  island  within  the  past  few  years. 
Reinforcements  of  troops  have  been  sent  periodically  from  Cadiz  and  San- 
tander,  not  a  tithe  of  whom  will  ever  see  Spain  again ;  captain-general  suc 
ceeds  captain-general  with  the  regularity  of  clockwork,  and  notwithstanding 


THE    TEN    YEARS'    WAR    IN    CUBA.  127 

the  end  never  is,  but  always  to  be.  The  insurgents  are  beaten  on  the  average 
twiee  a  month,  yet  somehow  they  always  turn  up  in  excellent  health  and 
spirits  as  if  they  thrived  on  repeated  defeat.  It  is  very  difficult  to  get  at  the 
truth  about  Cuba;  but  one  prediction  maybe  made  with  safety:  As  long  as 
Don  Carlos  parades  Navarre  and  the  Vascongadas,  the  pacification  of  Cuba 
will  be  adjourned.  No  Spaniard  with  the  spirit  of  a  true  hidalgo  will  allow 
for  a  moment  in  public  controversy  that  his  country  can  part  with  the  island, 
and  yet  there  is  scarcely  one  traveled  and  educated  Spaniard,  we  venture  to 
affirm,  who  will  not  admit  in  the  intimacy  of  private  conversation  that  his 
country  can  not  hold  the  island." 

The  London  Times,  of  January  26th,  said: 

"In  Europe  at  least  there  will  be  a  tendency  to  do  injustice  to  Mr.  Fish's 
indictment  of  Spain,  precisely  for  the  reason  which  may  render  it  effective 
among  his  own  countrymen.  When  American  diplomacy  states  a  complaint, 
it  usually  makes  a  large  call  on  those  general  terms  of  invective  which  please 
half-educated  readers,  but  shock  the  taste  and  rouse  the  suspicions  of  the  more 
fastidious  students. 

"Critical  minds  are  apt  to  fancy  that  the  rhetoric  has  been  framed  for  the 
purpose  of  touching  the  Americans  themselves,  and  when  they  mentally 
translate  it  into  scholarly  English  they  tend  to  cut  away  much  of  the  truth  as 
well  as  to  improve  the  style.  We  speak  the  more  frankly  because  Mr.  Fish 
seeks  to  obtain  the  moral  support  of  European  countries  in  his  contest  with 
the  Spanish  Minister  of  foreign  affairs  respecting  the  civil  war  in  Cuba.  He 
would,  we  assure  him,  have  been  much  more  effective  if  he  had  given  specific 
examples  of  the  wrongs  or  hardships  suffered  by  his  countrymen  and  left  his 
readers  to  supply  general  phrases  of  indictment.  Nevertheless,  there  need  be 
no  doubt  that  his  charges  are  substantially  just,  and  the  truth  itself  so  grave 
as  to  need  little  ornament  from  rhetoric. 

"In  Cuba  Spain  owns  one  of  the  fairest  and  most  fertile  islands  in  the 
world,  and  it  has  been  detestably  misgoverned.  While  we  have  allowed  our 
colonies  to  rule  themselves  in  their  own  way,  Spain  has  persisted  in  keeping 
Cuba  in  the  same  state  of  tutelage  as  when  she  herself  was  the  greatest  power 
in  the  world,  and  when  the  very  idea  of  colonial  rights  had  scarcely  arisen. 
The  island  has  been  dependent  on  the  will  of  a  government  changed  every 
few  years  by  a  pronunciamiento  or  a  popular  revolution.  It  has  been  used  as 
a  place  of  honorable  banishment  for  unruly  soldiers.  The  dangerous  spirits 


i2S  THE    TEN    YEARS'    WAR    IN    CUBA. 

of  the  army  have  been  sent  to  Cuba  to  be  kept  out  of  mischief,  and  they  have 
let  loose  in  the  colony  the  temper  which  had  been  found  perilous  at  home. 
Freed  from  responsibility,  they  have  often  displayed  a  repetition  of  that 
domineering  spirit,  that  contempt  of  the  rights  of  others,  and  that  cruelty 
which  once  added  dark  chapters  to  the  history  of  the  Spanish  conquest.  The 
slaughter  of  the  crew  of  the  Virginius  was  an  act  which  would  have  been  quite 
natural  three  centuries  ago,  but  which,  when  committed  in  our  time,  seems 
wonderful  on  account  of  its  folly  as  well  as  of  its  atrocity.  If  the  author  of 
such  a  deed  had  been  an  Englishman,  he  would  assuredly  have  been  hung; 
yet  he  is  still  at  liberty,  and  we  believe  he  has  still  some  kind  of  command. 

"We  cannot  wonder  that  Mr.  Fish,  who  speaks  for  a  people  as  proud  in 
their  own  way  as  the  Spaniards  and  immeasurably  more  powerful,  should 
peremptorily  demand  the  trial  of  General  Burriel.  America  has  also  many 
other  causes  of  complaint.  Her  citizens  owned  much  property  in  Cuba,  and 
a  great  deal  of  it  has  been  confiscated  by  the  Spanish  government.  Restitu 
tion  has  been  promised  and  evaded." 

It  is  amusing  to  note  the  London  Times  giving  lessons  in  English  to  the 
Honorable  Hamilton  Fish.  The  Times  had  to  say,  January,  1876,  further: 

"If  the  documents  just  presented  to  Congress  are  serious  at  all,  they  are 
most  important  documents,  and  we  incline,  after  making  every  allowance  for 
the  necessities  and  peculiarities  of  President  Grant's  position,  to  believe  that 
they  are  more  serious  than  is  generally  imagined.  It  is  perfectly  possible 
that  General  Grant  has  decided  in  his  own  mind  that  he  will  not  quit  office 
without  inflicting  punishment  on  Spain,  and  that  he  has  renewed  his  com 
plaints  with  an  intention  of  making  them  heard,  and  that  he  is  now  deliber 
ately  warning  Congress,  the  American  people,  and  the  European  States  that 
he  means  to  have  either  redress  or  war. 

"He  may  be  trifling  with  the  world,  but  it  is  much  more  probable  that  he 
is  not ;  and  if  he  is  not  he  is  taking  precisely  the  steps  European  diplomatists 
would  expect.  He  is  demanding  definitely  and  distinctly  a  just  thing,  the 
trial  of  General  Burriel,  which  the  Spanish  government  cannot,  without  risk 
ing  a  collision  with  the  volunteers,  concede,  except  on  paper.  He  is  telling 
Madrid  in  the  plainest  words  he  can  use  that  unless  he  can  obtain  redress  he 
shall  propose  to  resort  to  force. 

"It  seems  to  us  that  to  imagine  President  Grant,  with  a  Democratic 
majority  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  a  great  Spanish  fleet  in  the  harbor 


THE    TEN    YEARS'    WAR    IN    CUBA.  129 

of  Habana,  and  the  Presidential  convention  almost  at  hand,  is  doing  all  this  in 
order  to  court  a  slap  in  the  face  from  Madrid,  a  slap  which,  unresented,  would 
send  him  on  his  retirement  into  a  discredited  obscurity,  is  almost  absurd;  and 
if  he  is  in  earnest  the  situation  is  most  serious.  It  is  all  very,  well  to  talk  of 
the  American  Constitution  and  the  Democratic  majority  and  the  absence  of 
material  preparations  in  the  United  States.  The  President  can  order  any 
movement,  either  of  fleet  or  army,  that  he  pleases.  The  Spaniards  are  in  no 
humor  to  bear  interference,  and  if  they  defy  the  Union  neither  Democrats  nor 
_Reptiblicans_will  renumber  party  squabbles.  They  might  refuse  the  Presi 
dent  his  third  term,  and  might  be  ready  to  hang  him,  but  they  would  plunge 
into  war  with  none  the  less  fierceness  and  carry  it  on  with  none  the  less 
decision." 

This   is   a  character  sketch   not   quite   friendly,    but  written   after  some 
studies  that  did  not  lead  to  total  darkness. 

Mr.   George  H.    Boker,   Minister  to  Russia,  wrote  from  St.    Petersburg, 

January,    1875,   that  Prince  Gortch.akoff    was   warmly  sympathetic    with  the 

United  States,  and  seemed  surprised  at  the  patience  and  the  forbearance  with 

(which  our  government  had  acted,  not  only  toward  the  government  of  Spain, 

but  toward  the  more  easily  approached  provincial  authorities  of  Cuba.     He 

f  said,  significantly,  that  history  does  not  show  us  that  this  has  been  the  usual 

conduct  of  strong  powers  toward  weaker  ones.     He  commended  the  reluctance 

which  the  government  of  the  United  States  seemed  to  feel  in  proceeding  to 

serious  measures  with  a  country  in  the  distracted  condition  of  Spain,  and  he  said 

that  this  last  act,  the  laying  of  the  question  before  the  great  powers  for  their 

consideration  and  possible  action,  was  a  display  of  candor  and  of  magnanimity 

.  on  our  part  that  was  almost  without  precedent  in  international  affairs,  and  the 

prince  was  good  enough  to  say  it  set  forever  at  rest  the  report  that  the  United 

States  "had  views  of  territorial  extension  in  the  direction  of  Cuba."     And 

Gortchakoff  told  Boker  that  the  course  of  Spain  would  depend  altogether  upon 

the  action  of  the  British  government,  and  the  representations  which  might  be 

made  by  it  at  the  court  of  Madrid,   regarding  the    unsatisfactory  relations 

between  the  United  States  and  Spain.     He  said  that  the  combined  influence 

of  all  the  other  powers  was  not  equal  tb  that  of  Great  Britain  with  the  Spanish 

government. 

The    Hon.     George    P.     Marsh    had    a    full    conversation   at    Rome   in 
December,    1875,  with  Mr.  Viscomti  Venosta,   and  stated  that  "the  editorial 


J3Q  THE    TEN    YEARS'    WAR    IN    CUBA. 

tone  of  many  journals  in  the  United  States,  and  that  of  many  articles 
in  journals  not  professedly  advocating  the  annexation,  was  prompted  by  fraud 
ulently  naturalized  Cubans,  refugees,  and  other  persons  interested  in  severing 
the  connection  between  Spain  and  Cuba;  that  I  knew  no  reason  to  think  that 
the  general  population  of  the  United  States,  still  less  the  more  enlightened 
and  patriotic  classes,  desired  the  possession  of  the  island. "  And  Mr.  Marsh 
referred,  by  way  of  illustration,  to  the  pretense  of  French,  and  to  some  extent 
of  Italian,  journals  that  the  intervention  of  the  Emperor  Napoleon  III.  in 
Mexico  was  rendered  necessary  by  the  ambitious  views  of  the  United  States  in 
regard  to  territorial  extension,  and  pointed  out  that  "after  the  capture  of  the 
City  of  Mexico  by  General  Scott  we  were  virtually  in  possession  of  the.  whole 
country,  and  could  have  retained  it  if  we  had  so  desired,  but  that  we  volun 
tarily  surrendered  it,  retaining  only  California,  and  some  other  territory  then 
thought  to  possess  little  value,  and  paying  to  Mexico  a  large  sum  as  an 
indemnity. "  The  painstaking  of  Mr.  Marsh  to  free  Americans  from  the  charge 
of  wanting  more  land  seems  to  show  that  gentleman  to  have  been  more 
amiable  in  his  sentiments  than  accurate  in  his  observations. 


4 


CHAPTER    V. 

The  Duty  of  Fair  Play  to  the  Spaniards  of  the  Peninsula 

and  of  Cuba. 

Some   Testimony  That  is  Not  Partial  to  Cuban  Insurgents — Caleb  Gushing  on    Inherent 
•  Spanish  Character — More  Than  One  Kind  of  Our  Naturalized  Citizens — A  List  of  Them 

and    of     Claims — Conflicting    Testimony    as    to    Cuban    Armies — Two    Picturesque 
Witnesses. 

There  is  no  duty  plainer  in  writing  the  story  of  the  conflict  between  the 
United  States  and  Spain  than  that  of  showing  fair  play  to  the  people  who 
were  so  signally  discomfited,  and  whose  weaknesses  have  been  uncovered  by 
war.  The  Hon.  Caleb  Gushing  had  the  lawyer's  accomplishment  of  stating  a 
case  for  friend  or  foe  with  little  reference  to  personal  judgment,  and  he 
always  presented  the  facts  that  were  the  frame  of  his  argument  with  a  vivid 
ness  peculiarly  his  own.  In  April,  1876,  he  took  occasion  to  say,  in  the 
course  of  his  correspondence  with  the  State  Department,  that  "all  our 
troubles  with  Spain  have  been  incidents  of  the  delirium  tremens  of  anarchy 
and  revolution  which  seized  upon  her  in  1868,  involving  civil  war  in  Cuba,  in 
the  northern  provinces,  indeed  all  over  the  peninsula."  Mr.  Cushing  pro 
ceeded  to  say  that  all  Madrid  believed  that  "faulty  as*has  been  the  adminis 
tration  of  Spain  in  Cuba,  most  of  the  maladministration  has  been  the  logical 
effect  of  the  factious,  ungovernable,  and  traitorous  spirit  and  conduct  of  the 
Cubans  themselves,  rebellious,  as  all  Spaniards  are  prone  to  be,  by  their  hered 
itary  national  character."  Beyond  this  it  was  alleged  that  "no  repressive 
measures  would  ever  have  been  adopted  in  Cuba  but  for  the  frequent  rebel 
lions  or  attempted  rebellions  there  in  times  of  complete  order,  tranquillity,' 
and  prosperity,  as  in  1823,  1829,  1837,  and  1854,  including  the  infamous  acts 
of  Narciso  Lopez  in  twice  recruiting  armed  foreign  adventurers  to  invade  the 
island,  the  worst  of  all  forms  of  treason.'  This,  however,  is  not  the  judicial 
department  of  the  kind  of  which  Mr.  Cushing  is  speaking,  but  is  the  presenta- 


132  DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS. 

tion  of  one  side — that  which  was  bitterly  wrong — by  one  who  was  for  the 
moment  the  passionate  advocate  of  those  whose  case  he  was  stating.  In  the 
next  paragraph  Mr.  Gushing  says  all  Americans  bear  witness,  after  seeing 
both  Cubans  and  Spaniards  that  "Cubans  are  Spaniards,  with  all  the  faults  of 
Spaniards  in  aggravated  degree;  and  whereas  discontent  is  the  habit  in 
Spain,  and  violence  the  ordinary  manifestation  of  discontent — whereas  in 
Spain  opposition  parties  systematically  pursue  the  practice  of  quarreling  with 
any  and  all  governments,  however  well-intentioned  these  may  be,  and  deliber 
ately  provoking  measures  of  repression  in  order  to  have  pretext  to  declaim 
against  oppression  and  tyranny — so  the  Spaniards  say  it  always  has  been  in 
Cuba."  Herein,  however,  Mr.  Gushing  loses  sight  of  the  teachings  of 
American  history.  What  he  says  of  the  excessive  faults  of  the  Cubans,  would  ' 
have  applicability  and  wotild  not  be  quickly  and  confidently  contested,  if  the 
Spaniards  had  not  been  troubled  in  other  colonies  the  same  as  in  Cuba.  The 
Cubans  are  Spaniards  as  the  Mexicans,  Peruvians,  Chilians,  and  the  rest  of 
the  free  and  independent  States  of  what  was  once  Spanish  America  were— 
but  it  was  not  the  delirium  tremens  of  1868  that  moved  Mexico,  Bolivia, 
Argentina,  and  all  the  rest  of  the  American  Spanish  to  rise  up  against  the 
Spaniards  of  the  peninsula.  The  methods  of  Cuban  rebellions  were  disagree 
able  in  the  extreme,  especially  when  they  followed  the  examples  of  the  ways 
and  means  of  Spanish  repression.  We  believe  it  to  be  true  that  the  Spaniards 
thought  it  a  justifiable  act  of  war  to  fire  the  cane  fields  of  Cubans  known  to  be 
against  the  perpetuity  of  Spanish  rule  in  the  island,  before  Gomez  carried  the 
torch  through  the  provinces  of  Matanzas,  Havana  and  Pinar  del  Rio.  Mr. 

Gushing  drew  a  picture  of  the  state  of  Spanish  politics  in  a  letter  reviewing 

. 

the  debate  in  the  Cortes  on  the  address  to  the  king,  saying  it  mainly  con 
sisted  of  easy  exhibition  of  the  inconsistencies,  the  errors  and  the  crimes,  the 
tergiversations,  pronunciamientos,  treasons,  and  insurrections  of  which  all 
parties  have  heretofore  been  guilty,  as,  one  after  the  other,  they  attained  the 
giddy  heights  of  political  power,  or  sank  into  the  depths  of  angry,  impatient, 
and  factious  opposition.  In  these  mutual  recriminations  of  parties,  in  this 
general  settlement  of  political  account  between  successive  governments  and 
administrations — which  has  only  served  to  show  that  all  of  them,  as  they  rose, 
ascended  on  the  ruins  of  their  country,  and,  as  they  fell,  left  behind  a  deplor 
able  deficit  of  wisdom  and  usefulness  to  the  debit  of  each  —  the  home 
government  of  Spain  passed  through  all  the  disorders  of  the  dissolution  of 


DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS.  133 

greedy  and  corrupt  tyranny  and  in  the  colonial  wars  following  the  Napoleonic 
occupation.  The  one  binding  tie  in  the  peninsula  became  the  oppression  of  the 
American  Spaniards.  Hence,  at  last,  the  chaos  Gushing  sketches,  and  out  of 
a  series  of  revolutions  came  an  horrible  confusion  of  cruelties. 

In  a  general  review  of  the  diplomatic  situation  in  Europe,  written  in 
March,  1876,  Mr.  Gushing  closed: 

"I  stand  behind  the  players  here  and  see  the  cards  they  are  playing.  It 
is  not  our  game.  We  can  do  much  with  Spain,  but  it  will  have  to  be  done  on 
our  own  ground.  We  have  no  cause,  in  my  belief,  to  expect  aid  from  the 
European  Powers,  not  even  from  Great  Britain.  The  problem  rather  is  to 
work  out  our  own  policy  in  such  way  as  to  avoid  obstructions  on  the  part  of 
those  powers. " 

It  was  in  1878  that  the  Spaniards  came  to  the  conclusion,  as  the  insurrec 
tion  had  lasted  ten  years,  and  one  hundred  thousand  regular  soldiers  could  not 
overcome  it  by  force,  that  the  rebels  might  be  heard  as  to  terms  of  peace  with 
out  'giving  up  their  arms,  and  the  result  was  the  peace  of  Zanjon,  negotiated 
with  the  insurgent  leaders  by  Martinez  Campos.  The  latest  and  last  of  the 
insurrections  against  the  rule  of  the  Spaniards  broke  out  in  February,  1895.  In 
the  twenty  years  before  the  United  States  and  Spain  found  themselves  at  war, 
there  had  been  in  Cuba  over  thirteen  years'  warfare  and  less  than  seven  of  the 
comparative  reduction  of  flagrant  disorders  characterized  as  peace.  Martinez 
Campos  was  regarded  as  the  great  military  chieftain  of  Spain,  and  his  country 
men  did  not  care  to  inquire  too  particularly  into  the  preliminaries  to  the  peace 
of  Zanjon.  He  was  commissioned  as  soon  as  the  war  broke  out  afresh  in  Feb 
ruary,  1895,  to  put  down  the  rebellion,  and  heavy  masses  of  troops  were 
hurried  from  the  peninsula  to  the  island.  The  old  field  marshal  of  Spain 
began  his  work  with  an  appearance  of  confidence  and  exceptional  vigor.  It 
was  soon  ascertained  that  the  spirit  of  the  insurgents  was  more  implacable 
than  ever — that  they  had  larger  forces  and  better  equipments,  and  were  more 
resolute  and  desperate  than  on  former  occasions — while  Campos  was  in  the 
field  there  was  sharp  skirmishing — indeed,  some  of  the  fighting  was  the  most 
severe  that  ever  occurred  in  the  island,  until  the  American  army  moved  upon 
Santiago.  Campos  made  a  strenuous  effort  to  confine  the  scenes  of  warfare  to 
the  three  eastern  provinces,  as  had  been  the  case  from  1868  to  1878,  but 
Gomez  had  a  large  following,  horses  were  abundant,  sugar  carts  numerous, 
and  there  was  food  in  the  pastures  and  fruity  forests. 


134  DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS. 

He  did  the  unexpected  thing  moving  west,  and  succeeded  in  opening  new 
regions  for  devastation.  Campos,  with  the  utmost  use  of  steamers  and  rail 
ways,  and  his  superior  forces,  could  not  check  the  adventurous  rush  of  the 
Mvarm  with  Gomez,  whose  right  arm  was  the  indomitable  Antonio  Maceo. 
The  Spaniards  were  exasperated  by  their  failures,  and  furious  that  the  rebels 
had  broken  all  bounds  and  records.  The  flood  marks  of  rebellion  were  wider 
and  higher  than  in  the  ten  years ;  and  then  Campos  was  not  killing  prisoners 
in  satisfactory  numbers.  He  was  attempting  to  carry  on  war  according  to  the 
usages  of  civilization,  and  that  was  not  the  way  the  Spaniards  desired  to  make 
peace.  The  prestige  of  the  soldier  faded  rapidly,  and  there  were  fierce 
demands  from  the  volunteers,  of  whom  there  were  eleven  regiments  in 
Havana  alone,  for  more  bloodshed,  not  in  battle,  but  in  executions.  A  change 
was  called  for  both  in  Madrid  and  Havana.  Campos  was  recalled,  and  General 
Weyler  designated  for  the  vacancy,  Ex-Captain-General  Marin  serving  ad 
interim.  The  news  of  Weyler 's  appointment  filled  the  Cubans  with  horror, 
and  at  once  the  steamers  for  all  ports  on  the  Gulf,  and  for  Key  West,  Savan 
nah,  Charleston  and  New  York,  were  crowded  with  fugitives.  Weyler  was 
already  a  man  of  terrible  reputation.  He  had  been  in  the  ten  years'  war  a 
lieutenant-colonel  in  charge  of  a  Spanish  column,  distinguished  for  the  per 
sonal  havoc  that  was  committed  in  its  marches.  He  was  boastful  of  his  body 
guard  of  black  men,  and  always  ready  to  receive  men  of  color  in  camp  or  in 
the  palace.  He  was  alternatively  claimed  as  and  accused  of  being  a  Repub 
lican!  There  were  many  stories  of  his  personal  participation  in  outrages  of 
an  incredible  nature,  not  a  few  of  them  physically  impracticable.  It  is  in  this 
sort  of  fiendish  romance  that  Spaniards  and  Cubans  revel,  as  the  only  ade 
quate  expression  of  their  astonishing  animosities.  The  evil  most  keenly 
anticipated  by  the  Cuban  sympathizers  in  Havana  from  Weyler  was  that  he 
would  issue  decrees  ordering  and  commanding  all  business  men  to  show  their 
colors — to  be  explicitly  for  or  against  Spain  in  Cuba,  and  condone  evasions 
only  upon  spending  their  fortunes  in  bribes  rather  than  awaiting  the  more 
summary  processes  of  execution  and  confiscation.  Life  and  fortune  might  be 
preserved  for  a  time  by  this  giving  up  everything  on  the  installment  plan. 
The  Cuban  ladies  were  shocked  by  the  very  name  of  Weyler,  saying  there  was 
no  safety  where  he  was  for  the  innocent.  There  was  a  panic,  and  when  Wey 
ler  was  announced  at  Porto  Rico,  there  was  wild  haste  to  get  away  to 
Yucatan,  Venezuela,  Mexico,  or  the  United  States.  There  was  reported  a 


DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS.  135 

blood  league  among  the  Cubans,  the  purpose  being  the  assassination  of  the 
new  captain-general  the  moment  he  set  foot  on  the  soil  of  Cuba.  He  was 
duly  warned  but  unmolested,  and  his  safety  was  accounted  for  by  the  repre 
sentation  that  those  who  had  sworn  to  sacrifice  themselves  that  the  monster 
should  die,  were  convinced  that  such  an  act  as  the  murder  of  a  captain- 
general  would  be  injurious  to  the  Cuban  cause,  and  that  the  better  way  was 
to  stand  well  with  sympathetic  public  sentiment. 

There  was  little  time  lost  in  the  development  of  General  Weyler's  policy. 
It  was  rigorous  and  remorseless.  He  denied  for  a  time  the  charges  of 
cruelty,  protested  that  he  did  not  approve  as  many  executions  as  Campos  had 
done.  His  proceeding  did  not  vary  much  from  the  regular  course  of  Spanish 
suppression  of  rebellion,  but  never  before  had  the  system  of  the  Spaniards  in 
pacificating  colonies  been  exhibited  to  the  world  in  so  strong  a  light.  As  the 
line  was  drawn  between  those  true  and  false  to  the  peninsular  Spaniard,  it 
became  evident  that  the  people  of  Cuba  were  almost  unanimously  against 
Spain.  On  the  side  of  the  peninsula  were  the  Spanish  army  and  navy,  the 
swarms  of  office  holders,  and  their  subordinates,  the  volunteers  given  the 
situations  that  should  be  occupied  by  the  Cubans,  the  contractors  and  all  busi 
ness  men  who  made  money  out  of  the  war — the  officials  of  all  descriptions, 
the  sycophants  of  power,  and  those  still  striving  by  complacency  to  avoid  the 
rugged  issues  of  responsibility.  The  Spanish  army  was  so  numerous  that 
garrisons  were  in  all  the  considerable  towns,  and  there  were  thousands  of  little 
forts ;  and  some  sugar  plantations  were  paying  taxes  and  assessments  to  Wey- 
ler  and  Gomez  alike.  The  people  at  large  outside  the  fortified  lines  were 
against  Spain,  with  few  exceptions.  Weyler  could  not  get  information  about 
the  movements  of  insurgents,  but  there  was  not  a  Spanish  column  in  motion, 
that  was  not  signaled.  The  stones  in  the  road  and  the  trees  by  the  wayside 
told  from  day  to  day  of  all  Spanish  activity.  There  was  not  a  country  store, 
not  a  magazine  for  the  rebellion — not  a  swift  pony  or  a  fat  pig,  a  drove  of 
cattle  or  sheep,  a  tree  full  of  fruit,  or  a  potato  patch,  that  was  not  contraband 
of  war.  The  country  houses  and  villages  that  the  insurgents  spared  were  fired 
by  the  Spaniards,  and  the  massacre  of  domestic  animals  and  destruction  of 
food  supplies  of  all  kinds,  made  way  for  famine.  It  was  the  Spanish  policy  to 
make  the  country  untenable  by  bodies  of  hostile  irregulars. 

The  peasantry  were  not  allowed  to  till  the  fields,  and  this  was  the 'answer 
to  the  rebel  burning  of  cane  and  tobacco.  As  the  Cubans  at  large  gave  the 


136  DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS. 

news  of  Spaniards  moving  about,  the  country  people  were  concentrated 
under  the  supervision  of  the  regular  garrisons.  On  both  sides  the  conduct  of 
the  war  forced  this  result,  and  due  accountability  was  not  admitted  by 
either.  Those  who  were  wild  for  war  between  the  United  States  and  Spain 
found  fault  with  the  Spaniards  alone,  and  the  first  material  undertaking  in  the 
war  by  our  country  for  humanity  was  in  sending  food  to  those  perishing  by 
starvation  and  medicine  to  those  wasted  by  the  plague  of  fever.  It  was  plain 
to  all  observers  that  after  all  the  sacrifices  the  Spaniards  had  made  for  Cuba 
they  would  conquer  the  island  only  by  the  annihilation  of  the  elements  of  the 
prosperity  that  once  had  remarkable  celebrity.  Weyler's  greatest  military 
effort  was  to  pen  Maceo  in  the  west  end,  by  a  fortified  line — trocha — twenty- 
one  miles  long,  the  narrowest  part  of  the  island.  Maceo  broke  through  just 
before  his  death,  but  when  he  was  gone  the  western  province  was  generally 
quieted.  There  were  the  accustomed  bulletins  about  the  achievements  of  the 
successors  of  Maceo,  but  there  were  none  who  answered  that  description. 
The  sheer  weight  of  the  Spanish  columns  was  felt  by  their  antagonists  and  the 
strength  of  the  rebellion  had  largely  declined,  though  holding  a  great  deal 
of  territory.  There  were  symptoms  of  exhaustion  all  around,  but  on  "Horror's 
head  horrors"  accumulated.  That  the  insurgents  took  a  part  in  forcing  these 
dreadful  issues  is  certain — for  the  devastation  of  plantations  for  five  hundred 
miles  was  the  visible  sign  of  the  memorable  campaign  of  Gomez,  the  Domin 
ican  Commander-in-Chief.  The  Spanish  government,  March  i,  1897, 
addressed  to  the  Hon.  Hannis  Taylor,  the  American  Minister,  a  communication 
of  explanation  of  the  arrest  of  certain  alleged  citizens  of  the  United  States 
captured  and  taken  to  Santiago  de  Cuba,  suspected  of  being  American  spies. 
When  released  they  each  claimed  damages  in  the  sum  of  ten  thousand  dollars. 
The  defense  'was  that  the  arrest  of  these  people  was  not  for  landing  in  Cuba, 
but  "at  the  beginning  of  a  formidable  insurrection,"  when  "on  every  point  of 
the  coast  landed  large  and  small  expeditions — arrived  from  several  ports 
and  shores  of  the  Mexican  Gulf.  Many  of  those  who  afterwards  took  a 
part  in  the  rebellion  as  chiefs,  rank  soldiers,  and  scouts,  came  precisely 
from  Haiti,  as  is  well  known,  using  small  crafts  similar  to  that  of  the 
claimants.  In  no  other  manner  did  the  well-known  chief,  Antonio  Maceo, 
join  the  insurgent  bands,  and  so  great  was  the  number  of  those  who  used 
this  means  of  coming  to  and  going  from  the  island  that  I  do  not  consider  it 
venturesome  to  say  that  at  a  certain  time  there  was  a  regular  communication 


DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS.  137 

by  means  of  small  crafts  and  open  boats  between  Cuba  and  the  Antilles  and 
the  nearest  keys." 

One  of  the  most  frequent  irritations  manipulated  to  increase  the  strain 
upon  the  relations  of  the  United  States  and  Spain  was  the  arrest  by  Spanish 
authorities  of  naturalized  American  citizens.  The  Senate  of  the  United 
States,  December  21,  1896,  directed  a  report  of  all  naturalized  citizens 
arrested  since  the  breaking  out  of  the  insurrection  in  Cuba  February  24,  1895. 
There  were  seventy-four  such  persons.  The  Secretary  of  State  of  the  United 
States,  Mr.  Olney,  in  sending  the  list,  said: 

"Passports,  certificates  of  naturalization,  registration  in  the  consulates  of 
this  government  on  the  island  of  Cuba,  and  service  on  ships  sailing  under  the 
flag  of  the  United  States,  having  been  alike  accepted  by  our  consular  officers 
and  the  Spanish  authorities  as  prima  facie  evidence  of  citizenship,  establishing 
the  rights  of  the  claimants  to  the  treatment  secured  to  our  citizens  under  our 
treaties  and  protocols  with  Spain,  it  has  been  deemed  advisable  to  include  in 
the  subjoined  list  all  persons  of  the  classes  referred  to  who  have  been  arrested. 

"Of  the  74  persons  arrested,  7  have  been  tried,  namely:  Nos.  i,  36,  70,  71, 
72,  73,  and  74.  In  the  cases  of  2  of  these  (Nos.  i  and  36)  appeals  have  been 
taken,  and  in  the  cases  of  the  other  5,  the  Competitor  prisoners,  a  new  trial 
has  been  ordered. 

"Thirty-six  persons  arrested  have  been  released  after  the  charges  against 
them  had  been  investigated  and  found  to  be  baseless. 

"Eighteen  have  been  expelled  from  the  island,  after  periods  of  confine 
ment  lasting  from  a  few  days  to  nearly  a  year  in  the  case  of  Jose  Aguirre  (No. 
2);  while  17  cases  are  still  pending.  The  charges  against  14  of  the  17  are  as 
follows : 

"Nos.  31  and  35,  sedition  and  rebellion. 

"No.  38,  rebellion. 

"Nos.  37,  40,  61,  and  62,  rebellion  with  arms  in  hand. 

"No.  43,  purchase  and  concealment  of  arms  and  ammunition. 

"No.  53,  disorderly  conduct  and  insults  to  Spain. 

"Nos.  70,  71,  72,  73,  and  74,  landing  arms  from  Competitor  for  insurgents. 

"In  the  remaining  three  cases  (Nos.  35,  47,  and  52),  the  nature  of  the 
charges  having  not  yet  been  ascertained,  demand  has  been  made  both  at 
Habana  and  Madrid  that  they  be  at  once  formulated  and  communicated,  or 
that  prisoners  be  released." 


138  DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS. 

We  present  in  full  the  list  of  American  citizens,  native  and  naturalized, 
arrested  and  imprisoned  in  Cuba  since  February  24,  1895,  to  date,  stating  also 
cause  of  arrest,  charges,  place  of  confinement,  whether  tried,  released, 
deported,  or  cases  pending: 

1.  Julio  Sanguily,  49  years;  native  of  Cuba;  naturalized   1878;  arrested 
February  24,  1895  ;  charge  of  rebellion;  tried  November  28,  1895  ;  found  guilty 
and  sentenced  to  life  imprisonment;  case  appealed  to  supreme  court,  Madrid. 
Was  also  tried  on  charge  of  participation  in  the  kidnapping  of  the  sugar  planter 
Fernandez    de    Castro,   in    1894,   by    the    late    bandit,    Manuel    Garcia,   and 
acquitted.     Tried  for  the  second  time  December  21,  1896,  for  rebellion,  the 
case  remanded  from  Spain,  and  again  sentenced  December  28  to  life  imprison 
ment;  an  appeal  taken.      Has  been  imprisoned  in  the  Cabana  fort. 

2.  Jose  Marie  Timoteo  Aguirre,  52  years;  native  of  Cuba;  naturalized 
1881;    arrested  February  24,  1895;  charge  of  rebellion;    confined  in  Cabana 
fort;  acquitted  and  deported  September  6,  1895;  went  to  the  United  States. 

3.  Francisco  Peraza,  arrested  at  Sagua,  March  2,  1895  ;  charge  of  partici 
pation  in  the  robbery  of  some  cattle;  released  March  4,  1895. 

4.  Francisco   Carrillo,    45    years;     native    of    Cuba;     naturalized    1891; 
arrested  at  Remedies  on  February  24,  1895,  upon  a  gubernative  order  for  not 
having  inscribed  himself  in  the  register  of  foreigners  in  any  province  of  the 
island;    confined  in  Cabana  fort;    released   and  deported  to    United    States 
May  29,  1895. 

5.  Juan  Roderiguez  Valdez,  native  of  Cuba;  naturalized   1876;  arrested 
at  Puerto  Principe  April  5,  1895;  released  April  6. 

6.  Justo    Gener,    68    years;    native  of    Cuba;    naturalized;    arrested   at 
Matanzas  April  6;  released  April  9,  1895. 

7.  Jose  Maria  Caraballo,  42  years;    native  of  Cuba;    naturalized   1877; 
arrested  at  Matanzas  April  6;  released  April  9,  1885. 

8.  Manuel  Fuentes,  33  years;  native  of  Cuba;  naturalized   1889;    corre 
spondent  New  York  World;  arrested  at   Caimanera  April   30,  1895;  released 
May  4,  1895,  on  condition  that  he  return  to  United  States. 

9.  Manuel  Vargas,   arrested  at  Remedies  July  3,    1895;    released  and 
expelled  July  13,  1895;  charged  with  being  an  agent  of  the  insurgents,  etc.  ; 
naturalized. 

10.  Domingo  Gonzalez  y  Alfonso,  42  years;  native  of  Cuba;  naturalized 
1876;  arrested  at  Quivican  July  3,  1895;  expelled  September  3,  1895,  for  the 


GENERAL  BLANCO,  WHO  COMMANDED  SPANISH  FORCES  IN  CUBA. 


fel 


DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS.  141 

reason  that  his  presence  in  the  island  is  a  source  of  danger  to  the  govern 
ment. 

11.  Victoriano  Bulit  Perez,  33  years,  native  of  Cuba,  of  American  par 
ents;    arrested  at  Sagua  July   12,    1895;    accused  of   "proposing  treasonable 
acts";  released  November  8,  1895. 

12.  Joseph  Ansley,   56  years;    born  in   Habana,   of  American  parents; 
arrested  at  Sagua  August  26,  1895;  charge,  "presence  prejudicial  to  peace  of 
island";  deported  to  United  States  September  21,  1895. 

13.  Aurelio  Ansley,  34  years;  son  of  Joseph  Ansley.     Same  as  above. 

14.  Luis  Ansley,  30  years;  son  of  Joseph  Ansley.     Same  as  above. 

15.  John  A  Sowers,  65  years;  native  of  Virginia.     Same  as  above. 

16.  Carlos   M.    Garcia  y   Ruiz,    28    years;    born   in  the   United   States; 
arrested  at  Sagua  September  7,  1895 ;  accused  of  attempting  to  join  the  insur 
rectionists;  released  October  7,  1895. 

17.  Jose  Martinez  Gonzalez,  45  years;  native  of  Cuba;  naturalized  1873; 
arrested  at  Sagua  September  12,  1895;  charge  of  riding  on  railroad  without 
paying  fare;  no  evidence  against  him;  released  September  19,  1895. 

18.  Mariano  Rodriguez  Zayas,  native  of  Cuba;  arrested  Habana  Septem 
ber  17;  released  September  19,  1895;  naturalized;  no  charges. 

19.  Jose  Martinez  Mesa,  41  years;    native  of  Cuba;    naturalized   1878; 
arrested  at  Habana  September  17,    1895;    released  September   19,    1895;    no 
charges. 

20.  Eugene    Pelletier,   42    years;     native  of    Cuba;    naturalized    1877; 
arrested  at  Cienfuegos  December  5,  1895;    charged  with  recruiting  for  the 
insurrection;  released,  under  surveillance,  May  17,  1896. 

21.  Joseph  J.  Trelles,  native  of  Cuba;  naturalized;  arrested  at  Matanzas 
December  24,  1895;  released  December  26,  1895;  no  charges. 

22.  Manuel  M.  (or  W.)  Amieva,  39  years;  native  of  Cuba;    naturalized 
1878;  arrested  at  Matanzas  December  24,  1895,  as  a  suspect;  released  Decem 
ber  31,  1895;  no  charges. 

23.  Solomon,    Chas.    S.,    native    of    the    United   States,    arrested    and 
released. 

24.  Marcos  E.  Rodriguez,  57  years;  native  of  Cuba;  naturalized  1875; 
arrested  January   17,  1896,  on  board  American  steamship  Olivette;    charge, 
aiding  the  rebellion,  sedition,  etc. ;  released  April  i,  1896. 

25.  Louis    Someillan,   Sr.,   58    years;    born  in  Cuba;    naturalized   Key 


142  DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS. 

West,    1878;  arrested  January   17,    1896,  at  Habana;    released  April   i,  1896; 
charge,  aiding  rebellion,  sedition,  etc. 

26.  Louis    Someillan,    Jr.,    36  years;    born   in   Habana,    son   of    above; 
arrested  January  17  at  Habana;  released  April  i,  1896;  charge,  aiding  rebel 
lion,  sedition,  etc. 

27.  Ladislao  Quintero,    born   in    Key  West;    made   a  prisoner  of    war 
February  22,  1896, -at  Guatao,  where  he  had  been  wounded  by  Spanish  troops; 
released  April  n,  1896. 

28.  Walter  Grant  Dygert,  25  years;  born  in  the  United  States;  arrested 
February  23,  1896;  imprisoned  at  Guines;  supposed  to  be  insurgent  leader  El 
Inglesito;  finally  released  and  sent  to  United  States  April  24,  1896. 

29.  Rev.    Albert    J.    Diaz,    native    of    Cuba;     naturalized;    arrested    at 
Habana  April   16,  1896,  charged  with  forwarding  rebel  correspondence;  con 
fined   at  police  headquarters;    expelled  April  16,  1896;    accused   of  abetting 
insurrection. 

30.  Alfred  Diaz;  brother  of  above;  arrested,  same  charge;  both  of  the 
Diazes  were  released  April  22,    1896,   on  condition  of  leaving  the   country; 
went  to  Key  West. 

31.  Joseph    L.    Cepero,    native    of     Cuba;    naturalized     1881;    arrested 
prior    to  January   20,    1896,   on    board    steamer    from    Cienfuegos    to    Bata- 
bano;    case  now  pending  before  civil  court  Santa  Clara;    confined   in   Santa 
Clara  prison;  charge,  sedition,  rebellion,  etc. 

32.  Luis  Martinez,  arrested  about  March  i,  1896;  charged  with  treason 
able  correspondence;  released  April  13,  1896,  on  §400  bail;  naturalized  1873. 

33.  William  A.  Glean,  native  of  Cuba,  of  American  parents;  arrested  at 
Sagua  April,  1896;  charge,  rebellion;  military  jurisdiction  inhibited  in  favor 
of  civil  July  28,  1896;  released  and  returned  to  the  United  States. 

34.  Louis  M.  Glean,  brother  of  the  above;  same  as  above. 

35.  Frank  J.  Larrieu,  native  of  Cuba;  naturalized;  arrested  at  Cardenas 
May  15,  1896;  case  pending;  charges  not  made  known. 

36.  Louis  Someillan,   58  years;    native  of  Cuba;    naturalized;  arrested 
July  7,  1896,  for  second  time;  charge,  aiding  rebellion;  turned  over  to  civil 
courts,  is  confined  in  city  prison;  trial  held  January  8,  1897;  sentenced  Jan 
uary  13  to  imprisonment  in  chains  for  life;  appeal  taken. 

37.  Manuel  Fernandez  Chaqueilo,  19  years;    native  of  Key  West;    cap 
tured  July  9,  1896;  was  the  companion  of  Charles  Govin;  is  in  Cabana  fort; 


DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS.  143 

case   pending-,   under  military  jurisdiction;    charge,  "rebellion  with  arms  in 
hand." 

38.  George  W.  Aguirre,  25  years;  born  in  the  United  States;  captured 
by  a  Spanish  gunboat  July  10,  1896;  case  pending  before  civil  court  of  Jafuco; 
confined  in  Cabana  fort ;  charge  of  rebellion. 

39.  Samuel    T.    Tolon,    45    years;    native    of   Cuba;    naturalized    1878; 
arrested  on  board  American  steamer  Seneca  September  3,  1896;  incommunicado 
twenty-two  days;  charged  with  being  a  delegate  to  the  Cuban  Junta;  released 
and  deported  September  30,  1896;  went  to  New  York. 

40.  Oscar  Cespedes,  20  years;  native  of   Key  West;    captured  without 
arms  in  insurgent  hospital  near  Zapata  swamp  about    September  5,    1896; 
imprisoned  at  San  Severino  fort,  Matanzas;  question  of  competency  between 
military  and  civil  jurisdiction  decided  in  favor  of  military;  case  pending. 

41.  Francisco  E.  Cazanas,  arrested  as  suspect  at  Matanzas  October  14, 
1896;  released  October  16,  1896. 

42.  Alfredo  Hernandez,  44  years;  native  of  Matanzas;  naturalized  1876; 
arrested  at  his  house   at    Habana    September    6,    1896;    suspicion   of    being 
concerned  in  the  insurrection ;  expelled  September  23,  1896;  went  to  Key  West. 

43.  Antonio  Saurez  Del  Villar,  native  of 'Cuba;  naturalized;  arrested  at 
Cienfuegos  September  5,  1896;  charged  with  purchase  and  concealing  of  arms 
and  ammunition;  case  sent  to  civil  jurisdiction  December  23,  1896;  in  prison 
at  Cienfuegos;  case  pending. 

44.  Jose  Curbino,  native  of  Cuba;  naturalized;  arrested  at  Rincon,  Sep 
tember  18,  1896;  surrendered  to  military  authorities  without  arms;  released 
and  is  residing  at  Santiago  de  las  Vegas. 

45.  Joseph  Austin  Munoz,  native  of  New  Orleans;  arrested  at  Matanzas 
September  18,    1896;     released  September    19;    claimed   that  arrest  was  by 
mistake. 

46.  Ramon  Rodriguez,  native  of  Cuba;  naturalized;  arrested  September 
20,  1896,  upon  requisition  from  governor  of  Matanzas;  had  been  in  insurrec 
tion  ;  surrendered  and  failed  to  report  regularly ;  sent  to  Cardena  and  released. 

47.  Esteben    Venero,    22    years;     native    of    Cuba;     naturalized    1895; 
arrested  at  Los  Palos  (Habana  province)  about  September  22,  1896;  charges 
not  stated;  Captain-General  asked  for  evidence  of  American  citizenship  on 
December  9,  which  was  sent  him;  case  pending  cognizance  of  military  or  civil 
jurisdiction. 


i44  DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS. 

48.  Adolfo  Torres,  native  of  Cuba;  naturalized;  arrested  October  4,  at 
Sagua;  charges  not  stated;  release  ordered  November  23,  1896,  question  of 
competency  not  established;  released  November  26,  officer  remarking,    "We 
have  no  charges  against  you." 

49.  Esteben  Cespedes  (colored),  born  in  Cuba;  naturalized  Key  West, 
1891;  arrested  October  13,  1896,  charged  with  naniguismo  (voodoo);  expelled 
November  7,  and  went  to  Key  West. 

50.  Ramon  Crucet,  48  years;  born  in  Cuba;  naturalized   1873;  arrested 
in    Colon    November   i,    1896;    charges,    public    censure   of  acts  of  Spanish 
government;  released  December  18,  1896;  no  grounds  of  complaint. 

51.  Louis  Lay,  18  years;  native  of  Cuba,  of  American  parents;  arrested 
November  9,  1896,  during  a  raid  upon  a  social  club  in  Regla;    confined  ia 
Cabana  fort;    case  ordered  to  be  transferred  to  civil   court  at  Guanabacoa, 
December  23;  charges,  aiding  rebellion.     Released  January  15,  1897. 

52.  Jose  Gonzalez,  63  years;  native  of  Bejucal,  Cuba;  naturalized  1882; 
arrested  at  Las  Mangas  November  10,  1896,  taken  to  prison  at  Pinar  del  Rio; 
charges  not  yet  made  known  to  consulate-general,  Habana. 

53.  Theodore  L.  Vives,  native  of  Cienfuegos;  naturalized  1891;  arrested 
November  19,    1896;    charges,   first  disorderly  conduct  and    then    insults  to 
Spain;  case  pending  cognizance  of  military  or  civil  jurisdiction;  is  confined 
in  jail. 

54.  Henry  J.    Delgado,   native  of    the   United   States;    captured  about 
December  10,  1896,  at  an  insurgent  hospital  in  Pinar  del  Rio  province,  after 
having  been  ten  weeks  in  a  hut  sick;  sent  to  Havana  to  Cabana  fort;  removed 
to  hospital  December  28,  1896,  where,  our  consul-general  reports,  he  received 
best  medical  attention;  died  in  hospital  January  19,  1897. 

55.  Gaspar  A.  Betancourt,  63   years;  native  of  Cuba;  naturalized  1877; 
arrested  December  26,  1896,  confined  at  police  headquarters  incommunicado, 
charged  with  sedition. 

56.  Fernando  Pino  Hernandez,  19  years  (colored);  native  of  Key  West, 
charged  with  naniguismo   (voodoo) ;    ordered  to  be   expelled   December  30, 
1896;  will  be  sent  to  Key  West. 

5  7 .  Amado  Pino  Hernandez,  2 1  years ;  brother  of  the  above ;  same  as  above. 

58.  Jose  Antonio   Iznaga,   native    of    Cuba;    naturalized;     expelled    in 
August,  1896;  no  report. 

59.  August  Bolton,  naturalized  1893. 


A  PK^KET  SQUAD  OF  CUBAN  SOLDIERS. 


GENERAL  CASTELLIO  AND  STAFF. 


i 


PLAZA  IN  SANTIAGO,  CUBA. 


GROUP  OF  NATIVE  WOMEN   IN  PONCE,  PORTO  RICO. 


DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS.  147 

60.  Gustave  Richelieu,  naturalized  1870;  taken  in  a  boat  near  Santiago 
de  Cuba  about  February  23,  1896;  released  from  prison  about  March  i,  1896; 
subsequently  rearrested  and  recommitted  for  leaving  Guantanamo  without 
permission ;  consul  considers  second  arrest  an  excuse  for  detention ;  release 
granted  shortly  after. 

61.  Frank  Agramont,  and  62,  Thos.  Julio  Sainz,  arrested  with  arms  in 
their  hands,  May,  1895;  charge,  rebellion;  to  be  tried  for  armed  insurrection 
against  the  government ;  Santiago  de  Cuba. 

63.  John  D.  Ferrer,  no  evidence  against  him;  released  March  23,  1896; 
naturalized  at  New  York,  1878. 

64.  Pedro  Duarte ;  65,  Jorge  Calvar,  and  66,  Ramon  Romagosa,  arrested 
at  Manzanillo  for  alleged  conspiracy  in  insurrection;  expelled  August  n,  1896. 

It  will  be  noted  that  there  was  a  strong  tendency  displayed  by  naturalized 
citizens,  whose  names  did  not  themselves  declare  American  ancestry,  to  par 
ticipate  in  the  contested  affairs  of  Cuba.  In  the  case  of  the  men  who  crossed 
from  Haiti  to  Cuba  in  a  fishing  boat,  they  obtained  able  counsel,  and  we  find 
it  stated  respecting  the  Spaniards,  by  this  gentleman  in  a  letter  to  the  State 
Department: 

"The  euphuistic  palaver  and  the  circumambient  correspondence  of  the 
Spanish  authorities  thinly  veils  a  deliberate  purpose  to  advisedly  disregard 
these  obligations." 

This  language  of  the  counsel  of  naturalized  citizens,  it  may  be  observed, 
while  possibly  circumambient,  is  not  cast  in  the  circumlocution  molds  of  the 
curved  palaver  of  stately  diplomacy. 

The  claims  stacked  in  the  State  Department,  brought  before  the  Senate 
in  January,  1897,  were  in  the  order  following: 

August  Bolten,  arrest  and  imprisonment $  10,000.00 

John  D.  Ferrer,  arrest  and  imprisonment 25,000.00 

Mrs.  C.  J.  Diaz  de  Clarke,  property  losses 116,335.00 

John  F.  Java,  property  losses 90,585.00 

Jose  Ignacio  Toscano,  property  losses 15,000.00 

Pedro  Plutarco  Ortiz,  property  losses 84,000.00 

F.  J.  Cazanas,  property  losses     ........* 39,843.00 

Jose*  G.  and  Jose  M.  Delgado,  property  losses 178,534.00 

Jose  Antonio  Iznaga,  property  losses        156,500.00 

Ricardo  Machado,  property  losses 64,900.00 


148  DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS. 

Francisco  Seiglie,  property  losses     . $778,510.00 

Jose  Rafael  de  les  Reyes  y  Garcia  and  wife,  property  losses     .     .  729,161.00 

Frederick  P.  Montes,  property  losses 160,000.00 

George  L.  Lay,  property  losses value  of  horse 

Andres  L.  Terry,  property  losses 334,905.00 

John  A.  Sowers,  arrest,  imprisonment,  and  expulsion    ....  200,000.00 

Perfecto  Lacosti,  property  losses 652,900.00 

Win.  A.  and  Louis  M.  Glean,  imprisonment 150,000.00 

Wm.  A.  Glean,  property  losses 4,668.00 

Louis  M.  Glean,  property  losses 7,547.00 

Whiting  &  Co.,  property  losses • 60,240.00 

Mrs.  A.  L.  Whiting,  property  losses 17,000.00 

J.  B.  Carillo  de  Albornoz,  property  losses 36,000.00 

Ignacio  Larrondo,  property  losses 129,472.38 

Cristobal  N.  Madan,  property  losses  and  personal  injuries       .     .  88,000.00 

Antonio  A.  Martinez,  property  losses        35,000.00 

Joaquin  P.  Cruz  and  wife,  property  losses 70,000.00 

George  W.  Hyatt,  property  losses 285,490.54 

Manuel  A.  R.  Morales,  property  losses 275,000.00 

Peter  Dominguez,  expulsion 10,000.00 

Teresa  Joerg,  property  losses 2,500.00 

James  A.  Glean,  property  losses 28,425.00 

Peter  S.  Rodriguez,  property  losses 40,796.00 

Antonio  M.  Jimenez,  property  losses 19,158.45 

Pedro  C.  Casanova,  property  losses 40,400.00 

Pedro  C.  Casanova,  personal  injuries 40,000.00 

Walter  G.  Dygert,  arrest  and  imprisonment 100,000.00 

Frederick  A.  Libbey,  property  losses 23,166.00 

Jose  M.  Caraballo,  property  losses 90,470.00 

Jose  M.  Caraballo,  arrest,  imprisonment,  etc 60,000.00 

Angel  Gronlier,  property  losses 34,779.00 

Albert  V.  de  Goicouria,  property  losses 130,000.00 

Rosa  A.  Maragliano,  property  losses 30,000.00 

Juana  M.  C.  de  Maragliano 25,000.00 

J.  de  Armas  y  Armas,  property  losses 69,525.00 

Maximo  M.  Diaz,  property  losses 10,000.00 


DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS.  149 

Wm.  W.  Gay,  expulsion $  25,000.00 

Thomas  R.  Dawley,  arrest,  imprisonment,  etc 100,000.00 

George  Fortier,  property  losses        32,450.00 

L.  F.  Marejon  y  Marquez,  property  losses 15,000.00 

Wm.  G.  Thorne.  property  losses 25,000.00 

M.  D.  J.  Garcia  y  Pino,  executrix,  etc.,  property  losses       .     .     .  200,000.00 

Manuel  Prieto,  property  losses 58,850.00 

Gustave  Richelieu,  imprisonment a  fair  indemnity 

Miguel  de  la  Vega  y  Gener,  property  losses 71,683.00 

J.  Sanchez  y  Coba,  property  losses 16,290.00 

F.  J.  Terry  y  Dorticas,  property  losses 202,952.50 

J.  C.  de  Albornoz  O'Farrill,  property  losses 106,105.49 

A.  C.  de  Albornoz  O'Farrill,  property  losses 130,703.12 

Heine  Safety  Boiler  Co.,  property  losses 27,316.80 

R.  M.  y  de  la  Cruz,  property  losses not  stated 

Francisco  Rionda  (Central  Tuinucu  Sugar  Cane  Manufacturing 

Co.),  property  losses         527,480.20 

Charles  Rosa,  property  losses 882,840.00 

Rabel  &  Co.,  property  losses        75,785.00 

Joseph  M.  Duenos,  property  losses 15,000.00 

P.  P.  de  Leon,  property  losses 379,000.00 

J.  F.  de  Cossio,  property  losses 20,000.00 

Peter  E.  Ri very,  personal  injuries  . suitable  indemnity 

Samuel  T.  Tolon,  personal  injuries 50,000.00 

Samuel  T.Tolon,  property  losses 100,000.00 

Adolphus  Torres,  imprisonment 25,000.00 

A.  L.  Terry  y  Dorticos  and  A.  E.  Terry,  property  losses    .     .     .  81,888.00 

A.  E.  Terry,  property  losses        110,500.00 

Frederick  L.  Craycraft,  personal  injuries 25,000.00 

Thomas  E.  Rodriguez,  property  losses,  banishment,  etc.    .     .     .  61,000.00 

Oscar  Giguel,  property  losses      .          100,000.00 

Jose  Tur,  property  losses 251,500.00 

• 

Adolf o  Santa  Maria,  property  losses 120,803.32 

Enrequita  Santa  Maria,  property  losses 94,953-32 

Joseph  M.  Fernandez,  property  losses 61,115.61 

George  Becket,  property  losses 75,000.00 


15°  DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS. 

Manuel  F.  Lopez,  killing  of  son,  S.  N.  Lopez $100,000.00 

Adolf o  Torres,  arrest  and  imprisonment        25,000.00 

There  was  a  great  deal  of  Cuban  investigation  by  committees  of  Congress, 
the  object  of  which  seemed  to  be  to  persuade  the  American  people  that  Amer 
ican  captives  were  subjected  to  indignities  that  must  be  compensated,  and  to 
celebrate  the  glories  of  the  armies  of  the  rebellion.  In  truth,  there  were 
several  kinds  of  American  citizens,  and  a  large  assortment  of  insurgents; 
and  any  resinous  wood  that  could  be  thrown  where  it  would  flame  for 
war  was  welcome  and  pitched  on  the  fire.  The  American  people  need  first  of 
all  for  their  own  sake,  to  sift  the  truth  about  the  Cuban  people,  and  see  how 
many  of  those  who  were  so  rapid  to  be  naturalized  citizens  before  the  war  are 
faithful  Americans  after  the  war;  and  to  what  extent  the  Cuban  Republic,  as 
it  was  magnified  by  the  mysteries  around  it  in  the  war,  may  claim  that  they 
have  acquired  title  to  the  country,  for  which  they  speak  with  and  of  authority. 
As  to  the  number  of  troops  in  the  field  for  Cuba,  Mr.  Frederick  W.  Lawrence, 
May  20,  1896,  said:  "Generals  Gomez  and  Maceo  have  now  under  their 
command  in  the  neighborhood  of  100,000  men,  whose  numbers  would  be  very 
largely  increased  if  the  men  who  desire  to  form  them  could  pass  through  the 
Spanish  lines."  The  imagination  of  Mr.  Lawrence  must  have  been  pro 
foundly  affected.  He  said:  "General  Gomez,  with  nearly  30,000  men,  is 
marching  westward,  and  has  reached  a  point  in  Matanzas  close  enough  to  the 
city  of  Havana  to  cause  great  trepidation."  This  was  a  dream.  Gomez 
n2ver  had  one-half  of  30,000  men,  and  at  this  time  was  not  marching  west 
ward,  and  there  was  no  trepidation  at  Havana  about  him.  Mr.  Lawrence 
thought  Havana  could  be  taken  easily,  and  added:  "In  the  opinion  of  mili 
tary  men  whom  I  have  seen,  defenses  of  Habana  are  totally  inadequate  to 
protect  the  city  from  an  invasion  on  the  land  side."  The  only  protection  the 
capital  has  from  an  attack  by  land  are  a  few  insignificant  stockade  forts 
erected  around  the  outskirts  and  garrisoned  by  poorly  equipped,  undrilled, 
half  starved  volunteers,  who,  during  the  hours  when  they  are  off  duty,  may 
be  seen  in  the  streets  of  Habana  asking  alms  of  citizens,  like  ordinary  beggars. 
It  seems  incredible  that  such  men  would  succeed  in  holding  Habana  against 
an  attack  by  such  fighters  as  the  Cubans  under  General  Gomez  have  on  more 
than  one  occasion  proven  themselves  to  be."  It  seems  strange  that  an  intel 
ligent  man  could  believe  these  assertions,  that  would  be  ridiculous  if  they 
had  not  been  a  part  of  the  war  whoopery  that  was  for  a  time  a  leading  feature 


DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS.  151 

with  our  public  men  who  wanted  war  in  a  few  minutes.  If  Gomez  had  30,000 
men,  what  happened  to  them  when  our  18,000  all  told  landed  and  lost 
1,500  men,  killed,  wounded  and  missing-,  in  carrying"  Spanish  positions  near 
Santiago?  Mr.  Lawrence  was  deceived.  The  30,000  troops  of  Gomez,  the 
nearly  100,000  thundering  at  the  gates  of  Havana,  were  an  array  of  impostures, 
the  object  of  which  was  to  subordinate  the  United  States  to  Cuba,  and  play 
second  fiddle  to  Gomez  with  the  army  of  the  United  States'.  We  fortunately 
escaped  from  the  consequences  of  the  conspiracy  of  falsification,  and  we  are 
indebted  to  the  solid  sense  of  the  President  for  the  escape.  There  was  good 
fighting  done  with  slender  forces  in  Pinar  del  Rio  by  Maceo,  but  Gomez 
''Oripnted"  himself  and  was  hors  de  combat.  Where  did  he  bury  his  100,000 
heroes,  or  what  otherwise  became  of  them?  Mr.  Lawrence  was  good  enough 
to  add: 

"Up  in  the  mountains  the  leaders  of  the  army  of  the  Republic  have  estab 
lished  ranches,  where  men  are  engaged  in  breeding  and  raising  cattle  for 
food  purposes.  The  raising  of  vegetables  is  also  encouraged  by  the  Cuban 
commanders,  and  in  addition  to  this  means  of  subsistence  they  have  the  native 
food  plants  that  grow  in  wild  profusion  all  over  the  island. 

"From  this  it  will  be  readily  understood  that  no  matter  how  long  the  war 
should  last,  or  how  much  privation  they  might  suffer  in  other  directions,  the 
Republican  army  will  never  suffer  dangerously  from  lack  of  food." 

They  did  not  seem  to  be  flush  of  provisions  when  they  first  struck  our 
troops  in  Santiago.  We  quote  again  from  Mr.  Lawrence : 

"The  Cubans  have  been  accused  of  incendiarism  in  a  criminal  sense  because 
they  have  destroyed  sugar  cane,  tobacco,  mills,  and  plantations.  They  insist 
that  they  should  not  be  regarded  as  criminals,  but  that  the  orders  which  the 
commanders  issued  for  the  destruction  of  the  island  were  justifiable  war 
measures. 

"I  have  personal  knowledge  that  in  a  great  many  cases  the  plantations 
have  been  destroyed  with  the  consent  of  the  owners.  In  fact,  a  great  number 
of  owners  of  plantations  that  have  been  destroyed  informed  me  personally  that 
they  had  invited  the  Cubans  to  do  so  because  they  did  not  want  to  grind  their 
cane,  and  thereby  supply  revenues  to  the  Spanish  government." 

The  cane-burning  was  barbarian,  inflicting  immense  losses  upon  the 
Cubans,  destroying  the  only  chance  they  had  of  really  providing  a  govern 
ment. 


152  DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS. 

The  Rev.  A.  J.  Diaz  saw  the  armies  of  Maceo  and  Gomez — great  crowds 
of  men,  Maceo  seven  or  eight  thousand,  Gomez  ten  thousand,  and  Mr.  Aguirre 
had  an  army. 

"Q.  Now,  what  class  of  people  did  that  army  consist  of? — A.  The  best 
class  of  young  men  in  Habana,  generally. 

"Q.   Do  you  mean  the  Province  of  Habana? — A.   No;  the  city. 

"Q.  Aguirre's  command  consists  mostly  of  city  boys,  does  it? — A.  Yes, 
sir. 

"Q.  How  many  were  there? — A.  He  had  at  that  time  about  2,000;  that 
was  his  escort. 

"Q.  He  had  others? — A.  Oh,  yes.  He  had  in  the  province  10,000  or 
15,000  men,  scattered  all  over  the  Province  of  Habana  in  different  camps. 

"Q.  Now,  what  kind  of  people  did  the  army  of  Maceo  appear  to  be? — A. 
Very  fine  people,  too;  white  people;  doctors,  lawyers,  druggists. 

"Q.   Intelligent  people? — A.   Intelligent  people. 
By  Senator  Davis: 

"Q.  What  kind  of  people  were  the  private  soldiers  in  Maceo's  army? — A. 
Well,  they  have  some  colored  people,  too— many — and  they  have  some  of  these 
intelligent  people  as  private  soldiers,  a  great  many  of  them  people  who  do  not 
want  any  rank;  just  wanted  to  be  soldiers,  just  to  do  that  in  the  democratic 
line  to  encourage  others. ' ' 

There  are  fifteen  thousand  city  boys  from  Havana,  eh !  What  happened 
to  them?  What  were  they  doing  when  Blanco  was  fortifying  the  city? 

Senator  Morgan  wanted  to  know  how  many  Spanish  troops  were  in  Cuba 
in  the  May  before  we  attacked  Spain,  and  Dr.  Diaz  said: 

"A.  I  think  they  have  in  Cuba  only  about  70,000  or  80,000  soldiers.  I  do 
not  think  they  have  more  than  that. 

"Q.  How  many  have  come  there  since  this  war  broke  out? — A.  Nearly 
150,000  to  180,000. 

4'Q.  What  has  become  of  the  balance  of  them? — A.  Well,  a  great  many 
of  them  have  been  killed,  and  many  of  them  have  joined  the  rebels. 

"Q.   Joined  the  rebels? — A.   A  great  many  of  them;  yes,  sir." 

Dr.  Diaz  was  hard  at  it  to  make  up  a  rebel  army  of  about  100,000  men, 
but  having  mustered  them  in  he  has  never  been  able  to  find  ten  per  cent  of 
them.  The  mighty  Cuban  armies  had  arms!  We  quote  again  from  the 
examination  of  Dr.  Diaz : 


DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS.  153 

"Q.  Do  the  Cubans  get  any  arms  and  ammunition  from  the  villages  cr 
people? — A.  Yes;  they  get  them  from  Habana. 

"Q.  How  do  they  get  them? — A.  Exactly,  I  do  not  know  the  way  they 
manage  it,  but  I  know  they  get  all  they  need." 

Mr.  William  D.  Smith  was  once  a  soldier  in  the  United  States  army.  He 
was  examined  by  Senator  Morgan  June  3,  1897.  He  joined  Gomez,  he  says, 
in  the  midst  of  a  battle.  The  Cubans  lost  68  killed  and  no  wounded.  The 
Cubans  dug  up  180  dead  Spaniards  by  order  of  Gomez,  and  reburied  them  at 
once.  He  wanted  to  count  the  dead.  Mr.  Smith  was  a  gushing  talker.  He  said : 

"There  were  242  engagements  I  have  been  in  with  General  Gomez,  besides 
little  skirmishes  I  did  not  count.  It  is  a  dash  and  a  few  shots,  and  get  out  of 
the  way  where  they  outnumber  you.  There  were  242  engagements  where  he 
stood  his  ground  and  camped  on  the  ground  of  the  Spaniards,  the  last  engage 
ment  just  a  few  days  before  I  left,  when  General  Gomez  and  General  Weyler 
met  for  the  first  time. 

"Q.   Where  was  that?— A.   At  La  Reforma. 

"Q.  A  sugar  estate? — A.  No,  sir;  not  a  sugar  estate;  it  is  a  cattle  range; 
the  most  beautiful  place,  I  think,  in  La  Villias.  It  is  General  Gomez's  favor 
ite  camping  ground,  because  his  son  was  born  there. 

"Q.  How  did  the  last  battle  wind  up? — A.  General  Weyler  withdrew  the 
troops  and  went  to  Puerto  Principe,  and  Gomez  camped  on  the  ground. 

"Q.  How  many  troops  were  engaged? — A.  Gomez  had  1,500,  or  pos 
sibly  2,000 — I  am  trying  to  get  this  as  near  right  as  possible — I  do  not  want  to 
overestimate.  The  Spanish  had  20,000  men — General  Weyler  had  20,000 
troops  with  him. 

"Q.  20,000  in  bodies  within  reach  of  each  other? — A.  No,  sir;  20,000  men 
right  in  the  fight  at  one  time;  not  in  a  mass,  in  any  one  body,  but  he  had 
20,000  in  columns.  The  fighting  down  there  requires  explanation.  It  seems 
ridiculous  that  1,500  men  would  stand  and  fight  20,000,  but  the  Spaniards 
always  march  in  a  column  of  1,000  men  and  one  piece  of  artillery — one  cannon. 
They  came  into  Reforma  in  twenty  different  directions.  The  trap  was  being 
laid  by  General  Weyler  to  capture  General  Gomez.  The  General  was  cog 
nizant  of  it  for  two  weeks,  and  waited  for  them  to  come.  The  way  he  fought 
those  20,000,  he  would  have  100  men  fight  one  column,  and  50  men  fight 
another  column,  and  100  men  fight  another,  and  75  still  another  column,  and 
so  on,  and  he  stood  them  off  like  that.  I  have  known  10  Cubans  to  hold  a 


i54  DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS. 

Spanish  column  of  1,000  men  until  General  Gomez  could  get  together  his 
impedimenta  and  get  out — hold  them  at  a  dead  standstill.  I  account  for  it 
by  the  reason  that  the  Spaniards  thought  that  there  was  a  trap,  an  ambuscade, 
and  they  would  not  run  into  it.  That  is  General  Gomez's  tactics;  he  has  done 
it  several  times. 

"Q.  What  is  the  area  of  that  estate? — A.  Between  ten  and  twelve  thou 
sand  acres. 

"Q.   What  were  the  losses  in  the  battle  of  La  Reforma? — A.   The  last  one? 

"Q.  Yes,  sir. — A.  The  Cuban  losses  were  26,  I  think,  killed,  during  the 
two  days'  righting. 

"Q.   How  many  days? — A.   Two  days. 

"Q.  How  many  wounded? — A.  The  wounded  it  is  hard  to  estimate.  We 
never  know  the  exact  number  wounded,  because  so  many  are  wounded  who 
do  not  pay  any  attention  to  it.  I  saw  one  man  wounded  who  was  shot  with  a 
Mauser  bullet,  which  passed  right  through  him.  and  we  never  knew  anything 
about  it  for  two  days.  That  seems  almost  miraculous,  but  it  is  true.  I  sup 
pose  you  have  seen  that  Mauser  bullet.  The  lead  is  covered  by  some  metal. 
I  can  show  you  a  wound  that  you  would  have  said,  if  it  had  happened  with 
any  other  cartridge,  that  I  would  have  had  to  have  an  amputation.  One 
went  right  through  my  ankle,  and  I  was  only  in  the  hospital  two  hours — long 
enough  to  have  it  done  up.  The  bullet  does  not  make  any  fracture.  I  have 
never  seen  a  case  of  amputation  since  I  have  been  on  the  island,  and  it  does 
not  cause  septicaemia.  There  is  the  wound  [exhibiting].  The  bullet  entered 
here  [pointing  to  his  ankle],  and  came  out  there.  I  was  never  laid  up  a  min 
ute.  The  doctor  in  camp  simply  dressed  it  with  iodoform  and  a  little  anti 
septic.  That  is  why  I  say  it  is  almost  impossible  to  give  an  exact  account  of 
the  wounded. 

"Q.   About  how  many? — A.   I  should  say  50  or  75. 

"Q.  What  was  the  loss  to  the  Spaniards? — A.  Their  loss  was  180  or  185 
killed,  and  the  wounded  we  never  know,  although  in  getting  here  after  leav 
ing  camp  I  ran  across  a  practice — that  is,  a  guide — and  he  told  us  he  had 
guided  General  Weyler's  forces  across  the  Rio  Sassa,  and  he  got  it  from  the 
soldiers  that  they  had  300  or  400  wounded. 

"Q.  Weyler  was  in  personal  command  on  the  one  side  and  Gomez  on  the 
other  at  that  time? — A.  Yes,  sir;  the  first  time  they  had  ever  met.  The 
New  York  Sun  gave  an  account  of  it. 


THE  MAJOR,  HIS  ADJUTANT,  ORDERLY,  AND  WIFE. 


PARTIAL  VIEW  OF  THE  ARSENAL,  FACING  THE  BACOOR,  IN  CAVITE. 


DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS.  157 

"Q.  Where  did  Gomez's  troops  camp  after  that  battle? — A.  At  Reforma, 
on  the  battlefield.  He  has  always  marched  over  the  battlefield  since  I  have 
been  with  him. 

"Q.  General  Gomez  is  commander  in  chief  of  the  Cuban  army? — A.  He 
calls  himself  the  general  in  chief.  The  commander  in  chief  is  Cisneros 
Betancourt. 

"Q.  Under  whom  does  he  hold  his  commission? — A.  Under  the  Cuban 
government.  He  has  a  diploma,  the  same  as  I  have — I  have  seen  it — only,  of 
course,  with  different  names  and  grades. 

"Q.  Do  all  the  officers  hold  their  commissions  from  the  civil  government? 
—A.  Everything  above  a  captain. 

"Q.  Does  Gomez  make  report  to  the  civil  government? — A.  Daily.  They 
may  not  get  them  daily,  but  there  is  a  daily  report  made  by  Gomez  to  the 
civil  government.  He  makes  them  up,  and  every  two  or  three  days  they  are 
sent  by  couriers.  Of  course,  there  may  be  a  jump  of  a  day  or  two. 

"Q.  Does  he  report  for  his  own  command  or  entire  army? — A.  For  the 
entire  army. 

"Q.   The  army,  then,  is  divided  into ? — A.   Into  six  army  corps." 

This  old  soldier  should  have  been  at  the  head  of  the  literary  bureau  at 
Key  West.  Examined  by  Senator  Morgan,  he  said: 

"Every  Cuban  on  the  island  of  Cuba,  unless  he  has  run  away  and  got 
under  the  protection  of  the  Spanish  government,  is  supposed  to  have  a  gun  in 
his  hand  or  be  working  for  those  who  have  a  gun ;  and  they  do  it  with  a  roya^ 
good  will.  These  men  work  ten  hours  a  day;  the  pacificos  go  to  the  moun 
tains  and  till  the  soil.  I  saw  in  Trinidad,  where  there  were  15  or  20  acres  on 
the  slope  of  the  mountains  where  they  have  cut  the  timber  down  and  planted 
sweet  potatoes,  and  you  can  kick  out  sweet  potatoes  as  large  as  that  cuspidor. 
I  have  not  eaten  a  meal  on  the  island  without  having  all  I  wanted,  and  the 
finest  honey  and  beef  and  sweet  potatoes.  Gomez  is  husbanding  the  beef, 
and  I  think  he  has  enough  to  last  time  immemorial.  They  are  only  allowed 
to  kill  what  is  actually  consumed.  The  same  can  be  said  of  the  horses ;  all 
under  the  control  of  the  Cubans  are  in  depositos.  He  does  not  allow  a  soldier 
to  ride  a  mare,  only  geldings;  that  is  in  case  the  war  is  prolonged,  so  that 
they  may  have  their  horses.  They  systematically  propagate  horses,  mules, 
and  cattle. 

"Q.   From  your  knowledge  of  resources  of  Cuba  and  its  power  to  produce 


i58  DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS. 

animal  life,  how  long  do  you  think  that  the  Cuban  government  could  sustain 
an  army  of  fifty  or  sixty  thousand  men? — A.  Under  the  plan  or  system  they 
are  working  now,  I  do  not  know  why  they  should  not  support  it  for  ages.  I 
know  that  the  cattle  are  apparently  just  as  many  as  when  I  went  there  a  year 
ago,  and  more  vegetables,  because  they  have  been  accumulating  them  all  the 
time.  The  civil  government  works  at  that  all  the  time,  and  there  are  more 
of  them  than  a  year  ago. 

"Q.  How  are  the  women  and  children  provided  for? — A.  Those  in  the 
interior — their  husbands,  the  pacificos — the  rule  is:  The  civil  government 
allows  one  man  to  provide  food  for  every  five  women  and  children.  These 
can  be  five  women,  or  one  woman  and  four  children,  but  it  allows  one  man  to 
stay  away  from  the  army — or  a  portion  of  the  time — one  man  for  five  women 
and  children.  That  is  the  civil  law.  And  they  have  their  houses  in  these 
mountains,  and  they  raise  their  pork  and  vegetables,  and  a  great  many  of  the 
women  work  in  the  shops  where  they  are  making  clothes  for  the  soldiers.  In 
one  portion  of  this  shop  there  was  a  great  number — I  never  counted  them — 
daughters  of  the  Cubans  in  the  field  and  their  wives,  in  there  making  clothes. 
I  have  seen  10,000  suits  of  clothes  at  one  time,  piled  out  there.  That  includes 
a  pair  of  pants,  a  coat,  and  shoes. 

"Q.  Is  the  Cuban  army  well  fed? — A.  The  best  I  ever  saw  in  any  army. 
I  have  not  had  a  meal — and  that  applies  to  the  army,  when  I  say  myself  I 
mean  all — I  have  not  had  five  meals  on  the  island 

"Q.  What? — A.  There  have  not  been  five  meals  on  the  island  when  I 
have  not  had  my  coffee  and  sugar.  I  say  sugar;  sometimes  we  had  honey  in 
place  of  the  sugar — 

"O.  Where  is  the  coffee  raised? — A.  Certain  kinds  of  coffee  grow  wild  in 
this  province  of  Santa  Clara.  In  these  Trinidad  hills  there  is  one  vast  forest 
of  coffee,  where  I  have  seen  coffee  on  the  ground  two  inches  thick — on  the 
ground  rotting. 

"Q.  Is  it  good  coffee? — A.  It  is  fair  coffee.  It  is  not  the  best  coffee. 
Their  best  coffee  is  not  the  very  best  grade  of  coffee— 

"Q.  It  makes  a  good,  wholesome  beverage? — A.  Yes,  sir;  it  is  good 
enough,  so  that  when  the  soldiers  don't  get  it  they  growl  considerably. 

"Q.  You  would  say  the  army  is  well  fed? — A.  Yes,  sir;  I  hardly  think 
that  expresses  it;  they  have  luxuries. 

"Q.   Take  the  body  of  the  Cuban  army,  the  white  people  in  it,  are  they 


DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS.  159 

as  intelligent  as  the  average  of  people  in  the  rural  districts  here — what  we 
call  backwoods  of  the  United  States? — A.  Yes,  sir. 

44Q.  Are  they  patriotic? — A.  As  much  so  as  any  class  of  people  I  ever 
saw.  So  much  so  that  I  not  only  heard  General  Gomez  and  the  government 
and  the  officers,  but  I  have  heard  private  soldiers  talk.  I  will  say  that  there 
is  not  a  man  in  the  escort  or  in  the  Victoria  regiment  that  I  have  not  heard  an 
expression  from  similar  to  this:  That  before  they  would  lay  down  their  arms 
they  would  let  every  Spaniard  in  Spain  walk  over  their  dead  bodies,  and  they 
would  not  accept  anything  but  absolute  independence.  If  you  want  to  make 
them  angry,  talk  autonomy  to  them.  They  say  they  have  been  caught  once, 
but  they  will  never  be  the  fish  to  be  caught  again  with  the  same  bait.  And  I 
have  heard  Gomez  say  that  they  should  be  glad  to  have  the  United  States 
recognize  them,  but  that  they  will  keep  up  the  war  until  they  secure  inde 
pendence  if  it  takes  twenty  years  to  do  it. 

"Q.  Is  there  any  considerable  proportion  of  native  Americans  in  the 
Cuban  army? — A.  I  do  not  think  there  is  over  20  in  the  army." 

Mr.  Smith,  once  upon  a  time  of  Ohio,  with  a  record  of  over  two  hundred 
battles  alongside  General  Gomez — in  one  of  which  20,000  Spaniards  under 
Weyler  were  defeated  by  1,500  Cubans — gave  this  account  under  pressure  of 
cross-examination  of  the  escort  of  the  famous  Dominican  chieftain : 

"I  was  appointed  a  captain  in  Gomez's  escort,  where  they  are  all  officers, 
appointed  over  the  heads  of  old  Cubans  who  have  been  in  the  service  for 
years — some  of  them  with  him  in  the  ten-year  war — appointed  second  in 
command,  jumping  over  all  the  others,  and  there  is  no  jealousy  of  me. 

*'Q.   About  what  is  the  strength  of  that  escort? — A.   From  70  to  90. 

"Q.  All  officers? — A.  Yes,  sir  With  the  exception  of  myself,  there  is  no 
man  in  it  who  has  got  in  except  through  some  special  act  of  bravery.  They 
are  General  Gomez's  body-guard.  He  goes  into  an  engagement,  and  they  are 
first  into  the  fight  and  the  last  to  leave,  and,  by  reason  of  that,  I  know  they 
have  from  10  to  15  or  20  in  the  hospital,  and  they  have  nearly  all  been 
wounded  more  than  once.  I  have  never  been  wounded  except  the  once. 

41Q.  What  is  the  strength  of  this  Victoria  regiment? — A.  When  it  came 
into  Las  Vegas  it  was  142 ;  when  I  left  there,  the  other  day,  they  were  all, 
with  the  exception  of  38,  in  the  hospital,  wounded." 

Mr.  Smith  went  so  far  as  to  describe  Cubitos.  The  Cuban  President,  he 
said,  had  headquarters  at  Nahassa — and  proceeded : 


160  DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS. 

"Q.  The  same  place  you  call  Cubitos? — A.  It  is  in  the  vicinity.  Nahassa 
is  a  very  level  piece  of  country,  a  beautiful  river  running  through  it,  and  fine 
grass  for  the  horses.  Cubitos  is  a  little  back  of  it." 

It  will  be  observed  that  Cubitos  was  the  only  place  Mr.  Smith  did  not 
know  all  about,  and  Cubitos  is  the  capital  of  this  land  of  milk  and  honey,  fat 
cattle  and  sweet  potatoes  as  big  as  cuspidors.  Rut  it  is  a  "little  back." 

Did  the  Cubans  have  a  coast-guard?  Oh,  yes — to  be  sure  they  had — and 
Smith  told  all  about  it,  though  he  thought  his  talk  might  hurt.  He  said: 

"There  is  a  continuous  guard  of  armed  men  around  that  island,  called  the 
coast-guard.  They  are  fully  armed,  with  plenty  of  ammunition. 

"Q.  About  how  many  men? — A.  I  presume  in  that  coast-guard  about 
5,000  men.  They  fight  if  necessary,  but  it  is  a  complete  chain  of  guards. 
Now,  there  are  several  reasons  for  that  guard.  The  Cuban  government  has  a 
perfect  line  of  communication,  as  I  say,  all  through  the  island.  They  also 
have  a  perfect  line  of  communication  with  the  United  States." 

Mr.  George  Bronson  Rea,  of  Brooklyn,  was  examined  June  n,  1897. 
He  was  an  electrical  engineer  and  newspaper  correspondent,  and  before  the 
war  had  charge  of  an  electrical  light  plant.  January  18,  1896,  he  took  the 
field  with  Gomez  in  Pinar  del  Rio.  After  being  with  Gomez  for  a  month  he 
joined  Maceo,  .was  with  him  six  months,  and  then  slipped  through  the  Span 
ish  lines,  visited  New  York,  and  returned  in  January,  1897,  to  Cuba,  and  was 
with  Gomez  until  the  middle  of  April.  Asked  how  great  an  army  Gomez  had, 
Mr.  Rea  said:  "About  150  under  his  personal  command — the  escort  and  the 
Victoria  regiment — each  about  80  men."  The  grand  army  of  Gomez  in  the 
province  of  Santa  Clara  was  in  "two  divisions  and  various  regiments."  Mr. 
R£a  proceeded  to  give  an  intelligible  story  of  Gomez's  forces,  at  the  time  the 
orartory  of  senators  was  seeking  to  subordinate  the  United  States  to  this  mili 
tary  pastmaster.  "I  can  in  one  minute,"  said  Mr.  Rea,  "give  the  total 
accurately."  This  was  a  frightful  menace,  but  it  had  to  go!  Mr.  Rea  said: 

"This  recent  campaign  of  Gomez  in  the  eastern  part  of  La  Villas  has  been 
carried  out  by  the  first  division  of  what  they  call  the  fourth  army  corps, 
divided  into  three  brigades:  The  brigade  of  Remedios,  about  800  men;  the 
brigade  of  Sancti  Spiritus,  about  600  men ;  and  the  brigade  of  Trinidad, 
about  400  men.  There  are  three  more  brigades,  composing  the  second 
division:  That  of  Cienfuegos,  about  500  men;  the  brigade  of  Sagua,  about  400 
men;  and  the  brigade  of  Villa  Clara,  probably  500  more.  That  is  all  in  that 


.*  ^c 


•; 

i 


DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS.  163 

province.  In  the  province  of  Matanzas  there  are  very  few  insurgents; 
indeed,  I  think  they  could  be  safely  estimated  at  about  400  or  500  men  in  the 
whole  province.  In  the  province  of  Havana,  probably  at  the  present  time 
there  are  2,000  insurgents.  Last  November — or  October,  I  meant  to  say — I 
was  down  in  the  province  of  Havana  about  one  month  or  a  month  and  a  half, 
and  then  there  were  about  that  number,  and  the  force  has  not  augmented. 
Contrary  to  all  stories  as  to  their  number,  the  force  has  not  increased.  I 
left  Maceo  in  Pinar  del  Rio  with  6,000  men.  The  number  of  men  in  the  east 
ern  part  of  the  island  is — what  I  have  said  already  in  regard  to  the  western 
part  can  be  relied  on,  but  in  the  eastern  part  of  the  island  I  would  not  like  to 
give  any  testimony  to  be  depended  upon  as  accurate — as  to  my  opinion  as  to 
the  number  of  men,  there  are,  I  should  judge,  probably  about  4,000  or  5,000 
men  in  the  two  eastern  provinces. 

4tQ.  What  provinces? — A.  Santiago  de  Cuba  and  Camaguey.  The  total 
I  have  not  figured,  but  in  my  estimation  they  do  not  exceed  25,000  armed 
men  on  the  island. ' ' 

Of  this  25,000  armed  Cubans,  four  thousand  were  of  Maceo's  forces, 
and  they  dwindled  after  his  death. 

An  effort  was  made  by  the  examiners  to  show  Mr.  Rea  was  not  the 
friend  of  the  Cubans,  but  he  had  simply  been  telling  the  truth,  and  put 
down  the  land  army  of  the  Cuban  commander-in-chief  at  one  hundred  and 
fifty  men  in  hand,  the  rest  scattered  so  as  to  scare  the  Spaniards  a  little 
everywhere.  We  quote  the  report: 

*'Q.  As  far  as  the  Spanish  were  concerned,  you  were  watched? — A.  Yes, 
sir;  I  suppose,  if  caught,  I  should  have  suffered  the  fate  of  Govin. 

**Q.   What  did  they  do  with  him? — A.   They  chopped  him  up. 

*'Q.  Have  you  any  knowledge  of  that? — A,  Yes,  sir;  no  personal  knowl 
edge. 

"Q.  Whence  is  your  information  derived? — A.  From  two  persons  who 
were  wTith  him;  one  Lieutenant-Colonel  Mirabal  and  the  other  Colonel  Gordon 
—both  dead  now.  They  were  in  a  fight  between  Major  Valencia,  who  had  60 
or  80  men,  and  the  Spaniards  under  General  Ochoa  from  Jaruco.  It  took 
place  near  the  sugar  estate  of  Jiquiabo,  and,  as  generally  the  case  in  a  little 
fight,  the  Cubans,  after  firing  a  few  volleys,  got  out  of  the  way,  and  Govin, 
never  having  been  in  a  fight  before,  found  himself  alone  and  the  Spaniards 
very  close  to  him.  They  told  me  that  Govin,  when  he  saw  he  was  to  be  cap- 


164  DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS. 

tured,  walked  forward  to  meet  the  Spanish  column  to  surrender,  hoping  his 
American  citizenship  would  help  him  in  this  case;  but  it  seems  that  his 
papers— parties  told  me  who  said  they  were  watching  and  saw  it  done  (but  I 
do  not  attach  much  importance  to  the  statement  myself,  because  I  never  saw 
a  Cuban  that  would  stay  near  a  Spanish  column  long  enough  to  watch  much) 

but  they  said  the  papers  were  torn  up  and  thrown  in  his  face,  and  he  was 

tied  to  another  man  and  taken  to  San  Mateo  and  kept  there  all  night,  and  the 
next  morning  as  they  were  led  out  to  march  to  Jaruco  he  was  untied  from 
the  other  prisoner  and  fastened  to  a  tree  and  Chopped  up  with  machetes." 

Govin  was  killed,  Rea  said,  because  he  was  an  American.  Rea  added  that 
he  did  not  carry  a  revolver,  for  he  could  get  out  of  the  way  when  the  Spaniards 
came  "by  keeping  up  with  the  Cubans."  He  once  engaged  in  hostilities  to 
this  effect,  though  a  man  of  peace: 

"I  directed  Gomez  once  how  to  burn  out  a  locomotive,  and  that  is  all.  I 
took  no  actual  hand  in  it ;  I  told  the  old  man  how  they  could  do  it,  and  men 

Cubans — went  to  work  and  did  it.      That  is  as  far  as  my  experience  in 

helping  the  insurgents  has  ever  gone. 

44Q.  What  do  you  mean  by  burning  out  a  locomotive — destroying  it? — A. 
Yes,  sir.  If  the  water  gets  low  and  the  fire  is  kept  going,  it  will  burn  out  the 
tubes  and  then  it  will  not  stand  the  pressure. 

"Q.  He  had  captured  the  locomotive,  and  wanted  to  destroy  it? — A.  Yes, 
sir.  He  asked  me  how  to  do  it — he  knew  I  was  an  electrical  engineer — and  I 
gave  him  the  benefit  of  my  experience. 

"Q.  Did  you  give  him  the  benefit  of  your  experience  in  firing  dynamite 
shells?— A.  No,  sir. 

t4Q.   You  knew  how  to  do  it? — A.   Yes,  sir. 

"Q.  Did  he  ever  ask  for  your  assistance? — A.  Maceo  intimated  as  much 
to  me  once  or  twice,  but  I  thought  I  was  not  there  to  do  that;  I  was  there  as 
n  neutral,  and  it  was  not  my  business.  They  have  had  a  few  foreigners  come 
there  to  show  them  how  to  blow  up  railroad  trains  and  use  dynamite 
cartridges,  and  they  have  treated  them  badly,  in  such  a  way  as  to  disgust 
them  and  drive  them  away.  A  Frenchman  came  along  and  was  to  show  the 
Cubans  how  to  make  dynamite — and  there  was  also  a  powder  maker.  Two 
bombs  were  prepared,  but  the  Cubans  were  jealous,  as  the  bomb-maker  was 
going  to  get  some  glory,  and  so  only  eighteen  men  were  s^nt  to  help  him. 
The  bombs  were  exploded,  and  when  the  engine  went  off  the  track  they  had  a 


DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS.  165 

couple  of  hand  bombs  which  they  were  to  throw  into  the  train,  but  when  the 
engine  was  derailed  and  the  Spanish  soldiers  poured  out  of  the  cars  the 
Cubans  got  scared  and  ran  away  and  left  the  Frenchman  alone.  He  got 
away  safe,  but  was  disgusted,  and  left  them. " 

Evidently  the    way  Mr.    Rea    talked    was    not    what    the   investigators 
wanted,  but  the  cross-examination  helped  the  story  of  the  witness. 
By  Mr.  Morgan : 

"Q.  How  many  fights  have  you  been  in,  did  you  say? — A.  More  or  less, 
about  80 ;  not  counting  little  shooting  scrapes. 

**Q.    How  many? — A.   About  80,  not  counting  shooting  scrapes. 

"Q.  In  how  many  battles  have  the  Cubans  held  the  ground? — A.  I  have 
only  seen  the  Cubans  advance  twice. 

"Q.  I  only  speak  of  holding  the  ground. — A.  They  may  hold  the  ground 
temporarily — for  one  minute  or  ten  minutes  or  fifteen. 

44Q.  I  mean  after  the  battle  is  over. — A.  They  generally  come  back  after 
the  Spaniards  give  up  the  pursuit. 

"Q.  After  the  pursuit? — A.  Yes,  sir.  I  was  with  Antonio  Maceo  in 
those  fights  around  Tapia,  and  we  had  about  a  dozen  of  them,  hot  and  heavy. 
He  would  wait  until  the  Spaniards  came  up,  and  from  one  hilltop  he  would 
hold  them  back  until  they  grew  too  strong  for  him  and  then  retreat  to  the 
next  hilltop,  going  back  and  back  until  the  Spaniards  would  give  it  up  after  a 
while  and  retire,  getting  tired  of  the  conflict. 

"Q.   When  they  got  tired,  Maceo  would  come  back? — A.   Yes,  sir. 

"Q.  Who  would  win  the  battle? — A.  I  would  call  it  a  draw.  There  is 
one  strange  thing  about  it;  I  rarely  saw  a  Cuban  killed." 

These  distasteful  accounts  of  Cubans  are  like  those  that  came  out  of  the 
conversation  of  the  private  American  soldiers  who  met  both  Spaniards  and 
Cubans  at  Santiago. 

Mr.  Rea  was  asked  why  the  rebels  ought  to  be  in  the  open,  as  he  had  said 
they  were  hiding  themselves  too  much  in  Matanzas  province,  and  he  answered, 
4  *  To  subsist, ' '  for  they  had  to  go  to  the  cultivated  zones  for  vegetables.  Asked 
whether  it  was  not  in  those  zones  where  people  were  starving,  the  witness 
contumaciously  said,  "The  starvation  business  has  been  exaggerated";  and 
he  proceeded  to  tell  how  the  sweet  potato — the  boniato — would  grow  by  itself: 

44Q.  Suppose  the  worst  for  the  Cubans,  can  not  they  plant  boniatos;  and 
when  not  assailed  by  the  Spaniards  can  not  they  live? — A.  Yes,  sir;  they  can, 


1 66  DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS. 

and  to  a  certain  extent  they  do,  but  in  the  province  of  La  Villas  they  have 
shown  a  wasteful  spirit  by  eating  all  they  have  to-day,  and  never  giving  a 
thought  of  to-morrow. 

*'Q.  Maybe  they  want  to  prevent  Weyler  from  getting  it? — A.  The 
Cubans  recognize,  too,  that  they  must  have  enough  to  eat  if  they  want  to  wait 
until  the  United  States  intervenes  and  recognizes  them." 

Senator  Morgan  does  not  seem  to  have  made  much  headway  with  this 
young  man.  The  examination  proceeded: 

"Q.  Pinar  del  Rio — how  did  you  subsist  there  with  6,000  men  [Rea's 
estimate  of  Maceo's  forces]? — A.  I  left  Pinar  del  Rio  last  year,  last  October. 
The  northern  part  of  the  province,  from  Mariel  to  a  point  called  La  Mulata, 
cattle  had  about  disappeared.  There  were  a  few  corralled  in  the  hills  by  the 
Cubans.  Vegetables  had  completely  disappeared,  except  those  planted  around 
the  Spanish  forts.  The  cane  fields  had  been  burnt ;  there  was  not  a  stalk  of 
cane  standing.  It  was  a  devastated  country  in  every  sense  of  the  word.  This 
was  not  done  by  the  Cubans,  but  by  the  Spaniards,  to  take  away  the  fodder 
for  the  Cuban  cavalry,  and  the  fire  spread  in  all  directions ;  to  the  thickets, 
and  palm  groves,  and  everywhere  else.  Antonio  Maceo  sent  every  three 
nights  an  armed  force  of  men  with  the  impedimenta  (two  or  three  hundred 
unarmed  men)  down  near  Cabanas  to  bring  the  boniatos  out,  or,  in  lieu  of 
that,  they  went  to  the  zones  of  cultivation  near  the  large  fortified  sugar 
factories  La  Linza  and  Bramales,  between  Cabanas  and  Bahia  Honda,  where 
there  were  also  a  few  vegetables.  In  through  the  hills,  at  that  time,  Antonio 
Maceo  had  quite  a  large  number  of  vegetables  planted.  He  was  a  very  prac 
tical  man,  who  saw  ahead  more  than  any  of  the  rest,  and  he  took  all  the 
impedimenta,  probably  1,500  men,  and  he  set  them  to  work  planting  sweet 
potatoes,  so  he  must  have  had  quite  a  sufficient  supply  to  last  him  that  cam 
paign  in  the  hills.  Along  the  southern  coast,  or  the  part  of  Pinar  del  Rio 
lying  south  of  the  Cordillera,  there  was  quite  a  supply  of  cattle,  and,  in  fact, 
all  south  of  the  railway  was  grazing  ground,  and  large  cattle  ranches  were 
scattered  throughout  the  country,  but  I  should  not  think  there  was  many 
cattle  left  at  the  present  time,  because  the  policy  of  Weyler,  when  he  found 
that  he  could  not  corner  the  Cubans,  was  to  destroy  their  means  of  subsist 
ence  ;  and  all  cattle  found  in  the  hills  and  on  the  plains  have  been  killed. 

"Q.  About  how  many  troops  had  Weyler? — A.  About  40,000. 

*'Q.   And  Maceo  about  6,000? — A.   Yes,  sir. 


DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS.  [67 

"Q.  It  appears  the  Spaniards,  then,  were  engaged  in  raising  potatoes  to 
feed  Maceo's  command,  principally? — A.  Yes,  sir;  in  this  case. 

"Q.  Whenever  they  got  out  of  potatoes  they  sent  out  and  got  them  from 
under  the  fort? — A.  That  is  right. 

"Q.  If  I  understood  you  correctly,  there  was  never  a  battle-ground  that 
Maceo's  command  did  not  return  to  after  the  battle  was  over? — A.  No,  sir; 
there  were  several  occasions  where  he  came  back,  especially  in  that  country  of 
Pinar  del  Rio,  where  the  hills  are.  In  the  open  country  he  never  came  back. 
I  was  with  Antonio  Maceo  when  he  returned  after  the  first  invasion  of  Pinar 
del  Rio  and  had  so  many  big  fights  in  Havana  province.  There  was  where  I 
joined  him,  and  during  the  month  or  more  I  was  with  him  in  this  section, 
there  was  a  constant  succession  of  fights,  one  after  the  other,  and  we  could  not 
come  back  and  camp  where  we  were  the  day  before.  It  was  simply  one  con 
tinuous  skirmish,  day  after  day,  moving  from  place  to  place." 

One  thing  Mr.  Rea  did  not  approve.  The  insurgents  in  Matanzas  hid 
themselves  in  the  swamps  too  much — ''could  not  establish  prefectos  in  Havana 
or  Matanzas  provinces." 

"Q.  Why? — A.  Because  the  country  is  very  open.  They  have  a  few  in 
the  swamps,  but  in  the  provinces  of  Havana  and  Matanzas  it  is  practically 
impossible  to  hold  a  prefectora. 

"Q.   You  say  it  is  open? — A.   It  is  the  open  country  of  that  island. 

"Q.  Because  the  Spaniards  hold  the  towns? — A.  Because  the  towns  are 
close  together  and  the  Spanish  columns  are  continually  on  the  move,  and 
there  are  no  hills  and  nooks  where  they  can  hide  themselves  in  any  force, 
except  along  the  southern  coast  in  these  swamps,  which  are  terrible  places  to 
live  in.  The  insurgents  cannot  hold  out  in  the  province  of  Matanzas  a  day. 

"Q.  Is  it  not  a  fact  that  they  are  holding  out? — A.  Well,  if  you  want 
to  immerse  yourself  in  the  swamp  and  stay  there  you  are  holding  out,  but 
you  are  not  doing  anything. 

"Q.   But  they  are  still  there?— A.   Yes,  sir. 

k'Q.  The  Spanish  have  not  driven  them  out? — They  have  driven  them 
off  the  open  country  where  they  ought  to  be." 

The  judicial  examiners  stood  up  for  the  patriots  immersed  in  the  swamps, 
and  would  not  consent  that  those  fighting  by  immersion  were  not  conquering 
heroes,  though  in  hiding  until  they  wanted  beef  they  hooked  it  from  the 
Spaniards.  Maceo  was  the  real  great  fighting  man  of  the  rebellion.  Rea 


168  DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS. 

spoke  of  the  concentration  of  the  Cubans — of  their  forcing  the  Spaniards  into 
the  towns  at  first.     Asked  to  explain,  he  said : 

"When  the  invasion  reached  the  provinces  of  Havana  and  Pinar  del  Rio 
(I  was  in  the  island  from  the  time  the  revolution  broke  out),  when  the  Cubans 
reached  these  provinces,  they  found  a  large  majority  of  the  people  living 
there  were  Spanish  storekeepers,  clerks,  etc.,  many  belonging  to  the  volunteer 
corps.  (All  Spaniards  coining  to  Cuba  have  to  belong  to  the  volunteer  corps.) 
If  they  have  not  served  in  Spain,  they  join  the  volunteers  to  free  themselves 
from  the  enforced  military  service  which  all  have  to  suffer  in  Spain.  Also  in 
Pinar  del  Rio  the  large  bulk  of  the  population  are  Canary  Islanders,  not 
Cubans,  and  all  stanch  supporters  of  the  Crown,  and  belong  to  the  volunteer 
corps.  A  large  majority  of  the  tobacco  planters  are  also  Canary  Islanders,  as 
are  also  many  of  the  sugar  planters  in  Havana  and  Matanzas.  The  Cubans 
commenced  their  career  of — well,  they  really  commenced  the  atrocities  them 
selves  then.  The  Spaniards  of  the  volunteer  corps  were  taken  and  hung,  and 
the  trail  of  Bermudez  could  be  followed  by  the  bodies  of  those  who  were  hung 
on  the  trees. 

"Q.  Did  you  ever  see  an  instance  of  that  kind? — A.  Yes,  sir;  two  of 
them — three  of  them. 

"Q.  Where? — A.  The  first  was  on  the  sugar  estate  of  Santa  Teresa,  in 
the  province  of  Havana.  The  second — hold  on,  he  was  not  a  Spaniard,  he  was 
a  Cuban — I  believe,  near  Rio  Bayamos,  also  in  the  province  of  Havana.  In 
the  province  of  Pinar  del  Rio,  while  I  did  not  see  them,  I  know  of  the  case 
where  Bermudez  hung  21 — everybody  spoke  of  it — 21  to  one  tree,  of  these 
Spanish  volunteers. 

"Q.  Who  was  Bermudez? — A.  Bermudez  led  the  vanguard  of  Maceo's 
army  during  the  invasion.  Bermudez  was  a  bandit  before  the  war,  and  is 
called,  among  the  people  who  lived  in  the  fields,  the  Weyler  of  the  Cubans. 

"Q.  What  has  become  of  him? — A.  He  is  still  there,  if  he  did  not  die  of 
his  wound,  received  just  before  Maceo  crossed  the  trocha.  I  do  not  mean  to 
say  that  this  was  approved  by  Maceo,  for  when  Maceo  found  that  so  many 
people  had  been  killed,  he  deprived  Bermudez  of  his  command. 

"Q.  It  was  done  by  a  bandit? — A.  An  ex-bandit;  but  he  was  a  colonel  in 
the  Cuban  army. 

"Q.   He  was  deprived  of  his  command  by  Maceo? — A.   Yes,  sir. 

"Q.   Because  of  these  outrages? — A.   Yes,  sir.     Antonio  Maceo  and  all  the 


DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS.  169 

rest  of  these  Cuban  chiefs,  when  they  got  this  invasion  finished,  or  had 
carried  their  revolution  to  the  far  western  part  of  the  province,  started  to 
organize  their  various  zones  and  appointed  local  chiefs.  One  of  the  first  steps 
of  these  local  chiefs  was  to  eliminate  from  the  country  people  all  those  who 
had  Spanish  tendencies.  All  who  lived  in  the  country  who  were  in  any  way 
suspected  of  Spanish  sympathy  and  all  who  belonged  to  the  volunteer  corps, 
were  ordered  to  the  towns  and  their  houses  were  burned  over  their  heads. 
That  started  the  concentration  business.  When  Weyler  began  his  concentra 
tion,  there  was  not  a  man  living  in  the  open  fields  who  was  not  at  least 
morally,  if  not  openly,  a  Cuban  insurgent.  A  man  to  live  in  the  fields  has  to 
work  for  the  Cuban  government,  and  plant  vegetables  for  them,  and  he  is, 
technically,  an  insurgent,  living  under  the  laws  of  the  Cuban  prefecto,  and  he 
has  to  acknowledge  their  authority  or  go  to  the  town.  They  give  no  choice. 

"Q.  They  do  not  kill  him,  but  send  him  to  town? — A.  They  do  not  kill 
them.  They,  have  hung  several  for  various  little  offenses. 

"Q.  What  kind  of  offenses? — A.  One  fellow  in  the  province  of  Havana,  a 
Cuban  colonel — Col.  Raul  Arango — invited  me  once  to  a  double  hanging. 
One  man  he  had  ordered  to  town,  and  had  been  seen  outside  afterwards,  and 
he  was  going  to  catch  him  and  hang  him — 

"Q.  Treat  him  as  a  spy? — A.  I  suppose  so.  The  other  man  was  to  be 
hung  because  he  had  taken  cattle  into  town  without  permission. 

"Q.  Treated  him  as  a  spy  also? — A.  The  cattle  were  his  own.  If  they 
catch  any  one  who  is  giving  help  to  the  Spaniards  they  string  him  up. 

"Q.  The  Cubans  treat  those  who  are  not  with  them  as  the  enemies  of  the 
Republic? — A.  Yes,  sir.  It  was  only  recently,  in  the  province  of  Villa  Clara, 
that  I  called  Gomez's  attention  to  it,  and  asked  him  what  he  meant,  and  if  it 
was  his  policy.  Around  the  small  town  of  Fomento  the  Spaniards  had  not 
operated  for  a  long  time.  It  was  about  the  beginning  of  Weyler 's  campaign, 
in  the  month  of  January  or  February.  There  were  probably  100  families,  or 
800  individuals,  living  within  a  radius  of,  say,  3  leagues  of  this  town — all  little 
farmers,  most  of  them  Cubans  and  insurgent  sympathizers  working  for  the 
cause.  Many  were  families  of  the  insurgents  where  the  men  were  out  fight 
ing.  To  show  that  Gomez  is  bound  to  force  this  concentration  business  him 
self,  these  people  were  ordered  several  times  to  vacate  their  homes  and  either 
go  to  the  towns  or  to  the  hills.  They  did  not  obey.  I  believe  the  order  was 
given  twice,  and  still  they  did  not  notice  it.  Major  Herrera — a  Cuban  major 


i  yo  DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS. 

— was  given  orders  by  Brigadier  Bravo,  of  Trinidad,  to  burn  the  houses  of 
everyone  and  thus  force  them  to  move.  The  orders  were  carried  out,  and  the 
houses  of  these  people  were  looted  and  burned,  and  their  money  and  valuables 
taken  away  by  their  own  countrymen.  These  people  left  destitute,  and  a 
great  many,  enraged  at  the  treatment  they  received,  went  to  the  town  and 
joined  the  local  guerrillas.  I  reported  it  to  Gomez,  and  asked  if  that  was  his 
policy,  as  he  was  always  decrying  the  Spaniards  for  employing  these  methods. 
He  said:  'Those  people  would  not  get  out  of  there,  and  I  did  it  as  a  humane 
measure.  The  humanity  consists  in  forcing  them  to  go  away,  because  if  they 
stay  there  the  Spaniards  will  come  along  and  kill  them.'  The  idea  is  to  get 
the  people  out  of  the  country.  It  is  just  as  much  to  Gomez's  ends  as  to  those 
of  the  Spaniards  not  to  have  too  many  people  around.  It  is  only  because  he 
is  at  present  in  a  country  where  there  are  no  people,  or  where  there  are  no 
pacificos  living,  that  he  is  able  to  elude  the  vigilance  of  the  Spaniards.  This 
•policy  was  not  started  recently,  but  long  ago,  and  Weyler  has  taken  the  same 
precaution  as  Gomez  had  done  previously. 

**Q.  Around  what  town  was  this? — A.   Fomento. 

"Q.  After  they  had  their  houses  burnt,  they  joined  the  guerrillas? — A.  A 
great  many,  as  they  were  enraged  at  the  treatment  they  received  at  the  hands 
of  those  they  thought  their  friends. 

*'Q.  Do  you  know — you  have  had  good  opportunity  for  observing — have 
you  known  any  case  where  Gomez  or  Maceo,  or  any  other  Cuban  general,  has 
caused  prisoners  captured  either  in  battle  or  out  of  battle  to  be  shot? —  A.  I 
once  had  occasion  to  write  about  the  conduct  of  Lieut.  Col.  Frederico  Nunez, 
in  the  province  of  Pinar  del  Rio.  He  captured  five  Spanish  soldiers  on  the 
estate  Susi,  near  Cayajabos,  and  strung  them  up. 

"Q.  Did  Maceo  know  of  that? — A.  No;  he  was  very  indignant  about  it 
when  he  heard  of  it. 

"Q.   What  did  he  do  about  it? — A.   Reprimanded  him,  I  guess. 

"Q.  What  was  the  excuse  for  doing  it? — A.  I  forget  the  excuse.  There 
was  quite  a  little  talk  about  it.  He  had  some  trouble  with  General  Arolas  at 
the  time,  and  there  was  something  behind  it;  I  could  not  explain. 

"Q.  Did  he  do  it  as  an  act  of  retaliation  upon  some  Spanish  general? 
—A.  No. 

"Q.   Because  they  were  spies? — A.   No. 

"Q.   Well? — A.    He  might  have   done  it  because  they  were   spies.      He 


DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS.  171 

captured  them  near  the  trocha,  as  Cayajabos  was  the  first  town  outside  the 
trocha. 

<4Q.  How  did  Maceo  know  about  them? — A.  Nunez  made  the  report  himself. 

*'Q.  Made  the  report  that  he  captured  them  and  hung  them? — A.  Yes, 
sir.  You  asked  me  did  I  know  anything.  I  have  a  copy  of  an  official  docu 
ment  of  one  of  these  executions,  committed  by  a  Cuban  sub-chief  without  the 
knowledge  of  his  superiors.  Here  is  a  letter  from  Juan  Ducasse,  commanding 
the  southern  brigade  of  the  province  of  Pinar  del  Rio. 

"Q.  No,  sir. — A.  kl  have  notice  that  you  have  verified  some  executions 
in  the  district  under  my  command  without  my  previous  knowledge 

"Q.  Who  was  that  from? — A.  Ducasse  to  his  subordinate.  'I  direct  this 
present  letter  to  you  so  that  in  the  future  you  will  abstain  from  doing  this 
without  filling  all  the  legal  requirements  that  are  necessary  in  such  cases. 
Please  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  the  present  letter. '  This  was,  as  I  say, 
sent  by  Ducasse  to  one  of  his  subalterns  (Maj.  Thomas  Murgado)  who  had 
caused  a  couple  of  pacificos  to  be  executed. 

"Q.  In  every  case  the  act,  when  it  came  to  the  knowledge  of  the  com 
mander,  was  disapproved  and  rebuked — the  man  sometimes  deprived  of  his 
rank? — A.  Yes,  sir.  In  another  case  I  had  the  confession  of  a  man  who  did  it. 
Dr.  Rojas  Sanchez  was  a  commander  in  Zayas's  force.  He  boasted  of  having 
been  given  eight  prisoners  to  deliver  to  the  Spanish  authorities,  and  openly 
bragged  that  only  four  got  there. 

"Q.  Did  he  say  he  reported  that  fact  to  his  commanding  officer? — A. 
No,  sir. 

"Q.  He  kept  that  concealed? — A.  Yes,  sir;  to  show  that  Zayas  was  acting 
in  good  faith,  when  he  made  a  big  raid  into  the  town  of  Esperanza,  near  Santa 
Clara  city,  this  same  major  openly  boasted  that  he  refused  to  go  into  the  town 
unless  given  permission  to  use  his  machete  on  all  pacificos,  and  Zayas  would 
not  allow  him  to  go  in,  but  ordered  him  to  stay  outside  the  town.  A  story 
comes  to  my  mind 

"Q.  A  story  I  don't  care  about. — A.  It  is  not  a  story;  it  was  told  to  me 
by  two  soldiers 

"Q.   I  don't  care  about  putting  in  this  record  the  stories 

"A.   I  am  perfectly  convinced  of  it." 

It  was  a  great  point  that  the  investigating  senators  did  not  care  about 
stories. 


1 72  DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS. 

"Q.  How  do  you  know. any  orders  were  given  by  any  Cuban  officer  to 
loot  and  burn,  to  machete  the  men,  but  respect  the  women?  Do  you  know 
that  order  was  ever  given? — A.  I  have  heard  it  at  La  Palma.  I  have  been  at 
attacks  on  towns,  and  I  have  heard  the  order  to  loot  and  burn  the  town,  but 
to  respect  women  and  children.  The  reason  Maceo  suffered  such  a  defeat  at 
Palma  was  because  he  put  in  all  his  unarmed  men  to  assist  in  looting,  they 
were  so  anxious  to  get  clothing.  His  men  were  nearly  naked. 

4'Q.  You  went  as  an  electrical  engineer  when  you  first  went  to  Cuba?— 
A.  Yes,  sir. 

"Q.  How  long  did  you  work  at  that? — A.  Until  the  year  after  the  war 
began. 

"Q.  Establishing  telegraph  lines? — A.  No,  sir;  putting  up  electric  light 
plants." 

There  was  much  anxiety  about  Mr.    Rea's  occupation,  but  his  answers 
were  clear  and  to  the   point,  and  the   more   he   was  examined,  the  greater 
amount  of  truth,  as  in  this  case : 
By  Mr.  Davis: 

"Q.  Do  you  not  understand  that  those  concentrados  are  mostly  women 
and  children  and  old  men? — A.  I  do  not  understand  that  at  all. 

"Q.  Have  you  ever  witnessed  one  of  those  places?— A.  I  saw  just  as  many 
young  men  as  there  were  old  men. 

"Q.   When? — A.  Just  before  I  came  home — a  few  months  ago. 

"Q.  Men  that  have  come  in  from  the  country — Cubans? — A.  I  saw  just 
as  many  young  men  as  old  men.  The  Cuban  who  has  his  country  at  heart 
—who  was  a  patriot — went  out  during  the  first  year.  Those  who  have  joined 
during  the  last  year  have  been  forced  out  by  various  circumstances — by  lack 
of  food,  by  persecutions  of  the  Spaniards,  etc.  All  the  Cubans  who  had 
money  when  this  war  broke  out  came  to  the  United  States,  and  are  carrying- 
on  the  war  from  here.  Leaving  out  those  who  rose  up  against  Spain  during 
the  first  year  of  the  outbreak,  the  men  carrying  on  this  war  in  the  island  are 
those  who  could  not  help  themselves  or  had  no  money  to  get  away.  This 
insurrection  was  going  on  for  a  year  in  the  provinces  of  Camaguey  and  Santa 
Clara,  and  those  in  the  west  did  not  have  the  nerve  to  take  up  arms. 

"Q.   Did  you  ever  have  any  difficulty  with  Gomez? — A.  Yes,  sir. 

"Q.  What  was  it? — A.  It  is  quite  a  long  story.  General  Gomez  and  I 
were  very  good  friends  until — I  do  not  say  he  is  a  bad  friend  of  mine  now,  but 


DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS.  173 

he  treated  me  very  badly.  He  did  not  treat  me  as  he  had  others.  He 
treated  Scovil  much  better.  He  offered  him  twenty  men  to  help  him  get 
through,  and  did  not  offer  me  any.  • 

"Q.  What  do  you  mean  by  impartial  manner? — A.  He  showed  partiality 
to  the  others. 

"O.  In  what  month  or  in  what  year  did  this  partiality  begin? — A.  When 
I  first  met  the  old  man. 

"Q.  What  other  correspondents  were  in  the  camp? — A.  Sylvester  Scovil, 
correspondent  of  the  World. 

"Q.    He  treated  him  better  than  you?— A.   Yes,  sir. 

"Q.   That  continued  until  you  ceased  all  relations  with  him? — A.   Yes,  sir. 

"Q.  Now  you  can  go  on  and  make  any  statement  you  want  to. — A.  I  had 
been  away  from  him  to  Trinidad.  I  saw  things  that  astonished  me — that 
ought  not  to  have  taken  place  in  the  Cuban  government.  I  saw  many  things 
that  would  work  against  them  if  printed  and  prove  detrimental  to  their  char 
acter.  Among  other  things  Smith  and  I  witnessed — not  exactly  witnessed, 
but  we  were  within  half  a  mile  of  the  town  of  Paredes.  At  i  o'clock  at  night 
the  Cubans,  attacked  the  town.  There  were  16  Spanish  soldiers  in  the  garri 
son — in  one  fort  5,  in  another  9,  in  another  2.  They  attacked  the  town  and 
captured  two  forts,  and  there  were  but  5  Spaniards  to  deal  with,  when  some 
one  raised  the  cry,  'Here  comes  the  Spaniards,'  and  they  ran  out  of  the  town, 
leaving  their  dead  and  wounded.  The  Cuban  commander  made  a  report  to 
Gomez,  saying  he  had  gained  a  big  victory,  while  exactly  the  opposite  was  the 
case.  He  left  his  dead  and  wounded  in  the  streets  and  ran  away.  Also, 
Smith  and  I  had  experience  with  the  'majas'  or  unarmed  men,  who  live  in  the 
hills  and  steal  the  food  from  the  pacificos  and  respect  no  one's  authority.  We 
also  had  seen  several  cases  on  the  part  of  the  government  prefectos,  who 
would  not  attend  to  their  business.  When  I  got  to  Gomez's  camp,  the  old 
man  asked  me,  very  honestly,  'How  about  your  trip?'  I  said,  'I  have  not 
enjoyed  it  very  much;'  and  I  went  on  to  explain  what  I  had  seen.  I  told  the 
old  man,  for  his  benefit,  what  I  had  seen,  and  Smith  did  also,  and  the  old  man 
was  quite  interested  until  finally  he  got  mad  and  walked  away ;  and  I  talked 
some  with  the  other  officers  and  made  some  criticisms  on  what  had  passed  and 
that  they  did  not  know  anything  about.  Gomez  came  to  me  after  supper 
when  I  was  passing  through  the  camp,  and  said,  'What  do  you  mean,  Mr. 
Rea,  by  telling  me  all  these  things  that  you  saw  on  that  trip?'  In  the  after- 


i74  DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS. 

noon  before  that  he  came  to  me  and  said,  'You  have  told  me  these 
things,  I  suppose,  because  you  sympathize  with  me  and  want  them  cor 
rected.'  Afterwards  he  called  to  me  and  asked  what  I  meant  by  it,  and  I 
told  him  again  what  I  had  said  before.  He  said  it  was  not  true,  and  I  told  him 
it  was  not  my  habit  to  lie. 

"Q.  Was  Smith  in  the  camp? — A.  Yes,  sir. 

"Q.  Did  you  call  on  him  to  corroborate  you? — A.  No,  sir;  Smith  is 
afraid  of  the  old  man.  Gomez  said,  'What  did  you  mean  by  saying  my 
brigadier  made  a  false  report?'  and  I  said  that  he  did  make  a  false  report  if 
he  had  said  that  he  won  a  victory,  after  he  had  run  away  and  left  his  dead 
and  wounded.  He  said,  'What  do  you  think  of  it,  and  what  are  you  going  to 
write  about  it?'  I  said,  'I  am  to  write  the  truth,'  and  he  said  that  I  had  no 
business  to  write  the  truth. 

"Q.  Did  he  make  any  point  that  you  had  made  the  same  statements  that 
you  made  to  him  to  the  various  men  in  his  command? — A.  No,  sir;  the  various 
men  in  his  command  have  made  these  statements  to  him.  He  got  very  mad 
about  it,  and  said  that  if  I  wrote  these  stories  he  would  shoot  me.  I  looked  at 
him  in  surprise.  I  thought  perhaps  the  old  man  might  take  it  into  his  head  to 
do  it  then.  I  said  that  it  was  a  pretty  serious  thing  to  shoot  a  man,  especially 
an  American,  and  he  answered  that  as  the  United  States  or  nobody  else  had 
recognized  him  as  a  belligerent,  and  his  status  was  that  of  a  bandit,  he  would 
shoot  me,  and  that  he  could  not  be  held  responsible.  After  awhile  he  calmed 
down,  and  we  parted  very  comfortably.  In  the  morning  Gomez,  in  the  front 
of  all  his  forces,  started  again  on  the  American  Congress,  the  New  York 
Herald,  the  American  public,  Grover  Cleveland,  and  everybody  else,  and  I 
told  him  I  could  not  stand  it  any  longer.  He  said  all  we  cared  about  it 
was  what  we  could  get  out  of  it  or  the  money  we  might  make. 

"Q.  What  did  you  say  about  that? — A.  I  said  he  was  way  off — that  is  not 
exactly  what  I  said. 

"Q.  Give  us  exactly. — A.  I  said.  'General  Gomez,  you  are  very  unjust. 
You  very  well  know  that  if  the  United  States  should  set  its  foot  down,  and  cut 
off  your  chance  of  getting  arms  and  ammunition,  your  revolution  could  not 
last.' 

"Q.  Was  that  between  you  and  Gomez  alone? — A.  No,  sir;  the  whole 
army  was  there — that  is,  the  whole  of  the  army  he  had,  150  men  and  staff. 

"Q.   They  heard  it  all? — A.   Yes,  sir.     After  it  was  all  over  they  came  to 


DUTY    OF    FAIR    PLAY    TO    THE    SPANIARDS.  175 

me  and  tried  to  smooth  it  over.  I  said  they  could  not  smooth  it  over  until 
the  old  man  apologized.  Smith  was  there,  and  was  very  mad.  He  went  up 
to  Gomez  and  told  him  that  he  must  stop  abusing  Americans  or  he  would 
resign. 

4'Q.  Did  he  give  a  reason  for  this? — A.  Because  he  had  insulted  the 
nation  and  Americans. 

"Q.  Smith  did  not  show  he  was  very  much  afraid  of  the  old  man,  then? 
— A.  No,  sir. 

"Q.   He  didn't  like  it?— A.   Yes,  sir. 

"Q.  Did  you  leave  Gomez  after  this  incident? — A.  About  an  hour  after 
wards. 

"Q.   Did  you  leave  his  camp  then? — A.   About  an  hour  afterwards. 

"Q.  Did  you  report  these  facts  to  your  paper? — A.  To  the  paper,  yes, 
sir;  I  did  not  publish  them.  I  did  not  know  whether  I  was  right  in  publish 
ing  them  or  not.  The  old  man  made  these  remarks  to  me,  and  raised  the 
dickens  for  no  cause  whatever.  He  was  quite  put  out  because,  I  suppose,  the 
old  fellow  thought  we  ought  to  have  been  arrested  and  put  in  prison  by  the 
Spanish  government,  so  as  to  raise  an  issue  between  that  government  and  our 
own. 

"Q.  Did  you  say  anything  about  the  partiality  he  had  shown  to  other  cor 
respondents? — A.  No,  sir;  I  never  said  a  word  about  it.  He  was  comparing 
me  with  the  other  correspondents.  He  said  that  it  would*  be  a  very  good 
thing  if  Scovil  or  I  were  arrested,  and  then  the  United  States  government 
would  get  into  trouble  with  Spain  in  regard  to  it,  and  he  made  the  same 
remark  that  morning,  and  he  made  a  comparison  between  Scovil  and  myself, 
and  I  said:  'General,  the  day  I  get  arrested  by  the  Spaniards,  I  don't  think  it 
will  cause  a  war  that  will  redound  to  your  benefit. ' 

"Having  read  and  corrected  the  above  statement,  I  hereby  sign  me 
same.  GEO.  BRONSON  REA, 

"355  Sixth  Avenue,  Brooklyn,  N.  Y." 


CHAPTER   VI. 

The  Two  Sorts  of  Spaniards  in  Cuba. 

The  Food  Supplies  in  Cuba — Introduction  of  the  Torch  by  the  Insurgents — Garcia's  Fine 
Army  with  an  Engineer  Corps — The  Double  Tax  on  Sugar  Making— Spanish  Methods 
of  Making  War — The  Policy  of  Annihilation — A  Government  in  Light  Marching  Order. 

The  importance  of  Mr.  Rea's  testimony  is  in  the  fact  that  it  has  been 
substantially  confirmed  by  the  revelations  made  in  the  American  conquest  of 
Cuba.  The  insurgents  have  been  found  generally  as  Mr.  Rea  represented, 
with  the  exception,  perhaps,  that  he  was  occasionally  excited  by  his  sense  of 
humor,  and  as  the  cue  of  the  Commission  was  to  deal  with  the  Cubans  as 
saints  and  martyrs,  this  exuberance  was  discouraged.  However,  the  efful- 
gency  of  Mr.  Smith  may  be  accepted  as  compensation.  The  Spaniards  and 
the  Cubans  made  war  upon  the  same  general  principles,  with  the  exception  of 
the  treatment  of  prisoners  and  wounded.  The  cruelty  of  the  Spaniards  in 
dealing  with  thqse  combatants  was  systematic  and  rarely  allowed  an  instance 
of  mercy.  The  Cubans  as  a  rule  did  not  torture  helpless  enemies,  and  they 
seldom  "chopped  up"  prisoners,  but  the  humane  purposes  of  the  leaders  were 
often  evaded.  It  was  plain  policy  on  the  part  of  the  Cubans  to  deal  tenderly 
with  the  disabled  and  spare  those  who  had  surrendered,  for  they  hoped  to 
have  their  hospitals  respected.  Dr.  Diaz  states  as  within  his  personal  knowl 
edge  that  Martinez  Campos  favored  the  ministrations  of  the  Red  Cross,  but 
Weyler  held  charitable  attention  was  due  Spaniards  only.  Cubans,  however, 
used  the  torch  without  hesitation,  and  at  last  were  mad  with  the  illusion  that 
when  property  was  destroyed  the  Spaniards  were  the  exclusive  sufferers.  The 
Cuban  zeal  for  everlasting  war  faded  perceptibly  during  the  last  year  of  the 
struggle.  Mr.  Rea  estimated  that  when  Maceo's  western  army  gradually 
disappeared  after  the  fall  of  their  one  magnetic  leader,  there  were  not  more 
than  twenty  thousand  Cubans  in  the  army,  while  the  whole  force  of  the  Span 
iards  was  not  less  than  135,000  men.  Mr.  Rea  was  asked  the  question: 

176 


THE    TWO    SORTS    OF    SPANIARDS    IN    CUBA.  177 

"Q.  Have  you  any  way  of  accounting  for  the  fact  that  the  Cubans — 
according-  to  your  estimate  being  only  25,000  strong — have  been  able  to  pre 
vent  the  135,000  Spaniards  from  running  over  and  destroying  them? — A.  You 
cannot  lick  a  man  if  he  will  not  let  you,  or  if  he  runs  away  from  you  all  the 
time. 

"O.  Cuba  is  bounded  by  the  sea  on  every  side,  and  is  patrolled  by  the 
navy  of  Spain? — A.  There  are  a  great  many  hills  and  woods,  etc.  A  body  of 
1,000  men  does  not  take  up  much  space.  That  is  the  reason  Gomez  has  divided 
his  men  into  bodies  of  about  150  men,  so  he  can  get  into  the  woods. 

"Q.  If  his  force  does  not  shrink  considerably,  how  long  can  he  protract 
this  struggle?— A.  As  long  as  he  has  anything  to  eat. 

"Q.  What  are  his  resources  for  feeding  his  forces? — A.  When  I  left  the 
province  of  La  Villas,  two  months  ago,  the  eastern  part,  where  Gomez  is,  had 
quite  a  large  number  of  cattle,  owing  to  the  reason  that  it  is  a  grazing  coun 
try,  quite  the  reverse  to  the  western  provinces,  which  are  devoted  to  the 
culture  of  cane  and  tobacco.  The  eastern  provinces  of  La  Villas  and  Cam- 
aguey  are  devoted  to  cattle  and  grazing,  the  eastern  part  of  La  Villas  espe 
cially.  While  he  had  plenty  of  cattle  to  last  him,  economically,  for  about  a 
year,  he  had  no  potatoes,  no  vegetables,  of  any  account." 

In  Matanzas  there  were  practically  no  insurgents.  The  few  existing  took 
refuge  in  the  swamps,  and  subsisted  chiefly  on  a  species  of  jutia  or  racoon 
and  crocodile  steaks — no  vegetables  and  no  cattle,  except  as  they  could  forage 
on  the  Spaniards.  There  were  wild  dispatches,  however,  day  by  day,  about 
the  wonderful  war  going  on  in  Matanzas. 

The  most  unreserved  of  the  admirers  of  General  Gomez  is  Capt.  W.  D. 
Smith,  who  was  also  an  admirer  of  Garcia,  and  gave  in  his  s\vorn  testimony 
the  account  of  the  army  of  the  "Oriente"  : 

"Garcia  has  the  finest  equipped  army  on  the  island.  His  chief  of  staff  is 
General  Menocal,  a  very  good  engineer,  who  speaks  very  good  English.  He 
lias  organized  an  engineer  corps;  he  has  got  a  signal  corps;  he  has  got  his 
cavalry  and  his  artillery,  and  his  engineer  corps  is  pretty  fine,  too.  It  is  right 
up  to  date.  Any  one  who  ever  told  me  before  I  went  do\vn  there  that  the 
Cubans  had  a  good  engineer  corps  I  would  have  laughed  at  him,  but  it  is 
true." 

The  insurgent  troops  that  came  out  of  the  woods  at  Santiago  were  there 
fore  the  very  flower  of  the  Cuban  army.  Smith  bestowed  upon  the  Cubans, 


1 78  THE    TWO    SORTS    OF    SPANIARDS    IN    CUBA. 

finding  what  was  wanted,  more  than  60,000  men,  saying,  ''They  can  put  in 
the  field  a  little  over  60,000  men."  As  for  Gomez  personally: 

"General  Gomez  called  me  the  morning  I  left  there,  and  said:  'I  want  to 
speak  to  you.  There  have  been  false  reports,  and  some  may  say  to  you  that  I 
have  been  sick.'  Gomez  is  a  man  over  70  years  old.  He  put  his  hand  on  the 
pommel  of  his  saddle  and  vaulted  right  over,  and  put  his  other  hand  on  and 
vaulted  right  back  again.  He  said  to  me,  'You  do  that,'  and  I  told  him  that 
I  had  business  elsewhere.  'A  sick  man  cannot  do  that,'  he  said." 

The  way  Gomez  harassed  the  Spaniards  is  thus,  according  to  Captain 
Smith : 

"Just  the  moment  Gomez  gets  news  that  a  column  has  left  Sancti 
Spiritus  or  any  other  fort  he  marches  toward  that  column  and  they  meet.  I 
have  never  known  Gomez  to  lie  idle  when  there  was  a  Spanish  column  out; 
when  they  meet  there  is  a  fight  right  off.  At  night  the  Spaniards  halt,  and 
Gomez  retires  a  mile  or  so.  The  Spaniards  dare  not  put  out  a  picket  at  night ; 
their  only  guard  is  in  their  camps.  Just  as  quick  as  dark  comes,  Gomez 
details  an  officer  with  15  or  20  men  to  keep  that  camp  awake,  firing  into  them 
all  night,  and  then  at  daybreak  Gomez  attacks  the  camp,  and  so  on,  and  they 
are  fighting  all  day  and  night,  and  so  on.  Whenever  they  go  into  camp  there 
are  15  or  20  men  more  keeping  them  awake  all  night,  and  the  result  is  that 
the  Spanish  troops  are  exhausted,  and  obliged  to  return  to  the  town  for 
rations  or  from  fatigue. 

"O.  The  Spanish  commanders  are  obliged  to  go  back  for  provisions? — A. 
Yes,  sir. 

"Q.  Is  the  island  of  Cuba,  in  the  places  which  were  not  cultivated,  heavily 
timbered? — A.  Yes,  sir. 

"Q.  Forests  dense? — A.  Yes,  sir;  some  of  the  finest  forests  the  eye  ever 
saw;  thousands  upon  thousands  of  acres  of  the  finest  mahogany,  stretching  as 
far  as  the  eye  can  see." 

Mr.  Stephen  Bonsai,  journalist,  described  the  policy  of  the  concentration 
of  the  peasantry.  The  orders  were  issued  October,  1896,  and,  "Every  peasant 
and  every  person  living  in  the  four  western  provinces  outside  the  garrison 
towns  were  driven  into  stations  of  concentration,  their  houses  were  all  burnt, 
their  crops  and  the  palm  trees  destroyed,  all  the  roots  that  grew — yams,  etc. 
— were  dug  up,  with  the  idea,  many  of  the  officers  told  me,  to  rob  insurgent 
bands  in  these  so-called  'pacified'  provinces  of  the  means  of  subsistence." 


THE    TWO    SORTS    OF    SPANIARDS    IN    CUBA.  181 

In  the  four  western  provinces  there  were  twenty  sugar  estates  protected, 
by  regular  and  irregular  Spanish  troops,  paid  by  the  sugar  men.  Where 
there  were  twenty  sugar  estates,  there  had  been  200,  and:  "You  go  along 
through  the  western  provinces  and  you  can  see  the  standing  chimneys" — all 
the  great  machinery  burned !  There  is  a  close  relationship  that  should  be  in 
mind  between  the  sugar  estate  burning  and  the  concentration  abomination. 
No  matter  how  much  the  Spaniards  were  paid  to  protect  the  sugar  estates, 
they  were  burned  unless  the  rebels  were  paid  also.  That  is,  there  had  to  be 
"two  taxes  paid  to  the  two  governments."  Mr.  Bonsai  says  sometimes  a 
man  who  paid  a  thousand  soldiers  would  refuse  to  pay  the  Gomez  tax,  and 
"the  crop  was  always  burned."  This  happened  to  an  American  named 
Stillman.  "He  was  somewhat  sluggish  and  his  crop  was  burned."  This  was 
the  bottom  of  the  policy  of  the  insurgent  commander  in  chief.  He  would 
allow  the  Spanish  to  make  sugar  if  the  cause  of  liberty  got  a  share  of  the 
blackmail  that  was  impartial  as  it  was  infamous. 

Mr.  Bonsai  was  asked  whether  the  payment  of  sugar  protection  was  an 
open  bargain,  and  he  said: 

"It  was  a  bargain.  It  was  arranged  at  the  palace  in  Havana,  and  they 
had  to  pa}r  extra  there.  It  was  a  written  contract.  They  had  to  pay  extra  to 
keep  the  comandante  sweet.  It  cost  them  a  pretty  penny  to  have  this  garri 
son.  Every  man  l)ad  to — the  way  they  did  this,  they  would  have  these  places 
declared  strategic  points.  That  was  the  way  the  Spaniards  would  excuse  the 
fact  that  the)'  were  having  large  bodies  of  troops  in  places  where  they  were 
absolutely  of  no  use.  So  Mr.  Atkins  or  the  sugar  planters  would  go  to 
Havana  and  have  breakfast  with  the  Marquis  Palmerola,  and  have  a  talk, 
and  have  their  places  declared  a  strategic  point,  and  the  Captain  General 
would  order  a  certain  number  of  troops  there  until  further  orders,  with  the 
understanding  that  the  proprietor  would  pay  so  much  bounty.  I  visited  one 
estate  where  there  were  a  thousand  men. 
By  Mr.  Davis: 

"Q.  What  estate? — A.  Azpeztequia,  on  the*  southern  coast,  belonging  to 
the  Marquis,  now  in  Madrid,  and  who  belongs  to  the  constitutional  or  tory 
party  in  Cuba.  It  had  eighty  forts  defending  it. 

"Q.  Eighty  forts? — A.  Fortines.  They  look  like  forts  in  Sebastopol,  a 
game  we  used  to  play  when  I  was  a  boy 

"By  Mr.  Morgan: 


182  THE    TWO    SORTS    OF    SPANIARDS    IN    'CUBA. 

"Q.  Did  you  learn  whether  this  destruction  of  sugar  plantations  was  the 
work  of  one  side  exclusively  or  both? — A.  I  think  it  was  both  sides.  It  is  a 
rather  difficult  question,  because  they  have  each  changed  their  policy.  The 
Spanish  idea  the  first  year  of  the  war,  the  last  campaign,  as  announced  over 
his  own  signature  by  Mr.  Dupuy  de  Lome,  was  to  make  the  sugar  crop. 
That  was  to  show  that  the  revolution  was  merely  local  and  of  little  impor 
tance.  This  letter  was  published  in  the  New  York  Herald,  being  the  ideas  of 
the  representative  of  the  Spanish  government  in  the  United  States,  and  at 
that  time  they  took  steps  to  protect  the  sugar  estates  to  the  best  of  their  abil 
ity.  Azpeztequia  was  the  first  man  to  fortify  his  estate.  As  soon  as  they 
found  out,  as  they  did  a  year  and  a  half  ago,  while  the  first  sugar  crop  was 
making,  that  even  the  most  loyal  Spaniard,  being  a  business  man,  was  per 
fectly  willing  to  pay  50  cents  a  bag  for  the  sugar  he  made  to  the  insurgents,  or 
to  the  Cuban  prefecto — when  they  found  out  that  the  people  they  were  pro 
tecting  were  paying  taxes  into  the  patriot  treasury  they  concluded  it  would 
be  a  good  thing  to  destroy  all  the  sugar. 

"By  Mr.  Davis: 

"Q.  By  'them'  you  mean  the  Spanish? — A.  Yes,  sir.  This  year  they 
have  done  nothing  for  the  sugar  people,  because  they  knew  all  the  sugar 
people,  whether  American,  French,  German,  or  the  most  loyal  Spaniard, 
were  paying  tribute  on  their  prospective  crop  to  the  insurgent  local  repre 
sentatives.  It  is  so  easy  to  burn  cane.  One  man  can  burn  cane,  and  4,000 
can  not  stop  it.  So  the  policy  of  the  Spanish  government  in  Cuba  on  the 
sugar  question  changed  entirely.  Last  year  it  was  to  make  the  crop;  this  year 
they  think  to  hurt  the  Cubans  more  by  destroying  it." 

It  should  be  carefully  observed  that  the  cane  conflagrations  became  s=o 
fashionable  that  the  Spaniards  participated  like  the  others,  but  few  people 
have  reflected  that  in  this  war  with  the  torch,  the  incendiary  San  Domingo 
method  of  destroying  all  that  fire  would  burn,  the  worst  of  the  atrocities  of 
the  war  had  their  origin — and  Weyler  and  Gomez  will  be  held  participants  in 
the  crime  as  far  as  history  enlightens  men.  Mr.  Bonsai  said  in  his  evidence 
about  the  perishing  people  crowded  around  the  Spanish  garrisons — a  horrible 
example  being  at  Matanzas: 

"Judge  Day  asked  me  two  or  three  days  ago,  I  do  not  suppose  confi 
dentially,  what  would  happen  if  the  Spanish  government  should  change  its 
policy  and  drive  these  people  back  to  the  places  whence  they  came.  I  said 


THE    TWO    SORTS    OF    SPANIARDS    IN    CUBA.  183 

that  many  would  die  on  the  way;  that  many  more  would  die  of  starvation  after 
they  arrived. 

"Q.   And  very  few  would  survive? — A.  Yes,  sir. 

"Q.  So  it  is  death  to  stay,  and  death  to  go  back  to  their  homes?— 
A.  Yes,  sir." 

It  does  not  occur  to  everybody,  as  it  certainly  should,  that  this  horrible 
system  of  warfare  never  was  known  in  Cuba  until  General  Gomez  led  his 
columns  five  hundred  miles  through  the  island,  burning  plantations;  the  Cuba 
Libre  journals  in  New  York  setting  forth  in  glowing  terms  that  the  ruddy 
skies  were  the  token  of  the  triumphant  progress  of  the  liberating  army. 
There  was  no  devastation  like  this  in  the  ten  years'  war  from  1868  to  1878! 
That  was  comparatively  civilized.  The  firebrand  was  thrown  in  1896  in 
the  name  of  freedom,  and  the  end  was  blackmail,  famine,  pestilence,  and 
death.  The  leaders  in  this  were  not  the  Spanish,  but  the  Cuban  officers. 
The  Spaniards  did  not  at  first  throw  fire,  but  they  followed  the  San  Domingo 
example  and  became  destroyers,  as  the  insurgents  were.  The  very  Cubans 
who  began  this  desperado  work,  complaining  bitterly  because  their  own  fashion 
was  imitated,  are  the  foremost  and  most  venomous  of  the  enemies  of  the  United 
States,  insisting  that  their  government  of  shadows  and  army  of  false  pretenses 
must  be  consoled  with  money  for  the  horrors  they  themselves  so  largely 
originated.  The  Spaniards  are  said  to  have  avowed  that  they  had  a  policy  of 
extermination.  This  is  in  Mr.  Bonsai's  testimony: 

"The  Spaniards  say  that  the  policy  of  what  they  call  'kindness'  has 
failed,  and  that  now  they  have  quite  made  up  their  minds  that  the  only  thing 
is  extermination ;  that  there  will  never  be  peace  on  the  island  as  long  as  there 
are  any  of  these  Cubans  left,  or  any  considerable  number  of  them. 

l'Q.  The  policy  is  then  to  exterminate? — A.  Yes,  sir;  and  they  are  not  at 
all  squeamish  about  admitting  it. 

"O.   They  propose  to  destroy  the  peasant  population? — A.   Yes,  sir. 

"Q.  And  then  to  repopulate  with  Spanish? — A.  Yes,  sir.  They  have 
already  exterminated  one  race,  and  Las  Casas  tells  how  they  did  it.  They 
will  probably  follow  the  same  methods  with  the  Creole  race. 

"Q.  None  of  the  Indians  are  living? — A.  No,  sir;  within  forty  years  of 
taking  possession  by  the  Spaniards,  the  Caribbean  or  Giboney  race  quite  disap 
peared,  although  they  had  numbered  400,000  or  500,000,  in  a  generation  and 
a  half." 


184  THE    TWO    SORTS    OF    SPANIARDS    IN    CUBA. 

But  why  did  the  Cubans  introduce  into  this  war  the  lurid  features  of  bar 
barism,  the  firebrand  with  which  the  meanest  savage  can  lay  in  ashes  the 
proudest  monuments  of  civilization — the  greater  achievements  of  art,  the 
grandest  realizations  of  the  creative  forces  of  industry?  "The  Cuban 
Republic"  has  this  question  to  answer  before  the  people  of  the  United  States, 
who  have  now  to  deal  not  with  the  peninsular  Spaniards,  but  with  Spaniards  of 
the  island  who  are  not  an  improvement  on  the  old  stock.  We  know  well  how 
freely  the  Spaniard  has  shed  blood,  how  he  has  for  a  century  stained  his 
colonies  with  red  rivers,  how  cruel,  haughty,  revengeful  he  has  been,  but 
what  we  want  to  ascertain  absolutely  now  is  whether  he  has  precedence  as  an 
incendiary  and  freedom  reached  by  sacrifice  of  fire?  By  whom  was  laid  waste 
the  production  of  one  million  tons  of  sugar  per  annum  in  Cuban  plantations? 
The  peninsular  Spaniards  did  not  do  that  savagery.  Mr.  Bonsai  said : 

"General  Weyler  is  not  unpopular  among  what  you  might  call  the  most 
powerful  section  of  the  Spaniards  in  the  island  of  Cuba.  On  the  contrary,  he 
is  quite  popular.  He  is  just  the  man  they  want.  They  believe  with  him  in 
command  this  policy  of  extermination  will  be  carried  out  to  its  logical  con 
clusion.  I  remember,  in  Santa  Clara,  in  the  Club  of  Merchants,  in  the  town 
of  Santa  Clara — it  was  at  the  time  when  it  was  proposed  that  Gen.  Martinez 
Campos  should  come  to  Cuba — they  said  to  me,  these  men  of  influence, 
unanimously,  that  4if  Martinez  Campos  comes  to  the  island  of  Cuba  and 
makes  any  proposition  of  compromise,  as  he  had  before,  we  will  shoot  him  in 
the  streets  of  Havana.  We  do  not  want  General  Weyler  removed,  because  he 
is  our  man.  He  is  bloodthirsty,  and  he  is  the  man  we  want. '  ' 

Certainly  !•  The  tale  of  bloodthirstiness  is  the  old,  old  Spanish  story,  and 
Weyler  was  a  man  of  blood.  But  was  he  the  first  of  the  firebugs  in  this  war? 
Why  deny  Gomez  the  credit  of  the  premier  firebrand  policy?  Dr.  F.  B.  Winn 
said  there  were  4, 700  insurgent  troops  at  his  time  in  Havana  province,  and 
the  concentrados  numbered  about  80,000  "paisonos — farmers." 

"Q.  What  class  of  people  constitute  these  concentrados? — A.  Small 
farmers,  renters,  what  we  would  call  in  this  country,  I  suppose,  tenant 
farmers ;  a  good  many  storekeepers.  Out  there  they  have  these  small  stores 
scattered  all  over  the  country.  It  is  a  very  old  country,  and  near  the  sugar 
plantations  or  in  the  thickly  settled  community  they  would  have  five  or  six  of 
these  small  grocery  stores  to  sell  groceries,  small  articles,  and  drinks,  etc. — to 
sell  everything;  and  those  people  have  been  scattered  and  their  stores  burned. 


THE    TWO    SORTS    OF    SPANIARDS    IN    CUBA.  187 

They  are  loyal ;  but  the  greater  part  of  the  concentrados  are  little  farmers  who 
were  unable  to  get  out  of  the  island,  and  did  not  care  to  join  the  insurgents, 
and  wanted  to  get  to  town ;  lived  in  bad  houses,  which  the  Spaniards  burned. 
The  Spaniards  burned  all  these  houses,  all  the  wooden  houses. 

"Q.  Was  that  generally  through  the  province  of  Havana,  the  burning  of 
houses  of  the  common  people? — A.  Complete;  all  burnt;  none  left  standing. 

"Q.  None  at  all? — A.  None  at  all;  not  a  house  left  standing  outside  of 
the  fortification." 

This  was  the  first  of  the  Spanish  answers  to  the  sugar  plantation  firebug 
crusade.  The  famine  followed. 

"Q.  Are  these  little  palm  leaf  huts  furnished  with  any  furniture  or  con 
veniences  for  living? — A.  No,  sir.  Some  have  a  chair — you  can  get  a  chair 
pretty  near  any  place  in  the  island.  I  could  camp  any  place  in  the  province 
and  have  a  chair  to  sit  down  on  in  five  minutes.  The  whole  island  is  strewn 
with  chairs,  sewing  machines,  tables,  and  household  articles,  etc. 

"Q.  Broken  out  of  the  houses? — A.  Yes,  sir.  These  concentrados  can 
not  come  out  for  them,  and  they  make  their  chairs  and  provide  the  houses 
pretty  well. 

"Q.  By  whom  has  this  wreck  of  the  houses  been  conducted  and  carried 
on? — A.  The  large  stone  houses,  of  which  there  were  a  good  many  in  that 
province — the  wealthy  people's  houses — were  destroyed  by  the  insurgents,  as 
they  regarded  them  as  possible  fortifications  for  the  Spanish  army.  The  little 
wooden  houses,  the  small  houses,  were  destroyed  by  the  Spaniards." 

Dr.  Winn  gave  a  most  interesting  and  important  account  of  the  "sur 
rendered  people,"  saying: 

"They  are  people  who  came  to  America,  ran  away  from  Cuba  to  America, 
and  came  to  the  Junta  and  were  a  charge  on  the  Junta,  and  to  get  them  off 
their  hands  they  sent  them  back  to  the  insurgent  lines.  For  the  most  part 
they  were  young  men  who  lived  in  Havana ;  dudes,  as  we  would  call  them 
here;  some  bachelors,  with  a  diploma  from  a  college.  They  would  come  back 
to  Cuba  with  their  diplomas  and  call  themselves  captains,  majors,  and  colo 
nels,  and  they  would  come  up  and  represent  themselves  to  the  men  who  have 
been  fighting  in  the  field  for  two  years,  and  they  would  say:  'We  come  from 
the  Junta,  and  you  get  us  a  horse  and  a  negro  and  we  want  commands  in  the 
army,'  and  the  officers  would  say:  'You  get  yourself  a  horse  and  a  negro,  if 
you  want  them,  and  get  to  fighting, '  and  they  would  fight  for  a  day  or  two, 


i88  THE    TWO    SORTS    OF    SPANIARDS    IN    CUBA. 

and  then  slip  into  the  brush  and  wait  their  chance  to  come  into  the  Spanish 
lines.  There  is  another  class  of  presentados  called  maja,  who  are  in  the 
woods.  They  took  to  the  woods  when  the  orders  of  concentration  came. 
They  are  supposed  to  be  there  to  fight  when  arms  are  sent  to  them.  When 
arms  are  furnished  them,  they  are  ordered  to  the  force  to  fight.  About  40  per 
cent  of  them  sneak  into  the  first  town  and  surrender.  They  will  not  sur 
render  until  they  have  a  gun,  but  when  they  have  a  gun  it  is  a  sort  of  guaranty 
for  them.  That  is  another  kind  of  presentados.  " 

The  doctor  gave  this  unquestionable  statement  of  the  way  a  Spanish 
column  searches  a  thick  wood  for  Cuban  hospitals,  that  they  may  chop  up  the 
wounded  with  machetes : 

"I  at  one  time  got  out  of  the  woods  before  the  soldiers  got  in,  and  sat  on 
a  hill  300  or  400  yards  away  and  watched  them  go  into  the  woods.  The  chief 
stopped  about  300  yards  from  where  they  entered  the  brush,  and  the  infantry 
marched  up  and  all  the  officers  stood  back,  and  the  sergeant  or  lieutenant  or 
small  officers  ordered  the  men  in.  The  men  marched  up  to  the  brush,  and 
then  they  would  hesitate,  and  these  officers  would  draw  their  canes — they 
nearly  all  carry  canes — or  some  of  them  machetes,  and  they  would  whip  them 
in.  They  would  grab  a  man  by  the  arm  and  strike  him  with  a  cane  and  drag 
and  push  him  in.  By  the  time  a  man  got  a  little  ways  in  he  would  cry  'Viva 
Espagnol,'  and  then  the  others  would  follow,  and  they  would  all  rush  in  and 
set  the  houses  afire,  and  yell  and  raise  the  mischief  generally,  and  those  on 
the  outside  would  run  tip  and  try  to  set  the  brush  afire,  try  to  set  the  whole 
army  afire,  as  it  looked  to  me.  If  it  had  been  dry  brush,  like  American 
undergrowth,  they  would  have  burnt  the  entire  army  up. 

"Q.  By  brush  do  you  mean  trees  and  bushes  that  have  been  cut  down? 
— A.  No,  sir;  it  is  short  growth  that  has  not  been  cut  down." 

Dr.  Danforth,  of  Milwaukee,  for  a  year  physician  to  Cisneros,  President 
of  Cuba,  was  examined  June,  1897,  and  when  asked  the  favorite  question 
about  the  mysterious  Cuban  capital,  he  said: 

"They  have  had  no  capital  until  about  the  ist  of  February  of  this  year, 
and  then  they  put  up  a  number  of  houses  at  Aguira,  about  three  leagues  to 
west  of  the  city  of  Wymero,  in  Puerto  Principe,  and  they  established  that  as 
the  seat  of  government. 

44Q.   Were  they  not  at  Cubitos?— A.   No,  sir. 

"Q.   Have  they  ever  been  driven  out  of  their  seat  of  government  by  the 


THE    TWO    SORTS    OP    SPANIARDS    IN    CUBA.  189 

Spaniards? — A.  Not  tip  to  the  time  I  left;  but  I  will  tell  yon  in  candor  that 
all  the  Spaniards  have  to  do,  if  they  want  to,  is  to  march  100  men  down  there 
And  drive  the  Cubans  out.  I  was  there  on  the  2Qth  of  April,  and  they  had 
but  8  men  in  the  capital. 

"Q.    Is  there  any  regular  postal  service? — A.   Yes,  sir. 

"Q.  In  what  manner  is  it  conducted? — A.  On  this  plan:  They  have  the 
prefects  of  these  districts,  and  they  act  as  distributing  officers  in  the  postal 
service,  I  believe. 

"Q.  They  are  from  3  to  6  leagues  apart? — A.  Yes,  sir.  All  the  people 
in  their  districts  are  coming  and  going  to  and  from  their  place.  They  usually 
risit  the  prefects  at  least  once  every  week  or  two  to  get  mail." 

"Once  every  week  or  two"  was  the  regular  mail  service  of  this  country 
with  a  capital  city  containing  eight  men  and  located  for  several  months  where 
:.t  was  the  greater  part  of  the  time  visible  only  by  the  all-searching  eye  of 
Omnipotence. 

Dr.  Danforth  is  a  gentleman  of  large  figures.  He  estimated  the 
Spanish  forces  in  Cuba  at  300,000  men — the  Cubans  about  one  in  ten. 
As  to  food: 

"In  Camaguey,  where  I  was,  they  have  boniato,  or  sweet  potatoes.  Some 
times  they  will  have  yucca,  sometimes  plantains,  sometimes  cochanchilla,  a 
mixture  of  honey  and  hot  water.  Sometimes  they  will  have  coffee,  sometimes 
they  will  not  have  anything  except,  perhaps,  meat. 

"Q.  How  about  their  supply  of  meat? — A.  It  is  ample. 
"Q.  Where  is  that  obtained? — A.  Everywhere,  anywhere.  By  the  laws 
of  the  Cubans,  by  the  law  of  the  land,  it  is  a  fact  that  the  Cuban  rulers 
declared,  when  this  war  first  started,  that  all  horses  and  all  cattle  in  the 
island,  wherever  found,  were  to  be  regarded  as  public  property.  The  result 
is  you  can  find  cattle  everywhere  in  Camaguey.  I  do  not  believe  I  have 
ever  ridden  three  miles  without  seeing  more  or  less  cattle.  The  yucca  grows 
without  any  care  at  all.  They  have  also  a  great  many  bananas,  or  plantains, 
as  they  are  termed,  growing  at  Cubitos  at  the  present  time.  They  have  a  great 
many  of  those,  and  they  send  over  from  the  rest  of  the  province  every  once 
in  a  while  to  secure  several  mule  loads  of  the  yucca  and  plantain,  or  boniato 
— the  sweet  potato. 

"Q.   I  do  not  understand  about  that  plant  yucca.     Is  that  a  plant  which 
grows  in   moist  soil,  like  a  radish? — A.   No,  sir;  it  belongs   to  the  family  of 


igo  THE    TWO    SORTS    OF    SPANIARDS    IN    CUBA. 

tubers,  I  believe.  It  is  the  root,  and  the  root  will  increase  in  size,  and  will 
weigh  anywhere  from  5  to  100  pounds.  They  are  very  large. 

"Q.  Is  it  palatable  and  nutritious? — A.  Indeed,  it  is.  It  is  just  about  like 
our  Irish  potato;  just  about  the  same  thing. 

"Q.  Do  they  cook  it  in  the  same  way  as  Irish  potatoes? — A.  Yes,  sir;  they 
cut  it  up  and  put  it  in  water  and  allow  it  to  boil  just  about  as  with  Irish 
potatoes. 

"Q.  It  comes  out  mealy? — A.  No,  sir;  it  comes  out  in  the  original  pieces, 
very  nicely  done — mealy  and  nice  to  the  taste. 

"Q.   They  eat  it  with  salt,  just  as  you  would  an  Irish  potato? — A.   Yes,  sir. 

"Q.    That  food  does  not  require  cultivation? — A.   No,  sir. 

4<Q.   Grows  indigenous? — A.   Yes,  sir;  wherever  you  chance  to  put  it. 

"Q.  I  have  been  interested,  too,  in  another  thing,  and  that  is,  what  is 
the  production  of  hogs  in  the  island  of  Cuba? — A.  They  have  an  immense 
number.  Contrary  to  the  custom  in  the  United  States,  they  allow  them  to 
run  wild,  and  they  eat  whatever  they  find.  I  do  not  know  exactly  what  they 
do  live  on,  but  they  live  very  well.  They  have  what  they  call  hog  dogs,  and  if 
you  want  a  hog  you  call  the  dogs  ,and  they  will  take  after  the  hogs,  and  after 
chasing  them  around,  the  dogs  will  seize  them  by  the  ears  and  maintain  their 
hold  until  the  man  comes  up,  and  then  they  tie  their  legs  together  and  sling 
him  across  the  saddle  and  take  him  to  the  house  and  kill  him. 

"Q.  They  are  in  good  condition? — A.   Always. 

"Q.  Have  the  Spanish  ever  attempted  to  drive  them  out  of  there? — A. 
Never  as  yet,  up  to  the  time  I  left  Cuba,  although  one  day  there  was  word 
sent  that  a  Spanish  column  of  4,000  men  was  only  a  league  and  a  half  off, 
and  we  had  orders  to  get  our  horses  up  and  saddled,  and  everything  on 
them,  ready  to  start  at  a  moment's  notice.  However,  it  proved  to  be 
a  false  rumor. 

"Q.  And  where  is  the  treasury  of  the  government  kept? — A.  That  is 
somewhat  complex.  The  treasurer  of  the  government  is  Mr.  Pina,  and  he 
receives  and  disburses  all  moneys,  and  as  fast  as  he  will  get  on  hand  any 
considerable  store  of  money  that  money  is  sent,  I  believe,  to  New  York,  in 
some  way  or  another,  to  the  Junta,  and  there  is  used  for  the  purposes  that  are 
best  calculated  to  help  the  revolutionists. 

"Q.  In  the  meantime,  where  does  he  keep  his  money;  where  does  he 
have  it  for  safe-keeping? — A.  In  the  chests. 


THE    TWO    SORTS    OF    SPANIARDS    IN    CUBA.  191 

"Q.  Carried  with  the  government? — A.  Yes,  sir;  with  the  President's  escoi  t. 

"Q.   Carried  along  with  the  archives? — A.   Yes,  sir. 

"Q.  About  what  proportion  of  the  Cuban  army  is  negroes? — A.  Well,  I 
should  say  less  than  50  per  cent.  I  do  not  know  how  much  less,  but  less  than 
50  per  cent. 

"Q.  As  a  rule,  are  the  negroes  under  white  officers,  white  Cuban  officers? 
— A.  Yes,  sir. 

"Q.  Are  they  good  soldiers? — A  Yes,  sir;  very  good,  indeed;  and 
splendid  fighters,  too." 

It  is  agreeable  to  hear  that  the  money,  gathered,  we  presume,  chiefly 
through  what  we  may  call  the  supplementary  sugar  tax,  was  shipped  to  the 
New  York  Junta.  The  wars  of  independence  of  Spanish  colonies  were  always 
a  competition  of  Juntas,  the  original  Spaniards  holding  that  they  were  the 
divinely  appointed  ruling  class.  It  was  in  Cuba  only  that  the  insurgents  got 
ahead  of  the  regulars  in  the  use  of  fire — and  this  was  ominously  under  lead  of 
the  military  chieftain  from  the  east  end  of  Haiti. 

We  have  followed  the  testimony  taken  by  the  Senate  committee  of  investi 
gation  sufficiently  to  show  the  character  of  the  war  in  Cuba,  and  have 
endeavored  to  apportion  judicially  the  measures  of  the  degrees  of  the  respec 
tive  responsibilities  for  the  peculiar  horrors  of  the  conflict  between  the 
antagonists.  There  was  an  awful  accumulation  of  evidence  of  unparalleled 
atrocities.  We  have  to  so  far  acknowledge  the  rights  of  the  belligerents  as  to 
admit  the  consanguinity  of  the  combatants.  We  shall  quote  in  addition  to  the 
passages  that  truly  set  forth  the  situation  of  the  woeful  island  during  the  last 
year  before  the  American  intervention  and  participation  in  war,  only  a  few 
lines  from  the  statement  of  Mr.  C.  F.  Koop,  of  Boston,  who  described  fearful 
brutalities  on  the  cars  by  Spanish  officers : 

"Q.  You  can  state  some  of  the  instances  which  impressed  you  as  being 
characteristic  of  the  situation. — A.  One  of  the  saddest,  if  not  the  saddest 
sight  I  saw  was  the  case  of  a  woman  who  stood  in  front  of  a  hotel  in  Santa 
Clara,  and  who  dropped  dead  when  I  handed  her  a  piece  of  bread.  That  was 
the  saddest  sight  I  saw  on  the  whole  trip. 

"Q.  Did  she  undertake  to  eat  it? — A.  She  dropped  the  baby  which  she 
had  in  her  arms,  grabbed  the  piece  of  bread  which  I  handed  her,  drove  her 
teeth  into  it  and  fell  over  dead.  She  had  a  baby  in  her  arms  and  two  little 
children  hanging  on  to  her  skirts. 


i92  THE    TWO    SORTS    OP    SPANIARDS    IN    CUBA. 

"Q.  What  became  of  the  baby  she  let  drop? — A.  The  baby  died  that 
night  or  the  next  morning.  I  found  out  in  the  morning  that  it  had  died;  and 
the.  other  two  children  died  a  day  or  two  afterwards. 

"Q.   Died  of  starvation? — A.   Yes;  starvation." 

Mr.  Koop  was  a  man  traveling  in  the  tobacco  business,  and  he  expressed 
the  opinion  that  the  true  purpose  of  the  Spaniards  in  herding  the  farmers  in 
the  "Zones"  of  cultivation  was  to  cause  them  to  perish  of  fevers  and  starva 
tion.  We  quote: 

"Q.  Do  the  Spanish  treat  the  Cubans  with  repugnance? — A.  They  feel 
that  a  Cuban  is  worse  than  a  dog. 

"Q.  You  think,  then,  that  the  purpose  of  the  regulation  was  really  to 
starve  these  people  to  death? — A.  Yes;  the  sole  purpose.  It  is  well  known 
that  900,000  of  those  natives  were  forced  in  from  their  homes,  and  out  of  that 
number  500,000  have  died  already.  Therefore,  the  results  have  proved  the 
motive. 

"Q-  What  was  the  apparent  relation  between  the  soldiers  and  these 
reconcentrados,  or  did  the  soldiers  seem  to  have  any  sort  of  human  regard  for 
them? — A.  Many  of  the  soldiers  are  low  spirited  and  absolutely  incapable  of 
having  such  resentment,  because,  in  the  majority  of  cases,  they  were  mere 
boys  and  in  such  a  condition  as  to  be  hardly  able  to  take  care  of  themselves. 
The  repugnance  was  largely  among  the  officers  and  the  Spanish  guards,  which 
is  the  flower  of  the  army.  They  are  in  better  condition  than  the  common 
soldiers.  The  Home  Guard,  picked  men,  are  also  in  better  condition. 

"Q.  What  is  the  feeling  of  this  class  that  are  in  better  condition — what  is 
their  feeling  towards  these  poor  reconcentrados,  as  you  saw  it? — A.  There  is 
a  sort  of  a  feeling  between  them  that  they  would  eat  at  one  another's  table,  if 
they  could.  If  one  had  anything,  they  would  give  it  to  the  other.  There 
was  no  animosity  among  the  ordinary  soldiery  of  the  Spanish  army." 

During  the  examination  of  witnesses  by  Senators  to  ascertain  accurately 
the  state  of  the  island,  much  attention  was  given  any  one  who  had  ever  been 
in  or  about  the  Cuban  capital,  and  anything  that  supported  the  view  that  the 
Cubans  h,ad  a  civil  government  somewhere  in  the  woods  was  dwelt  upon  and 
made  impressive  as  possible.  This  was  with  a  view  of  putting  the  Cubans  to 
the  front  as  constituting  a  Republic.  There  was  found,  to  the  satisfaction  of 
the  pro-Cuban  party,  that  there  was  an  organization  camped  in  a  secUided 
spot,  in  light  marching  order,  with  a  President,  and  a  cabinet  and  all  the 


THE    TWO    SORTS    OF    SPANIARDS    IN    CUBA.  193 

formal  appurtenances.  As  the  Cubans  could  not  maintain  themselves  at  any 
particular  port,  they  were  given  to  magnifying  the  formalities  and  celebrating 
the  functional  equipments  of  their  government  and  to  claiming  for  it  a  "com 
plete"  postal  system,  and  also  an  all-encircling  coast  guard,  but  this  machine 
lacked  a  great  deal  of  perfection,  and  indeed  the  uses  to  which  it  was 
applicable  were  rather  in  anticipation  than  performance — like  the  Cuban  army 
in  the  later  months  before  the  United  States  declared  war.  The  far-sighted 
organizers  remote  from  the  scenes,  seeing  that  they  had  ready  a  government 
to  claim  the  sovereignty  to  be  wrested  by  our  arms  from  the  Spaniards,  set 
up  an  official  ring  as  the  people  of  Cuba,  with  power  to  mortgage  the  bloody 
ashes  of  the  island,  and  assume  to  rule  when  their  turn  came  as  the  Spaniards 
had  done.  The  history  of  the  island  in  the  future  must  depend  in  a  compre 
hensive  way  upon  the  dealing  with  the  professors  of  official  Cubanism,  by  the 
government  of  the  United  States,  whose  specific  promise  to  the  people  of 
Cuba  and  the  United  States  and  all  civilized  men,  was  and  remains  to  estab 
lish  a  "stable  government."  The  immediate  necessity  is  that  the  possessions 
with  which  Spain  has  parted  are  to  be  subordinated  to  our  military  forces, 
under  the  inviolable  guaranties  of  "the  faith  and  honor  of  the  army  of  the 
United  States." 


Nfr^C^? 

/•yf^%/'"- 

*1&? 


CHAPTER    VII. 


General  Lee's  Consul-Generalship  in  Cuba. 

The  Conservative  Administrations  of  Grant,  Cleveland  and  McKinley — A  Variety  of  "Ameri 
can  Citizens"  in  Havana — Judicious  Discrimination  of  Consulate  Authorities — A  Young 
Man  who  Gave  Himself  Away — The  Brave  Stand  of  the  President  against  Bulling  the 
Market  for  Bonds  Issued  on  a  Basis  of  Bloody  Ashes. 

The  consul-generalship  of  General  Fitzhugh  Lee,  at  Havana,  lapping  the 
national  administrations  of  President  Cleveland  and  President  McKinley,  was 
an  important  incident  in  the  development  of  the  public  opinion  and  official 
policy  of  the  United  States  in  the  affairs  of  Cuba.  The  lines  pursued  by 
President  Cleveland  and  the  State  papers  of  Secretary  Olney  did  not  depart 
widely  from  those  of  the  concluding  administration  of  President  Grant  and 
the  grave  and  powerful  but  reserved  communications  from  Secretary  Fish, 
whose  correspondence  from  Ministers  Daniel  Sickles  and  Caleb  Cushing  at 
Madrid  was  marked  by  individual  distinctions  so  strong  that  their  letters  are 
a  most  valuable  source  of  interior  intelligence,  indispensable  to  a  correct 
understanding  of  the  course  of  events  from  the  Ostend  manifesto  to  the 
declaration  by  the  United  States  of  war  against  Spain.  There  is  to  be 
marked  the  consistent  straightforwardness  of  the  administrations  of  General 
Grant,  Grover  Cleveland  and  William  McKinley,  in  the  performance,  under 
circumstances  of  constant  difficulty,  of  our  duty  toward  Spain  as  a  friendly 
power  in  the  maintenance  of  our  international  obligations.  Though  this  was 
a  subject  of  a  great  deal  of  polite  writing  and  speaking  by  the  diplomatic 
representatives  of  Spain,  it  was  a  fact  .perfectly  within  the  scope  of  the  intel 
ligence  of  the  American  people  that  the  popular  feeling  in  Spain  was  that  we 
encouraged  filibusters  and  were  considerably  accountable  for  the  Cuban 
insurrections  that  were  so  disastrous  to  the  credit  of  the  Spaniards.  Our 
people  did,  of  course,  sympathize  with  the  Cubans,  and  entertained  no  doubt 
that  Spain  would  and  should  lose  the  island,  as  Mexico,  Peru,  and  the  rest  of 

194 


MAJOR-GENERAL  FITZHUGH  LEE,  CONSUL  AT  HAVANA  WHEN  WAR  WAS  DECLARED. 


GENERAL    LEE'S    CONSUL-GENERALSHIP    IN    CUBA.       197 

the  continental  Spanish-American  States  were  lost.  The  interests  the  United 
States  had  in  Cuba  were  presented  with  extraordinary  force  in  the  course  of 
the  later  of  the  ten  years'  war,  by  Secretary  Fish,  whose  pen  had  the  poten 
tiality  of  representing  his  own  great  ability  and  the  Presidency  of  Grant. 

There  was  a  deep  impression  made  upon  Spain,  in  the  course  of  this  cor 
respondence,  but  it  was  not,  on  the  whole,  conciliatory,  for  it  clearly  was  a 
;,  warning  that  the  time  could  not  be  far  distant  when  the  United  States  would 
intervene  in  Cuba.  The  Spaniards  had  two  hopes — one  that  they  might  over 
come  the  rebellion,  and  the  other  that  Europe  would  support  their  Cuban 
sovereignty  against  that  which  would  naturally  seem  to  the  monarchies 
American  aggression.  President  Grant,  while  pressing  Spain  to  take  decisive 
action,  was  not  fortunate  in  opportunity,  because  his  period  of  executive  power 
was  coincident  with  a  series  of  Spanish  revolutions,  but  he  urged  that  it  was 
the  duty  of  other  nations  to  sustain  our  tentative  advances,  and  associated 
with  this  appeal  to  the  powers  was  necessarily  the  strict  observance  of  the 
conventionalities  of  the  usages  of  the  strong  governments  with  respect  to 
declarations  of  independence  and  the  recognition  of  belligerent  rights.  Mr. 
Cleveland's  conservatism  on  this  subject  remained  unshaken,  and  the  assaults 
of  the  literary  laborers  in  the  filibuster  cause  were  disregarded  without  indica 
tions  of  uneasiness,  while  the  anxious  urgency  of  the  Cuban  agents  that  they 
should  be  considered  the  representatives  of  a  Republican  form  of  government 
found  no  countenance  in  the  White  House  or  the  State  Department.  The 
Cuban  desire  was  for  right  of  belligerency,  and  it  was  supported  by  exaggera 
tions  of  all  shams  of  Cuban  organization,  the  general  and  particular  purpose 
being  to  gain  recognition  of  rights  as  combatants,  and  to  manage  that  condi 
tion  so  as  to  drive  the  United  States  to  make  war  with  Spain.  The  State 
Department,  in  the  closing  months  of  Cleveland's  administration,  was  in  doubt 
as  to  the  condition  of  Cuba,  holding  that  there  was  no  reliable  information 

|  from  that  quarter,  positively  nothing  that  called  for  action  by  the  nation. 
The  naturalized  citizens  of  the  United  States  in  Cuba  had,  to  a  distinct 

I  degree,  been  actuated  in  declaring  their  intentions  by  the  hope  of  protection 
in  time  of  political  trouble,  and  many  of  them  were  disposed  to  interpret  as 
among  their  privileges  as  American  citizens,  exemption  from  punishment 
when  they  interfered  with  Spanish  rule.  The  more  persistent  they  were  in 
getting  into  dangerous  places,  the  more  intense  their  appreciation  of  the 
duties  toward  them  as  Americans,  of  the  representatives  of  the  government  of 


198      GENERAL    LEE'S    CONSUL-GENERALSHIP    IN    CUBA. 

the  United  States.  They  laid  special  claim  to  the  protection  of  the  Consulate 
of  the  United  States  at  Havana,  and  were  there  very  frequently  with  griev 
ances.  It  was  not,  as  a  rule,  in  proportion  to  the  dimensions  of  their  actual 
wrongs  that  they  were  insistent  in  presenting- them;  and  if  their  affair  was 
insignificant  they  were  apt  to  become  exasperating.  The  office  of  the  Con 
sulate  was  well  provided  for  matters  of  business,  but  it  was  not  redolent  of  the 
flavor  most  pleasing  to  the  Cubans  who  were  sympathetic  with  the  insurrec 
tion.  Consul-General  Ramon  O.  Williams  had  long  been  a  man  of  affairs 
in  Havana,  and  had  an  extensive  acquaintance  and  many  friendly  relations 
with  Spaniards.  He  was  an  expert  in  the  obligations  of  his  office,  and  knew 
every  point  of  the  law.  The  Spanish  language  was  familiar  to  him,  and  he 
had  for  some  time  contemplated  resigning  his  official  place,  in  which  case  Vice 
Consul  Joseph  A.  Springer  was  the  best  equipped  man  for  the  succession  in 
case  the  ordinary  promotion  for  long  and  effective  service  was  considered. 
Mr.  Springer  was  thoroughly  informed,  had  facile  command  of  the  Spanish 
language,  was  learned  in  the  laws,  and  familiar  with  the  customs  of  the 
people.  As  Cuba  became  the  center  of  news-interest  in  the  United  States,  the 
Havana  hotels  were  thronged  with  correspondents  of  the  newspapers  of  Amer 
ica  and  Europe,  with  their  interpreters  and  secretaries,  and  the  office  of  the 
Consul-General  was  a  much  favored  rendezvous.  It  became  manifest  to  the 
young  gentlemen  in  the  service  of  the  press  that  all  "American  citizens"  were 
|/ not  alike  welcome;  and  that  a  naturalized  Cuban,  who  had  never  been  out  of 
the  island,  and  had  shown  a  talent  for  the  intrigues  indigenous  in  an  insurgent 
atmosphere,  was  not  promptly  waited  upon  when  he  desired  United  States 
officials  to  find  his  valuable  mule  confiscated  as  a  bearer  of  burdens  of 
smuggled  goods — struck  a  chilling  frost  when  making  known  his  claim  upon 
the  great  Republic  that  should  have  felt  much  complimented  when  the  citizen 
ship  of  the  sufferer  was  for  the  fortieth  time  vociferated.  Omissions  on  the 
part  of  Williams  or  Springer  to  find  a  lost  mule,  or  something  of  that  nature, 
were  liable  to  be  celebrated  in  some  of  the  most  famous  journals  that  ever  put 
forth  their  leaves  for  the  help  of  the  human  race.  One  young  man,  whose 
passage  had  been  paid  to  Havana  by  the  Spanish  Consul  in  New  York,  to 
write  the  stories  to  please  Spain,  and  whose  appetite  for  gold  increased  with 
indulgence,  caused  him  presently  to  hate  Spanish,  and  then  to  offer  his  serv 
ices  as  a  spy,  to  report  on  other  conespondents,  and  give  away  their  confi 
dence — this  versatile  youth  took  it  upon  himself  to  lecture  Consul-Gemeral 


GENERAL    LEE'S    CONSUL-GENERALSHIP    IN    CUBA.       199 

Williams  as  to  the  use  he  made  of  law  books,  and  instruct  him  in  the  detail  of 
official  duty.  He  also  denounced  Williams  to  his  face,  and  encountered  no 
incivility.  Some  time  later  the  young  man  was  disturbed  to  find  out  that  Mr. 
Williams  had  in  his  desk  a  few  scraps  of  paper  that  proved  the  Spanish  rela 
tions  of  his  assailant,  but  scorned  to  strike  him  down  with  his  own  letters. 
President  Cleveland  concluded  some  months  later  to  accept  the  resignation 
of  Mr.  Williams,  which  he  had  on  file  to  be  used  when  convenient,  and  to 
appoint  to  fill  the  vacancy  General  Lee.  Undoubtedly  this  was  a  judicious 
selection.  Fitzhugh  Lee  was,  in  the  first  place,  a  man  of  good  nerve,  and 
of  military  experience.  He  was  a  Southern  man,  and  the  Spaniards  would 
not  be  able  to  deceive  him  with  their  perpetual  protestation  that  they  were 
engaged  in  putting  down  a  negro  insurrection ;  and  he  was  a  man  of  such 
home  distinction  that  he  could  not  be  easily  turned  from  his  purposes  by 
that  which  was  said  of  him  pro  or  con.  President  McKinley  had  made  known 
before  his  inauguration  that  he  would  call  an  extra  session  of  Congress.  He 
had  no  personal  desire  to  avoid  the  presence  of  Congress,  but  was  sincerely  of 
the  judgment  that  the  members  were  of  incomparable  utility  as  the  Senators 
of  the  several  States,  and  direct  representatives  of  the  people.  The  course  of 
the  Cleveland  administration,  in  doing  things  and  refraining  to  do  other  things, 
so  as  to  leave  unembarrassed  by  action  the  successors  upon  whom  must  fall  the 
weight  of  responsible  decisions,  was  well  considered  and  in  excellent  form, 
and  General  Lee  had  shown  so  cleverly  and  with  such  serious  deportment  his 
sense  of  the  high  duties  committed  to  him  that  he  was  continued  in  office,  and 
gained  more  and  more  the  confidence  of  his  countrymen.  He  supported 
forcibly  the  first  movement  of  the  government  in  t}ie  McKinley  administration 
demanding  the  speedy  trial  or  release  of  the  American  citizens  under  arrest, 
and  the  resolute  tone  with  which  this  policy  was  presented  had  an  immediate 
influence.  At  the  same  time,  there  was  less  of  the  friction  of  frivolous  mani 
festations  that  were  expressly  intended  to  aggravate  contentions.  There  was 
a  change  in  Captain-Generals  in  Cuba;  General  Weyler,  having  been  identified 
with  so  much  that  was  oppressive  and  exasperating,  was  withdrawn  and  Gen 
eral  Blanco,  a  more  gracious  character,  with  a  better  military  reputation, 
substituted;  and  Blanco's  policy  presently  was  shaped  so  as  to  placate,  if 
practicable,  the  rising  indignation  of  the  people  of  the  United  States.  These 
things  were  believed  to  make  for  the  preservation  of  peace,  rather  than  to 
cause  war  between  the  United  States  and  Spain;  and  hence  the  fierce  agituti»n 


200      GENERAL    LEE'S    CONSUL-GENERALSHIP    IN    CUBA. 

of  the  Cuban  war  party,  whose  hopes  and  struggles  were  to  fight,  and  they 
became  ferocious  at  the  thought  of  peace.  They  were  soon  in  a  super-heated 
state,  and  as  incessant  as  Red  Indians  rubbing  sticks  of  wood  together  to 
kindle  a  fire,  to  communicate  their  incandescence  to  Congress.  The  Presi 
dent's  message  December  6,  1897,  was  a  State  paper  of  excellent  temper,  and 
of  the  profoundest  logic,  legal  and  historical,  and  yet  it  did  not  favorably 
impress  our  public  men,  and  papers  who  insisted  the  time  had  come  for  war, 
and  inconsiderate  of  our  unprepared  situation  in  a  military  sense,  chafed 
against  all  restraints  of  composure. 

President  McKinley's  message  to  the  Fifty-fifth  Congress,  assembled  in 
regular  session,  stated  the  most  important  problem  with  which  the  government 
was  called  upon  to  deal  in  its  foreign  relations  concerned  its  "duty  toward 
Spain  and  the  Cuban  insurrection."  JThe  President  referred  to  the  disquieting 
prospect  that  Spain's  weak  hold  upon  the  island  might  lead  to  the  transfer  of 
Cuba  to  a  continental  power,  and  the  declarations  of  policy  that  any  change 
must  be  in  the  direction  of  "independence  or  acquisition  by  or  through  pur 
chase."  The  ten  years'  war  was  outlined  in  a  few  sentences,  with  the  Peace 
of  Zanjon,  and  the  "present  insurrection  in  February,  1895"  —  its  "remark 
able  increase"  and  "tenacious  resistance  against  the  enormous  forces"  that 
Spain  massed  against  it.  The  offer  of  friendly  offices  in  1876  had  failed.  No 
mediation  on  our  part  had  been  accepted.  The  answers  were:  "There  is  no 
effectual  way  to  pacify  Cuba  unless  it  begins  with  the  actual  submission  of  the 
rebels  to  the  mother  country.  "  The  President  denounced  the  cruel  policy  of 
concentration  initiated  in  February^iSgtS,  that  depopulated  the  districts  com 
manded  by  the  Spanish  armies.  He  proceeded,  after  characterizing  this  policy 
as  cruel,  to  say  of  it:  "The  agricultural  inhabitants  were  herded  in  and  about 
the  garrison  towns,  their  lands  laid  waste,  and  their  dwellings  destroyed. 
This  policy  the  late  Cabinet  of  Spain  justified  as  a  necessary  measure  of 
war  and  as  a  means  of  cutting  off  supplies  from  the  insurgents.  It  has 
utterly  failed  as  a  war  measure.  It  was  not  civilized  warfare.  It  was 
extermination."  \The  part  of  the  Cuban  leaders  in  burning  out  the  civiliza- 
-tion  of  the  island  to\cut  off  Spanish  resources  was  not  mentioned,  for  it  was  the 
President's  basis  of  operations  that  there  was  no  responsible  Cuban  govern 
ment  to  deal  with.  ^The  persecution  of  American  citizens  had  especially 
aroused  the  President,  and  he  did  not  feel  it  incumbent  upon  him  to  investi 
gate  naturalization  papers.  His  first  duty  was  "to  make  instant  demand  for 


. 

JYL'  v- 


."  it..- 


: 


GENERAL    LEE'S    CONSUL-GENERALSHIP    IN    CUBA.       203 

the  release  or  speedy  trial  of  all  American  citizens  under  arrest,  and  before  the 
change  of  the  Spanish  Cabinet  in  October  last  twenty-two  prisoners,  citizens 
of  the  United  States,  had  been  given  their  freedom."  Then  came  the  work  of 
charity.  The  message  of  the  President  very  seriously  recited  the  develop 
ments  of  the  situation  leading  up  to  the  most  grave  utterance  that  ever  came 
from  a  chief  magistrate  of  this  country,  touching  our  international  obliga 
tions  as  Americans,  and  the  conservative  propriety  of  our  interest  in  the  peace 
of  communities  of  the  neighborhood. 

The  culmination  of  the  message  was  in  this  paragraph:  "Sure  of  the 
right,  keeping  free  from  all  offense  ourselves,  actuated  only  by  upright  and 
patriotic  considerations,  moved  neither  by  passion  nor  selfishness,  the  govern 
ment  will  continue  its  watchful  care  over  the  rights  and  property  of  American 
citizens,  and  will  abate  none  of  its  efforts  to  bring  about  by  peaceful  agencies 
a  peace  which  shall  be  honorable  and  enduring.  If  it  shall  hereafter  appear 
to  be  a  duty  imposed  by  our  obligations  to  ourselves,  to  civilization  and 
humanity,  to  intervene  with  force,  it  shall  be  without  fault  on  our  part  and 
only  because  the  necessity  for  such  action  will  be  so  clear  as  to  command  the 
support  and  approval  of  the  civilized  world." 

The  remarkable  words  were  "to  intervene  with  force."  Spain  well  knew 
what  the  four  words  signified,  but  those  engaged  in  shouting  war  cries  in  Cuba 
and  this  country  were  not  satisfied.  They  had  been  screaming  for  years 
against  General  Grant  and  Grover  Cleveland,  because  they  did  not  accept  the 
New  York  Junta  as  a  nation,  entitled  to  use  the  arms  of  the  United  States  for 
the  faction  in  Cuba  that  sought  with  our  aid  to  supersede  the  Spaniards. 
President  McKinley  offended  the  filibusters  when  he  declared:  "The  wise 
utterances  of  President  Grant  in  his  memorable  message  of  December  7,  1875, 
are  signally  relevant  to  the  present  situation  in  Cuba,  and  it  may  be  whole 
some  now  to  recall  them."  This,  of  course,  was  simple  treason  to  the 
Republic  of  Cuba.  President  Grant  said,  and  President  McKinley  quoted  with 
approbation,  these  words:  "A  recognition  of  the  independence  of  Cuba  being, 
in  my  opinion,  impracticable,  and  indefensible,  the  question  which  next  pre 
sents  itself  is  that  of  the  recognition  of  belligerent  rights  in  the  parties  to  the 
contest."  More  than  this,  President  McKinley  said:  "In  a  former  message 
to  Congress  I  had  occasion  to  consider  this  question,  and  reached  the  con 
clusion  that  the  conflict  in  Cuba,  dreadful  and  devastating  as  were  its  inci 
dents,  did  not  rise  to  the  fearful  dignity  of  war."  In  a  word,  the  President 


204      GENERAL    LEE'S    CONSUL-GENERALSHIP    IN    CUBA. 

did  not  propose  to  use  the  United  States  for  the  pretended  Cuban  Republic, 
and  that  was  the  very  pith  of  the  Cuban  war  party's  position.  The  President, 
instead  of  floundering  into  war  headlong  for  the  Cuban  incendiaries,  who  pre 
pared  at  once  to  destroy  property  and  issue  certificates  of  bonded  indebtedness, 
made  a  last  sincere  and  pressing  effort  to  defer  war,  and  so  far  as  was  pos 
sible  interpreted  events  as  helpful  for  the  preservation  of  peace.  He  said  he 
regarded  the  recognition  of  belligerency  of  the  Cuban  insurgents  as  "now 
unwise  and  therefore  inadmissible" — and  he  held  that  "a  hopeful  change  has 
supervened  in  the  policy  of  Spain  toward  Cuba.  A  new  government  has  taken 
office  in  the  mother  country.  It  is  pledged  in  advance  to  the  declaration  that 
all  the  effort  in  the  world  cannot  suffice  to  maintain  peace  in  Cuba  by  the 
bayonet;  that  vague  promises  of  reform  after  subjugation  afford  no  solution 
of  the  insular  problem ;  that  with  a  substitution  of  commanders  must  come  a 
change  of  the  past  system  of  warfare  for  one  in  harmony  with  a  new  policy. ' ' 

These  were  the  promptings  and  teachings  of  a  generous  heart,  and  there 
was  behind  them  the  wisdom  of  expediency,  for  if  we  were  drifting  to  war,  we 
would  be  great  gainers  by  the  time  occupied.  All  the  American  citizen 
prisoners  in  Cuba  were  released.  There  could  be  nothing  lost  save  as  to  the 
Cuban  Republic,  and  bonds  based  on  the  naked  chimneys,  monumental  of 
ancient  and  prosperous  industry!  The  President  was  in  position  to  say: 
"Not  a  single  American  citizen  is  now  in  arrest  or  confinement  in  Cuba  of 
whom  this  government  has  any  knowledge.  The  near  future  will  demonstrate 
whether  the  indispensable  condition  of  a  righteous  peace,  just  alike  to  the 
Cubans  and  to  Spain,  as  well  as  equitable  to  all  our  interests  so  intimately 
involved  in  the  welfare  of  Cuba,  is  likely  to  be  attained.  If  not,  the  exigency 
of  further  and  other  action  by  the  United  States  will  remain  to  be  taken. 
When  that  time  comes  that  action  will  be  determined  in  the  line  of  indispu 
table  right  and  duty.  It  will  be  faced,  without  misgiving  or  hesitancy,  in  the 
light  of  the  obligation  this  government  owes  to  itself,  to  the  people  who  have 
confided  to  it  the  protection  of  their  interests  and  honor,  and  to  humanity. ' ' 

There  was  behind  the  President  all  the  powers  of  the  people,  and  all  the 
dignities  of  decency  and  civilization ;  and  the  grim  necessity  of  which  he  had 
knowledge  exceeding  others — for,  if  war  was  just  ahead,  we  should  not  make 
haste  to  get  into  it  without  preparation. 

There  was  an  ignorant  and  inflammatory  public  opinion — part  vanity  and 
part  malice — fed  by  the  falsehoods  of  Spanish  Cubans  through  the  convenient 


GENERAL    LEE'S    CONSUL-GENERALSHIP    IN    CUBA.        205 

wires,  and  it  was  foolishly  and  wantonly  and  insolently  wrong,  as  regards  the 
conditions  under  which  we  were  moving  to  encounter  in  Cuba — first,  the 
rainy  season;  second,  the  sweltering  venom  of  the  yellow  fever;  third, 
insufficient  water  supplies  and  inadequate  facilities  for  the  water  transportation 
even  of  our  regular  army  and  the  articles  requisite  to  its  higher  efficiency. 
Last,  but  not  least,  there  was  not  abroad  in  our  country  understanding  of  the 
fighting  abilities  of  the  Spaniards  on  the  defensive,  or  the  fruitfulness  of  the 
soil  that  made  starvation  outside  prisons  a  tedious  task — for  we  could  only 
blockade  the  ports.  The  marvels  of  the  soil  and  sky  of  Cuba  in  providing 
food  remained,  and  not  until  the  full  story  of  the  war  is  read  will  the  people 
at  large  be  truly  informed  of  the  endowments  of  the  island,  golden  in  all  but 
the  yellow  metal.  The  Cuban  Spaniards  and  American  filibusters  were  rank 
with  violence  that  would  have  been  ludicrous  if  it  had  not  closly  approached 
criminality,  because  the  President  held  open  to  the  last  hour  it  was  practicable 
the  door  that  led  to  the  paths  of  peace.  It  was  Cuban  influence  that  burnt  the 
sugar  plantations  that  did  not  yield  the  Republic  a  special  tax,  that'branded 
the  insurrection  with  the  San  Domingo  mark,  and  redoubled  outcries  for 
recognizing  independence,  on  preposterous  grounds,  granting  belligerency, 
and  putting  firebrands  wherever  there  was  fuel  for  war. 


CHAPTER   VIII. 

The  Actual  Experience  and  Sentiments  of  the  People  of  Cuba. 

Two  Parties  of  Malign  ants — The  Firm  Stand  of  the  President  at  the  Beginning  of  the  War — 
A  Study  of  the  Historical  Truth  of  the  Situation — The  President's  Language  Contrasted 
with  that  of  the  Fire  Bugs — Extreme  Views  of  Senators  Davis',  Daniel,  Foraker,  and 
Others — The  Fury  of  the  War  Party — Cuban  and  Spanish  Desperadoes — The  Massacre 
of  the  Maine — The  Findings  of  the  Courts — List  of  the  Lost  on  the  Ship. 

The  public  sentiment  in  Havana  did  not  easily  appear  to  strangers.  It 
was  of  vital  consequence  to  those  who  were  owners  of  real  estate  or  engaged  in 
business,  surrounded  with  families,  to  assume  an  attitude  as  far  as  permissible 
from  party  ism — to  be  moderate  in  all  things,  cultivate  good  will,  put  out,  as 
a  form  of  consenting  to  the  conditions,  the  Spanish  colors,  wear  dress  suits  on 
occasions  of  ceremony,  welcoming  General  Weyler,  for  example.  There 
were  those  who  took  the  risks  of  avowed  sympathy  with  the  insurgents,  but 
they  had  reasons  for  refraining  from  active  service.  One  of  the  ways  of 
preventing  persecutions  was  in  the  'susceptibility  of  many  holding  Spanish 
commissions  to  the  acceptance  of  concessions  in  cash  or  its  equivalent. 

The  processes  of  protection  in  the  city  were  like  those  that  prevented  the 
burning  of  a  few  cane  fields  and  mills,  and  the  dispersion  of  the  carts  and 
horses  that  were  an  important  part  of  the  equipment  of  plantations — that  is, 
the  payment  of  a  double  tax.  There  were  those  who  communicated  with  the 
avowed  rebels  in  Key  West,  New  York,  and  elsewhere,  and  the  Spanish 
officials  were  complacent  about  that.  The  price  of  taking  a  small  package  of 
"private"  letters  to  the  United  States  post  office  was  a  five  dollar  Spanish  gold 
piece.  Often  Spanish  or  insurgent  officers  were  transported  to  and  fro  from 
Havana — visiting  the  United  States — at  regular  rates,  according  to  the  rank  of 
the  travelers.  Under  this  system  it  was  not  difficult  to  account  for  adventures 
that  were  touched  up  with  superficial  mystery.  What  was  the  need  of  daring 
when  bribery  was  so  facile?  Heroism  was  as  marketable  as  Mauser  cartridges 

206 


SENTIMENTS    OF    THE    PEOPLE    OF    CUBA.  207 

at  Morro  Castle!  The  men  of  sincerities  ascertained  that  there  were  deplor 
able  disadvantages  in  persistent  integrity.  There  were  two  besetting  dangers 
for  an  honest  man.  One  was  to  give  mortal  offense  to  the  important  Span 
iards  by  telling  the  truth  of  them — and  the  other  was  to  insult  the  civilian 
insurgents  by  truthfulness  respecting  them,  the  capital  crime  being  to  doubt 
the  ability  of  the  government  in  the  woods  to  issue  bonds,  command  armies, 
and  exercise  all  the  supreme  functions  of  a  national  sovereignty.  Those  who 
absorbed  this  fictitious  officialism  held  that  it  was  treason  to  question  their 
regularity,  and  they  were  sure  as  possible  of  everything  and  in  a  state  of 
infallibility  all  the  time.  It  was  highly  criminal  to  fail  in  faith  in  any  false 
hood  invented  in  and  telegraphed  from  the  Florida  bureaus.  It  was  the  most 
wicked  way  of  being  treasonable  to  Cuba  Libre  to  hesitate  to  believe  that  the 
New  York  Junta  and  the  literary  manufactures,  carried  on  outside  Cuba  with 
the  making  of  Havana  cigars,  were  not  the  veritable  and  the  only  people  of 
Cuba.  One  development  of  scoundrelism  in  Cuba  fostered  another.  The 
canker  of  corruption  in  the  Spanish  service  was  not  unknown  among  the 
Cubans.  There  were  pecuniary  reasons  for  the  protraction  of  the  war. 
There  is  a  real  people  of  Cuba  behind  all  this.  There  is  also  a  real  Spanish 
manhood  that  is  not  revealed  in  this  outrageous  distemper  of  dishonesty.  If 
one  got  the  unreserved  confidence  of  true  Cubans — those  who  in  spite  of  mis- 
government  had  made  the  island  prosper — the  truth  would  break  out  about  in 
this  way:  "We  have  been  taxed  regularly  and  irregularly,  by  the  Spaniards 
and  the  rebels — double  taxed  in  custom  houses — forced  to  pay  for  things  done 
and  undone — compelled  to  pay  all  sorts  of  soldiers  and  loafers  to  care  for 
us,  openly  and  secretly — have  everything  offered  now  as  always  for  money— 
and  are  refused  justice  in  any  case  without  it.  Now  we  are  exhausted.  Our 
money  is  gone.  We  are  not  politicians.  This  is  a  rich  country.  There  is  no 
end  of  money  to  be  made  here.  We  only  want  order — no  matter  whether 
under  a  monarchy  or  a  republic — anything  so  that  we  can  do  business.  We 
know  that  if  the  Spanish  conquer  the  island  and  rule  it  again  we  shall  be 
ruined  utterly.  We  are  almost  in  a  condition  of  beggary  now.  It  will  be 
very  little,  if  any,  better  for  us  if  these  fellows  who  claim  to  have  a  Cuban 
government  should  become  the  masters  of  the  island.  They  will  ruin  us  just 
the  same  as  the  Spaniards.  In  either  case  we  are  reduced  to  poverty,  and 
shall  be  without  hope.  We  have  one  chance — that  we  shall  sometime  soon— 
very  soon,  before  it  is  too  late  for  us  and  our  children — become  a  part  of  the 


208  SENTIMENTS    OF    THE    PEOPLE    OF    CUBA. 

United  States."  Notwithstanding  the  terrible  indictment  of  the  Spanish 
colonial  system,  of  which  the  last  and  worst  development  was  in  Cuba,  by  the 
President  in  his  message  of  December,  1897,  it  would  have  been  impossible 
to  have  framed  a  paper  more  disturbing  and  alarming  to  the  managers  of  the 
Cuban  policy  than  the  whole  document  as  it  appeared  with  its  plain  use  of  the 
plain  words  "intervention  with  force."  The  Cuban  holders  of  commissions 
or  diplomas,  as  they  say,  wanted  intervention  with  force,  to  be  sure,  but  for 
them,  in  their  way.  The  programme  was  for  the  United  States  to  make  the 
war  and  finish  it  and  turn  over  the  island  to  the  Cuban  republic.  There  was  a 
huge  speculation  in  this  contrived  to  be  at  the  expense  of  the  United  States, 
and  President  McKinley's  straightforward  course  was  an  interference.  One 
of  the  Cuban  outcries  had  been  stifled.  It  was  that  crowds  of  "American 
citizens"  were  imprisoned  and  not  tried.  That  was  at  an  end.  Weyler  was 
gone  like  a  gory  scapegoat,  and  Blanco  had  arrived,  dressed  in  regimentals 
that  he  gave  assurance  were  white  robes.  He  made  an  impression  that  there 
was  a  real  meaning  behind  his  good  words.  He  seemed  to  be  taking  himself 
in  earnest.  The  Spanish  language  was  not  exhausted.  The  President 
appeared  to  have  hopes  that  his  policy  of  peace  could  prevail. 

It  was  necessary  that  there  should  be  something  done  in  Havana  to 
change  the  current.  There  was  always  under  Spanish  rule  a  chance  for  a 
panic  there.  The  vindictive  volunteers  were  ever  ready  for  the  indulgence 
of  resentments.  They  hated  the  Blanco  style,  and  opposed  it  with  the  same 
malignity  that  their  extreme  opposites — the  firebug  patriots — denounced  the 
pacific  President  of  the  United  States.  They  discovered  that  the  American 
citizens  in  Havana  were  in  peril,  that  they  needed  ships  of  war  to  protect 
them!  That  was  one  of  the  cultivated  alarms  always  ready  for  an  emergency. 
The  incendiaries  had  failed  to  impress  General  Lee.  There  was  a  solidity 
about  his  composition  that  gave  them  sore  grief.  Lee  was  fearless  and  posi 
tive  as  against  Spanish  misconduct  toward  American  citizens,  no  matter  how 
defective  their  title  might  be.  He  acted  on  the  face  of  the  papers — but  the 
incandescent  Cuban  officialism  did  not  appeal  to  him  strongly.  He  did  not 
submit  himself  to  those  people  or  take  them  into  his  confidence.  He  was  an 
American,  not  a  Cuban,  but  he  could  not  see,  as  the  United  States  and 
Spain  were  in  friendly  relations,  officially,  why  there  should  not  be  one  of  our 
ships  of  war  in  the  Havana  harbor — on  the  like  terms  of  those  of  the  favored 
nations.  The  Cuban  theory  that  our  war  ships  were  wanted  in  the  harbor  to 


SENTIMENTS    OF    THE    PEOPLE    OF    CUBA.  209 

protect  Americans  was  unsound.  The  real  want  was  to  use  and  display  our 
ships  of  war  so  as  to  promote  the  war  conspiracy!  It  was  certain  that  if  we 
sent  ships  to  Havana  waters  to  rest  there  as  fixtures  we  would  sacrifice  many 
lives  to  the  pestilential  influences  of  that  spot  where  centuries  of  filthiness  have 
made  provision  for  plagues  of  fever.  It  was  clear  also  to  any  observer  that  if 
there  were  Americans  in  personal  danger,  a  ship  of  war  more  or  less  could 
not  save  them,  for  the  ships  would  necessarily  be  out  of  the  way  of  the  resorts 
of  the  city,  and  under  the  German  guns  with  which  the  old  forts  and  the  new 
fortifications  were  armed.  It  was  provided  that  there  should  be  arranged 
an  exchange  of  courtesies  between  Spanish  and  American  ships  of  war,  and 
two  ill-foted  cruisers  were  appointed,  the  Maine  to  visit  Havana  and  the 
Vizcaya  to  call  at  New  York. 

The  malignants  on  both  sides  in  Cuba,  the  extreme  peninsular  Spaniards, 
and  the  extreme  Cuban  Spaniards,  the  filibusters  and  adventurers,  were  joyful 
over  the  massacre  01  Jie  Maine,  and  used  the  awful  story  to  fan  the  smolder 
ing  embers  of  war  into  a  conflagration.  They  were  aided  by  the  Cuban  war 
party  in  the  United  States,  and  a  great,  irresistible  wave  of  emotion  that  was 
deeper  than  anger,  and  of  indignation  that  rises  like  the  ocean  uplifted  by  an 
earthquake  and  rolls  mighty  billows  upon  distant  shores.  It  was  the  Presi 
dent's  duty,  and  he  performed  it,  to  be  clear  headed  for  the  country,  to  hold 
the  balances  of  judgment  serenely  higher  than  the  sphere  of  the  tempests.  It 
is  not  often  in  the  annals  of  mankind  that  a  man  has  had  a  loftier  and  broader 
responsibility  to  discharge,  and  the  President,  awed  by  the  overmastering 
sense  of  the  destiny  upon  him,  was  not  disquieted  and  depressed,  but  calmed 
and  elevated  by  the  magnitude  of  events,  as  became  a  President  of  the  people, 
and  there  were  those  who  would  have  belittled 'the  days  as  they  passed  with 
sound  and  fury,  and  cheapened  themselves  with  hatefulness  and  fancies  that 
haste  and  clamor  would  be  thought  identical  with  the  expression  of  serious 
duties, — and  the  sensationalists  displayed  themselves  on  fire  lines  and 
illuminated  the  distortions  of  their  own  insignificance.  In  proportion  as  the 
people  of  the  United  States  knew  war  and  were  of  general  intelligence,  they 
sustained  with  their  moral  sympathy  and  political  force  the  equipoise  of  the 
Executive  Department;  they  commended  the  request  of  Captain  Sigsbee  of 
the  Maine  for  a  suspension  of  public  opinion  as  to  that  catastrophe,  and  the 
deliberate  reserve  of  the  President,  accepting  the  tenders  of  courtesies  of 
Spanish  military  and  naval  civil  authorities  in  the  way  of  regrets  and  condo- 


210  SENTIMENTS    OF    THE    PEOPLE    OF    CUBA. 

lences  for  the  victims  of  the  Havana  harbor  explosion.  In  the  message  of  the 
President  May  nth,  after  quoting-  state  papers  of  Cleveland  and  Jackson,  and 
reciting  once  more  the  hideous  situation  in  Cuba  and  the  elements  of  danger 
and  disorder,  he  said  these  had  been  "strikingly  illustrated  by  a  tragic  event 
which  has  deeply  and  justly  moved  the  American  people.  I  have  already 
transmitted  to  Congress  the  report  of  the  naval  court  of  inquiry  on  the 
destruction  of  the  battleship  Maine  in  the  harbor  of  Havana  during  the  night 
of  the  1 5th  of  February.  The  destruction  of  that  noble  vessel  has  filled  the 
national  heart  with  inexpressible  horror.  Two  hundred  and  fifty-eight  brave 
sailors  and  marines  and  two  officers  of  our  navy,  reposing  in  the  fancied 
security  of  a  friendly  harbor,  have  been  hurled  to  death,  grief  and  want 
brought  to  their  homes,  and  sorrow  to  the  nation. 

"The  naval  court  of  inquiry,  which,  it  is  needless  to  say,  commands  the 
unqualified  confidence  of  the  government,  was  unanimous  in  its  conclusion 
that  the  destruction  of  the  Maine  was  caused  by  an  exterior  explosion,  that  of 
a  submarine  mine.  It  did  not  assume  to  place  the  responsibility.  That 
remains  to  be  fixed. 

"In  any  event,  the  destruction  of  the  Maine,  by  whatever  exterior  cause, 
is  a  patent  and  impressive  proof  of  a  state  of  things  in  Cuba  that  is  intoler 
able.     That  condition  is  thus  shown  to  be  such  that  the  Spanish  government 
I  [  cannot  assure  safety  and  security  to  a  vessel  of  the  American  navy  in  the  har 
bor  of  Havana  on  a  mission  of  peace,  and  rightfully  there." 

Further,  dwelling  in  this  connection  on  recent  diplomatic  correspondence, 
"A  dispatch  from  our  Minister  to  Spain,  of  the  26th  ultimo,  contained  the  state 
ment  that  the  Spanish  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  assured  him  positively  that 
Spain  will  do  all  that  the  highest  honor  and  justice  require  in  the  matter  of 
the  Maine.  The  reply  above  referred  to  of  the  3ist  ultimo  also  contained  an 
expression  of  the  readiness  of  Spain  to  submit  to  an  arbitration  all  the 
differences  which  can  arise  in  this  matter,  which  is  subsequently  explained  by 
the  note  of  the  Spanish  Minister  at  Washington  of  the  loth  instant,  as 
follows : 

*  'As  to  the  question  of  fact  which  springs  from  the  diversity  of  views 
between  the  reports  of  the  American  and  Spanish  boards,  Spain  proposes  that 
the  facts  be  ascertained  by  an  impartial  investigation  by  experts,  whose 
decision  Spain  accepts  in  advance. ' 

"To  this  I  have  made  no  reply. "     Nothing  was  wanted  of  Spain's  experts. 


SENTIMENTS    OF    THE    PEOPLE    OF    CUBA.  211 

The  date  of  this  message  was  within  ten  days  of  the  declaration  of  war, 
and  the  President  closed  in  these  words,  that  will  ever  reflect  honor  upon  him : 

"I  ask  the  Congress  to  authorize  and  empower  the  President  to  take 
measures  to  secure  a  full  and  final  termination  of  hostilities  between  the 
government  of  Spain  and  the  people  of  Cuba,  and  to  secure  in  the  island  the 
establishment  of  a  stable  government,  capable  of  maintaining  order  and 
observing  its  international  obligations,  insuring  peace  and  tranquillity  and  the 
security  of  its  citizens  as  well  as  our  own,  and  to  use  the  military  and  naval 
forces  of  the  United  States  as  may  be  necessary  for  these  purposes. 

"And  in  the  interest  of  humanity  and  to  aid  in  preserving  the  lives  of  the 
starving  people  of  the  island  I  recommend  that  the  distribution  of  food  and 
supplies  be  continued,  and  that  an  appropriation  be  made  out  of  the  public 
Treasury  to  supplement  the  charity  of  our  citizens. 

"The  issue  is  now  with  the  Congress.  It  is  a  solemn  responsibility.  I 
have  exhausted  every  effort  to  relieve  the  intolerable  condition  of  affairs  which 
is  at  our  doors.  Prepared  to  execute  every  obligation  imposed  upon  me  by 
the  Constitution  and  the  law,  I  await  your  action. 

"Yesterday,  and  since  the  preparation  of  the  foregoing  message,  official 
information  was  received  by  me  that  the  latest  decree  of  the  Queen  Regent  of 
Spain  directs  General  Blanco,  in  order  to  prepare  and  facilitate  peace,  to  pro 
claim  a  suspension  of  hostilities,  the  duration  and  details  of  which  have  not 
yet  been  communicated  to  me. 

"This  fact,  with  every  other  pertinent  consideration,  will,  I  am  sure,  have 
your  just  and  careful  attention  in  the  solemn  deliberations  upon  which  you  are 
about  to  enter.  If  this  measure  attains  a  successful  result,  then  our  aspira 
tions  as  a  Christian,  peace-loving  people  will  be  realized.  If  it  fails,  it  will  be 
only  another  justification  for  our  contemplated  action. " 

It  does  not  seem,  now  that  the  war  is  over,  fairly  and  swiftly  won,  that 
there  was  lacking  in  this  measured  language  anything  becoming  the  dignity 
of  the  United  States,  the  spirit  of  resolve  and  sacrifice  of  the  people  at  large, 
or  any  sign  of  negligence  in  the  discharge  of  the  tremendous  functions  of  t 
Presidential  office.  The  words  "contemplated  action"  were  of  deep  meanin 

There  was  something  of  injustice,   for  a  time,  in  the  criticisms  of  th 
course  of  the  President,  of  the  steadfast,  imperturbable  demeanor  with  whic 
he  met  the  extraordinarily  exacting  demands  upon  him,  but  the  people  pres 
ently  knew,  not  from  spoken  words  or  through  the  pomps  of  complacency,  but 


212  SENTIMENTS    OF    THE    PEOPLE    OF    CUBA. 

the  deeds  that  were  wrought  from  day  to  day,  that  their  Chief  Magistrate,  the 
Commander-in-Chief  of  the  army  and  navy,  was  at  the  front  and  never 
flinched  under  fire.  There  appeared  in  the  message,  April  n,  this  passage  of 
solemn  caution — then  justified — now  amply  vindicated: 

14 1  said  in  my  message  of  December  last,  'It  is  to  be  seriously  considered 
whether  the  Cuban  insurrection  possesses'  beyond  dispute  the  attributes  of 
statehood  which  alone  can  demand  the  recognition  of  belligerency  in  its 
favor.  The  same  requirement  must  certainly  be  no  less  seriously  considered 
when  the  graver  issue  of  recognizing  independence  is  in  question ;  for  no  less 
positive  test  can  be  applied  to  the  greater  act  than  to  the  lesser ;  while,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  influences  and  consequences  of  the  struggle  upon  the  internal 
policy  of  the  recognizing  State,  which  form  important  factors  when  the  recog 
nition  of  belligerency  is  concerned,  are  secondary,  if  not  rightly  eliminable, 
factors  when  the  real  question  is  whether  the  community  claiming  recognition 
is  or  is  not  independent  beyond  peradventure. 

"Nor  from  the  standpoint  of  expediency  do  I  think  it  would  be  wise  or 
prudent  for  this  government  to  recognize  at  the  present  time  the  independence 
of  the  so-called  Cuban  Republic.  Such  recognition  is  not  necessary  in  order 
to  enable  the  United  States  to  intervene  and  pacify  the  island.  To  commit 
this  country  now  to  the  recognition  of  any  particular  government  in  Cuba 
might  subject  us  to  embarrassing  conditions  of  international  obligation  toward 
the  organization  so  recognized.  In  case  of  intervention  our  conduct  would  be 
subject  to  the  approval  or  disapproval  of  such  government.  We  would  be 
required  to  submit  to  its  direction  and  to  assume  to  it  the  mere  relation  of  a 
friendly  ally. 

"When  it  shall  appear  hereafter  that  there  is  within  the  island  a  govern 
ment  capable  of  performing  the  duties  and  discharging  the  functions  of  a 
separate  nation,  and  having,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  proper  forms  and 
attributes  of  nationality,  such  government  can  be  promptly  and  readily  recog 
nized  and  the  relations  and  interests  of  the  United  States  with  such  nation 
adjusted." 

This  excellent  medicine  was  a  bitter  dose  in  the  bellies  of  the  Cubans  who 
were  doing  their  fighting  out  of  the  island  whose  soil  was  contested.  Among 
the  forces  the  President  was  obliged  to  restrain  from  misadventure  was  the 
report  of  Mr.  Davis,  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  who  paraded 
several  resolutions  of  Congress.  .Mr.  Davis  said  one-third  of  the  people  of 


SENTIMENTS    OF    THE    PEOPLE    OF    CUBA.  213 

Cuba  in  the  eastern  end  of  the  island  were  subordinate  to  the  insurgent  gov 
ernment  and  "that  third  of  population  pays  taxes  to  them,  serves  in  their 
armies,  and  in  every  way  supports  and  is  loyal  to  them.  This  situation  has 
existed  ever  since  the  first  few  months  of  the  war.  The  armies  of  Spain 
under  Campos,  Weyler,  and  Blanco,  successively  have  been  repelled  in  every 
invasion  that  they  have  attempted  of  the  eastern  half  of  the  island.  The  cause 
of  Spain  has  continually  grown  weaker,  and  that  of  the  insurgents  has  grown 
stronger." 

This  was  not  warranted.  It  was  the  acceptance  of  the  exaggerations  of 
the  Spanish  Cubans,  and  it  was  the  temporary  misfortune  of  the  country  that 
this  falsified  current  history  could  not  be  as  conclusively  exposed  as  it  has  been 
by  the  accounts  of  the  army  and  navy  of  the  United  States.  Throughout  the 
able  and  ingenious  report  of  Mr.  Davis,  the  injudicial  element  cropped  out, 
and  the  absence  of  the  impartial  spirit,  that  gives  due  weight  to  all  facts,  is  evi 
dent  in  the  omission  of  the  truth  that  the  insurgent  forces  were  the  first  to 
use  the  torch  and  originated  the  savage  policy  of  desolation. 

The  President  was  equal  to  the  firm  presentation  of  the  truth:  "As  I 
said  in  my  message  of  last  December,  it  was  not  civilized  warfare ;  it  was 
extermination.  The  only  peace  it  could  beget  was  that  of  the  wilderness  and 
the  grave.  Meanwhile,  the  military  situation  in  the  island  had  undergone  a 
noticeable  change.  The  extraordinary  activity  that  characterized  the  second 
year  of  the  war,  when  the  insurgents  invaded  even  the  hitherto  unharmed 
fields  of  Pinar  del  Rio  and  carried  havoc  and  destruction  up  to  the  walls  of  the 
city  of  Havana  itself,  had  relapsed  into  a  dogged  struggle  in  the  central  and 
eastern  provinces.  The  Spanish  arms  regained  a  measure  of  control  in  Pinar 
del  Rio  and  parts  of  Havana,  but,  under  the  existing  conditions  of  the  rural 
country,  without  immediate  improvement  of  their  productive  situation. 
Even  thus  partially  restricted,  the  revolutionists  held  their  own,  and  their 
conquest  and  submission,  put  forward  by  Spain  as  the  essential  and  sole  basis 
of  peace,  seemed  as  far  distant  as  at  the  outset." 

Here  is  the  exercise  of  the  judicial  faculty.  Mr.  Davis  reported:  "It  is 
the  opinion  of  this  committee  that  the  time  to  interpose  has  arrived;  that 
intervention  which  will  stop  the  war  and  secure  the  national  independence  of 
Cuba  should  at  once  take  place. ' ' 

Even  this  was  not  going  far  enough.  The  annexed  document  is  an 
essential  part  of  the  record : 


214  SENTIMENTS    OF    THE    PEOPLE    OP    CUBA. 


"VIEWS   OF    MINORITY. 

"The  undersigned  members  of  said  committee  cordially  concur  in  the 
report  made  upon  the  Cuban  resolutions,  but  we  favor  the  immediate  recogni 
tion  of  the  Republic  of  Cuba,  as  organized  in  that  island,  as  a  free,  independ 
ent,  and  sovereign  power  among  the  nations  of  the  world. 

"DAVID    TURPIE. 

"R.   Q.   MILLS. 

"JNO.  W.   DANIEL. 

"J.   B.   FORAKER." 

There  was  for  a  time  a  formidable  following  of  this  doctrine,  which  was  an 
effusion  of  passion  and  an  apotheosis  of  imposture,  and  it  will  claim  a  fixed 
place  in  the  popular  recollection,  to  mark  the  danger  escaped,  showing  that 
when  the  Senate  tottered  on  the  edge  of  a  precipice,  the  quality  of  public 
safety  was  found  in  the  House.  Far  beyond  all  other  investigating  commit 
tees,  the  army  of  the  United  States  discovered  the  whole  truth,  and  there  are 
clouds  of  witnesses  that  our  recognition  of  the  Cuban  "Republic"  as  an  estab 
lished  government  would  have  been  a  degradation  of  ourselves.  This  does 
not  imply  that  the  Cuban  insurgent  forces  are  not  largely  composed  of  brave 
and  honest  men,  and  that  there  is  not  capacity  in  them  to  participate  in  good 
government,  but  all  that  concerned  them  was  subjected  to  competitive 
deceptions  from  the  peninsular  and  insular  people  who  had  the  same  habits  of 
both  misapprehending  and  misrepresenting  themselves  and  prevaricating, 
whether  as  friends  or  foemen.  The  Cuban  cause  would  have  been  greatly 
benefited  if  it  had  been  truthfully  served,  though  nothing  could  have  excused 
or  even  considerably  extenuated  the  confirmation  of  the  Spanish  accusation  of 
following  the  precedent  of  San  Domingo,  a  cause  that  produced  heroes  and 
yet  bequeathed  to  the  world  a  startling  lesson  of  the  crimes  that  may  be  com 
mitted  in  the  name  of  liberty,  the  barbarism  of  which  license  is  productive. 

However,  the  greater  crimes  in  the  Indies  have  had  their  origin  in  the 
wrongs  inflicted  upon  labor  paid  with  the  lash,  and  the  greed  of  the  strong  in 
consuming  the  earnings  of  the  weak. 

The  events  immediately  preceding  the  blowing  up  of  the  Maine  are  pre 
sented  in  the  dispatches  passing  between  Consul-General  Lee  and  Secretary  of 
State  Day.  January  12,  1898,  mobs,  led  by  Spanish  officers,  attacked  the 


SENTIMENTS    OF    THE    PEOPLE    OF    CUBA.  215 

offices  of  three  newspapers  advocating  autonomy.  The  autonomists  were 
rhetoricians,  who  thought  reform  could  be  founded  in  fine  words.  Mobs,  on 
the  1 3th,  shouted  against  Blanco  and  for  Weyler;  the  palace  and  consulate 
were  guarded.  General  Lee  thought  if  Blanco  could  not  control  the  situation, 
"or  if  Americans  and  their  interests  are  in  danger,  ships  must  be  sent;"  and 
it  was  added  they  must  be  ready  to  move  promptly.  Quiet  prevailed  for  a 
few  days.  January  24th  Mr.  Day  telegraphed  Mr.  Lee: 

"It  is  the  purpose  of  this  government  to  resume  friendly  naval  visits  at 
Cuban  ports.  In  that  view  the  Maine  will  call  at  the  port  of  Havana  in  a  day 
or  two.  Please  arrange  for  a  friendly  interchange  of  calls  with  authorities." 

Lee  telegraphed  at  once: 

"Advise  visit  be  postponed  six  or  seven  days,  to  give  last  excitement 
more  time  to  disappear.  Will  see  authorities  and  let  you  know  result.  Gov 
ernor-General  away  for  two  weeks.  I  should  know  day  and  hour  visit." 

Mr.  Day  responded,  24th: 

"Maine  has  been  ordered.  Will  probably  arrive  at  Havana  sometime 
to-morrow.  Cannot  tell  hour ;  possibly  early.  Cooperate  with  authorities  for 
her  friendly  visit.  Keep  us  advised  by  frequent  telegrams." 

The  next  dispatch  from  Lee  was  on  January  25th,  that  the  "authorities 
profess  to  think  United  States  has  ulterior  purpose  in  sending  ship — would 
obstruct  autonomy,  produce  excitement,  probably  demonstration;"  and  they 
asked  that  the  Maine  should  not  be  sent  until  instructions  could  be  received 
from  Madrid,  and  the  closing  words  of  the  dispatch  were  that  the  authorities 
said,  "If  for  friendly  motives,  as  claimed,  delay  unimportant."  On  the  same 
day,  "Ship  quietly  arrived"  at  eleven  in  the  morning.  There  was  no  demon 
stration.  Spanish  commanders  called  on  the  commander  of  the  Maine,  and 
salutes  were  exchanged.  It  will  be  observed  that  the  first  feeling  of  the 
Spaniards  was  unfriendly  to  the  Maine,  and  this  was  succeeded  by  civility. 
General  Lee,  with  Captain  Sigsbee,  and  two  officers,  called  on  the  acting 
1  aptain-General  January  zyth,  and  the  following  day  Lee  telegraphed: 

"Acting  Governor-General  Parrado  and  staff  went  with  me  this  morning 
to  return  visit  of  Sigsbee.  Inspected  the  Maine,  were  entertained  and  given 
the  appropriate  salute.  Expressed  pleasure  at  their  reception  and  admiration 
for  the  splendid  battleship." 

On  the  4th  of  February  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  thought  it  "not  prudent 
for  sanitary  reasons"  to  remain  long  in  Havana.  If  there  was  another  vessel 


216  SENTIMENTS    OF    THE    PEOPLE    OF    CUBA. 

than  the  Maine  sent,  what  kind  of  a  ship  should  it  be?  Lee  replied  same 
day: 

"Do  not  think  slightest  sanitary  danger  to  officers  or  crew  until  April  or 
even  May.  Ship  or  ships  should  be  kept  here  all  the  time  now.  We  should 
not  relinquish  position  of  peaceful  control  of  situation,  or  conditions  would  be 
worse  than  if  vessel  had  never  been  sent.  Americans  would  depart  with 
their  families  in  haste  if  no  vessel  in  harbor,  on  account  of  distrust  of  preser 
vation  of  order  by  authorities.  If  another  riot  occurs,  will  be  against 
Governor-General  and  autonomy,  but  might  include  an ti- American  demonstra 
tion  also.  First-class  battleship  should  replace  present  one  if  relieved,  as 
object  lesson  and  to  counteract  Spanish  opinion  of  our  Navy,  and  should  have 
torpedo  boat  with  it  to  preserve  communication  with  Admiral." 

February  nth  Lee  telegraphed:  "Sigsbee  attended  General  Blanco's 
reception  with  me  last  night.  This  morning  paid  him  and  others  of  govern 
ment  officials  visit."  The  next  telegram  in  order  was: 

(General  Lee  to  Mr.  Day.) 

"Havana,  February  16,  1898,  12:30  p.  m. — Mjiine  blown  up  and  destroyed 
to-nignt  at  9 140  p.  m.  Explosion  occurred  well  forward  under  quarters  of 
crew;  consequence  many  were  lost.  It  is  believed  all  officers  saved,  but 
Jenkins  and  Merritt  not  yet  accounted  for.  Cause  of  explosion  yet  to  be 
investigated.  Captain-General  and  Spanish  army  and  navy  officers  have 
rendered  every  assistance.  Sigsbee  and  most  of  his  officers  on  Ward  steamer 
City  of  Washington.  Others  on  Spanish  man-of-war  and  in  city.  Am  with 
Sigsbee  now,  who  has  telegraphed  Navy  Department." 

On. the  8th  of  January  General  Lee  wrote  Secretary  Day: 

"I  estimate  that  probably  200,000  of  the  rural  population  in  the  provinces 
of  Pinar  del  Rio,  Havana,  Matanzas,  and  Santa  Clara  have  died  of  starvation 
or  from  resultant  causes,  and  the  deaths  of  whole  families  almost  simultane 
ously  or  within  a  few  days  of  each  other,  and  of  mothers  praying  for  their 
children  to  be  relieved  of  their  horrible  sufferings  by  death,  are  not  the  least 
of  the  many  pitiable  scenes  which  were  ever  present.  In  the  provinces  of 
Puerto  Principe  and  Santiago  de  Cuba,  where  the  'reconcentrado  order'  could 
not  be  enforced,  the  great  mass  of  the  people  are  self-sustaining." 

The  following  is  one  of  General  Lee's  inclosures: 

"Statistics  of  death  rate  in  Santa  Clara  (a  town  of  14,000  inhabitants) : 


SENTIMENTS    OF    THE    PEOPLE    OF    CUBA.  217 


1890 578 

1891 720 

1892 596 

1893  . 619 

1894 687 

1895 872 


1896  (epidemic  of  yellow  fever 
among- army  and  Cubans)    .    1,417 

5,489 

1897  (no  epidemic)     ....  6,981 


(1,492  more  than  in  seven  previous  years.)" 

After  the  funeral  civilities  over  the  victims  of  the  Maine,  the  Spanish 
officials  found,  through  a  Naval  Board  of  inquiry,  March  22d: 

"That  the  character  of  the  proceedings  undertaken  and  respect  for  the 
law  which  establishes  the  absolute  extra  territoriality  of  a  foreign  war  vessel 
have  prevented  the  determination,  even  by  conjecture,  of  the  said  internal 
origin  of  the  disaster,  to  which  also  the  impossibility  of  establishing  the 
necessary  communication  either  with  the  crew  of  the  wrecked  vessel  or 
the  officials  of  their  government  commissioned  to  investigate  the  causes 
of  the  said  event,  or  with  those  subsequently  intrusted  with  the  issue,  has 
contributed. 

"Sixth.  That  the  interior  and  exterior  examination  of  the  bottom  of  the 
Maine,  whenever  it  is  possible,  unless  the  bottom  of  the  ship  and  that  of  the 
place  in  the  bay  where  it  is  sunk  are  altered  by  the  work  which  is  being 
carried  on  for  the  total  or  partial  recovery  of  the  vessel,  will  prove  the 
correctness  of  all  that  is  said  in  this  report;  but  this  must  not  be 
understood  to  mean  that  the  accuracy  of  these  present  conclusions  requires 
such  proof." 

The  United  States  naval  court  of  inquiry,  convened  by  Rear-Admiral 
Montgomery  Sicard,  in  pursuance  of  orders  of  the  Department,  found 
that: 

"The  destruction  of  the  Maine  occurred  at  9:40  p.  m.,  on  the  i5th  day  of 
February,  1898,  in  the  harbor  of  Havana,  Cuba,  she  being  at  the  time  moored 
to  the  same  buoy  to  which  she  had  been  taken  upon  her  arrival.  There  were 
two  explosions  of  a  distinctly  different  character,  with  a  very  short  but  dis 
tinct  interval  between  them,  and  the  forward  part  of  the  ship  was  lifted  to  a 
•marked  degree  at  the  time  of  the  first  explosion.  The  first  explosion  was 
more  in  the  nature  of  a  report  like  that  of  a  gun,  while  the  second  explosion 
was  more  open,  prolonged,  and  of  greater  volume.  This  second  explosion 
was,  in  the  opinion  of  the  court,  caused  by  the  partial  explosion  of  two  or 
more  of  the  forward  magazines  of  the  Maine. 


2i8  SENTIMENTS    OF    THE    PEOPLE    OF    CUBA. 

"At  frame  17  the  outer  shell  of  the  ship,  from  a  point  n^  feet  from  the 
middle  line  of  the  ship,  and  6  feet  above  the  keel  when  in  its  normal  position, 
has  been  forced  up  so  as  to  be  now  about  4  feet  above  the  surface  of  the 
water,  therefore  about  34  feet  above  where  it  would  be  had  the  ship  sunk 
uninjured. 

"The  outside  bottom  plating  is  bent  into  a  reversed  V-shape  (^\),  the  after 
wing  of  which,  about  15  feet  broad  and  32  feet  in  length  (from  frame  17  to 
frame  25),  is  doubled  back  upon  itself  against  the  continuation  of  the  same 
plating,  extending  forward. 

"At  frame  18  the  vertical  keel  is  broken  in  two,  and  the  flat  keel  bent 
into  an  angle  similar  to  the  angle  formed  by  the  outside  bottom  plating. 
This  break  is  now  about  6  feet  below  the  surface  of  the  water,  and  about  30 
feet  above  its  normal  position. 

"In  the  opinion  of  the  court  this  effect  could  have  been  produced  only  by 
the  explosion  of  a  mine  situated  under  the  bottom  of  the  ship  at  about  frame 
1 8  and  somewhat  on  the  port  side  of  the  ship. 

"The  court  finds  that  the  loss  of  the  Maine  on  the  occasion  named  was 
not  in  any  respect  due  to  fault  or  negligence  on  the  part  of  any  of  the  officers 
or  members  of  the  crew  of  said  vessel. 

"In  the  opinion  of  the  court  the  Maine  was  destroyed  by  the  explosion  of 
a  submarine  mine,  which  caused  the  partial  explosion  of  two  or  more  of  the 
forward  magazines. 

"The  court  has  been  unable  to  obtain  evidence  fixing  the  responsibility  for 
the  destruction  of  the  Maine  upon  any  person  or  persons. ' ' 

There  is  no  rational  question  that  the  condition  of  the  wreck  of  the  Maine 
demonstrates  the  first  explosion  was  exterior,  and  that  exempting  the  higher 
Spanish  officers  from  the  charge  of  guilty  knowledge,  there  must  have  been 
some  concerned  who  had  official  information  and  responsibility.  We  give 
the  official  casualty  list  on  the  Maine.  It  far  exceeds  in  extent  of  fatalities  all 
the  losses  of  the  American  navy  in  all  the  service  of  our  squadrons  in  the 
annihilation  of  the  fleets  of  Montijo  and  Cervera  at  Manila  and  Santiago,  and 
all  the  combats  with  the  shore  batteries  of  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico: 

"U.  S.  S.  Maine,  ist  rate,  blown  up  in  Havana  harbor,  February  15,  1898. 
List  of  officers,  sailors,  and  marines  on  board  of  the  U.  S.  S.  Maine,  who  were 
killed  or  drowned  when  that  vessel  was  wrecked  in  the  harbor  of  Havana, 
February  15,  1898,  or  who  subsequently  died  of  their  injuries." 


I 


CAPTAIN  SIGSBEE,  WHO  COMMANDED  THE  ILL-FATED  "MAINE.' 


SENTIMENTS  OF  THE  PEOPLE  OF  CUBA. 


221 


(The   men  marked  with  an  asterisk   (*)   died    subsequently  of    injuries 
received  when  the  U.  S.  S.  Maine  was  destroyed.) 

OFFICERS. 

Jenkins,  Frederick  W.,  lieutenant. 
Merritt,  Darwin  R.,  assistant  engineer. 


SAILORS. 


Adams,  John  T.,  coal  passer. 
Aitken,  James  P.,  boatswain's  mate, 

first  class. 
Anderson,    John,    boatswain's    mate, 

second  class. 

Andersen,  Holm  A. ,  coal  passer. 
Anderson,  Charles,  landsman. 
Anderson,  Gustav  A.,  seaman. 
Anderson,  John,  seaman. 
Anderson,  Axel  C.,  seaman. 
Andrews,  Frank,  ordinary  seaman. 
Anfindsen,  Abraham,  cockswain. 
Anglund,  Bernhard,  blacksmith. 
Auchenbach,  Harry,  fireman,  second 

class. 

Barry,  John  P.,  apprentice,  first  class. 
Barry,  Lewis  L.,  coal  passer. 
Baum,  Henry  S.,  landsman. 
Becker,  Jakob,  chief  machinist. 
Bell,  John  R.,  cabin  steward. 
Blomberg,  Fred,  landsman. 
Bookbinder,  John,  apprentice,  second 

class. 

Boll,  Fritz,  bayman. 
Bonner,  Leon,  seaman. 
Brinkman,  Heinrich,  seaman. 
Brofeldt,  Arthur,  chief  gunner's  mate. 
Bruns,  AdolphC.,  quartermaster,  third 

class. 

Burns,  Edward,  coal  passer. 
Burkhardt,     Robert,     quartermaster, 

second  class. 


Butler,      Frederick      F.,      machinist, 

second  class. 
Boyle,     James,     quartermaster,     first 

class. 

Clarke,  James  C.,  shipwright. 
Caine,  Thomas,  blacksmith. 
Cameron,  Walter,  seaman. 
Carr,    Herbert    M.,    gunner's    mate, 

second  class. 

Caulfield,  William  R.  B.,  landsman. 
Chingi,  Suke,  mess  attendant. 
Christiansen,    Charles     A.,     fireman, 

first  class. 

Clark,  Thomas,  coal  passer. 
Cochrane,  Michael,  fireman,  first  class. 
Cole,  Thomas  M.,  bayman. 
Coleman,   William,   ordinary  seaman. 
Coleman,    William,    fireman,    second 

class. 

Conroy,  Anthony,  coal  passer. 
Cosgrove,    William,    fireman,   second 

class. 

Curran,  Charles,  cockswain. 
Dahlman,  Berger,  seaman. 
Dennig,  Charles,  seaman. 
Donoughy,    William,    ordinary     sea 
man. 

Drury,  James,  fireman,  first  class. 
Edler,  George,  seaman. 
Eiermann,   Charles    F.    W.,   gunner's 

mate,  first  class. 
*Erikson,  Andrew  V.,  seaman, 


222 


SENTIMENTS    OF    THE    PEOPLE    OF    CUBA, 


SAILORS— CONTINUED. 


Etts,  John  P.,  seaman. 

Evensen,  Karl,  seaman. 

Fadde,    Charles     F.     J.,     apprentice, 

first  class. 

Falk,  Rudolph,  oiler. 
Faubel,  George  D.,  chief  machinist. 
Fewer,  William  J.,  boatswain's  mate, 

second  class. 

Finch,  Trubie,  apprentice,  first  class. 
*Fisher,  Frank,  ordinary  seaman. 
Fisher,  Alfred  J.,  oiler. 
Flaherty,  Michael,  fireman,  first  class. 
Fleishman,  Lewis  M.,  seaman. 
Flynn,  Patrick,  fireman,  second  class. 
Fougere,  John,  coal  passer. 
Fountain,  Bartley,   boatswain's  mate, 

first  class. 

Frank,  Charles,  apprentice,  first  class. 
Furlong,  James  F.,  coal  passer. 
Gaifney,  Patrick,   fireman,  first  class. 
Gardner,  Frank,  coal  passer. 
Gardner,  Thomas  J.,  chief  yeoman. 
Gorman,   William    H.,   ordinary  sea 
man. 

Gordon,  Joseph  F. ,  fireman,  first  class. 
Graham,  James  A.,  chief  yeoman. 
Graham,  Edward  P.,  coal  passer. 
Grady,  Patrick,  coal  passer. 
Greer,   William    A.,   apprentice,   first 

class. 
Griffin,      Michael,      fireman,      second 

class. 

Gross,  Henry,  landsman. 
Grupp,  Reinhardt,  coal  passer. 
Hallberg,  John  A.,  oiler. 
Hamburger,  William,  landsman. 
Hamilton,     Charles     A.,     apprentice, 

first  class. 
Hamilton,    John,     chief     carpenter's 

mate. 


Hanrahan,  William  C.,  cockswain. 

Harris,  Edward,  water  tender. 

Harris,  Millard  F.,  quartermaster, 
third  class. 

Harley,  Daniel  O'C.  fireman,  second 
class. 

Harty,  Thomas  J.,  coal  passer. 

Hassell,  Charles  F.,  gunner's  mate, 
third  class. 

Hauck,  Charles,  landsman. 

Hawkins,  Howard  B.,  ordinary  sea 
man. 

Hennekes,  Albert  B.,  gunner's  mate, 
second  class. 

Herriman,  Benjamin  H.,  apprentice, 
first  class. 

*Holzer,  Frederick  C.,  ordinary  sea 
man. 

Holm,  Gustav,  boatswain's  mate, 
second  class. 

^Holland,  Alfred  J.,  cockswain. 

Horn,  William  J.,  fireman,  first  class. 

Hough,  William  L.,  landsman. 

Hughes,  Patrick,  fireman,   first  class. 

Ishida,  Otogiro,  steerage  cook. 

Johansen,  Peter  C.,  seaman. 

Johnson,  Charles,  ordinary  seaman. 

Johnson,  John  W.,  landsman. 

Johnsson,  Peter,  oiler. 

Johnson,  George,  coal  passer. 

Jones,  Thomas  J.,  coal  passer. 

*Jectson,  Harry,  seaman. 

Jencks,  Carlton,  gunner's  mate,  third 
class. 

Jernee,  Fred,  coal  passer. 

Just,  Charles  F.,  apprentice,  first 
class. 

Kane,  Michael,  coal  passer. 

Kay,  John  A.,  machinist,  first  class. 

Kelly,  Hugh,  coal  passer, 


SENTIMENTS  OF  THE  PEOPLE  OF  CUBA. 


223 


SAILORS— CONTINUED. 


Kelly,  John,  coal  passer. 
Keskull,  Alexander,  seaman. 
Keys,  Harry  J.,  ordinary  seaman. 
Kihlstrom,  Fritz,  ordinary  seaman. 
Kinsey,      Frederick     E.,      machinist, 

second  class. 
Kinsella,       Thomas      F.,      machinist, 

second  class. 
Kitagata,    Ytikichi,    warrant    officers' 

cook. 
Kniese,      Frederick     H.,      machinist, 

first  class. 
*Koebler,  George  W.,  apprentice,  first 

class. 
Kranyak,    Charles,    apprentice,    first 

class. 

Krtise,  Hugo,  painter. 
Laird,  Charles,   master-at-arms,   third 

class. 
Lambert,    William,    Fireman,    second 

class. 
Lancaster,  Luther,  boatswain's  mate, 

second  class. 
Lapierre,     George,     apprentice,     first 

class. 

Lawler,  Edward,  coal  passer. 
League,  James  M.,  chief  yeoman. 
Lee,  William  J.,  apprentice,  first  class. 
Leene,  Daniel,  coal  passer. 
Lees,  Samuel,  ordinary  seaman. 
Leupold,     Gustav,     fireman,    second 

class. 

Lewis,  John  B.,  water  tender. 
Lewis,  Daniel,  oiler. 
Lieber,      George,     apprentice,      first 

oiass. 

Lorenzen,  Jorgen  J.,  oiler. 
Louden,  James  W.,  apprentice,  second 

class. 
Lowell,  Clarence  E. ,  ordinary  seaman. 


Lund,  William,  cockswain. 

Lydon,  John  T.,  ordinary  seaman. 

Lynch,  Matthew,  coal  passer. 

Lynch,  Bernard,   fireman,   first  class. 

Malone,  Michael,  fireman, second  class. 

Marshall,  John  E.,  landsman. 

Marsden,  Benjamin  L.,  apprentice, 
first  class. 

Martensson,  Johan,  gunner's  mate, 
third  class. 

Mason,  James  H.,  landsman. 

Matiasen,  Carl,  seaman. 

Matza,  John,  coal  passer. 

Meilstrup,  Elmer  M.,  ordinary  sea 
man. 

Merz,  John,  landsman. 

Mero,  Eldon  H.,  chief  machinist. 

Miller,  George,  seaman. 

Miller,  William  S.,  apprentice,  second 
class. 

Mobles,  George,  cockswain. 

Moore,  Edward  H.,  coal  passer. 

Monfort,  William,  landsman. 

Moss,  Gerhard  C.,  machinist,  first 
class. 

Moss,  John  H.,  landsman. 

Mudd,  Noble  T.,  seaman. 

Murphy,  Cornelius,  oiler. 

McGonigle,  Hugh,  fireman,  second 
class. 

McManus,  John  J.,  fireman,  second 
class. 

McNiece,  Francis  J.,  coal  passer. 

Nielsen,  Sophus,  cockswain. 

Nielsen,  John  C.,  seaman. 

Nolan,  Charles  M.,  gunner's  mate, 
third  class. 

Noble,  William,  fireman,  second  class. 

Nagamine,  Tomekichi,  mess  attend 
ant. 


224 


SENTIMENTS    OF    THE    PEOPLE    OF    CUBA. 


SAILORS — CONTINUED. 


Ohye,  Mas,  mess  attendant. 

Ording,  Gustav  C.,  carpenter's  mate, 

third  class. 
O'Connor,    James*    chief    boatswain's 

mate. 
O'Hagan,  Thomas  J.,  apprentice,  first 

class. 
O'Neill,      Patrick,      fireman,      second 

class. 

O'Regan,  Henry  H.,  water  tender. 
Paige,  Frederick,  landsman. 
Palmgren,  John,  seaman. 
Perry,  Robert,  mess  attendant. 
Phillips,  Francis  C.,   apprentice,   first 

class. 

Pinkney,  James,  mess  attendant. 
Porter,  John,  coal  passer. 
Powers,  John,  oiler. 
Price,  Daniel,  fireman,  first  class. 
Quigley,     Thomas    J.,    plumber   and 

fitter. 

Quinn,  Charles  P.,  oiler. 
Reilly,  Joseph,  fireman,  first  class. 
Reiger,   William  A.,   gunner's   mate, 

first  class. 

Rising,  Newell,  coal  passer. 
Robinson,  William,  landsman. 
Roos,  Peter,  sail  maker. 
Rush  worth,  William,  chief  machinist. 
Safford,   Clarence  E.,  gunner's  mate, 

first  class. 

Salmin,  Michael  E.,  ordinary  seaman. 
Schroeder,  August,  ordinary  seaman. 
Scott,  Charles  A.,  carpenter's  mate, 

second  class. 

Scully,  Joseph,  boiler  maker. 
Seery,  Joseph,  fireman,  first  class. 


Sellers,  Walter  S.,  apothecary. 
Shea,  Patrick  J.,  fireman,   first  class. 
Shea,  Thomas,  landsman. 
Shea,  John  J.,  coal  passer. 
Sheridan,  Owen,  fireman,  second  class. 
Shilling-ton,  John   H.,   yeoman,   third 

class. 

Simmons,  Alfred, .coal  passer. 
*Smith,  Carl  A.,  seaman. 
Smith,   Nicholas  J.,    apprentice,   first 

class. 

Stevenson,  Nicholas,  seaman. 
Sugisaki,  Isa,  wardroom  steward. 
Sutton,  Frank,  fireman,  second  class, 
Suzuki,  Kashitara,  mess  attendant. 
Talbbt,  Frank  C.,  landsman. 
Tehan,  Daniel  J.,  coal  passer. 
Thompson,  George,  landsman. 
Tigges,  Frank  B.,  coppersmith. 
Tinsman,  William  H.,  landsman. 
Todoresco,   Constantin,   fireman,   first 

class. 

Troy,  Thomas,  coal  passer. 
Tuohey,  Martin,  coal  passer. 
Walsh,  Joseph  F.,  cockswain. 
Wallace,  John,  ordinary  seaman. 
Warren,  John,  fireman,   second  class. 
White,   Charles   O.,    chief    master-at- 

arms. 

Whiten,  George,  seaman. 
White,  Robert,  mess  attendant. 
Wickstrom,  Johan  E.,  seaman. 
Wilson,  Albert,  seaman. 
Wilson,  Robert,   chief  quartermaster. 
Wilbur,   George  W.,  apprentice,   first 

class. 
Ziegler,  John  H.,  coal  passer. 


SENTIMENTS  OF  THE  PEOPLE  OP  CUBA. 


227 


MARINES. 


Wagner,  Henry,  first  sergeant. 
Bennet,  John,  private. 
Betting,  Vincent  H.,  private. 
Brosnan,  George,  private. 
Burns,  James  R.,  private. 
Brown,  James  T. ,  sergeant. 
Dierking,  John  H.,  drummer. 
Downing,  Michael  J.,  private. 
Johnson,  Charles  E.,  private. 
Jordan,  William  J.,  private. 
Kean,  Edward  F.,  private. 
Kelly,  Frank,  private. 
Lauriette,  George  M.,  private. 
Losko,  Peter  A.,  private. 


Monahan,  Joseph  P.,  private. 
McDermott,  John,  private. 
Newton,  C.  H.,  fifer. 
Newman,  F.  J.,  private. 
Richter,  A.  H.,  corporal. 
Roberts,  James  H.,  private. 
Schoen,  Joseph,  corporal. 
Stock,  H.  E.,  private. 
Strongman,  James,  private. 
Suman,  E.  B.,  private. 
Timpany,  E.  B.,  private. 
Van  Horn,  H.  A.,  private. 
Warren,  Asa  V.,  private. 
Wills,  A.  O.,  private. 


LIST    OF    OFFICERS,    SAILORS,    AND    MARINES    ON    BOARD 
OF    THE    U.    S.    S.    MAINE    WHO    WERE    SAVED. 

Capt.  Charles  D.  Sigsbee,  commanding. 
Lieut.  Commander  Richard  Wainwright. 

Lieuts.  George  F.  W.  Holman,  John  Hood,  and  Carl  W.  Jungen. 
Lieuts.  (Junior  Grade)  George  P.  Blow,  John  J.  Blandin. 
Naval  Cadets  Jonas  H.  Holden,  Watt  T.   Cluverius,  Amon  Bronson,  and 
David  F.  Boyd,  Jr. 

Surg.  Lucien  G.  Heneberger. 

Paymaster  Charles  M.  Ray. 

Chief  Engineer  Charles  P.  Howell. 

Passed  Assistant  Engineer  Frederic  C.  Bowers. 

Assistant  Engineer  John  R.  Morris. 

Naval  Cadets  (engineer  division)  Pope  Washington  and  Arthur  Crenshaw. 

Chaplain  John  P.  Chidwick. 

First  Lieut,  of  Marines  Albertus  W.  Catlin. 

Boatswain  Francis  E.  Larkin. 

Gunner  Joseph  Hill. 

Carpenter  George  Helms. 

Pay  Clerk  B.  McCarty. 


SAILORS. 


Allen,  James  W.,  mess  attendant. 
Anderson,  Oskar,  cockswain. 
Awo,  Firsanion,  steerage  cook. 


Bergman,  Charles,  boatswain's  matev 

first  class. 
Bloomer,  John  H.,  landsman. 


SENTIMENTS    OF    THE    PEOPLE    OF    CUBA. 


SAILORS— CONTINUED. 


Bullock,  Charles  H.,   gunner's  mate, 

second  class. 

Cahill,  Francis  D.,  landsman. 
Christiansen,  Karl,  fireman,  first  class. 
Cronin,  Daniel,  landsman. 
David,  George,  ordinary  seaman. 
Dolan,  John,  seaman. 
Dressier,   Gustav  J.,  apprentice,   first 

class. 

Durckin,  Thomas  J.,  ordinary  seaman. 
Flynn,  Michael,  seaman. 
Foley,     Patrick    J.,    apprentice,     first 

class. 

Fox,  George,  landsman. 
Gartrell,   William    M.,    fireman,    first 

class. 

Hallberg,  Alfred,  cockswain. 
Ham,  Ambrose,  ^prentice,  first  class. 
Harris,  Westmore,  mess  attendant. 
Heffron,  John,  ordinary  seaman. 
Herbert,  John,  landsman. 
Herness,   Alfred   B.,   gunner's    mate, 

third  class. 

Hutchings,  Robert,  landsman. 
Johnson,  Alfred,  seaman. 
Kane,  Joseph  H.,  landsman. 
Kushida,    Katsusaburo,     warrant    of 
ficers'  steward. 
Lanahan,  Michael,  landsman. 
Larsen,  Peder,  seaman. 
Larsen,  Martin,  seaman. 
Load,  John  B.,   master-at-arms,  third 

class. 


Lohman,  Charles  A.,  coal  passer. 

Mack,  Thomas,  landsman. 

Matsen,  Edward,  ordinary  seaman. 

Mattisen,  William,  ordinary  seaman. 

Melville,  Thomas,  coal  passer. 

Mikkelsen,  Peter,  seaman. 

Moriniere,  Louis,  seaman. 

McCann,  Harry,  seaman. 

McNair,  William,  ordinary  seaman. 

Panck,  John  H.,   fireman,   first  class. 

Pilcher,  Charles  F. ,  ordinary  seaman. 

Rau,  Arthur,  seaman. 

Reden,  Martin,  seaman. 

Richards,      Walter     E.,     apprentice, 

second  class. 

Rowe,  James,  ship's  cook,  fourth  class. 
Rusch,  Frank,  ordinary  seaman. 
Schwartz,    George,    ship's    cook,    first 

class. 

Shea,  Jeremiah,  coal  passer. 
Teackle,  Harry,  seaman. 
Thompson,  William  H.,  landsman. 
Toppin,  Daniel  G.,  wardroom  cook. 
Turpin,  John  H.,  mess  attendant. 
Waters,  Thomas  J.,  landsman. 
Webber,  Martin  V.,  landsman. 
White,  John  E.,  landsman. 
Williams,  James,  gunner's  mate,  third 

class. 

Williams,  Henry,  cabin  cook. 
Willis,     Alonzo,     apprentice,    second 

class. 
Wilbur,  Benjamin  R.,  cockswain. 


MARINES. 


Anthony,  William,  private. 
Coffey,  John,  private. 
Galpin,  C.  P.,  private. 
Germond,  C.  V.,  private. 
Lutz,  Joseph,  private. 


Loftus,  Paul,  private. 
McDevitt,  William,  private. 
McGuinness,  William,  private. 
McKay,  Edward,  private. 
Meehan,  Michael,  sergeant. 


Thompson,  T.  G.,  corporal. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

The  San  Domingo  Torch  in  Aid  of  the  Cuban  Rebellion. 

The  Policy  of  Maximo  Gomez,  and  the  Famine  in  Cuba — The  Reports  of  American  Consuls 
in  Cuba  on  the  Cane  Burning  and  its  Relation  to  the  Starvation  of  the  People — The 
Agent  of  the  Cubans  in  Arms  Justified  Barbarism — The  Testimony  of  Our  Consuls  that 
the  Gomez  Policy  was  the  Cause  of  the  Death  of  Thousands — Direct  Evidence  of  Black 
Mail  Taxes  and  the  Anxiety  of  Cuban  People  to  be  Annexed  to  the  United  States.— The 
Desperado  Orders  by  Gomez  Before  Weyler  Came  to  Cuba. 

One  of  the  well  remembered  circumstances  of  the  agitations  that  preceded 
the  declaration  of  war  with  Spain  a  few  days  was  the  intensity  with  which  the 
champions  of  the  freedom  and  independence  of  the  Republic  of  Cuba  demanded 
the  reports  that  the  American-Cuban  consuls  had  furnished  the  State  De 
partment,  respecting  the  Spanish  policy  of  the  malicious  extermination  of 
the  Cuban  people,  and  there  was  a  clamor  because  it  was  held  to  be  prudent 
to  revise  those  papers,  or  withhold  them  for  a  few  days,  in  order  that  the  Span 
iards  might  not  find,  in  the  official  statements  of  the  consuls,  reasons  that 
would  seem  to  demand  the  slaughter  of  writers  of  truth  about  the  island. 

There  were  two  or  three  days'  waiting,  when  the  consuls  were  withdrawn 
from  their  posts,  and  preserved,  events  following  so  fast  that  what  they  had  to 
say  about  Cuban  affairs  has  never  received  very  much  attention.  The  real 
character  of  the  documentary  evidence  will,  as  a  rule,  be  in  the  nature  of  news 
to  those  who  read  this  volume.  The  newspapers  having  the  country  in  charge 
and  having  undertaken  the  management  of  the  war,  had  not  much  space  to 
give  Cuban  outrages  when  once  there  was  assurance  that  we  were  going  to 
war  with  the  Spaniards. 

On  the  day  the  Maine  was  blown  up,  February  15,  1898,  General  Lee 
wrote  to  President  McKinley,  enclosing  a  letter  from  the  insurgent  General 
Maximo  Gomez,  without  date,  in  which  the  general  said: 

"The  revolution,  as  absolute  master  of  the  country,  has  never  prohibited 

any  citizen,  whatever  his  nationality,  from  earning  his  living,  and  it  has  hap- 

229 


23o  TORCH    IN    AID    OF    THE    CUBAN    REBELLION. 

pened  that  as  soon  as  the  barbarous  concentration  decree  was  promulgated 
innumerable  families  have  left  and  still  leave  the  city  for  the  field,  impelled  by 
hunger  to  wrest  from  the  fruitful  Cuban  vegetation  the  means  of  relieving  the 
most  pressing  needs  of  life.  Those  unhappy  beings  ignore  the  fact  that  if  the 
Spaniards,  by  steel  and  privation,  have  shrouded  their  hearths  in  mourning, 
so  also  it  might  be  said  that  the  flora  of  Cuba  was  in  mourning,  devastated  by 
the  bullet  and  torch." 

It  must,  of  course,  have  been  a  solemn  occasion  when  General  Gomez 
referred  to  the  "torch,"  at  the  same  time  claiming  that  he  had  done  nothing 
to  prevent  the  gaining  of  a  livelihood  by  any  man.  When  the  Hon.  T. 
Estrada  Palma,  in  1895,  December  yth,  wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  State  Rich 
ard  Olney,  he  made  a  statement  of  points  upon  which  he  asked  "that  the  rights 
of  belligerency  be  accorded  them  by  your  government;"  and  he  stated  many 
propositions  and  elucidated  many  principles,  but  gave  the  greater  part  of  his 
interesting  narrative  to  the  achievements  of  Gomez,  especially  the  celebration 
of  his  campaign  against  Captain-General  Martinez  Campos,  who  was  as  a  fact 
pretty  roughly  handled.  The  strategy  of  fire  by  the  military  Commander-in- 
Chief  was  given  a  good  deal  of  space ;  and  as  far  east  as  Santa  Clara  Mr. 
Palma  mentions  that  "a  most  important  work  of  the  forces"  under  Gomez, 
"which  occupied  considerable  time*  and  caused  many  encounters  with  the 
enemy,  was  the  destruction  of  telegraph  and  telephone  communications  and 
railroads,  of  which  there  are  many  lines  or  branches  in  this  district."  Of 
course,  this  was  just  preparing  the  island  to  enter  upon  a  superior  course  of 
internal  improvements,  but  Gomez  had  everything  his  own  way,  the  Spanish 
not  interfering,  and  we  quote  Mr.  Palma's  report:  "Early  in  July  he  issued 
the  first  of  the  now  famous  orders  relative  to  the  sugar  crop,  and  announced 
his  intention  of  marching  through  Santa  Clara  and  into  Matanzas  in  the 
winter  in  order  to  superintend  the  carrying  out  of  his  decrees."  This  is  an 
official  avowal  to  the  Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States  by  the  authorized 
agent  of  the  Cubans  in  arms,  of  the  beginning  of  the  destruction  of  the  greatest 
industry  in  the  richest  island  in  the  world — and  as  Gomez  marched  westward 
the  skies  over  Cuba  were  flushed  with  fire,  so  that  the  red  glow  was  visible  at 
once  from  the  Atlantic  Ocean  and  the  Caribbean  Sea.  We  continue  to  quote 
from  Mr.  Palma — page  8,  following  the  demand  of  the  U.  S.  Senate  commit 
tee,  that  Cuba  should  at  once  take  her  place  as  a  sovereign  sister  among  the 
nations  of  the  earth. 


TORCH    IN    AID    OF    THE    CUBAN    REBELLION.  231 

"It  was  not  the  intention  of  General  Gomez  when  he  planned  his  winter 
campaign  to  inarch  on  and  lay  siege  to  the  capital,  his  only  object  being  to 
prevent  the  grinding  and  export  of  the  sugar  crop  and  the  consequent  flow  of 
treasure  into  the  Spanish  coffers,  and  to  demonstrate  to  the  world  that  he 
could  control  the  provinces  and  enforce  his  orders. 

"While  this  march  of  the  main  bodies  of  troops  westward  has  been  carried 
on,  the  Cuban  forces  of  the  other  army  corps  have  also  succeeded  in  carrying 
out  the  orders  concerning  sugar  cane  and  preventing  the  establishment  of 
Spanish  lines  of  communication." 

We  suppose  that  it  must  have  been  simply  the  modesty  of  Gomez  that  he 
did  not  "lay  siege"  to  Havana.  That  was  undoubtedly  the  way  to  fire  Cuba 
— or  it  would  have  been  if  it  had  not  been  for  the  regulation  of  the  sugar  busi 
ness  with  "the  torch."  But  Gomez  wrote  to  President  McKinley  on  the  day 
of  the  Maine  massacre  that  he  never  interfered  with  a  day's  work  that  was  to 
get  a  living. 

Mr.  Palma  describes  in  his  letter  to  Mr.  Olney  that  the  Cuban  army  con 
sisted  of  five  army  corps,  and  says:  "The  first  two  corps  consist  of  26,000 
men,  mostly  infantry;  the  third,  of  about  4,000  men,  mostly  cavalry;  the 
Fourth  and  Fifth  Corps  consisted  before  the  late  invasion  of  Gomez  of  over 
20, .000  men,  both  infantry  and  cavalry,  which  force  has  been  considerably 
increased  in  these  last  days." 

Now,  here  was  a  magnificent  army  of  liberation  of  50,000  men,  with  more 
coming,  and  arms  and  ammunition  pouring  in,  and  a  good  supply,  as  Mr. 
Palma  mentions,  of  artillery.  What  had  become  of  them  when  Maximo 
Gomez  was  thundering  at  the  gates  of  Havana  two  hundred  and  fifty  miles 
away,  with  his  body-guard  and  the  Victoria  regiment,  eighty  men  in  each  of 
the  august  regiments?  And  where  were  the  first,  and  second,  fourth  and  fifth 
army  corps  of  ten  thousand  men,  at  least,  in  each,  with  4,000  cavalry  to  boot, 
and  field  pieces  galore?  Where  were  those  glittering  hosts  when  our  small  army 
of  17,000  men  landed  near  Santiago  to  cooperate  with  the  Cuban  cavaliers  and 
legionaries?  Why  did  not  Gomez  take  his  swelling  ranks,  already  victorious 
in  setting  on  fire  hundreds  of  plantations,  and  set  up  a  republic  sure  enough? 

The  particular  object  in  gathering  the  Cuban  consuls'  reports  was  to 
kindle  a  blaze  with  them  like  that  of  a  flaming  cane  field,  so  as  to  fan  high  the 
blasts  of  war  with  the  intelligence,  indisputable  because  official,  of  the  horrors 
of  the  camps  where  the  small  farmers  were  passing  away  with  fevers  and 


232  TORCH    IN    AID    OF    THE    CUBAN    REBELLION. 

starvation,  the  grim  results  of  the  desolation  of  the  plantations  of  sugar  and 
tobacco.  Now,  General  Lee  believed  in  the  sincerity  of  Captain-General 
Blanco,  and  his  chief  of  staff,  Pando — believed  they  honestly  sought  to  make 
an  end  of  the  famine,  and  in  a  letter  from  Lee  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  Day, 
•November  23,  1897,  we  find  the  perfectly  frank  and  true  story  of  the  situation: 

"First.     The  insurgents  will  not  accept  autonomy. 

"Second.  A  large  majority  of  the  Spanish  subjects  who  have  commer 
cial  and  business  interests  and  own  property  here,  will  not  accept  autonomy, 
but  prefef  annexation  to  the  United  States  rather  than  an  independent  repub 
lic  or  genuine  autonomy  under  the  Spanish  flag. 

"Third.  The  Spanish  authorities  are  sincere  in  doing  all  in  their  power 
to  encourage,  protect,  and  promote  the  grinding  of  sugar.  The  grinding 
season  commences  in  December. 

"Fourth.  The  insurgents'  leaders  have  given  instructions  to  prevent 
grinding  wherever  it  can  be  done,  because  by  diminishing  the  export  of  sugar 
the  Spanish  government  revenues  are  decreased.  It  will  be  very  difficult  for 
the  Spanish  authorities  to  prevent  cane  burning,  because  one  man  at  night 
can  start  a  fire  which  will  burn  hundreds  of  acres,  just  as  a  single  individual 
could  ignite  a  prairie  by  throwing  a  match  into  the  dry  grass. " 

Precisely,  and  just  as  a  fool  or  a  fiend  can  burn  a  house  or  a  city.  Notice 
the  reference  to  Spanish  subjects  wanting  to  be  citizens  of  the  United  States. 

Mr.   A.   C.    Brice   was   the   consul  at   Matanzas,  and  wrote,  January   17, 


"The  scenes  of  misery  and  distress  daily  observed  are  beyond  belief. 
Here  is  one  out  of  hundreds.  In  a  family  of  seventeen  living  in  an  old  lime 
kiln,  upper  part  of  city  limits,  all  were  found  dead  except  three,  and  they 
barely  alive.  ...  A  few  of  the  strongest  of  these  people  have  been  sent 
out  to  sugar  plantations,  which  expect  to  grind.  They  get  30  cents  per  day 
and  board  themselves. 

"A  few  plantations  are  grinding  cane.  In  every  case  they  are  heavily 
guarded  by  Spanish  troops,  and  have  paid  insurgents  for  so  doing.  Was 
shown  a  letter  from  insurgent  chief  to  owner  of  a  large  plantation,  in  which 
the  price  demanded  for  grinding  was  2,000  cen tones  ($10,600  United  States 
gold).  It  was  paid.  To  make  crop  of  sugar  this  season  money,  oxen,  and 
laborers  must  be  had.  I  am,  etc.,  A.  C.  BRICE, 

"United  States  Consul." 


TORCH    IN    AID    OF    THE    CUBAN    REBELLION.  233 

Here  we  see  what  was  the  great  principle  of  "the  torch"  to  which  Gomez 
refers  in  such  a  dainty  way  in  his  letter  through  Lee  to  the  President.  He 
was  an  insurgent  chief  who  wanted  $10,000  United  States  gold  for  a  permit  to 
make  sugar  on  one  plantation ;  and  the  perishing  Cubans  of  the  famine  camps 
could  have  had  work  if  this  blackmail  tax  had  been  paid  to  the  Republic  of 
Cuba.  .^The  torch  of  liberty  was  to  light  the  flames  of  total  destruction  in  a 
great  cane  mill  that  offered  employment  to  the  starving — if  the  machinery 
moved  without  a  rebel  permit ;  and  yet  Gomez  would  not  allow  restraint  upon 
working  for  a  livelihood^ — except  in  a  case  where  $10,000  American  gold  was 
wanted  to  send  to  NVw  York  for  patriotic  purposes.  Some  of  our  great 
Statesmen  have  discovered  in  Gomez  a  second  George  Washington,  but  closely 
studied  there  is  to  be  found  some  difference  between  the  two  men. 

Mr.  Hyatt,  U.  S.  Consul  at  Santiago  de  Cuba,  writing  November  20, 
1897,  said: 

"The  Spanish  residents  of  the  island  are  becoming  very  outspoken  in 
favor  of  closing  the  war  and  annexation  to  the  United  States.  There  are 
numerous  inquiries  among  them  of  how  they  can  become  citizens  of  our 
Government.  There  are  also  quite  a  number  of  Spanish  soldiers  making  the 
same  inquiry.  The  business  Spaniards  here  declare  that  they  are  tired  of 
doing  business  at  a  loss,  and  that  peace  and  prosperity  can  only  come  by 
annexation.  Many  are  greatly  disappointed  that  the  United  States  consul 
cannot  make  American  citizens  of  them  at  once. 

"With  highest,  etc.,  PULASKI    F.   HYATT, 

"United  States  Consul." 

December  5,  1897,  Mr.  Hyatt  wrote:  "Mr.  Rigney,  an  American  sugar 
planter  near  Manzanilla,  was  preparing  to  grind  during  the  coming  season. 
A  few  nights  since  the  insurgents  fired  seven  cannon  shots  among  his  build 
ings,  one  ball  passing  through  the  roof  of  his  house.  Americans  were  hope 
ful  that  they  would  be  allowed  to  make  their  crop,  and  several  are  making 
ready  to  do  so ;  but  the  action  of  the  insurgents  toward  Mr.  Rigney  gives  the 
problem  a  doubtful  aspect.  It  may  have  been  a  personal  matter  against  Mr. 
Rigney.  The  number  of  destitute  Americans  fed  by  this  consulate  decreased 
from  89  to  64,  but  is  again  on  the  increase." 

It  is  to  be  taken  into  consideration  that  here  is  another  consular  report  of 
Spanish  residents  wanting  to  become  Americans,  through  "annexation  to  the 
United  States."  We  think  it  entirely  probable  that  these  people  may  soon 


234  TORCH    IN    AID    OF    THE    CUBAN    REBELLION. 

know  enough  to  help  govern  themselves.  Spanish  soldiers  are  making  the 
same  inquiry.  Here  it  is  mentioned  as  a  matter  of  business  that  as  insurgent 
cannon  balls  were  fired  to  stop  sugar  making,  the  destitution  of  American 
citizens  was  on  the  increase.  The  connection  between  fire  and  famine  is 
distinctly  made. 

American  Consul  McGarr,  writing  from  Cienfuegos,  January  10,  1898: 

"Consulate  of  the  United  States,  Cienfuegos,  January  10,  1898. — Sir:  All 
the  sugar  mills  in  this  consular  jurisdiction,  23  in  number,  have  been  grind 
ing  since  the  first  of  the  month,  and  at  the  busy  centrales  the  various  indus 
tries  incident  to  the  gathering  of  the  crop  and  the  manufacture  of  sugar  are 
in  full  and  steady  operation. 

"Several  of  the  principal  estates  are  owned  by  American  citizens  and  cor 
porations,  and  most  of  their  skilled  employes  are  brought  from  the  United 
States. 

"The  demand  for  labor  on  the  sugar  estates  has  drawn  from  the  towns  a 
great  portion  of  the  unemployed  laborers  and  given  employment  to  the  male 
'concentrados,'  many  of  whom  were  in  a  state  of  enforced  idleness  and 
destitution.  As  a  consequence,  few  of  them  are  now  seen-  here,  and  the  labor 
'congestion'  has  been  relieved. 

"Small  predatory  parties  of  insurgents  make  frequent  attempts  to  fire  the 
cane  fields,  and  it  requires  constant  and  active  vigilance  to  prevent  their 
destruction.  The  dry  weather  and  the  high  winds  prevailing  at  this  season 
render  it  a  simple  matter  for  one  person  (who  can  easily  conceal  himself  in 
the  tall  cane)  to  start  a  conflagration  that  will,  unless  promptly  extinguished, 
destroy  hundreds  of  acres  in  a  few  hours. 

"Hence  the  almost  impossibility,  with  the  utmost  watchfulness  and  using 
every  practicable  safeguard,  to  prevent  some  loss  of  cane  by  the  fires  started, 
often  under  cover  of  darkness,  by  the  stealthy  incendiaries  familiar  with  the 
locality  and  always  on  the  alert  for  an  opportunity  to  apply  the  torch. 

"The  sugar  crop  is  the  support  of  all  classes,  and  especially  of  the  labor 
ing  class,  and  should  it  be  in  large  part  destroyed  a  famine  in  reality  would 
be  inevitable. 

"lam,  etc.,  OWEN    McGARR, 

"United  States  Consul." 

This  does  not  seem  to  have  been  exactly  what  was  expected  in  the 
consular  reports,  but  it  is  extremely  pertinent  and  valuable,  and  it  could  never 


FIRE  ROOM  OF  THE  U.  S.  S.  "BROOKLYN. 


TORCH    IN    AID    OF    THE    CUBAN    REBELLION.  237 

have  had  a  greater  opening  for  usefulness  than  just  now,  as  the  flag  of  the 
United  States  is  raised  over  Cuba. 

The  Consul,  Mr.  Hyatt,  at  Santiago  de  Cuba,  writing  December  21,  1897, 
said : 

"As  yet  planters  are  all  at  sea  as  to  whether  they  will  grind  cane  or  not. 
It  is  no  secret  that  they  will  have  to  make  terms  with  the  insurgents  if  they 
do,  and  I  understand  that  an  agreement  by  which  50  cents  per  bag,  or  about 
15  cents  per  100,  will  be  paid  for  Cuban  hands  off.  Planters  say  this  will 
leave  them  no  profit,  but  leave  their  plantations  in  better  order  for  future 
operations. 

"The  three  Rivery  brothers,  American  citizens  and  owners  of  coffee, 
cocoa,  and  orange  groves,  are  about  to  return  to  their  places.  They  are  abso 
lutely  penniless,  and  say  they  would  have  surely  starved  but  for  the  food 
issued  from  this  consulate.  I  shall  continue  to  supply  them  with  food,  and 
issue  a  month's  rations  of  such  food  as  rice,  beans,  codfish,  crackers,  etc.,  as 
their  homes  are  over  30  miles  away." 

The  letter  following,  from  a  historic  place,  is  of  historical  importance : 

(Mr.  Hyatt  to  Mr.  Day.) 

"Consulate  of  the  United  States,  Santiago  de  Cuba,  January  12,  1898.— 
Sir:  I  deem  it  a  duty  to  lay  before  the  honorable  Department  of  State  the 
situation  here  as  affecting  American  interests,  and  to  inclose  herewith  an 
order  issued  by  command  of  General  Maximo  Gomez,  and  a  translation  of  the 
same,  forbidding  the  grinding  of  the  sugar  crop  for  the  years  1897  and  1898. 

"In  this  part  of  Cuba,  so  far  as  I  can  learn,  all  idea  of  making  a  sugar 
crop  is  entirely  abandoned. 

"I  regret  to  say  that  the  stoppage  of  industries,  from  present  appearances, 
will  not  halt  at  the  sugar  crop,  but  coffee  and  other  agricultural  crops  fall 
under  the  same  ban. 

"I  had  hoped  that,  after  the  reconcentration  order  was  revoked,  through 
the  energetic  action  of  the  present  administration,  we  would  find  no  trouble 
in  reinstating  American  industries;  but  it  appears  that  all  of  the  benefits  that 
should  have  accrued  to  our  citizens  are  thwarted  by  the  action  of  the  insur 
gents,  who  refuse  to  allow  them  to  return  to  their  sugar,  coffee  and  other 
estates.  The  Pompo  Manganese  mines,  owned  by  Americans,  which  would 


238  TORCH    IN    AID    OF    THE    CUBAN    REBELLION. 

at  the  present  time  be  a  very  profitable  investment  if  allowed   to  operate, 
are  also  being  held  up  by  the  same  power. 

"The  three  Rivery  brothers,  whom  I  informed  you  recently  I  was  about  to 
assist  in  returning  to  their  coffee  and  fruit  estates,  got  there  only  to  find  they 
could  not  go  to  work  until  permission  was  obtained  from  the  insurgent  com 
mander,  which  permission  seems  doubtful,  I  myself,  as  I  understand  my  duty, 
being  inhibited  from  rendering  them  any  assistance  at  this  point. 

"These,  with  several  sugar  estates  within  my  consular  district,  are  held 
up  and  becoming  more  worthless  than  before. 

"It  is  beyond  the  power  of  my  pen  to  describe  the  situation  in  eastern 
Cuba.  Squalidity,  starvation,  sickness,  and  death  meet  one  in  all  places. 
Beggars  throng  our  doors  and  stop  us  on  the  streets.  The  dead  in  large  num 
bers  remain  over  from  day  to  day  in  the  cemeteries  unburied. 

"Very  respectfully,  PULASKI    F.   HYATT, 

"United  States  Consul." 

The  connection  between  the  blackmail,  sugar  burning  policy  of  the  insur 
gents  reaffirmed  by  Gomez,  and  the  "squalidity,  starvation,  sickness  and 
death"  is  absolutely  established. 

Mr.  Walter  B.  Barker,  writing  November  20,  1897: 

"As  to  grinding  the  present  crop,  I  have  interviewed  most  of  the  largest 
planters  in  this  consular  district,  who  stated  that  unless  assured  of  immunity 
from  the  insurgent  chief — Gomez — they  would  not  jeopardize  their  property 
by  attempting  to  grind. ' ' 

"Consulate  of  the  United  States,  Sagua  la  Grande,  December  15,  1897.— 
Sir :  Thinking  it  may  interest  the  Department,  I  have  the  honor  to  transmit 
herewith  clippings  from  a  leading  Spanish  journal  published  in  Havana, 
.  .  .  calling  attention  to  the  inability  of  the  mills  to  grind  in  the  Province 
of  Santiago  de  Cuba,  which  is  one  of  the  obstacles  to  grinding  in  this  (Santa 
Clara)  province,  where  the  planters  are  not  able  to  pay  tribute  required  by 
the  insurgents. 

"The  grinding  season  being  at  hand  without  preparations  having  been 
made  dissipates  all  hope  of  a  beginning. 

"Not  to  grind  the  present  crop,  small  as  it  must  be,  will  bring  distress  far 
greater  than  can  be  imagined. 

"I  am,  etc.,  WALTER   B.   BARKER, 

"Consul." 


TORCH    IN    AID    OF    THE    CUBAN    REBELLION.  239 

(Mr.  Barker  to  Mr.  Day.) 

"Consulate  of  the  United  States,  Sagua  la  Grande,  December  28,  1897. — 
The  suffering  and  destitution  among  the  concentrados  ...  is  fearful,  and 
must  continue  to  grow  worse. 

"How  could  the  situation  be  otherwise,  since  the  island  is  producing 
absolutely  nothing,  save  some  growing  cane,  and  at  the  same  time  completely 
exhausted  of  all  food.  Relief  alone  can  be  obtained  from  the  outer  world 
in  the  way  of  charitable  contributions. 

"This — Santa  Clara — province  is  capable  at  this  season  of  producing, 
perhaps,  two-thirds  of  whatever  cane  might  be  made  in  the  entire  island. 

"To  grind  this  cane  without  interruption  would  be  the  means  of  saving 
the  lives  of  thousands  who,  without  this  or  outside  aid  within  the  next  thirty 
to  fifty  days,  must  die  of  actual  hunger.  Over  a  month  since,  the  planters 
were  officially  advised  of  Spain's  inability  to  provide  protection  in  order  to 
operate  their  mills.  This  leaves  the  sugar  growers  entirely  in  the  hands  of 
the  Cubans  in  revolt,  as  to  whether  they  will  be  allowed  to  grind  without 
hindrance  or  fear  of  total  destruction  of  their  property.  I  know  that  strict 
orders  have  been  given  to  subordinate  commanders  under  no  circumstances 
must  mills  be  permitted  to  grind,  under  penalty  of  violation  of  the  order 
forth  destruction  of  property. 

"Without  contributions  of  food  and  medicine  from  the  outer  world,  and 
at  once,  a  sacrifice  of  lives  will  ensue,  the  responsibility  for  which  no  Chris 
tian  people  can  face. 

"I  am,  etc.,  WALTER   B.   BARKER,  Consul." 

Here  is  the  proof  in  consular  reports  that  were  expected  to  fill  the 
United  States  with  horror  toward  the  Spaniards,  furnishing  the  proof  that  the 
insurgents,  carrying  on  their  blackmail  war  upon  industry,  refused  to  save 
thousands  of  liyes  by  permitting  sugar  making. 

"Consulate  of  the  United  States,  Sagua  la  Grande,  January  31,  1898. — At 
my  suggestion  several  families  returned  to  the  American-owned  'Central 
Santa  Anna, '  the  owner  having  been  forced  to  abandon  the  property  in  order 
to  prevent  further  spoliation  of  the  mill  machinery.  Although  a  government 
guard  is  stationed  on  the  place,  they  (former  tenants)  were  ordered  to  leave. 

"One  sugar  mill  is  running,  not  without  interruption,  with  chances  of 
making  one-fourth  of  a  crop.  Another— just  started  up — was  attacked  yester- 


240  TORCH    IN    AID    OF    THE    CUBAN    REBELLION. 

day  by  a  band  of  insurgents,  killing  14  and  wounding  5  of  the  guerrillas  paid 
by  the  estate  to  protect  the  operatives.  Seven  laborers  were  killed,  the 
insurgents  leaving  two  of  their  dead. 

44  An  adjoining  estate,  the  property  of  the  British  consul,  was  also  attacked, 
the  growing  cane  burned.  This  precludes  further  attempts  to  grind,  as  men 
cannot  be  induced  to  work  while  the  insurgents  roam  at  will  over  the  country. 

"lam,  etc.,  WALTER    B.   BARKER,  Consul." 

We  do  not  say  that  Maximo  Gomez  meant  to  inflict  famine  upon  Cuba, 
for  he  probably  had  the  barbarian  instinct  that  led  him  to  think  that  to  fling- 
firebrands  was  a  way  of  announcing  liberty.  He  issued  a  proclamation  dated 
at  Sancti  Spiritus,  November  n,  1895,  placing  the  responsibility,  as  he  said, 
for  the  great  ruin  he  was  about  to  inflict,  upon  "passive"  people.  He  added: 

"This  people  cannot  hesitate  between  the  wealth  of  Spain  and  the  liberty 
of  Cuba.  Its  greatest  crime  would  be  to  stain  the  land  with  blood  without 
effecting  its  purposes  because  of  puerile  scruples  and  fears  which  do  not  con 
cur  with  the  character  of  the  men  who  are  in  the  field." 

July  i,  1895,  at  Najasa  Camaguay,  Gomez  issued  an  address  to  the  plant 
ers  and  cattle  ranchers : 

"Whereas,  all  exploitations  of  any  product  whatsoever  are  aids  and 
resources  to  the  Government  that  we  are  fighting,  it  is  resolved  by  the 
General-in-Chief  to  issue  this  general  order  throughout  the  island  that  the 
introduction  of  articles  of  commerce,  as  well  as  beef  and  cattle,  into  the  towns 
occupied  by  the  enemy,  is  absolutely  prohibited.  The  sugar  plantations  will 
stop  their  labors,  and  whosoever  shall  attempt  to  grind  the  crop  notwith 
standing  this  order,  will  have  their  cane  burned  and  their  buildings  demol 
ished." 

Any  one  disobeying  this  order  was  to  be  considered  an  enemy  and 
"treated  as  a  traitor."  Gomez  also  issued  a  peremptory  order  as  follows: 

"Headquarters  of  the  Army  of  Liberation,  Territory  of  Sancti  Spiritus, 
November  6,  1895. — Animated  by  the  spirit  of  unchangeable  resolution  in 
defense  of  the  rights  of  the  revolution  of  redemption  of  this  country  of  colo 
nists,  humiliated  and  despised  by  Spain,  and  in  harmony  with  what  has  been 
decreed  concerning  the  subject  in  the  circular  dated  the  ist  of  July,  I  have 
ordered  the  following: 

"Article  I.  That  all  plantations  shall  be  totally  destroyed,  their  cane  and 
outbuildings  burned,  and  railroad  connections  destroyed. 


TORCH    IN    AID    OF    THE    CUBAN    REBELLION. 


243 


"Ait.  II.  All  laborers  who  shall  aid  the  sugar  factories — these  sources 
of  supplies  that  we  must  deprive  the  enemy  of — shall  be  considered  as  traitors 
to  their  country. 

"Art.  III.  All  who  are  caught  in  the  act,  or  whose  violation  of  Article 
II.  shall  be  proven,  shall  be  shot.  Let  all  chiefs  of  operations  of  the  army  of 
liberty  comply  with  this  order,  determined  to  unfurl  triumphantly,  even  over 
ruin  and  ashes,  the  flag  of  the  Republic  of  Cuba. 

"In  regard  to  the  manner  of  waging  the  war,  follow  the  private  instruc 
tions  that  I  have  already  given. 

"For  the  sake  of  the  honor  of  our  arms  and  your  well-known  courage  and 
patriotism,  it  is  expected  that  you  will  strictly  comply  with  the  above  orders. 

"M.  GOMEZ,  General-in-Chief. 

"To  the  chiefs  of  operations:  Circulate  this." 

Here  we  have  the  official  announcement  of  the  policy  of  firebugs,  as  that 
of  liberation,  and  it  is  the  confirmation  of  this  firebug  policy  that  is  now  thrust 
like  a  torch  in  the  face  of  the  United  States,  in  the  name  of  freedom  and 
independence. 


IP 


f 


CHAPTER    X. 

The  Way  the  War  Business  was  Handled. 

The  Declaration  of  War— The  President's  Call  upon  Congress  to  Take  Action— Fit  and 
Few  Words — The  Constant  Scramble  in  Congress  for  the  Cuban  Ghost  Dance  Govern 
ment — The  Official  Text  of  the  President's  War  Proclamations  —The  Navy  had  First  to 
Take  Command  of  the  Seas— The  Timely  Dispatches  from  the  Navy  Department,  Mak 
ing  Ready  for  War — Major  General  Miles  and  his  50,000  Cubans. 

A  considerable  number  of  members  of  Congress  were  slow  in  appreciating 
the  excellence  of  the  attitude  of  the  President  in  holding  fast  the  last  chances 
of  peace  and  at  the  same  time  urging  forward  as  part  of  the  same  policy  works 
of  charity  and  preparations  for  war.  He  was  better  understood  and  held  in 
higher  esteem  during  a  few  days  of  agitation,  abroad  than  at  home,  and  the 
general  consent  of  civilized  nations  that  the  international  position  of  our 
country  was  unassailable,  that  contributed  to  our  success,  was  in  a  great 
measure  due  to  the  propriety  of  the  course  of  the  President,  which  presently 
consolidated  public  sentiment  in  all  the  States,  and  appealed  with  dignity  to 
the  Powers,  whose  interest  became  as  intelligible  as  it  was  indisputable. 
Especially  was  the  far-sighted  thoughtfulness  of  the  President  comprehended 
and  respected  in  England,  and  through  all  the  months  of  exciting  trial  and 
straining  tests  we  felt  the  firm  grasp  of  her  friendly  hand,  and  the  growth  of 
mutual  regard  stronger  than  treaties,  because  it  was  the  genuine  self-evidence 
of  the  kindred  blood  of  the  nations,  and  that  their  joint  influence  would  be 
without  conventions  one  of  the  mightiest  in  the  betterment  of  the  world. 

The  weight  of  the  President's  message  of  April  nth  was  felt  to  be  over 
whelming  in  gravity  and  import.  He  said,  4'I  ask  Congress  to  authorize  and 
empower  the  President  to  take  measures  to  secure  a  full  and  final  termination 
of  hostilities  between  the  government  of  Spain  and  the  people  of  Cuba,  and 
to  insure  in  the  island  the  establishment  of  a  stable  government."  The  words 
had  been  picked  for  their  places,  and  were  "stable."  There  was  wanted, 

244 


THE    WAY    THE    WAR    BUSINESS    WAS    HANDLED.        245 

the  President  added,  a  government  in  Cuba  "capable  of  maintaining  order 
and  of  observing  its  international  obligations — insuring  peace  and  tranquillity, 
and  the  security  of  its  citizens  as  well  as  its  own."  This  was  just  as  plain  as  a 
proclamation  could  have  been  written,  that  the  ghost  dance  of  the  Cuban 
Republic  was  not  what  was  wanted — that  their  government  was  a  gang  not  to 
be  put  in  possession  by  our  arms  of  the  island  they  had  devastated  with  the 
torch.  The  next  words  were  that  the  President  wanted  the  authority  of  Con 
gress  "to  use  the  military  and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States" — and  this 
as  might  be  "necessary  for  those  purposes."  The  next  four  sentences  were 
clear  as  shafts  of  white  light,  keen  as  steel,  and  terminal,  "The  issue  is  now 
with  the  Congress.  It  is  a  solemn  responsibility.  I  have  exhausted  every 
effort  to  relieve  the  intolerable  condition  of  affairs  which  is  at  our  doors. 
Prepared  to  execute  every  obligation  imposed  upon  me  by  the  Constitution 
and  the  law,  I  await  some  action."  These  were  the  words  of  truth  and 
sobriety.  The  country  was  the  stronger  for  this  soberness,  and  knew  it. 
There  was  no  need  to  tjtSote  Grant  and  Jackson,  but  it  was  done,  and  well 
done.  There  was  no  question  as  to  the  commander  and  pilot  of  the  Ship  of 
State.  On  the/i3th  of  April  Yhe  House  resolved  for  immediate  intervention, 
334  to  19.  The  terms  of  the  resolution  were  tinged  with  the  preliminary 
temper,  but  the  business  was  in  the  words:  "The  President  is  hereby  author 
ized  and  directed  to  intervene  at  once,  to  stop  the  war  in  Cuba."  The  Presi 
dent's  words  were  not,  in  the  part  of  the  resolution  that  was  definite  and 
certain,  far  departed  from.  The  purpose  of  the  _mterventipjLw_as  defined  to, 
be  "permanent  peace  and  order,"  and  "establishing  by  the  free  action  of  the 
people^  a  "stable  and  independent  government  of  their  own,"  and  the  Presi- 
denFTvas  empowered  to  use  the  army  and  navy  for  that  purpose.  But  the 
filibuster  war  party  strove  to  twist  into  the  texture  of  the  proceedings  an 
advertisement  of  the  intended  Republic,  and  a  quit  claim  deed  to  its  pro 
fessional  managers;  the  scramble  was  for  this  perversity.  There  was  a  joint 
resolution  that  "the  United  States  government  hereby  recognizes  the  inde 
pendence  of  the  Republic  of  Cuba."  This  was  defeated,  191  to  150.  The 
Senate,  with  a  whereas  about  the  Maine,  resolved,  "That  the  people  of  the 
island  of  Cuba  are  and  of  right  ought  to  be  free  and  independent."  It  was 
amended  to  read, "That  the  people  of  the  island  of  Cuba  of  right  ought  to  be 
free  and  independent."  The  House  voted,  yeas  178,  nays  156.  The  next  day 
the  President  wrote  on  the  joint  resolution  engrossed  on  parchment, 


. 


246        THE    WAY    THE    WAR    BUSINESS    WAS    HANDLED. 

"Approved,  William  McKinley,  April  20,  1898."  The  passports  of  the  Span 
ish  Minister  were  dated  the  same  day,  and  the  next  day  the  American 
Minister  left  Madrid,  handing  the  interests  of  the  American  citizens  and 
affairs  to  the  Minister  of  England.  The  President's  blockade  message  was  of 
the  date  of  April  25th.  The  call  for  volunteers,  in  the  aggregate  125,000,  was 
on  the  23d  of  April,  and  it  was  certified  as  done  by  the  President,  by  John 
Sherman,  Secretary  of  State. 

"MESSAGE  FROM  THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES. 
"Transmitting  Copies  of  Correspondence  Recently  Had  with  the  Representa 
tive  of  Spain  in  the  United  States,  with  the  United  States  Minister  at 
Madrid,  and  through  the  Latter  with  the  Government  .of  Spain,  Showing 
the  Action  Taken  under  the  Joint  Resolution  Approved  April  20,  1898.— 
April  25,  1898.  —  Referred  to  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  and 
ordered  to  be  printed. 

"To  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the  United  States  of 
America: — I  transmit  to  the  Congress,  for  its  consideration  and  appropriate 
action,  copies  of  correspondence  recently  had  with  the  representative  of 
Spain  in  the  United  States,  with  the  United  States  Minister  at  Madrid,  and 
through  the  latter  with  the  government  of  Spain,  showing  the  action  taken 
under  the  joint  resolution  approved  April  20,  1898,  'for  the  recognition  of  the 
independence  of  the  people  of  Cuba,  demanding  that  the  government  of  Spain 
relinquish  its  authority  and  government  in  the  island  of  Cuba,  and  with 
draw  its  land  and  naval  forces  from  Cuba  and  Cuban  waters,  and  directing  the 
President  of  the  United  States  to  use  the  larfd  and  naval  forces  of  the  United 
States  to  carry  these  resolutions  into  effect. ' 

"Upon  communicating  to  the  Spanish  Minister  in  Washington  the  demand 
which  it  became  the  duty  of  the  Executive  to  address  to  the  government  of 
Spain  in  obedience  to  said  resolution,  the  Minister  asked  for  his  passports  and 
withdrew.  The  United  States  Minister  at  Madrid  was  in  turn  notified  by  the 
Spanish  Minister  for  foreign  affairs  that  the  withdrawal  of  the  Spanish  repre 
sentative  from  the  United  States  had  terminated  diplomatic  relations  between 
the  two  countries,  and  that  all  official  communications  between  their  respect 
ive  representatives  ceased  therewith. 

"I  commend  to  your  especial  attention  the  note  addressed  to  the  United 
States  Minister  at  Madrid  by  the  Spanish  Minister  for  foreign  affairs  on  the 


THE    WAY    THE    WAR    BUSINESS    WAS    HANDLED.         247 

2ist  instant,  whereby  the  foregoing  notification  was  conveyed.  It  will  be  per 
ceived  therefrom  that  the  government  of  Spain,  having  cognizance  of  the 
joint  resolution  of  the  United  States  Congress,  and  in  view  of  the  things 
which  the  President  is  thereby  required  and  authorized  to  do,  responds  by 
treating  the  reasonable  demands  of  this  government  as  measures  of  hostility, 
following  with  that  instant  and  complete  severance  of  relations  by  its  action, 
which  by  the  usage  of  nations  accompanies  an  existent  state  of  war  between 
sovereign  powers. 

"The  position  of  Spain  being  thus  made  known  and  the  demands  of  the 
United  States  being  denied  with  a  complete  rupture  of  intercourse  by  the  act 
of  Spain,  I  have  been  constrained,  in  exercise  of  the  power  and  authority 
conferred  upon  me  by  the  joint  resolution  aforesaid,  to  proclaim,  under  date 
of  April  22,  1898,  a  blockade  of  certain  ports  of  the  north  coast  of  Cuba,  lying 
between  Cardenas  and  Bahia  Honda,  and  of  the  port  of  Cienfuegos  on  the 
south  coast  of  Cuba;  and  further,  in  exercise  of  my  constitutional  powers  and 
using  the  authority  conferred  upon  me  by  the  act  of  Congress  approved  April 
22,  1898,  to  issue  my  proclamation,  dated  April  23,  1898,  calling  forth  volun 
teers  in  order  to  carry  into  effect  the  said  resolution  of  April  20,  1898.  Copies 
of  these  proclamations  are  hereto  appended. 

"In  view  of  the  measures  so  taken,  and  with  a  view  to  the  adoption  of 
such  other  measures  as  may  be  necessary  to  enable  me  to  carry  out  the 
expressed  will  of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  in  the  premises,  I  now 
recommend  to  your  honorable  body  the  adoption  of  a  joint  resolution  declar 
ing  that  a  state  of  war  exists  between  the  United  States  of  America  and  the 
Kingdom  of  Spain,  and  I  urge  speedy  action  thereon,  to  the  end  that  the 
definition  of  the  international  status  of  the  United  States  as  a  belligerent 
power  may  be  made  known,  and  the  assertion  of  all  its  rights  and  the  main 
tenance  of  all  its  duties  in  the  conduct  of  public  war  may  be  assured. 

"WILLIAM    McKINLEY. 

"Executive  Mansion,  Washington,  April  25,  1898." 

No.    i. 

Mr.  Sherman  to  Mr.  Woodford. 
(Telegram  in  Cipher.) 

"Department  of  State,  Washington,  April  14,  1898 — Tuesday  noon. — 
House  of  Representatives,  324  to  19,  passed  yesterday  afternoon  resolution 
authorizing  and  directing  the  President  to  intervene  at  once  to  stop  the  war 


-MS        THE     WAY    THE    WAR    BUSINEvSS    WAS    HANDLED. 

in  Cuba,  with  the  purpose  of  securing"  peace  and  order  there  and  establishing 
by  the  free  action  of  the  people  thereof,  a  stable  and  independent  government 
of  their  own,  and  empowering  him  to  use  the  land  and  naval  forces  to  execute 
that  purpose.  Senate  committee  on  Foreign  affairs  reported  yesterday  reso 
lution  declaring  that  the  people  of  the  island  of  Cuba  are,  and  of  right  ought 
to  be,  free  and  independent,  demanding  that  Spain  relinquish  authority  and 
government  in  Cuba  and  withdraw  land  and  naval  forces  therefrom,  and 
empowering  the  President  to  use  Army  and  Navy  and  militia  to  carry  reso 
lutions  into  effect.  It  will  probably  be  decisively  voted  to-day.  Ultimate 
resolution  in  conference  can  not  now  be  forecast,  but  will  doubtless  direct 
intervention  by  force,  if  need  be,  to  secure  free  Cuba.  The  situation  is  most 
critical.  JOHN  SHERMAN." 


No.   2. 

.  Mr.  Day  to  Mr.  Woodford. 
(Telegram,  in  part  cipher.) 

"Department  of  State,  Washington,  April  17,  1898. — The  Senate,  Satur 
day  evening,  by  67  votes  to  21,  passed  a  resolution  amending  all  of  the  House 
resolution  after  the  enacting  clause.  It  declares  as  follows: 

"  'Resolved  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the  United 
States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled : 

**  'First.  That  the  people  of  the  Island  of  Cuba  are,  and  of  right  ought 
to  be,  free  and  independent,  and  that  the  government  of  the  United  States 
hereby  recognizes  the  Republic  of  Cuba  as  the  true  and  lawful  government  of 
that  island. 

"  'Second.  That  it  is  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  demand,  and  the 
government  of  the  United  States  does  hereby  demand,  that  the  government 
of  Spain  at  once  relinquish  its  authority  and  government  in  the  island  of  Cuba, 
and  withdraw  its  land  and  naval  forces  from  Cuba  and  Cuban  waters. 

"  'Third.  That  the  President  of  the  United  States  be,  and  he  hereby  is 
directed  and  empowered  to  use  the  entire  land  and  naval  forces  of  the  United 
States  and  to  call  into  the  actual  service  of  the  United  States  the  militia  of  the 
several  States  to  such  extent  as  may  be  necessary  to  carry  these  resolutions 
into  effect. 

"  'Fourth.  That  the  United  States  hereby  disclaims  any  disposition  or 
intention  to  exercise  sovereignty,  jurisdiction,  or  control  over  said  island, 


THE    WAY    THE    WAR    BUSINESS    WAS    HANDLED.         249 

except  for  the  pacification  thereof,  and  asserts  its  determination  when  that  is 
accomplished  to  leave  the  government  and  control  of  the  island  to  its  people.' 

"The  House  has  taken  a  recess  until  10  Monday  morning,  when  vote  will 
be  taken  on  concurring  in  the  Senate  amendments.  If  the  House  non-concurs, 
conference  follows.  Ultimate  form  of  resolution  cannot  yet  be  foreseen. 

''Sunday  morning,  i  o'clock.  DAY,  Acting." 


No.   3. 
Mr.  Day  to  Mr.  Woodford. 

(Telegram,  in  cipher.) 

"Department  of  State,  Washington,  April  19,  1898. — At  3  this  morning, 
after  prolonged  conferences,  the  Senate  and  the  House  of  Representatives 
adopted  the  joint  resolution  the  text  of  which  was  telegraphed  to  you  Satur 
day  night,  omitting  from  the  first  section  the  words  'and  that  the  government 
of  the  United  States  hereby  recognizes  the  Republic  of  Cuba  as  the  true  and 
lawful  government  of  that  island.'  Vote  in  Senate,  42  to  35  ;  in  House,  310 
against  6. 

"An  instruction  will  be  telegraphed  you  later,  immediately  on  the  Presi 
dent  signing  the  joint  resolution.  In  the  meantime  you  will  prepare  for 
withdrawal  from  Spain,  and  notify  consuls  to  be  ready  for  the  signal  to  leave. 
If  any  consul  is  in  danger,  he  may  quietly  leave  at  his  discretion. 

"DAY." 


No.   4. 
Mr.  Woodford  to  Mr.  Day. 

(Telegram,  in  cipher.) 

"Madrid,  April  20,  1898. — Have  received  telegram  of  Tuesday  morning; 
am  prepared  to  withdraw;  have  notified  consuls  to  be  ready. 

"WOODFORD." 

No.  5. 
Mr.  Sherman  to  Mr.  Woodford. 

(Telegram,  plain.) 

"Department  of  State,  Washington,  April  20,  1898. — You  have  been 
furnished  with  the  text  of  a  joint  resolution  voted  by  the  Congress  of  the 
United  States  on  the  ipth  instant  (approved  to-day)  in  relation  to  the  pacifica- 


25o        THE    WAY    THE    WAR    BUSINESS    WAS    HANDLED. 

tion  of  the  island  of  Cuba.  In  obedience  to  that  act  the  President  directs  you 
to  immediately  communicate  to  the  government  of  Spain  said  resolution,  with 
the  formal  demand  of  the  government  of  the  United  States  that  the  govern 
ment  of  Spain  at  once  relinquish  its  authority  and  government  in  the  island 
of  Cuba  and  withdraw  its  land  and  naval  forces  from  Cuba  and  Cuban  waters. 
In  taking  this  step  the  United  States  hereby  disclaims  any  disposition  or 
intention  to  exercise  sovereignty,  jurisdiction,  or  control  over  said  island 
except  for  the  pacific;rtion  thereof,  and  asserts  its  determination  when  that  is 
accomplished  to  leave  the  government  and  control  of  the  island  to  its  people 
under  such  free  and  independent  government  as  they  may  establish. 

"If  by  the  hour  of  noon  on  Saturday  next,  the  23d  day  of  April,  instant, 
there'  be  not  communicated  to  this  government  by  that  of  Spain  a  full  and 
satisfactory  response  to  this  demand  and  resolution  whereby  the  ends  of  peace 
in  Cuba  shall  be  assured,  the  President  will  proceed  without  further  notice  to 
use  the  power  and  authority  enjoined  and  conferred  upon  him  by  the  said 
joint  resolution  to  such  extent  as  may  be  necessary  to  carry  the  same  into 
effect.  SHERMAN." 


No.   6. 
Mr.  Sherman  to  the  Spanish  Minister. 

"Department  of  State,  Washington,  April  20,  1898. — Sir:  I  have  the 
honor  to  communicate  to  you  a  copy  of  an  instruction  sent  this  day  to  the 
United  States  Minister  at  Madrid,  by  telegraph,  in  obedience  to  a  joint  reso 
lution  of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  of  America  in  relation  to  the 
pacification  of  the  island  of  Cuba,  approved  this  day,  of  which  a  copy  is 
hereto  annexed. 

"I  avail  myself  of  this  opportunity  to  repeat  to  you  the  assurances  of  my 
highest  consideration.  JOHN  SHERMAN." 

"Joint  Resolution  for  the  recognition  of  the  independence  of  the  people  of 
Cuba,  demanding  that  the  government  of  Spain  relinquish  its  authority 
and  government  in  the  Island  of  Cuba,  and  withdraw  its  land  and  naval 
forces  from  Cuba  and  Cuban  waters,  and  directing  the  President  of  the 
United  States  to  use  the  land  and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States  to 
carry  these  resolutions  into  effect. 
"Resolved  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the  United 


THE    WAY    THE    WAR    BUSINESS    WAS    HANDLED.        251 

States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled,  First.  That  the  people  of  the 
island  of  Cuba  are,  and  of  right  ought  to  be,  free  and  independent. 

"Second.  That  it  is  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  demand,  and  the 
government  of  the  United  States  does  hereby  demand,  that  the  government 
of  Spain  at  once  relinquish  its  authority  and  government  in  the  island  of  Cuba 
and  withdraw  its  land  and  naval  forces  from  Cuba  and  Cuban  waters. 

"Third.  That  the  President  of  the  United  States  be,  and  he  hereby  is, 
directed  and  empowered  to  use  the  entire  land  and  naval  forces  of  the  United 
States,  and  to  call  into  the  actual  service  of  the  United  States  the  militia  of 
the  several  States,  to  such  extent  as  may  be  necessary  to  carry  these  reso 
lutions  into  effect. 

" Fourth.  That  the  United  States  hereby  disclaims  any  disposition  or 
intention  to  exercise  sovereignty,  jurisdiction,  or  control  over  said  island 
except  for  the  pacification  thereof,  and  asserts  its  determination,  when  that  is 
accomplished,  to  leave  the  government  and  control  of  the  island  to  its  people. 

"Approved,  April  20,  1898." 

No.    7. 
Spanish  Minister  to  Mr.  Sherman. 

(Translation.) 

"Legation  of  Spain,  Washington,  April  20,  1898.  (Received  11:35  a- 
m.) — Mr.  Secretary:  The  resolution  adopted  by  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States  of  America  and  approved  to-day  by  the  President  is  of  such  a  nature 
that  my  continuance  in  Washington  becomes  impossible  and  obliges  me  to 
request  of  you  the  delivery  of  my  passports. 

"The  protection  of  Spanish  interests  will  be  intrusted  to  the  French 
Ambassador  and  to  the  Austrian-Hungarian  Minister. 

"On  this  occasion,  very  painful  to  me,  I  have  the  honor  to  renew  to  you 
the  assurances  of  my  highest  consideration. 

"LUIS   POLO   DE   BERNABfi." 


No.   8. 

Mr.  Sherman  to  the  Spanish  Minister. 

"Department  of  State,  Washington,   April   20,    1898. — Mr.    Minister:    I 
have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  note  of  this  day's  date,  in 


252        THE    WAY    THE    WAR    BUSINESS    WAS    HANDLED. 

which  you  state  that  the  resolution  adopted  by  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  and  to-day  approved  by  the  President,  is  of  such  a  nature 
as  to  make  your  continuance  in  Washington  impossible  and  constrains  you  to 
request  that  your  passports  be  given  you.  You  add  that  the  protection  of 
Spanish  interests  is  intrusted  to  the  Ambassador  of  France  and  the  Minister 
of  Austria- Hungary. 

"In  response  to  your  request  I  have  the  honor  to  hand  you  a  passport  for 
yourself,  your  family,  and  your  suite.  I  beg  also  to  inform  you  that  arrange 
ments  have  been  made  for  a  guard  to  attend  you  during  your  presence  in  the 
territory  of  the  United  States. 

"Sincerely  regretting  the  step  that  you  have  felt  constrained  to  take,  I 
avail  myself  of  this  opportunity  to  again  tender  you  the  assurances  of  my 
highest  consideration.  JOHN  SHERMAN." 


•  Copy  of  passport  handed  to  Minister  Polo  de  Bernabe. 
No. — .)  United  States  of  America. 

"To  all  to  whom  these  presents  shall  come  greeting:  Know  ye  that  the 
bearer  hereof,  Senor  Don  Luis  Polo  de  Bernabe,  Envoy  Extraordinary  and 
Minister  Plenipotentiary  of  Spain  to  the  United  States,  is  about  to  travel 
abroad,  accompanied  by  his  family  and  suite. 

"These  are  therefore  to  request  all  officers  of  the  United  States,  or  of  any 
State  thereof,  whom  it  may  concern,  to  permit  them  to  pass  freely,  without 
let  or  molestation,  and  to  extend  to  them  friendly  aid  and  protection  in  case 
of  need. 

"In  testimony  whereof,  I,  John  Sherman,  Secretary  of  State  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  have  hereunto  set  my  hand  and  caused  the  seal  of  the 
Department  of  State  to  be  affixed  at  Washington,  this  2oth  day  of  April,  A.  D. 
1898,  and  of  the  independence  of  the  United  States  of  America  the  one  hun 
dred  and  twenty-second. 

"(Seal.)  SHERMAN." 

No.   9. 
Mr.  Sherman  to  Mr.  Woodford. 

(Telegram,  in  part  cipher.) 

"Department  of  State,  April  20,  1898.— Senor  Polo  de  Bernabe*,  Spanish 
Minister  to  the  United  States,  upon  being  informed,  shortly  before  noon 


THE    WAY    THE    WAR    BUSINESS    WAS     HANDLED.         253 

to-day,  of  the  action  of  this  government  taken  in  pursuance  of  the  resolutions 
of  Congress  of  April  19,  1898,  has  asked  for  his  passports.  In  compliance  with 
his  request  passports  for  himself,  his  family,  and  suite  have  been  handed  him, 
with  assurances  of  safety  while  within  the  territory  of  the  United  States. 

"Unless  previously  handed  your  passports,  you  will  be  expected  to 
remain  near  the  Court  of  Spain  till  Saturday  noon  of  this  week,  and  unless  bv 
that  day  and  hour  some  communication  is  received  from  the  government  of 
Spain  which  you  deem  will  be  satisfactory  to  this  government,  you  will  ask 
for  your  passports  and  safe  conduct.  SHERMAN." 


No.    10. 

Mr.  Woodford  to  Mr.  Sherman. 

(Telegram,  received  in  cipher.) 

"Madrid,  April  21,  1898.  (Received  9:02  a.  m.) — Early  this  (Thursday) 
morning,  immediately  after  the  receipt  of  your  open  telegram  and  before  I 
had  communicated  same  to  Spanish  government,  Spanish  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  notified  me  that  diplomatic  relations  are  broken  between  the  two 
countries,  and  that  all  official  communication  between  their  respective  repre 
sentatives  has  ceased.  I  accordingly  asked  for  safe  passport.  Turn  legation 
over  to  British  embassy  and  leave  for  Paris  this  afternoon.  Have  notified 
consuls." 

No.  ii. 
Mr.  Woodford  to  Mr.  Sherman. 

(Telegram.) 

"United  States  Legation,  Madrid,  April  21,  1898. — Following  is  text  of 
official  note  received  this  morning  at  7  130  o'clock  from  Spanish  Minister  of 
State : 

"  'In  compliance  with  a  painful  duty,  I  have  the  honor  to  inform  your 
excellency  that,  the  President  having  approved  a  resolution  of  both  Chambers 
of  the  United  States  which,  in  denying  the  legitimate  sovereignty  of  Spain 
and  in  threatening  armed  intervention  in  Cuba,  is  equivalent  to  an  evident 
declaration  of  war,  the  government  of  His  Majesty  has  ordered  its  Minister  in 
Washington  to  withdraw  without  loss  of  time  from  the  North  American  ter 
ritory  with  all  the  personnel  of  the  legation.  By  this  act  the  diplomatic  rela 
tions  which  previously  existed  between  the  two  countries  are  broken  off,  all 


254        THE    WAY    THE    WAR    BUSINESS    WAS    HANDLED. 

official  communication  between  their  respective  representatives  ceasing,  and 
I  hasten  to  communicate  this  to  your  excellency  in  order  that  on  your  part 
you  may  make  such  dispositions  as  seem  suitable. 

"  'I  beg-  of  your  excellency  to  kindly  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  this  note, 
and  I  avail  myself,  etc.'  WOODFORD." 


No.  12. 

Mr.  Woodford  to  Mr.  Sherman. 
(Telegram.) 

** Madrid,  April  21,  1898.  (Received  3:01  p.  m.) — Following  is  text  of  my 
reply  to  official  note  received  this  morning  at  7  130  o'clock  from  Spanish  Min 
ister  of  State: 

"  'I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  this  morning  of  your  note 
of  this  date  informing  me  that  the  Spanish  Minister  at  Washington  has  been 
ordered  to  withdraw  with  all  his  legation  and  without  loss  of  time  from  North 
American  territory.  You  also  informed  me  that  by  this  act  diplomatic  rela 
tions  between  the  two  countries  are  broken  off,  that  all  official  communica 
tion  between  their  respective  representatives  ceases.  I  have  accordingly  this 
day  telegraphed  the  American  Consul-General  at  Barcelona  to  instruct  all  the 
consular  representatives  of  the  United  States  in  Spain  to  turn  their  respective 
consulates  over  to  the  British  consuls  and  to  leave  Spain  at  once.  I  have 
myself  turned  this  legation  over  to  Her  Britannic  Majesty's  embassy  at 
Madrid.  That  embassy  will  from  this  time  have  the  care  of  all  American 
interests  in  Spain.  I  now  request  passports  and  safe  conduct  to  the  French 
frontier  for  myself  and  the  personnel  of  this  legation.  I  intend  leaving  this 
afternoon  at  4  o'clock  for  Paris.  I  avail  myself,  etc.' 

"WOODFORD." 

No.  -13. 

(Blockade  of  Cuban  Ports.) 
By  the  President  of  the  United  States  of  America. 

"A    PROCLAMATION. 

"Whereas,  by  a  joint  resolution  passed  by  the  Congress  and  approved 
April  20,  1898,  and  communicated  to  the  government  of  Spain,  it  was 


THE    WAY    THE    WAR    BUSINESS    WAS    HANDLED.        255 

demanded  that  said  government  at  once  relinquish  its  authority  and  govern 
ment  in  the  island  of  Cuba,  and  withdraw  its  land  and  naval  forces  from  Cuba 
and  Cuban  waters;  and  the  President  of  the  United  States  was  directed  and 
empowered  to  use  the  entire  land  and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States,  and 
tc  call  into  the  actual  service  of  the  United  States  the  militia  of  the  several 
States  to  such  extent  as  might  be  necessary  to  carry  said  resolution  into 
effect;  and 

"Whereas,  in  carrying  into  effect  said  resolution,  the  President  of  the 
United  States  deems  it  necessary  to  set  on  foot  and  maintain  a  blockade 
of  the  north  coast  of  Cuba,  including  all  ports  on  said  coast,  between 
Cardenas  and  Bahia  Honda,  and  the  port  of  Cienfuegos  on  the  south  coast 
of  Cuba: 

"Now,  therefore,  I,  William  McKinley,  President  of  the  United  States, 
in  order  to  enforce  the  said  resolution  do  hereby  declare  and  proclaim  that 
the  United  States  of  America  have  instituted  and  will  maintain  a  blockade  of 
the  north  coast  of  Cuba,  including  ports  on  said  coast  between  Cardenas  and 
Bahia  Honda,  and  the  port  of  Cienfuegos  on  the  south  coast  of  Cuba,  afore 
said,  in  pursuance  of  the  laws  of  the  United  States  and  the  law  of  nations 
applicable  to  such  cases.  An  efficient  force  will  be  posted  so  as  to  prevent 
the  entrance  and  exit  of  vessels  from  the  ports  aforesaid.  Any  neutral  ves 
sel  approaching  any  of  said  ports,  or  attempting  to  leave  the  same,  without 
notice  or  knowledge  of  the  establishment  of  such  blockade,  will  be  duly 
Warned  by  the  commander  of  the  blockading  forces,  who  will  indorse  on  her 
register  the  fact,  and  the  date,  of  such  warning,  where  such  indorsement  was 
made;  and  if  the  same  vessel  shall  again  attempt  to  enter  any  blockaded  port, 
she  will  be  captured  and  sent  to  the  nearest  convenient  port  for  such  proceed 
ings  against  her  and  her  cargo  as  prize  as  may  be  deemed  advisable. 

"Neutral  vessels  lying  in  any  of  said  ports  at  the  time  of  the  establish 
ment  of  such  blockade  will  be  allowed  thirty  days  to  issue  therefrom. 

"In  witness  whereof,  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand  and  caused  the  seal  of 
the  United  States  to  be  affixed. 

"Done  at  the  city  of  Washington,  this  22d  day  of  April,  A.  D.  1898,  and 
of  the  independence  of  the  United  States  the  one  hundred  and  twenty-second. 

"(Seal.)  WILLIAM    McKINLEY. 

"By  the  President: 

"JOHN    SHERMAN,  Secretary  of  State." 


256        THE    WAY    THE    WAR    BUSINESS    WAS    HANDLED. 

No.   14. 

(Call  for  Volunteers — Spain.) 
By  the  President  of  the  United  States. 


"A   PROCLAMATION. 

"Whereas  a  joint  resolution  of  Congress  was  approved  on  the  twentieth 
day  of  April,  1898,  entitled  'Joint  resolution  for  the  recognition  of  the  inde 
pendence  of  the  people  of  Cuba,  demanding-  that  the  government  of  Spair 
relinquish  its  authority  and  government  in  the  island  of  Cuba,  and  with 
draw  its  land  and  naval  forces  from  Cuba  and  Cuban  waters,  and  directing  the 
President  of  the  United  States  to  use  the  land  and  naval  forces  of  the  United 
States  to  carry  these  resolutions  into  effect ;'  and 

"Whereas,  by  an  act  of  Congress  entitled  'An  act  to  provide  for  tempo 
rarily  increasing  the  military  establishment  of  the  United  States  in  time  of 
war,  and  for  other  purposes/  approved  April  22,  1898;  the  President  is  author 
ized,  in  order  to  raise  a  volunteer  army,  to  issue  his  proclamation  calling  for 
volunteers' to  serve  in  the  Army  of  the  United  States: 

"Now,  therefore,  I,  William  McKinley,  President  of  the  United  States,  by 
virtue  of  the  power  vested  in  me  by  the  Constitution  and  the  laws,  and  deem 
ing  sufficient  occasion  to  exist,  have  thought  fit  to  call  forth  and  hereby  do 
call  forth,  volunteers  to  the  aggregate  number  of  125,000,  in  order  to  carry 
into  effect  the  purpose  of  the  said  resolution ;  the  same  to  be  apportioned,  as 
far  as  practicable,  among  the  several  States  and  Territories,  and  the  District 
of  Columbia,  according  to  population,  and  to  serve  for  two  years,  unless 
sooner  discharged.  The  details  for  this  object  will  be  immediately  communi 
cated  to  the  proper  authorities  through  the  War  Department. 

"In  witness  whereof  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand  and  caused  the  seal  of 
the  United  States  to  be  affixed. 

"Done  at  the  city  of  Washington,  this  twenty-third  day  of  April,  A.  D. 
1898,  and  of  the  independence  of  the  United  States  the  one  hundred  and 
twenty-second. 

"(Seal.)  WILLIAM    McKINLEY. 

"By  the  President:  JOHN   SHERMAN,  Secretary  of  State." 


THE    WAY    THE    WAR    BUSINESS    WAS    HANDLED.        257 


PROCLAMATIONS     OF    THE    PRESIDENT    RELATING     TO    THE 

WAR   WITH    SPAIN. 

(Blockade  of  Cuban  Ports.) 
By  the  President  of  the  United  States  of  America. 

"A    PROCLAMATION. 

"Whereas,  by  a  joint  resolution  passed  by  the  Congress  and  approved 
April  20,  1898,  and  communicated  to  the  government  of  Spain,  it  was 
demanded  that  said  government  at  once  relinquish  its  authority  and  govern 
ment  in  the  island  of  Cuba,  and  withdraw  its  land  and  naval  forces  from  Cuba 
and  Cuban  waters;  and  the  President  of  the  United  States  was  directed  and 
empowered  to  use  the  entire  land  and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States,  and 
to  call  into  the  actual  service  of  the  United  States  the  militia  of  the  several 
vStates  to  such  extent  as  might  be  necessary  to  carry  said  resolution  into 
effect;  and 

"Whereas,  in  carrying  into  effect  said  resolution,  the  President  of  the 
United  States  deems  it  necessary  to  set  on  foot  and  maintain  a  blockade  of  the 
north  coast  of  Cuba,  including  all  ports 'on  said  coast  between  Cardenas  and 
Bahia  Honda  and  the  port  of  Cienfuegos  on  the  south  coast  of  Cuba: 

"Now,  therefore,  I,  William  McKinley,  President  of  the  United  States, 
in  order  to  enforce  the  said  resolution,  do  hereby  declare  and  proclaim  that 
the  United  States  of  America  have  instituted,  and  will  maintain  a  blockade  of 
the  North  coast  of  Cuba,  including  ports  on  said  coast  between  Cardenas  and 
Bahia  Honda,  and  the  port  of  Cienfuegos  on  the  south  coast  of  Cuba,  afore 
said,  in  pursuance  of  the  laws  of  the  United  States  and  the  law  of  nations 
applicable  to  such  cases.  An  efficient  force  will  be  posted  so  as  to  prevent 
the  entrance  and  exit  of  vessels  from  the  ports  aforesaid.  Any  neutral  vessel 
approaching  any  of  said  ports,  or  attempting  to  leave  the  same,  without  notice 
or  knowledge  of  the  establishment  of  such  blockade,  will  be  duly  warned  by 
the  commander  of  the  blockading  forces,  who  will  indorse  on  her  register  the 
fact,  and  the  date,  of  such  warning,  where  such  indorsement  was  made;  and 
if  the  same  vessel  shall  again  attempt  to  enter  any  blockaded  port,  she  will  be 
captured  and  sent  to  the  nearest  convenient  port  for  such  proceedings  against 
her  and  her  cargo  as  prize,  as  may  be  deemed  advisable. 


25«        THE    WAY    THE    WAR    BUSINESS    WAS    HANDLED. 

"Neutral  vessels  lying  in  any  of  said  ports  at  the  time  of  the  establish 
ment  of  such  blockade  will  be  allowed  thirty  days  to  issue  therefrom. 

11  In  witness  whereof,  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand  and  caused  the  seal  of 
the  United  States  to  be  affixed. 

"Done  at  the  city  of  Washington,  this  226.  day  of  April,  A.  D.  1898,  and 
of  the  independence  of  the  United  States,  the  one  hundred  and  twenty- 
second. 

"(Seal.)  WILLIAM    McKINLEY. 

"By  the  President. 

"JOHN    SHERMAN,  Secretary  of  State. " 


(Call  for  Volunteers — Spain.) 
By  the  President  of  the  United  States. 


"A    PROCLAMATION. 

"Whereas,  a  joint  resolution  of  Congress  was  approved  on  the  twentieth 
day  of  April,  1898,  entitled  'Joint  resolution  for  the  recognition  of  the  independ 
ence  of  the  people  of  Cuba,  demanding  that  the  government  of  Spain  relin 
quish  its  authority  and  government  in  the  island  of  Cuba,  and  withdraw  its 
land  and  naval  forces  from  Cuba  and  Cuban  waters,  and  directing  the  Presi 
dent  of  the  United  States  to  use  the  land  and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States 
to  carry  these  resolutions  into  effect, '  and 

"Whereas,  by  an  act  of  Congress  entitled  'An  act  to  provide  for  tempo 
rarily  increasing  the  military  establishment  of  the  United  States  in  time  of  war 
and  for  other  purposes,'  approved  April  22,  1898;  the  President  is  authorized, 
in  order  to  raise  a  volunteer  army,  to  issue  his  proclamation  calling  for  vol 
unteers  to  serve  in  the  Army  of  the  United  States: 

"Now,  therefore,  I,  William  McKinley,  President  of  the  United  States, 
by  virtue  of  the  power  vested  in  me  by  the  Constitution  and  the  laws,  and 
deeming  sufficient  occasion  to  exist,  have  thought  fit  to  call  forth  and  hereby 
do  call  forth,  volunteers  to  the  aggregate  number  of  125,000,  in  order  to  carry 
into  effect  the  purpose  of  the  said  resolution ;  the  same  to  be  apportioned,  as 
far  as  practicable,  among  the  several  States  and  Territories  and  the  District 


H 

Ti 


THE    WAY    THE    WAR    BUSINESS    WAS    HANDLED.        261 

of  Columbia,  according  to  population,  and  to  serve  for  two  years,  unless 
sooner  discharged.  The  details  for  this  object  will  be  immediately  communi 
cated  to  the  proper  authorities  through  the  War  Department. 

"In  witness  whereof  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand  and  caused  the  seal  of 
the  United  States  to  be  affixed. 

"Done  at  the  city  of  Washington,  this  twenty-third  day  of  April,  A.  D. 
1898,  and  of  the  independence  of  the  United  States  the  one-hundred  and 
twenty-second. 

"(Seal.)  WILLIAM    McKINLEY. 

"By  the  President: 

"JOHN   SHERMAN,  Secretary  of  State. " 

(War  with  Spain — Maritime  Law. ) 
By  the  President  of  the  United  States  of  America. 

"A    PROCLAMATION. 

"Whereas,  by  an  act  of  Congress,  approved  April  25,  1898,  it  is  declared 
that  war  exists  and  that  war  has  existed  since  the  2ist  day  of  April,  A.  D. 
1898,  including  said  day,  between  the  United  States  of  America  and  the 
Kingdom  of  Spain ;  and 

"Whereas,  it  being  desirable  that  such  war  should  be  conducted  upon 
principles  in  harmony  with  the  present  views  of  nations  and  sanctioned  by 
their  recent  practice,  it  has  already  been  announced  that  the  policy  of  this 
government  will  be  not  to  resort  to  privateering,  but  to  adhere  to  the  rules  of 
the  Declaration  of  Paris : 

"Now,  therefore,  I,  William  McKinley,  President  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  by  virtue  of  the  power  vested  in  me  by  the  Constitution  and  the 
laws,  do  hereby  declare  and  proclaim : 

"i.  The  neutral  flag  covers  enemy's  goods,  with  the  exception  of  con 
traband  of  war. 

"2.  Neutral  goods,  not  contraband  of  war,  are  not  liable  to  confiscation 
under  the  enemy's  flag. 

"3.     Blockades  in  order  to  be  binding  must  be  effective. 

"4.  Spanish  merchant  vessels,  in  any  ports  or  places  within  the  United 
States,  shall  be  allowed  till  May  21,  1898,  inclusive,  for  loading  their  cargoes 


262        THE    WAY    THE    WAR    BUSINESS    WAS    HANDLED. 

and  departing  from  such  ports  or  places;  and  such  Spanish  merchant  vessels, 
if  met  at  sea  by  any  United  States  ship,  shall  be  permitted  to  continue  their 
voyage,  if,  on  examination  of  their  papers,  it  shall  appear  that  their  cargoes 
were  taken  on  board  before  the  expiration  of  the  above  term;  Provided,  that 
nothing  herein  contained  shall  apply  to  Spanish  vessels  having  on  board  any 
officer  in  the  military  or  naval  service  of  the  enemy,  or  any  coal  (except  such 
as  may  be  necessary  for  their  voyage),  or  any  other  article  prohibited  or  con 
traband  of  war,  or  any  dispatch  of  or  to  the  Spanish  government. 

"5.  Any  Spanish  merchant  vessel  which,  prior  to  April  21,  1898,  shall 
have  sailed  from  any  foreign  port  bound  for  any  port  or  place  in  the  United 
States,  shall  be  permitted  to  enter  such  port  or  place,  and  to  discharge  her 
cargo,  and  afterward  forthwith  to  depart  without  molestation;  and  any  such 
vessel,  if  met  at  sea  by  any  United  States  ship,  shall  be  permitted  to  continue 
her  voyage  to  any  port  not  blockaded. 

"6.  The  right  of  search  is  to  be  exercised  with  strict  regard  for  the  rights 
of  neutrals,  and  the  voyages  of  mail  steamers  are  not  to  be  interfered  with 
except  on  the  clearest  grounds  of  suspicion  of  a  violation  of  law  in  respect  of 
contraband  or  blockade. 

"In  witness  whereof,  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand  and  caused  the  seal  of 
the  United  States  to  be  affixed. 

"Done  at  the  city  of  Washington,  on  the  twenty-sixth  day  of  April,  in 
the  year  of  our  Lord  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  ninety-eight,  and  of  the 
independence  of  the  United  States  the  one  hundred  and  twenty-second. 

"(Seal.)  WILLIAM    McKINLEY. 

"By  the  President: 

"ALVEY  A.   ADEE,  Acting  Secretary  of  State." 


(Second  call  for  Volunteers — Spain.) 
By  the  President  of  the  United  States. 

"A   PROCLAMATION. 

"Whereas,  an  act  of  Congress  was  approved  on  the  twenty- fifth  day  of 
April,  1898,  entitled  'An  act  declaring  that  war  exists  between  the  United 
States  of  America  and  the  Kingdom  of  Spain, '  and 

"Whereas,  by  an  act  of  Congress  entitled  'An  act  to  provide  for  tem 
porarily  increasing  the  military  establishment  of  the  United  States  in 


THE    WAY    THE    WAR    BUSINESS    WAS    HANDLED.         263 

time  of  war  and  for  other  purposes,  approved  April  22,  1898;  the  President  is 
authorized,  in  order  to  raise  a  volunteer  army,  to  issue  his  proclamation  for 
calling  for  volunteers  to  serve  in  the  army  of  the  United  States: 

"Now,  therefore,  I,  William  McKinley,  President  of  the  United  States, 
by  virtue  of  the  power  vested  in  me  by  the  Constitution  and  the  laws,  and 
deeming  sufficient  occasion  to  exist,  have-thought  fit  to  call  forth  and  hereby 
do  call  forth,  volunteers  to  the  aggregate  number  of  75,000  in  addition  to  the 
volunteers  called  forth  by  my  proclamation  of  the  twenty-third  day  of  April, 
in  the  present  year;  the  same  to  be  apportioned,  as  far  as  practicable,  among 
the  several  States  and  Territories  and  the  District  of  Columbia,  according  to 
population,  and  to  serve  for  two  years,  unless  sooner  discharged.  The  pro 
portion  of  each  arm  and  the  details  of  enlistment  and  organization  will  be 
made  known  through  the  War  Department. 

"In  witness  whereof  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand  and  caused  the  seal  of 
the  United  States  to  be  affixed. 

"Done  at  the  city  of  Washington,  this  twenty-fifth  day  of  May,  in  the 
year  of  our  Lord  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  ninety-eight,  and  of  the 
independence  of  the  United  States  the  one  hundred  and  twenty-second. 

"(Seal.)  WILLIAM    McKINLEY. 

"By  the  President: 

"WILLIAM    R.   DAY,  Secretary  of  State. " 


(Blockade — Southern  Cuba  and  San  Juan,  Puerto  Rico.) 
By  the  President  of  the  United  States. 

"A   PROCLAMATION. 

"Whereas,  for  the  reasons  set  forth  in  my  Proclamation  of  April  22, 
1898,  a  blockade  of  the  ports  on  the  northern  coast  of  Cuba,  from  Cardenas  to 
Bahia  Honda,  inclusive,  and  of  the  port  of  Cienfuegos,  on  the  south  coast  of 
Cuba,  was  declared  to  have  been  instituted ;  and 

"Whereas,  it  has  become  desirable  to  extend  the  blockade  to  other  Span 
ish  ports: 

"Now,  therefore,  I,  William  McKinley,  President  of  the  United  States,  do 
hereby  declare  and  proclaim  that,  in  addition  to  the  blockade  of  the  ports 
specified  in  my  Proclamation  of  April  22,  1898,  the  United  States  of  America 


264        THE    WAY    THE    WAR    BUSINESS    WAS    HANDLED. 

has  instituted  and  will  maintain  an  effective  blockade  of  all  the  ports  on  the 
south  coast  of  Cuba  from  Cape  Frances  to  Cape  Cruz,  inclusive,  and  also  of 
the  port  of  San  Juan,  in  the  Island  of  Porto  Rico. 

"Neutral  vessels  lying  in  any  of  the  ports  to  which  the  blockade  is  by  the 
present  Proclamation  extended,  will  be  allowed  thirty  days  to  issue  there 
from,  with  cargo. 

"In  witness  whereof,  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand,  and  caused  the  Seal 
of  the  United  States  to  be  affixed. 

"Done  at  the  city  of  Washington,  this  twenty-seventh  day  of  June,  A. 
D.  1898,  and  of  the  independence  of  the  United  States  the  one  hundred  and 
twenty-second. 

"(Seal.)  WILLIAM    McKINLEY. 

"By  the  President: 

"J.   B.   MOORE,  Acting  Secretary  of  State." 

The  various  departments  of  the  government  of  the  United  States  have 
performed  the  part  of  a  government  by  the  people,  of  and  for  the  people,  in 
giving  full  information  of  the  conduct  of  the  war  with  Spain.  The  policy  of 
candor  has  prevailed.  Since  nations  lifted  the  sword  against  each  other  there 
has  been  no  war  more  obstinately  and  weakly,  though  vindictively,  provoked 
than  that  which  Spain  insisted  upon  with  the  United  States.  Notwithstanding 
a  remarkable  lack  of  preparation  in  military  matters,  owing  to  the  unthinking 
habit  as  to  the  possible  occurrence  of  speedy  and  costly  war  measures  forced 
upon  us — a  habit  in  the  indulgence  of  which  as  a  political  luxury  Congress 
fairly  represented  and  competed  with  the  people — the  war  was  a  wonderful 
success.  The  Spaniards  had  in  their  colonies  that  we  assailed  ten  regular  soldiers 
to  every  man  of  our  regular  army,  and  they  were  thoroughly  supplied  with 
rifles,  almost  equal  in  range,  and  better  supplied  with  fixed  ammunition  than 
ours,  and  field  artillery  up  to  date.  They  had  for  many  years  been  of  the 
opinion  that  they  would  sometime  in  this  generation  have  to  fight  us  for  the 
West  India  Islands,  and  so  had  in  their  calculations  pitted  their  navy  against 
that  of  the  United  States,  with  results  in  their  minds  flattering  to  themselves. 
As  long  ago  as  daring  the  second  administration  of  General  Grant,  it  was 
Spanish  public  opinion,  with  which  there  was  general  concurrence  in  Europe, 
with  the  possible  exception  of  England,  that  we  were  not  a  match  for  Spain  at 
sea.  This  idea  was  based  upon  the  estimation  in  which  Europe  held  the 
lighter  class  of  vessels  for  war  purposes — the  smaller  cruisers,  the  gunboats, 


GUNS  USED  BY  UNITED  STATES  INFANTRY.    BREECH  CLOSED. 


GUNS  USED  BY  UNITED  STATES  INFANTRY.     BREECH  OPEN. 


UNITED  STATES  LIGHT  ARTILLERY  AT  PORT  TAMPA. 


ARTILLERY  TARGET  PRACTICE  AT  PORT  TAMPA. 


THE    WAY    THE    WAR    BUSINESS    WAS    HANDLED.         267 

torpedo  boats  and  torpedo  destroyers.  In  these  Spain  certainly  outnumbered 
us.  But  our  naval  men  had  not  lost  time  in  their  studies  of  the  squadrons  of 
the  greater  sea  powers,  and  fortunately  they  had  early  reached  the  conclusion 
that  the  battleship  able  to  cross  the  great  oceans  was  the  old  reliable  style  of 
combatant,  and  that  comparatively  a  few  guns  of  very  high  power,  supported 
by  rapid-fire  guns,  stood  many  chances  of  proving  the  most  effective  combina 
tion  that  could  be  devised.  It  seems  to  be  established  by  our  experience  that 
two  battleships — say  the  Oregon  and  the  Iowa — could  have  sunk,  without 
receiving  a  serious  scratch,  all  the  torpedo  and  destroyer  and  light  cruiser 
boats  in  the  Spanish  navy.  There  were  twelve  gunboajs  in  the  squadron  of 
the  Spaniards  in  the  Philippines  that  did  not  in  the  war  period  show  sign  of 
existence,  though  they  were  invited  to  adventure  by  our  transports  on  the 
Pacific,  bearing  practically  unarmed  regiments.  It  is  characteristic  of  modern 
wars  that  they  are  practically  short,  owing  to  the  rapidity  with  which  orders 
are  sent  by  telegraph  and  troops  by  railways  and  steamers ;  and  the  concen 
trated  destructiveness  of  monster  war  ships,  and  rapidly  mobilized  armies,  are 
such  enormous  consumers  of  men  and  money  that  expenses  in  active  opera 
tions  cannot  long  be  endured. 

However,  our  war  with  Spain  was  fought  to  a  finish  in  a  fortnight  and  a 
hundred  days,  and  we  had  a  procession  of  triumphs  from  start  to  end.  It  may 
have  been  a  fault  that  victory  became  too  monotonous  for  some  of  our  men, 
prepared  as  they  presumed  to  draw  prizes,  and  for  the  journalism  of  fragmen 
tary  distortion  that  covers  all  countries  wrapped  up  in  newspapers  and  yet  is 
adapted  only  to  sea  serpents,  earthquakes  and  the  land  where  earthquakes 
abide  and  typhoon  and  the  cyclone  are  at  play,  and  no  music  is  tolerated  that 
is  gentler  than  the  calliope.  There  never  was  as  much  that  was  difficult 
accomplished  in  warfare  in  the  same  time  as  by  this  country,  with  so  small  a 
loss  of  life,  or  more  gratifying  acts  of  good  conduct  in  which  heroes  came 
from  all  ranks  in  the  service,  and  yet  there  is  a  literature  of  criticism  of  the 
conduct  of  the  war.  It  is  the  ordinary  fortune  of  war  that  the  exposures, 
fatigues  and  privations  of  camp  life  and  the  march  cost  more  lives  than  are 
lost  on  battlefields,  but  for  these  things  our  country  seemed  to  be  least 
prepared,  and  feeling  sure  abundant  provision  was  made  for  the  soldiers, 
there  have  been  disappointments  demanding  victims,  and  we  have  volumes  of 
testimony  taken  by  the  commission  appointed  by  the  President  to  investigate 
the  business  of  the  War  Department  in  the  war  with  Spain. 


268        THE    WAY    THE    WAR    BUSINESS    WAS    HANDLED. 

The  report  of  the  Major-General  commanding-  the  army,  Nelson  A.  Miles, 
contains  this  passage : 

"At  the  commencement  of  the  war  the  problem  was  largely  a  naval  one, 
and  until  the  question  of  superiority  between  our  navy  and  the  Spanish  navy, 
or  such  naval  forces  as  might  be  furnished  by  any  other  European  power  or 
combination  of  powers  supporting  the  Spanish  government,  was  determined, 
military  operations  had  to  be  determined  by  the  success  or  failure  of  our  naval 
forces.  I  was  fully  convinced  that  should  our  navy  prove  superior  the  posi 
tion  of  the  Spanish  army  in  Cuba  would  be  rendered  untenable  with  a  mini 
mum  loss  of  life  and  treasure  to  the  United  States." 

It  was  the  first  certainty  of  the  war  that  the  command  of  the  sea  must 
be  settled  before  military  operations  took  place  outside  our  own  lines.  The 
navy  Department  had  its  work  cut  out  for  it — knew  what  was  on  hand,  the 
possibilities,  where  the  ships  were  and  how  manned  and  equipped,  and  three 
months  in  advance  of  the  declaration,  precautionary  orders  were  issued.  Many 
of  them  are  presented  in  the  Appendix  Report  of  the  Bureau  of  Navigation, 
and  these  are  described  as  "only  part  of  the  more  important  precautionary 
orders  issued  by  the  Department,"  and  as  "orders  not  elsewhere  included." 
This  further  preface  is  given : 

"No  attempt  has  been  made  to  indicate  the  vast  amount  of  work  done  by 
the  bureaus  and  offices  of  the  Department  in  putting  ships  and  yards  in  the 
highest  state  of  efficiency  and  in  purchasing  and  manufacturing  war  material. 
Arrangements  for  purchases  abroad  began  in  February,  but  the  correspond 
ence  in  relation  thereto  is  so  voluminous  that  it  is  not  published. ' ' 


Washington,  January  16,  1898. 
Selfridge,  Villefranche-sur-Mer : 

Retain  men  on  this  enlistment.     Detailed  instructions  by  mail. 

LONG. 


Washington,  January  n,  1898. 
Helena,  Funchal,  Madeira: 

Secret  and  confidential.  In  view  of  recent  events,  it  is  considered  advisa 
ble  to  delay  departure  from  Funchal.  Can  you  obtain  good  berth  behind 
breakwater  for  a  considerable  time?  LONG. 


THE    WAY    THE    WAR    BUSINESS    WAS    HANDLED.        269 

Washington,  January  17,  1898. 
Chester,  Cincinnati,  Montevideo,  Uruguay: 

Secret  and  confidential.  Affairs  are  very  disturbed  at  Cuba.  It  is  con 
sidered  advisable  to  change  the  disposition  of  ships.  Announce  unofficially 
your  intention  to  proceed  with  the  Cincinnati  and  Castine  (on)  cruise  to  north 
ward  for  exercise  and  drill,  and  to  visit  the  most  northern  part  of  the  South 
Atlantic  Station.  As  soon  after  as  possible,  without  thereby  causing  com 
ment,  proceed  to  Para,  Brazil,  at  discretion,  and  there  await  further  orders. 

LONG. 


Washington,  January  17,  1898. 
Helena,  Funchal,  Madeira: 

Proceed  to  Lisbon,  Portugal,  at  discretion,  and  there  await  further  orders. 

LONG. 


Washington,  January  17,  1898. 
Wilmington,  Basseterre,  Guadeloupe: 

Delay  execution  of  orders  of  December  9  for  the  present.  Cruise  in 
Windward  Islands,  not  touching  at  Spanish  ports.  Will  keep  in  telegraphic 
communication.  About  February  14  proceed  to  La  Guayra,  and  there  await 
further  orders.  Do  not  detach  Ensigns  Bretherton  and  Dayton. 

LONG. 

(The  orders  of  December  9  directed  the  Wilmington  to  proceed  to  the 
South  Atlantic  Station.) 


Washington,  January  26,  1898. 
Selfridge,  Villefranche : 

Orders  were  sent  by  steamer  of  January  19  naval  force  on  European 
Station,  proceed  to  Lisbon  after  February  2.  Orders  have  been  issued  to 
Commander  of  Helena.  Will  remain  until  further  orders  at  Lisbon. 

LONG. 


Washington,  January  27,  1898. 
Dewey,  Olympia,  Yohohama,  Japan: 

Retain  until  further  orders  the  crew  of  the   squadron   whose  terms  of 
enlistment  have  expired.  CROWNINSHIELD. 


270        THE    WAY    THE    WAR    BUSINESS    WAS    HANDLED. 

Washington,  February  17,  1898. 
Cincinnati,  Para,  Brazil: 

The  Cincinnati  and  Castine  proceed  to  such  ports  as  you  think  best  to  the 
north  of  Para,  Brazil.  Keep  in  telegraphic  communication  with  Washington. 

LONG. 

Washington,  February  24,  1898. 
Bunce,  Navy  Yard,  New  York: 

Keep  closest  watch  on  submarine  boat.  Inform  captain  of  Vizcaya  about 
her.  If  in  your  judgment  circumstances  warrant  it,  seize  her.  Learn,  if  pos 
sible,  from  Nixon  or  otherwise  where  she  has  gone  and  what  interest  controls 
her.  LONG. 


Washington,  February  25,  1898. 
Howell,  Lisbon: 

Secret  and  confidential.  Keep  the  squadron  at  such  port  as  it  may  be  in 
(Lisbon)  until  further  orders.  Keep  filled  with  coal.  ROOSEVELT. 

Washington,  February  25,  1898. 
Dewey,  Hongkong: 

Secret  and  confidential.  Order  the  squadron,  except  Monocacy,  to  Hong 
kong.  Keep  full  of  coal.  In  the  event  of  declaration  of  war,  Spain,  your 
duty  will  be  to  see  that  the  Spanish  squadron  does  not  leave  the  Asiatic  coast, 
and  then  offensive  operations  in  Philippine  Islands.  Keep  Olympia  until 
further  orders.  ROOSEVELT. 

Washington,  February  26,  1898. 
Wilmington,  La  Guaira: 

Proceed  to  Barbados  and  report  for  duty  to  the  Commander  in  Chief 
United  States  Naval  Force  on  South  Atlantic  Station.  LONG. 


Washington,  February  26,  1898. 
Chester,  Barbados: 

Keep  full  of  coal,  the  best  that  can  be  had.     When  Castine   has  been 
docked,  order  her  to  Barbados.     Wilmington  has  been  ordered  to  Barbados. 

LONG. 


THE    WAY    THE    WAR    BUSINESS    WAS    HANDLED.         271 

And  on  this  February  26th — two  months  before  the  war  was  on,  Miller, 
Honolulu;  Howell,  Lisbon;  Dewey,  Hongkong-;  Sicard,  Key  West,  were  tele 
graphed  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  "Keep  full  of  coal,  the  best  that  can  be 
had."  There  was  no  stinting  about  that.  Uncle  Sam's  ships  were  not  to  be. 
caught  without  coal.  From  January  27th  to  April  7th,  there  were  four  cables 
for  the  Navy  Department  to  Dewey.  Hongkong:  First,  hold  enlisted  men 
whose  terms  were  expired,  for  further  orders;  second,  go  to  Hongkong;  third, 
in  case  of  war  see  that  the  Spanish  fleet  does  not  get  away;  fourth,  keep  full 
of  coal,  then  offensive  operations  in  Philippine  islands.  Keep  Olympia!  All 
this  five  weeks  before  the  war  was  declared.  Keep  full  of  coal,  was  reiter 
ated.  April  7th,  Dewey,  Hongkong,  was  told  in  plain  terms  to  "prepare  for 
action." 


Washington,  March  3,  1898. 
Navy  Yard,  League  Island : 

Enlist  seamen,  firemen,  and  petty  officers  for  general  service  for  crews  of 
Columbia  and  Minneapolis.  Direct  commanding  officers  of  those  vessels  to 
get  them  in  readiness  for  service  at  sea.  CROWNINSHIELD. 

(Note. — Enlistments  under  this  and  following  order  exceeded  quota 
established  by  law.) 


Washington,  March  3,  1898. 
Navy  Yards,  Brooklyn,  Boston: 

Enlist  seamen,  firemen,  and  petty  officers  for  general  service  for  crews  of 
Columbia  and  Minneapolis.  CROWNINSHIELD. 


Washington,  March  3,  1898. 
Navy  Yard,  Mare  Island,  Cal. : 

Order  Mohican,  navy  yard,  Mare  Island,  to  receive  on  board  ammunition 
now  there  for  the  naval  force  on  Asiatic  Station;  then  proceed  at  once  to 
Honolulu  and  transfer  to  the  Baltimore.  As  soon  as  Mohican  arrives  Balti 
more  will  leave  for  Hongkong.  Orders  by  mail.  When  will  Mohican  be 
ready?  •  LONG. 


272        THE    WAY    THE    WAR    BUSINESS    WAS    HANDLED. 

Navy  Department,  Washington,  March  4,  1898. 

Sir:  The  Department  has  this  date  directed,  by  telegraph,  that  the 
ammunition  now  at  the  navy  yard,  Mare  Island,  intended  for  the  Asiatic 
Station  and  for  the  U.  S.  F.  S.  Baltimore,  shall  be  shipped  to  that  vessel  by 
the  Mohican.  You  will  please  prepare  the  Mohican  to  receive  this  ammuni 
tion,  and  have  her  proceed  to  Honolulu  at  the  earliest  practicable  date. 

Very  respectfully,  JOHN  D.  LONG,  Secretary. 

Commandant  Navy  Yard,  Mare  Island,  Cal. 


Washington,  March  7,  1898. 
Brooklyn,  La  Guayra: 

The  situation  is  getting  worse.  Proceed  without  delay  to  Hampton 

roads.  LONG. 

(Note. — The  above  order  was  in  contemplation  of  the  formation  of  the 
Flying  Squadron.) 


Washington,  March  9,  1898. 
Sicard,  Key  West : 

Not  to  expend  ammunition,  target  practice  or  as  a  test,   until  further 
orders.  LONG. 


Washington,  March  12,  1898. 
Howell,  Lisbon: 

Direct  Bancroft  to  proceed  at  once  to  Norfolk.     Direct  Helena  to  proceed 
at  once  to  Key  West.  LONG. 


Washington,  March  14,  1898. 
Howell,  Lisbon,  Portugal: 

Proceed  at  once  to  Newcastle-upon-the-Tyne.  Upon  arrival  communi 
cate  immediately  with  the  United  States  naval  attache  at  London.  Hoist 
United  States  flag  upon  Amazonas  and  Abreu.  Appoint  to  the  command  of 
former  Lieut.  Commander  A.  P.  Nazro  and  sufficient  officers  and  crew  of  the 
San  Francisco.  Proceed  to  New  York.  San  Francisco  to  convoy.  Utilize 
your  staff  watch  duty.  LONG. 


THE    WAY    THE    WAR    BUSINESS    WAS    HANDLED.        273 

Washington,  March  15,  1898. 
Chester,  Barbados: 

Order  the  squadron  to  proceed  to  Port  Antonio.  The  Annapolis  left 
yesterday  from  Curacao  (for  a)  cruise  to  the  northward,  to  arrive  not  later 
than  March  31  at  Key  West.  I  could  not  communicate  by  telegraph,  and  he 
does  not  know  the  altered  situation.  Try  to  intercept  and  direct  to  proceed 
to  Hampton  Roads,  Va.  LONG. 

(The  Annapolis  had  left  on  a  practice  cruise  with  apprentices  on  board,  ana 
was  to  remain  at  sea  for  seventeen  days.) 


Washington,  March  17,  1898. 
Sicard,  Key  West,  Fla.  : 

Send  Texas  and  Massachusetts  to  Hampton  Roads,  Va.,  without  delay. 

LONG. 

(Note. — The  above  order  was  issued  to  carry  on  the  formation  of  the 
Flying  Squadron.) 

Washington,  April  4,  1898. 
Sampson,  Key  West,  Fla. : 

Be  ready  on  receipt  of  order  to  take  possession  of  Key  West  cable  and 
telegraph  office,  and  to  place  an  officer  in  charge.  He  will  not  permit  the 
transmission  to  Cuba  of  any  telegram  relating  to  the  action  of  the  President 
or  Congress.  Will  be  further  instructed.  The  business  of  the  company  not 
to  be  interfered  with  any  more  it  is  necessary.  The  officer  assigned  upon  this 
duty  must  be  one  discreet  and  judicious.  LONG. 


Washington,  April  7,  1898. 
Dewey,  Hongkong: 

Land  all  woodwork,  stores,  etc.,  it  is  not  considered  necessary  to  have  for 
operations.  LONG. 

Washington,  April  19,  1898. 
Navy  Pay  Office,  San  Francisco,  Cal. : 

Send  the  following  cipher  message  to  Admiral  Miller  by  first  steamer: 
Proceed  with  your  personal  staff  to  San  Francisco  immediately  by  steamer. 
Order  Mohican  to  San  Francisco.  Keep  Bennington  at  Honolulu.  Bring 
squadron  records.  LONG. 


274        THE    WAY    THE    WAR    BUSINESS    WAS    HANDLED. 

Washington,  April  21,  1898. 
Navy  Yard,  Boston,  New  York,  Norfolk,  Mare  Island: 

The  naval    force  on  the    North  Atlantic   Station   are  blockading  Cuba. 
War  has  not  been  declared.     War  may  be  declared  at  any  moment. 

LONG. 


Washington,  April  23,  1898. 
Schley,  Fort  Monroe: 

Send  Minneapolis  immediately  to  Eastport,  Me.,  skirting  coast  above 
Cape  Ann;  Columbia  to  Newport,  R.  I.  Both  will  receive,  upon  arrival, 
further  orders.  LONG. 


Fort  Monroe,  April  24,  1898. 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Washington : 

Minneapolis  and  Columbia  left  at   1 1  p.  m.  Saturday  night,  having  pro 
ceeded  in  obedience  to  orders.  SCHLEY. 


It  should  be  remembered  that  while  the  wires  were  worked  in  this  way 
the  world  around,  a  part  of  the  intellectual  force  of  Congress  was  spent  in 
getting  up  time  tables  and  holding  stop  watches  to  hurry  the  President  into 
war,  and  the  disregard  of  yellow  fever  and  rainy  weather  and  passion  to  run 
our  ships  against  forts,  and  land  a  few  of  our  small  force  of  regulars  to  aid  the 
standing  army,  50,000  strong,  of  the  free  and  independent  Republic  of  Cuba. 
The  Major  General  commanding,  however,  refers  to  "an  auxiliary  force  of 
50, ooo  natives. "  As  we  did  not  before  the  battles  put  ashore  twenty  thousand 
regulars  and  volunteers,  it  is  our  army  that  would  have  been  the  "auxiliary 
force."  The  natives,  we  infer,  were  already  in  the  island,  for  General  Miles 
mentions  the  landing  at  "the  harbor  of  Banes,  on  the  north  coast  of  Cuba, 
which  has  been  held  during  the  war  by  the  Cubans. ' '  This  harbor  should 
have  been  discovered  earlier,  for  it  would  have  been  a  great  help  to  the  sister 
Republic.  There  was  landed,  "for  the  10,000  Cubans  under  General  Garcia," 
7,500  rifles,  1,000,000  cartridges,  5,000  uniforms  and  other  material."  We 
presume  it  was  these  new  and  fresh  Cuban  uniforms  that  so  much  impressed 
our  comparatively  small  force  at  Santiago. 


CHAPTER     XL 


The  Story  of  Dewey's  Splendid  Victory  Told  by  Those  Who  Won  It. 

The  Battle  of  Manila  Bay — Confidential  Information  From  Madrid,  Showing  Spanish  Con 
fidence  in  Their  Navy — Rapid  Exchange  of  Cables  between  Dewey  and  Long — Ener 
getic  Inquiry  in  the  Navy  Department — Everything  Rushed  from  the  Start — Dewey's 
Masterly  Movements  and  Immortal  Victory — The  Official  Reports  Full  of  Stories  of  the 
Battle  That  Will  be  News  to  the  People — Details  of  Uncommon  Value — Spanish  Official 
Report  Exceedingly  Interesting — Admiral  Montijo  was  not  Surprised  but  Fired  First — 
The  Celebrated  Breakfast  Caused  by  a  False  Alarm. 

The  Bureau  of  Navigation  publishes  a  communication  dated  Madrid,  the 
1 6th  of  April,  1898,  five  days  before  the  war  opened — the  name  of  the 
writer  not  given.  He  was  evidently  a  deeply  interested  and  well  instructed 
observer.  Attention  is  called  to  an  article  April  6th,  in  the  Heraldo  of 
Madrid,  that  caused  much  comment.  We  quote : 

"We  had  an  opportunity  to-day  to  talk  for  a  long  time  with  General 
Beranger,  the  last  secretary  of  the  navy  under  the  Conservative  Cabinet.  To 
the  questions  which  we  directed  to  him  concerning  the  conflict  pending  with 
the  United  States  he  was  kind  enough  to  inform  us  that  he  confided  absolutely 
in  the  triumph  of  our  naval  forces.  The  attack  on  our  island  ports  is  not  to 
be  feared,  he  said,  by  an  enemy  taking  advantage  of  the  darkness  of  night. 
The  reason  of  this  is  that  Havana,  as  well  as  Cienfuegos,  Nuevitas,  and  San 
tiago,  are  defended  by  electrical  and  automobile  torpedoes,  which  can  work  at 
a  great  distance  (have  a  large  radius  of  action).  Sefior  Canovas  del  Castillo. 
who  did  not  neglect  these  things,  arranged  for,  in  agreement  with  me,  the 
shipping  to  Cuba  of  190  torpedoes,  which  are  surely  located  in  these  ports  at 
present.  The  transportation  and  installation  of  these  war  machines  was  in 
the  charge  of  the  distinguished  torpedoist,  Senor  Chacon.  I  have  already 
said  that  we  shall  conquer  on  the  sea,  and  I  am  now  going  to  give  you  my 
reasons.  The  first  of  these  is  the  remarkable  discipline  that  prevails  on  our 
war  ships,  and  the  second,  as  soon  as  fire  is  opened  the  crews  of  the  American 

277 


278          THE    STORY    OF    DEWEY'S    SPLENDID    VICTORY. 

ships  will  commence  to  desert,  since  we  all  know  that  among-  them  are  people 
of  all  nationalities.  Ship  against  ship,  therefore,  a  failure  is  not  to  be  feared. 
I  believe  that  the  squadron  detained  at  Cape  de  Verdes,  and  particularly  the 
destroyers,  should  have  and  could  have  continued  the  voyage  to  Cuba,  since 
they  have  nothing  to  fear  from  the  American  fleet.  In  this  class  of  ships  we 
are  on  a  much  higher  level  than  the  United  States." 

This  Heraldo  was  the  most  important  of  the  Madrid  journals,  and  the 
statement  about  torpedoes,  coming  at  the  juncture  it  did,  is  quite  striking. 
The  Madrid  correspondent  who  furnished  the  Heraldo  translation  wrote  on 
that  "the  press  has  fed  the  people  with  all  sorts  of  nonsense  about  the 
superior  bravery  of  the  Spanish  sailor,  the  superior  discipline  on  board  the 
Spanish  ships,  and  the  greater  fighting  power  of  the  navy.  The  belief  in  this 
superiority  of  the  Spanish  navy  over  that  of  the  United  States  accounts,  in  a 
large  measure,  in  my  opinion,  for  the  determination  to  fight  us.  This  opinion 
is  shared  also  by  many  intelligent  persons,  in  fact,  I  believe,  by  all  Spaniards. 
They  say  they  have  nothing  to  lose,  they  could  not  be  worse  off  with  the  war 
than  without  it,  as  they  are  about  to  lose  Cuba  anyhow ;  but  they  can  do 
incalculable  damage  to  our  commerce;  seriously  injure,  if  not  destroy,  our 
navy,  and,  although  they  would  probably  be  beaten  in  the  end,  they  will  have 
taught  us  a  salutary  lesson  in  the  meantime.  One  of  the  most  intelligent, 
best-informed  Spaniards  I  have  met  here,  a  man  who  has  traveled  much,  and 
claims  to  have  a  great  admiration  for  the  United  States,  and  who  knows  much 
about  our  history  and  resources,  a  senator  from  the  Kingdom,  told  me  yester 
day  that  the  thing  that  he  dreaded  most  was  the  long  period  that  the  hostilities 
would  last.  He  was  sure  that  three  years  would  be  the  very  least  that  the 
struggle  would  continue." 

At  this  time  the  Spaniards  thought  they  were  rapidly  getting  their  navy 
in  order,  and  were  in  course  of  preparing  Cervera's  fleet,  which  sailed  from 
the  Cape  Verdes  thirteen  days  later.  The  correspondent  gave  the  Spanish 
vessels  that  were  believed  to  be  approaching  an  efficient  state.  "The  torpedo 
squadron,  consisting  of  three  destroyers,  three  torpedo  boats,  and  the  con 
verted  cruiser  Cuidad  de  Cadiz,  with  the  Colon  and  Maria  Teresa,  are  at  the 
Cape  de  Verdes  awaiting  instructions.  It  is  said  that  the  Colon  and  Teresa 
left  Cadiz  in  such  a  hurry  that  they  were  not  properly  provisioned.  Provisions 
and  coal  have  been  sent  to  them.  I  have  no  reason  to  believe  that  they  have 
not  a  full  supply  of  ammunition.  The  Oquendo  and  Vizcaya  from  Porto  Rico 


THE    STORY    OF    DEWEY'S    SPLENDID    VICTORY.          279 

should  arrive  at  Cape  de  Verdes  to-day.  Although  I  have  no  definite  informa 
tion,  I  believe  the  Pelayo  arrived  at  Cadiz  yesterday,  coming  from  Cartagena. 
It  was  intended  that  she  should  go,  after  a  few  days'  necessary  delay  in 
Cartagena,  and  it  is  reported  that  she  was  sighted  in  the  Straits  of  Gibraltar 
day  before  yesterday.  The  Proserpina,  Osado,  Destructor,  Barcelo, 
Retamosa,  Habana,  Halcon,  torpedo  boats  and  destroyers,  and  the  Vitoria, 
are  now  practically  ready  in  Cadiz,  awaiting  the  arrival  of  the  Carlos  V.  and 
the  Pelayo.  The  Alfonso  XIII.  is  also  about  ready  in  Cartagena.  The 
installation  for  moving  the  guns  by  electricity  in  the  Carlos  V.  is  not  com 
pleted,  and  I  am  unable  to  get  at  the  estimate  of  the  date  when  she  will  be 
entirely  ready  for  service.  It  is  said  on  good  authority,  however,  that  in  an 
emergency  she  could  be  used  at  once,  working  such  parts  as  have  not  power 
applied  by  hand.  Work  is  being  pushed,  also,  as  rapidly  as  possible  on  the 
Cisneros,  but  she  can  hardly  be  ready  for  many  weeks.  The  trans-Atlantic 
steamers  Mexico,  Panama,  Santo  Domingo,  San  Augustin,  and  Villaverde, 
now  in  Cuban  waters,  are  being  armed  as  auxiliary  cruisers.  Nine  trans- 
Atlantic  steamers  in  Spanish  ports  at  present  are  also  being  armed  as 
cruisers.  To  this  number  should  be  added  the  Columbia  and  Normannia, 
recently  purchased  in  Germany,  and  the  Giralda,  now  being  converted  in 
Barcelona.  This  makes  twenty-one  auxiliary  cruisers  concerning  which  I 
have  quite  definite  information.  The  two  steamers  bought  in  Germany  were 
strengthened  there,  and  are  in  condition  to  receive  their  artillery  and  crew 
when  they  arrive  at  Cadiz,  which  is  expected  to-day." 

Other  ships  were  to  be  taken  by  the  government,  and  there  were  extraor 
dinary  precautions  to  prevent  the  getting  out  of  news  about  the  ships,  upon 
the  assumption  that  Cervera  would  do  the  unexpected.  This  publication 
gives  in  better  form  than  it  has  been  found  elsewhere,  the  basis  of  fact  upon 
which  the  Spanish  rested  their  anticipations  of  successfully  disputing  our 
supremacy  at  sea. 

The  cable  was  in  April  kept  busy  between  the  Navy  Department  at 
Washington,  and  Admiral  George  Dewey  at  Hongkong.  The  dispatches  run : 

Washington,  April  i,  1898. 
Dewey,  Hongkong: 

Fill  up  with  provisions  purchased  on  station ;  then  how  many  days'  pro 
visions  have  you  on  hand?  How  much  soap  and  tobacco  shall  I  ship? 

LONG. 


28o          THE    STORY    OF    DEWEY'S    SPLENDID    VICTORY. 

Washington,  April  4,  1898. 
Dewey,  Hongkong: 

Can  you  purchase  immediately  supply  steamer?     What  will  be  the  cost  of? 

LONG. 


Hongkong,  April  4,  1898.     Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Washington: 

I  have  chartered  the  British  steamer  Nanshan,  having  over  3,000  tons  of 
coal  now  on  board.  Before  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  can  and  would  purchase 
this  steamer.  I  request  the  earliest  information  in  order  to  conclude  arrange 
ments.  Cannot  be  made  after  the  outbreak  of  hostilities.  DEWEY. 

Washington,  April  6,  1898. 
Dewey,  Hongkong: 

Purchase  immediately  Nanshan  and  one  more  vessel  for  supplies. 
Charge  special  appropriation.  Send  the  receipts  to  the  Department.  Enlist 
for  special  service,  if  possible,  one  year,  unless  sooner  discharged,  the  crew 
of.  Detach  and  order  assume  command  of  each  an  officer.  Arm  if  possible. 
War  may  be  declared.  Condition  very  critical.  LONG. 


Washington,  April  6,  1898. 
Dewey,  Hongkong: 

The  receipt  of  telegram  of  April  4  is  acknowledged.  I  approve  action. 
Expedite  delivery.  April  6  may  be  last  opportunity.  LONG. 

Hongkong,  April  6,  1898. 
Secretary  of  Navy,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

I  have  purchased  Nanshan,  and  I  have  engaged  her  crew.  Will  detail  an 
officer  for  command.  I  have  ordered  three  officers,  50  men  from  Monocacy  to 
fill  vacancies  here.  I  hope  to  get  another  steamer.  .  .  .  The  receipt  of 
telegram  April  6  acknowledged,  to  expedite  delivery.  DEWEY. 

It  was  April  yth  that  Dewey  was  cabled  by  Long,  "Land  all  woodwork." 
There  was  but  little  more  time  to  lose  or  use  before  action.  Long's  cable  was 
the  equivalent  of  "Clear  for  action!" 

Hongkong,  April  9,  1898. 
Secretary  of  Navy,  Washington: 

I  have  purchased  the  British  steamer  Zafiro,  for  supplies,  for  ^18,000 
sterling.  I  will  arm,  equip,  and  man  vessel  immediately.  DEWEY. 


ADMIRAL  DEWEY,  HERO  OF  MANILA  BAY. 


THE    STORY    OF    DEWEY'S  SPLENDID    VICTORY.  283 

Washington,  April  21,  1898. 
Dewey,   Hongkong: 

The  naval  force  on  the  North  Atlantic  Station  are  blockading  Cuba.  War 
has  not  yet  been  declared,  but  may  be  declared  at  any  moment.  I  will 
inform  you.  Await  orders.  LONG. 

Washington,  April  24,  1898. 
Dewey,  Hongkong: 

War  has  commenced  between  the  United  States  and  Spain.  Proceed  at 
once  to  Philippine  Islands.  Commence  operations  at  once,  particularly 
against  the  Spanish  fleet.  You  must  capture  vessels  or  destroy.  Use  utmost 
endeavors.  LONG. 

Hongkong,  April  25,  1898. 
Secretary  of  Navy,  Washington : 

The  squadron  will  leave  for  Manila,  Philippine  Islands,  immediately  upon 
the  arrival  of  the  United  States  consul  from  Manila.  DEWEY. 

Hongkong,  April  25,  1898. 
Secretary  of  Navy,  Washington : 

In  accordance  with  the  request  of  the  governor  of  Hongkong,  the  squad 
ron  leaves  to-day  for  Mirs  Bay,  China,  to  await  telegraphic  instructions. 
Address,  Hongkong.  I  will  communicate  by  tug.  DEWEY. 

Hongkong,  April  27,  1898. 
Secretary  of  Navy,  Washington : 

Williams,  the  United  States  consul  from  Manila,  has  arrived.  The 
squadron  will  sail  immediately  for  the  Philippine  Islands.  DEWEY. 


Hongkong,  May  7,  1898.      (Manila,  May  i.) 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Washington : 

The  squadron  arrived  at  Manila  at  daybreak  this  morning.  Immediately 
engaged  enemy  and  destroyed  the  following  Spanish  vessels :  Reina  Christina, 
Castillia,  Don  Antonio  de  Biloa,  Don  Juan  de  Austria,  Isla  de  Luzon,  Isla  de 
Cuba,  General  Lezo,  Marquis  del  Duaro,  El  Curreo,  Velasco,  one  transport, 
Isla  de  Mandano,  water  battery  at  Cavite.  I  shall  destroy  Cavite  arsenal  dis 
pensatory.  The  squadron  is  uninjured.  Few  men  were  slightly  wounded.  I 


284          THE    STORY    OF    DEWEY'S    SPLENDID    VICTORY. 

request  Department  will  send  immediately  from  San  Francisco  fast  steamer 
with  ammunition.  The  only  means  of  telegraphing  is  to  the  American  consul 
at  Hongkong.  DEWEY. 


Washington,  May  3,  1898. 
Dewey  (care  American  consul),  Hongkong: 

I  send  hearty  congratulations  to  yourself  and  your  officers  and  men. 
The  President  highly  appreciates  your  achievement.  I  await  report  from 
you,  on  receipt  of  which  further  action  will  be  taken  and  any  supplies  that 
you  wish  will  be  forwarded.  LONG. 

Hongkong,  May  7,  1898.      (Cavite,  May  4.) 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Washington : 

I  have  taken  possession  of  the  naval  station  at  Cavite,  Philippine  Islands, 
and  destroyed  its  fortifications.  Have  destroyed  fortifications  bay  entrance, 
paroling  garrison.  Have  cut  cable  to  mainland.  I  control  bay  completely, 
and  can  take  city  at  any  time,  but  I  have  not  sufficient  men  to  hold.  The 
squadron  excellent  health  and  spirits.  The  Spanish  loss  not  fully  known ; 
very  heavy;  150  killed,  including  captain,  on  Reina  Christina  alone.  I  am 
assisting  and  protecting  Spanish  sick  and  wounded,  250  in  number,  in  this 
hospital,  within  our  lines.  Will  ammunition  be  sent?  I  request  answer 
without  delay.  I  can  supply  squadron  coal  and  provisions  for  a  long  period. 
Much  excitement  at  Manila.  Scarcity  of  provisions  on  account  of  not  having 
economized  stores.  Will  protect  foreign  residents.  DEWEY. 


Washington,  May  7,  1898. 
Dewey  (care  American  consul),  Hongkong: 

The  President,  in  the  name  of  ths  American  people,  thanks  you  and  your 
officers  and  men  for  your  splendid  achievement  and  overwhelming  victory. 
In  recognition  he  has  appointed  you  acting  rear-admiral,  and  will  recommend 
a  vote  of  thanks  to  you  by  Congress  as  a  foundation  for  further  promotion. 
The  Charleston  will  leave  at  once  with  what  ammunition  she  can  carry. 
Pacific  Mail  Steamship  Company's  steamer  Pekin  will  follow  with  ammunition 
and  supplies.  Will  take  troops  unless  you  telegraph  otherwise.  How  many 
will  you  require?  LONG. 


THE    STORY    OF    DEWEY'S    SPLENDID    VICTORY.          285 

Washington,  May  7,  1898. 

Sir:  Under  the  authority  of  section  1434  of  the  Revised  Statutes  of  the 
United  States,  you  have  been  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  United  States 
naval  force  on  the  Asiatic  Station,  with  the  rank  of  rear-admiral. 

You  will  hoist  the  flag  of  a  rear-admiral,  will  wear  the  uniform,  and  will 
affix  that  title  to  your  official  signature.  Respectfully. 

JOHN  D.  LONG,  Secretary. 
Commodore  George  Dewey,  U.  S.  N., 

Commander-in-Chief  U.  S.  Naval  Force,  Asiatic  Station, 
U.  S.  Flagship  Olympia. 


Hongkong,  June  17,  1898.      (Cavite,  June  12.) 
vSecretary  of  Navy,  Washington: 

The  following  is  correct  list  Spanish  vessels  destroyed  May  i :  Two  pro 
tected  cruisers,  Isla  de  Cuba,  Isla  de  Luzon;  five  unprotected  cruisers,  Reina 
Christina,  Castilla,  Don  Antonio  de  Ulloa,  Don  Juan  de  Austria,  Velasco; 
two  gunboats,  General  Lezo,  Marquis  del  Duero;  one  transport,  Isla  de 
Mindano;  one  surveying  vessel,  Argos,  both  armed.  The  following  have 
been  captured:  One  transport,  Manila;  one  gunboat,  Callao. 

DEWEY. 

Manila,  November  26,  1898. 
Secretary  Navy,  Washington : 

Isla  de  Luzon,  Isla  de  Cuba,  and  Don  Juan  de  Austria  have  been  raised 
and  docked.  My  anticipations  as  to  their  value  fully  realized.  Will  leave 
shortly  for  Hongkong  under  their  own  steam.  Constructor  Capps  deserving 
highest  commendation.  DEWEY. 


(Report  of  engagement  of  squadron  with  Spanish  forces  at  Manila  Bay.) 
"(No.  240  D.)     U.  S.  Naval  Force  on  Asiatic  Station,  Flagship  Olympia, 

Cavite,  Philippine  Islands,  May  4,  1898. — Sir:  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  the 

following  report  of  the  operations  of  the  squadron  under  my  command : 

"The  squadron  left  Mirs  Bay  on  April  27,  immediately  on  the  arrival  of 

Mr.  O.  F.  Williams,  United  States  consul  at  Manila,  who  brought  important 

information  and  who  accompanies  the  squadron. 

"Arrived  off  Bolinao  on  the  morning  of  April  30,  and,  finding  no  vessels 


286          THE    STORY    OF    DEWEY'S    SPLENDID    VICTORY. 

there,  proceeded  down  the  coast  and  arrived  off  the  entrance  to  Manila  Bay 
on  the  same  afternoon. 

"The  Boston  and  Concord  were  sent  to  reconnoiter  Port  Subic,  I  having 
been  informed  that  the  enemy  intended  to  take  position  there.  A  thorough 
search  of  the  port  was  made  by  the  Boston  and  Concord,  but  the  Spanish  fleet 
was  not  found,  although,  from  a  letter  afterwards  found  in  the  arsenal 
(inclosed  with  translation),  it  appears  that  it  had  beeii  their  intention  to  go 
there. 

"Entered  the  Boca  Grande,  or  south  channel,  at  n  130  p.  m.,  steaming  in 
column  at  distance  at  8  knots.  After  half  the  squadron  had  passed,  a  battery 
on  the  south  side  of  the  channel  opened  fire,  none  of  the  shots  taking  effect. 
The  Boston  and  McCulloch  returned  the  fire. 

"The  squadron  proceeded  across  the  bay  at  slow  speed,  and  arrived  off 
Manila  at  daybreak,  and  was  fired  upon  at  5:15  a.  m.,  by  three  batteries  at 
Manila  and  two  at  Cavite  and  by  the  Spanish  fleet  anchored  in  an  approxi 
mately  east  and  west  line  across  the  mouth  of  Bakor  Bay,  with  their  left  in 
shoal  water  in  Zanacao  Bay. 

"The  squadron  then  proceeded  to  the  attack,  the  flagship  Olympia,  under 
my  personal  direction,  leading,  followed  at  distance  by  the  Baltimore,  Raleigh, 
Petrel,  Concord,  and  Boston,  in  the  order  named,  which  formation  was  main 
tained  throughout  the  action.  The  squadron  opened  fire  at  5  141  a.  m.  While 
advancing  to  the  attack,  two  mines  were  exploded  ahead  of  the  flagship,  too 
far  to  be  effective. 

"The  squadron  maintained  a  continuous  and  precise  fire  at  ranges  varying 
from  5,000  to  2,000  square  yards,  countermarching  in  a  line  approximately 
parallel  to  that  of  the  Spanish  fleet.  The  enemy's  fire  was  vigorous,  but 
generally  ineffective. 

"Early  in  the  engagement  two  launches  put  out  toward  the  Olympia  with 
the  apparent  intention  of  using  torpedoes.  One  was  sunk  and  the  other 
disabled  by  our  fire  and  beached  before  an  opportunity  occurred  to  fire  tor 
pedoes.  At  7  a.  m.  the  Spanish  flagship  Reina  Christina  made  a  desperate 
attempt  to  leave  the  line  and  come  out  to  engage  at  short  range,  but  was 
received  with  such  galling  fire,  the  entire  battery  of  the  Olympia  being  con 
centrated  upon  her,  that  she  was  barely  able  to  return  to  the  shelter  of  the 
point.  The  fires  started  in  her  by  our  shell  at  this  time  were  not  extinguished 
until  she  sank. 


THE    STORY    OF    DEWEY'S    SPLENDID    VICTORY.          287 

"At  7:35  a.  m.,  it  having  been  erroneously  reported  to  me  that  only  15 
rounds  per  gun  remained  for  the  5 -inch  rapid  fire  battery,  I  ceased  firing  and 
withdrew  the  squadron  for  consultation  and  a  redistribution  of  ammunition, 
if  necessary. 

"The  three  batteries  at  Manila  had  kept  up  a  continuous  fire  from  the 
beginning  of  the  engagement,  which  fire  was  not  returned  by  this  squadron. 
The  first  of  these  batteries  was  situated  on  the  south  mole  head,  at  the 
entrance  to  the  Passig  river,  the  second  on  the  south  bastion  of  the  walled 
city  of  Manila,  and  the  third  at  Malate,  about  one -half  mile  farther  south. 
At  this  point  I  sent  a  message  to  the  Governor-General  to  the  effect  that  if  the 
batteries  did  not  cease  firing  the  city  would  be  shelled.  This  had  the  effect  of 
silencing  them. 

"At  11:16  a.  in.,  finding  that  the  report  of  scarcity  of  ammunition  was 
incorrect,  I  returned  with  the  squadron  to  the  attack.  By  this  time  the  flag 
ship  and  almost  the  entire  Spanish  fleet  were  in  flames,  and  at  12:30  p.  m.  the 
squadron  ceased  firing,  the  batteries  being  silenced  and  the  ships  sunk,  burnt 
and  deserted. 

"At  12:40  p.  m.  the  squadron  returned  and  anchored  off  Manila,  the 
Petrel  being  left  behind  to  complete  the  destruction  of  the  smaller  gunboats, 
which  were  behind  the  point  of  Cavite.  This  duty  was  performed  by  Com 
mander  E.  P.  Wood  in  the  most  expeditious  and  complete  manner  possible. 

"The  Spanish  lost  the  following  vessels: 

"Sunk — Reina  Christina,  Castilla,  Don  Antonio  de  Ulloa. 

"Burnt — Don  Juan  de  Austria,  Isla  de  Luzon,  Isla  de  Cuba,  General 
Lezo,  Marques  del  Duero,  El  Correo,  Velasco,  and  Isla  de  Mindanao  (trans 
port). 

"Captured — Rapido  and  Hercules  (tugs),  and  several  small  launches. 

"I  am  unable  to  obtain  complete  accounts  of  the  enemy's  killed  and 
wounded,  but  believe  their  loss  to  be  very  heavy.  The  Reina  Christina  alone 
had  150  killed,  including  the  captain,  and  90  wounded. 

"I  am  happy  to  report  that  the  damage  clone  to  the  squadron  under  my 
command  was  inconsiderable.  There  were  none  killed,  and  only  7  men  in  the 
squadron  very  slightly  wounded.  As  will  be  seen  by  the  reports  of  the  com 
manding  officers  which  are  herewith  inclosed,  several  of  the  vessels  we're 
struck  and  even  penetrated,  but  the  damage  was  of  the  slightest,  and  the 
squadron  is  in  as  good  condition  now  as  before  the  battle. 


288          THE    STORY    OF    DEWEY'S    SPLENDID    VICTORY. 

"I  beg  to  state  to  the  Department  that  I  doubt  if  any  commander-in- 
chief,  under  similar  circumstances,  was  ever  served  by  more  loyal,  efficient, 
and  gallant  captains  than  those  of  the  squadron  now  under  my  com 
mand.  Capt.  Frank  Wildes,  commanding  the  Boston,  volunteered  to  remain 
in  command  of  his  vessel,  although  his  relief  arrived  before  leaving 
Hongkong. 

"Asst.  Surg.  C.  P.  Kindleberger,  of  the  Olympia,  and  Gunner  J.  C. 
Evans,  of  the  Boston,  also  volunteered  to  remain  after  orders  detaching  them 
had  arrived. 

"The  conduct  of  my  personal  staff  was  excellent.  Commander  B.  P. 
Lamberton,  chief  of  staff,  was  a  volunteer  for  that  position,  and  gave  me 
most  efficient  aid.  Lieut.  T.  M.  Brumby,  flag  lieutenant,  and  Ensign  W.  P. 
Scott,  aid,  performed  their  duties  as  signal  officers  in  a  highly  creditable 
manner.  The  Olympia  being  short  of  officers  for  the  battery,  Ensign  H.  H. 
Caldwell,  flag  secretary,  volunteered  for  and  was  assigned  to  a  subdivision  of 
the  5 -inch  battery. 

"Mr.  J.  L.  Stickney,  formerly  an  officer  in  the  United  States  Navy,  and 
now  correspondent  for  the  New  York  Herald,  volunteered  for  duty  as  my 
aid,  and  rendered  valuable  service. 

"While  leaving  to  the  commanding  officers  to  comment  on  the  conduct  of 
the  officers  and  men  under  their  commands,  I  desire  especially  to  mention  the 
coolness  of  Lieut.  C.  G.  Calkins,  the  navigator  of  the  Olympia,  who  came 
under  my  personal  observation,  being  on  the  bridge  with  me  throughout  the 
entire  action,  and  giving  the  ranges  to  the  guns  with  an  accuracy  that  was 
proven  by  the  excellence  of  the  firing. 

'On  May  2,  the  day  following  the  engagement,  the  squadron  again  went 
to  Cavite,  where  it  remains.  A  landing  party  was  sent  to  destroy  the  guns 
and  magazines  of  the  batteries  there.  The  first  battery,  near  the  end  of 
Sangley  Point,  was  composed  of  two  modern  Trubia  B.  L.  rifles  of  15  centi 
meters  caliber.  The  second  was  one  mile  farther  down  the  beach,  and  con 
sisted  of  a  modern  Canet  12 -centimeter  B.  L.  rifle  behind  improvised 
earthworks. 

"On  the  3d,  the  military  forces  evacuated  the  Cavite  arsenal,  which  was 
taken  possession  of  by  a  landing  party.  On  the  same  day  the  Raleigh  and 
Baltimore  secured  the  surrender  of  the  batteries  on  Corregidor  Island,  parol 
ing  the  garrison  and  destroying  the  guns. 


THE    STORY    OF    DEWEY'S    SPLENDID    VICTORY.          289 

"On  the  morning  of  May  4  the  transport  Manila,  which  had  been  aground 
in  Bakor  Bay,  was  towed  off  and  made  a  prize. 
"Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"GEORGE  DEWEY, 

"Commodore,  U.  S.  N., 

"Commanding  U.  S.  Naval  Force  on  Asiatic  Station. 
"The  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Washington,  D.  C." 


"U.  S.  Naval  Force  on  Asiatic  Station,  Flagship  Olympia,  Cavite, 
Philippine  Islands,  July  9,  1898. — Sir:  Referring  to  section  46355  of  the 
Revised  Statutes,  I  have  the  honor  to  forward  the  following  list  of  the  com 
plements  of  the  vessels  of  the  enemy  destroyed  by  the  squadron  under  my 
command  in  the  battle  of  Manila  Bay  on  May  i,  1898,  taken  from  the  official 
list  of  the  vSpanish  Navy: 

Ship.  Officers,  etc.     Total  complement. 

Reina  Christina 57  352 

Castilla 52  349 

Don  Juan  de  Austria 28  179 

Don  Antonio  de  Ulloa 31  159 

Isla  de  Cuba 31  156 

Isla  de  Luzon 31  156 

Marques  del  Duero 18  96 

General  Lezo 20  115 

Argos 21  87 

Velasco 28  147 

1,796 

"The  trans- Atlantic  Company's  steamer  Isla  de  Mindanao  was  armed  and 
took  part  in  the  battle,  and  was  also  destroyed.  Her  complement  is  not 
known,  but  it  is  estimated  at  120. 

"From  the  above  it  appears  that  the  enemy  had  more  men  in  this  engage 
ment  than  the  LTnited  States  squadron.  In  this  connection  I  bftg  to  invite  the 
attention  of  the  Department  to  a  letter  from  the  commanding  officer  of  the 
Petrel,  dated  June  26,  1898,  which  has  already  been  forwarded  and  which 


29o          THE    STORY    OF    DEWEY'S    SPLENDID    VICTORY. 

gives  a  statement  by  one  of  the  crew  of  the  Reina  Christina,  showing  that  the 
crews  of  the  Spanish  vessels  were  largely  in  excess  of  the  complements  given 
here. 

"I  have  the  honor  to  be,  very  respectfully, 

"GEORGE  DEWEY, 
"Rear-Admiral,  U.  S.  N., 

"Commanding  U.  S.  Naval  Force  on  Asiatic  Station. 
"The  Secretary  of  the  Navy, 

"Navy  Department,  Washington,  D.  C. " 

The  lamented  Captain  Gridley's  report  of  working  the  Olympia  in  the 
famous  action  demands  a  place  in  history,  and  is  a  most  realistic  picture  of  the 
resources  and  vicissitudes,  the  mishaps  and  the  stern  work  of  the  flagship: 

"(No.  6-C.)  U.  S.  Flagship  Olympia,  Off  Manila,  Philippine  Islands, 
May  3,  1898. — Sir:  I  have  the  honor  to  make  the  following  report  of  this 
ship's  engagement  with  the  enemy  on  May  i : 

"On  April  30  we  stood  down  for  the  entrance  to  Manila  Bay.  At  9:42 
p.  m.  the  crew  were  called  to  general  quarters  (the  ship  having  been  previ 
ously  cleared  for  action),  and  remained  by  their  guns,  ready  to  return  the  fire 
of  the  batteries  if  called  upon. 

"About  11:30  p.  m.  we  passed  through  Boca  Grande  entrance  of  Manila 
Bay.  The  lights  on  Corrigidor  and  Caballo  islands  and  on  San  Nicolas  Banks 
were  extinguished. 

"After  this  ship  had  passed  in,  the  battery  on  the  southern  shore  of 
entrance  opened  fire  at  the  ships  astern,  and  the  McCulloch  and  the  Boston 
returned  the  fire. 

"At  4  a.  m.  of  May  i  coffee  was  served  out  to  officers  and  men.  At  day 
break  sighted  shipping  at  Manila.  Shifted  course  to  southward  and  stood  for 
Cavite.  At  5  :o6  two  submarine  mines  were  exploded  near,  Cavite  bearing 
south-southeast,  distant  4  miles.  At  5:15  battery  on  Sangley  Point  opened 
fire,  but  the  shell  fell  short.  Other  shells  passed  over  us,  ranging  7  miles. 
At  5 :4i  a.  m.  we  opened  fire  on  Spanish  ships  with  forward  8-inch  guns, 
which  were  soon  followed  by  the  5 -inch  battery.  A  rapid  fire  was  kept  up 
until  the  close*of  the  action. 

"The  range  varied  from  5,600  to  2,000  yards. 

"A  torpedo  boat  ran  out  and  headed  for  this  ship,  but  was  finally  driven 


THE    STORY    OF    DEWEY'S    SPLENDID    VICTORY.          291 

back  by  our  secondary  battery.     She  came  out  a  second  time  and  was  again 
repulsed.     This  time  she  had  to  be  beached,  as  several  shot  had  hit  her. 

"Batteries  from  Manila  fired  occasional  shots  at  the  ships  during  the 
action,  but  did  no  damage. 

"At  6 :2o  turned  to  starboard  and  headed  back  in  front  of  the  Spanish  line. 
The  Olympia  led  the  column  three  times  to  the  westward  and  twice  to  the 
eastward  in  front  of  the  Spanish  ships  and  shore  batteries.  On  one  occasion 
the  Spanish  flagship  Reina  Christina  was  hit  by  an  8-inch  shell  from  our  for 
ward  turret  and  raked  fore  and  aft.  At  7  135  ceased  firing  and  stood  out  into 
Manila  Bay. 

"The  men  went  to  breakfast. 

"Many  of  the  Spanish  ships  were  seen  to  be  on  fire,  and  when  we  returned 
at  n:i6to  complete  the  destruction  of  the  Spanish  fleet,  only  one,  the  Don 
Antonio  de  Ulloa,  and  the  shore  batteries  returned  our  fire.  The  former  was 
sunk  and  the  latter  was  silenced. 

"At  12:40  p.  m.  stood  back  to  Manila  Bay  and  anchored. 

"Besides  making  the  ordinary  preparations  of  clearing  ship  for  action,  the 
heavy  sheet  chains  were  faked  up  and  down  over  a  buffer  of  awnings  against 
the  sides  in  wake  of  the  5 -inch  ammunition  hoists,  and  afforded  a  stanch  pro 
tection,  while  iron  and  canvas  barricades  were  placed  in  various  places  to 
cover  guns'  crews  and  strengthen  moderate  defenses. 

"The  vessel  was  struck  or  slightly  hulled  as  follows: 

"i.  Plate  indented  i^  inches  starboard  side  of  superstructure  just  for 
ward  of  second  5 -inch  sponson. 

"2.  Three  planks  torn  up  slightly  in  wake  of  forward  turret  on  starboard 
side  of  forecastle. 

"3.     Port  after  shrouds  of  fore  and  main  rigging. 

"4.     Strongback  of  gig's  davits  hit  and  slightly  damaged. 

"5.  Hole  in  frame  of  ship  between  frames  65  and  66  on  starboard  side 
below  main  deck  rail;  made  by  a  6-pounder. 

"6.     Lashing  of  port  whaleboat  davit  carried  away  by  shot. 

"7.     One  of  the  rail  stanchions  carried  away  outside  of  port  gangway. 

"8.  Hull  of  ship  indented  on  starboard  side  i  foot  below  main-deck  rail 
and  3  feet  abaft  No  4  coal  port. 

•"The  forward  8-inch  guns  fired  23  shells.     The  ammunition  hoist  was 
temporarily  out  of  commission  on  account  of  the  blowing  of  the  fuse.     The 


292          THE    vSTORY    OF    DEWEY'S    SPLENDID    VICTORY. 

right  gun  worked  well  with  the  electrical  batteries.  Battery  of  left  gun  failed 
to  explode  the  primer  after  the  first  shot ;  also  resistance  lamp  in  dynamo  cir 
cuit  broken.  Used  percussion  primers  in  this  gun  with  good  results  after  the 
first  shot. 

"The  after  turret  fired  13  shells.  Had  three  misfires  with  battery  of  right 
gun  and  two  with  dynamo  circuit,  as  fuses  blew  out.  In  renewing  fuses  they 
were  immediately  blown  out;  so  shifted  to  percussion  primers  with  good 
results.  In  left  gun  i  shell  jammed,  after  which  used  half -full  and  half- 
reduced  charge,  which  fired  it.  Battery  of  this  gun  gave  good  results.  One 
primer  failed  to  check  gas. 

"The  smoke  from  the  5 -inch  battery  and  from  the  forward  8-inch  gun  15 
gave  considerable  trouble,  and  in  both  turrets  the  object  glass  of  the  telescopic 
sights  became  covered  with  a  deposit  from  the  powder  and  had  to  be  wiped  off 
frequently.  These  are,  nevertheless,  considered  good  sights  for  heavy  guns; 
but  it  is  recommended  that  bar  sights  be  installed  in  case  of  emergency,  as 
there  is  no  provision  for  sighting  other  than  with  the  telescopes. 

"The  batteries  for  the  5 -inch  guns  found  to  be  unreliable.  Used  dynamo 
circuit  on  3  guns  with  good  results.  Ammunition  poor.  Many  shell  became 
detached  from  the  cases  on  loading  and  had  to  be  rammed  out  from  the 
muzzle.  Several  cases  jammed  in  loading  and  in  extracting.  Guns  and  gun 
mounts  worked  well.  Fired  about  281  5 -inch  shell. 

"The  6-pounder  battery  worked  to  perfection,  firing  1,000  rounds. 
Fired  360  rounds  of  i -pounder  and  1,000  rounds  of  small-arm  ammunition. 

"From  9:42  p.  m.  of  April  30  till  12:40  p.  m.  May  i,  two  divisions  of  the 
engineer's  force  worked  the  boilers  and  engines,  keeping  up  steam  and  work 
ing  well,  notwithstanding  the  heat  of  the  fire  and  engine  rooms.  The  third 
division  worked  at  their  stations  in  the  powder  division. 

"The  ship  needs  no  immediate  repairs,  and  is  in  excellent  condition  to 
engage  the  enemy  at  any  time. 

"There  were  no  casualties  nor  wounded  on  this  ship. 

"Where  every  officer  and  man  did  his  whole  duty  there  is  only  room  for 
general  praise.  Pay  Inspector  D.  A.  Smith,  Fleet  Pay  Clerk  Wm.  J.  Right- 
mire,  and  Pay  Clerk  W.  M.  Long  all  volunteered  for  and  performed  active 
service  not  required  by  their  stations.  Ensign  H.  H.  Caldwell,  secretary  to 
the  commander-in-chief,  volunteered  for  fighting  duty  and  was  assigned  tp  the 
command  of  a  subdivision  of  the  5 -inch  battery.  Mr.  J.  L.  Stickney,  corre- 


THE    STORY    OF    DEWEY'S    SPLENDID    VICTORY.          293 

spondent  of  the  New  York  Herald  (and  formerly  a  naval  officer  of  exceptional 
ability),  served  as  a  volunteer  aid  to  the  commander-in-chief  and  rendered 
valuable  assistance  in  carrying  messages  and  in  keeping  an  accurate  account 
of  the  battle.  One  6-pounder  was  manned  by  a  crew  of  marines,  and  two 
relief  crews  for  the  5-inch  guns  and  two  for  the  6-pounders  acted  as  sharp 
shooters  under  Capt.  W.  Biddle,  U.  vS.  M.  C. 

"The  range  was  obtained  by  cross  bearings  from  the  standard  compass, 
and  the  distance  taken  from  the  chart. 

"I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  CH.  V.  GRIDLEY, 

"Captain  U.  S.  N,,  Commanding-  U.  S.  Flagship  Olympia. 

"The  Commander-in-Chief,  Asiatic  Station." 

Captain  J.  B.  Coghlan,  of  the  Raleigh,  says  that  at  12:10  a.  m.,  May  ist, 
there  was  a  flash  as  a  signal,  and  five  minutes  later  a  shot  was  fired  from  El 
Saile  Island  and  returned  without  effect.  At  5  a.  m.,  nearly  five  hours  later, 
"when  the  squadron  was  nearly  abreast  the  city  of  Manila  and  the  flagship  was 
turning  to  pass  down  toward  Cavite,  the  Lunetta  Battery,  of  apparently  heavy 
guns,  at  Manila,  opened  fire  and  continued  so  long  as  the  squadron  was  in 
action."  This  was  a  dangerous  battery  of  Krupp  guns,  with  a  large  supply 
of  ammunition.  The  captain  says  his  vessel  was  struck  but  once,  "and  then 
by  a  6-pounder  shell,  which  passed  through  both  sides  of  the  whaleboat  (above 
her  water  line),  and  then  glanced  along  the  chase  of  the  starboard  6-pounder 
on  our  poop.  The  gun  was  not  injured,  and  the  whaleboat  but  slightly,  and 
she  is  again  ready  for  service. " 

In  conclusion  the  captain  says  to  the  admiral:  "Permit  me  to  congratu 
late  you  upon  the  very  brilliant  victory  you  achieved  over  a  naval  force  nearly 
equal  to  your  own,  and  backed  by  extensive  shore  batteries  of  very  heavy 
guns,  and  this  without  the  loss  of  a  single  life.  History  points  to  no  greater 
achievement. " 

Captain  Asa  Walker,  of  the  Concord,  says:  "In  passing  the  city  a  big  gun 
opened  on  the  fleet,  to  which  I  replied  with  two  shots.  The  Concord  held  her 
position  in  the  line  until  your  order  to  withdraw  from  action.  The  Concord 
was  not  hit.  The  following  is  a  list  of  the  ammunition  expended:  One  hun 
dred  and  fifteen  6-inch  full  charges,  sixty-seven  6-inch  reduced  charges,  six 
shrapnel,  one  hundred  and  seventy-six  6-inch  common  shell,  two  hundred  and 
twenty  6-pounder  cartridges,  one  hundred  and  twenty  3-pounder  cartridges, 


294          THE    STORY    OF    DEWEY'S    SPLENDID    VICTORY. 

and  sixty  i -pounder  cartridges,"  or  seven  hundred  and  sixty-four  shots  fired. 
The  executive  officer  of  the  Concord  reports: 

"Three  complete  turns  were  made  by  our  squadron  in  front  of  the 
enemy's  line,  the  ships  firing-  whenever  the  guns  would  bear. 

"At  7:40  a.  m.  we  ceased  firing,  in  obedience  to  signal  from  the  com- 
mander-in-chief,  and  at  8  no  a.  m.  the  crews  went  to  breakfast.  At  this  time 
several  of  the  enemy's  ships  were  in  flames  and  explosions  took  place  on 
board  one  of  them ;  some  were  sinking  and  others  withdrawing  for  protection 
behind  Canacao  and  Cavite. 

"At  12:25  not  a  Spanish  flag  was  flying  in  the  harbor  except  from  the 
staff  of  the  sunken  cruiser  Don  Antonio  dc  Ulloa,  submerged  behind  Sangley 
Point;  the  Reina  Christina  was  a  mass  of  flames,  and  sunk  near  the  bastion  at 
Cavite,  and  the  Castilla  was  burning  rapidly  in  Canacao  Bay. 

"At  i  :45  we  started  to  rejoin  the  squadron,  but  were  ordered  to  go  to  the 
Petrel  at  Cavite,  where  she  had  seen  sent  to  destroy  the  vessels  at  the 
arsenal.  She  signaled  as  we  anchored,  'Have  destroyed  eight  vessels  here.' 
White  flags  were  flying  at  various  points  on  shore,  and  there  was  no  longer 
any  resistance. " 

Captain  Dyer,  of  the  Baltimore,  makes  a  most  interesting  report,  saying: 

"At  early  daylight  the  fleet  had  reached  a  point  close  up  to  the  shipping 
off  the  city  of  Manila,  when  the  signal  was  made,  'Prepare  for  general 
action.1  Spanish  batteries  near  Old  Manila  opened  fire  at  long  range  at 
about  the  same  time.  Flagship  leading,  with  port  helm,  bore  down  on 
the  right  of  Spanish  line  of  vessels,  formed  in  a  somewhat  irregular  crescent 
at  anchor. 

"Our  column  passed  down  the  enemy's  line,  turning  with  port  helm  as 
their  left  was  reached,  engaging  them  with  starboard  battery  on  the  return. 
This  maneuver  was  performed  three  times  at  distances  from  the  enemy's  ships 
varying  from  2,600  to  5,000  yards,  when  you  signaled  to  'withdraw  from 
action'  at  7  :35. 

"Upon  reaching  a  convenient  distance  in  the  bay,  you  signaled,  'Let  the 
people  go  to  breakfast' ;  and  at  8  140,  'Commanding  officers  repair  on  board  the 
flagship. ' 

"While  on  board  the  flagship  I  received  an  order  to  intercept  a  steamer 
coming  up  the  bay,  reported  to  be  flying  Spanish  colors. 

"Soon  after  starting  on  this  duty  I  discovered  the  colors  of  the  stranger 


THE    STORY    OF    DEWEY'S    SPLENDID    VICTORY.  295 

to  be  British,  and  so  reported  by  signal,  you  having  in  the  meantime  made 
general  signal  to  get  under  way  and  follow  your  motions,  this  ship  being  at 
the  time  some  2  miles  to  the  south-southwest  of  the  flagship  on  her  way  to 
intercept  the  supposed  Spanish  steamer. 

"At  10:55  y°u  made  general  signal,  'Designated  vessel  will  lead,'  with 
Baltimore's  distinguishing  pennant,  and  in  a  few  minutes  signal  to  'Attack 
the  enemy's  batteries  or  earthworks'  and  for  fleet  to  'close  up';  in  obedi 
ence  to  which  order  this  ship  led  in,  with  starboard  helm,  to  a  position  off 
the  Canacoa  and  Sangley  Point  batteries  and  opened  fire  with  starboard 
battery  at  a  distance  of  about  2,800  yards,  closing  in  to  2,200,  between  which 
and  2,700  yards  our  best  work  was  done,  slowing  the  ship  dead  slow,  stopping 
the  engines  as  range  was  obtained,  delivering  a  rapid  and  accurate  fire  upon 
the  shore  batteries  and  a  gunboat  just  inside  of  Sangley  Point.  You 
signaled,  at  1:20,  to  'Prepare  to  anchor,'  and  at  1:30,  'Anchor  at  discretion.' 

"The  victory  was  complete." 

The  executive  officer  of  the  Baltimore  reports: 

"The  Baltimore  was  struck  five  times,  with  small  projectiles,  all  of  which, 
with  one  exception,  exploded  or  broke  up.  The  most  serious  hit,  happily 
attended  with  no  serious  injury  to  any  officer  or  man,  came  from  a  4.  y-inch 
steel  projectile,  which  entered  the  ship's  side  forward  of  the  starboard  gang 
way,  about  a  foot  above  the  line  of  the  main  deck.  It  passed  through  the 
hammock  netting,  downward  through  the  deck  planks  and  steel  deck,  bend 
ing  and  cracking  deck  beam  in  wardroom  stateroom  No.  5,  then  glanced 
upward  through  the  after  engine  room  coaming,  over  against  the  after 
cylinder  of  No.  3  6-inch  gun  (port),  carrying  away  lug  and  starting  several 
shield  bolts  and  putting  the  gun  out  of  commission ;  deflected  over  to  the  star 
board  side,  striking  a  ventilator  ladder  and  dropping  on  deck.  In  its  passage 
it  struck  a  box  of  3-pounder  ammunition  of  the  fourth  division,  exploding 
several  charges,  and  wounded  Lieutenant  Kellogg,  Ensign  Irwin,  and  6  men 
of  the  gun's  crew — none  very  seriously.  A  second  shot  came  in  about  a  foot 
above  the  berth  deck,  just  forward  of  the  blowers,  passed  through  the  'thwart- 
ship  alleyway,  hitting  the  exhaust  pipe  of  the  starboard  blower,  causing  a 
slight  leak.  A  third  shot  struck  about  2  feet  above  the  water  line  on  the  port 
side,  abreast  bunker  B-no,  passed  into  the  bunker,  cutting  blower  drain  and 
main  air  duct,  and  exploding  in  bunker.  A  fourth  shot  came  in  about  6  feet 
above  the  berth  deck,  starboard  side,  abreast  the  forward  end  of  the  forward 


296          THE    STORY    OF    DEWEY'S    SPLENDID    VICTORY, 

wash  room,  and  broke  up  in  a  clothes  locker.  A  fifth  struck  the  starboard 
forward  ventilator,  slightly  bending  it. 

"The  upper  cabin  skylight,  the  after  range  finder,  and  the  two  whaleboats 
hanging  at  the  davits  were  all  destroyed  by  the  shock  of  discharge  from  the 
8-inch  guns  of  the  second  division." 

Commander  E.  P.  Wood,  of  the  Petrel,  reports:  "Just  as  day  was  break 
ing,  about  5  o'clock,  the  shore  batteries  below  Manila  began  firing.  It  was 
scarcely  light  enough  to  distinguish  signals  from  this  vessel  when  flagship 
made  signal  to  'Prepare  for  action,'  so  signal  was  repeated  from  the  Balti 
more.  During  time  column  was  forming  and  closing  up,  the  batteries  from 
below  Manila  were  firing.  As  flagship  stood  to  southward  the  ships  and 
batteries  at  Cavite  began  their  firing,  and  gradually,  as  we  approached,  we 
could  make  out  ships  under  way  in  harbor  and  three  guns  on  shore  firing." 

The  Petrel  expended  in  three  turns  before  breakfast:  "Ninety-two 
6-inch  common  shells,  eighty-two  6-inch  full  charges,  ten  reduced  charges,  and 
two  hundred  and  fifty-three  3-pounders.  Several  times  during  rounds  had  to 
cease  firing  on  account  of  smoke  and  in  order  to  economize  ammunition. 

"The  action  of  ammunition  was  exceedingly  good.  There  was  expended 
during  action,  one  hundred  and  thirteen  6 -inch  common  shells,  three  6-inch 
armor-piercing  shells,  eighty- two  6-inch  full  charges,  thirty-four  6-inch 
reduced  charges,  and  three  hundred  and  thirteen  3-pounder  ammunition. 
Owing  to  the  heat  due  to  firing,  the  pads  swelled  and  made  it  very  difficult  to 
lock  the  breech  plug.  Nothing  would  remedy  this  save  shifting  plugs, 
replacing  hot  plug  by  the  one  from  the  other  gun  which  was  cool.  The  wedge 
of  firing  lock  jammed  frequently,  due  to  hot  parts.  This  was  remedied  by 
shifting  locks. 

"The  percussion  primers  worked  very  unsatisfactorily;  sometimes  four 
primers  would  be  expended  before  one  would  act.  Primers  leaked  badly, 
causing  excessive  deposit  in  primer  seat,  hard  extraction,  and  delay  in  prim 
ing  of  gun  and  requiring  frequent  boring  of  vent." 

Lieutenant  Hughes  reports:  "The  ship  was  gradually  cleared  for  action, 
this  work  having  been  begun  in  Hongkong,  when  the  fore  and  foretopsails 
yards,  fore  trysail  gaff,  ladders,  diving  outfit,  part  of  the  running  rigging, 
etc.,  were  placed  on  board  the  transport  Nanshan,  and  completed  the  day 
before  the  squadron  entered  Manila  Bay.  In  the  operation  of  preparing  the 
ship  for  action  certain  articles  and  material  in  the  equipment  and  construction 


THE    STORY    OF    DEWEY'S    SPLENDID    VICTORY.          297 

departments  were  necessarily  thrown  overboard.  Among  these  may  be  men 
tioned  all  of  the  varnishes,  inflammable  paints  and  oils,  tar,  turpentine,  etc., 
lumber,  two  boats'  strong  backs,  one  turpentine  chest,  one  ice  chest,  one  large 
hammock  box,  the  carpenter's  bench." 

Captain  Wilder,  of  the  Boston,  brought  up  the  rear,  and  makes  a  model 
report  for  brevity  and  prose.  He  remarks: 

"Several  shots  were  fired  by  the  batteries  in  Manila,  and  two  shots  were 
given  in  reply.  At  5:35  (a.  m.)  action  with  the  enemy  commenced,  and  was 
continued  at  varying  distances,  steaming  in  a  circle,  until  7:35  a.  m.,  firing 
with  a  fair  degree  of  deliberation  and  accuracy.  At  times  the  smoke  was 
dense,  interfering  very  materially  with  maneuvering  and  firing. 

"The  Spanish  fleet  and  shore  batteries  replied  vigorously,  and  an  attempt 
was  made  with  an  improvised  torpedo  boat,  but  our  fire  was  overpowering  and 
the  enemy  received  heavy  damage  and  loss. 

"In  obedience  to  signal,  I  withdrew  from  action  at  7:35,  and  gave  the 
crew  breakfast  and  rest. 

"At  ii  :io  the  action  was  renewed,  and  continued  until  the  enemy  ceased 
firing  and  his  ships  were  all  burned,  sunk,  or  withdrawn  behind  the  arsenal  of 
Cavite. 

"It  gives  me  pleasure  to  bear  witness  to  the  courage  and  resolution  of  the 
Spanish  fleet,  and  to  say  that  they  defended  themselves  creditably." 

This  report  of  the  working  of  the  guns  is  interesting: 

"There  being  no  quick  and  accurate  method  of  finding  the  range,  it  was 
found  that  a  considerable  number  of  the  shots  apparently  fell  short.  Had  the 
ship  been  provided  with  a  range  finder  the  effectiveness  of  the  firing  would 
have  been  somewhat  increased;  as  it  was,  the  result  was  generally  good. 
After  passing  the  enemy,  a  countermarch  was  made,  and  fire  was  opened  with 
the  starboard  battery.  This  maneuver  was  repeated  several  times,  until  the 
enemy  seemed  to  be  silenced.  During  this  part  of  the  engagement  full 
charges  with  common  shell  were  used  in  all  guns  of  the  main  battery. 
The  guns  generally  worked  well,  but  after  an  hour's  fighting  it  was  found  that 
most  of  the  breech  plugs  of  the  6  and  8  inch  guns  were  expanded  by  the  heat, 
so  as  to  make  it  a  somewhat  difficult  operation  to  close  the  breech.  After 
firing  the  forward  8-inch  for  half  an  hour  it  was  found  necessary  to  put  in  a 
new  gas-check  pad,  and  the  firing  was  then  continued.  The  wire  breeching;; 
of  No.  2  6-inch  gun  (starboard)  were  carried  away  near  the  end  of  the  hring. 


298          THE    STORY    OF    DEWEY'S    SPLENDID    VICTORY. 

The  lock  of  No.  3  6-inch  (port)  was  disabled,  and  a  spare  one  substituted. 
The  action  was  resumed  at  11:10  a.  m.,  the  starboard  battery  being  first 
engaged.  The  reply  was  principally  from  the  forts,  but  these  were  soon 
silenced.  Advantage  had  been  taken  of  the  interval  to  put  the  battery  in 
order  again.  The  breechings  on  No.  2  6-inch  were  replaced  by  the  gunner's 
mate  of  the  division.  The  guns  were  still  very  hot,  and  the  breech  plugs 
became  still  harder  to  work.  The  forward  8-inch  gun  was  put  out  of  com 
mission  for  about  twenty  minutes  from  this  cause.  At  12:20  the  ship  was 
turned  around  and  the  port  battery  brought  into  play.  At  12  140  p.  m.  'Cease 
firing'  was  sounded,  a  white  flag  having  been  raised  at  Cavite. ' ' 

The  executive  officer,  J.  A.  Howe,  says  of  the  officers  and  men:  "Very 
few,  if  any  of  them,  had  ever  been  under  fire  before,  but  their  cool 
ness  was  remarkable.  They  were  full  of  zeal,  energy,  and  enthusiasm,  and 
were  untiring.  Where  the  conduct  of  all  was  so  commendable  it  would  be 
impossible  to  single  out  any  individual  for  special  praise.  One  noteworthy 
feature  was  the  conduct  of  the  Chinese  messmen,  who  were  stationed  in  the 
after  powder  division.  While  they  are  usually  considered  entirely  alien  in 
their  ideas,  and  are  not  regarded  as  good  fighters,  yet  in  this  case  they  dis 
played  as  much  zeal,  bravery,  and  energy  as  any  other  person.  The  uninter 
rupted  ammunition  supply  in  the  after  part  of  the  ship  was  largely  due  to  their 
efforts." 

In  the  Spanish  official  report,  Admiral  Montijo  mentions  that  he  left  the 
Bay  of  Manila  for  Subic  with  his  squadron  April  25,  at  n  p.  m.,  and  had  one 
wooden  cruiser  disabled  on  the  way  through  leaks  and  disabled  machinery. 
The  admiral  found,  "with  much  disgust,"  of  the  defense  of  the  western 
entrance  to  Subic,  that  "the  guns  which  should  have  been  mounted  on  that 
island  were  delayed  a  month  and  a  half.  This  surprised  me,  as  the  shore 
batteries  that  the  navy  had  installed  (with  very  little  difficulty)  at  the  entrance 
of  the  bay  of  Manila,  under  the  intelligent  direction  of  colonel  of  naval  artil 
lery,  Senor  Garces,  and  Lieutenant  Beneavente,  were  ready  to  fight  twenty- 
four  days  after  the  commencement  of  the  work. 

"I  was  also  no  less  disgusted  that  they  confided  in  the  efficacy  of  the  few 
torpedoes  which  they  had  found  feasible  to  put  there. 

"The  entrance  was  not  defended  by  torpedoes  nor  by  the  batteries  of  the 
island,  so  that  the  squadron  would  have  had  to  bear  the  attack  of  the  Ameri 
cans  with  its  own  resources,  in  40  meters  of  water,  and  with  little  security. 


ADMIRAL  MONTIJO,  COMMANDER  OF  THE  FLEET  THAT  ADMIRAL  DEWEY  SUNK. 


VIEWS  OF  THE  NAVY  YARD  AT  CAVITE,  PHILIPPINES. 


THE    STORY    OF    DEWEY'S    SPLENDID    VICTORY.          301 

Our  vessels  could  not  only  be  destroyed,  but  they  could  not  save  their  crews. 
I  still  held  a  hope  that  the  Americans  would  not  go  to  Subic,  and  give  us  time 
for  more  preparations,  but  the  following  day  I  received  from  the  Spanish 
consul  at  Hongkong  a  telegram  which  said:  'Enemy's  squadron  sailed  at  2  p. 
m.  from  the  bay  of  Mira,  and  according  to  reliable  accounts  they  sailed  for 
Subic  to  destroy  our  squadron,  and  then  will  go  to  Manila. ' 

"This  telegram  demonstrated  that  the  enemy  knew  where  they  could  find 
my  squadron,  and  that  the  port  of  Subic  had  no  defenses." 

There  was  held  a  council  of  war,  and  returned  to  fight  "under  less  insup 
portable  conditions"  in  the  bay  of  Manila,  but  "not  near  the  City,  because  far 
from  defending  it,  this  would  provoke  the  enemy  to  bombard  the  plaza,  which 
doubtless  would  have  been  demolished  on  account  of  its  few  defenses.  It 
was  unanimously  decided  that  we  should  take  position  in  the  bay  of  Caiiacao, 
in  the  least  water  possible,  in  order  to  combine  our  fire  with  that  of  the  bat 
teries  of  Point  Sangley  and  Ulloa. 

"I  immediately  ordered  Del  'Rio  to  concentrate  his  forces  in  the  most 
strategic  point  of  the  arsenal,  taking  every  disposition  to  burn  the  coal  and 
stores  before  allowing  them  to  fall  into  the  power  of  the  enemy.  I  sent  the 
Don  Juan  de  Austria  to  Manila  to  get  a  large  number  of  lighters  filled  with 
sand  to  defend  the  water  line  of  the  Castilla  (which  could  not  move)  against 
the  enemy's  shells  and  torpedoes.  At  10  a.  m.  on  the  2yth  I  left  Subic  with 
the  vessels  of  my  squadron,  towing  the  Castilla  by  the  transport  Manila. 

"In  the  afternoon  of  the  same  day  we  anchored  in  the  Gulf  of  Canacao  in 
8  meters  of  water.  On  the  following  morning  we  anchored  in  line  of  battle, 
the  Christina,  Castilla,  Don  Juan  de  Austria,  Don  Juan  de  Ulloa,  Luzon, 
Cuba,  and  Marques  del  Duero,  while  the  transport  Manila  was  sent  to  the 
Roads  of  Bacoor,  where  the  Velasco  and  Lezo  were  undergoing  repairs. 

"At  7  p.  m.  I  received  a  telegram  from  Subic  announcing  that  the  enemy's 
squadron  had  entered  the  port  at  3,  reconnoitering,  doubtless  seeking  our 
ships,  and  from  there  they  had  sailed  with  course  for  Manila. 

"The  mail  steamer  Isla  Mindanao  arrived  in  the  bay.  I  advised  her  cap 
tain  to  save  his  vessel  by  going  to  Singapore,  as  the  enemy  could  not  get  into 
the  entrance  probably  before  midnight.  As  he  was  not  authorized  from  the 
trans- Atlantic,  he  did  not  do  so,  and  thefi  I  told  him  that  he  could  anchor  in 
shallow  water  as  near  as  possible  to  Bacoor. 

"At  midnight  gun  fire  was  heard  off  Corregidor,  and  at  2  on  the  morning 


302          THE    STORY    OF    DEWEY'S    SPLENDID    VICTORY. 

of  the  ist  of  May  I  received  telegraphic  advices  that  the  American  vessels 
were  throwing1  their  search  lights  at  the  batteries  of  the  entrance,  with  which 
they  had  exchanged  several  shots.  I  notified  the  commanding  general  of  the 
arsenal,  Senor  Sostoa,  and  the  general-governor  of  the  plaza,  Capt.  Senor 
Garcia  Pana,  that  they  should  prepare  themselves.  I  directed  all  the  artillery 
to  be  loaded,  and  all  the  sailors  and  soldiers  to  go  to  their  stations  for  battle." 

Montijo  details  the  tonnage  of  vessels  and  the  character  of  guns,  to  show 
the  odds  in  favor  of  the  Americans,  adding  all  his  vessels  had  been  painted 
dark  gray  color,  had  taken  down  their  masts  and  yards;  and  the  boats,  to 
avoid  the  effects  of  projectiles  and  the  splinters,  had  their  anchors  buoyed  and 
cables  ready  to  slip  instantly.  At  5:15  the  signal  to  open  the  fire  of  the 
Spanish  fleet  was  made,  and  the  American  answer  came  promptly.  Montijo 
says: 

"The  Americans  fired  most  rapidly.  There  came  upon  us  numberless 
projectiles,  as  the  three  cruisers  at  the  head  of  the  line  devoted  themselves 
almost  entirely  to  fight  the  Christina,  my  flagship.  A  short  time  after  the 
action  commenced  one  shell  exploded  in  the  forecastle  and  put  out  of  action 
all  those  who  served  the  four  rapid-fire  cannon,  making  splinters  of  the  for 
ward  mast,  which  wounded  the  helmsman  on  the  bridge,  when  Lieut.  Jose 
Nunez  took  the  wheel  with  a  coolness  worthy  of  the  greatest  commendation, 
steering  until  the  end  of  the  fight.  In  the  meanwhile,  another  shell  exploded 
in  the  orlop,  setting  fire  to  the  crews'  bags,  which  they  were  fortunately  able 
to  control. 

"The  enemy  shortened  the  distance  between  us,  and,  rectifying  his  aim, 
covered  us  with  a  rain  of  rapid-fire  projectiles.  At  7:30  one  shell  destroyed 
completely  the  steering  gear.  I  ordered  to  steer  by  hand  while  the  rudder 
was  out  of  action.  In  the  meanwhile,  another  shell  exploded  on  the  poop,  and 
put  out  of  action  9  men.  Another  destroyed  the  mizzen  masthead,  bringing 
down  the  flag  and  my  ensign,  which  were  replaced  immediately.  A  fresh 
shell  exploded  in  the  officers'  cabin,  covering  the  hospital  with  blood,  destroy 
ing  the  wounded  who  were  being  treated  there.  Another  exploded  in  the 
ammunition  room  astern,  filling  the  quarters  with  smoke  and  preventing  the 
working  of  the  hand  steering  gear.  As  it  was  impossible  to  control  the  fire, 
I  had  to  flood  the  magazine  when  the*  cartridges  were  beginning  to  explode. 

"Amidships  several  shells  of  smaller  caliber  went  through  the  smokestack, 
and  one  of  the  large  ones  penetrated  the  fire  room,  putting  out  of  action  i 


THE    STORY    OF    DEWEY'S    SPLENDID    VICTORY.          303 

master  gunner  and  12  men  serving  the  guns.  Another  rendered  useless  the 
starboard  bow  gun;  while  the  fire  astern  increased,  fire  was  started  forward 
by  another  shell,  which  went  through  the  hull  and  exploded  on  the  deck. 

"The  broadside  guns,  being  undamaged,  continued  firing  until  there  were 
only  one  gunner  and  one  seaman  remaining  unhurt  for  firing  them,  as  the 
guns'  crews  had  been  frequently  called  upon  to  substitute  those  charged  with 
steering,  all  of  whom  were  out  of  action. 

"The  ship  being  out  of  control,  the  hull,  smoke  pipe,  and  mast  riddled 
with  shot,  or  confused  with  the  cries  of  the  wounded;  half  of  her  crew  out  of 
action,  among  whom  were  7  officers,  I  gave  the  order  to  sink  and  abandon  the 
ship  before  the  magazines  should  explode,  making  signal  at  the  same  time 
to  the  Cuba  and  Luzon  to  assist  in  saving  the  rest  of  the  crew,  which  they  did, 
aided  by  others  from  the  Duero  and  the  arsenal. 

"I  abandoned  the  Christina,  directing  beforehand  to  secure  her  flag,  and 
accompanied  by  my  staff,  and  with  great  sorrow,  I  hoisted  my  flag  on  the 
cruiser  Isla  de  Cuba. 

"After  having  saved  many  men  from  the  unfortunate  vessel,  one  shell 
destroying  her  heroic  commander,  Don  Luis  Cadarso,  who  was  directing  the 
rescue. 

"The  Ulloa,  which  also  defended  herself  firmly,  using  the  only  two  guns 
wrhich  were  available,  was  sunk  by  a  shell  which  entered  the  water  line,  put 
ting  out  of  action  her  commander  and  half  of  her  remaining  crew,  those  which 
were  only  remaining  for  the  service* of  the  two  guns  stated. 

"The  Castilla,  which  fought  heroically,  remained  with  her  artillery  use 
less,  except  one  stern  gun,  with  which  they  fought  spiritedly,  was  riddled 
with  shot  and  set  on  fire  by  the  enemy's  shells,  then  sunk,  and  was  abandoned 
by  her  crew  in  good  order,  which  was  directed  by  her  commander,  Don  Alonzo 
Algado.  The  casualties  on  this  ship  were  23  killed  and  80  wounded. 

"The  Austria,  very  much  damaged  and  on  fire,  went  to  the  aid  of  the 
Castilla.  The  Luzon  had  three  guns  dismounted,  and  was  slightly  damaged 
in  the  hull.  The  Duero  remained  with  one  of  her  engines  useless,  the  bow 
gun  of  12  centimeters  and  one  of  the  redoubts. 

"At  8  o'clock  in  the  morning,  the  enemy's  squadron  having  suspended  its 
fire,  I  ordered  the  ships  that  remained  to  us  to  take  positions  in  the  bottom  of 
the  Roads  at  Bacoor,  and  there  to  resist  to  the  last  moment,  and  that  they 
should  be  sunk  before  they  surrendered. 


304          THE    STORY    OF    DEWEY'S    SPLENDID    VICTORY. 

"At  10:30  the  enemy  returned,  forming  a  circle  to  destroy  the  arsenal 
and  the  ships  which  remained  to  me,  opening  upon  them  a  horrible  fire,  which 
we  answered  as  far  as  we  could  with  the  few  cannon  which  we  still  had 
mounted. 

"There  remained  the  last  recourse,  to  sink  our  vessels,  and  we  accom 
plished  this  operation,  taking  care  to  save  the  flag,  the  distinguishing  pennant, 
the  money  in  the  safe,  the  portable  arms,  the  breech  plugs  of  the  guns,  and 
the  signal  codes. 

"After  which  I  went  with  my  staff  to  the  Convent  of  Santo  Domingo  de 
Cavite,  to  be  cured  of  a  wound  received  in  the  left  leg,  and  to  telegraph  a 
brief  report  of  the  action,  with  preliminaries  and  results. 

"It  remains  only  to  say  that  all  the  chiefs,  officers,  engineers,  quarter 
masters,  gunners,  sailors,  and  soldiers  rivaled  one  another  in  sustaining  with 
honor  the  good  name  of  the  navy  on  this  sad  day. 

"The  inefficiency  of  the  vessels  which  composed  my  little  squadron,  the 
lack  of  all  classes  of  the  personnel,  especially  master  gunners  and  seamen 
gunners ;  the  inaptitude  of  some  of  the  provisional  machinists,  the  scarcity  of 
rapid-fire  cannon,  the  strong  crews  of  the  enemy,  and  the  unprotected  char 
acter  of  the  greater  part  of  our  vessels,  all  contributed  to  make  more  decided 
the  sacrifice  which  we  made  for  our  country  and  to  prevent  the  possibility  of 
the  horrors  of  the  bombardment  of  the  city  of  Manila,  with  the  conviction  that 
with  the  scarcity  of  our  force  against  the  superior  enemy  we  were  going  to 
certain  death  and  could  expect  a  loss  of  all  our  ships. 

"Our  casualties,  including  those  of  the  arsenal,  amounted  to  381  men 
killed  and  wounded." 

There  is  a  surprising  amount  of  information  in  the  official  reports  of 
Admiral  Dewey's  famous  victory  that  will  be  of  the  nature  of  novelty  to 
people  at  large.  The  fact  becomes  prominent  that  a  great  deal  of  credit  is 
due  the  Navy  Department  for  its  foresight,  vigilance,  incessant  industry  in 
supplying  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Asiatic  fleet  the  news  of  the  day, 
cautioning  him  not  to  spare  expense  where  there  was  anything  in  reach  or 
sight  to  aid  the  fighting  ships  when  the  decisive  hours  came.  The  conversa 
tion  between  the  Navy  Department  and  the  Asiatic  command  was  right  to  the 
point.  Nothing  seemed  to  escape,  or  to  be  misunderstood.  The  movements 
on  behalf  of  the  United  States  were  characterized  by  confidence,  certainty  of 
purpose,  promptitude  and  precision  of  execution.  The  Spaniards  were  hesi- 


41.  Street  in  the  Suburb  of  La  Ermita.  42.  Rosario  Street  in  La  Ermit->.  43.  Luneta'Square  in  Manila. 
44.  Hospital  of  San  Juan  de  Dios.  45.  Manila  Cathedral.  46.  Royal  Street  in  Malate.  "  47.  lloyal  Street 
in  Santa  Ana.  48.  Monument  of  Don  Simon  de  Anda  y  Salazar  in  the  Malecon  Square. 

VIEWS  IN  AND  AROUND  MANILA. 


THE    vSTORY    OF    DEWEY'S    SPLENDID    VICTORY.          307 

tant,  uncertain,  confused,  and  the  doom  that  was  upon  them  was  announced 
plainly — the  one  redeeming  feature  for  them  being  in  the  personal  bravery  of 
the  officers  and  men.  The  rottenness  of  the  government  of  Spain  provided 
the  elements  of  defeat.  The  preparations  by  the  Spaniards  for  the  battle  con 
trast  effectively  with  those  of  the  Americans.  Admiral  Montijo  was 
"disgusted"  to  find  nothing  done  at  the  vital  point  for  the  defense  of  Subic, 
and  warned  that  the  Americans  were  on  the  way,  made  haste  to  Manila 
Bay,  where  he  planned  his  line  of  defense  so  as  to  be  flanked  by  shore 
batteries,  and  yet  to  spare  the  city — a  strategy  afterward  sharply  resented  by 
Admiral  Dewey  when  he  sent  his  compliments  to  the  authorities  in  Manila 
with  the  message  that  another  gun  fired  at  an  American  ship  and  the  city 
would  be  destroyed.  The  flanking  batteries  were  of  powerful  German  guns, 
several  of  them  firing  heavier  metal  than  any  in  the  American  squadron,  and 
they  were  well  located  to  do  hurt  to  our  ships.  Montijo's  line  had  been  formed 
with  reference  to  them,  and  he  had  contrived  to  be  in  part  protected  by  shal 
lows.  He  had  towed  a  ship  that  he  calls  a  floating  battery,  from  Subig,  and 
sought  to  protect  this  machine  with  other  vessels.  The  Americans  stripped 
for  the  battle,  their  ships  and  themselves,  throwing  overboard  all  that  was 
inflammable,  sparing  nothing  that  would  splinter  or  burn.  The  Spaniards 
were  much  encumbered  with  fuel,  and  the  fires  kindled  by  our  shells  were 
inextinguishable.  There  have  been  doubts  whether  the  Spaniards  were  sur 
prised  by  the  American  visit.  They  certainly  were  not.  Admiral  Montijo 
had  two  days'  warning,  heard  the  guns  at  the  mouth  of  the  harbor  at  mid 
night,  and  made  full  preparation  for  the  shock  that  he  knew  was  approaching. 
He  gave  the  signal  for  the  firing  to  commence,  and  the  Americans  were 
received  by  two  shore  batteries  and  a  floating  one  and  the  entire  Spanish 
squadron.  The  American  reply  was  immediate,  and  the  hour  was  that  of 
daybreak.  The  victory  of  our  ships  was  so  thorough,  and  the  loss  on  our  side 
so  insignificant,  that  our  countrymen  have  hardly  ascertained  how  many  things 
there  were  to  think  about,  and  with  what  efficacy  the  hard  work  was  done,  or 
through  what  strife  with  tribulations  it  was  accomplished.  The  gunners 
found  out  in  battle  much  they  had  not  been  familiar  with,  in  handling  their 
tools.  The  dreadful  and  beautiful  machines  they  used  were  fashioned 
delicately  as  telescopes,  and  might  in  several  particulars  be  mistaken  for 
instruments  of  science  of  refined  construction  and  nice  adjustments.  One 
of  the  words  of  caution  to  the  men  that  the  Commander-in-Chief  made 


3o8          THE    STORY    OF    DEWEY'S    SPLENDID    VICTORY. 

impressive  was  that  ammunition  was  not  to  be  wasted.  They  were  far  from 
home,  and  in  a  protracted  engagement  might  disarm  themselves.  It  was 
an  erroneous  report  that  only  fifteen  rounds  remained  of  the  ammunition  for 
the  four-inch  rapid  fire  battery  that  caused  the  remarkable  intermission  in 
the  battle — and  the  celebrated  recess.  The  boys,  it  will  be  remembered, 
wanted  to  finish  the  job  before  they  had  coffee,  but  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  insisted  on  breakfast  all  around,  and  not  a  minute  was  lost.  First  the 
smoke  of  the  firing  and  the  burning  ships  covered  the  scene  of  action,  though 
the  American  ships  were  kept  in  motion.  Second,  the  guns  were  so  hot  it 
was  hard  to  work  them.  Third,  the  heat  was  excessive — May  is  the  hottest 
month  of  the  year  at  Manila.  The  rest  was  refreshing  and  reassuring  to  the 
Americans.  They  saw  their  victory,  and  poured  in  what  Admiral  Montijo 
calls  "a  horrible  fire"  that  soon  closed  the  conflict  with  the  annihilation  of  the 
Asiatic  squadron  of  Spain. 

At  12:40  the  flagship  signaled  "Cease  firing. "  The  resistance  of  the 
Spaniards  had  ended.  There  were  only  the  slain  and  wounded,  the  wrecks 
and  ships  on  fire,  the  swarms  of  prisoners  and  fugitives,  the  burning  houses 
at  Cavite,  the  silenced  batteries — a  battle  won  whose  proud  story  shall  never 
fade,  the  American  arms  with  freshly-wrought  splendors  on  the  seas,  the  flag 
of  the  Great  Republic  with  brightened  stars  and  stripes,  the  sound  of  Ameri 
can  guns  ringing  around  the  globe,  great  news  on  the  streets  of  the  capitals 
of  all  nations,  another  radiant  chapter  in  our  inheritance  of  glory. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

After  the  May  Day  Battle  in  Manila  Bay. 

Dewey's  Cables  during  the  Time  He  Held  the  Harbor  with  the  City  of  Manila  under  His 
Guns — Dispatches  Full  of  History  and  Rich  in  Personal  Characteristics — Authentic 
Information  from  the  Inside — The  Official  Story — Dewey's  Unfavorable  Opinion  of 
Cubans — Capture  of  the  City — Trouble  with  Aguinaldo — Our  Ships  and  Crews. 

During"  the  days  Admiral  Dewey  was  on  the  way  from  Mirs  Bay  to  that  of 
Manila,  the  news  got  into  circulation  that  something  was  to  be  expected  from 
our  Asiatic  squadron.  Our  ships  of  war  in  time  of  war  could  not  remain  in 
neutral  ports,  and  those  on  the  coast  of  China  had  been  ordered  to  assume  the 
offensive  in  the  Philippines,  especially,  it  was  the  early  public  understanding, 
to  "remove"  the  Spanish  fleet,  so  that  our  commerce  on  the  seas  of  Asia 
might  not  be  assailed  or  obstructed.  We  had  a  very  vigilant  consul  at  Hong 
kong,  who  had  been  at  pains  to  inform  himself  as  to  affairs  in  the  Spanish 
archipelago,  and  was  favorably  impressed  by  the  Filipino  insurgents,  and 
when  Admiral  Dewey  departed  on  his  important  errand,  his  line  of  communi 
cations  was  "by  tug"  through  the  consulate.  The  first  account  of  the  action 
in  Manila  Bay  was  from  the  defeated  Spaniards,  and  in  ,the  course  of  explain 
ing  their  misfortunes  they  confessed  to  disaster  that  at  length  included  all  the 
ships  in  that  part  of  the  world  flying  the  flag  of  Spain,  with  the  exception  of 
a  few  gunboats  scattered  so  far  among  the  islands  that  they  disappeared  from 
all  scenes  of  action.  The  immediate  impression  made  by  the  loss  of  cable 
connection  with  Manila  while  it  was  relating  the  story  that  the  navy  of  Spain 
had  vanished  in  the  Orient,  so  valiantly  defended  that  the  Americans  were 
"compelled  to  maneuver  repeatedly,"  was  that  the  Spaniards  had  cut  the  wires 
so  as  to  keep  the  extent  of  their  broken  fortunes  to  themselves.  The  cable 
was  cut  by  order  of  Admiral  Dewey,  who  selected  a  suitable  place,  took 
out  a  section  of  the  cable,  coiled  it  away  and  buoyed  both  ends.  He  first  pro 
posed  to  preserve  the  line  for  the  use  of  both  parties,  but  the  offer  was 

309 


310     AFTER    THE    MAY    DAY    BATTLE    IN    MANILA    BAY, 

quickly  rejected.  After  a  few  hours  the  minds  of  the  authorities  of  Spain 
were  changed,  and  they  sent  an  acceptance  of  the  conservation  of  the  privilege 
of  talking  to  Madrid  in  exchange  for  admitting  the  American  Admiral  to 
equal  rights,  but  it  was  too  late.  There  was  a  weary  wait  for  news  from 
Dewey,  and  the  full  orbed  intelligence  had  to  travel  by  dispatch  boat  to  Hong 
kong.  When  the  city  of  Manila  fell  into  our  possession  the  cable  was  soon 
spliced,  and  money  poured  into  the  company  at  the  rate  of  four  dollars  a 
word.  The  dispatches  by  Admiral  Dewey  through  the  combination  of  tugs 
and  cables,  during  the  intermission  in  through  wire  service,  and  his  cable 
grams  afterward,  are  so  many  thunderbolts  of  history,  and  the  journals  gener 
ally  have  been  so  busily  magnifying  current  matters  that  this  treasury  of 
solid  knowledge  has  not  been  attractively  displayed,  until,  thanks  to  the 
Navy  Department,  it  appears  in  these  pages: 

Hongkong,  May  12,  1898. 
Secretary  of  Navy,  Washington: 

There  is  little  change  in  the  situation  since  my  last  telegram.  I  am 
transferring  to  transports  steel  breech-loading  rifles  from  sunken  Spanish 
men-of-war;  also  stores  from  arsenal  in  my  possession.  I  am  maintaining 
strict  blockade.  Add  Argos  to  the  list  of  destroyed  vessels.  El  Correo  prob 
ably  El  Cano.  I  send  this  telegram  to  Hongkong.  ...  It  has  been 
reported  at  Manila  that  Pelayo  and  another  vessel  are  en  route  to  Philippine 
Islands.  DEWEY. 

Hongkong,  May  15,  1898.     (Cavite,  May  12.) 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Washington: 

I  thank  the  President  for  my  promotion.  Forcibly  recommend  that  Com 
mander  Lamberton,  chief  of  staff;  Captains  Wildes,  the  commander  of  the 
Boston;  Coghlan,  the  commander  of  the  Raleigh;  Gridley,  the  commander  of 
the  Olympia;  Dyer,  the  commander  of  the  Baltimore;  Walker,  the  commander 
of  the  Concord;  Wood,  the  commander  of  the  Petrel — without  whose  aid  I 

could  have  done  nothing,  each  to  be  advanced  ten  numbers. 

DEWEY. 


Hongkong,  May  15,  1898.      (Cavite,  May  13.) 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Washington : 

The  squadron  thanks  the  President  for  his  message  in  your  telegram  of 
May  7.     I  am  maintaining  strict  blockade  of  Manila  by  sea,  and  believe  rebels 


AFTER    THE    MAY    DAY    BATTLE    IN    MANILA    BAY.      31 1 

are  hemming  in  by  land,  although  they  are  inactive  and  making  no  demon 
strations.  Great  scarcity  of  provisions  in  the  city.  I  believe  the  Spanish 
Governor-General  will  be  obliged  to  surrender  soon.  I  can  take  Manila  at  any 
moment.  To  retain  possession  and  thus  control  Philippine  Islands  would 
require,  in  my  best  judgment,  well-equipped  force  of  5,000  men,  although 
United  States  troops  sent  by  Pekin  will  be  very  useful  to  relieve  the  Olympia  of 
guarding  Cavite.  United  States  troops  should  make  provision  for  extremely 
hot,  moist  climate.  Spanish  force  is  estimated  10,000  men.  The  rebels  are 
reported  30,000  men.  I  should  suggest  the  Charleston  or  Pekin  bring  a  few 
officers  and  about  100  men,  partly  Engineers'  Department,  to  man  transport 
Manila  and  captured  vessels.  I  am  loading  Manila  with  ordnance  from  the 
Spanish  man-of-war.  I  propose  to  assign  Lieutenant-Commander  Singer  to 
command.  Captured  on  May  12  the  Spanish  gun  vessel  Callao  attempting  to 
run  blockade;  released  on  parole  officers  and  men.  I  have  plenty  of  coal  for 
the  present  and  can  purchase  more  in  Chinese  ports.  Will  hold  frequent  com 
munication  with  Hongkong.  One  British,  one  French,  two  German,  one 
Japanese  men-of-war  here  observing.  Baltimore  requires  immediately  one 
Mark  IV  mount  for  one  6-inch  B.  L.  R.,  a  supply  of  extractors  for  Hotchkiss 
3-pounders  and  for  Hotchkiss  6-pounders;  also  locks  most  recent  design  for 
main  battery.  DEWEY. 

Hongkong,  May  24,  1898.      (Cavite,  May  20.) 
Secretary  of  Navy,  Washington : 

Situation  unchanged.  Strict  blockade  is  continued.  Great  scarcity  pre 
vails  at  Manila.  Foreign  subjects  fear  an  outbreak  of  the  Spanish  soldiers. 
Arrangements  have  been  made  for  them  to  be  transferred  to  Cavite  by  the 
foreign  men-of-war,  if  necessary.  Aguinaldo,  the  rebel  commander-in-chief, 
was  brought  down  by  the  McCulloch.  Organizing  forces  near  Cavite,  and 
may  render  assistance  that  will  be  valuable.  I  do  not  consider  submarine 
mines  practicable  here,  on  account  of  great  depth  and  width  of  bay  and 
entrance.  If  attacked  by  superior  force,  the  squadron  will  endeavor  to  give 
good  account  of  itself.  The  American  bark  Saranac  was  captured  off  Iloilo, 
Philippine  Islands.  Upon  the  arrival  of  the  Charleston  with  ammunition,  I 
propose  to  recapture  and  to  clear  the  island  of  small  Spanish  gun  vessels. 
When  is  Charleston  expected  to  arrive?  I  request  you  will  send  to  the  Asiatic 
Station  the  Bennington  and  the  Yorktown,  if  possible.  Will  be  more  useful 


312      AFTER    THE    MAY    DAY    BATTLE    IN    MANILA    BAY. 

than  the  Philadelphia.  How  many  troops  coming  here  Pekin?  When 
expected  to  arrive?  I  request  send  provisions  for  the  squadron — 2,000  men 
for  three  months.  Also  small  stores.  DEWEY. 


Hongkong,  May  27,  1898.      (Cavite,  May  29.) 
Secretary  of  Navy,  Washington : 

No  change  in  the  situation  of  the  blockade.  Is  effective.  It  is  impossible 
for  the  people  in  Manila  to  buy -pro  visions,  except  rice.  The  French  men- 
of-war  must  go  to  Saigon  for  provisions.  It  is  important  that  I  should  know 
as  early  as  possible  whereabouts  and  strength  of  the  possible  Spanish  expedi 
tion  to  the  Philippines,  and,  if  possible,  that  the  squadron  should  be  reinforced 
with  a  battleship  or  armored  cruiser.  The  captain  of  the  Olympia  (Gridley) 
condemned  by  medical  survey;  is  ordered  home;  leave  by  Occidental  and 
Oriental  Steamship  Company's  steamer  from  Hongkong  on  May  28.  Com 
mander  Lamberton  has  been  appointed  to  the  command  of  the  Olympia. 
Steamer  has  just  arrived  from  Amoy  with  3,000  Mauser  rifles  and  great 
amount  ammunition  for  Aguinaldo,  whose  force  is  increasing  constantly. 
Bark  Saranac  is  sailing  under  the  British  flag;  is  loading  with  sugar 
at  Iloilo  for  New  York.  DEWEY. 


Hongkong,  May  30,  1898. 
Secretary  of  Navy,  Washington : 

Aguinaldo,  revolutionary  leader,  visited  the  Olympia  yesterday.  He 
expects  to  make  general  attack  on  May  31.  Doubt  ability  to  succeed.  Situa 
tion  remains  unchanged.  DEWEY. 


Hongkong,  June  6,  1898. 
Secretary  of  Navy,  Washington : 

The   following    telegram    has  been    received,    addressed    United   States 
consul,  Hongkong: 

''Direct  Captain  Hodgson,  McCulloch,  turn  over  command  Foley;  return 
home.  CRIDLER." 

I  request  to  be  informed  is  this  official?  DEWEY. 

(The  reply,  through  Allen,  Acting  Secretary,  was  "official.") 


AFTER    THE    MAY    DAY    BATTLE    IN    MANILA    BAY.      313 

U.  S.  Naval  Force  on  Asiatic  Station, 

Flagship  Olympia,  Cavite,  Philippine  Islands,  June  12,  1898. 
Sir:  I  take   pleasure  in  bringing  to  the  attention  of  the  Department  the 
zeal  and  efficiency  of  Capt.   Daniel  B.    Hodgson,   R.  C.  S.,  commanding  the 
McCulloch,  while  serving  in  the  squadron  under  my  command. 

The  McCulloch  steamed  from  Hongkong  to  Manila  Bay  in  the  squadron 
formation,  and  ran  the  batteries  at  the  entrance  with  the  squadron,  and  while 
not  in  the  line  of  battle  at  the  battle  of  Manila  Bay,  was  kept  near  by  and  in 
readiness  to  assist  any  vessel  that  might  be  disabled. 

Since  joining  my  command,  and  up  to  the  time  of  his  detachment,  Cap 
tain  Hodgson  has  kept  the  McCulloch  in  a  high  state  of  efficiency,  and  ready 
to  move  at  a  moment's  notice,  and  has  made  her  a  valuable  auxiliary  to  the 
squadron. 

I  request  that  the  Department  will  communicate  this  report  to  the  hon 
orable  Secretary  of  the  Treasury. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  very  respectfully, 

GEORGE  DEWEY, 
Rear-Admiral,  U.  S.  N., 

Commanding  U.  S.  Naval  Force  on  Asiatic  Station. 
The  Secretary  of  the  Navy   Washington,  D.  C. 


Hongkong,  June  6,  1898.     (Cavite,  June  3.) 
Secretary  of  Navy,  Washington  : 

Receipt  of  telegram  of  May  26  is  acknowledged,  and  I  thank  the  Depart 
ment  for  the  expression  of  confidence.  Have  acted  according  to  the  spirit  of 
Department's  instructions  therein  from  the  beginning,  and  I  have  entered 
into  no  alliance  with  the  insurgents  or  with  any  faction.  This  squadron  can 
reduce  the  defenses  of  Manila  at  any  moment,  but  it  is  considered  useless 
until  the  arrival  of  sufficient  United  States  forces  to  retain  possession. 

DEWEY. 

Hongkong,  June  6,  1898. 
Secretary  of  Navy,  Washington : 

There  are  no  guns  of  recent  design  available  to  mount  upon  shore,  being 
without  breech  mechanism,  mounts,  or  ammunition.  There  is  no  telegraphic 
communication  Bolinao  to  Hongkong.  Have  just  received  4,500  tons  of  coal; 
I  have  sufficient  coal  for  two  months.  Insurgents  have  been  engaged 


3i4      AFTER    THE    MAY    DAY    BATTLE    IN    MANILA    BAY. 

actively  within  the  province  of  Cavite  during  last  week;  they  have  won  several 
small  victories,  taking-  prisoners  about  1,800  men,  50  officers;  Spanish  troops, 
not  native.  I  am  preparing  arsenal  and  Cavite  for  the  occupation  United 
States  troops,  and  will  have  vessel  of  Cape  Engano  to  meet  United  States 
transports.  DEWEY. 

Hongkong,  June  27,  1898. 
Secretary  of  Navy,  Washington : 

Receipt  of  telegram  of  June  14  is  acknowledged.  Aguinaldo,  insurgent 
leader,  with  thirteen  of  his  staff,  arrived  May  19,  by  permission,  on  Nanshan. 
Established  self  Cavite,  outside  arsenal,  under  the  protection  of  our  guns,  and 
organized  his  army.  I  have  had  several  conferences  with  him,  generally  of  a 
personal  nature.  Consistently  I  have  refrained  from  assisting  him  in  any  way 
with  the  force  under  my  command,  and  on  several  occasions  I  have  declined 
requests  that  I  should  do  so,  telling  him  the  squadron  could  not  act  until  the 
arrival  of  the  United  States  troops.  At  the  same  time  I  have  given  him  to 
understand  that  I  consider  insurgents  as  friends,  being  opposed  to  a  common 
enemy.  He  has  gone  to  attend  a  meeting  of  insurgent  leaders  for  the  purpose 
of  forming  a  civil  government.  Aguinaldo  has  acted  independently  of  the 
squadron,  but  has  kept  me  advised  of  his  progress,  which  has  been  wonderful. 
I  have  allowed  to  pass  by  water  recruits,  arms,  and  ammunition,  and  to  take 
such  Spanish  arms  and  ammunition  from  the  arsenal  as  he  needed.  Have 
advised  frequently  to  conduct  the  war  humanely,  which  he  has  done  invari 
ably.  My  relations  with  him  are  cordial,  but  I  am  not  in  his  confidence. 
The  United  States  has  not  been  bound  in  any  way  to  assist  insurgents  by  any 
act  or  promises,  and  he  is  not,  to  my  knowledge,  comjnitted  to  assist  us.  I 
believe  he  expects  to  capture  Manila  without  my  assistance,  but  doubt 
ability,  they  not  yet  having  many  guns.  In  my  opinion,  these  people  are  far 
superior  in  their  intelligence  and  more  capable  of  self-government  than  the 
natives  of  Cuba,  and  I  am  familiar  w^ith  both  races.  DEWEY. 

Hongkong,  June  17,  1898.     (Cavite,  June  12.) 
Secretary  of  Navy,  Washington : 

Insurgents  continue  hostilities  and  have  practically  surrounded  Manila. 
They  have  taken  2,500  Spanish  prisoners,  whom  they  treat  most  humanely. 
They  do  not  intend  to  attack  city  proper  until  the  arrival  of  United  States 
troops  thither;  I  have  advised.  Twelve  merchant  vessels  are  anchored  in  the 


33.  In  tlie  Valleys  of  Carabao.  34.  Street  in  the  District  of  Paco,  Manila.  35.  Aristocratic  Residences 
in  tho  Suburbs  of  San  Juan  del  Monte.  30.  Square  of  Santa  Ana  in  the  District  of  San  Sebastian,  Manila. 
37.  View  of  the  Royal  Highway  of  La  Concepciou.  38.  The  King's  Wharf,  Manila.  39.  The  Aguilar  Barrier 
in  Tomio,  Manila.  40.  The  Cathedral  of  Jaro  in  Ilo-Ilo. 

VIEWS  IN  THE  PHILIPPINES,  MOSTLY  IN  AND  AROUND  MANILA. 


17.    Royal  Street  in  Lipa,  Batantjas  Province.     18.    School  of  Arts  and  Commerce  in  Ilo-Ilo.     IS).     Molo 
Church  in  Ilo-Ilo.    20.    A  Filipino  Funeral  Party  in  Ilo-Ilo.  Grouppd  Around  the  Tomb.    21.    A  View  of  the 
San  Sebastian  Highway,  Manila.    22.     Romblon— Capital  of  the  Island  of  Su  Nombre.     23.    View  of  the 
de  Aguadas,  Manila.     24.    Filipino  Carpenters  of  Ilo-Ilo  at  Work. 

VIEWS  FROM  THE  PHILIPPINES 


AFTER    THE    MAY    DAY    BATTLE    IN    MANILA    BAY.      317 

bay  with  refugees  on  board  under  guard  of  neutral  men-of-war;  this  with  my 
permission.  Health  of  the  squadron  continues  excellent.  The  German  com- 
mander-in-chief  arrived  to-day.  Three  German,  two  British,  one  French,  one 
Japanese  men-of-war  now  in  port;  another  German  man-of-war  is  expected. 
I  request  the  departure  of  the  Monadnock  and  the  Monterey  be  expedited. 

DEWEY. 

Hongkong,  June  17,  1898.     (Cavite,  June  13.) 
Secretary  of  Navy,  Washington : 

I  request  the  Department  will  send  six  months'  supplies  in  all  depart 
ments,  including  medical,  for  the  squadron,  including  McCulloch,  Zafiro, 
Nanshan,  Manila,  complement  about  50  men,  and  Callao,  complement  about 
25  men.  It  is  practically  impossible  to  obtain  further  supplies  within  the 
limits  of  the  station  during  the  war.  DEWEY. 


Hongkong,  June  17,  1898.      (Cavite,  June  12.) 
Secretary  of  Navy,  Washington : 

I  request  the  Department  send  350  men  and  20  marines  to  fill  vacancies 
existing  to  replace  men  whose  terms  of  enlistment  have  expired  or  will  expire 
before  October  i.  DEWEY. 


Cavite,  June  17,  1898. 
Secretary  of  Navy,  Washington : 

No  change  since  my  telegram  of  June  12.  Have  sent  the  Baltimore, 
Cape  Engano,  Luzon  Island,  to  meet  American  transports.  The  health  of 
the  squadron  continues  excellent.  Another  French  man-of-war  has  arrived. 

DEWEY. 

Cavite,  June  17,  1898. 
Secretary  of  Navy,  Washington : 

Commanding  officers  have  no  recommendation  to  make  under  Revised 
Statutes,  sections  1407  and  491.  All  officers  and  men  did  their  whole  duty 
nobly,  but  the  nature  of  the  action  did  not  admit  of  any  individual  display  of 
personal  heroism.  DEWEY. 

Hongkong.     (Received  June  27,  1898.) 
Secretary  of  Navy,  Washington : 

No  change  in  the  situation  since  my  telegram  of  June  17.  Five  German, 
3  British,  i  French,  i  Japanese  men-of-war  in  port.  Insurgents  constantly 


AFTER    THE    MAY    DAY    BATTLE    IN    MANILA    BAY. 

closing  in  on  city.  The  United  States  transports  and  the  Charleston  have  nut 
yet  arrived.  The  Baltimore  is  at  Cape  Engano  awaiting  them.  Have 
received  information  Cadiz  squadron  passed  Gibraltar  Friday  morning,  June 
17,  bound  eastward.  Shall  the  Monadnock  and  the  Monterey  arrive  in  time? 
In  my  judgment,  if  the  coast  of  Spain  was  threatened,  "the  squadron  of  the 
enemy  would  have  to  return.  One  hundred  and  twenty-one  officers,  United 
States  Navy,  6  paymaster's  clerks,  and  1,709  men  were  engaged  battle  of 
Manila  Bay.  DEWEY. 


Hongkong,  July  i,  1898. 
Secretary  of  Navy,  Washington : 

Referring  to  your  telegram  of  June  21,  the  crew  now  on  board  is  more 
efficient  than  new  men  would  be.  I  consider,  however,  that  in  justice  to 
them,  and  to  prevent  discontent,  if  not  dissatisfaction  in  the  squadron,  men 
whose  terms  of  enlistment  have  expired  should  be  relieved  from  duty  in  this 
hot  and  unhealthful  climate  as  soon  as  possible.  DEWEY. 


Hongkong,  July  i,  1898.     (Cavite,  June  26.) 
Secretary  of  Navy,  Washington : 

I  shall  have  vessel  at  Hongkong  on  or  about  July  i.     The  Charleston  and 
transports  have  not  yet  arrived.  DEWEY. 


Hongkong,  July  i,  1898. 
Secretary  of  Navy,  Washington: 

The  British  bark  Austria  has  gone  to  Hongkong  without  cargo.  In  my 
opinion  allowing  to  return  to  load  might  give  cause  for  complaint  to  other 
neutral  nations  whose  ships  have  been  warned  off.  DEWEY. 


Hongkong,  July  7,  1898.     (Cavite,  July  4.) 
Secretary  of  Navy,  Washington : 

The  receipt  of  telegram  is  acknowledged.  The  United  States  troops  have 
landed  and  have  been  comfortably  housed  at  Cavite,  Luzon  Island.  Insur 
gents  are  still  active.  The  Chinese  subjects  have  been  permitted  to  leave 
freely.  Cold-storage  steamer  has  not  yet  arrived.  Aguinaldo  proclaimed 
himself  president  of  the  revolutionary  republic  on  July  i.  DEWEY. 


AFTER    THE    MAY    DAY    BATTLE    IN    MANILA    BAY.      319 

Hongkong,  July  13,  1898. 
vSecretary  of  Navy,  Washington  : 

AgTiinaldo  informed  me  his  troops  had  taken  all  of  Subic  Bay  except  Isla 
Grande,  which  they  were  prevented  from  taking  by  the  German  man-of-war 
Irene.  On  July  7  sent  the  Raleigh  and  the  Concord  there;  they  took  the 
island  and  about  1,300  men,  with  arms  and  ammunition;  no  resistance.  The 
Irene  retired  from  the  bay  on  their  arrival.  I  shall  send  the  Boston  Cape 
Engano  about  July  16,  to  meet  second  army  detachment.  It  is  not  practicable 
to  send  Guam.  No  chartered  vessel  available.  DEWEY. 


Hongkong,  July  20,  1898.     (Cavite,  July  17.) 
Secretary  of  Navy,  Washington : 

Situation  unchanged.  Second  army  detachment  arrived  to-day.  All 
well  on  board.  The  health  of  the  squadron  continues  good.  No  sickness 
whatever.  I  have  taken  the  coal  of  the  British  ship  Honolulu  and  I  am 
retaining  her  until  the  port  is  opened.  Have  provisions  for  six  months.  The 
receipt  of  telegram  of  July  7  is  acknowledged;  in  view  of  the  information 
therein  shall  retain  Pekin  and  China  as  auxiliaries.  I  do  not  expect  the 
Monterey  before  August  5,  and  the  Monadnock  ten  days  later.  If  necessary, 
shall  proceed  with  the  squadron  to  meet  the  Monadnock  to  the  east  Cape 
Engano,  Luzon.  Shall  return  other  transports  to  the  United  States  as  soon 
as  possible.  DEWEY. 

Hongkong,  July  30,  1898.      (Cavite,  July  26.) 
Secretary  of  Navy,  Washington : 

Merritt  arrived  yesterday  in  the  Newport.  The  remainder  of  the 
expedition  is  expected  within  the  next  few  days.  Situation  is  most  critical  at 
Manila.  The  Spanish  may  surrender  at  any  moment.  Merritt's  most  diffi 
cult  problem  will  be  how  to  deal  with  insurgents  under  Aguinaldo,  who  has 
become  aggressive,  and  even  threatening  toward  our  army.  The  Monadnock 
was  at  Honolulu  on  July  8;  expected  to  leave  four  days  later.  .  .  . 

DEWEY. 


Hongkong,  August  i,  1898.      (Cavite,  July  29.) 
Secretary  of  Navy,  Washington : 

Referring  to  your   telegram   July   20,    strict   blockade   continues.      The 
neutral  vessels  are  not  allowed  to  enter.     From  information,  which  I  consider 


320      AFTER    THE    MAY    DAY    BATTLE    IN    MANILA    BAY. 

reliable,  Spanish  Governor-General  would  surrender  to  United  States  forces 
at  once,  if  it  was  not  for  insurgent  complication.  In  any  event,  they  must 
capitulate  very  soon.  Merritt  and  I  are  working  together  to  this  end.  The 
remainder  of  Merritt's  forces  has  not  yet  arrived.  Pekin  will  leave  to-morrow 
for  San  Francisco,  Cal.  DEWEY. 


Hongkong,  August  9,  1898.     (Cavite,  August  4.) 
Secretary  of  Navy,  Washington : 

The  receipt  of  telegram  of  July  26  acknowledged.  Have  provisions  for 
three  months,  fresh;  also  plenty  of  coal.  Do  not  need  provisions  from 
Australia.  The  Monterey  and  Brutus  arrived  to-day.  DEWEY. 


Washington,  August  12,  1898. 
Dewey,  Hongkong: 

Peace  protocol  signed  by  President.     Suspend  all  hostilities  and  blockade. 

ALLEN. 


Washington,  August  12,  1898. 
Dewey,  Hongkong: 

The  protocol,  signed  by  the  President  to-day,  provides  that  the  United 
States  will  occupy  and  hold  the  city,  bay  and  harbor  of  Manila  pending  the 
conclusion  of  a  treaty  of  peace,  which  shall  determine  the  control,  disposi 
tion,  and  government  of  the  Philippines.  This  is  most  important. 

ALLEN,  Acting. 

The  dispatches  from  Admiral  Dewejr  are  at  once  characteristic  and  his 
torical — strikingly  so. 

His  career  during  the  lonesome  months,  before  Anderson,  McArthur, 
Greene  and  Merritt  came,  was  full  of  dramatic  situation,  and  there  is  a  cutting 
sparkle  in  his  cabled  words  that  scintillates  intelligence.  May  1 2th  he  was 
"transferring  to  transports  steel  breech-loading  rifles  from  sunken  Spanish 
men-of-war."  There  is  a  picture  in  a  sentence.  The  Admiral  "forcibly 
recommends"  promotions  of  officers  "without  whose  aid  I  could  have  done 
nothing."  "The  squadron  thanks  the  President  for  his  message."  In  reply 
as  to  whether  he  "would  desire  submarine  mines,"  "in  case  of  attack  by  a 


AFTER    THE    MAY    DAY    BATTLE    IN    MANILA    BAY.      323 

superior  force,"  the  answer  eight  days  later  was  the  squadron  would 
"endeavor  to  give  good  account  of  itself." 

Aguinaldo  had  visited  the  Olympia  and  overrated  his  ability.  The 
insurgent  general  had  stated  he  would  make  a  general  attack  on  Manila. 
Captain  Hodgson,  "up  to  the  time  of  his  detachment,"  had  kept  his  ship 
"in  a  high  state  of  efficiency, "  and  made  her  "a  valuable  auxiliary." 

The  Admiral  had  entered  into  no  alliance  with  the  insurgents  or  any 
faction.  He  declined  to  cooperate  with  the  fleet  in  aid  of  the  insurgents. 
Aguinaldo  had  been  allowed  to  help  himself  at  the  Spanish  arsenal.  As  the 
insurgents  were  opposed  to  a  common  enemy,  they  were  "friends." 
Aguinaldo  "expected"  to  take  Manila,  but  had  not  the  force  to  do  it,  and  never 
could  have  taken  it  if  he  had  had  twenty  thousand  men  at  his  back.  Indeed, 
the  Spaniards,  if  they  had  not  been  afraid  of  the  American  fleet,  could  have 
marched  out  and  raised  the  siege.  The  most  -striking  of  the  sayings  of  the 
Admiral  was  that  he  knew  familiarly  both  the  Filipinos  and  Cubans,  and 
"these  people  (Filipino)  are  far  superior  in  their  intelligence  and  more 
capable  of  self-government  than  the  natives  of  Cuba."  The  movement  of  the 
Cadiz  fleet  was  a  subject  of  great  interest;  and  the  Admiral,  July  i7th,  said 
he  would,  "if  necessary,  proceed  with  the  squadron  to  meet  the  Monadnock 
to  the  east  of  Cape  Engano" — the  northeast  corner  of  Luzon.  The  necessity 
was  in  case  of  the  arrival  of  the  Cadiz  fleet  with  battleships,  the  Monadnock 
still  lingering  on  the  Pacific.  Dewey's  idea  was  that  with  the  two  monitors 
he  would  be  master  of  the  situation,  and  prove  it  by  sinking  a  second  Spanish 
fleet.  Fortune  did  not  favor  him  to  that  extent.  In  a  dispatch  to  Admiral 
Dewey,  Secretary  Long  stated,  May  2oth,  mentioning  a  rumor  of  Spaniards 
sending  troops  and  battleships  to  the  Philippines,  that  "our  means  of  receiv 
ing  intelligence  from  Spain  are  very  untrustworthy."  May  29th,  Long  cabled 
Dewey,  "There  is  no  Spanish  force  en  route  to  Philippines."  Long  tele 
graphed,  August  ist,  report  that  monks  and  other  prisoners  in  the  hands 
of  insurgents  at  Cavite  were  in  danger  of  being  "unjustly  put  to  death," 
and  "this  should  not  be  permitted"  if  the  Admiral  was  "in  a  position  to  pre 
vent  it. "  June  6th  Navy  Department  cabled  Dewey,  "Cold-storage  steamer 
from  Australia  is  due  about  June  20  at  Manila,  with  fresh  provisions  for  the 
squadron."  And  July  26th  this  comprehensive  inquiry  was  made: 

Do  you  want  another  fresh  provision  ship  or  anything  else  from  Australia? 

LONG. 


324      AFTER    THE    MAY    DAY    BATTLE    IN    MANILA    BAY. 

The  following  cable  is  a  model  of  compliment  and  caution: 

Washington,  May  26,  1898. 
Dewey  (care  American  consul),  Hongkong: 

You  must  exercise  discretion  most  fully  in  all  matters,  and  be  governed 
according  to  circumstance  which  you  know  and  we  cannot  know.  You  have 
our  confidence  entirely.  It  is  desirable,  as  far  as  possible,  and  consistent  for 
your  success  and  safety,  not  to  have  political  alliances  with  the  insurgents  or 
any  faction  in  the  islands  that  would  incur  liability  to  maintain  their  cause  in 
the  future.  LONG. 

July  27th  the  Admiral  desired  the  British  foreign  office  should  be 
informed  of  his  "deep  appreciation"  of  the  services  of  the  British  Consul 
Walker,  who  had  "performed  the  trying  duties  of  acting  United  States  consul 
during  the  last  three  months  in  a  most  able  and  painstaking  manner,  and  has 
been  of  invaluable  assistance  to  me,  being  my  only  means  of  communication 
with  the  Spanish  authorities,  and  the  chief  agent  in  the  protection  of  foreign 
residents." 

The  Admiral's  account  of  the  fall  of  Manila  was  that  the  city  surrendered 
"to  our  land  and  naval  forces  after  a  combined  attack" — a  "division  of  the 
squadron  shelled  the  forts  and  intrenchments  at  Malate,  on  the  south  side  of 
the  city,  driving  back  enemy,  our  army  advancing  on  that  side  at  the  same 
time. " 

On  the  day  of  the  surrender  of  Manila : 

Washington,  August  13,  1898. 
Dewey  (care  American  Consul),  Hongkong: 

The  President  desires  to  receive  from  you  any  important  information  you 
may  have  of  the  Philippines;  the  desirability  of  the  several  islands;  the 
character  of  their  population ;  coal  and  other  mineral  deposits ;  their  harbor 
and  commercial  advantages,  and  in  a  naval  and  commercial  sense  which 
would  be  the  most  advantageous.  If  you  have  other  information  which  may 
be  of  value  to  the  government  in  their  negotiations,  the  President  may  desire 
your  presence  here.  If  he  should  request  you  to  come,  take  the  quickest  route 
of  travel.  ALLEN,  Acting  Secretary  of  Navy. 


Manila,  August  20,  1898. 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Washington : 

Referring  to  the  Department's  telegram  of  August  13,  important  islands 
are:     Colon,    Luzon,   Panay,    Cebu,   Negros,    Leyte.      Others,   owing  to  the 


AFTER    THE    MAY    DAY    BATTLE    IN    MANILA    BAY.      325 

nature  of  the  inhabitants,  have  a  small  amount  of  civilization,  want  of  cultiva 
tion.  They  may  be  neglected,  especially  isles  of  southern  group.  Luzon  is 
in  all  respects  the  most  desirable  to  retain.  Contains  most  important  com 
mercial  ports.  Manila  is  farthest  north.  Produces  all  of  the  good  tobacco. 
Friendly  natives.  Civilization  somewhat  advanced.  Not  yet  developed. 
Possible  rich  minerals.  Population,  825,000.  Subic  Bay  best  harbor  for 
coaling  purposes  and  military.  Water  deep;  landlocked;  easily  defended. 
Strategically,  command  of  bay  and  city  of  Manila,  with  arsenal  at  Cavite, 
most  valuable.  Panay,  Cebu,  Negros  thickly  populated,  most  civilized,  and 
well  cultivated.  Iloilo  second  commercial  port;  center  of  sugar  trade ;  a  good 
harbor  strategically;  in  view  of  the  situation,  good  for  defense.  Cebu  third 
commercial  port ;  a  good  harbor,  very  desirable.  No  coal  of  good  quality  can 
be  procured  in  Philippine  Islands.  Some  has  been  mined  on  Cebu,  English 
company.  I  trust  it  may  not  be  necessary  to  order  me  to  Washington. 
Should  regret  very  much  to  leave  here  while  matters  remain  in  present  critical 
condition.  DEWEY. 


Washington,  August  27,  1898. 
Dewey,   Manila: 

The  President  received  your  telegram,  and  will  respect  your  wishes  and 
not  direct  you  to  leave  your  present  duty.  He  desires  you  to  communicate  to 
General  Merritt  your  views  upon  the  general  question  of  the  Philippines, 
with  such  information  as  you  have,  and  to  transmit  to  the  President  in  writing 
by  the  quickest  method  (possibly  by  hand  of  Merritt)  the  substance  of  your 
suggestions  to  Merritt.  ALLEN. 

There  had  been  no  account  of  the  Philippine  Islands  in  which  there  was  as 
much  said  in  a  few  words  as  Dewey's  dispatch  of  August  2oth.  The 
President  was  well  pleased  because  the  Admiral  evidently  understood  the 
critical  importance  of  the  situation  and  wanted  to  stay  at  his  post.  When  the 
American  army  entered  Manila — and  it  is  to  be  remembered  the  action  of  the 
navy  prevented  heavy  loss  of  life — the  insurgents  were  "dusted  out  of  the 
way,"  driven  out  of  the  city  while  the  Spaniards  were  forced  into  the  walled 
portion.  There  were  8,500  Americans  in  the  army.  The  Spaniards  surren 
dered  13,180,  and  the  insurgents  mustered  about  14,000.  As  early  as  July  26th, 
the  Admiral,  who  had  been  judicious  in  friendliness  to  Aguinaldo,  stated 


326      AFTER    THE    MAY    DAY    BATTLE    IN    MANILA    BAY. 

Merritt's  most  difficult  problem  would  be  in  dealing  with  the  insurgents 
under  Aguinaldo,  "who  has  become  aggressive  and  even  threatening  toward 
our  army,"  and  four  days  after  the  American  army  was  in  possession  a  joint 
dispatch  was  sent  by  Merritt  through  the  Navy  Department  to  the  Adjutant 
General : 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Washington:  Hongkong,  August  17,  1898. 

Send  the  following  telegram : 

"To  Adjutant  General: — Insurgents  demand  joint  occupation  of  the  city. 
Inform  me  how  far  I  shall  proceed  in  forcing  obedience  of  the  insurgents  in 
this  matter  and  others  that  may  arise.  Is  the  government  willing  to  use  all 
means  and  .  .  .  the  natives  to  submit  to  authority  of  United  States? — 
Merritt."  DEWEY. 

Washington,  August  17,  1898. 
Dewey,  Hongkong: 

Answering  your  joint  cable,  the  President  directs  as  follows: 
There  must  be  no  joint  occupation  with  the  insurgents.  The  LTnited 
States,  in  the  possession  of  city,  bay,  and  harbor  of  Manila,  must  preserve 
peace,  protecting  persons  and  property  in  the  territory  occupied  by  their  mili 
tary  and  naval  forces.  Insurgents  and  all  others  must  recognize  the  military 
occupation  and  authority  of  the  United  States  and  the  cessation  of  hostilities 
proclaimed  by  the  President.  Use  any  means  in  your  judgment  necessary  to 
this  end.  All  law-abiding  people  must  be  treated  alike.  ALLEN. 


But  the  "cable"  was  not  "joint. "  The  line  had  not  been  mended,  and 
Dewey 's  dispatch  boat  had  to  furnish  the  facilities  to  Hongkong.  Dewey  dis 
patched  Merritt's  dispatch  writh,  "Send  the  following  telegram  to  the 
Adjutant  General."  The  return  message  is  plainly  the  President's  own,  and 
the  insurgents  were  permitted  and  required  to  occupy  themselves  with  the 
rural  department. 

The  burning  question  of  the  Philippines  came  up  in  a  cable  from  Consul 
Williams  to  the  State  Department  as  follows: 

"Large  number  Spanish  priests  and  civil  officers,  an  element  dangerous 
to  United  States,  wish  to  leave  for  Hongkong.  No  means  of  transportation. 
Army  authorities  willing  to  send  transports  same  via  Hongkong,  but  lack 
authority.  Will  War  Department  cable  me  authorization?  No  expense  to 
government.  Officers  all  advise  measure.  WILLIAMS,  Consul. " 


AFTER    THE    MAY    DAY    BATTLE    IN    MANILA    BAY.      327 

This  was  sent  to  the  Admiral  asking  for  the  President  what  he  thought, 
and  Dewey's  reply  was: 

"Am  advised  that  in  addition  to  Spanish  civil  authorities  there  are  about 
750  priests,  who  are  anxious  to  leave  the  country.  Strongly  advise  that  they 
be  given  passage  to  Hongkong,  as  they  are  heartily  disliked  by  the  insur 
gents,  and  their  departure  would  tend  to  appease  latter  and  to  promote  har 
mony.  ' ' 

Information  was  asked  August  29,  at  the  instance  of  the  French  Ambas 
sador  in  Washington,  as  to  the  treatment  of  Spanish  prisoners ;  and  Dewey 
replies: 

"From  my  observation  and  that  of  my  officers,  the  Spanish  prisoners  are 
not  treated  cruelly  by  the  insurgents,  but  they  are  neglected,  not  from  design, 
but  owing  to  want  of  proper  food  supply,  medical  outfit,  and  attendance." 

The  President  directed  that  Dewey  should,  during  the  suspension  of  hos 
tilities,  exert  his  influence  "to  restrain  insurgent  hostilities  toward  Spaniards, 
and  while  maintaining  a  position  of  rightful  supremacy  as  to  the  insurgents,  to 
pursue,  so  far  as  possible,  a  conciliatory  course  to  all." 

It  was  a  few  days  before  this  that  General  Aguinaldo  became  careful  to 
refer  matters  of  account  to  his  "Council. "  He  put  off  the  part  of  dictator, 
and  found  it  a  necessary  ceremony  to  confer  a  great  deal.  He  took  advice  as 
to  the  Spanish  priests  he  had  captured  and  imprisoned,  concluding  to  hold 
them  as  hostages.  The  Belgian  Consul  at  Manila  established  himself  in  the 
confidence  of  Admiral  Dewey,  who  wrote  that  Mr.  Audie,  knowing  the  fall  of 
Manila  certain,  was  "most  assiduous  in  his  endeavors  to  bring  about  its  sur 
render  without  loss  of  life  or  property."  There  was  a  new  Governor-General 
appointed,  because  he  was  for  fighting  to  the  end,  and  the  Belgian  Consul, 

"much   to  his  credit,"  the  Admiral  says,   overcame   the    resistance   of   the 

• 

new  man,  and  also  "acted  as  intermediary  between  the  two  Governor-Gen 
erals  on  the  one  hand  and  General  Merritt  and  myself  on  the  other,  carrying 
several  important  communications,  among  them  a  message  from  me  to  the 
Governor-General  to  the  effect  that  if  the  numerous  batteries  on  the  water 
front  of  the  walled  city  kept  silent  the  city  would  not  be  shelled.  The  effect 
of  this  was  the  capture  of  this  rich  and  populous  city  without  loss  of  life  to  the 
squadron  or  to  non-combatants  and  with  little  or  none  to  our  army." 

If  the  cable  had  been  in  working  order  from  Manila  to  Hongkong  and 
beyond  during  the  early  days  of  August,  the  signing  of  the  protocol  would  in 


328      AFTER    THE    MAY    DAY    BATTLE    IN    MANILA    BAY. 

all  probability  have  been  delayed  until  the  surrender  of  the  city,  but  the  fact 
that  the  capitulation  was  signed  a  day  later  than  the  protocol,  Washington  and 
Madrid  time,  did  not  materially  change  the  situation. 

The  crushing  defeat  of  the  Spanish  fleet  by  Admiral  Dewey  had  a  ter 
rorizing  influence,  and  the  fact  that  the  City  would  be  destroyed  as  well  as  the 
fleet,  influenced  all  proceedings,  and  as  the  Admiral  describes,  saved  the 
effusion  of  blood  when  the  American  advance  took  place.  It  is  curious  to 
note  in  the  business  report  by  the  Admiral  of  our  Asiatic  squadron  that  there 
are  a  good  many  things  the  matter  with  the  vessels — "the  boiler  tubes  of  the 
Boston  give  out  frequently,  the  Raleigh's  engines  and  boiler  are  under  con 
stant  repair,  and  the  construction  of  her  fire  rooms  faulty ;  the  boilers  of  the 
Baltimore  are  only  fair."  The  squadron  has,  under  Dewey,  burned  36,815 
tons  of  coal.  The  price  of  4,000  tons  not  reported.  The  32,813  tons  co'st 
$330,060.71 — of  this  $96,802.04  wras  consumed  by  the  Olympia  and  tenders. 

The  Admiral  grimly  says:  "Regular  target  practice  was  held  according 
to  prescribed  methods  during  the  first  half  of  the  fiscal  year,  after  which  it 
was  discontinued,  the  ammunition  being  needed  for  war  purposes.  Especial 
attention  has  been  paid* to  subcaliber  practice.  The  marksmanship  in  action 
vas  excellent,  and  during  four  months  in  Manila  Bay  there  has  been  almost 
ao  sickness. " 

Vessel.  Sick,  per  cent.     Deaths.     Hospital.     Home. 

Olympia 1.25  4  36  6 

Baltimore 1.24  o  18  2 

Boston 2.16  2                    9  4 

Charleston      ......  2.88  o  12  o 

Concord      ........  2.58  o                   3  o 

McCulloch 8.80  2                   7  4 

Monadnock 1.16  o  22  2 

Monocacy 2.17  i  19  i 

Monterey 1.19  o  18  i 

Petrel    , 2.48  i                   o  2 

Raleigh 5.77  2  15  2 

Total 12  159  24 


'$jr& 

' 


CHAPTER    XIII. 

The  Object  Lesson  of  the  Voyage  of  the  Oregon. 

The  People  Instructed  for  the  Army  by  the  Experience  of  the  Navy — The  Run  from  Washing 
ton  State  to  Florida — Splendid  Spirit  of  the  Men — The  Fearful  Storm  in  the  Straits  of 
Magellan — The  Threat  of  Destroying  a  Spanish  Torpedo  Boat  at  Rio — The  Finish 
Alone  and  in  Good  Form,  and  Famous  the  World  Over. 

The  lesson  of  the  War  with  Spain  that  will  prove  most  profitable  to  the 
people  of  the  United  States,  if  they  accept  the  teachings  of  a  costly  experience, 
is  the  comfort,  economy  and  self-respect  of  strengthening-  the  army,  providing 
for  it  ungrudgingly  the  arms  most  approved  by  the  nations  in  arms,  and  mak 
ing  the  posts  schools  of  military  science  and  marksmanship  with  the  firearms  of 
precision  great  and  small.  It  will  not  be  the  part  of  wisdom  to  go  on  scolding 
Congress  for  its  neglect  of  duty  to  the  army.  %A11  demagogy  aside,  and  we 
find  the  army  has  been  immensely  improved  since  the  close  of  the  war  of  the 
States  and  sections,  and  the  gradual  decline  almost  to  departure  of  the  Indian 
question,  as  an  army  problem.  This  is  the  condition  of  enlisted  men,  and 
their  character.  Now  thousands  of  young  men  go  into  the  army  as  an  occu 
pation,  and  take  pride  in  being  soldiers.  More  than  that,  they  are  often 
inspired  to  educate  themselves — and  they  find  the  zeal  of  competition  and  the 
flush  of  accomplishment  in  target  practice,  as  our  pioneer  backwoodsmen 
rejoiced  to  excel  in  "shooting  at  a  mark."  There  is  an  art  in  handling  the 
modern  rifle,  that  requires  training,  as  certainly  as  there  is  skill  and  deft 
ness  in  perfecting  musical  gifts.  There  is  a  tradition  that  in  the  second  of  our 
wars  with  Great  Britain  a  Kentucky  soldier  killed  an  Indian  at  the  measured 
distance  of  a  mile.  The  feat  was  one  of  celebrity,  and  there  was  much  said 
for  years  of  the  calculations  required  to  give  the  long-barreled,  old-fashioned 
gun  the  correct  elevation,  how  necessary  it  was  that  the  rifle  grooves  should 
be  cut  with  a  care  equal  to  the  finest  workmanship  on  a  watch,  that  the  ball 
should  be  perfectly  round,  and  equally  solid  in  every  part,  and  the  "patch" 

329 


33o  THE    OBJECT    LESSON    OF    THE    OREGON. 

that  fitted  it  so  that  it  should  be  so  guided  in  the  initiatory  whirl,  as  not  to  have 
a  thread  amiss,  or  too  thick  or  thin,  just  so  that  the  full  force  of  the  powder 
would  he  applied,  and  the  missile  sent  on  its  long  flight  with  all  possible 
mechanical  aids — all  these  details  demanded  that  the  firm  nerve,  the  cool 
intelligence,  the  keen  eye,  the  alert  executive  will,  the  steady  hand,  should 
answer  to  the  impulse  of  the  brain  of  the  man.  It  is  not  a  feat  held  to  be  re 
markable  now  to  shoot  accurately  more  than  a  mile.  There  are  many  of  our 
soldiers  who  could  pick  an  enemy  out  of  a  tree  top  at  that  distance,  and  there 
ought  to  be  more  of  them.  The  improvement  of  the  gun  gives  a  wider  scope 
and  surer  chances  for  the  faculties  of  the  man — the  thing  indispensable.  The 
advance  of  the  army  has  been  rapid,  in  quality,  in  bulk,  and  in  the  favor  of 
the  people,  who  remember  that  the  sword  as  an  emblem,  and  the  rifle  as  a 
fact,  should  be  the  weapons  of  liberty,  that  despotism  with _  its  tools  may 
not  have  conceded,  through  the  carelessness  or  the  over-confidence  of  popular 
government,  advantages  that  may  be  fatal,  and  are  sure  to  be  costly,  in 
contests  with  freedom.  If  republicanism  is  to  win  in  the  world,  it  must  be 
stronger  in  the  hands  and  that  which  they  hold,  than  empire — even  for  the 
reason  that  the  people  should  show  the  capacity  for  greater  realization  from 
stated  resources,  when  they  control  and  levy  upon  themselves,  than  govern 
ments  of  inheritance  in  which  the  potency  of  manhood  for  the  enterprise  of 
man  is  classified  away.  It  was  well  said  when  the  war  of  the  States  was  over 
that  the  war  had  legislated. 

It  has  been  ascertained  that  the  momentous  enactments  of  war  were  not 
always  placed  in  forms  of  law,  constitutional  or  other — were  not  invariably 
reduced  to  writing,  and  that  so  far  had  we  advanced  in  governing  by  the  will 
of  the  people  that  there  was  jurisprudence  in  the  instincts  of  man,  efficacy  in 
traditions  and  public  opinion  that  will  not  await  the  solemnities  of  deliberate 
representative  bodies  or  pause  to  be  valid,  until  the  church  or  the  courts  have 
given  them  consecration.  The  great  Republic  has  recognized  that  the  army 
may  be  of  and  for  the  people,  and  yet  not  be  irregular,  spasmodic,  undisci 
plined — that  it  is  a  mathematical  establishment  and  an  instrument  scientific 
as  astronomy — just  as  a  modern  piece  of  artillery  is  wrought  to  resemble  a 
telescope,  and  is  aimed  at  an  enemy  in  the  blue  distances  on  land  or  sea  as 
stars  are  found  and  defined  in  the  abyss  in  which  they  are  as  motes  of  dust 
incandescent  in  the  light  of  the  sun.  Much  as  our  army  was  advanced  and 
elevated  in  and  by  the  generation  that  has  just  passed  between  wars,  it  did 


THE    OBJECT    LESSON    OF    THE    OREGON.  331 

not  gain  comparatively  as  the  navy  did  at  the  same  time  in  the  things  that  are 
the  essentials,  when  the  great  trials  by  battle,  the  Supreme  Courts  of  the  last 
resort,  came  to  pass  like  bolts  from  the  blue,  in  the  hours  of  destiny  when  the 
unexpected  happens  and  is  not  the  more  anticipated  because  it  has  occurred  a 
thousand  times. 

A  great  American  writer  of  the  English  language,  Captain  Mahan,  taught 
England  the  significance  of  the  words  "Sea  Power" — how  nations  had  been 
rising  to  greatness  through  the  ages,  with  increased  velocity  and  augmented 
certainty,  as  they  gained  respect  and  held  dominion  on  the  seas,  commanding 
from  stormy  waters  the  fertile  shores.  It  was  not  inapt  that  one  of  our 
countrymen  made  this  reassuring  revelation  to  England,  for  it  was  in  Ameri 
can  waters,  after  both  France  and  England  had  lost  their  fairest  colonies  on 
the  North  American  continent,  that  the  centuries  of  conflict  between  the 
greater  nations  of  Western  Europe,  for  supremacy  on  the  central  oceans  and 
over  all  the  world-wide  waters,  was  in  the  West  Indies — the  archipelago — at 
the  broad  gates  of  the  American  Mediterranean — closed  in  favor  of  Great 
Britain  as  the  mistress  of  the  seas,  not  to  be  again  contested  until  we  ourselves 
are  the  contestants.  It  auspiciously  transpired,  when  England's  con 
sciousness  was  quickened  by  Captain  Mahan  to  comprehend  her  own  great 
ness,  that  events  were  in  the  air  that  would  bring  the  English  speaking 
people  nearer  each  other  in  sympathy,  with  broader  common  interests,  than 
ever  before,  and  that  the  greater  sea  power  warmly  congratulated  us  upon  our 
accession  of  victories,  honors  and  trophies. 

There  could  have  been  no  more  acceptable  evidence  of  the  timeliness  of 
our  triumphs  than  the  British  cheers  that  greeted  them.  We  were  fortunate 
in  the  high  education  of  our  naval  officers  and  in  the  good  will  that  came  down 
to  us  from  days  of  glory  long  ago  for  the  navy,  and  developed  in  a  degree  of 
Congressional  enlightenment  that  seconded  the  studies  of  our  men  of  science 
as  navigators  and  constructers,  the  result  being  that  unprepared  for  war  on 
land  as  we  were,  when  we  were  swept  by  currents  surveyed  long  ago,  made 
wild  by  recent  storms,  into  the  Spanish  war,  we  had  the  consummate  fighting 
ships  whose  names  have  been  added  in  letters  of  light  to  the  old  rolls  of  the 
records  of  renown. 

Even  when  we  got  the  navy  we  did  not  get  the  docks  and  arsenals,  that 
are  the  homes  of  fleets,  where  they  clothe  their  necks  with  thunder,  and 
make  ready  for  glorious  enterprise.  However,  having  gotten  so  much,  we 


332  THE    OBJECT    LESSON    OF    THE    OREGON. 

should  go  on  and  remove  the  factional  restraints  of  conservatism.  Sup 
pose  we,  the  people  of  the  United  States,  had  done  as  well  for  the  army  as  for 
the  navy — that  is,  suppose  we  had  just  doubled  our  regiments,  troops  and 
batteries — and  then  had  added  a  reserve  for  the  field,  say  96  guns  (Blanco, 
the  last  Spanish  defender  of  Cuba,  had  183  pieces  of  field  artillery).  Suppose 
we  had  fixed  up  one  port  on  our  southern  coast  where  there  was  an  inex 
haustible  supply  of  good  water — a  dockyard  where  our  battleships  could  have 
been  scraped,  and  we  had  ascertained  the  elementary  principles  of  putting  an 
army  on  ships,  and  at  the  same  time  arranged  for  getting  them  off  again — we 
would  have  saved  time  and  expenses,  and  escaped  the  friction  about  small 
matters  that  has  distracted  the  measure  of  attention  due  the  events  that,  after 
all  embarrassments  and  obstructions,  have  uplifted  our  countrymen  with  the 
heroic  sentiment  that  is  the  charm  of  history  and  the  vital  glow  that  gives 
color  to  the  memory  of  nations ;  imparts  a  lofty  spirit  of  patriotism,  and  fills 
the  atmosphere  with  the  illumination  of  great  and  shining  deeds  that  will  be 
the  footsteps  of  light  on  the  hills  of  the  hereafter  of  the  land,  that  has  almost 
hesitated  to  accept  the  gifts  the  gods  have  provided  in  the  South  seas,  east  and 
west,  and  that  came  to  us  with  the  endowment  of  the  tropics,  the  affluence  of 
achievement  and  the  opulence  of  the  beautiful. 

The  army  had  to  wait  on  the  shore  of  Florida  for  the  navy  to  clear  the 
seas,  and  it  was  a  superb  dramatic  scene,  for  which  all  the  world  was  a  stage, 
that  while  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Asiatic  squadron  was  warned  at 
Hongkong  to  clear  for  action  in  the  Philippines,  the  battleship  Oregon,  built 
at  San  Francisco,  was  called  from  the  North  Pacific  to  make  haste  around 
South  America  to  reinforce  the  Atlantic  fleet,  to  ward  off  the  stroke  which 
Spain  seemed  to  be  delivering  to  defend  the  last  of  her  American  possessions. 
There  was  an  early  and  forcible  call  for  the  Oregon  in  this  brief  but  sufficient 

telegram : 

Washington,  March  7,  1898. 
Oregon,  Bremerton,  Wash. : 

The  situation  is  getting  worse.  You  should  go  to  San  Francisco  as  soon 
as  possible  and  get  ammunition.  LONG. 

(Oregon  arrived  at  San  Francisco  March  9,  1898.) 


Washington,  March  12,  1898. 

Sir :  When  in  all  respects  ready  for  sea,  proceed,  with  the  vessel  under 
your  command,  to  Callao,  Peru,  and  await  further  orders. 


THE    OBJECT    LESSON    OF    THE    OREGON.  333 

In  view  of  the  present  critical  condition  of  affairs,  the  Oregon  should 
leave  San  Francisco  at  the  earliest  possible  date,  and  arrive  at  Callao  as  soon 
as  practicable. 

The  crew  is  to  be  constantly  drilled,  the  passage  of  the  ship  not  to  be 
delayed  thereby.  Very  respectfully, 

JOHN  D.  LONG,  Secretary. 
Commanding  Officer,  U.  S.  S.  Oregon. 

(Through  Commandant,  Mare  Island,  Cal.) 

Washington,  March  12,  1898. 
Navy  Yard,  Mare  Island,  Cal. : 

Prepare  Oregon  for  sea  with  all  possible  dispatch.  Long  cruise.  Fill 
with  coal.  When  will  she  be  ready  to  sail?  LONG. 

(On  March  17  Capt.  C.  E.  Clark  assumed  command  of  Oregon,  relieving 
Capt.  B.  J.  McCormick,  condemned  by  medical  survey. 

On  March  19  the  Oregon  left  San  Francisco  for  Callao,  arriving  at  the 
latter  port  April  4,  1898,  having  made  an  average  speed  of  10.7  knots.) 


Washington,  March  22,  1898. 
Marietta,  Panama,  Colombia: 

Proceed  to  Callao,  Peru,  and  make  arrangements  to  coal  Oregon   upon 
arrival.     Left  March  19  from  San  Francisco  for  Callao.  LONG. 


Washington,  March  29,  1898. 
Marietta,  Callao,  Peru: 

Contract  for  best  coal  to  be  delivered  on  board  Oregon  immediately  upon 
arrival.  Oregon  to  coal  utmost  dispatch.  You  proceed  at  once  to  Valparaiso. 
It  is  possible  you  may  take  possession  of  Chilean  armored  cruiser. 

LONG. 


U.  S.  S.  Marietta,  3d  Rate,  Callao,  Peru,  March  31,  1898. 
Sir:  I  respectfully  acknowledge  the  receipt  this  day  of  the  Department's 
cipher  dispatch  dated  the  29th  instant. 

In  compliance  therewith  I  have  made  necessary  contract  for  coal  for  the 


334  THE    OBJECT    LESSON    OF    THE    OREGON. 

Oregon,  and  have  750  tons  in  lighters  for  her  now,  which  will  be  placed  along 
side  the  moment  she  arrives. 

This  vessel  leaves  to-night  for  Valparaiso,  Chile. 

Respectfully, 

F.  M.  SYMONDS, 

Commander,  U.  S.  N.,  Commanding,  and  Senior  Officer  Present. 
The  Secretary  of  the  Navy, 

Navy  Department,  Washington,  D.  C. 


Callao,  Peru,  April  5,  1898. 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Washington : 

Will  complete  work  necessary  boilers  and  engines.  Will  be  ready  to  sail 
Thursday  night  (7th).  I  can  make  Montevideo,  perhaps  Rio  Janeiro,  not 
stopping  at  Valparaiso,  and  if  coal  may  be  obtained  at  Sandy  Point,  Patagonia, 
I  could  make  Bahia.  CLARK. 


Callao,  April  6,  1898. 
Secretary  of  Navy,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

On  account  of  navigation  of  Magellan  Strait,  and  reported  movements 
Spanish  torpedo  vessel  near  Montevideo,  I  should  recommend  Marietta  to 
accompany  this  vessel.  If  required,  I  could  touch  Talcahuana,  Chile,  for 
orders  six  days  after  my  sailing.  CLARK. 


Washington,  April  6,  1898. 
Oregon,  Callao,  Peru: 

Proceed  at  once  to  Montevideo  or  Rio  Janeiro.  The  Spanish  torpedo 
boat  Temerario  is  in  Montevideo.  Marietta  has  been  ordered  to  proceed  to 
Sandy  Point,  Patagonia,  to  arrange  for  coal.  How  many  tons  of  coal  will  you 
require?  The  Marietta  and  Oregon  to  proceed  together.  Keep  secret  your 
destination.  Keep  secret  this  message.  LONG. 

(Oregon  sailed  from  Callao  April  7  for  Sandy  Point.) 


Washington,  April  7,  1898. 
Marietta,  Valparaiso: 

Oregon  leaves  to-day  from  Callao  for  Sandy  Point,  Patagonia.  Go  ahead 
and  secure  600  tons  of  coal  for  her  and  accompany  to  the  north.  The  United 
States  consulates  in  Cuba  have  closed.  United  States  Consul-General  is 
coming  home.  LONG. 


THE    OBJECT    LESSON    OF    THE    OREGON.  335 

The  authorities  at  Valparaiso  were  very  cautious  and  careful  in  their  treat 
ment  of  American  ships  on  the  way  to  the  Atlantic  at  this  time.  There  had 
been  threats  by  Spanish  residents  that  the  Marietta  should  be  destroyed  in  the 
harbor  of  the  capital  of  Chile.  The  commander  of  the  Marietta  reported : 

"Although  we  had  a  patrol  boat  about  the  vessel,  and  made  necessary 
preparations  on  board  for  a  night  attack,  still  it  was  unnecessary,  as  by  orders 
of  the  civil  authorities  shore  boats  were  not  permitted  under  any  pretext  to 
approach  the  vessel  within  300  meters  during  the  night,  and  I  learned  that  a 
government  detective  force  on  shore  closely  watched  suspected  localities  and 
persons." 

Captain  Clark,  of  the  Oregon,  writing  at  Rio  Janeiro  April  3oth,  of  his  run 
from  Callao,  states  he  left  that  port  April  yth,  one  boiler  under  repairs,  tak 
ing  i,  i oo  tons  coal  in  eighty  hours,  100  tons  in  bags  on  deck,  and  reached 
the  Straits  in  comparatively  good  weather,  "though  a  heavy  swell,  increased 
by  fresh  southerly  winds,  made  the  ship  pitch  heavily,  the  jack  staff  some 
times  disappearing  under  the  solid  seas  that  swept  all  but  the  superstructure 
deck.  The  vibrations  and  the  racing  of  the  propellers  were  very  marked  at 
times,  but  the  condition  of  affairs  and  the  Department's  instructions  warranted 
a  high  rate  of  speed. 

"Entered  the  straits  at  about  3:30  p.  m.  on  the  i6th,  and  that  evening 
anchored  outside  Port  Tamar.  One  of  the  severest  gales  of  the  season  broke 
before  an  anchorage  could  be  reached,  and  as  the  wind  and  rain  became  so 
dense  that  the  abrupt  shores  could  not  be  seen,  while  no  soundings  could  be 
obtained,  the  Oregon  was  for  a  time  awkwardly  placed.  Just  before  dark  the 
anchors  were  let  go  on  a  rocky  shelf,  fringed  by  islets  and  reefs,  in  38  and  52 
fathoms  of  water,  and  they  fortunately  held  through  some  of  the  most  violent 
gusts  I  have  ever  experienced." 

The  Oregon  made  1 1  ^  knots  an  hour,  but  was,  after  meeting  the  Mari 
etta,  detained  by  her  low  rate  of  speed  during  the  run  to  Rio.  "Owing  to  the 
chance  that  the  Spanish  torpedo  vessel,  the  Temerario,  might,  if  war  existed, 
sight  us  before  dark  and  get  near  enough  to  dispatch  a  torpedo  during  tfhe 
night,  only  the  leading  vessels  showed  any  lights,  and  these  were  screened  at 
the  sides.  The  8-inch  and  6-inch  guns  were  loaded  with  shell,  and  ammuni 
tion  for  the  rapid-fire  guns  was  kept  on  deck,  four  crews  in  each  watch  being 
stationed  at  the  guns.  Orders  for  the  maneuvering  of  the  two  ships  in  the 
event  of  falling  in  with  a  suspicious-looking  vessel  were  issued." 


336  THE    OBJECT    LESSON    OF    THE    OREGON. 

The  crews  were  in  high  spirits,  the  engineer  officers,  for  instance,  "volun 
tarily  doubling  their  watches  when  high  speed  was  to  be  made,  and  the 
attempts  of  men  to  return  to  the  fire  room  after  being  carried  out  of  it 
insensible ;  and  most  of  the  crew,  who  were  working  by  watches  day  and  night 
at  Sandy  Point,  preferred  to  leave  their  hammocks  in  the  netting  until  they 
could  get  the  ship  coaled." 

At  Rio  was  a  cable  from  Long  stating  war  was  declared,  nine  days 
before,  and  to  await  orders — the  Spanish  torpedo  boat  probably  on  the  way 
from  Montevideo  for  Rio.  On  Dewey's  great  day  this  dispatch  from  the  Navy 
Department  showed  a  sense  of  apprehension : 

"Washington,  May  i,  1898. — Oregon,  Rio  de  Janeiro,  Brazil:  Four  Span 
ish  armored  cruisers,  heavy  and  fast,  three  torpedo  boat  destroyers,  sailed 
April  29  from  Cape  de  Verde  to  the  west,  destination  unknown.  Beware  of 
and  study  carefully  the  situation.  Must  be  left  to  your  discretion  entirely  to 
avoid  this  fleet  and  to  reach  the  United  States  by  West  Indies.  You  can  go 
when  and  where  }^ou  desire.  Nicthero)^  and  the  Marietta  subject  to  the 
orders  of  yourself. ' ' 

Next  day  Captain  Clark  was  ordered  to  await  orders,  and  the  next  that 
order  was  countermanded,  and  then  came  the  news  of  the  annihilation  of  the 
Spanish  Asiatic  fleet. 

Captain  Clark  telegraphed  May  4th:  "Keeping  near  the  Brazilian  coast, 
as  the  Navy  Department  considers  the  Spanish  fleet  from  Cape  de  Verde 
Islands  superior,  will  be  unsuitable.  I  can  coal  from  the  Nictheroy,  if 
necessity  compels  it,  to  reach  the  United  States.  If  the  Nictheroy  delays  too 
much  I  shall  hasten  passage,  leaving  her  with  the  Marietta.  Every  depart 
ment  of  the  Oregon  in  fine  condition." 

Clark  was  impatient,  and  telegraphed  from  Bahia  May  Qth : 

"Much  delayed  by  the  Marietta  and  the  Nictheroy.  Left  them  near  Cape 
Frio,  with  orders  to  come  home  or  beach,  if  necessity  compels  it,  to  avoid 
capture.  The  Oregon  could  steam  14  knots  for  hours,  and  in  a  running  fight 
m^ht  beat  off  and  even  cripple  the  Spanish  fleet.  With  present  amount  of 
coal  on  board  will  be  in  good  fighting  trim,  and  could  reach  West  Indies.  If 
more  should  be  taken  here  I  could  reach  Key  West;  but,  in  that  case,  belt 
armor,  cellulose  belt,  and  protective  deck  would  be  below  water  line.  Where 
abouts  of  Spanish  fleet  requested.  CLARK." 
The  next  word  from  the  Navy  Department  was  to  push  on,  avoiding  the 


THE    OBJECT    LESSON    OF    THE    OREGON.  337 

Spaniards,  but  the  belief  of  the  Board  was  that  the  Oregon  would  defeat  the 
Spanish  fleet.  It  was  determined  not  to  send  ships  to  assist  the  Oregon. 
Writing  on  the  Oregon  at  sea,  May  i8th,  Captain  Clark  said,  being  advised  the 
night  after  his  arrival  at  Rio  of  the  Spanish  torpedo  boat  going  to  that  port, 
he  sent  an  officer  to  the  captain  in  command  of  the  Brazilian  flagship  and 
explained  to  him,  "that  the  Oregon,  a  $5,000,000  battleship,  might  be  disabled 
or  even  destroyed  by  the  torpedo  vessel  of  the  nation  that  had  blown  up  the 
Maine,  and  that  I  relied  upon  the  Brazilian  naval  forces  to  prevent  any  such 
act  of  hostility  in  their  waters,  but  that  if  the  Temerario  entered  the  harbor 
and  approached  the  Oregon  with  a  hostile  purpose  I  must  destroy  her. ' ' 

Captain  Clark  moved  further  up  the  bay  after  delivering  this  message, 
and  instructed  the  commander  of  the  Marietta  "to  send  her  steam  launch  to 
the  Temerario  if  she  appeared,  and  inform  the  commander  that  if  he 
approached  within  half  a  mile  of  the  Oregon  he  would  be  sunk."  The  Mari 
etta  was  ordered  to  keep  her  search  light  on  the  vessel  all  the  time. 

The  Brazilians  upon  this  became  extremely  vigilant  and  courteous.  The 
torpedo  boat  did  not  appear,  and  Captain  Clark  grew  weary  of  waiting  for  his 
two  companions — one  slow  and  one  crippled — and  the  night  of  May  5th, 
"believing  that  the  Department  needed  the  Oregon  at  the  seat  of  war,  and 
knowing  that  if  we  fell  in  with  a  Spanish  fleet  of  superior  force,  with  torpedo 
vessels,  I  must  make  a  running  fight  of  it  at  full  speed,  which  meant  leaving 
the  Marietta  and  Nictheroy  to  escape  the  best  way  they  could,  as  even  the 
former  could  not  be  counted  a  factor  in  such  an  encounter,"  the  Oregon 
moved  on  at  high  speed,  and  arrived  at  Jupiter  Inlet,  Florida,  May  24th,  hav 
ing  made  a  straight  run  north  from  the  Brazilian  coast  beyond  the  islands, 
and  then  a  run  west.  This  congratulatory  correspondence  followed: 

Washington,  May  26,  1898. 
Oregon  (through  Naval  Base,  Key  West,  Fla.): 

The  Department  congratulates  you,  your  officers,  and  crew  on  the  com 
pletion  of  your  long  and  remarkably  successful  voyage.  LONG. 


.  U.  S.  S.  Oregon,  ist  Rate,  Key  West,  Fla.,  May  27,  1898. 
Sir:    I  have  the    honor  to  acknowledge  the   Department's  telegram   of 
yesterday,  which  was  received  and  read  to  all  hands  at  muster  the  same  even 
ing,   causing  great  enthusiasm  and  spontaneous  cheers.     That  the  officers, 
who  have  labored  so  faithfully  and  intelligently  to  bring  the  ship  around  in 


338 


THE    OBJECT    LESSON    OF    THE    OREGON. 


our  efficient  condition  for  fighting  and  steaming,  and  especially  that  the  crew, 
who  individually  and  collectively  have  made  real  sacrifices  and  who  for  two 
months  have  asked  for  nothing  but  the  privilege  of  doing  extra  work  that 
might  hasten  the  progress  of  the  ship,  should  be  mentioned  and  congratulated, 
.affords  me,  as  the  commanding  officer,  especial  gratification. 

Very  respectfully,  C.  E.  CLARK, 

Captain,  U.  S.  N.,  Commanding. 
The  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

There  could  be  no  happier  illustration  than  that  furnished  by  the  Oregon, 
in  the  long  voyage  and  subsequent  history,  of  the  perfection  attained  in  the 
building  of  our  battleships,  the  superior  excellence  of  their  armament,  the 
high  spirit  of  the  crews  and  the  admirable  tone  and  distinction  of  the  officers 
equal  as  always  found  to  all  occasions. 

It  is  plain  that  the  confidence  of  the  Navy  Department  and  of  Captain 
'Clark  was  increased  as  the  voyage  of  the  Oregon  progressed.  The  Captain 
was  not  in  luck  that  he  did  not  meet  Cervera's  fleet.  As  instructed  by  the 
experiences  of  the  war — of  what  the  Oregon  did,  and  the  fate  of  the  fugitive 
ships  at  Santiago — only  a  series  of  accidents  that  there  is  no  occasion  to  think 
probable  would  have  prevented  that  ship,  single  handed,  from  destroying 
the  entire  squadron  reserved  for  the  doom  that  overtook  the  fated  ships  July 
3d  on  the  Coast  of  Cuba  west  of  Santiago. 


CAPTAIN   CLARK,  OF  THE  'OREGON.."  IN   HIS  OFFICE. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

The  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 

Putting  the  Army  into  the  Combat — The  Plans  of  Campaign — The  Proposed  Waiting  and 
Equipping  Policy  of  the  Major  General  Commanding — His  Strange  Confidence  in  the 
Cuban  Story  of  an  Army  of  50,000  Rebels  to  Help  Us — Reasons  Why  We  Could  not 
Wait  Six  Months  after  Declaring  War  before  Striking  Decisively  with  the  Army. 

The  report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  the  year  of  the  war  with  Spain  and 
the  peace  also,  is  a  document  necessarily  memorable  and  that  has  other  than 
adventitious  distinctions.  It  is  remarkable  for  its  fullness  and  the  absolute 
fair  play  given  those  who  have  found  fault  with  the  administration  of  the  War 
Department,  and  the  sweeping  frankness  with  which  the  true  inwardness  has 
been  told,  by  the  insertion  of  the  original  dispatches,  that  tell  the  bottom 
facts.  As  the  war  was  over  when  the  report  was  prepared,  though  the  treaty 
had  not  then  been  signed,  there  was  an  unusually  early  opportunity  to  take 
the  public  into  complete  confidence  by  spreading  in  plain  print  the  documen 
tary  truth — the  whole  truth,  too — in  the  official  history  of  the  war.  The  story 
is  told  now  and  forever,  and  if  it  could  be  gathered  into  volumes  unabridged, 
and  each  of  the  millions  of  the  American  people  had  them  to  read,  without 
note  or  comment,  there  would  be  no  special  occasion,  though  abundant  room, 
for  this  book. 

The  annual  report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  for  the  year  1898  is  in  a  large 
sense  the  original  papers  of  the  history  of  the  Spanish  war,  which  freed  the 
possessions  of  Spain  from  centuries  of  misrule  and  from  all  oppression,  except 
the  things  for  which  all  peoples  are  brought  to  judgment,  aside  from  disabili 
ties  that  are  the  fault  of  misgovernment,  inflicted  upon  the  character  of  the 
people  themselves.  It  is  impossible  that  in  the  flash  of  a  sword,  however 
mightier  it  may  be  than  the  wand  of  a  magician,  the  wrongs  that  are  the 
growth  of  centuries  shall  be  dissipated.  We  may  give  masses  of  mankind 
equalities  of  opportunity  and  they  themselves  must  be  responsible  for  the 


342  THE    REPORT    OF    THE    SECRETARY    OF    WAR. 

results.  We  have  cast  down  the  tyrant,  and  the  people  are  free  to  rise.  We 
have  possessed  lands,  and  that  are  resources  for  the  future  generations — the 
assurances  that  there  is  subsistence  in  the  soil,  the  skies,  the  waters,  and  the 
sunlight,  for  the  children  of  God — the  toilers  that  are  to  be. 

The    Secretary    thus   gives    the    history    of    the    war    in    a    few    words: 

"An  army  of  about  250,000  volunteers  and  recruits  for  the  regulars  was 
called  into  existence  from  civil  life,  which,  with  the  regular  army,  made  a 
total  force  of  274,717  men.  It  was  organized,  armed,  and  equipped  (no 
supplies  being  on  hand  other  than  those  for  the  regulars,  save  Springfield 
muskets),  and  50,000  men  of '  this  force  were  transported  by  land  and  sea  to 
battlefields  in  the  tropics  12,000  miles  apart,  where  they  won  their  victories 
without  a  single  defeat,  and  all  within  the  period  of  one  hundred  and  thirteen 
days  from  the  declaration  of  war  to  signing  the  protocol. ' ' 

The  report  crowds  two  hundred  and  thirty-one  pages.  The  report  of 
the  Major  General  commanding  the.  army,  with  the  accompanying  reports  of 
the  commanders  of  independent  expeditions,  are  given  in  full  by  the  Secre 
tary.  Major  General  Miles,  in  the  course  of  a  few  of  the  first  weeks  of  the 
war,  produced  a  series  of  orders  or  recommendations,  for  the  preparations 
of  ideal  campaigns,  and  that  which  he  directed  and  suggested  was  persuasive 
as  well  as  peremptory,  but  not  in  actual  'business  affairs  so  precise  as  to  be 
convincing  that  the  lines  were  drawn  upon  which  the  work  could  be  done 
smoothly.  It  was  not  possible  to  be  sure  of  the  detail  of  a  campaign  on  an 
island  with  a  large  army  of  regulars  as  defenders,  before  all  disputes  were 
settled  as  to  the  command  of  the  surrounding  waters.  The  plans  of  the 
general  commanding  were  of  course  constructed  of  material  in  which  theories 
played  a  great  part — and  it  was  lost  time  to  be  elaborate,  before  the  disap 
pearance  of  the  elementary  uncertainties.  In  the  proposals  of  General 
Miles  there  are  the  marks  of  vigorous  industry  and  the  professional  and 
technical  points  of  the  military  business.  On  the  i3th  of  April,  the 
General  issued  a  careful  expression  of  his  judgment,  of  which  we  give  this 
paragraph : 

"The  history  of  the  expedition  to  the  Crimea  and  to  Egypt  indicate  the 
necessity  of  complete  and  perfect  equipment  of  each  military  organization, 
and  the  army  should  be  thoroughly  and  effectively  organized  in  every  depart 
ment — infantry,  artillery,  cavalry,  engineer  corps,  signal  corps,  construction 
train  for  building  wharves,,  piers,  etc.,  and  repairing  railway  tracks  and 


THE    REPORT    OF    THE    SECRETARY    OF    WAR.  343 

bridges,  corduroying  roads,  etc.,  pontoon  trains  and  appliances  for  depot  and 
reserve  trains — in  order  that  upon  landing  on  foreign  soil  every  company, 
battery,  regiment,  brigade,  and  division  shall  be  in  perfect  condition,  fully 
supplied  and  equipped  to  render  effective  service.  Hence  the  regiments  of 
infantry,  cavalry,  and  light  batteries  of  artillery  should  be  fully  supplied  with 
tentage,  camp  equipage,  arms,  ammunition,  intrenching  tools,  and  transpor 
tation,  with  medical  supplies,  and  rations  and  food  for  men  and  animals  for 
at  least  six  months.  The  command  should  also  be  supplied  with  field  artil 
lery,  siege  guns,  howitzers,  and  mortars  for  offensive  work  against  any  field- 
works  or  fortifications  of  the  enemy,  or  for  the  protection  of  camps  and  depots 
that  might  be  established." 

All  this  is  well  stated,  but  it  is  in  the  nature  of  general  conversation, 
and  does  not  bear  the  positive  edge  and  point  of  military  direction,  but  no 
doubt  it  had  its  value  in  impressing  the  people  that  there  was  much  to  do  in 
preparing  for  war.  The  plans  of  operation  of  the  Major  General  command 
ing  will  long  be  read  with  the  deepest  interest,  but  they  had  a  common  fault, 
requiring  too  much  time  for  execution  April  9th  the  Major  General  in  com 
mand  made  various  recommendations,  one  of  which  was,  "that  at  least  22  regi 
ments  of  infantry,  5  regiments  of  cavalry,  and  the  light  artillery  be  mobilized, 
and  placed  in  one  large  camp  where  they  can  be  carefully  and  thoroughly 
inspected,  fully  equipped,  drilled,  disciplined,  and  instructed  in  brigades  and 
divisions,  and  prepared  for  war  service.  This  will  give  approximately  a  force 
of  30,000  men."  This  was  in  addition  to  other  recommendations,  and  fol 
lowed  by  one  "that  the  President  call  for  a  volunteer  force  from  the  different 
States  and  Territories  of  at  least  50,000  men,  in  addition  to  the  above  force, 
to  constitute  one  army  for  any  offensive  movements  against  the  Spanish  army 
in  Cuba,  estimated  at  150,000  men,  of  which  number  80,000  are  reported  as 
effective  for  military  service.  The  entire  force  should  be  fully  equipped  with 
motmtain,  field,  and  siege  artillery,  and  all  the  appliances  and  equipments 
required  for  actual  war  service." 

Also  there  were  to  be  available  for  any  emergency  that  might  arise, 
"State  troops  along  the  Atlantic,  Gulf  and  Pacific  coasts,"  and  in  addition  to 
"any  emergency"  there  might  be  "threatened  attacks  upon  the  towns,  villages 
or  cities  that  are  exposed,"  and  "for  the  concentration  of  the  large  force  that 
may  be  required  in  the  future."  It  was  apparent  to  all  that  the  first  thing 
was  to  know  whether  the  sea  was  to  be  our  basis  of  offensive  operations.  If 


344  THE    REPORT    OF    THE    SECRETARY    OF    WAR. 

it  was,  we  did  not  require  a  diffusion  of  strength  with  a  view  of  defending 
ourselves.  If  we  invaded  Cuba  we  were  not  to  be  invaded  or  even  assaulted 
in  turn.  The  one  sure  thing  in  the  situation  was  that  we  had  first  to  dispose 
of  the  Spanish  fleets.  If  Spain  was  going  to  fight  for  Cuba,  she  had  to  do  it 
with  her  navy,  for  her  available  army  was  there.  The.  Major  General  wanted 
"at  least"  30,000  men  for  one  large  camp  where  they  should  be  "carefully 
and  thoroughly  inspected, "  and  another  "at  least"  50,000,  "to  constitute  our 
army  for  any  offensive  movements  against  the  Spanish  army  in  Cuba," 
estimated  at  150,000.  This  would,  of  course,  mean  logically  the  land  army 
that  was  in  due  time  to  be  under  the  command  of  the  Major  General  com 
manding,  and  engaged  in  the  reduction  of  Havana.  Certainly  this  ambition 
of  the  Commanding  General  was  the  logical  outlook  of  his  position,  the 
natural  consequence  of  the  impending  war,  but  it  was  qualified  with  severe 
and  repeated  warnings  that  the  real  work  was,  with  the  view  of  saving  the  lives 
of  our  soldiers,  to  be  postponed  for  a  considerable  time.  The  contemplation 
of  the  Major  General  commanding  is  stated  in  his  official  report,  with  refer 
ence  to  letters  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  that  the  real  "plan"  was  "harassing 
the  Spanish  forces  and  doing  the  enemy  the  largest  amount  of  injury  during 
the  time  necessary  for  our  Navy  to  demonstrate  its  superiority — the  rainy  or 
sickly  season,  and  the  time  actually  required  to  equip  and  instruct  the  volun 
teer  forces  with  the  least  possible  loss  to  ourselves. ' '  In  that  letter  he  also 
asserted  the  belief  as  entertained  from  the  first,  that  "we  could  secure  the 
surrender  of  the  Spanish  army  in  the  island  of  Cuba  without  any  great  sacri 
fice  of  life."  In  the  letter  here  referred  to,  the  General  said: 

"In  my  opinion  it  is  extremely  hazardous,  and  I  think  it  would  be 
injudicious,  to  put  an  army  on  that  island  at  this  season  of  the  year,  as  it 
would  undoubtedly  be  decimated  by  the  deadly  disease,  to  say  nothing  of  hav 
ing  to  cope  with  some  80,000  troops,  the  remnant  of  214,000,  that  have  become 
acclimated,  and  that  are  equipped  with  183  guns.  And  still  another  element 
of  extreme  danger  would  be  to  place  an  army  there  with  the  possibility  of 
our  own  navy  not  being  able  to  keep  the  waters  between  our  own  territory 
and  that  island  clear  of  hostile  ships  or  fleets. 

"By  mobilizing  our  force  and  putting  it  in  healthful  camps  and  using  such 
force  as  might  be  necessary  to  harass  the  enemy  and  doing  them  the  greatest 
injury  with  the  least  possible  loss  to  ourselves,  if  our  navy  is  superior  to 
theirs,  in  my  judgment,  we  can  compel  the  surrender  of  the  army  on  the 


TRANSPORT  "NEWPORT"  OF  THE  PHILIPPINE  EXPEDITION  LEAVING  SAN  FRANCISCO. 
GENERAL  MERR1TT  ON  THE  BRIDGE. 


THE    REPORT    OF    THE    SECRETARY    OF    WAR.  347 

island  of  Cuba  with  very  little  loss  of  life,  and  possibly  avoid  the  spread  of 
yellow  fever  over  our  own  country. 

"There  is  still  time,  if  this  is  favorably  considered,  to  put  a  small  force  of 
regular  troops,  number  approximately  18,000  men,  in  healthful  camps  until 
such  time  as  they  can  be  used  on  the  island  of  Cuba  with  safety." 

This  was  planning,  on  the  i8th  of  April,  to  allow  all  summer  for  the  navy 
of  the  United  States  to  demonstrate  its  superiority  to  the  Spaniards,  and  to 
put  off  the  aggressive  opening  of  the  war  six  months  at  least,  our  troops  being 
instructed  in  those  healthful  camps  that  were  so  numerous  in  the  general 
understanding  in  April  and  so  scarce  a  little  later. 

After  the  rainy  and  sickly  seasons  were  over  in  Cuba,  there  was  to  be  one 
masterly  effort  by  a  grand  army  perfected  in  every  respect — to  consist  of 
50,000  men  at  least,  to  overpower  Blanco's  80,000  effectives  and  183  guns; 
our  ships  harassing  the  Spaniards  with  their  target  practice  at  old  forts,  we 
presume.  But  the  Major  General  commanding  had  several  reserves  to  bring 
up — the  50,000  men  who  were  to  be  the  one  specifically  great  and  authorita 
tively  conducted  army — and  one  of  them  was  "an  auxiliary  force  of  50,000 
natives."  Here  the  Major  General  commanding  (page  20  of  the  report  of 
the  Secretary  of  War)  apologizes  for  the  small  force  comparatively  that  was 
to  be  ready  to  move  six  months  later.  He  says  he  "deemed  it  of  the  first 
importance  to  well  equip  such  force  rather  than  to  partly  equip  a  much  larger 
number."  With  all  possible  respect  for  General  Miles,  there  is  evidence  here 
of  unsound  calculations.  Any  expedition  beginning1  vrith  the  anticipation  that 
invaders  of  Cuba  could  be  reinforced  by  50,000  natives  vroulJ  have  been 
founded  on  a  rotten  romance.  Our  soldiers  did  not  find  forces  of  natives 
reliable  for  the  fire  lines,  when  they  got  ashore  at  Santiago.  There  is  a  cer 
tain  reserve  on  the  subject,  as  a  more  uncertain  enthusiasm  that  has  been 
countenanced  by  some  of  the  generals,  but  the  private  soldiers  tell  a  different 
story.  The  list  of  Cuban  casualties  was  2  killed  and  4  wounded,  when  we 
lost  1,500  men. 

There  is  quoted  a  dispatch  from  Admiral  Sampson  to  the  Secretary  of 
the  Navy  and  repeated  to  Miles  at  Tampa,  as  follows: 

"Mole  St.  Nicholas,  Haiti. — General  Miles's  letter  received  through 
Colonel  Hernandez  on  June  6.  Garcia  regards  his  wishes  and  suggestions  as 
orders,  and  immediately  will  take  measures  to  concentrate  forces  at  the  points 
indicated,  but  be  is  unable  to  do  so  as  early  as  desired  on  account  of  his 


348  THE    REPORT    OF    THE    SECRETARY    OF    WAR. 

expedition  to  Banes  Port,  Cuba,  but  he  will  march  without  delay.  All  of  his 
subordinates  are  ordered  to  assist  to  disembark  the  United  States  troops,  and 
to  place  themselves  under  orders.  Santiago  de  Cuba  well  fortified,  with 
advanced  intrenchments,  but  he  believes  position  for  artillery  can  be  taken  as 
Miles  desires.  (Approximate)  twelve  thousand  (12,000)  regulars  and  three 
thousand  (3,000)  militia  between  Santiago  and  Guantanamo.  He  has  sent 
force  in  order  to  prevent  aid  going  to  Santiago  from  Holguin.  Repeats  every 
assurance  of  good  will,  and  desires  to  second  plans.  SAMPSON." 

The  General  comments:  "It  will  be  observed  that  General  Garcia  re 
garded  my  requests  as  his  orders,  and  promptly  took  steps  to  execute  the 
plan  of  operations.  He  sent  3,000  men  to  check  any  movement  of  the  12,000 
Spaniards  stationed  at  Holguin.  A  portion  of  this  latter  force  started  to 
the  relief  of  the  garrison  at  Santiago,  but  was  successfully  checked  and 
turned  back  by  the  Cuban  forces  under  General  Feria.  General  Garcia 
also  sent  2,000  men,  under  Perez,  to  oppose  the  6,000  Spaniards  at  Guan 
tanamo,  and  they  were  successful  in  their  object.  He  also  sent  1,000  men, 
under  General  Rios,  against  the  6,000  men  at  Manzanillo.  Of  this  gar 
rison,  3,500  started  to  reinforce  the  garrison  at  Santiago,  and  were  en 
gaged  in  no  less  than  thirty  combats  with  the  Cubans  on  their  way  before 
reaching  Santiago,  and  would  have  been  stopped  had  General  Garcia's 
request  of  June  27  been  granted.  With  an  additional  force  of  5,000  men 
General  Garcia  besieged  the  garrison  of  Santiago,  taking  up  a  trong  posi 
tion  on  the  west  side  and  in  close  proximity  to  the  harbor,  and  he  afterwards 
received  General  Shafter  and  Admiral  Sampson  at  his  camp  near  that  place. 
He  had  troops  in  the  rear,  as  well  as  on  both  sides,  of  the  garrison  at  San 
tiago  before  the  arrival  of  our  troops." 

The  Major  General  commanding  accepted  Cuban  stories  as  facts  so  far  as 
to  say  that  Garcia  was  besieging  Santiago,  and  proceeded  to  give  Garcia  one 
force  of  3,000  men,  another  of  2,000,  another  of  1,000  men,  and  then  "with 
an  additional  force  of  5,000  men  besieged  the  garrison  of  Santiago."  Here  we 
have  four  Cuban  armies,  in  round  numbers  11,000  men  in  all.  We  know  what 
15,000  men.  who  were  with  Shafter  have  to  say  about  these  besiegers  of  the 
garrison  of  Santiago.  They  saw  only  a  few  scattering  bands.  Major-Gen 
eral-Commanding  Miles  was  incorrectly  informed.  He  did  not  see  and  count 
the  troops,  and  he  did  not  have  reliable  intelligence  about  the  thirty  combats. 
As  Garcia  obeyed  the  wishes  of  General  Miles  as  orders,  why  did  not  the 


THE    REPORT    OF    THE    SECRETARY    OF    WAR.  349 

American  General  commanding-  wish  to  have  the  11,000  men  brought  in  to 
crowd  the  Spaniards  somewhat?  General  Garcia  had  such  Cuban  troops  as 
there  were  anywhere  in  sight,  excepting  the  grand  army  of  160  men  under 
Gomez,  who  were  constantly  encamped  for  their  health  in  a  salubrious  part  of 
the  country  mountainous  in  its  character.  The  romantic  50,000  Cuban  army 
had  existed  so  long  in  the  Key  West  Bureau,  and  Gomez  was  so  constantly 
thundering  at  the  gates  of  Havana,  from  his  elevated  point  of  observations  in 
the  mountains  of  the  Cuban  Orient,  that  delusions  were  propagated  and  still 
find  believers.  According  to  the  report  of  the  Commanding  General  of  the 
United  States,  as  reproduced  in  the  report  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  the  plan 
of  campaign  with  which  he  opened  was  to  do  the  best  we  could  to  harass  the 
Cubans  until  the  rainy  season  and  the  sickly  season  were  over,  about  the 
middle  of  December,  four  months  after  the  surrender  of  Spain  in  consenting 
to  the  terms  of  the  protocol.  Then  everything  was  to  be  perfectly  prepared  for 
a  movement  with  50,000  men,  when  the  fighting  was  to  be  hot  and  heavy.  Of 
course,  the  rainy  season  and  the  yellow  fever  were  most  serious  .reasons  for 
not  rushing  the  war.  The  President  did  not  want  to  invade  Cuba  in  the  midst 
of  the  yellow  fever  season,  and  to  subject  the  troops  to  the  torrential  rains 
when  it  was  death  to  sleep  on  the  ground — he  wanted  to  use  some  time  in 
preparation,  and  thought  peace  might  be  preserved  after  all  if  the  people 
would  consider  the  actual  facts,  and  be  patient,  but  all  that  had  been  over 
ruled  by  Congress.  Honorable  members  wanted  to  know  who  was  afraid  of 
the  rain.  The  yellow  fever  was  not  a  subject  of  jesting,  but  there  was  evi 
dence  in  abundance  that  the  yellow  journals  were  immuncs.  The  Major 
General  commanding  had  a  wholesome  sensibility  as  to  the  fatality  it  would  be 
to  attack  Havana  as  the  English  did  in  1762  in  the  midsummer — that  season 
being  selected  owing  to  the  dread  of  the  hurricanes  to  be  expected  in  October 
and  almost  always  on  hand  in  that  month  except  when  Columbus  discovered 
America.  At  the  same  time  the  Major  General  commanding  held  the  opinions 
expressed  in  these  words  from  his  official  report : 

"Congregating  tens  of  thousands  of  men,  many  of  whom  were  not  uni 
formed,  and  scarcely  any  properly  equipped,  in  great  camps  away  from  their 
States,  rendered  it  difficult  for  them  to  be  properly  supplied  with  food,  cook 
ing  utensils,  camp  equipage,  blankets,  tentage,  medical  supplies,  transporta 
tion,  etc.,  and  was  to  a  great  extent  the  cause,  in  my  judgment,  of  the 
debilitating  effect  upon  the  health  and  strength  of  the  men,  who  were  other- 


35°     THE  REPORT  OF  THE  SECRETARY  OF  WAR. 

wise  in  good  physical  condition.  The  material  necessary  to  clothe  and  equip 
large  armies  was  not  even  manufactured  at  that  time,  and  the  consequent 
condition  of  the  troops  for  weeks  and  months  was  injurious  to  the  commands 
in  many  ways." 

What  better  could  have  been  done  under  the  "plan"  of  the  Major  General 
commanding  does  not  appear.  The  analysis  and  comparison  "of  various  plans 
of  campaigns  that  were  not  tried  cannot  fail  to  be  unprofitable,  and  it  is  desir 
able  to  avoid  the  contentious  exercise,  for  there  is  a  drift  in  it  away  from  higher 
considerations.  Many  of  the  suggestions  by  Major-General-Commanding  Miles 
were  excellent.  His  orders  as  a  rule  were  judicious.  If  they  seem  sometimes 
too  vague  now,  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  the  very  subjects  to  which  they 
related  were  at  the  moment  foggy.  But  the  plan  of  waiting  as  long  to  pre 
pare  a  force  to  conquer  Cuba  as  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  held  for  the 
movement  on  Richmond,  was  inadmissible,  first  because  public  opinion  would 
not  have  permitted  it ;  second,  as  the  event  proved,  because  it  was  not  neces 
sary.  If  .there  was  any  doubt  of  our  command  of  the  seas  as  against 
Spain,  after  Dewey's  victory  at  Manila,  it  was  not  in  existence  after 
the  Oregon  from  the  North  Pacific  joined  the  North  'Atlantic  squadron.  The 
President's  plan  was  more  specific  than  that  of  the  military  head  of  the 
army,  and  as  he  was  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  army  and  the  navy,  he 
tried  it  and  it  had  the  merit  of  simplicity,  proving  efficacious.  It  was  to 
mobilize  the  regular  army,  which  was  wonderfully  well  done,  and  with  the 
most  available  volunteer  regiments,  strike  a  blow,  not  at  Havana,  but  at  some 
other  vital  point  possibly,  in  Porto  Rico,  more  probably  in  southern  or  eastern 
Cuba.  Major  General  Miles,  among  others,  had  two  harbors  011  the  north 
shore  in  his  mind.  The  run  of  Cervera's  fleet  into  the  harbor  of  Santiago 
decided  the  spot  to  deliver  the  blow,  and  the  delivery  proved  to  be  the 
decisive  event. 

The  President  of  the  United  States  had  more  to  study  than  the  necessity 
of  the  inspection  and  instruction  of  the  troops  who  were  called  out  for  a  war  of 
invasion.  It  required  no  prophet,  civil  or  military,  to  tell  him  that  there 
were  two  things  apparently  much  in  the  mind  of  Congress  that  must  be 
avoided.  Our  navy,  while  conclusions  with  the  navy  of  Spain  were  untried  on 
the  Atlantic  waters,  was  not  to  be  thrust  against  the  fortresses  and  stone  walls 
of  Havana.  That  was  not  the  way  to  prepare  to  meet  the  Spanish  fleet, 
which  was  obliged  to  appear  in  all  available  force  for  the  protection  of  Cuba 


THE    REPORT    OF    THE    SECRETARY    OF    WAR.  35 1 

and  Porto  Rico,  or  abandon  at  the  outset  the  assertion  of  the  competency  of 
the  kingdom  to  care  for  itself.  The  declaration  about  the  bombardment  of 
Havana  was  not  worthy  to  be  considered.  It  was  also  of  common  understand 
ing,  aside  from  the  consecutive  production  of  the  current  literature  of  prac 
tical  politics,  that  the  way  to  open  the  war  was  not,  while  the  West  India 
waters  were  in  controversy,  to  scrape  together  all  the  transports  that  could  be 
found,  and  land  tha  mass  of  our  soldiers,  regular  and  volunteer — irrespective 
of  the  condition  of  the  latter — in  the  province  of  Havana,  to  enter  speedily  as 
forced  marches  would  carry  our  columns,  into  the  yellow  fever  territory,  where 
there  were  floods  falling  from  the  skies,  and  the  supply  of  wholesome  water 
very  short  indeed.  The  foremost  and  most  fantastic  ideas  of  campaigning  in 
Cuba  had  therefore  to  be  returned  marked  officially,  "Not  approved,"  to  the 
journals  that  were  happy  to  believe  they  were  the  authors  of  the  war,  and 
about  to  finish  it  after  a  few  days'  flurry. 

Secretary  Seward,  in  the  tentative  days  between  the  secession  of  the 
extreme  southern  States,  and  the  red  deluge  that  swept  over  the  land,  assisted 
public  confidence  by  coldly  studied,  airy  declarations  that  the  disorder  would 
be  ended  in  ninety  days.  The  people  on  both  sides  of  the  line  about  to  burst 
into  fire  would  have  been  appalled  and  shaken  if  they  could  have  foreseen  one 
battlefield,  where,  years  later  in  the  struggle,  many  thousands  perished.  Mr. 
Seward 's  ninety  days  will  be  a  byword  for  centuries,  to  measure  great  mis 
takes  with,  but  it  is  questionable  whether  that  acute  statesman  was  ever 
mistaken  for  a  minute.  It  was  his  duty  to  be  confident,  and  especially  his 
calling  for  the  period  of  initiation,  as  he  w:is  the  representative  of  his 
country  in  affairs  international.  The  parallel  case  in  Cuba  was  the  feeling  of 
some  who  possessed  dual  reputations  as  soldiers'  and  statesmen,  that  a  three 
weeks'  blockade  of  Havana,  with  an  occasional  thirteen-inch  shell,  would 
turn  over  the  great  city  to  the  United  States.  In  the  beginning  there  was 
impatience  because  our  will-power  did  not  seem  equal  to  the  immediate  con 
quest  of  Cuba,  but  very  soon  the  immense  common  sense  of  the  people 
asserted  itself,  upon  the  proposition  that  we  could  afford  to  wait,  and  there 
was  a  vivid  recollection  that  we  had  not  been  developing  the  army  along 
with  the  navy,  and  that  one  of  the  penalties  for  the  public  fault  of  procrasti 
nation  was  that  we  had  to  encounter  the  expenses  and  endure  the  disappoint 
ments  of  delay.  The  Major  General  commanding  had  the  hard-earned 
reputation  of  a  gallant  soldier.  Scarred  with  wounds,  an  officer  who  had  led 


352  THE    REPORT    OF    THE    SECRETARY    OF    WAR. 

his  men,  sword  in  hand,  on  the  bloody  hillsides  sloping  north  to  the  Rappa- 
hannock,  and  he  was  firm  in  the  general  estimate  as  a  man  of  bravery,  decision 
of  character,  and  experience.  His  various  orders,  prognostications  and 
plans  excited  interest  as  they  became  known,  and  their  influence  was  in  the 
correct  direction  of  giving  the  people  intelligence  to  the  effect  that  the  war 
was  a  very  serious  business,  that  must  be  pressed  with  comprehensive  energy, 
and  that  the  first  lesson  was  to  "learn  to  labor  and  to  wait. "  Plans,  as  plans, 
though  accompanied  with  statistics,  did  not  seize  the  people.  What  they 
wanted  was  to  get  at  the  Spaniards.  The  first  utterance  of  the  Major  General 
commanding  was  not  believed  -to  be  a  happy  one,  for  it  had  a  chill  in  it,  and 
did  not  appear  to  be  demanded.  It  was  that  we  did  not  want  to  begin  this  war 
with  a  Bull  Run.  Still,  this  was  meant  to  assist  in  forming  public  opinion  to 
sustain  the  authorities  in  the  works  of  preparation.  And  yet  it  would  have 
been  a  colossal  blunder  to  have  held  the  troops  assembled,  with  our  enormous 
railroad  facilities,  in  camps  all  summer.  If  we  couldn't  command  the  sea, 
an  offensive  war  was  impossible.  Clearly  we  had  the  sea  power.  The 
prodigious  victory  of  Dewey  was  the  thing  needed,  to  tell  the  world  the  true 
story,  and  it  satisfied-  our  self-esteem  while  it  demanded  action,  if  not  all  along 
the  line,  at  least  wherever  the  enemy  obtruded  a  mark.  It  would  be  ruinous 
to  linger.  We  were  spending  a  million  dollars  a  day,  and  every  dollar  must 
be  accounted  for.  Our  regular  army  could  and  would  shoot  a  Spanish  force 
in  pieces,  as  our  Asiatic  squadron,  had  smashed  the  fleet  of  Spain  at  Manila. 
The  thing  to  do  was  to  disregard  the  maneuvers  of  the  Cape  Verde  fleet,  and 
in  the  east  end  of  Cuba,  where  the  only  insurgent  forces  of  any  value  were 
held  to  be,  or  Porto  Rico,  a  healthful  island  abounding  in  good  roads,  water, 
supplies,  and  provisions  in  the  fields  and  woods,  strike  quick  and  hard,  leav 
ing  the  pen  and  pool,  and  pestilence,  and  famine,  of  Havana  to  the  Spaniards. 
It  was  so  ordered  in  time  and  place  befitting. 


';£fi*'i*z?3 


CHAPTER     XV. 


The  Early  Correspondence  of  the  Department  of  War. 

Activity  in  the  War  Department  before  the  Declaration  of  War  —  The  Precautionary  Policy 
of  the  Major  General  Commanding  —  Differences  of  Opinion  in  High  Places  about  an 
Early  Invasion  of  Cuba—  Importance  of  Healthful  Camps—  The  Dangers  of  \Vater 
Supplies—  The  Inside  History  of  a  Troubled  Time—  Shafter's  Sagacity  as  to  the  Im 
portance  of  a  First  Engagement  —  The  Demand  for  a  Competent  Army  Enforced. 

• 

"The  telegraphic  and  other  correspondence  relating  to  the  war,"  is  the 
unpretending  headline  that  follows  the  official  reports  of  the  generals  having 
dependent  commands  and  engaged  in  actions  of  importance  ;  and  a  remarkable 
collection  of  dispatches  and  communications  appear.  The  utter  candor  of  this 
official  publication  is  displayed  in  these  few  introductory  words,  in  the 
type  that  declares  the  remarks  of  the  Secretary: 

"Early  in  Maya  movement  upon  Havana  was  contemplated,  as  it  was 
believed  that  the  city  could  be  assaulted  and  captured  before  the  rainy  season 
set  in,  but  the  plan  was  subsequently  abandoned  on  account  of  the  reported 
movements  of  the  enemy's  fleet. 

"It  was  proposed  to  send  a  portion  of  the  army  of  invasion  from  Tampa, 
and  to  gather  another  part  of  it  at  Key  West,  on  account  of  the  close  proximity 
of  the  latter  place  to  Mariel,  Cuba  (a  point  about  26  miles  west  of  Havana)." 

This,  the  Secretary  says,  "will  be  shown  by  the  following  dispatches.  " 
There  is  a  great  deal  more  than  this  "shown  in  that  which  is  given,  and  the  first 
thing  one  is  reminded  of  in  reading  the  lines  that  it  was  believed  Havana 
"could  be  assaulted  and  captured  before  the  rainy  season,  "  is  that  the  war 
Secretary  was  warlike  from  the  first  day  of  the  war  and  an  opponent  of  delays, 
holding  that  to  strike  promptly  was  the  way  to  do  business. 

The  Spanish  fleet  had  the  advantage  of  associating  itself  with  mysteries. 
The  Cape  Verde  squadron  appeared  in  the  West  Indies  and  disappeared,  and 
the  Spaniards  were  able  to  hide  their  purposes  and  the  deficiencies  of  their 
ships,  by  the  suppression  of  intelligence.  The  presence  of  a  squadron  of  half 

353 


354          THE    EARLY    CORRESPONDENCE    OF    THE   WAR. 

a  dozen  heavily  armed  cruisers  and  some  torpedo  boats  that  had  a  reputation 
for  ability  to  be  destructive  far  beyond  their  performance,  was  a  menace,  and 
caused  a  suspension  of  the  invasion  of  Cuba.  If  Cervera's  fleet  had  returned 
to  Spain,  and  there  had  been  a  show  of  mustering  the  naval  force  of  that 
nation  for  a  rush  upon  the  Philippines  or  into  the  harbor  of  Havana,  the 
course  of  war  events  would  have  been  largely  changed,  though  there  is  no 
reason  to  be  persuaded  that  changed  results  would  have  been"  reached. 
Still,  the  commitment  of  our  army  to  the  siege  of  Havana  would  have  been  a 
dangerous  first  move,  for  from  what  we  know  of  the  army  and  armament  of 
Blanco,  his  force  in  the  field  and  the  formidableness  of  his  fortifications,  it 
would  have  been  beyond  our  strength  to  take  the  capital  city  of  Cuba  before 
the  rainys  season,  and  we  should  have  been  constrained  to  fight  it  out  with  the 
Spaniards  in  the  place  where  they  were  most  thoroughly  prepared,  and  could 
have  concentrated  their  whole  army,  while  our  troops  would  have  been 
sufferers  from  insufficient  or  impure  water  supplies,  and  victimized  by  the 
yellow  fever.  Once  occupied  in  besieging  Havana,  we  could  not  have  aban 
doned  it,  and  our  ill-prepared  regiments  must  have  taken  the  lines  of  the 
enemy  by  assault  as  the  way  that  would  save  the  soldiers  from  fevers  by 
shedding  their  blood.  That  is  to  say,  the  Santiago  policy  must  have  been 
introduced  at  an  earlier  day  and  on  a  larger  scale ;  and  while  the  victory  at 
Havana  the  valor  and  numbers  of  our  soldiers  should  have  won,  might  have 
been  more  conclusive  than  that  of  Santiago,  it  must  have  been  more  costly. 
It  is  not  surprising  that  the  Secretary  of  War  and  the  Major  General  com 
manding  did  not  come  to  an  agreement  on  plans  of  campaign,  for  it  is  accord 
ing  to  the  weight  of  the  facts  in  the  scales,  that  in  theory  of  war  the  General 
wanted  too  much  professional  elaboration,  and  the  Secretary  had  a  hazardous 
confidence  the  war  could  be  suddenly  finished  by  rushing  it  and  deliver 
ing  blows  with  the  utmost  celerity,  assuming  the  enemy  to  lack  in  preparation 
for  defense,  as  much  as  we  were  wanting  in  equipage  for  offense.  It  was 
Cervera's  fitful  fleet  that  put  an  end  to  the  proposed  assault  upon  Havana, 
that  it  might  be  captured  before  the  rains  and  the  fevers  came  to  destroy  the 
tens  of  thousands  while  the  sword  devoured  its  thousands. 

The  first  telegram  of  the  long  series  is  this : 

"Headquarters  of  the  Army,  Washington,  D.  C.,  May  9,  1898. — The 
Major  General  commanding  directs  that  the  following  orders  be  sent  by 
telegraph  to  General  Wade,  at  Tampa: 


UNITED  STATES  VOLUNTEER  IN  FULL  MARCHING  ORDER. 


MODEL  OF  GUNS  USED  ON  AFT  DECKS. 


10-INCH  DISAPPEARING  GUN  CARRIAGE.    MODEL.  1896. 


THE    EARLY    CORRESPONDENCE    OF    THE    WAR.  357 

"Direct  Major-General  Shafter  to  move  his  command,  under  protection 
of  Navy,  and  seize  and  hold  Mariel,  or  most  important  point  on  north  coast  of 
Cuba,  and  where  territory  is  ample  to  land  and  deploy  army.  Follow  up  his 
command  with  all  the  forces  sent  to  you.  Troops  will  be  sent  you  as  rapidly 
as  possible  from  Chickamauga  and  other  points.  Have  troops  fully  equipped; 
send  abundance  of  ammunition  and  ship  with  them  food  for  men  and  animals 
for  sixty  days,  to  be  followed  by  four  months'  supplies. 

"J.  C.  GILMORE,  Assistant  Adjutant-General." 


There  is  a  certain  uncertainty  about  this,  not  removed  by  the  words 
"ample,"  to  describe  "territory,"  or  "rapidly  as  possible,"  "fully  equipped," 
"abundance  of  ammunition."  There  is  more  cadence  than  command  in  this. 
It  is  a  flourish  of  phrases  rather  than  an  order.  But  the  Secretary  of  War 
and  the  Commanding  General  appear  to  have  started  together.  Adjutant 
General  Corbin  forwarded  the  order  that  the  Major-General  commanding, 
with  the  approval  of  the  Secretary,  directed.  Of  course  this  meant  the  execu 
tion  of  the  Havana  plan.  The  first  difficulty  was  the  lack  of  fresh  water  at 
Key  West.  This  interfered  with  the  concentration  of  a  large  force  there. 

The  Commanding  General,  April  i5th,  had  sent  "orders  to  all  departments. 
The  generals  in  the  field  were  designated  as  follows:  Maj.  Gen.  John  R. 
Brooke,  Chickamauga  Park ;  Brig.  Gen.  William  R.  Shafter,  New  Orleans,  La.  ; 
Brig.  Gen.  J.  J.  Coppinger,  Mobile,  Ala. ;  Brig.  Gen.  J.  F.  Wade,  Tampa, 
Fla. 

The  war  telegrams  from  the  war  office  began  to  fly  April  i5th.  The  first 
in  order  after  the  preparatory  dispatches  to  the  army  posts,  were  these : 

Adjutant-General's  Office,  Washington,  April  15,  1898. 
Brig.  Gen.  J.  F.  Wade, 

Commanding  Department  Dakota,  St.  Paul,  Minn. : 

With  approval  of  Secretary  of  War,  the  Major  General  commanding  army 
directs,  as  necessary  for  the  public  service,  that  you,  accompanied  by  your 
adjutant-general,  proceed  with  least  practicable  delay  to  Tampa,  Fla.,  to 
assume  command  of  troops  ordered  to  rendezvous  there.  Please  designate 
officer  to  perform  duties  of  adjutant-general  at  department  headquarters  and 
submit  names  of  other  staff  officers  whom  you  desire  to  take  with  you. 

H.  C.  CORBIN,  Adjutant-General. 


358          THE    EARLY    CORRESPONDENCE    OF    THE    WAR. 

Adjutant-General's  Office,  Washington,  April  15,  1898. 
Brig.  Gen.  J.  F.  Wade, 

Commanding  Department  Dakota,  St.  Paul,  Minn. : 

Referring  to  previous  telegrams  on  the  same  subject,  the  Major-General 
commanding  army,  with  approval  of  Secretary  of  War,  directs,  as  necessary 
for  the  public  service,  that  you  order  your  chief  quartermaster  to  proceed 
immediately  and  in  advance  of  your  own  departure  to  Tampa,  Fla. ,  for  the 
purpose  of  selecting  suitable  ground  as  a  camp  for  the  troops  ordered  to 
rendezvous  there  for  your  action  on  arrival.  SCHWAN,  A.  A.  G. 

This  was  a  week  before  the  declaration  of  war.  Three  days  before  the 
declaration,  April  i8th,  in  full  view  of  the  impending  crisis,  the  Major-General 
commanding  put  in  the  strongest  terms  his  admonitions  that  the  troops  should 
be  located  in  healthful  camps,  and  his  opinion  that  it  would  be  "extremely 
hazardous"  and  injudicious  to  put  an  army  in  Cuba,  considering  the  season  of 
the  year,  "as  it  would  undoubtedly  be  decimated  by  the  deadly  disease,  to  say 
nothing  of  having  to  cope  with  some  80,000  troops,  the  remnant  of  214,000, 
that  have  become  acclimated,  and  that  are  equipped  with  183  guns.  And 
still  another  element  of  extreme  danger  would  be  to  place  an  army  there  with 
the  possibility  of  our  own  navy  not  being  able  to  keep  the  waters  between  our 
own  territory  and  that  island  clear  of  hostile  ships  or  fleets."  The  feeling  of 
the  Commanding  General  that  the  navy  might  not  be  able  to  afford  perfect 
protection  to  the  army  in  course  of  transportation,  or  after  disembarkation  on 
a  hostile  shore,  was  not  shared  seriously  by  naval  officers  whose  confidence  in 
victory  over  the  Spanish  was  never  clouded,  but  no  intelligent  persons 
could  escape  the  presence  of  peril  in  placing  the  army  in  Cuba  before  the 
question  of  commanding  the  surrounding  seas  was  settled  by  actual  combat  or 
the  retirement  of  the  Spaniards  from  the  scenes  of  activity.  The  Major- 
General  commanding  shared  in  the  ordinary  expressions  of  well-informed 
public  opinion,  among  which  was  the  spread  of  the  yellow  fever  in  our  own 
country  as  an  incident  of  our  military  expeditions,  and  he  thought  it  possible 
to  "compel  the  surrender  of  the  army  on  the  island  of  Cuba  with  very  little 
loss  of  life."  There  was  manifestly  a  reliance  in  the  military  mind  upon  the 
blockade  which  was  in  the  thoughts  of  all  men — and  indeed  distorted  by  the 
popular  imagination.  The  food  productiveness  of  Cuba  had  not  been  realized. 
It  had,  surprisingly,  survived  the  torch,  the  machete,  and  the  "zones  of  cultiva 
tion,"  of  the  desolation  of  which  so  much  was  said. 


THE    EARLY    CORRESPONDENCE    OF    THE    WAR.          359 

There  was  "still  time,"  the  Commanding  General  said,  "to  put  a  small 
force  of  regular  troops,  numbering  approximately  18,000  men,  in  healthful 
camps  until  such  time  as  they  can  be  used  on  the  island  of  Cuba  with  safety." 
Here  was  the  first  development  of  disagreement.  The  experienced  officers 
understood  the  meaning  of  "healthful  camps,"  but  Congress  and  the  country 
basked  in  a  state  of  enthusiasm,  and  were  slow  of  comprehension  of  the  most 
sinister  feature  of  the  conditions — the  inability  of  new  troops  to  make  use  of 
their  rations  and  take  care  of  themselves  in  camps.  In  the  presence  of  a 
combination  of  the  inexperience  both  of  officers  and  privates,  and  impractica 
bility  of  providing  the  articles  demanded  for  nearly  a  quarter  of  a  million  men 
turned  suddenly  into  the  fields  from  their  habitations,  there  was  no  avoidance 
of  discomfort,  and  the  carelessness  of  the  men  in  exposing  themselves,  so  as 
to  be  partially  disqualified  for  instruction,  was  as  certain  as  the  rains  and  the 
changing  temperature  by  day,  and  night,  of  the  winds.  It  was  much  easier  to 
talk  of  healthful  camps  than  to  find  them,  and  still  harder  to  preserve  the 
wholesomeness  of  grounds  selected. 

The  American  people  in  the  hurries  of  their  labors  in  expanding  the 
cultivation  of  the  continent,  building  cities  and  mills,  clearing  away  forests, 
establishing  the  drainage  of  thickly  settled  communities,  have  fallen  into 
methods  of  improvement  that  unfortunately  have  promoted  the  washing  away 
of  the  fertile  properties  of  the  soil — this  to  a  great  extent  by  the  inconsiderate 
waste  of  forests— -the  diminution  in  volume  of  the  brooks  that  once  turned 
grist  mills,  beautified  the  country,  and  were  full  of  food  fishes,  and  the 
pollution  of  living  streams  from  villages,  towns,  cities,  and,  above  all,  manu 
factories,  wherein  the  conversion  of  raw  materials  into  articles  involved 
chemical  and  mechanical  changes.  At  the  same  time,  the  water  supplies  for 
the  centers  of  concentrated  population  have  been  found  in  dangerous  associa 
tion  with  the  drainage  of  impurities. 

There  were  imperative  reasons  for  camps  in  Florida,  that  peninsula  being 
the  closest  approximation  of  our  land  to  that  of  the  Spaniards — Cuba  being 
within  a  day's  run  of  Tampa.  This  was  fair  striking  distance.  It  permitted 
the  close  prognostication  of  the  weather,  an  exceedingly  important  advan 
tage  in  the  transfer  of  an  army  by  ships  to  make  a  landing  that  would  be  in 
all  probability  disputed,  by  heavy  masses  of  infantry  and  artillery.  It  was  held 
that  the  sojourn  of  our  young  men  in  Florida  would  in  a  degree  be  an 
advanced  step  of  acclimatization,  a  half-way  resting  place  between  the  fields 


360          THE    EARLY    CORRESPONDENCE    OF    THE    WAR. 

and  shops  of  America,  and  the  trials  of  the  threatening  Cuban  climate,  famous 
for  its  deadly  influences  upon  invading  armies,  as  both  Spanish  and  English 
history  gave  expositions.  This  memorandum  for  the  Adjutant-General,  and 
the  response  of  that  officer,  gave  the  official  history  of  the  direction  to  General 
Shafter  to  take  command  of  the  regular  army  that  was  to  be  the  head  of  the 
spear  to  penetrate  Cuba: 

Headquarters  of  the  Army,  Washington,  D.  C.,  April  29,  1898. 
The    Major-General    commanding    desires    that,    by  letter,    Brig.    Gen. 
William  R.  Shafter  be  directed,  upon  his  arrival  at  Tampa,  Fla.,  to  assume 
command  of  all  troops  now  assembled  there. 

J.  C.  GILMORE,  Assistant  Adjutant-General. 

War  Department,  Adjutant-General's  Office, 

Washington,  April  29,  1898. 
Brig.  Gen.  William  R.  Shafter,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

Sir:  Under  instructions  from  the  President,  the  Secretary  of  War  directs 
that  upon  your  arrival  at  Tampa,  Fla.,  you  assume  command  of  all  the  troops 
assembled  there.  Very  respectfully, 

H.  C.  CORBIN,  Adjutant-General. 

The  water  supply  deficiency  was  the  first  embarrassment  encountered. 
This  was  known  to  be  an  awaiting  woe  at  Key  West,  but  was  not  expected  to 
lurk  at  Tampa  also.  General  Shafter 's  first  dispatches  disclosed  that  his 
plunge  into  the  task  assigned  him  had  located  a  rising  tide  of  troubles : 

Tampa  Bay  Hotel,  Tampa,  Fla.,  May  7,  1898 — 3:44  p.  m. 
Adjutant-General  United  States  Army,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

Am  crowding  work  of  watering  and  coal  transport,  and  put  in  pen  and 
stall  for  sortie  (stock?).  Will  have  it  completed  Wednesday  sure.  Many 
obstacles  to—  SHAFTER,  Brigadier-General. 

(Note. — Telegram  apparently  not  completed.) 


Tampa  Bay  Hotel,  Tampa,  Fla.,  May  7,  1898 — 6:50  p.  m. 
Adjutant-General,  United  States  Army, 

War  Department,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

Colonel  Lawton  just  returned  from  Key  West.  Brings  message  from 
Commodore  Watson  that  water  is  absolutely  necessary;  that  supply  on  all 
ships  is  very  short,  and  that  if  can  assist  him  in  getting  supply  it  will  be  a 
great  favor  to  him.  A  barge,  capacity  one  hundred  thousand  gallons,  can 


THE    EARLY    CORRESPONDENCE    OF    THE    WAR.          363 

start  in  morning  for  Key  West,  towed  by  one  of  ships  under  charter.     Cost  of 
water  two  cents  per  gallon.     No  tug  here  for  hire.     Shall  I  send  it? 

SHAFTER,  Brigadier-General. 

The  footnote  that  the  telegram  of  Shafter  appeared  to  be  unfinished  is  an 
example  of  the  thoroughness  with  which  the  telegraphic  correspondence  has 
been  given  to  the  public.  The  dispatch  had  a  word  evidently  of  erroneous 
writing,  and  the  unbroken  termination  tells  that  a  work  of  "watering"  was  in 
progress,  and  between  the  words  is  the  easy  reading  that  the  work  watering 
ships  was  slow,  and  that  the  least  of  the  evil  consequences  was  loss  of  time. 
The  news  from  Key  West  was  that  those  who  got  further  along  were  faring 
worse. 

Adjutant-General  Corbin's  reply  to  Shafter's  dispatch  of  May  yth,  dated 
6:50  p.  m.,  about  the  short  water  supply  at  Key  West,  was  rushed  the  follow 
ing  morning: 

Adjutant-General's  Office,  Washington,  May  8,  1898. 
General  Shafter,  Tampa  Bay  Hotel,  Tampa,  Fla. : 

Your  telegram  concerning  water  supply  for  Commodore  Watson  received, 
and  Secretary  of  War  directs  you  to  make  every  possible  effort  to  furnish  any 
thing  and  everything  to  help  him  -along.  In  this  and  other  cases  Secretary  of 
War  approves  any  action  you  take,  but  desires  every  such  order  of  yours 
reported  for  his  information.  H.  C.  CORBIN,  Adjutant-General. 

May  loth,  by  direction  of  the  Major-General  commanding,  the  invasion  of 
Cuba  was  postponed  for  a  week : 

Headquarters  of  the  Army,  Washington,  D.  C.,  May  10,  1898. 

The  Major-General  commanding  directs  that  the  following  orders  be 
telegraphed  General  Wade,  Tampa,  Fla. :  That  the  movement  of  troops  to 
Cuba  is  delayed  until  Monday,  May  16,  1898.  In  the  meantime,  he  will  send 
the  infantry  in  the  ships,  with  an  abundant  supply  of  water  and  whatever  else 
is  required  with  them,  to  Key  West,  there  to  disembark.  The  ships  are  to 
return  to  Tampa  to  carry  more  infantry  to  Key  West,  until  there  are  about 
12,000  men  there.  These  will  move  from  Key  West,  to  Dry  Tortugas  and 
Cuba,  on  ships  coming  from  New  York.  Also,  that  General  Brooke  has  been 
directed  to  send  to  Tampa  from  Chickamauga  the  Second,  Seventh,  Eighth, 
Twelfth,  and  Sixteenth  Infantry.  These  can  be  forwarded  to  Key  West 
by  any  means  available. 

J.  C.  GILMORE,  Assistant  Adjutant-General. 


364          THE    EARLY    CORRESPONDENCE    OF    THE    WAR. 

The  next  day  after  the  order  of  12,000  troops  to  Key  West,  came  to  hand 
this  jarring  information  about  the  water  supply: 

Tampa  Bay  Hotel,  Tampa,  Fla.,  May  n,  1898. 

(Received  Washington,  8:12  p.  in.) 

Adjutant-General  United  States  Army,  for  Commanding  General, 
War  Department,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

Water  for  large  body  of  troops  at  Key  West  is  serious  question.  Abso 
lutely  no  water  there.  Only  water  barge  from  this  port,  capacity  130,000 
gallons,  should  reach  Key  West  to-morrow  with  water  for  navy,  and  be  back 
Friday.  Transports  carry  considerable  water,  but  have  no  way  of  distillation. 
Is  imperative  that  water  be  placed  in  Key  West  before  troops  begin  to  arrive. 
Quartermaster-General  has  been  asked  to  charter,  clean,  loan,  and  start 
1,000,000  gallons  tank  steamer  with  light  draft  barge  for  unloading.  Dry 
Tortugas  reported  to  have  brackish  water  in  cisterns.  Am  now  trying  to 
ascertain  quantity  and  quality.  Expect  information. 

J.  F.  WADE,  Brigadier-General. 

On  the  same  day  the  Major-General  commanding  directed  the  troops  at 
Tampa  to  be  in  readiness  to  ship  to  Dry  Tortugas  (ominous  name!)  to  be 
there  on  the  morning  of  the  i6th. 

Here  is  an  example  of  a  way  a  rumor  appears  in  an  official  telegram : 

(Telegram. — Rush. — Confidential.) 
Adjutant-General's  Office,  Washington,  May  13,  1898. 
Col.  A.  S.  Kimball,  Army  Building,  New  York  City: 

Report  at  once  any  information  you  have  about  Spanish  war  boats  on  our 
coast.  Give  full  information.  Hold  transports  until  further  orders. 
Acknowledge.  NELSON  A.  MILES, 

Major-General  Commanding  Army. 

It  has  often  been  remarked  that  as  a  rule  a  dispatch  is  more  important  at 
the  delivery  than  at  the  receiving  end  of  the  wrire  over  which  it  passes,  and 
that  the  magnifying  power  of  a  wire  is  in  proportion  to  its  length.  A  "head- 
quaiters"  will  be  more  stirred  up  by  a  telegram  than  the  personal  report  of  a 
scout.  An  official  dispatch  increases  the  phenomenon  of  long-distance  teleg 
raphy. 

The  dispatches  from  Major-General  Shafter  were  at  this  period  thoughtful, 
and  straight  shots.  He  recommended  legislation  to  enable  soldiers  on  the 
field  "to  exercise  the  franking  privilege  as  was  done  during  the  War  of  the 


THE    EARLY    CORRESPONDENCE    OF    THE    WAR.          365 

Rebellion,"  urged  that  recruits  should  join  their  regiments  when  they  could 
be  under  the  control  of  the  officers  who  would  command  them,  stopped  part 
of  the  volunteer  regiments  at  Jacksonville  owing  to  "difficulty  of  finding  suit 
able  camping  ground  with  abundant  water  supply." 

On  this  last  dispatch  Corbin  telegraphed  that  the  Secretary  of  War 
wanted  "further  recommendation  on  this  line  as  to  distribution  of  troops,  with 
view  to  their  comfort  and  their  ultimate  transport  from  Tampa." 

The  Seventy-first  New  York  regiment. attracted  the  attention  of  Shaftcr, 
who  telegraphed : 

Tampa  Bay  Hotel,  Tampa,  Fla.,  May  22,  1898. 

(Received,  Washington,  6:33  p.  m.) 
Adjutant-General  U.  S.  A.,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

Upon  personal  report  to  me  by  colonel  of  the  Seventy-first  New  York 
that  300  of  his  men  have  never  fired  a  gun,  I  have  ordered  15,000  rounds  of 
ammunition  be  given  that  regiment  for  target  practice.  Will  do  same  with 
other  volunteer  regiments  that  I  find  uninstructed. 

SHAFTER,  Major-General. 

General  Corbin  telegraphed  Shafter  asking  him  to  take  up  and  solve  the 
question  of  organization  of  the  Fifth  and  Seventh  corps  and  "do  a  very  great 
service."  The  dispatch  from  Shafter,  one  of  the  important  papers,  is  as 
follows : 

Tampa  Bay  Hotel,  Tampa,  Fla.,  May  24,  1898. 

(Received,  Washington,  2:45  P-  m-) 
The  Adjutant-General  U.  S.  A.,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

Recommend  brigades  to  consist  of  three  regiments  of  infantry,  three 
brigades  to  a  division.  Regular  regiments  to  be  brigaded  together,  adding 
two  volunteer  regiments  to  the  sixteen  regular  regiments  alreadyhere  to  form 
first  and  second  divisions  of  Fifth  Army  Corps,  the  other  corps  to  be  formed 
in  like  manner  from  volunteer  regiments.  General  officers  in  order  of  rank  of 
respective  corps  to  command  divisions  as  fast  as  organized;  others  to  com 
mand  brigades.  Staff  officers  recently  appointed  to  be  assigned  as  far  as 
practicable  with  the  volunteers,  in  order  to  give  brigade  commanders  the 
benefit  of  their  experience.  The  five  cavalry  regiments  here  now  to  be 
formed  into  two  brigades  of  three  and  two  regiments  respectively.  Should 
cavalry  volunteer  regiments  be  assigned  here,  brigades  then  to  be  formed 
with  two  regiments  each.  The  number  of  regiments  for  each  brigade  as  I 


366  THE    EARLY    CORRESPONDENCE    OF    THE    WAR. 

have  indicated  is  approved  by  General  Wheeler.  Other  general  officers  whom 
I  have  consulted  agree  with  me  as  to  the  number  of  regiments  to  constitute  a 
brigade.  Recommend  placing  all  the  regular  regiments  in  one  corps,  so  that 
they  may  be  taken  first  for  service  in  Cuba.  If  this  is  not  satisfactory,  half 
of  the  regulars  can  be  assigned  to  each  corps,  and  in  event  of  an  ad 
vance  on  Cuba  the  regulars  in  each  corps  formed  for  the  advance.  I  think, 
however,  that  it  would  be  better  to  have  all  regulars  in  one  corps.  The 
light  artillery  should  (remain),  as  at  present,  all  together  under  charge  of 
Colonel  Randolph.  They  should  accompany  the  advance,  and  then  be 
assigned  one  battery  to  each  division  and  one  to  cavalry  corps,  the  remainder 
to  constitute  the  reserve.  If  this  project  is  approved,  I  request  early  order, 
and  I  will  immediately  proceed  to  complete  the  organization.  I  have  been  led 
to  make  the  recommendations  in  view  of  an  early  advance,  and  from  the  fact 
that  I-believe  the  first  battle  will  be  the  decisive  one  and  that  the  best  troops 
should  bear  the  brunt,  supported  as  strongly  as  possible  by  the  volunteers. 

SHAFTER,  Major-General,  Commanding. 

This  dispatch  is  a  model  of  executive  statement  and  the  last  sentence  not 
only  contains  the  outlines  of  the  Santiago  campaign,  but  is  marked  by  the 
sagacity  that  solved  the  situation — <kthe  first  battle  will  be  the  decisive  one, 
and  the  best  troops  should  bear  the  brunt."  It  was  sound  military  sense  in 
Shafter  to  discern  six  weeks  ahead  of  the  fact  that  the  decisive  battle  would 
be  the  first  one,  and  he  wanted  no  mistake  about  that.  General  Shafter  thus 
emerged  from  the  moonshine  of  distant  speculation,  and  put  himself  in  the 
place  of  the  critical  command  and  mapped  the  event,  without  knowing  where 
on  the  island  the  fateful  field  was  located. 

In  the  wars  that  may  hereafter  come  upon  us,  this  is  an  example  to  be 
quoted.  It  is  a  line  of  sunlight  to  be  distinguished  in  the  morning,  followed 
to  the  noon  of  victory.  The  importance  of  the  increase  of  the  regular  army 
is  tremendously  increased  by  the  truth,  plain  now  and  to  be  more  and  more 
made  known  to  the  comprehensive  assimilation  of  the  intelligence  gathered  by 
prescient  observation,  that  the  decisive  battles  will  be  the  first  ones,  or  at 
least  that  the  losers  of  the  opening  engagements  will  find  the  cost  of  the 
restoration  of  fallen  fortunes  intolerably  augmented  by  the  education  of 
sufficient  armies,  after  the  wars  are  on.  In  the  campaigns  of  modern  warfare 
there  is  no  instance  but  that  in  our  war  of  States  in  the  United  States  in 
which  the  winners  of  the  first  serious  combat  were  not  those  who  gained  the 


THE    EARLY    CORRESPONDENCE    OF    THE    WAR. 


367 


closing  triumph;  and  it  was  a  terrible  road  to  travel  from  Manassas  to 
Appomattox.  In  the  Crimean  war  the  allies  held  the  field  of  battle  of  Alma. 
In  the  Franco-Austrian  war  Marshal  McMahon  was  the  victor  at  Magenta,  and 
it  was  followed  by  Solferino.  The  Prussians  won  the  first  events  in  the 
advance  into  Silesia  in  the  combat  with  -Austria,  and  Sadowa  was  the  finish. 
In  the  Franco-German  war  the  French  lost  the  skirmishes  on  the  frontier,  the 
battles  of  Woerth  and  Saarbriick,  and  the  end  was  Gravelotte,  Sedan,  and  the 
capitulation  of  Paris.  The  same  fatality  was  visible  in  the  English  invasion 
of  Egypt,  the  Chilean  assault  upon  Peru,  the  Japanese  advance  into  China,  the 
Turkish  humiliation  of  the  Greeks. 

These  object  lessons  all  tell  the  same  story.  They  mean  the  necessity 
that  is  imposed  upon  a  nation  of  great  resources — a  fine  place  for  looting,  as 
Blucher  said  of  London — to  have  a  competent  army;  first  for  the  insurance  of 
peace  with  dignity  and  honor,  second  to  guard  against  the  misfortune  of 
insufficiency  at  the  start  when  the  red  flame  of  war  bursts  through  the  roofs 
and  the  walls  of  the  world,  and  one  disaster  makes  way  for  another — following 
fast  and  following  faster — all  modern  improvements  hastening  and  extending 
the  original  impulse  to  ruin.  Every  decent  sentiment  of  national  duty 
demands  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  that  they  shall  be  an  armed 
nation.  It  turned  out  at  Santiago  as  Shafter  said  it  would  somewhere,  that 
the  decision  would  be  made  where  the  armies  of  the  belligerents  first  met  in 
battle  array.  It  was  the  foresight  that  put  the  regulars  to  the  front  where  the 
swords  crossed,  that  enabled  us  to  close  the  campaign  with  a  clap  of  thunder 
and  a  blaze  of  glory. 


CHAPTER   XVI. 

The  Phantom  Fleets  of  Spain  in  Cuban  Waters. 

Admiral  Cervera  Sailed   into   the  Unknown   and    Became   a   Mystery   and    a   Menace— He 
Appeared   and    Disappeared   and    Was    at    Last    Found   at    Santiago    by    Commodore 

Schley Imperative    Demands    for    Information    Answered — The    Orders    of    General 

Shafter  and  Plans  of  General  Miles — Dramatic  Scenes  at  Tampa — Just  as  the  Great 
Fleet  was  Sailing  Another  Spanish  Hoodoo  Fleet  was  Announced — After  All  a  Pros 
perous  Voyage,  and  Easy  Landing. 

The  fleet  of  Admiral  Cervera  sailed  from  the  Cape  Verde  Islands  April 
2pth,  four  armored  cruisers,  and  three  torpedo  gunboats.  The  destination 
could  only  be  conjectured.  The  surface  indications  were  that  the  Spaniards 
had  done  the  best  they  could,  but  the  Cadiz  squadron  was  not  in  form  for 
fighting.  The  Cervera  fleet  was  obviously  unequal  to  raising  the  blockade  of 
Cuba,  and  must  have  for  its  objective  an  appearance  on  our  North  Atlantic 
coast,  with  the  view  of  exciting  an  alarm  that  would  be  a  diversion,  or  to 
maneuver  in  the  West  Indies,  to  disturb  the  disposition  of  those  destined  to 
invade  Cuba. 

The  Spanish  cruisers  had  a  high  reputation  for  speed,  and  were  undoubt 
edly  swifter  than  the  fleet  of  Admiral  Sampson,  which  was  limited  in  move 
ment  to  the  rate  at  which  the  monitors  could  be  towed,  and  for  a  time  it  was 
held  by  those  who  gave  time  to  conjecture  that  the  real  object  of  the 
Spaniards  was  to  capture  the  Oregon,  whose  voyage  from  the  Pacific  to  the 
Atlantic  was  of  universal  knowledge,  and  the  interest  in  it  constant  and  keen. 
There  was  a  hawk  in  the  sky,  and  it  might  strike  anywhere.  May  yth  Admiral 
Sampson  was  informed  at  Cape  Haitien  that  the  Spanish  squadron  was 
reported  at  St.  Thomas.  May  i4th  the  roving  cruisers  of  Spain  were  off 
Curacoa.  The  bombardment  of  San  Juan,  Porto  Rico,  by  Admiral  Sampson's 
fleet,  took  place  on  the  loth  of  May.  On  the  226.  was  received  a  dispatch  from 
Key  West  that  Cervera's  fleet  was  in  the  Santiago  harbor.  The  Naval 
Department  had  information  that — we  quote  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy — the 

368 


PHANTOM    FLEETS    OF    vSPAIN    IN    CUBAN    WATERS.      369 

"Spanish  fleet  had  munitions  of  war  destined  for  the  defense  of  Havana,  and 
was  under  imperative  orders  to  reach  Havana,  Cienfuegos,  or  a  port  connected 
with  Havana  by  rail ;  and  that  as  Cienfuegos  appeared  to  be  the  only  port  ful 
filling-  the  conditions,  the  Flying  Squadron  would  be  instructed  upon  arrival 
at  Key  West  to  proceed  to  Cienfuegos.  Instructions  were  at  the  same  time 
given  to  Admiral  Sampson  to  increase  the  Flying  Squadron  by  such  armored 
ships  as  he  might  deem  desirable." 

It  turned  out  that  for  a  time  Cervera's  fleet,  which  had  taken  refuge  at 
Santiago,  because  short  of  coal  and  provisions,  occupied  the  attention  of 
both  our  superior  squadrons,  and  detained  the  army  that  was  going  to  Cuba. 
May  27111,  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  wrote  the  Secretary  of  War:  "If  the  Span 
ish  fleet  is  in  the  harbor  of  Santiago  de  Cuba,  I  expect  absolute  information  to 
that  effect  from  our  naval  commanding  officer  at  any  moment.  On  receipt 
of  that  information,  the  movement  to  Santiago  should  be  made  without  a 
moment's  delay,  day  or  night,"  and  of  this  he  had  advised  Admiral  Sampson 
and  Commodore  Schley.  The  Secretary  telegraphed  Sampson : 

"If  Cervera's  division  is  proved  to  be  in  Santiago,  it  is  intended  to  make 
immediately  a  descent  upon  that  port  with  10,000  troops,  landing  about  eight 
miles  east  of  port.  You  will  be  expected  to  convoy  the  transports,  probably 
fifteen  or  twenty,  going  in  person  and  taking  with  you  New  York,  Indiana, 
Oregon,  and  as  many  smaller  vessels  with  good  batteries  as  can  possibly  be 
gathered." 

This  was  partly  in  apprehension  of  the  torpedo  vessels.  The  blockade  of 
Havana  was  to  be  provided  for  by  the  monitors  and  gunboats. 

The  Secretary's  telegram  to  Commodore  Schley  was: 

"The  most  absolutely  urgent  thing  now  is  to  know  positively  whether 
Cervera's  division  is  in  Santiago  harbor,  as,  if  so,  an  immediate  movement 
against  him  and  the  town  will  be  made  by  the  navy  and  a  division  of  about 
10,000  of  our  troops,  which  are  all  ready  to  embark.  Your  difficulties  regard 
ing  coaling  must  be  surmounted  by  your  own  ingenuity  and  perseverance. 
This  is  a  crucial  time,  and  the  Department  relies  upon  you  to  give  quickly 
information  as  to  Cervera's  presence,  and  to  be  all  ready  for  concerted  action 
with  the  army.  Two  colliers  have  been  ordered  to  St.  Nicolas  Mole." 

The  coast  line  of  Cuba  is  almost  as  long  as  that  of  our  country  on  the 
Atlantic.  The  island  is  nearly  eighteen  hundred  miles  from  east  to  west,  and 
there  are  many  islands  and  reefs.  Blockading  vessels  looking  for  a  hostile 


370 


PHANTOM    FLEETS    OF    SPAIN    IN    CUBAN    WATERS. 


fleet  are  surprising-  consumers  of  coal,  and  battleships  are,  as  a  rule,  hard  to 
coal  unless  in  comfortable  quarters.  Commodore  Schley  was  not  convinced 
as  quickly  as  others  that  the  Cape  Verde  fleet  was  at  Santiago,  and  hesitated 
whether  to  go  to  Key  West  for  coal.  He  knew  that  if  Cervera  was  to  give 
relief  to  the  city  of  Havana,  he  must  do  it  from  Cienfuegos,  within  easy  reach 
of  the  capital  by  rail,  and  that  if  he  was  aggressive.  But  Cervera,  instead  of 
seeking  enemies,  was  striving  to  elude  them,  and  secure  coal  and  provisions 
for  his  men,  do  what  was  possible  in  the  way  of  clearing  his  ships  to  restore 
their  much  declined  speed.  The  Commodore,  however,  concluded  after  he 
had  sent  out  dispatches  that  he  was  going  to  Key  West,  that  his  first  duty  was 
to  find  certainly  that  Cervera  was  or  was  not  at  Santiago,  and  wisely 
turned  his  ships  about  and  drove  them  east.  May  28th  he  cabled  from 
Kingston : 

"Have  been  unable  absolutely  to  coal  the  Texas,  Marblehead,  Vixen, 
Brooklyn  from  collier,  all  owing  to  very  rough  sea.  Bad  weather  since  leav 
ing  Key  West.  The  Brooklyn  alone  has  more  than  sufficient  coal  to  proceed 
to  Key  West-;  cannot  remain  off  Santiago  present  state  squadron  coal  account. 
Impossible  to  coal  leeward  Cape  Cruz  in  the  summer,  all  owing  to  south 
westerly  winds.  Harvard  reports  coal  sufficient  for  Jamaica;  leaves  to-day  for 
Kingston;  reports  only  small  vessels  could  coal  at  Gonaives  or  Mole.  Minne 
apolis  only  coaled  for  Key  West;  also  Yale,  which  tows  Merrimac.  Much  to 
be  regretted,  can  not  obey  orders  of  Department.  Have  striven  earnestly; 
forced  to  proceed  for  coal  to  Key  West  by  way  of  Yucatan  passage.  Cannot 
ascertain  anything  respecting  enemy  positive.  Obliged  to  send  Eagle — 
admitted  no  delay — to  Port  Antonio,  Jamaica;  had  only  25  tons  of  coal. 
Will  leave  St.  Paul  off  Santiago  de  Cuba.  Will  require  10,000  tons  of  coal  at 
Key  West.  Very  difficult  to  tow  collier  to  get  cable  to  hold. " 

On  the  same  day  Long  telegraphed : 

Washington,  May  28,  1898. 
Harvard,  care  American  Consul,  Kingston,  Jamaica: 

Following  must  be  delivered  to  Schley  as  soon  as  possible ;  utmost 
urgency.  Unless  it  is  unsafe,  your  squadron  Department  wishes  you  to 
remain  off  Santiago,  so  can  not  you  take  possession  of  Guantanamo,  occupy 
as  a  coaling  station?  If  you  must  leave,  are  authorized  to  sink  collier  in  the 
mouth  of  harbor  if  you  can  obstruct  thereby,  but  if  not  so  used  and  not 
necessary  to  you,  it  would  be  desirable  to  leave  her  Nicholas  Mole  or  vicinity. 


PHANTOM    FLEETS    OF    SPAIN    IN    CUBAN    WATERS.      37 1 

You  must  not  leave  tlie  vicinity  of  Santiago  de  Cuba  unless  it 1''     .nsafe  your 
squadron,  or  unless  Spanish  division  is  not  there.  LONG. 

Sampson  to  Long,  Key  West,  May  28 : 

"He  has  sufficient  coal  aboard,  undoubtedly,  to  keep  sea  for  some  time, 
as  all  except  Iowa  left  here  full.  The  importance  of  absolutely  preventing 
departure  of  Spanish  squadron  of  paramount  importance,  and  demands  the 
most  prompt  and  efficient  use  of  every  means." 

May  29,  Sampson  to  Long: 

"The  failure  of  Schley  to  continue  blockade  must  be  remedied  at  once  if 
possible.  There  can  be  no  doubt  of  presence  of  Spanish  division  at  Santiago. " 

Long  to  Schley,  May  29: 

"Schley,  Mole  Haiti.  (Also  sent  to  Port  Antonio  and  to  Kingston, 
Jamaica). — It  is  your  duty  to  ascertain  immediately  if  the  Spanish  fleet  is  in 
Santiago  and  report.  Would  be  discreditable  to  the  navy  if  that  fact  were  not 
ascertained  immediately.  All  military  and  naval  movements  depend  upon 
that  point." 

Schley  to  Long: 

"Off  Santiago  de  Cuba,  May  29,  10  a.  m. — Enemy  in  port.  Recognized 
Cristobal  Colon,  Infanta  Maria  Teresa,  and  two  torpedo-boat  destroyers 
moored  inside  Morro,  behind  point.  Doubtless  the  others  are  here.  I  have 
not  sufficient  coal." 

Long  to  Sampson,  29: 

"Schley  has  seen  the  Spanish  fleet  at  Santiago." 

Washington,  May  29,  1898. 

Cotton,  U.  S.  S.  Harvard,  Kingston,  Jamaica: 

Return  to  Schley  with  this  message.  Hold  on  at  all  hazards.  New  York, 
Oregon,  and  New  Orleans  are  on  the  way.  St.  Louis  and  Yankee  just  leaving 
New  York  for  Santiago,  via  Nicholas  Mole.  Two  more  colliers  en  route. 

LONG. 

Washington,  May  30,  1898. 
Harvard,  Kingston,  Jamaica: 

Deliver  Schley  following:  Where  are  the  other  two  armored  cruisers, 
Spanish  fleet?  When  discovered,  please  report  promptly.  Commander-in- 
Chief  North  Atlantic  Station  has  started  to  join  you.  LONG. 

Commodore  Schley  made  for  Santiago  in  good  time.     The  tone  of 
Sampson  and  the  Long  dispatches  was  not  that  of  approval  of  the 
dore's  disability  from  lack  of  coal.     The  Secretary  asked,  on  the  3oth  of  May, 


372      PHANTOM    FLEETS    OF    SPAIN    IN    CUBAN    WATERS. 

where  the  two  armored  cruisers  of  Spain  Schley  had  not  seen  were.  Schley 
had  seen  two  of  the  four  cruisers,  and  the  two  torpedo  boats — and  reporting 
them  by  name,  added,  "Doubtless  the  others  are  here."  Of  course,  that  was 
according  to  the  probabilities,  but  it  was  necessary  to  be  sure  of  all  the  Span 
iards,— and  so  the  energetic  Secretary  cautioned: 

Washington,  May  31,  1898. 
Sampson,  care  Cable  Office,  Mole  St.  Nicholas,  Haiti: 

It  is  essential  to  know  if  all  of  four  Spanish  armored  cruisers  in  Santiago, 
as  our  military  expedition  must  wait  for  this  information.  Report  as  soon  as 
possible.  LONG. 

Schley 's  answer,  May  3ist,  mentioned  that  he  needed  more  picket  boats 
very  badly,  and  he  added:  "Have  seen  one  more  vessel  of  the  Vizcaya  class 
in  port."  The  Commodore  would  not,  however,  swear  it  was  the  Vizcaya. 

On  the  29th  Sampson  had  come  around  to  this: 

"Telegram  just  received  from  Schley  shows  that  he  is  to-day  blockading 
Santiago  de  Cuba,  and  will  continue  to  do  so  until  coal  supply  has  been 
reduced  to  safe  limit  for  large  ships." 

Two  days  later  Schley  was  telegraphing  from  in  front  of  Santiago. 
"Smooth  sea  here  now."  The  waves  were  not  running  so  high,  but  Schley 
had  not  seen  all  the  Spanish  cruisers,  and  it  would  jiot  do  to  let  any  of  them 
get  out  when  our  transports  were  on  the  wing. 

The  Secretary  of  the  Navy  had  a  slight  attack  of  Cuban  stories  delivered 
in  this  official  form : 

Washington,  May  30,  1898. 
Harvard,  Kingston,  Jamaica: 

Deliver  following  to  Schley:  Sagua,  25  miles  east  of  Santiago,  is  reported 
a  good  place  for  landing,  and  that  the  insurgents  have  entire  possession  of 
this  vicinity,  and  some  horses  of  their  cavalry  are  kept  about  a  mile  inland. 
From  thence  it  has  been  reported  easy  to  reach  the  heights  in  the  rear  of 
Santiago,  commanding  view  of  the  whole  harbor,  without  any  probability  of 
meeting  with  the  Spanish  forces.  For  miles  the  road  is  mountainous,  and 
after  this  very  fair.  LONG. 

The  subsequent  proceedings  at  Santiago  did  not  show  that  the  reports  to 
the  Secretary  that  he  sent  on  to  Schley  were  strictly  accurate.  The  Cuban 
cavalry  of  the  coast  guard  did  not  muster  in  force  when  wanted,  and  the 
heights  in  the  rear  of  Santiago  were  not  "easy  to  reach"  without  meeting 


PHANTOM     FLEETS    OF    SPAIN     IN    CUBAN    WATERS.      373 

several  Spaniards,  and  right  in  the  neighborhood  the  Cubans  to  sacrifice 
their  lives  for  their  Republic  were  not  reported  as  numerous,  and  never  were 
found  by  burial  parties.  But  Admiral  Sampson  proceeded  to  Santiago 
»  waters,  on  this  dispatch  from  Long  dated  May  29th:  "Department  thinks  it 
very  desirable  that  you  carry  out  recommendation  to  go  yourself  with  two 
ships  to  Santiago  de  Cuba;"  and  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  North  Atlantic 
squadron  certified  to  "a  reliable  Cuban"  as  follows: 

Mole  Haiti,  June  4,  1898. 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Washington: 

Off  Santiago,  June  3. — Some  observations  made  to-day  by  a  reliable 
Cuban,  in  accordance  with  my  instructions,  made  four  armored  vessels  and 
two  torpedo  destroyers  at  Santiago.  At  that  time  repairs  and  more  coal 
needed  by  them.  SAMPSON. 

This  made  up  the  full  list  of  the  Spanish  fleet  seen  in  the  harbor  of 
Santiago. 

The  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  on  May  3ist,  wanted  to  know  from  the  Wai- 
Department,  as  there  seemed  to  be  a  movement  of  the  army  at  hand,  "what 
means  are  to  be  employed  by  the  War  Department  for  landing  the  troops, 
artillery,  horses,  siege  guns,  mortars,  and  other  heavy  objects,  when  the 
pending  military  expedition  arrives  on  the  Cuban  coast  near  Santiago." 

It  was  pointed  out  that  the  crews  of  the  armored  ships  "ought  not  to  be 
fatigued  by  the  work  incident  to  landing  troops,  stores,  etc."  They  were 
going  to  have  to  remove  Spanish  mines  and  to  meet  the  Spanish  fleet  in 
action,  and  so  must  not  be  overworked.  The  boys  were  eventually  able  to 
help  themselves  ashore,  but  the  transfer  from  the  ships  to  the  land  was  not 
accompanied  with  facilities  of  the  most  modern  sort.  WTe  were  a  shade 
deficient  in  that  line,  but  the  men  were  shifty  and  glad  to  swim  ashore  when 
boats  were  scarce,  but  they  left  their  supplies. 

It  seemed  that  the  time  for  action  had  arrived,  and  that  the  personal  tele 
grams  of  General  Corbin  and  the  cipher  dispatch  to  General  Shafter  following 
made  the  start  of  the  embarked  army  definite  and  certain : 

Adjutant-General's  Office,  Washington,  May  30,  1898 — 11:30  p.  m. 
Major-General  Shafter,  Tampa,  Fla. : 

My  telegram  just  now  said  important  telegram  would  reach  you  in  a  few 
minutes.  It  may  be  an  hour  before  I  can  have  it  ready,  but  no  more. 

H.  C.  CORBIN,  Adjutant-General. 


374      PHANTOM    FLEETS    OF    SPAIN    IN    CUBAN    WATERS. 

War  Department,  Washington,  May  30,  1898. 

(Sent  in  cipher  May  31,  1898,  2:30  a.  m.) 
Maj.  Gen.  William  R.  Shafter,  Tampa,  Fla.  : 

With  the  approval  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  you  are  directed  to  take  your 
command  on  transports,  proceed  under  convoy  of  the  Navy  to  the  vicinity  of 
Santiago  de  Cuba,  land  your  force  at  such  place  east  or  west  of  that  point  as 
your  judgment  may  dictate,  under  the  protection  of  the  Navy,  and  move  it  onto 
the  high  ground  and  bluffs,  overlooking  the  harbor,  or  into  the  interior,  as  shall 
best  enable  you  to  capture  or  destroy  the  garrison  there ;  and  cover  the  navy  as 
it  sends  its  men  in  small  boats  to  remove  torpedoes,  or  with  the  aid  of  the  navy 
capture  or  destroy  the  Spanish  fleet  now  reported  to  be  in  Santiago  Harbor. 
You  will  use  the  utmost  energy  to  accomplish  this  enterprise,  and  the  govern 
ment  relies  upon  your  good  judgment  as  to  the  most  judicious  use  of  your 
command,  but  desires  to  impress  upon  you  the  importance  of  accomplishing 
this  object  with  the  least  possible  delay.  You  can  call  to  your  assistance  any 
of  the  insurgent  forces  in  that  vicinity,  and  make  use  of  such  of  them  as  you 
think  advisable  to  assist  you,  especially  as  scouts,  guides,  etc.  You  are 
cautioned  against  putting  too  much  confidence  in  any  persons  outside  of  your 
troops.  You  will  take  every  precaution  against  ambuscades  or  surprises  or 
positions  that  may  have  been  mined  or  are  commanded  by  the  Spanish  forces. 
You  will  cooperate  most  earnestly  with  the  naval  forces  in  every  way,  agree 
ing  beforehand  upon  a  code  of  signals.  Communicate  your  instructions  to 
Admiral  Sampson  and  Commodore  Schley.  On  completion  of  this  enterprise, 
unless  you  receive  other  orders  or  deem  it  advisable  to  remain  in  the  harbor 
of  Santiago  de  Cuba,  reembark  your  troops  and  proceed  to  the  harbor  of  Port 
de  Banes,  reporting  by  the  most  favorable  means  for  further  orders  and  future 
important  service.  This  with  the  understanding  that  your  command  has  not 
sustained  serious  loss  and  that  the  above  harbor  is  safe  for  your  transports  and 
convoy.  When  will  you  sail? 

By  command  of  Major-General  Miles : 

H.  C.  CORBIN,  Adjutant-General. 

Tampa  Bay  Hotel,  Tampa,  Fla.,  May  31,  1898 — 11:58  a.  m. 
Gen.  H.  C.  Corbin,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

Telegram  received  3:45  this  morning  now  being  deciphered.  Your  boy 
will  go  with  me,  and  I  shall  take  same  care  of  him  I  would  my  own.  Much 
love.  SHAFTER,  Major-General,  Commanding. 


PHANTOM    FLEETS    OF    SPAIN    IN    CUBAN    WATERS.      375 

On  the  27th  of  May  General  Miles  had  addressed  a  letter  to  the  Secretary 
of  War,  saying  he  thought  it  would  be  advisable  to  "land  transports  with  a 
strong  force,"  and  so  on,  and  with  army  and  navy  together  capture  the  harbor, 
garrison  and  fleet  at  Santiago.  If  this  happened  prematurely,  the  General 
argued,  "We  will  be  able  to  land  a  superior  force,  and  I  believe  that  a  combined 
effort  will  result  in  capturing  the  island,  with  its  garrison,  provided  it  is  done 
before  it  can  be  reinforced  from  Spain.  The  distance  from  Key  West  to 
Porto  Rico  is  1,040  miles,  and  from  Cadiz,  Spain,  to  Porto  Rico,  it  is  about 
4,000  miles.  The  possession  of  Porto  Rico  would  be  of  very  great  advantage 
to  the  military,  as  it  would  cripple  the  forces  of  Spain,  giving  us  several  thou 
sand  prisoners.  It  could  be  well  fortified,  the  harbor  mined,  and  would  be  a 
most  excellent  port  for  our  navy,  which  could  be  speedily  relieved  from  any 
responsibility  in  the  charge  of  that  port,  as  we  could  leave  a  sufficient  garrison 
to  hold  it  against  any  force  that  might  be  sent  against  it." 

After  this  there  was  to  be  "a  movement  toward  the  west,"  and  a  base 
found  at  Nuevitas  along  the  Puerto  Principe  railroad — insurgents  to  be 
supplied  with  the  usual  '-'abundance  of  arms  and  munitions  of  war,"  our 
people  acting  in  conjunction  "with  the  forces  of  Lieutenant- General 
Garcia,  and  General  Gomez" — and  the  general  gave  this  cheerful  reassur 
ance  : 

"These  movements,  in  my  judgment,  can  all  be  accomplished  during  the 
rainy  season,  through  a  country  comparatively  free  from  yellow  fever,  well 
stocked  with  cattle,  and  having  grass  sufficient  for  our  anin^als.  While  this  is 
"being  accomplished  our  volunteer  army  will  be  prepared  to  land  in  the  vicinity 
of  Mariel,  Havana,  or  Matanzas  in  sufficient  force  to  complete  the  capture  or 
destruction  of  the  Spanish  forces  upon  the  island  of  Cuba.  The  advantage  of 
this  movement  will  be  that  the  army  and  navy  will  act  in  concert  and  close 
unison." 

Another  recommendation  was  that  this  would  not  divide  the  navy,  and 
the  General  adds:  "I  believe  that  the  entrance  to  the  port  of  Cienfuegos  can 
be  obstructed  or  blockaded  by  one  or  two  monitors  to  better  advantage  than 
to  send  the  army  there,  where  it  would  have  to  meet  a  strong  garrison,  which 
is  already  there." 

The  only  detail  neglected  is  as  to  the  two  monitors.  The  General  does 
not  say  whether  they  should  be  allowed  to  float— if  they  may  be  said  to  float 
— or  sunk  altogether;  and  the  General  does  not  say  whether  the  "close  unison" 


376      PHANTOM    FLEETS    OF    SPAIN    IN    CUBAN    WATERS. 

of  the  army  and  navy  could  be  best  secured  by  himself  or  Admiral  Sampson 
becoming  Commander-in-Chief  of  both  Army  and  Navy.  Of  course,  the  only 
real  objection  to  this  happy  adjustment  would  be  that  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  is  an  instrument  that  reserves  the  command  in  chief  of  the  sail 
ors  and  soldiers,  afloat  and  ashore,  to  the  President  alone.  In  the  instructions 
sent  by  General  Miles  to  General  Shafter  from  Washington,  May  31,  2:30  a. 
m.,  Shafter  was  told  to  move  his  army  as  his  judgment  might  dictate,  "onto 
the  high  ground  and  bluffs  overlooking  the  harbor  or  into  the  interior." 

Shafter  being  thus  instructed,  the  Major-General  left  for  Tampa  at  once, 
arriving  June  ist. 

The  first  bulletin  from  the  Major-General  commanding,  General  Miles, 
after  his  arrival  at  Tampa  was  that  men  were  working  night  and  day,  and 
there  was  an  important  and  gratifying  telegram  to  the  effect  that  "Dorst, 
Captain,"  had  at  Port  Banes,  northern  coast,  directly  opposite  Santiago, 
"landed  over  400  armed  and  equipped  Cubans;  1,300,000  rounds  ammuni 
tion,  Springfield  and  Remington;  7,500  Springfield  rifles;  20,000  rations, 
besides  large  quantities  equipment  and  clothing;  24  horses;  74  mules." 

As  for  Spanish  troops  there  were  40,000  in  the  province  of  Santiago,  and 
"nearly  1,000  insurgent  troops"  had  arrived  at  Banes,  a  favorite  resort,  no 
doubt,  of  the  Cuban  navy!  General  Miles  reported  favorably  June  2d  as  to 
work  going  on,  saying:  "The  working  force  at  Tampa  has  been  divided  into 
three  reliefs,  each  working  eight  hours  during  the  twenty-four,  nine  ships 
being  loaded  at  one  time." 

Rear  Admiral  Sicard  recommended  that  to  secure  secrecy  as  to  army 
movements,  "the  commanding  officer  of  the  army  in  Tampa  and  of  the  navy 
at  Key  West  be  directed  to  seize  and  detain  all  press  boats,  of  whatever 
character,  in  those  ports,  and  to  prevent  their  following  the  expedition,  plac 
ing,  if  necessary,  a  file  of  soldiers  or  marines  on  board  to  enforce  obedience; 
and  likewise  that  the  commanding  naval  officer  of  the  convoy  be  directed,  in 
case  a  press  boat  joins  the  fleet,  to  take  charge  of  her  and  compel  her  to 
remain  until  he  reaches  the  Commander-in-Chief,  who  shall  also  detain  her  so 
long  as  he  thinks  expedient  to  do  so." 

Orders  were  issued  accordingly.  Shafter  telegraphed  that  the  difficulties 
in  loading  could  not  be  appreciated.  General  Miles  illustrated  the  embarrass 
ments:  "Fifteen  cars  loaded  with  uniforms  were  sidetracked  25  miles  away 
from  Tampa,  and  remained  there  for  weeks  while  the  troops  were  suffering 


PHANTOM    FLEETS    OF    SPAIN     IN    CUBAN    WATERS.       377 

for  clothing-.  Five  thousand  rifles,  which  were  discovered  yesterday,  were 
needed  by  several  regiments.  Also,  the  different  parts  of  the  siege  train  and 
ammunition  for  same,  which  will  be  required  immediately  on  landing." 

It  was  the  next  day  that  Admiral  Sampson  cabled  that  the  Merrimac  was 
in  the  channel,  and  Cervera  "safely  bottled  up."  The  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
says  in  his  report  that  when  Sampson  arrived  off  Santiago  he  found  "Schley's 
squadron  in  column  to  the  westward  of  the  mouth  of  the  harbor,"  and  "on  June 
3rd  an  attempt  was  made  to  close  the  harbor  by  sinking  across  its  entrance  the 
collier  Merrimac.  This  attempt,  though  unsuccessful  in  its  object,  was  dar 
ingly  executed.  It  is  now  one  of  the  well-known  historic  marvels  of  naval 
adventure  and  enterprise,  in  which  Naval  Constructor  Hobson  and  his  men 
won  undying  fame." 

The  President  became  impatient  and  wanted  to  know  why  there  was  so 
much  delay  in  getting  off.  Shafter  replied,  June  5th,  6:32  a.  m.,  that  "delays 
occur  that,  cannot  be  prevented  or  foreseen" — and,  "Siege  guns  have  only 
been  assembled  late  this  evening.  They  will  be  loaded  on  cars  to-night  and 
sent  to  transports  early  in  the  morning,  and  the  loading  rushed.  Will  begin 
putting  men  on  to-morrow  p.  in.,  if  possible,  and  be  ready  to  start  Monday 
night  or  Tuesday  morning.  The  last  of  the  troops  from  Chickamauga  are 
expected  to-night.  Officers  engaged  in  loading  transports  have  worked  night 
and  day.  The  main  cause  for  delay  has  been  the  fact  that  great  quantities  of 
stores  have  been  rushed  in  promiscuously,  and  with  no  facilities  to  handle  or 
store  them.  The  last  10  miles  before  reaching  the  wharf  is  a  single  track, 
and  very  narrow  place  in  which  to  work.  The  capacity  of  this  place  has  been 
greatly  exceeded.  Could  have  put  the  troops  on  and  rushed  them  off,  but  not 
properly  .equipped  as  I  know  the  President  wishes  them.  I  will  not  delay  a 
minute  longer  than  is  absolutely  necessary  to  get  my  command  in  condition 
and  start  the  earliest  moment  possible." 

June  5th  General  Miles  telegraphed  that  the  delay  had  been  caused 
"through  no  fault  of  any  one  connected  with  it,"  and  contained  the  principal 
part  of  the  army,  "which  for  intelligence  and  efficiency  was  exceeded  by  no 
body  of  troops  on  earth."  The  General  requested  "ample  protection"  for 
this  command  from  the  navy  while  at  sea — and  he  added:  "This 
enterprise  is  so  important  that  I  desire  to  go  with  this  army  corps,  or  to 
immediately  organize  another  and  go  with  it  to  join  this,  and  capture  position 
No.  2." 


378      PHANTOM    FLEETS    OF    SPAIN    IN    CUBAN    WATERS.. 

General  Miles  telegraphed  the  day  following  that  theie  should  be  "a 
few  regiments  well  equipped  at  Camp  Alger. "  The  words  "few"  and 
"well"  here  are  not  of  military  precision — but  the  general  proposition  stands 
good. 

Admiral  Sampson  had,  on  June  yth,  "silenced  works  quickly  without 
injury  of  any  kind."  The  general  opinion  is  after  the  war  that  this  sentence 
should  have  read,  "without  injury  of  any  kind  to  the  works."  '  The  Admiral 
also  remarked:  "If  10,000  men  were  here,  city  and  fleet  would  be  ours  within 
forty-eight  hours.  Every  consideration  demands  immediate  army  movement. 
If  delayed,  city  will  be  defended  more  strongly  by  guns  taken  from  the  fleet. ' ' 

This  observation  was  not  confirmed  by  Shafter's  experience  with  18,000 
men.  Santiago  was  a  hard,  hot  nut  to  crack. 

The  night  of  June  ;th  the  Secretary  of  War  telegraphed  Shafter:  "The 
President  directs  you  to  sail  at  once  with  what  force  you  have  ready, ' '  and 
Shafter's  reply  was  worthy  the  occasion: 

Tampa,  Fla.,  June  7,  1898 — 9  p.  m. 
Secretary  of  War,  Washington : 

I  will  sail  to-morrow  morning.  Steam  cannot  be  gotten  up  earlier. 
There  is  loaded  to-night  one  division  of  infantry  (9  regiments),  16  companies 
of  dismounted  cavalry,  4  light  batteries,  2  siege  batteries  artillery,  2  companies 
of  engineers,  and  the  troops  from  Mobile.  I  will  try  and  get  on  the  rest  of 
the  cavalry  and  another  division  of  regular  infantry  by  morning.  I  will  sail 
then  with  whatever  I  have  on  board.  SHAFTER,  Major-General. 

Executive  Mansion,  Washington,  June  7,  1898. 
General  Shafter,  Tampa,  Fla. : 

About  how  many  men  will  you  have  ready  by  morning? 

CORBIN,  Adjutant-General. 


Port  Tampa,  Fla.  (direct),  June  7,  1898 — io:i5:p.  m. 
Adjutant-General  Corbin: 

I  expect  to  have  834  officers,  16,154  men  on  transports  by  daylight,  and 
will  sail  at  that  hour.  SHAFTER. 

General  Miles  telegraphed  that  the  last  of  the  troops  from  Chickamanga 
"arrived  this  morning  and  hurried  to  the  steamers." 


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PHANTOM    FLEETS    OF    SPAIN    IN    CUBAN    WATERS.      381 

This  was    a  remarkable  situation,    and  the  next  thing  was    a  startling 
shift  of  scenery: 

War  Department,  Washington,  D.  C.,  June  8,  1898. 
Major-General  Shafter,  Tampa,  Fla. : 

Wait  until  you  get  further  orders  before  you  sail.     Answer  quick. 

R.  A.  ALGER,  Secretary  of  War. 


Port  Tampa,  Fla.,  June  8,  1898 — 4:06  p.  m. 
R.  A.  Alger,  Secretary  of  War,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

Message  received.  Vessels  are  in  the  stream,  but  will  be  able  to  stop 
them  before  reaching  the  Gulf.  SHAFTER,  Major-General. 

War  Department,  Washington,  June  8,  1898. 
Major-General  Miles,  Tampa,  Fla.  : 

The  reason  for  countermanding  order  you  will  find  in  the  following. 
The  order  was  given  at  the  request  of  the  Navy  Department  by  direction  of 
the  President: 

"Key  West,  June  8. — Spanish  armor  cruiser,  second  class,  and  Spanish 
torpedo-boat  destroyer  seen  by  Eagle,  Nicholas  Channel,  Cuba. — Remey. " 

"Key  West,  June  8. — Last  cipher  just  came  by  Resolute,  just  arrived;  was 
pursued  by  two  vessels,  Nicholas  Channel,  Cuba,  last  night.  Shall  I  order 
Indiana  and  all  available  cruisers  to  coast  of  Cuba?  More  detail  to  follow.— 
Remey." 

Tampa,  Fla.,  June  8,  1898 — 11:42  p.  m. 
Hon.  Secretary  of  War,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

If  that  report  is  true,  those  Spanish  vessels  could  be  within  six  hours  of 
the  loaded  transports  now,  and  there  to-morrow.  Have  ample  measures 
been  taken  by  the  navy  to  insure  their  safety?  MILES,  Commanding. 

General  Miles  took  advantage  of  the  interval  to  submit  several  questions, 
suggestions  and  plans  of  campaign.  He  rattled  the  Secretary  of  War. 

June  9th,  6:50  p.  m. :  "Think  it  would  be  well  to  announce  that  the  army 
got  on  board  transports  and  started,  as  they  did  yesterday.  Say  nothing 
about  its  being  recalled,  but  let  our  naval  vessels  go  over  the  course  that  our 
transports  would  have  gone  over,  with  the  hope  of  finding  those  Spanish 
ships." 

Now,  the  General  wanted  to  know  whether  the  presence  of  Spanish  war 


382      PHANTOM    FLEETS    OF    SPAIN    IN    CUBAN    WATERS. 

vessels  didn't  render  it  extremely  hazardous  to  send  troops  on  transports  until 
the  Spaniards  were  "captured,  destroyed  or  driven  away."  The  General 
wanted  to  know  whether  he  should  go  on  with  the  organization  of  Expedition 
No.  2. 

The  reply  of  the  President  was : 

War  Department,  June  9,  1898. 
Major-General  Miles,  Tampa,  Fla. : 

The  President  directs  me  to  say  that  no  change  of  plan  will  be  made ;  that 
Expedition  No.  2  must  be  organized  as  rapidly  as  possible.  We  are  looking 
for  transports,  and  are  satisfied  the  navy  will  take  care  of  that  problem.  Give 
nothing  out.  %  R.  A.  ALGER,  Secretary  of  War. 

General  Miles  at  once  had  another  plan — not  a  change  in  the  plan,  but  a 
new  one,  right  from  the  mint.  It  took  hold  heartily  of  the  navy,  and  awak 
ened  its  drowsy  consciousness  thus: 

Tampa,  Fla.,  June  9,  1898 — 2:45  P-  m- 
Secretary  of  War,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

It  seems  that  it  is  a  naval  problem  }ret  unsolved,  and  it  might  be  advis 
able  for  the  command  now  on  board  transports  to  have  the  protection  of  the 
entire  navy  to  convoy  it  to  number  i,  number  2,  or  Nuevitas,  or,  if  this  is 
considered  too  hazardous,  then  keep  the  troops  in  healthful  camps,  as  they  are 
now,  and  assist  the  navy  to  destroy  the  Spanish  fleet.  There  are  here  25 
good  steamers  that  could  be  used  to  carry  water,  coal,  and  supplies,  guns, 
revolving  cannon,  and  mortars,  etc. ,  and  they  could  be  added  to  the  force  of 
the  navy.  It  seems  strange  to  be  suggesting  that  the  army  assist  the  navy  in 
this  way,  but  I  am  sure  we  would  receive  most  loyal  support  when  the  waters 
are  safe  for  crossing  with  the  army. 

MILES,  Major-General,  Commanding  Army. 


There  was  talk  of  disembarking  the  troops,  but  Shafter  said  it  was  not 
practicable.  They  could  not  be  encamped  comfortably,  but  were  taken  off  in 
detachments  to  exercise.  June  lyth  it  was  stated  that  the  expedition  should 
get  under  way  and  meet  convoy  at  Rebecca  Shoal. 

Port  Tampa,  Fla.,  June  10,  1898 — 9:30  p.  m. 
Adjutant-General  of  the  Army,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

Practically  all  the  transports  have  been  in  canal,  where  men  have  had 
free  access  to  shore,  and  they  have  been  off  the  greater  part  of  two  days. 
This  afternoon  all  but  eleven  of  the  transports  have  been  drawn  a  short  dis- 


PHANTOM    FLEETS    OF    SPAIN    IN    CUBAN    WATERS. 

tance  into  the  stream,  where  the  men  are  much  more  comfortable  than  in  the 
canal,  with  excellent  facilities  for  swimming  and  keeping  clean.  The  com 
mand  is  being  increased  only  by  recruits,  of  which  there  are  several  hundred, 
the  exact  number  of  which  will  be  telegraphed  you  in  the  morning,  and  by 
one  troop  of  cavalry  mounts.  The  transports  now  here  are  practically  filled, 
though  it  might  be  possible  to  get  one  more  regiment  of  volunteer  in  fan  try- 
on.  Will  be  able  to  tell  to-morrow,  when  a  rearrangement  of  some  of  the 
troops  will  be  made.  If  I  find  it  possible  to  take  another  regiment  I  prefer 
the  Thirty-second  Michigan.  SHAFTER, 

Major-General,  United  States  Volunteers,  Commanding. 

June  i2th,  7:18  p.  m.,  Shafter  telegraphed  Corbin: 

"Have  consulted  with  senior  naval  officer  present,  who  says  we  must 
have  daylight  to  get  down  to  lower  bay.  Will  start  the  transports  at  daylight 
to-morrow,  and  with  good  luck  will  meet  convoy  from  Key  West  before 
Wednesday  noon." 

Port  Tampa,  Fla.,  June  13,  1898 — 1:10  p.  m. 
Secretary  of  War,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

Steamers  are  moving  out  to  sea  and  should  be  away  by  i  o'clock. 

MILES,  Major-General. 


Playa  del  Este,  via  Haiti. 

(Received  at  Washington  June  22,  1898,  6:22  p.  m.) 
Secretary  of  War,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

Off  Daiquiri,   Cuba,  June   22,    1898. — Landing  at  Daiquiri  this  morning 
successful.     Very  little,  if  any,  resistance.  SHAFTER. 


CHAPTER   XVII. 

The  Sharp  Strain  of  the  Struggle  at  Santiago. 

General  Miles  as  a  Loyal  Soldier — Shafter's  Fine  Voyage  and  Safe  Landing — The  First 
Blood  in  Battle — Rush  of  Supplies  and  Reinforcements  to  the  Army — Alger  Wants 
Shafter  to  "Get  a  Good  Ready" — Why  Siege  Guns  were  not  Unloaded — Work  Cut  Out 
for  the  Regulars — Parallel  with  the  British  Siege  of  Havana — The  Sword  Had  to  be 
Swift  to  Save  from  the  Pestilence. 

The  credit  is  due  General  Miles  of  pulling  steadily  in  the  harness. 
When  one  of  his  suggestions  did  not  take  root,  he  was  soon  ready  with 
another.  If  one  of  his  campaigns  on  paper  wras  blown  away  in  the  morning, 
he  was  as  fertile  as  ever  in  the  evening.  He  saw,  after  the  Santiago  expedition 
was  under  way,  that  it  was  the  primary  enterprise,  and  would  in  all  ways  take 
precedence,  and  he  was  ready  and  willing  to  go  on  with  number  two.  If  he 
was  not  to  command  in  Cuba,  he  was  persevering  for  Porto  Rico.  His  plans 
might  be  subjected  to  all  trials  except  that  of  being  tried,  but  his  loyalty 
as  a  soldier  was  never  impeachable.  In  all  aspects  of  his  versatility 
he  was  facing  to  the  front.  If  he  thought  it  wise  to  wait,  he  said  so  at 
large  and  in  particular,  but  when  the  word  was  to  go,  he  was  up  and  doing  at 
the  tap  of  the  drum,  buttoned  and  buckled,  alert  and  stepping  out  to  the 
music.  In  his  contentions  with  the  critics  he  can  always  say  that  his  faults 
were  in  words,  and  the  facility  with  which  they  are  flashed  about  the  world, 
but  his  feet  were  rather  jubilant  than  laggard,  and  the  toes  of  his  boots 
pointed  to  the  enemy.  When  Shafter's  fleet  sailed  down  the  bay,  General 
Miles  telegraphed  the  War  Department  the  hour  and  the  minute — June  14, 
1898,  10:30  a.  m. — when  "the  last  one  wras  out  of  sight,"  and  he  mentioned 
an  auxiliary  cruiser,  that  would  go  in  six  hours,  and  for  a  wonder  the  Major- 
General  commanding  did  not  know  the  destination  of  the  boat.  This  was 
signed  simply,  "Miles,  Commanding,"  but  his  command  at  the  moment  was 
"out  of  sight"  so  far  as  the  regular  army  was  concerned.  Major-General 

384 


GENL.    HAWKINS   WHO    LED    THE    FAMOUS   CHARGE    OF    THE    1ST    BRIGADE   AT    SAN    JUAN, 

JULY    1ST,    1898. 


SHARP    STRAIN    OF    STRUGGLE    AT    SANTIAGO.  387 

Brooke  telegraphed  the  Adjutant-General  of  the  army  July  i4th  that  he  was 
"directed  to  fully  equip  15,000  men  for  duty  elsewhere,"  and  he  wanted  to 
know  whether  "the  ordnance  equipment  for  23  regiments"  was  on  the  way  to 
the  Chickamauga  Park,  or  likely  to  arrive  soon.  This  was  to  the  point. 
Miles,  commanding,  telegraphed  the  Secretary  of  War  June  i4th,  9:50  p%  m., 
that  he  thought  their  "telegrams  crossed  in  transit,"  not  at  all  an  improbable 
conjecture — though  what  happened  when  they  collided  has  not  yet  been  the 
subject  of  an  investigation.  But  the  fact  Miles  wanted  to  get  through  was 
that  one-half  the  "troops  for  No.  2" — the  army  for  Porto  Rico — were  at 
Tampa,  "fully  equipped  and  drilling  every  day  as  artillery.  Siege  trains, 
balloons,  heavy  ammunition,  commissary  and  quartermaster's  stores"  were 
also  there. 

Balloons  and  everything  all  ready,  Shafter  was  sailing  on  the  blue  sea 
under  the  indigo  sky  of  the  subtrqpics.  There  had  been  a  change  at  Tampa, 
— there  were  21  feet  of  water,  and  nine  ships  could  load  at  a  time.  Just  at 
this  hour  Inspector-General  Breckenridge  made  a  call  for  officers  in  these 
terms,  addressing  himself  to  the  Secretary  of  War: 

"Regular  officers  are  sadly  needed  among  volunteers,  but  regular  organi 
zations  are  also  already  suffering  from  paucity  of  officers.  Regular  organiza 
tions  furnish  a  remarkably  fine  training  school  for  officers  and  all  that  can  be 
so  trained  are  already  needed.  Can  not  regular  service  be  immediately 
supplied  with  all  the  junior  officers  the  law  allows,  especially  as  the  good  of 
the  service  evidently  demands  it?  Then  additional  second  lieutenants  can 
increase  the  numbers  now  so  greatly  needed.  It  must  be  evident  to  all  now 
that  we  need  a  larger  perfectly  trained  and  equipped  force,  especially  officers, 
and  the  best  place  for  quick  training  is  among  the  regulars.  It  would  be  well 
if  we  had  several  hundred  more  regular  officers  immediately." 

On  the  1 5th  of  June  the  Secretary  of  War  concluded  he  must  see  Major- 
General-Commanding  Miles  speedily  and  telegraphed  "Important  business 
requires  your  presence  here;  report  at  once,"  and  at  5:23  p.  m.  General  Miles 
was  able  to  say  over  the  wire,  "I  leave  by  the  first  train,  7:20  this  evening," 
and  the  telegrams,  which  are  of  the  kinetoscope  order,  show  that  he  was  in 
three  days  transacting  business  from  the  Washington  army  headquarters  in 
the  usual  way.  Telegrams  show  vigorous  work  in  the  camps  preparing  the 
volunteer  troops.  General  Coppinger,  June  26th,  telegraphed  that  cars  were 
being  as  rapidly  unloaded  as  delivered  by  railroads.  Some  days  70  were 


388  SHARP    STRAIN    OF    STRUGGLE    AT    SANTIAGO. 

unloaded,  then  only  13,  because  they  could  not  be  placed.  There  were  in  cor 
rals  i,Sn  unassigned  mules,  and  there  were  1,791  assigned  draft  mule  and 
15  Red  Cross  ambulances. 

Shafter,  Major-General  Volunteers,  commanding,  telegraphed: 

Playa  del  Este,  via  Haiti,  June  25th,  2:45  P-  m- — Daiquiri,  23. — Had 
very  fine  voyage,  lost  less  than  50  animals,  6  or  8  to-day;  lost  more  putting 
them  through  the  surf  to  land  than  on  transports.  Command  as  healthy  as 
when  we  left.  Eighty  men  sick.  Only  deaths  2  men  drowned  in  landing. 
Landings  difficult.  Coast  quite  similar  to  that  in  vicinity  of  San  Francisco, 
and  covered  with  dense  growth  of  bushes.  Landing  at  Daiquiri  unopposed. 
All  points  occupied  by  Spanish  troops;  heavily  bombarded  by  navy. to  clear 
them  out.  Sent  troops  toward  Santiago  and  occupied  Juragua  City,  a  natur 
ally  strong  place,  this  morning.  Spanish  troops  retreating  as  soon  as  our 
advance  was  known.  Had  not  mounted  troops  or  could  have  captured  them 
— about  600  all  told.  Railroad  from  there  in.  Have  cars  and  engine  in  pos 
session.  With  assistance  of  navy  disembarked  6,000  men  yesterday  and  as 
many  more  to-day.  Will  get  all  troops  off  to-morrow,  including  light  artillery 
and  greater  portion  of  pack  train,  probably  all  of  it,  with  some  of  the 
wagons;  animals  have  to  be  jumped  to  the  water  and  towed  ashore.  Had 
consultations  with  Generals  Garcia,  Rader,  and  Castillo,  i  p.  m.  of  2oth,  20 
miles  west  of  Santiago.  These  officers  were  unanimously  of  the  opinion  that 
landing  should  be  made  east  of  Santiago.  I  had  come  to  the  same  conclusion. 
General  Garcia  promises  to  join  me  at  Juragua  City  to-morrow  with  between 
3,000  and  4,000  men,  wrho  will  be  brought  from  west  of  Santiago  by  ships  of 
the  navy  to  Juragua  City  and  there  disembarked;  this  will  give  me  between 
4,000  and  5,000  Cubans,  and  leave  1,000  under  General  Rabi  to  threaten  Santi 
ago  from  the  west.  General  Kent's  division  is  being  disembarked  this  after 
noon  at  Juragua  City,  and  will  be  continued  during  the  night.  The  assistance 
of  the  navy  has  been  of  the  greatest  benefit,  and  enthusiastically  given. 
Without  them  I  could  not  have  landed  in  ten  days,  and  perhaps  not  at  all,  as 
I  believe  I  should  have  lost  so  many  boats  in  the  surf.  At  present  want 
nothing.  Weather  has  been  good.  No  rain  on  land,  and  prospects  for  fair 
weather. ' ' 

There  is  not  a  sentence  lost  in  this  dispatch.  It  is  not  long,  and  tells  all. 
If  General  Garcia  came  with  between  three  and  four  thousand  Cubans,  he 
would  have  between  four  and  five  thousand  of  them.  So  there  must  have  been 


SHARP    STRAIN    OP    STRUGGLE    AT    SANTIAGO.  389 

about  1,000  already  in  the  neighborhood  ready  for  rations.  A  few  of  the 
Cubans  had  a  skirmish  with  the  Spaniards — no  casualties  reported.  The  first 
fighting  was  when  General  Young,  with  964  officers  and  men,  one  squadron  of 
the  First  cavalry, one  of  the  Tenth  cavalry  and  two  of  the  First  U.  S.  Volun 
teer  cavalry,  on  the  morning  of  the  24th,  became  engaged  with  Spaniards 
entrenched  in  a  strong  position  at  La  Guasimo,  three  miles  from  Siboney  on 
the  Santiago  road.  General  Shafter  says  in  his  official  report: 

"The  enemy  made  an  obstinate  resistance,  but  were  driven  from  the  field 
with  considerable  loss.  Our  own  loss  was  i  officer  and  15  men  killed;  6 
officers  and  46  men  wounded.  The  reported  losses  of  the  Spaniards  were  9 
killed  and  27  wounded.  The  engagement  had  an  inspiriting  effect  upon  our 
men,  and  doubtless  correspondingly  depressed  the  enemy,  as  it  was  now 
plainly  demonstrated  to  them  that  they  had  a  foe  to  meet  who  would  advance 
upon  them  under  a  heavy  fire  delivered  from  entrenchments.  General 
Wheeler,  division  commander,  was  present  during  the  engagement,  and 
reports  our  troops,  officers  and  men,  fought  with  the  greatest  gallantry.  This 
engagement  gave  us  a  well- watered  country  farther  to  the  front,  on  which  to 
encamp  our  troops. " 

In  his  telegram  to  the  Adjutant-General  about  this  affair,  General  Shafter 
said:  "The  Spaniards  occupied  a  very  strong,  entrenched  position  on  a  high 
hill.  The  firing  lasted  about  an  hour,  and  the  enemy  was  driven  from  his 
position,  which  is  now  occupied  by  our  troops,  about  a  mile  and  a  half  from 
Sevilla.  The  enemy  has  retired  toward  Santiago." 

One  sees  in  the  telegrams  following  the  opening  fight  that  there  was 
intense  interest  and  exertion  in  the  War  Department.  The  army  was  com 
mitted  irrevocably  to  the  Santiago  stroke,  and  it  was  seen  that  there  was  to  be 
the  fight  of  the  war.  Coppinger  wires,  June  25th,  6:35  P-  m-»  in  answer 
to  inquiries  as  to  what  could  be  done  to  reinforce  Shafter:  "If  transports  and 
ammunition  are  provided,  I  can  ship  629  officers  and  12,860  men  from  Tampa. 
No  transports  have  reported  to  me.  I  understand  there  are  five  transports 
and  two  ocean  tramps  at  Port  Tampa." 

Corbin  telegraphs  Coppinger  to  know  "whether  in  the  transports  at  Port 
Tampa  there  are  two  or  three  lighters  that  can  be  sent  at  once  to  General 
Shafter.  Having  lost  one  going  over,  the  tug  he  has  is  not  sufficient  to  meet 
demands  of  the  service.  Time  is  essence  of  situation,  and  an  immediate 
answer  is  desired." 


390  SHARP    STRAIN    OF    STRUGGLE    AT    SANTIAGO. 

There  is  evidence  here  that  the  War  Department  was  alive  to  the  fact  that 
Shatter  might  need  help.  As  to  the  ships  at  Tampa,  there  were  seven,  "capac 
ity  about  5,000  men,  if  loaded  and  shipped  at  once.  This  will,  however,  be 
increased  when  the  boats  are  fitted  up.  At  present  there  are  but  two  boats 
which  are  in  proper  condition  to  load  and  ship  and  get  maximum  results.' 

The  Secretary  of  War  made  a  memorandum  June  25th,  that  15,000  men 
were  to  be  taken  from  Chickamauga,  and  12,000,  if  so  many  were  fit,  from 
Coppinger's  command,  Snyder's  division  to  embark  at  once  to  go  as  soon  as 
convoy  could  be  had,  to  reinforce  Shafter  at  Santiago.  Orders  were  issued  to 
establish  telegraphic  communication  between  Shafter's  headquarters  and  cable 
stations.  Corbin  telegraphed  Shafter, June  28th: 

''From  Mobile  the  large  steam  tug  Nimrod  and  light  draft  lighters  Ben, 
Ora,  and  Tourat,  have  been  ordered  to  get  out  of  Mobile  just  as  soon  to-day  as 
possible,  going  with  all  dispatch,  taking  into  consideration  the  safety  of  the 
lighters.  The  depot  quartermaster  at  Tampa  has  been  ordered  to  send  the 
Bessie  to  report  to  you.  The  Bessie  is  a  steam  lighter,  and  sister  to  the 
Laura.  General  Duffield  will  arrive  on  the  Yale  to-morrow  morning  with 
1,300  men.  Balance  of  his  brigade  left  Fort  Monroe  this  morning.  Orders 
have  been  given  to  have  a  division  sent  you  from  Tampa  this  week.  The 
wagon  transportation  will  leave  to-morrow." 

There  were  anxious  inquiries  already  about  the  remains  of  our  dead  and 
questions  raised  whether  bodies  could  be  embalmed,  which  was  not  possible. 
The  Secretary  of  War  telegraphed  that  the  parents  of  Hamilton  Fish  and 
others  were  "very  desirous  of  recovering  the  bodies  of  their  boys."  June  27th 
Alger  telegraphed  Shafter:  "Have  you  landed  the  siege  guns?"  and  the  order 
on  this  telegram  was  "rush."  Two  light  batteries,  Lemly's  and  Macomb's  of 
the  Seventh  Artillery,  at  Fort  Mayer,  Va.,  were  ordered  to  Tampa — and  the 
six  light  batteries  at  Tampa  were  ordered  on  fastest  steamers  immediately, 
but  this  was  subject  to  "when  convoy  arrives" — as  there  might  be  Spanish 
gunboats  hiding  in  the  many  shady  places  looking  for  an  unarmed  transport. 
Alger  had  telegraphed  Shafter  that  he  hoped  he  would  "take  time  to  get  a 
good  ready."  Shafter's  reply  was  from  Siboney,  June  2yth:  "Will  not  act 
hastily,  though  I  believe  I  can  take  the  place  within  forty-eight  hours,  but  I 
fear  at  considerable  loss  of  life.  There  is  no  necessity  for  haste,  as  we  are 
growing  stronger  and  they  weaker  every  day.  The  health  of  the  command  is 
reported  to  me  by  the  surgeon  as  remarkable.  Outside  of  the  wounded  there 


SHARP    STRAIN    OF    STRUGGLE    AT    SANTIAGO.  391 

are  to-day  less  than  150  men  sick.  So  far  no  wounded  have  died,  and  but  tuo 
men  of  disease  since  leaving  Tampa.  Am  very  glad  to  know  that  tugs  and 
lighters  are  on  the  way.  Hospital  steamer  Relief  is  all  that  we  need  at 
present." 

The  roads  were  dusty,  and  a  position  was  taken  within  three  miles  of 
Santiago,  and  in  plain  view  of  the  town!  June  28th  the  convoy  was  ready  at 
Key  West,  and  Corbin  asked  Coppinger  what  he  had  ready  to  go  next  day, 
and  the  answer  was,  "Six  batteries,  800  recruits  for  Shafter's  infantry,  and 
the  First  Illinois."  Incidentally  these  telegrams  passed: 

Playa  del  Este,  June  28,  1898 — 4:15  p.  m. 
Adjutant-General  U.  S.  A.,  Washington: 

Daiquiri,  Cuba,  June  27.  I  have  just  been  shown  a  telegram  from 
Greely  to  Major  Greene,  of  my  staff,  requesting  daily  confidential  reports  of 
operations  of  my  command.  I  have  ordered  him  never  to  send  any  report 
relating  to  my  command  that  is  not  first  submitted  to  me.  I  do  not  under 
stand  by  what  authority  General  Greely  presumes  to  ask  confidential  informa 
tion  from  a  member  of  my  staff.  SHAFTER,  Major-General. 


Adjutant-General's  Office,  Washington,  June  28,  1898. 
Major-General  Shafter,  Playa  del  Este,  Cuba: 

Your  telegram  of  this  date  concerning  giving  of  information  by  staff 
officers  has  been  read  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  your  action  therein  is 
approved  by  him,  without  any  reservation  whatever. 

H.  C.  CORBIN,  Adjutant-General. 

The  inference  is  that  General  Greely,  who  was  censor  of  the  press  dis 
patches,  wanted  points  to  make  his  duties  of  suppression  clear,  and  was  not 
guarded  as  to  the  form  of  stating  the  desire.  The  rush  and  urgent  telegrams 
were  now  flying  day  and  night.  The  form  of  "Acknowledge  receipt  and 
report  execution"  appears  frequently. 

Shafter  wanted,  June  28th,  "Thirty-six  sides  Lutigo  leather;  36  sides  har 
ness  leather;  50  pounds  copper  rivets,  one-half  inch;  5,000  pounds  mule 
shoes,  Nos.  2  and  3;  500  pounds  nails,  horseshoe  No.  6;  6  shoeing  hammers; 
24  rasps,  farriers';  12  coils  five-sixths  rope;  12  coils  three-eighths  rope ;  12 
hand  punches,  saddlers';  1,200  yards  canvas,  72-inch,  heavy;  1,200  yards 
canvas,  22-inch;  2  small  field  forges  for  pack  train;  2  small  anvils  for  pack 


39?  SHARP    STRAIN    OF    STRUGGLE    AT    SANTIAGO. 

train;  35  dozen  snaps,  i^-inch,  with  guard.     The  22-inch  canvas  is  to  make 
oversacks  for  carrying  forage." 

Here  is  one  of  the  Commanding  General's  telegrams: 

"Siboney,  Cuba,  June  28,  5  p.  m.  Have  just  learned  8,000  Spaniards  are 
en  route  here  from  Manzanillo  with  pack  train  and  beef  cattle  on  the  hoof; 
probably  54  miles  from  here  to-day;  advancing  at  the  rate  of  12  miles  per 
day." 

This  was  probably  from  a  "reliable  Cuban"  who  wan  ted  reinforcements 
and  rations.  Corbin  telegraphed  June  2Qth  from  Washington: 

"Six  transports  will  leave  Port  Tampa  this  evening  for  Santiago. 
Specialist  and  Unionist  carrying  artillery  horses  and  artillery  guard.  The 
Comanche  will  carry  artillerymen,  the  Hudson  infantry  recruits  for  your  com 
mand.  The  City  of  Macon  and  Gate  City  will  take  First  Illinois  and  such 
cavalry  recruits  and  signal  corps  as  can  be  loaded." 

Coppinger  telegraphed  the  Adjutant-General  June  29th,  12 : 15,  replying 
to  telegram  that  deducting  troops  about  leaving  on  transports  there  were  at 
Tampa — "infantry,  12,661;  cavalry,  4,693;  cavalry  horses,  5,000;  heavy  artil 
lery,  917;  horses,  378;  signal  corps,  147;  also  about  160  men  awaiting  dis 
charge  and  unequipped  recruits  belonging  to  General  Shafter's  command, 
and  about  150  tons  of  regimental  and  company  property,  and  tentage  left 
by  General  Shafter  with  the  cavalry,  being  about  1,000  tons  of  prop 
erty  of  all  kinds.  Quartermasters  estimate  4,300  mules,  840  cavalry  and 
artillery  horses,  921  Cuban  horses,  1,000  tons  hay,  500  tons  oats,  and  12,000 
tons  coal;  about  1,000  tons  miscellaneous  quartermaster's  property,  ordnance 
material,  and  forage  with  siege  train;  1,200  tons  commissary  stores  and  prop 
erty;  about  4,000  tons  ordnance." 

There  was  great  inquiry  as  to  Shafter's  slowness  in  getting  the  siege 
artillery  to  the  front,  and  he  cabled  the  Secretary  of  War : 

"I  have  not  yet  unloaded  the  siege  guns,  but  will  do  so  as  soon  as  I  can. 
I  do  not  intend  to  take  them  to  the  front  until  we  are  stopped  or  need  them. 
It  is  going  to  be  a  very  difficult  undertaking  to  get  them  up,  and  if  attempted 
now  would  block  the  road.  I  have  four  light  batteries  at  the  front,  and  they 
are  heavy  enough  to  overcome  anything  the  Spaniards  have.  If  we  have  to 
besiege  the  town  I  will  get  the  guns  up.  The  advance  picket  is  now  within 
2^  miles  of  Santiago.  Officers  making  reconnoissances  were  within  i^ 
miles  to-day,  and  met  with  no  opposition." 


SHARP    STRAIN    OF    STRUGGLE    AT    SANTIAGO.  393 

There  was  a  necessity  as  imperious  as  can  arise  in  the  affairs  of  a  great 
nation  in  days  of  destiny,  that  the  blow  the  United  States  had  to  strike  Spain 
when  declaring  war  upon  her,  must  be  delivered  as  soon,  after  the  declaration 
as  was  mechanically  practicable.  Owing  to  national  inattention  and  the  con 
servatism  of  Congress,  the  army  in  hand  that  was  efficient  was  small.  Under 
the  circumstances,  it  was  a  success  that  in  the  end  proved  to  be  the  assurance 
of  speedy  and  complete  victory  and  honorable  and  triumphant  peace,  to  get 
together  and  embark  in  time,  when  the  actual  beginning  of  the  war  was  in  May, 
so  considerable  an  army  as  that  which  sailed  and  made  a  prosperous  voyage 
under  Shafter. 

The  mobilization  of  this  force  and  its  embarkation  and  disembarkation 
would  have  been  wholly  impracticable  if  it  had  not  been  for  the  construction 
just  in  time  of  our  battleships  that  gave  us  the  unequivocal  superiority  over 
Spain  at  sea,  and  the  improved  character  of  the  regular  army.  Thorough  as 
the  confidence  of  the  country  has  -been  in  our  volunteer  military  system,  the 
people  are  educated  by  the  Spanish  war  as  never  before,  not  to  depend  upon 
it  to  the  exclusion  of  an  army  prepared  to  meet  emergencies  that  may  strike 
us  by  cablegrams,  through  orders  flying  in  the  twinkling  of  an  eye  by  tele 
graph.  We  had  not  the  force  to  attack  Havana  at  the  time  the  Santiago  army 
scrambled  through  the  Cuban  surf  to  remove  Spain  from  the  Americas.  If 
we  had  landed  in  the  west  instead  of  the  east  end  of  the  island,  as  was  at  first 
proposed,  we  could  undoubtedly  have  made  the  landing  and  held  the  ground, 
though  there  would  have  been  hard  fighting  to  do  that,  and  our  regular  army 
could  not  have  marched  straight  to  Havana.  The  Santiago  campaign  demon 
strates  that.  Blanco  would  have  opposed  us  with  from  fifty  to  sixty  thousand 
men,  and  150  guns,  and  on  several  fortified  lines.  It  would  have  been  neces 
sary  to  hasten  the  embarkation  of  all  the  volunteers,  fairly  armed,  in  all  the 
Southern  camps,  to  aid  the  regulars  in  advance,  and  we  would  have  had 
seventy  thousand  men  attacking  Havana  in  the  rain  and  the  yellow  fever. 
We  could  have  produced  in  and  about  the  city  of  Havana  the  horrors  of  the 
besieged  Jerusalem  as  described  by  Joseph  us,  and  repeated  in  our  camps  the 
awful  experiences  of  the  English,  the  New  Englanders,  and  the  New  Yorkers 
and  New  Jersey  men  who  conquered  Cuba  by  taking  Havana  in  August,  1762. 
The  change  of  the  point  of  attack  from  Havana  to  Santiago  saved  tens  of 
thousands  of  our  fellow  citizens  from  Cuban  graves,  but  it  was  the  cost  of  the 
war  and  not  its  eventual  substantial  fortunes,  changed  by  the  determination 


394  SHARP    STRAIN    OF    STRUGGLE    AT    SANTIAGO. 

that  hung  upon  the  will  of  the  President,  who  had  the  genius  of  good  sense 
to  choose  the  better  way.  The  change  made  the  sea  voyage  1,000  miles 
instead  of  200,  and  a  fearful  augmentation  of  difficulties  that  forced  delays, 
forcing  upon  Shafter's  army  the  deadly  demand  of  storming  the  lines  of  the 
enemy  instead  of  crushing  them  with  siege  artillery. 

To  those  who  have  not  ascertained  this  vital  point  the  story  of  the  cam 
paign  is  a  nightmare  dream  of  bloody  blundering.  Given  the  understanding 
that  interprets  the  circumstances,  the  conquest  of  Santiago,  while  an  enter 
prise  that  was  hazardous,  was  a  deed  of  the  highest  military  accomplishment. 
The  exertions  of  the  government  through  its  respective  departments  to  pro 
vide  for  the  army  of  the  invasion  of  Cuba  were  something  gigantic.  To  go 
from  Tampa  to  the  west  end  of  Cuba  was  like  a  voyage  from  New  York  to 
Norfolk,  but  from  Tampa  to  Santiago,  the  excursion  was  equal  to  the  journey 
from  Philadelphia  to  Havana.  Aware  of  the  certainty  of  wounds  and  sick 
ness,  the  steamer  John  Engliss  was  purchased  for  $450,000,  and  fitted  up  as  a 
hospital  ship  at  a  cost  of  $136,851.11,  and  named  the  Relief.  She  was  pro 
vided  with  every  appliance,  as  the  Quartermaster-General  comprehensively  as 
well  as  particularly  states,  "for  the  ease,  comfort  and  treatment  of  the  sick 
and  wounded.  The  interior  was  remodeled;  electric  plant  for  light  and 
purifying,  sterilizing  and  laundry  plants,  and  two  steam  launches  were  pro 
vided. "  The  launches  were  like  cradles,  to  carry  the  helpless  men  from  the 
shore  to  the  ship. 

After  the  first  of  July  there  were  chartered  on  the  Atlantic  coast  the 
steamers  Wanderer,  La  Grande  Duchesse,  Tarpan  and  Ute,  for  the  transpor 
tation  of  troops  and  supplies  to  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico,  and  with  these  the 
tonnage  was  111,000  tons,  the  carrying  capacity  250,000  men. 

The  Quartermaster-General  reports: 

"The  carrying  capacity  of  the  chartered  steamships  employed  in  connec 
tion  with  General  Shafter's  army  for  the  invasion  of  Cuba  was  not  found 
adequate  to  promptly  transport  the  number  of  troops,  in  addition  to  that 
army,  required  for  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico,  and  it  therefore  became  necessary  to 
increase  the  number  of  transport  vessels  with  larger  carrying  capacity  for  men 
and  animals,  with  bilge  keels  to  prevent  rolling,  and  thus  make  the  ships 
more  comfortable  for  stock. 

"Congress  being  averse  to  admitting  foreign  ships  to  American  registry, 
the  Secretary  of  War  decided  to  direct  the  purchase  of  vessels,  and  have  them 


WOUNDED  ON   THEIR  WAY  TO  DRESSING  PLACE  AT  BATTLE  OF  SAN  JUAN. 


SHARP    STRAIN    OF    STRUGGLE    AT    SANTIAGO. 


397 


fitted  up  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  army  for  the  safe  and  comfortable  transpor 
tation  of  men  and  animals  and  the  transportation  of  army  supplies.  Fourteen 
large  steamships  were  purchased  and  fitted  up  for  carrying  men,  animals, 
freight,  etc.  The  following  is  a  list  of  these  vessels: 


Name  of  Vessel 

Tonnage 

2,085 
2,792 
2,194 
5,658 
5,78o 
5,673 
5,673 
5,796 
3,732 
3,722 
4,126 
3,656 
5,641 
4,770 

Cost 

Class 

Carry 
Officers 

ing   Capacity 

Men 

Animals 

Panama  No.  i  

$  41,000 
175,000 
125,000 
660,000 
660,000 
660,000 
660,000 
660,000 
350,000 
35o-,ooo 
240,000 
250,000 
400,000 
200,000 

....Freighter  
do. 

10 

25 
15 
80 
80 
80 
80 

100 

40 
40 

45 
50 

75 

400 
400 
700 
,000 
,000 
,000 
,000 
,200 
800 
Soo 

,100 

,300 
2,000 

Port  Victor,  No.  2  

Rita,  No.  3  

do 

Mohawk,  No.  20  

..Combination  .. 
do 

1,000 
1,000 

1,000 
1,000 
1,000 
800 
800 
50 

TOO 

Mobile    No   21 

Massachusetts  No.  22 

do 

Manitoba   No   23  . 

do 

Minnewaska   No   24 

do 

Mississippi,  No.  25  
Michigan    No.  26 

do 

do. 

Roumanian  No.  27 

.    ...  do. 

Obdam,  No  30 

...Troop  ship.... 
db  
do  

Berlin,  No.  31     

Chester,  No.  32  

Total  

61,298 

5,431,000 

720 

12,700 

6,750 

"Eight  of  these  vessels  were  provided  with  refrigerators  for  the  transpor 
tation  of  fresh  meat,  seven  of  them  having  a  capacity  of  1,000  tons  each. 
Two,  the  Panama  and  the  Rita,  were  captured  by  the  navy,  and  were  pur 
chased  by  this  Department  after  having  been  condemned  as  prizes  by  the 
proper  courts  and  offered  for  sale. 

"All  of  these  were  merchant  vessels  and  were  temporarily  fitted  up  as 
army  transports  to  meet  the  urgent  demands  of  the  service  for  which  purpose 
an  expenditure  of  $178,018.37  was  made. 

"The  fleet  of  transport  ships  which  was  concentrated  at  Port  Tampa,  Fla., 
in  June  last  for  the  transportation  of  the  army  of  General  Shafter  to  Cuba, 
consisting  of  38  vessels,  including  2  water  boats,  3  steam  lighters,  i  collier, 
and  i  tug,  had  been  fitted  out  for  a  voyage  to  the  vicinity  of  Havana,  distant 
about  400  miles;  2  decked  barges  were  also  provided  by  the  Engineer  Depart 
ment.  One  of  the  steam  lighters,  the  tug,  and  a  decked  barge  failed  to  reach 
Cuba. 

"Upon  embarkation  of  the  troops  it  was  found  that  the  vessels  would  not 
safely  and  comfortably  carry  more  than  about  16,000  men  with  their  2,295 
animals,  equipments,  ammunition,  subsistence,  and  medical  supplies,  on  a 
voyage  of  1,000  miles." 


398  SHARP    STRAIN    OF    STRUGGLE    AT    SANTIAGO. 

To  relieve  the  fighting  soldiers  and  the  seamen  from  the  heavy  task  of 
landing  supplies — the  very  line  of  labor  that  exhausted  and  sickened  the 
British  when  they  were  besieging  Havana — the  Quartermaster's  Department 
entered  "into  contract  with  the  firm  of  D.  Van  Aken  &  Co.,  of  New  York 
City,  to  fit  out  an  expedition  with  a  large  force  of  mechanics  of  various  trades, 
and  laborers,  with  machinery,  such  as  pile  drivers,  implements  for  construc 
tion  of  docks  and  railways,  with  the  necessary  materials — iron  and  lumber — 
for  building  docks,  lighters,  repairing  railroads  and  engines.  The  company 
was  furnished  the  steamship  Panama  and  two  fine  ocean  tugs,  the  Gladisfen, 
which  was  chartered,  and  the  Gypsum  King,  which  was  purchased."  This 
outfit  afforded  great  aid  and  relief. 

The  English  expedition  which  assailed  and  captured  Havana  in  1762  was 
not  as  large  as  Shafter's  army.  The  force  of  Lord  Albemarle  was  only 
11,351  men.  The  vessels  o£the  squadron  numbered  203,  including  "six  ships 
with  the  baggage  of  general  officers,"  93  transports  and  43  ships  of  the  line; 
and  1,000  negroes  were  purchased  to  relieve  the  troops  of  drudgery,  and  with 
the  provincials  and  the  sailors  saved  the  enterprise  from  failure. 

Colonel  Humphrey,  Chief  Quartermaster,  worked  hard  at  Tampa  and 
Santiago,  and  says  of  the.  transports  that  began  to  arrive  early  in  May  at 
Tampa,  that  they  were  as  fast  as  reported,  "fully  coaled  and  watered  and 
policed,  and  later  fitted  with  bunks  and  stalls  for  the  comfort  of  men  and 
animals.  The  loading  of  the  transports  began  at  once,  and  was  carried  on 
speedily  and  systematically.  This  was,  at  best,  difficult,  owing  to  the  limited 
wharf  facilities.  The  place  affords,  in  all  particulars,  most  insufficient  facili 
ties  for  fitting  out  the  many  ships  and  embarking  so  large  a  force.  The  load 
ing  of  all  classes  of  stores  was  completed  at  n  a.  m  of  June  6th,  and  by  9  p.  m., 
June  8th,  the  troops  were  all  on  board  and  the  expedition  was  fully  embarked. 
The  departure,  however,  was  delayed  until  June  i4th,  by  reason  of  a  report 
made  by  the  naval  authorities  that  the  Spanish  war  vessels  were  seen  in 
Nicholas  Channel.  The  transports  when  sailing  were  in  good  order,  but  not 
in  so  prime  condition  as  when  the  troops  and  animals  were  embarked. ' ' 

No  effort  was  spared,  no  cost  counted  in  any  department,  or  nook,  or 
corner  of  the  government  of  the  United  States,  to  assist  the  plain  purpose  of 
the  Shafter  expedition.  The  General  recited  the  facts  of  the  bitter  fight  of 
the  24th,  in  which  out  of  964  our  loss  was  16  killed  and  52  wounded  in  an  hour. 
The  loss  of  the  enemy  reported  9  killed  and  27  wounded;  that  the  engagement 


SHARP  STRAIN  OF  STRUGGLE  AT  SANTIAGO. 


399 


had  "inspirited  the  men."  They  were  hardy  men  who  believed  that  they  had 
tried  the  tether  of  the  enemy  under  circumstances  that  were  and  would  be 
characteristic  of  the  campaign,  and  that  they  could  win  out,  but  the  effect  at 
Washington — and  it  is  well  that  it  was  so — was  to  hurry  telegrams  that  all  get 
ready  instantly  to  reinforce  the  army  at  Santiago.  That  the  fighting  right  at 
hand  would  be  of  the  severest  nature,  with  the  fearful  climate  and  the  dread 
ful  ambuscades  to  contend  with,  was  already  clear.  Moreover,  the  certainties 
were  that  the  few  Cubans  who  had  emerged  from  their  mysteries  could  not  be 
relied  upon  for  hot  work,  and  that  the  Spaniards  were  well  armed  and  abun 
dantly  supplied  with  ammunition,  that  their  Mauser  rifles  and  smokeless 
powder  were  haunting  as  a  superstition,  and  that  they  would  in  shelter  do 
things  to  truly  save  the  military  character  of  their  country  from  contempt. 
There  was  also  a  deep  conviction  of  danger  that  Shafter  needed  more  men,  and 
that  the  quicker  they  could  reach  him  the  surer  the  result  for  us,  and  the 
smaller  the  expenditure  of  the  blood  of  the  heroic  few.  The  United  States 
is  a  mighty  nation,  and  there  was  that  in  the  air  more  fiery  than  "the 
rocket's  red  glare"  in  the  song  of  the  banner,  but  while  the  people  waited 
with  anxiety  and  the  trains  rumbled,  and  there  were  busy  scenes  at  the  ports, 
and  the  volunteers  were  massed  and  rushed  to  the  rescue,  while  steamers 
blackened  the  sky  and  whitened  the  waters,  as  they  throbbed  through  the 
waves  to  the  scene  of  the  conflict,  the  brunt  of  the  battle  Avas  to  be  borne  by 
the  thin  lines  already  in  the  sultry  forests  and  on  the  steep  hillsides  where 
the  boys  stood  in  disciplined  devotion,  the  siege  guns  not  ashore,  incredible 
toil  the  only  way  to  get  forward  to  those  ready  to  famish  the  necessaries 
of  life.  Then  arose  the  specter  of  the  ghastliest  fever  that  blights  the  strong, 
and  so  the  breasts  of  the  boys  and  the  steel  they  bore  must  be  driven  home 
by  stormy  rushes,  that  the  sword  might  win  the  salvation  it  was  vain  to 
hope  for  when  the  pestilence  surely  on  the  wing  would  swoop  down  upon 
the  bivouacs  of  the  brave. 


The  Field  Fighting  for  Santiago, 

The  Supreme  Test  of  American  Valor— The  Thin  but  Steady  Regular  Line,  and  the  Es 
sential  Assistance  by  the  Foremost  Volunteers — The  Whole  Story  from  the  First 
Skirmish  to  the  Last  Assault  Told  in  War  Office  Dispatches  Far  More  Interesting 
than  the  Formal  Reports  of  the  Officers  and  More  Sensational  than  the  Lurid  Chap 
ters  in  the  Journals — Their  Publication  an  Admirable  Example  of  the  Candor  of  the 
Authorities — An  All-Night  Watch  for  News  at  the  White  House — Shafter's  Memorable 
Third  and  Fourth  of  July. 

The  President  sent  thanks  to  General  Shafter  and  his  army  for  "the  gal 
lant  action"  of  the  24th  June.  On  the  26th  the  Secretary  of  War  communi 
cated  to  General  Miles  that  with  the  least  possible  delay  an  expedition  would 
be  organized  under  the  immediate  command  of  Major-General  Brooke, 
"composed  of  three  divisions  taken  from  the  troops  best  equipped  in  the  First 
and  Third  Army  Corps,  and  two  divisions  from  the  Fourth  Army  Corps,  for 
movement  and  operation  against  the  enemy  in  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico.  The 
command  under  Major-General  Shafter,  or  such  part  thereof  as  can  be  spared 
from  the  work  now  in  hand,  will  join  the  foregoing  expedition,"  and  the 
whole  was  to  be  commanded  in  person  by  General  Miles,  who  was  to  place 
himself  "in  close  touch  with  the  senior  officers  of  the  navy  in  those  waters, 
with  the  view  to  harmonious  and  forceful  action."  This  telegram  was  sent  on 
the  day  of  the  assignment  of  General  Miles  to  the  Porto  Rico  occupation : 

Washington,  June  26,  1898. 
Maj.  Gen.  W.  R.  Shafter,  Commanding  United  States  forces  in  Cuba: 

In  burying  the  dead,  be  sure  and  detail  a  competent  officer  to  have  a 
map  made  giving  resting  place  of  each,  so  that  friends  can  find  the  remains 
of  their  loved  ones.  R.  A.  ALGER,  Secretary  of  War. 

There  have  been  serious  perplexities  about  the  graves.  It  is  true  that 
they  were  sometimes  shallow,  because  the  men  detailed  to  dig  them  were  so 
weak  from  the  heat  and  affected  by  exposure  to  the  sun  and  rain  that  they 

400 


THE    FIELD    FIGHTING    FOR    SANTIAGO. 


403 


4o4  THE    FIELD    FIGHTING    FOR    SANTIAGO. 

could  not  wield  the  grave-digger's  tools  more  than  a  very  few  minutes  at  a 
time.  Another  reason  exists  for  some  of  the  lost  graves,  which  were  identified 
by  bottles  tightly  corked,  containing  the  name,  organization  and  home  of  the 
deceased,  and  buried  close  by  the  remains.  There  was  also  an  external 
identification — strong  stakes  driven  at  the  head  of  the  graves  and  marked  so 
as  to  be  intelligible.  Some  of  the  stakes  were  removed  by  Santiago  refugees 
and  Cubans  who  professed  to  be  soldiers,  because  it  was  convenient  to  make 
use  of  them  to  cook  coffee.  This  was  resented  by  our  soldiers  to  the  point  of 
shooting  several  of  the  miscreants  informally,  but  the  mischief  was  done. 

On  the  2Qth  the  advance  pickets  were  within  a  mile  and  a  half  of  Santi 
ago,  and  Shafter  was  expecting  to  put  a  division  on  the  Caney  road  between 
that  place  and  Santiago  on  the  ist  of  July,  also  "advance  on  the  Sevilla  road  to 
the  San  Juan  road,  and  possibly  beyond,"  and  Garcia  with  3,000  men  was  to 
4 '  take  the  railroad  north  of  Santiago  and  prevent  Pando  reaching  the  city. ' '  The 
figures  of  Garcia's  force  show  that  the  "scatterment"  he  reported  of  his  fol 
lowers  when  the  time  came  to  show  them  up  had  not  been  reformed  alto 
gether.  Still  his  army  greatly  outnumbered  that  of  the  Commander-in-Chief 
Gomez,  who  for  strategic  reasons  kept  only  150  men  about  his  person,  holding 
the  others  in  reserve  in  the  recesses  of  the  wilderness,  where  no  human  eye 
beheld  them  when  the  cane  burning  orgies  were  over.  June  3oth  the  First 
Illinois,  1,200  men,  sailed  from  Tampa,  also  Shafter's  regular  recruits,  some 
hundreds,  and  two  hundred  thousand  rations.  Certainly  the  government  was 
doing  all  that  could  be  done. 

The  advance  of  the  ist  of  July  developed  the  enemy  and  Shafter  tele 
graphed  9: 34  a.  m:  "Action  going  on,  but  firing  only  light  and  desultory— 
began  on  the  right  near  Caney — Lawton's  division."  The  movement  was  on 
the  northeast  of  Santiago.  But  the  light  firing  deepened,  and  then  its  desul 
tory  character  changed.  July  ist  was  a  bloody  day.  The  first  dispatch  from 
the  field  to  the  War  Office  was: 

Siboney. — Had  a  very  heavy  engagement  to-day,  which  lasted  from  8  a. 
m.  till  sundown.  We  have  carried  their  outer  works  and  are  now  in  possession 
of  them.  There  is  now  about  three-quarters  of  a  mile  of  open  country 
between  my  lines  and  city.  By  morning  troops  will  be  intrenched  and  con 
siderable  augmentation  of  forces  will  be  there.  General  Lawton's  division 
and  General  Bates 's  brigade,  which  have  been  engaged  all  day  in  carrying  El 
Caney,  which  was  accomplished  at  4  p.  m.,  will  be  in  line  and  in  front  of 


THE    FIELD    FIGHTING    FOR    SANTIAGO.  405 

Santiago  during  the  night.     I  regret  to  say  that  our  casualties  will  be  above 
400.     Of  these  not  many  are  killed.      W.  R.  SHAFTER,  Major-General. 

The  second  dispatch  added  significance  to  the  story  of  the  fight  "from  8 
a.  m.  till  sundown" : 

Playa  del  Este,  via  Haiti. 

(Received  at  Washington  July  2,  1898 — 1:12  a.  m.) 
Adjutant-General,  Washington: 

Headquarters  near  Santiago  de  Cuba,  i. — I  fear  I  have  underestimated 
to-day's  casualties.  A  large  and  thoroughly  equipped  hospital  ship  should  be 
sent  here  at  once.  Chief  surgeon  says  he  has  use  for  40  more  medical  officers. 
Ship  must  bring  launch  and  boat  for  conveying  wounded. 

W.  R.  SHAFTER,  Major-General,  Fifth  Corps. 

The  response  from  Washington  was  that  the  hospital  ship  and  medical 
officers  would  be  sent  "as  soon  as  possible,"  and  was  confident  of  "ultimate 
complete  success."  The  Secretary  of  War  suggested  the  navy  could  "help" 
in  the  care  of  the  wounded. 

July  ist,  the  President  disapproved  of  a  "plan"  by  General  Miles  to  at 
once  capture  the  Isle  of  Pines.  The  Major-General  commanding  had  thought 
that  subject  all  over,  and  concluded  that  it  would  be  the  very  thing  to  take  the 
celebrated  retreat  of  the  pirates  in  the  Pines,  as : 

"It  is  said  to  have  the  most  delightful  climate  in  the  West  Indies,  being 
entirely  free  from  yellow  fever.  It  can  be  made  extremely  useful  for  the 
establishment  of  a  hospital  and  a  camp  of  prisoners,  and,  also,  eventually,  as 
a  base  for  supplying  the  Cubans,  and  possibly  for  the  cavalry  operations  on 
the  main  island  of  Cuba. 

"I  think  the  one  steamer  now  at  Tampa  can,  with  a  battery  of  artillery, 
and  one  regiment  of  infantry,  take  the  island,  land  from  two  to  six  months' 
supplies,  and  return  to  Tampa  inside  of  ten  days,  when  the  steamer  would  be 
ready  to  be  used  for  any  future  military  purpose." 

This  was  one  episode  of  the  day.  Another  was,  Brooke  telegraphed  from 
Chickamauga  he  was  "pressing  the  whole  corps  f or  movement. "  The  return 
of  as  many  transports  as  possible  from  Santiago  was  ordered  "at  once.  "  July 
3d,  at  5:25  p.  m.,  there  was  a  telegram  from  Tampa  to  the  Adjutant-General: 

"General  Randolph  and  six  light  batteries  on  the  Comanche  and  two 
English  9 -knot  transports,  and  the  First  District  of  Columbia  infantry,  on 
the  Catania,  have  sailed  for  Key  West  to-day." 


4o6  THE    FIELD    FIGHTING    FOR    SANTIAGO. 

At  7:55  p.  m.,  Coppinger  telegraphed  from  U.  S.  Camp,  Florida: 

''Specialist,  with  225  horses,  and  Unionist,  with  300  horses  and  2  mules, 
both  carrying  artillery  material  and  75  men  each,  sailed  at  8:35  this  morning. 
The  Comanche,  with  General  Randolph  and  balance  of  men  of  the  six  light 
batteries  and  50  horses,  left  at  11:40.  The  first  two  are  9-knot  freight 
ers;  the  Comanche  is  a  i6-knot  boat.  The  Catania,  with  the  First  District 
Volunteers,  less  Captain  Looker's  company,  remaining  here  as  provisional 
engineers,  left  at  12:30  p.  m." 

The  Adjutant-General  was  advised:  "Depot  quartermaster  has  conferred 
with  us  as  to  movement  Tampa  to  Savannah.  Both  Florida  railroads  have 
sent  to  Chickamauga  their  passenger  equipment,  which  is  being  held  in  readi 
ness  for  movement  from  there.  We  can  get  together  equipment  for  the  rough 
riders,  but  it  would  simplify  matters  if  you  could  order  Chickamauga  move 
ment  to  begin  at  once,  and  we  could  use  that  equipment  to  carry  the  5,000 
troops  to  Savannah. ' ' 

The  first  of  July,  1898,  was  Friday.  On  Sunday  morning  the  Secretary 
of  War  sent  a  telegram  to  the  general  commanding  the  army  assailing  Santi 
ago  that  shows  as  distinctly  as  a  tremor  of  the  eartfr  is  recorded  by  a  seis 
mometer,  the  strain  of  the  critical  hours: 

"Executive  Mansion,  Washington,  July  3,  1898 — 1:56  a.  m. 
Major-General  Shafter,  Playa  del  Este: 

(To  be  forwarded  at  once  to  headquarters  in  the  field.) 

The  following  is  just  received — midnight — from  sources  unofficial: 
"Cervera  has  been  ordered  to  shell  the  town  (Santiago)  when  Americans 
get  possession.  All  foreign  consuls  have  been  notified  to  retire  at  that  time 
to  places  of  safety  outside  of  city."  This  information  may  or  may  not  be 
correct,  but  is  sent  for  your  consideration.  We  are  awaiting  with  intense 
anxiety  tidings  of  to-day.  R.  A.  ALGER,  Secretary  of  War. 

The  President  was  up  all  night.  There  was  no  news,  and  it  was  hard 
to  have  faith  that  it  was  good  to  hear  nothing. 

This  is  the  Secretary's  telegram,  of  the  up-all-night-after- the-battle  vigil 
at  the  White  House : 

War  Department,  July  3,  1898. 
Major-General  Shafter,  Commanding  United  States  Forces,  Cuba: 

I  waited  with  the  President  until  4  o'clock  this  morning  for  news  from 
you  relative  to  Saturday's  battle.  Not  a  word  was  received,  nor  has  there  been 


THE    FIELD    FIGHTING    FOR    SANTIAGO.  407 

up  to  this  hour,  1 1  a.  m. ,  except  an  account  of  the  battle  of  Friday,  upon  which 
I  congratulate  you  most  heartily.  I  wish  hereafter  that  you  would  interrupt 
all  messages  that  are  being  sent  to  the  Associated  Press  and  others,  and  make 
report  at  the  close  of  each  day,  or  during  the  day  if  there  is  anything  of 
special  importance,  at  once.  The  Relief  left  New  York  yesterday.  She  has 
17  surgeons  aboard,  and  will  come  to  you  as  quickly  as  possible. 

R.  A.  ALGER,  Secretary  of  War. 

The  Relief  was  the  scientifically  provided  hospital  ship,  purchased  and 
fitted  out  in  anticipation  for  such  an  emergency,  but  too  late  to  go  with  the 
expedition. 

Playa  del  Este,  via  Haiti. 

(Received  Washington,  July  4,  1898 — 12:15  a.  m.) 
General  Alger,  Washington : 

Headquarters  Fifth  Army  Corps,  Cuba,  3. — Did  not  telegraph,  as  I  was  too 
busy  looking  after  things  that  had  to  be  attended  to  at  once,  and  did  not  wish 
to  send  any  news  that  was  not  fully  confirmed;  besides,  I  was  too  much 
excited  myself.  The  Spanish  fleet  left  the  harbor  this  morning  and  is 
reported  practically  destroyed.  I  demanded  surrender  of  the  city  at  10  o'clock 
to-day.  At  this  hour,  4:30  p.  m.,  no  reply  has  been  received;  perfect  quiet 
along  the  line;  situation  has  been  precarious  on  account  of  difficulties  of 
supplying  command  with  food,  and  tremendous  fighting  capabilities  shown  by 
the  enemy  from  his  almost  impregnable  position. 

SHAFTER,  Major-General. 

This  dispatch  tells  the  story  that  Shafter  had  been  sorely  tried.  The 
forceful  candor  of  his  way  of  putting  things  is  well  illustrated  here,  but  he 
had  suffered  from  illness  and  despondency,  and  in  the  darkest  hour  he  sent 
this  dispatch,  which  is  a  remarkable  contribution  to  the  full  story  of  historical 
events: 

Playa  del  Este,  July  3,  1898.     (Received  Washington,  11:44  a-  m-) 
The  Secretary  of  War,  Washington: 

Camp  near  Sevilla,  Cuba,  3.  We  have  the  town  well  invested  on  the 
north  and  east,  but  with  a  very  thin  line.  Upon  approaching  it  we  find  it  of 
such  a  character  and  the  defenses  so  strong  it  will  be  impossible  to  carry  it  by 
storm  with  my  present  force,  and  I  am  seriously  considering  withdrawing 
about  5  miles  and  taking  up  a  new  position  on  the  high  ground  between  the 
San  Juan  River  and  Siboney,  with  our  left  at  Sardinero,  so  as  to  get  our  sup- 


408 


THE    FIELD    FIGHTING    FOR    SANTIAGO. 


SKETCH   OF    THE    POSITION    Of    BOTH    ARMIES    ON  JULY  3. 

..x° 


,  X 


V  £S 


REDUCED  FROM  OFFICIAL  PLAN  PREPARED  BY  WAR  DEPARTMENT. 


THE    FIELD    FIGHTING    FOR    SANTIAGO.  409 

plies,  to  a  large  extent,  by  means  of  the  railroad,  which  we  can  use,  having 
engines  and  cars  at  Siboney.  Our  losses  up  to  date  will  aggregate  1,000,  but 
list  has  not  yet  been  made.  But  little  sickness  outside  of  exhaustion  from 
intense  heat  and  exertion  of  the  battle  of  the  day  before  yesterday  and  the 
almost  constant  fire  which  is  kept  up  on  the  trenches.  Wagon  road  to  the 
rear  is  kept  up  with  some  difficulty  on  account  of  rains,  but  I  will  be  able  to 
use  it  for  the  present.  General  Wheeler  is  seriously  ill,  and  will  probably 
have  to  go  to  the  rear  to-day.  General  Young  also  very  ill ;  confined  to  his 
bed.  General  Hawkins  slightly  wounded  in  foot  during  sortie  enemy  made 
last  night,  which  was  handsomely  repulsed.  The  behavior  of  the  regular 
troops  was  magnificent.  I  am  urging  Admiral  Sampson  to  attempt  to  force 
the  entrance  of  the  harbor,  and  will  have  consultation  with  him  this  morning. 
He  is  coming  to  the  front  to  see  me.  I  have  been  unable  to  be  out  during  the 
heat  of  the  day  for  four  days,  but  am  retaining  the  command.  General 
Garcia  reported  he  holds  the  railroad  from  Santiago  to  San  Luis,  and  has 
burned  a  bridge  and  removed  some  rails ;  also  that  General  Pando  has  arrived 
at  Palma,  and  that  the  French  consul  with  about  400  French  citizens  came 
into  his  lines  yesterday  from  Santiago.  Have  directed  him  to  treat  them  with 
every  courtesy  possible.  SH AFTER,  Major-General. 

The  dismal  lines  in  this  telegram  are  relating  to  the  serious  consideration 
of  retirement — "withdrawing  about  five  miles."  A  five  mile  retreat  could 
not  have  changed  American  destiny,  but  it  would  have  smashed  a  great  deal 
of  highly  wrought  red,  white  and  blue  china.  The  Secretary  of  War  struck 
the  right  keynote  when  he  finally  got  the  news  in  his  dispatch — firm,  quiet, 
strong  #vords  that  will  be  long  held  in  honorable  remembrance : 

War  Department,  Washington,  July  3,  1898 — 12:10  p.  m. 
Major-General  Shafter,  Playa  del  Este,  Cuba: 

Your  first  dispatch  received.  Of  course,  you  can  judge  the  situation 
better  than  we  can  at  this  end  of  the  line.  If,  however,  you  could  hold  your 
present  position,  especially  San  Juan  heights,  the  effect  upon  the  country  would 
be  much  better  than  falling  back.  However,  we  leave  all  that  matter  to  you. 
This  is  only  a  suggestion.  We  shall  send  you  reinforcements  at  once. 

R.  A.  ALGER,  Secretary  of  War. 

On  this  memorable  July  3d,  Alger  requested  that  the  transports  returned 
should  be  ordered  by  the  commander  of  the  fleet,  "directing  that  the  fastest 
vessels  sail  with  all  possible  speed  to  Port  Tampa,  in  order  that  they  may  get 


4io  THE    FIELD    FIGHTING    FOR    SANTIAGO. 

a  supply  of  coal  and  water,  and  commence  loading  before  the  others  arrive, 
thus  saving  time."  This  was  "pushing  things" — to  use  two  of  Phil.  Sheridan's 
words  as  he  put  them.  At  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  July  $d,  Shafter 
telegraphed : 

"Camp  near  Santiago,  3. — Large  quantities  of  underclothing  and  shoes, 
enough  for  entire  army,  are  badly  needed. ' ' 

The  response  the  next  day  was : 

St.  Paul  leaves  New  York  Wednesday  direct  for  Santiago  with  Eighth 
Ohio,  and  underclothing,  shoes,  stockings,  and  duck  suits  for  your  whole 
army.  How  are  you,  Wheeler,  Young,  and  others? 

R.  A.  ALGER,  Secretary  of  War. 

But  to  go  back  a  day : 

Adjutant-General's  Office,  Washington,  July  3,  1898 — 5  p.  m. 
Major-General  Shafter,  Playa  del  Este,  Cuba: 

You  can  have  whatever  reinforcements  you  want.  Wire  what  additional 
troops  you  desire,  and  they  will  be  sent  as  rapidly  as  transports  can  be 
secured.  In  addition  to  the  2,700  troops  now  en  route  from  Tampa,  the  St. 
Paul  and  Duchess  will  leave  Newport  News  not  later  than  Wednesday,  with 
3,000  troops  of  Garretson's  brigade;  the  St.  Louis,  Yale,  and  Columbia  will 
sail  probably  from  Charleston,  carrying  4,000  more,  and  others  will  be  sent 
from  Tampa  as  you  may  request. 

H.  C.  CORBIN,  Adjutant-General. 


War  Department,  Washington,  July  3,  189$. 
General  Shafter,  Commanding  United  States  Forces,  Cuba: 

We  are  forwarding  reinforcements  to  you  this  week.  How  is  your 
health?  Do  you  think  that  some  one  should  come  to  relieve  you?  Are  you 
going  to  be  able  to  stand  through?  What  do  you  think?  Be  very  careful  of 
yourself.  R.  A.  ALGER,  Secretary  of  War. 

This  was  a  delicate  but  decided  suggestion  that  Shafter 's  resignation 
was  the  thought  of  the  War  Department  and  the  country. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  4th  of  July  there  was  this  good  news  in  the 
war  office,  in  reply  to  the  "suggestion"  of  Alger  to  Shafter  that  he  had  better 
not  yield  any  ground,  but  hold  what  he  had  got : 


THE    FIELD    FIGHTING    FOR    SANTIAGO.  411 

Playa  del  Este,  via  Haiti. 

(Received  Washington,  July  4,  1898 — 1:16  a.  m.) 
The  Honorable  Secretary  of  War,  Washington: 

Headquarters  Fifth  Corps,  3. — I  shall  hold  my  present  position. 

SHAFTER,  Major-General. 

Holding  his  present  position  meant  two  things.  A  little  later  Shafter 
felt  better,  as  this  witnesses: 

Playa,  July  4,  1898. 

(Received  Washington  July  4,  1898 — 9:30  a.  m.) 
The  Adjutant-General's  Office,  U.  S.  Army,  Washington: 

Headquarters  Fifth  Army  Corps,  near  Santiago. — Your  telegram  inquir 
ing  about  my  health  just  received.  I  am  still  very  much  exhausted.  Eating 
a  little  this  p.  m.  for  the  first  time  in  four  days.  The  good  news  has  inspired 
everybody.  When  the  news  of  the  disaster  of  the  Spanish  fleet  reached  the 
'front,  which  was  during  the  period  of  truce,  a  regimental  band  that  had 
managed  to  keep  its  instruments  on  the  line,  played  "The  Star-Spangled 
Banner"  and  "There  will  be  a  hot  time  in  the  old  town  to-night,"  men  cheer 
ing  from  one  end  of  the  line  to  the  other.  Officers  and  men,  without  even 
shelter  tents,  have  been  soaking  for  five  days  in  the  afternoon  rains,  but  all 
are  happy.  SHAFTER,  Major-General,  U.  S.  A. 

The  American  eagle  has  a  fashion  of  flying  high  on  the  4th  of  July,  and 
this  was  no  exception.  There  are  two  dispatches  from  General  Shafter  that 
should  be  printed  together — the  following : 

Playa  del  Este,  via  Haiti. 
(Received  Washington  July  3,  1898 — 7  p.  m.) 
Secretary  War,  Washington: 

Camp  near  Santiago,  3. — Lieutenant  Allen,  Second  Cavalry,  is  Justin  from 
my  extreme  right,  which  is  on  the  railroad  running  north  from  Santiago  and 
which  overlooks  the  entire  bay.  Lieutenant  Allen  states  that  Cervera's  fleet 
was  in  full  view  until  nearly  10  o'clock  this  morning,  when  it  proceeded  down 
the  bay,  and  shortly  afterwards  heavy  firing  was  heard.  Duffield,  at  Siboney, 
has  just  telephoned  me  that  Captain  Cotton,  of  the  Harvard,  just  sent  him 
word  that  Admiral  Sampson  had  signaled  Cervera  had  come  out  and  had 
escaped,  and  that  he  was  in  pursuit.  The  .  Harvard  immediately  left.  The 
French  consul  informed  General  Garcia,  into  whose  lines  he  went  yesterday, 
that  Admiral  Cervera  had  stated  that  he  would  run  out  at  10  o'clock  this 


4i2  THE    FIELD    FIGHTING    FOR    SANTIAGO. 

a.  m.,  and  that  was  the  hour  Allen   witnessed  his  departure.     Cervera  told 
such  consul  it  was  better  to  die  fighting  than  blow  up  ships  in  harbor. 

SHAFTER,  Commanding. 


Playa  del  Este,  via  Haiti. 

(Received  Washington  July  3,  1898 — 7:31  p.  m.) 
Adjutant-General  United  States  Army,  Washington : 

Camp  near  Santiago,  Cuba  3. — Early  this  morning  I  sent  in  a  demand 
for  immediate  surrender  of  Santiago,  threatening  bombardment  to-morrow. 
Perfect  quiet  on  lines  for  one  hour.  From  news  just  received  of  escape  of 
fleet  am  satisfied  place  will  be  surrendered.  SHAFTER,  Commanding. 

It  was  very  good  of  the  French  consul  to  inform  General  Garcia  when 
Cervera  was  to  go  out,  and  Shafter  was  quick  and  hair-triggered  in  his 
rebound,  demanding  the  surrender  of  Santiago  within  the  same  day  that  he 
had  considered  a  fall-back  of  five  miles.  The  following  is  the  text  of  the 
demand: 

Headquarters  United  States  Forces, 
Near  San  Juan  River,  Cuba,  July  3,  1898 — 8:30  a.  m. 
To  the  Commanding  General  of  the  Spanish  Forces,  Santiago  de  Cuba : 

Sir:     I  shall  be  obliged  unless  you  surrender  to  shell  Santiago  de  Cuba. 

Please  inform  the  citizens  of  foreign  countries  and  all  women  and  children 
that  they  should  leave  the  city  before  10  o'clock  to-morrow  morning. 
Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

W.  R.  SHAFTER,  Major-General,  U.  S.  Army. 

The  reply  of  Jose  Toral,  the  Spanish  commander  at  Santiago,  was: 

"I  advise  the  foreigners  and  women  and  children  that  they  must  leave 
the  city  before  10  o'clock  to-morrow  morning.  It  is  my  duty  to  say  to  you 
that  this  city  will  not  surrender,  and  that  I  will  inform  the  foreign  consuls 
and  inhabitants  of  the  contents  of  your  message." 

The  British,  Portuguese,  Chinese,  and  Norwegian  consuls  came  to  Gen 
eral  Shaftcr's  lines  and  asked  if  non-combatants  could  occupy  the  town  of 
Caney  and  railroad  points,  and  wanted  until  10  o'clock  of  the  5th  instant 
before  the  city  was  fired  on.  "They  claim" — we  quote  Shafter — "that  there 
are  between  15,000  and  20,000  people,  many  of  them  old,  who  will  leave. 
They  ask  if  I  can  supply  them  with  food,  which  I  cannot  do  for  want  of 
transportation  to  Caney,  which  is  15  miles  from  my  landing." 


THE    FIELD    FIGHTING    FOR    SANTIAGO.  413 

Shafter  concluded  that  solely  in  the  interest  of  the  poor  women  and  chil 
dren  he  would  delay  the  bombardment  until  noon  of  the  5th,  if  in  the  interval 
no  demonstration  was  made  on  the  American  lines,  and  added  in  com 
municating-  this  to  the  Secretary  of  War: 

"I  do  not  know  that  these  extreme  measures  which  I  had  threatened  be 
justifiable  under  the  circumstances,  and  I  submit  the  matter  for  the  action  of 
the  President.  The  little  town  of  Caney  will  not  hold  one  thousand  people, 
and  great  suffering  will  be  occasioned  to  our  friends,  as  we  must  regard  the  peo 
ple  referred  to;  and  it  is  now  filled  with  dead  and  wounded,  the  dead  still 
unburied.  The  consuls  tell  Dorst  that  there  are  not  to  exceed  5,000  troops  in 
the  city.  I  can  hold  my  present  line  and  starve  them  out,  letting  the  non- 
combatants  come  out  leisurely  as  they  run  out  of  food,  and  will  probably  be 
able  to  give  such  as  are  forced  out  by  hunger  food  to  keep  them  alive.  I 
await  your  orders." 

The  Secretary  of  War  responded,  early  in  the  morning  of  the  4th : 

"While  you  would  be  justified  in  beginning  to  shell  Santiago  at  expira 
tion  of  time  limit  set  by  you,  still  under  the  conditions  named  in  your  dispatch 
and  for  humanity's  sake  the  postponement  of  the  bombardment  to  noon  of 
July  5th  is  approved." 

And  later  the  Secretary  continued  to  Shafter: 

"You  are  the  best  judge  of  the  situation,  and  all  the  country  has  every 
faith  in  your  wisdom.  How  are  you  physically,  anyway?" 

The  dispatch  from  Shafter,  showing  depression  so  deep  he  was  consider 
ing  retirement  to  a  line  abandoning  five  miles  of  lands  and  territory,  continued 
to  disturb,  if  not  dismay,  the  War  Office,  as  this  telegram  perfectly  expresses: 

Adjutant-General's  Office,  Washington,  July  4,  1898. 
Major-General  Shafter,  Playa  del  Este,  Cuba: 

After  conference  with  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of  War,  I  am 
directed  to  say  your  continued  illness  brings  sorrow  and  anxiety.  In  case  you 
are  disabled,  General  Wheeler  would,  of  course,  succeed  to  command.  His 
illness,  which  we  also  regret,  is  feared  to  be  so  serious  as  to  prevent  his 
assuming  command.  You  must  determine  whether  your  condition  is  such  as 
to  require  you  to  relinquish  command.  If  so,  and  General  Wheeler  is  dis 
abled,  you  will  order  the  next  general  officer  in  rank  for  duty  to  succeed  you 
and  to  take  up  the  work  in  hand.  It  is  not  expected  that  our  forces  will  make 
assault  until  they  are  ready.  H.  C.  CORBIN,  Adjutant-General. 


4i4  THE    FIELD    FIGHTING    FOR    SANTIAGO. 

The  reply  was  not  thoroughly  reassuring,  but  raised  the  pressure  of 
severe  anxiety  that  might  take  the  form  of  duty  to  order  the  resignation  of 
the  officer  who  was  ill. 

Playa  del  Este,  via  Haiti. 

(Received  Washington,  July  6,  1898 — 5:40  a.  m.) 
Adjutant-General,  Washington: 

Camp  near  Santiago,  Cuba,  5. — I  am  not  at  present  so  much  ill  as 
exhausted  from  the  intense  strain  that  has  been  on  me  for  last  two^  months. 
I  am  also  suffering  from  an  attack  of  gout,  which  prevents  me  from  moving 
about.  I  have,  however,  the  whole  business  in  my  hand,  and  am  managing 
it  through  able  staff  officers.  When  I  do  have  to  give  up  I  will  of  course 
follow  your  order,  but  I  hope  to  be  better  soon.  SHAFTER. 

This  day,  July  6th,  the  Commanding  General  at  Santiago  was  notified  that 
"Hobson  and  men"  were  to  be  exchanged,  and  the  next  day  Shafter  had  the 
pleasure  of  telegraphing : 

''Lieutenant  Hobson  and  all  his  men  have  just  been  received  safely  in 
exchange  for  Spanish  officer  and  prisoners  taken  by  us.  All  are  in  good 
health  except  two  seamen,  convalescent  from  remittent  fever." 

The  apprehensions  of  General  Shafter  as  to  the  safety  of  his  position  when 
he  considered  falling  back  were  in  some  degree  accountable  by  the  state  of  his 
health.  He  was  seriously  sick.  He  is  a  man  of  uncommon  bulk,  and  the 
climate  was  to  him  unexpectedly  trying.  He  could  not  endure  the  full  power 
of  the  sun,  and  suffering  from  an  attack  of  gout  was  an  additional  burden. 

The  line  the  American  troops  occupied  on  the  Friday  night  when  there 
was  such  an  oppression  in  the  atmosphere  was,  as  General  Shafter  described 
it,  "very  thin."  So  exhausting  had  been  the  experiences  of  the  day,  so  many 
men  had  been  killed  and  wounded,  and  so  many  had  been  overcome  by  heat, 
or  fatigued  into  disability,  and  the  carrying  of  the  wounded  to  the  rear  had 
been  a  grievous  labor,  demanding  many  bearers,  that  in  the  judgment  of 
most  competent  officers  not  more  than  three  thousand  of  our  men  were  in  a 
defensive  position.  The  question  was  whether  the  Spaniards  would  advance, 
and  there  was  concern  on  that  subject.  General  Joseph  Wheeler,  instead  of 
yielding  to  his  illness,  managed  to  shake  it  off,  and  was  on  the  thin  line 
encouraging  the  men,  and  expanding  his  conviction  to  them  that  they  were 
safe  from  an  attack  by  the  Spaniards  they  had  driven  before  them ;  that  the 
Spaniards  would  not  dare  to  fling  themselves  against  our  position,  and  must 


THE    FIELD    FIGHTING    FOR    SANTIAGO.  415 

get  the  worst  of  it  if  they  did.  But  the  line,  considering  its  great  extent,  was 
thin,  but  good  as  the  "thin  red  line"  the  British  held  against  the  solid  Russian 
masses,  good  stuff  as  they  were,  at  Balaklava  and  Inkerman.  The  four  dis 
patches  following  display  the  exact  lines  of  the  conditions : 

Playa  del  Este,  via  Haiti. 

(Received  at  Washington  July  5,  1898 — 7  a.  m.) 
Adjutant-General  U.  S.  Army,  Washington : 

i  :oy  p.  m.  Headquarters  United  States  forces  near  San  Juan  River, 
Cuba,  4. — I  regard  as  necessary  that  the  navy  force  an  entrance  into  the  har 
bor  Santiago  not  later  than  6th  instant,  and  assist  in  the  capture  of  the  place. 
If  they  do,  I  believe  the  place  will  surrender  without  further  sacrifice  of  life. 

SHAFTER,  Major-General,  U.  S.  Volunteers. 


Adjutant-General's  Office,  Washington,  July  5,  1898 — 11:20  a.  m. 
Major-General  Shafter,  Playa  del  Este,  Cuba: 

Secretary  of  War  instructs  me  to  say  that  the  President  directs  that  you 
confer  with  Admiral  Sampson  at  once  for  cooperation  in  taking  Santiago. 
After  the  fullest  exchange  of  views,  you  will  agree  upon  the  time  and  manner 
of  attack. 

By  command  Major-General  Miles: 

H.  C.  CORBIN,  Adjutant-General. 


Adjutant-General's  Office,  Washington,  July  5,  1898 — 3:10  p.  m. 
Major-General  Shafter,  Playa  del  Este,  Cuba: 

Your  telegram  this  date  has  been  submitted  to  the  President.  After  con 
sideration,  the  Secretary  of  War  directs  me  to  say  that  it  is  evident  from  your 
several  reports  that  you  do  not  consider  your  force  strong  enough  to  make  a 
successful  assault  upon  the  Spanish  army  entrenched  in  Santiago.  This 
being  the  case,  it  is  the  part  of  wisdom  to  await  reinforcements,  the  embarka 
tion  of  which  yon  have  already  been  advised.  As  you  have  already  been 
advised,  you  must  be  judge  of  the  time  and  manner  of  assault.  The  Presi 
dent  has  directed  that  you  and  Admiral  Sampson  have  a  conference  and 
determine  a  course  of  cooperation  best  calculated  to  secure  desired  results  with 
least  sacrifice. 

By  command  Major-General  Miles: 

H.  C.  CORBIN,  Adjutant-General. 


4i6  THE    FIELD    FIGHTING    FOR    SANTIAGO. 

Adjutant-General's  Office,  Washington,  July  6,  1898 — 2:30  p.  m. 
Maj.  Gen.  W.  R.  Shatter,  Playa  del  Este,  Cuba: 

The  Secretary  of  War  is  anxious  to  know  what  prospect  there  is  of  breaking 
through  the  mines.  He  would  be  very  glad,  even  with  a  delay,  to  have  coopera 
tion  of  the  navy,  thus  saving  many  lives.  The  St.  Paul,  sailing  from  New 
York  to-day,  has  nearly  everything  you  asked  for.  The  lighters,  sent  a  long 
time  since,  ought  to  be  with  you  by  this  time.  We  are  trying  to  make 
arrangements  for  light-draft  steam  vessels  for  carrying  orders,  etc.,  to  be  sent 
you  as  quickly  as  possible.  Can  you  not  procure  from  the  navy  steam 
launches  to  aid  you  in  landing  supplies  and  carrying  dispatches  while  we  are 
getting  crafts  of  our  own  for  that  object.  It  is  expected  you  will  communi 
cate  freely,  setting  forth  any  assistance  that  can  be  given  you  in  the  way  of 
suoplies  of  any  kind. 

By  command  Major-General  Miles: 

H.  C.  CORBIN,  Adjutant-General. 

General  Shatter,  when  his  Santiago  Fouth  of  July  was  but  fifteen  minutes 
old — 12:15  a.  m. — had  accounted  for  being  too  busy  to  telegraph  the  current 
intelligence  to  the  President  and  Secretary  of  War,  who  waited  in  vain 
until  four  in  the  morning,  that  he  did  not  want  to  be  sending  what  might  not 
be  confirmed,  and  there  was  a  further  embarrassment  in  "the  tremendous 
fighting  capabilities  shown  by  the  enemy."  The  words  that  followed — "from 
his  almost  impregnable  position" — did  not  take  away  the  great  compliment 
which  ought  to  be  useful  to  Spain  in  her  home  rule,  for  the  good  positions, 
though  they  may  be  defended  by  fighting  men  instinctively,  are  not  found 
marked  out  and  made  almost  impregnable  accidentally. 


CHAPTER   XIX. 

The  Strange  Story  of  the  Secret  Official  Cipher  of  Spain. 

The  Cables  that  Passed  Between  Sagasta,  Blanco,  Cervera,  Correa  and  Linares  During  the 
Crisis  of  the  Spanish  War  in  Cuba — A  Diary  Telegraphed  from  Santiago  to  Havana, 
Giving  the  Inside  of  Spanish  Affairs  from  the  Attack  to  the  Surrender — Cervera  not  Well 
Fitted  out,  Forced  to  Flight,  Protesting  that  he  was  Going  to  Destruction — The  Cables 
Are  a  Gallery  of  Paintings  of  Spanfsh  Character. 

In  association  with  the  official  history  of  the  war  between  the  United 
States  and  Spain,  as  recorded  in  our  departments  of  War  and  the  Navy,  and 
published  officially  for  the  information  of  all  nations  and  people,  we  are 
indebted  to  the  journalistic  investments  in  the  news  of  the  day — the  liberal 
purchase  of  intelligence  in  the  market — for  the  unquestionably  authentic 
cable  and  wire  dispatches  of  the  Spanish  Cabinet,  the  Premier  and  Ministers 
of  War  and  Navy ;  General  Blanco,  Admiral  Cervera,  the  military  commander 
of  the  defenders  of  Santiago,  the  spies  of  Spain  in  Canada,  and  others,  com 
municating  with  each  other,  privately  and  confidentially,  in  the  crisis  of  the 
struggle  between  the  several  storm  centers  of  the  Spaniards — Madrid,  Santi 
ago  and  Havana — stating  without  reservation  the  "true  inwardness"  of  their 
most  important  trusts,  exposing  their  own  shams,  expressing  facts,  exchang 
ing  opinions,  giving  orders,  embodying  the  secrets  of  State,  camp,  field,  fleet 
and  city.  These  cablegrams  and  telegrams  are  simply  the  Spanish  war 
secrets  revealing,  presenting  nakedly  their  fears  and  hopes,  jealousies  and 
sentiments,  public  and  personal.  The  grim  privacies  of  many  wars  have  been 
revealed,  after  the  lapse  of  many  years,  in  the  examination  of  musty  papers 
from  personal  collections,  and  the  disturbance  in  pigeon  holes  of  reserved 
documents,  too  momentous  to  trust  to  the  world  until  the  generation  of  their 
production  was  gone  and  the  freshness  of  their  significance  made  dull  by  the 

417 


418  STORY    OF    THE    SECRET    OFFICIAL    CIPHER. 

passage  of  time,  but  this  ancient  history  was  stinted,  not  merely  by  public  and 
personal  policy,  but  on  account  of  the  limitations  of  the  methods  in  old  times 
of  exchanging  facts  and  ideas,  and  of  the  preservation  in  permanent  form  of 
the  precise  words  of  conversations,  and  therefore  the  inexactness  of  all  ways  of 
conveying  messages.  The  introduction  of  telegraphy,  the  almost  universal 
use  of  the  wire,  and  the  reduction  of  messages  to  writing,  changes  many  con 
ditions  and  contributes  mechanically  to  the  veracity  of  the  wonderfully  com 
plete  material  of  history,  never  so  strikingly  illustrated  as  in  this  volume,  the 
purpose  of  whose  author  is  to  tell  the  story  of  the  war  in  the  words  of  those 
whose  deeds  are  celebrated ;  not  the  elaborated  after-thoughts  of  the  actors, 
but  their  hot  words  in  action.  Here  are  thousands  of  snap  shots,  true  as  the 
Kodak,  picturing  the  thoughts  of  men  responsible  for  decisions  in  masterful 
minutes,  setting  forth  strongly  as  if  painted  in  colors  the  strokes  of  will  power 
that  were  materialized  in  events.  It  seems  almost  incredible  that  we  have 
already  in  print  the  records  of  Spain's  unhappy  war,  as  written  by  those  who 
were  the  chieftains  entrusted  with  the  fleets  and  armies  of  the  kingdom,  in. 
the  capitals  of  Spain  and  Cuba,  and  in  Santiago,  the  city  made  memorable  in 
bombardments,  by  modern  ships  of  old  style  fortresses,  and  desperate  battles 
afloat  and  ashore,  in  which  both  sides  had  blood  on  their  hands  and  breasts. 

The  dispatches  that  we  give  were  the  discovery  of  the  New  York  Journal, 
and  of  course  made  their  first  appearance  in  the  pages  of  that  paper.  There 
are  two  facts  that  account  for  this  publication,  and  the  first  in  order  may  be 
mentioned  now  that  the  flag  of  the  United  States  floats  over  Cuba. 

The  telegraphic  operators  on  the  island  did  not,  as  a  class,  regard  the 
Spanish  cause  or  officers  with  favor,  and  they  and  other  young  men  having 
the  handling  of  instruments  for  the  transmission  and  the  transfiguration  of 
intelligence  were  like  minded.  Many  a  Spanish  secret  was  clicked  away 
according  to  the  Morse  alphabet,  or  conveyed  by  the  soundless  signals  with 
forefingers  that  experts  give  and  take.  An  operator  says  to  a  reporter,  both 
telegraphers,  at  a  way-station  on  a  railroad,  for  instance,  as  a  message  with 
pith  in  it  is  on  the  wire:  "Here,  listen  to  this!"  and  the  sounds  are  translated 
into  characters  that  are  imperishable,  if  that  which  they  contain  has  the 
indestructible  vitality  of  truth.  Then  the  Spanish  official  is  apt  to  be  cor 
rupted  by  the  large  latitude  with  which  he  interprets  the  word  concessions. 
There  was  a  time  when,  as  a  matter  of  business,  cartridges  sold  to  the  insur 
gents  were  carried  out  of  Morro  Castle  in  market  baskets.  A  golden  key 


THE  CHURCH  AT   EL   CANEY. 


STORY    OF    THE    SECRET    OFFICIAL    CIPHER.  421 

unlocks  more  secrets  in  Spain  than  in  countries  where  officialism  is  less  firmly 
commissioned  and  strictly  classified. 

The  Journal  was  able  to  say: 

"Very  interesting  are  the  almost  daily  bulletins  of  movements  of  the 
American  army  and  navy  from  the  Spanish  spies  at  Montreal.  The  originals 
of  these  documents  have  been  kept  in  the  Captain-General's  safe  in  Havana,  and 
were  copied  from  the  original  Spanish  by  a  Journal  representative,  and  were 
then  carefully  translated  into  English.  The  Journal  has  in  its  possession 
full  copies  in  the  original  Spanish. ' ' 

We  give  preference  in  the  order  of  presentation  of  the  dispatches  to  the 
story  of  Santiago  as  cabled  from  Captain  Dedemonte,  the  commander  of  the 
naval  station  at  Santiago,  to  Admiral  Ventura  Manterola,  at  the  Navy  Yard, 
Havana : 

April  12,  1898. — Molins  and  Galicia  will  probably  leave  on  Saturday. 
Both  went  to-day  to  arrange  the  defense  at  the  mouth  of  the  harbor,  which  the 
Mercedes  had  been  guarding.  They  planted. the  first  group  of  torpedoes  this 
morning,  and  began  work  on  the  second  group. 

April  14. — Ship  arrived  to-day  with  6,000  tons  of  coal. 

April  24. — I  have  requested  permission  to  extinguish  the  lights  at  the 
mouth  of  the  harbor. 

April  21. — The  first  line  of  electric  torpedoes  is  ready. 

April  28. — The  Mercedes  has  sent  ashore  her  1 6-centimeter  Hontoria 
guns.  The  huts  in  which  are  stationed  the  men  who  guard  the  torpedoes  are 
defended  with  a  Nordenfeldt  and  four  machine  guns,  all  served  by  sailors  from 
the  Mercedes. 

May  i. — Two  lines  of  electric  torpedoes  are  now  fully  installed. 

May  9. — Two  1 6-centimeter  Hontoria  guns  have  been  added  to  the  Zocapa 
fortifications.  German  steamer  Polaria  has  arrived  with  a  case  of  explosives. 

May  5. — Since  one  o'clock  this  morning  two  ships,  believed  to  be  Ameri 
can,  have  been  standing  off  the  mouth  of  the  harbor.  One  of  them,  with  all 
her  lights  shaded,  approached  within  a  pistol  shot  of  Morro.  As  soon  as  she 
was  discovered  by  the  tug  on  guard  there  she  turned  and  fled,  and  was  later 
seen  to  exchange  signals  with  the  other.  I  think  they  were  trying  to  cut  the 
cable.  It  is  not  probable  that  they  were  endeavoring  to  destroy  the  submarine 
torpedoes.  At  dawn  neither  of  them  could  be  seen. 

May  1 8. — A  small  vessel,  which  looked  like  the  one  that  tried  to  cut  the 


422  STORY    OF    THE    SECRET    OFFICIAL    CIPHER. 

cable,  and  a  large  transatlantic  steamer,  converted  into  a  war  ship,  have 
exchanged  shots  with  the  forts  at  the  mouth  of  the  harbor.  No  damage  was 
done  on  either  side.  At  4  o'clock  this  afternoon  both  ships  sailed  away. 
The  light  at  Morro  Castle  has  been  extinguished. 

May  19. — Maria  Teresa,  Oquendo,  Colon,  Vizcaya,  and  Pluton  have  just 
entered  Port. 

May  23. — Four  ships  of  the  enemy  are  reported. 

May  25. — At  dawn  this  morning  two  of  the  enemy's  ships  captured  an 
English  steamer. 

May  26. — Six  of  the  enemy's  ships  reported.  Although  the  squadron  has 
taken  on  1,300  tons  of  coal,  yet  it  has  not  enough. 

May  31. — Blockading  fleet  has  just  finished  firing  on  the  batteries  at  the 
mouth  of  the  harbor.  The  enemy  kept  up  the  firing  for  an  hour  and  a  half. 
Not  one  of  our  men  even  wounded,  and  no  damage  whatever  done.  It  is 
believed  that  Iowa  and  another  ironclad  were  badly  injured,  and  another  of 
the  ships  set  on  fire.  All  of  their  big  ships  engaged  in  the  fight.  Our  Colon 
enfiladed  the  entrance  to  the  canal  with  a  disastrous  fire,  as  did  the  guns  of  the 
Mercedes,  which  had  been  mounted  on  land.  Our  ships  in  the  harbor  also 
took  part,  throwing  a  number  of  projectiles  at  a  high  elevation.  Grand 
enthusiasm;  excellent  feeling.  . 

June  i. — Crew  of  the  Mercedes  thanks  you  most  sincerely  for  your  con 
gratulation.  I  recommend  very  highly  for  promotion  the  brave  Ensign 
Venancia  Nardiz,  who  commands  the  land  battery;  his  companion,  Ricardo 
Bruguedas,  and  Artillerist  Antonio  Raga. 

June  3. — The  enemy's  ship  Merrimac  tried  to  force  the  entrance  at  half- 
past  three  this  morning.  She  was  discovered  in  her  attempt,  and  Morro 
immediately  opened  fire  upon  her,  followed  in  lively  fashion  by  the  inner 
fortress  of  the  fort,  and  by  the  battery  manned  by  the  sailors  from  the  Mer 
cedes.  The  Mercedes  and  the  two  torpedo  boat  destroyers  later  joined  the 
combat.  Our  disastrous  fire  sunk  the  ship  in  the  channel.  It  does  not  wholly 
block  the  entrance.  No  damage  whatever  was  done  to  us.  We  captured  a 
lieutenant  and  seven  sailors. 

June  4. — The  squadron  has  exhausted  the  stock  of  powdered  coal. 

June  5. — The  squadron  needs  at  least  seventeen  hundred  tons  of  coal  to 
refill  its  bunkers. 

June  6. — Announcement  of  the  landing  of  the  enemy  at  Aguadores  was 


STORY    OF    THE    SECRET    OFFICIAL    CIPHER.  423 

an  error  of  Morro.  Firing  was  exceedingly  lively  by  the  squadron  for  three 
hours.  No  damage  done  to  ships  of  our  squadron,  but  six  were  killed  on  the 
Reina  Mercedes;  among  them  was  Lieutenant-Commander  Don  Emilio 
Acosta.  Three  were  seriously  wounded,  and  a  large  number  only  slightly. 
Among  the  latter  were  Ensign  Alexandro  Bolino,  temporarily  on  the  Reina 
Mercedes,  and  the  boatswain. 

June  7. — In  battle  yesterday  Reina  Mercedes  was  badly  injured.  She  was 
twice  set  on  fire  by  shells  of  the  enemy.  Lieutenant-Commander  dead. 

June  9. — Nineteen  ships  reported. 

June  ii. — Seventeen  ships  reported. 

June  12. — Seventeen  ships  reported. 

June  13. — Thirteen  ships  reported. 

June  14. — Early  this  morning  enemy's  ships  opened  fire  on  the  batteries 
at  the  mouth  of  the  harbor.  Three  ships  took  part.  R.  Bruquetas  and  two 
marines  slightly  wounded.  At  midnight  the  batteries  fired  at  random  at  the 
enemy's  ships.  Fourteen  ships  now  on  the  blockading  stations. 

June  1 6. — During  the  bombardment  to-day  one  sailor  was  seriously 
wounded  and  three  others  slightly  so,  while  one  marine  and  one  sailor,  both 
stationed  on  the  Mercedes,  were  killed.  Fourteen  ships  on"  the  blockading 
station.  According  to  Morro,  the  dynamite  crusier  Vesuvius  here  since 
yesterday. 

June  17. — The  ship  Sumefido  (?)  has  been  sunk  in  the  middle  of  the 
canal,  near  Zocapa  Point.  It  does  not  obstruct  the  passage  of  large  ships. 
She  was  sunk  in  twelve  fathoms  of  water. 

June  1 8. — The  form  of  the  blockading  line  is  that  of  an  arch,  whose 
points  rest  on  Punta  Cabrera,  on  the  west,  and  Aguadores  on  the  east.  The 
ships  of  the  enemy  are  all  the  time  appearing  and  disappearing  toward  the 
east.  An  night  they  flood  the  coast  and  the  entrance  of  the  harbor  incessantly 
with  light  from  the  electric  searchlights,  and  when  they  are  on  blockading 
duty  they  never  station  themselves  farther  than  eight  miles  from  Morro,  while 
at  Cabrera  and  Aguadores  they  stand  in  as  close  as  three.  There  are  four 
teen  ships  now  on  the  line.  Our  wounded  are  doing  well.  It  is  exactly  a 
month  to-day  since  they  fired  the  first  shot  against  us.  Since  that  time  they 
have  discharged  over  four  thousand  projectiles,  causing  us  no  material  dam 
age  whatever,  and  only  insignificant  injuries. 

June  21. — The  Admiral  of  our  squadron  has  had  more  Bustamente  tor- 


424  STORY    OF    THE    SECRET    OFFICIAL    CIPHER. 

pedocs  planted  in  the  harbor.  Since  last  night  four  were  placed  between 
Cayo  Smith  and  the  ship  Sumerfido  (?),  and  three  between  that  ship  and  Punta 
Solado.  At  3:50  o'clock  this  afternoon  thirty-nine  ships  of  the  enemy  returned 
unexpectedly.  They  had  sailed  early  this  morning,  going  eastward.  There 
are  sixty  now  in  sight  from  Morro.  The  thirty-nine  that  left  early  this  morn 
ing  had  large  bodies  of  troops  on  board  of  them.  I  have  reason  to  believe  that 
they  expect  to  land  at  once  at  Guantanamo. 

(Several  other  dispatches  sent  during  later  hours  of  the  afternoon  and 
night  of  this  date,  June  2ist,  indicate  that  the  lookout  man  at  El  Morro  was 
kept  busy  tallying  our  ships  by  the  frequent  departures  of  transports.) 

June  22. — According  to  information  received  from  El  Morro,  the  enemy 
began  embarking  troops  early  this  morning  at  Berracos,  while  their  ships  kept 
up  a  furious  bombardment  of  the  coast,  El  Morro  and  the  battery  at  the 
mouth  of  the  harbor. 

June  23. — In  front  of  the  mouth  of  the  harbor  are  eight  iron-clads,  two 
torpedo  boats,  and  the  Vesuvius  and  eight  transports,  the  remainder  up  to 
71  having  gone  down  the  coast.  We  believe  that  the  landing  of  troops  is 
continuing. 

June  24. — Twenty-two  ships  blockading  the  port.  The  remainder  up  to 
63  are  at  Baiquiri.  Others  are  bombarding  the  coast. 

The  Admiral  has  caused  the  Mercedes  to  be  anchored  within  the  harbor. 
He  says  he  now  has  provisions  for  sixty  days. 

June  25. — Alvarado  has  provisions  for  forty-five  days. 

I  learn  from  the  Military  Governor  that  the  troops  of  the  enemy  must 
have  suffered  very  severely  from  the  fire  of  our  men,  who  compelled  them  to 
abandon  their  position. 

June  26. — In  one  storehouse  alone  there  are  4,800  rations  at  the  disposal 
of  Admiral's  squadron.  Forty-two  ships  in  sight  on  station.  El  Morro  says 
that  last  night  Vesuvius  fired  two  dynamite  shells,  which  completely  destroyed 
the  house  of  the  torpedo  officer  and  caused  great  injury  in  the  fortress,  result 
ing  in  three  sailors  of  the  Reina  Mercedes  being  wounded. 

June  27. — Morro  says  that  Vesuvius  fired  three  more  dynamite  shells  last 
night,  but  they  did  no  damage,  for  they  fell  in  the  water. 

July  i. — Since  early  this  morning  a  battle  has  been  in  progress  with  more 
or  less  vigor  between  our  troops  and  the  enemy,  lasting  until  2  o'clock  this 
afternoon.  A  few  shells  fell  in  the  city,  causing  great  commotion.  A  few  of 


STORY    OF    THE    SECRET    OFFICIAL    CIPHER.  427 

the  ships  fired  at  an  elevation  with  the  object  of  hitting  the  ships  of  our 
squadron,  but  failed  to  do  so.  I  have  not  yet  learned  of  the  result  of  the 
battle  on  land.  Captain  Bustamente,  of  the  navy,  is  seriously  wounded.  It  is' 
said  that  General  Vara  del  Reye  was  killed,  together  with  many  other  officers, 
and  that  many  officers  have  also  been  wounded.  Killed  and  wounded  among 
the  troops  will  reach  a  high  figure.  General  Linares  was  also  wounded.  Day 
before  yesterday  squadron  of  the  enemy  captured  steamer  which  was 
endeavoring  to  enter  this  port.  A  captive  balloon  was  sent  up  from  the 
camp  of  the  enemy  and  inspected  our  advance  positions  and  probably 
harbor  also. 

July  2. — The  battles  on  land  and  sea  were  renewed  this  morning,  the 
squadron  of  the  enemy  firing  on  the  batteries  of  the  fort,  and  our  ships.  The 
firing  is  spirited.  At  8  o'clock  the  firing  ceased.  Our  losses  were  three  killed 
and  three  wounded — at  the  Reina  Mercedes  battery  at  Punta  Gorda.  Among 
the  wounded  are  Ensign  Peina  and  a  sailor  from  the  Mercedes.  The  Zocapa 
battery  has  been  silenced. 

July  3. — Our  squadron  has  left.  It  was  met  outside  by  a  very  sharp  fire 
from  the  enemy's  ships.  It  has  apparently  succeeded  in  running  the  block 
ade,  going  out  of  sight  of  land  in  a  westerly  direction. 

June  4. — One  hundred  and  eight  members  of  the  crews  of  the  Pluton, 
Terror  and  Infanta  Maria  Teresa  have  arrived  here.  Not  a  single  officer 
among  them.  Nobody  has  any  definite  news  of  the  Admiral.  Military 
Governor  has  sent  a  cablegram  for  the  General-in-Chief,  instructing  me  to 
sink  at  the  mouth  of  the  harbor  the  Reina  Mercedes.  This  will  be  done 
to-night. 

Enemy  bombarded  again  to-day.  Enemy  apparently  intends  to  force  the 
port.  I  have  confidence  in  the  first  line  of  electric  torpedoes,  but  there  are 
only  four  in  the  second  line,  the  rest  having  been  raised  to  enable  our  squad 
ron  to  pass  out.  I  have  proposed  to  the  Military  Governor  to  sink  the  Reina 
Mercedes  across  the  channel  in  eight  fathoms  of  water.  He  is  now  consulting 
with  the  General-in-Chief.  Reina  Mercedes  is  without  armament,  crew  or 
officers,  her  batteries  having  been  sent  to  the  mouth  of  the  harbor.  Her  boil 
ers  are  worthless.  I  consider  our  situation  as  grave. 

July  5. — There  are  twenty-four  ships  of  the  enemy  in  sight  at  dusk. 
Reina  Mercedes  was  sunk  at  the  mouth  of  the  harbor  by  the  guns  of  the 
enemy. 


428  STORY    OF    THE    SECRET    OFFICIAL    CIPHER. 

July  10. — At  9  o'clock  this  morning  there  were  twenty-four  ships  of  the 
enemy  on  blockading  station,  and  an  abundance  of  American  troops  on  land. 
Rebels  on  every  side  of  us  also.  Although  the  bombardment  has  ceased,  it 
seems  that  there  is  a  suspension  of  hostilities,  but  for  what  purpose  I  do  not 
know.  From  half-past  4  to  half-past  6  the  firing  between  our  troops  and  the 
enemy  has  been  exceedingly  lively.  A  few  projectiles  fell  among  the  ships  of 
the  squadron  and  the  land  batteries.  We  drove  the  enemy  from  the  first  line 
of  trenches.  Our  loss  not  heavy.  Our  men  behaved  with  rare  courage.  If 
we  had  had  an  abundance  of  ammunition  we  would  have  inflicted  a  severe 
blow  on  the  enemy. 

July  ii. — Random  firing  between  the  advanced  lines  of  both  sides.  Two 
ironclads  at  the  mouth  of  the  harbor,  two  in  Baiquiri  and  fifteen  at  different 
points  toward  the  east.  From  9  to  2  the  enemy's  ships  have  been  firing  on 
the  city,  using  projectiles  of  large  caliber,  but  a  majority  of  them  fell  short  of 
their  mark  and  exploded  in  the  bay.  Several  buildings  were  damaged. 

July  12. — Situation  the  same,  but  firing  has  ceased  for  the  sake  of  a 
parley. 

July  13. — Both  sides  have  agreed  to  cease  firing  till  12  o'clock  to-morrow. 

July  16. — Suspension  of  hostilities  continued,  General  Toral  holding  con 
ferences  with  American  General.  I  believe  that  the  capitulation,  in  the  event 
of  that  being  the  result  of  the  conferences,  will  be  on  the  basis  of  the  repatria 
tion  of  our  men  and  those  of  the  squadron  and  the  Reina  Mercedes.  Number 
of  people  dying  from  hunger  and  the  like  is  increasing.  Military  Governor  has 
issued  a  decree  against  pillage,  robbery  and  incendiarism.  There  are  in  Cuba 
to-day  50,000  Americans,  sixty  cannon,  the  squadron  and  the  rebels. 

July  17. — The  city  has  capitulated,  and  over  it  and  the  Alvarado  the 
American  flag,  has  been  raised.  Thus  ends  my  authority,  as  well  as  that  of 
my  associates  on  this  naval  station. 


This  diary  is  only  remarkable  because  it  was  written  day  by  day  in 
Santiago  anda  sent  to  Havana,  and  shows  the  shifting  shades  of  the  situation. 
We  reproduce,  according  to  their  dates,  the  Spanish  cipher  cables  that  the 
Journal  certifies  are  accurate  and  careful  translations  from  the  original  Span 
ish  copies  of  the  cipher  dispatches,  as  they  were  received  or  sent  by  Captain 
General  Blanco: 


•STORY  OF  THE  SECRET  OFFICIAL  CIPHER.         429 

Admiral  Cervera  reports  his  arrival  at  Santiago : 

Santiago,  May  19,  1898. 
Captain-General  Blanco,  Havana: 

Arrived  to-day  in  this  port,  where  the  entire  squadron,  desirous  of  cooper 
ating  in  defense  of  the  country,  has  the  pleasure  of  saluting  you. 

CERVERA. 


Linares,  at  Santiago,  reports  Cervera's  squadron: 

May  19,  1898. 

Captain-General  Blanco,  Havana: 

Cervera's  squadron  arrived  here  at  7  o'clock  this  morning,  the  Maria 
Teresa  flying  the  flag  of  the  Admiral.  The  Colon  brings  neither  her  forward 
nor  stern  guns,  not  having  been  able  to  mount  them.  The  squadron  is  com 
posed  of  the  cruisers  Teresa,  Oquendo,  Vizcaya  and  Colon,  the  torpedo  boat 
destroyers  Pluton  and  Furor,  and  two  steamers  of  the  Transatlantic  Line. 
The  Terror  remained  in  Martinique,  repairing  the  damages  sustained  on  the 
voyage.  The  Alicante  is  with  the  Terror.  They  both  need  coal  and  pro 
visions.  By  reason  of  the  increase  in  consumption  caused  by  the  arrival  of 
the  squadron,  the  provisions  of  this  place  will  only  hold  out  until  the  end  of 
June.  LINARES. 

Blanco  cables  Cervera  can't  fight: 

Havana,  May  20,  1898. 
General  Correa,  Minister  of  War,  Madrid : 

Cervera's  squadron  has  arrived  at  Santiago  de  Cuba,  without  the  Terror, 
which  remained  at  Martinique  with  the  Alicante,  both  blockaded  by  the  ships 
of  the  enemy.  The  squadron  comes  without  provisions  or  coal,  which  it  will 
take  on  there,  but  it  will  not  be  able  to  remain  a  long  time,  since  it  would 
expose  itself  to  be  blockaded,  thus  shutting  itself  off  completely  and  limiting 
itself  to  the  scant  resources  of  the  city  If  it  had  brought  the  Pelayo  and  the 
Carlos  Quinto  and  a  flotilla  of  torpedo  boats,  it  would  be  able  to  attempt 
something  important  and  to  contribute  powerfully  to  the  defense  of  the  island. 
Reduced  as  it  is,  however,  it  will  be  obliged  to  avoid  a  combat  as  much  as 
possible,  limiting  itself  to  maneuvers  which  will  not  expose  it  to  dangers,  but 
which,  on  the  other  hand,  cannot  produce  great  results.  The  squadron  has 
not  brought  with  it  any  transport,  either  with  coal  or  provisions,  which  would 
have  been  as  advantageous  for  us  as  arms  and  ammunition.  The  question  of 


430  STORY    OF    THE    SECRET    OFFICIAL    CIPHER. 

provisions  threatens  to  be  very  serious,  for  hardly  enough  remains  for  one 
month.  The  efforts  which  I  have  been  making  to  obtain  supplies  have  thus 
far  been  without  success.  The  only  thing  that  can  be  done  is  to  arm  some 
fast  transatlantic  steamers  and  send  them  to  run  the  blockade,  advising  me  of 
the  probable  date  of  their  arrival,  so  that  we  may  distract  the  attention  of  the 
enemy.  I  have  to-day  issued  a  decree  suppressing  all  the  duties  on  merchan 
dise  and  making  every  port  of  the  island  free.  I  consider  it  indispensable 
that  the  squadron  of  Cervera  be  reinforced  as  much  as  possible,  and  that  the 
torpedo  boat  destroyers  be  sent  here  to  increase  our  strength.  I  am  assured 
on  good  authority  that  the  enemy  plans  invasion  with  28,000  men  next  week. 

BLANCO. 


Linares's  impressions  of  Cervera's  fleet: 

Santiago,  May  20,  1898. 
Captain-General  Blanco,  Havana: 

Yesterday,  when  I  gave  an  account  of  the  number  of  ships  and  their 
classes  composing  the  squadron,  I  did  not  send  you  my  impressions,  expecting 
to  confer  with  the  Admiral,  because  I  supposed  that  you  were  fully  informed. 
Neither  here  nor  in  the  Peninsula  is  there  available  a  better  squadron  than 
that  of  Cervera,  who  says  that  he  can  only  be  reinforced  with  the  Carlos 
Quinto,  but  no  cruiser,  nor  the  Pelayo.  If  they  have  continued  mounting 
their  old  armament  they  could  not  be  expected  to  strengthen  the  other 
vessels,  since  they  would  lack  the  facilities  for  coping  with  vessels  enjoying 
modern  equipments.  As  it  now  stands,  Cervera's  squadron  cannot  go  out 
and  search  a  battle.  It  will  have  to  limit  itself  to  maneuvering  cleverly  in 
order  not  to  compromise  any  portion  of  our  naval  power.  If  it  remains  here 
long  enough  it  will  be  blockaded,  and  thus  completely  shut  off  from  com 
munication,  and  reduced  to  the  scant  resources  of  this  place.  It  is  my  duty 
to  lay  before  you  clearly  the  situation  and  to  assure  you  that  I  will  meet  all 
the  dangers  of  the  situation  with  all  energy.  However,  the  government 
should  know  the  real  state  of  affairs,  so  that  if  the  naval  forces  and  the  army 
should  be  unable  to  accomplish  anything,  the  failure  will  not  be  attributed  to 
lack  of  skill  and  bungling.  I  have  furnished  to  the  squadron  2,400  tons  of 
coal,  600  from  the  San  Luis  Railroad  Company's  storehouse,  and  1,800  from 
the  Yuruago  and  Baiquiri  mines.  LINARES. 


STORY    OF    THE    SECRET    OFFICIAL    CIPHER.  431 

Spanish  government's  understanding  of  Cervera's  position: 

Madrid,  May  21,  1898. 
Captain-General  Blanco,  Havana: 

In  the  name  of  the  government  I  thank  you  for  your  congratulation  in 
regard  to  the  safe  arrival  of  Cervera's  squadron.  The  Admiral  says  that  he 
expects  to  provision  it  in  as  short  a  time  as  possible,  because  it  is  his  opinion 
that  that  place  (Santiago)  will  shortly  be  in  a  very  difficult  position.  He, 
however,  asks  that  reinforcements  be  sent  to  him.  Assure  him  that  the 
government  appreciates  the  gravity  of  affairs,  and  is  fully  alive  to  the 
situation.  CORREA. 

Spanish  Consul  at  Montreal  tells  of  Schley's  departure: 

Montreal,  May  22,  1898. 
Captain-General  Blanco,  Madrid: 

Schley's  squadron  has  sailed  for  the  south  of  Cuba.  It  is  composed  of 
four  monitors  and  a  coast  defense  vessel.  BONILLA. 

Blanco  reports  a  British  collier: 

Havana,  May  22,  1898. 
General  Linares,  Santiago: 

I  have  information  that  the  American  battleship  Iowa  and  the  American 
cruiser  Brooklyn  and  two  other  large  ships  and  three  small  ones  are  off 
Cienfuegos.  I  have  also  to  inform  you  that  an  English  ship  loaded  with  coal 
has  sailed  from  Curacoa  for  Santiago.  BLANCO. 

Spying  on  our  fleets : 

Santiago,  May  23,  1898. 
Captain-General  Blanco,  Havana: 

The  two  ships  of  the  enemy  which  withdrew  yesterday,  going  westward, 
returned  this  morning  with  another  cruiser.  LINARES. 

Havana.  May  23,  1898. 
General  Linares,  Santiago: 

The  Indiana,  the  New  York,  Montgomery,  Dolphin,  Wilmington,  and 
three  other  cruisers,  left  the  blockading  station  off  Havana  to-day. 

BLANCO. 


432  STORY    OF    THE    SECRET    OFFICIAL    CIPHER. 

Santiago,  May  23,  1898. 
Captain-General  Blanco,  Havana: 

The  squadron  will  leave  to-morrow  morning.  I  do  not  know  what  direc 
tion  it  will  take.  It  is  said  it  will  abandon  the  coasts  of  Cuba. 

LINARES. 

Montreal,  May  23,  1898. 
Captain-General  Blanco,  Havana: 

Four  powerful  war  ships  sailed  on  the  2ist,  with  instructions  to  find  and 
destroy  Cervera's  squadron.  The  Cincinnati  and  Vesuvius  have  been  sent  to 
patrol  the  Yucatan  Channel.  BONILLA 

Havana   May  24,  1898 
General  Linares,  Santiago: 

Be  sure  and  notify  me  of  departure  of  squadron.  Am  eager  to  learn  of 
its  departure.  BLANCO. 

Cervera  decides  to  stay  at  Santiago : 

Santiago,  May  24,  1898. 
Captain-General  Blanco,  Havana: 

Cervera,  after  having  consulted  with  the  commanders  of  his  various  ships, 
has  been  to  see  me.  He  has  decided  to  remain  here  until  assured  that  he 
will  not  be  pursued  by  the  Americans  when  he  endeavors  to  leave  the  port. 
He  will  wait  until  they  make  a  move  on  Porto  Rico.  He  thinks  it  will  be 
best  to  go  to  Curacoa.  Unless  the  future  movements  of  the  enemy  should 
change  the  situation  he  does  not  think  it  would  be  well  to  go  to  Cienfuegos,  a 
point  which  is  connected  with  Havana  and  other  places  with  resources  and 
provisions.  A  few  ships  could  close  the  narrow  mouth  of  this  port  and  render 
difficult  for  an  indefinite  time  a  departure  from  it.  Thus  the  American  forces 
would  be  permitted  to  resume  without  embarrassment  the  attack  on  Havana, 
with  the  moral  advantage  of  having  rendered  our  squadron  useless. 

LINARES. 

Blanco's  wishes  for  success: 

Havana,  May  24,  1898. 
General  Linares,  Santiago: 

Your  observations  regarding  the  squadron  very  acceptable.  If  it  had 
gone  to  Cienfuegos  it  would  certainly  have  entered  that  port  without  incident. 
Your  situation  is  certainly  difficult  to-day,  for  the  reasons  which  you  indicate, 


STORY    OF    THE    SECRET    OFFICIAL    CIPHER.  433 

but  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  ingenuity  and  valor  of  your  Admiral  and  other 
chiefs  will  enable  a  departure  from  there  to  be  made  with  success,  for  which  I 
offer  you  again  my  sincerest  wishes.  BLANCO. 


Cervera  warned  against  being  "bottled  up": 

Havana,  May  24    1898. 
General  Linares,  Santiago: 

Oregon  arrived  to-day  at  Key  West.  The  flying  squadron  will  move  upon 
Santiago  to-day,  and  Sampson  expects  to  arrive  to-morrow.  Report  to 
Cervera  that  he  may  take  steps  to  prevent  himself  from  being  shut  up  in  the 
harbor.  BLANCO. 

Blanco  encourages  Madrid  : 

Havana,  May  27,  1898. 
General  Corea,  Minister  of  War,  Madrid  : 

Cervera'  s  squadron  has  made  a  great  impression  on  the  Americans.  They 
have  dispatched  seven  ships  to  Santiago.  BLANCO. 


Spanish  Consul  sends  word  of  Hobson's  plan: 

Montreal,  May  27,  1898. 
Captain-General  Blanco,  Havana: 

Believing  that  our  squadron  is  in  Santiago,  the  government  of  the  United 
States  is  thinking  of  sinking  large  hulks  at  the  entrance  of  the  bay  after  the 
destruction  of  the  fortifications.  I  advise  that  notice  of  this  be  sent  to  our 
squadron.  The  American  government  announces  an  agreement  with  Maximo 
Gomez.  It  is  said  that  a  steamer  will  touch  at  Key  West  very  soon  to  take  on 
an  expedition,  which  will  disembark  at  various  points.  BONILLA. 


Correa,  Minister  of  War,  much  pleased: 

Madrid,  May  30,  1898. 
Captain-General  Blanco,  Havana: 

The  belief  that  General  Linares  is  not  in  cable  communication  with  you 
and  the  interruption  of  the  telegraphic  land  line  cause  us  to  notify  you  that  we 
will  expect  you  to  send  us  information  of  the  Eastern  Department  and  of 
Cervera  as  you  may  receive  it.  The  last  paragraph  of  your  dispatch  has 
created  a  very  favorable  impression  on  the  government.  CORREA. 


434  .STORY    OF    THE    SECRET    OFFICIAL    CIPHER. 

Plot  to  smash  Dewey: 

Madrid,  June  3,  1898. 
Captain-General  Blanco,  Havana: 

The  very  serious  situation  in  the  Philippines  compels  us  to  send  there 
ships  and  reinforcements  of  troops  as  soon  as  possible.  In  order  to  be  able  to 
cope  with  the  squadron  of  the  enemy  in  Manila,  it  will  be  indispensable  to 
send  there  a  squadron  that  is  not  inferior.  Now  there  are  only  two  ships  of 
war  there,  and  one  of  them,  I  think,  cannot  pass  the  canal.  The  only  thing 
that  we  can  do  is  to  send  such  ships  of  Cervera's  squadron  as  may  be  able  to 
leave  Santiago,  but  before  adopting  a  resolution  to  that  effect  the  government 
desires  to  know  your  opinion  as  to  the  effect  that  would  be  produced  in  the 
people  of  Cuba  by  the  withdrawal  of  Cervera's  squadron.  This  move  would 
be  only  temporary,  and,  once  the  object  was  obtained  in  the  Philippines,  the 
squadron  would  return  to  Cuba  without  loss  of  time  and  strongly  reinforced. 

CORREA. 

Blanco  says  withdrawal  of  Cervera's  fleet  would  mean  the  loss  of  Cuba: 

Havana,  June  3,  1898. 
General  Correa,  Minister  of  War,  Madrid : 

I  would  be  lacking  in  my  duty  if  I  should  conceal  from  you  the  fact  that 
the  departure  from  these  waters  of  Cervera's  squadron  would  produce  here 
such  a  dismal  effect  that  I  doubt  if  I  would  be  able  to  cope  even  with  force 
with  the  situation  that  it  would  provoke.  The  volunteers  at  present,  primed 
to  their  utmost  by  reason  of  the  smallness  of  Cervera's  squadron  and  sus 
tained  in  their  exaltation  by  the  hope  of  the  arrival  of  reinforcements  from 
one  moment  to  another,  would  arise  in  a  body  on  learning  that  instead  of  rein 
forcements  the  ships  that  are  here  would  leave.  It  would  necessitate  the 
shedding  of  considerable  blood,  even  if  the  army  would  agree  to  fire  upon  the 
volunteers,  which  I  doubt.  In  that  case  the  loss  of  the  island  by  reason  of 
the  terrible  uprising  which  would  thus  be  caused  would  follow.  That  is  my 
opinion,  and  I  express  it  without  any  exaggeration.  So  my  conscience  directs 
— and  permit  me  to  add  that  in  my  judgment  the  salvation  of  Spain  and  of  the 
dynasty  is  here  in  Cuba,  and  here,  therefore,  you  ought  to  send  as  many  ships 
as  you  possibly  can.  If  the  Indians  of  the  Philippine  Islands  are  loyal,  they 
ought  to  be  sufficient  to  save  that  country.  If  they  are  not  loyal  there  is  no 
means  of  saving  the  Philippines.  BLANCO. 


'OQUENDO,"  STARBOARD  SIDE,  SHOWING  EXIT  OF  13-INCH  SHELL. 


"  OQUENDO,"  STARBOARD  SIDE,  AS  ABANDONED, 


STORY    OF    THE    SECRET    OFFICIAL    CIPHER.  437 

Cervera's  Marines  ordered  to  land: 

Havana,  June  13,  1898. 
General  Linares,  Santiago: 

In  order  to  resist  the  attack  on  Santiago,  either  by  sea  or  by  land,  the 
marines  of  Cervera's  squadron  should  be  landed  and  the  rapid  fire  guns,  and 
they,  it  seems,  could  be  also  used  to  good  effect.  BLANCO. 

Blanco  asks  authority  over  Cervera: 

Havana,  June  21,  1898. 
General  Correa,  Minister  of  War,  Madrid : 

I  have  regretted  very  much  that  the  independence  enjoyed  by  Cervera's 
squadron  has  prevented  me  from  intervening  in  the  matter  of  its  operation 
notwithstanding  the  fact  that  on  me  will  fall  whatever  the  consequences  may 
be,  especially  as  since  the  arrival  of  the  squadron  in  Santiago  and  its  pro 
longed  stay  there  I  have  had  to  change  the  campaign.  If  at  least  he  had 
endeavored  to  put  himself  in  communication  with  me,  with  Linares,  or 
Admiral  Manterola,  chief  of  the  navy  yard  in  Havana,  it  is  probable  that 
between  us  all  we  would  have  found  a  more  advantageous  solution  of  the 
problem  than  that  which  is  offered  to-day,  namely,  either  an  unequal  combat 
within  the  harbor  or  a  dash  through  the  enemy's  line  for  either  Haiti  or 
Jamaica,  where,  in  turn,  they  would  be  again  shut  up.  It  would  be  prefer 
able,  perhaps,  to  come  to  Cienfuegos  or  Havana,  which  is  possible  at  the  pres 
ent  time,  or  to  go  back  to  Spain  if  there  is  no  possibility  of  being  reinforced. 
It  is  better  to  take  all  these  risks  rather  than  to  remain  shut  up  in  Cuba  and 
to  be  compelled  to  surrender  because  of  hunger.  The  situation  is  very  grave, 
and  I  do  not  doubt  that  the  government  will  order  in  these  critical  times  that 
which  will  be  best  for  the  country  and  the  throne.  Permit  me,  however,  to 
suggest,  with  all  respect,  the  advisability  of  combining  all  military  action  in 
the  present  war,  decreeing  that  in  me  shall  reside  all  authority  as  command 
ing  chief  of  all  the  forces,  both  land  and  water,  operating  in  these  parts. 

BLANCO. 


Cervera  told  of  a  good  time  to  escape  : 

Havana,  June  24,  1898. 
General  Linares,  Santiago: 

Tell  Admiral  Cervera  that  I  desire  to  know  his  opinion  of  the  situation 
and  his  plans.  Tell  him  I  think  that  he  ought  to  leave  as  soon  as  possible  for 
whatever  port  he  may  think  most  advisable,  because  his  position  in  that 


438  STORY    OF    THE    SECRET    OFFICIAL    CIPHER. 

harbor,  in  my  opinion,  is  as  dangerous  as  it  can  possibly  be.  Last  night  alone 
there  were  seven  ships  there,  while  in  Cienfuegos  there  were  only  three,  and 
here  there  were  nine,  in  spite  of  which  the  Santo  Domingo  and  Montevideo, 
which  left  at  2  o'clock  in  the  morning,  were  able  to  run  the  blockade  with 
ease.  BLANCO 

Madrid,  June  24,  1898. 
Captain-General  Blanco,  Havana: 

The  squadron  of  blockading  ships  being  reduced  to  seven  at  Santiago,  the 
government  thinks  this  would  be  an  excellent  occasion  for  our  squadron  to 
endeavor  to  make  its  escape.  CORREA. 

Cervera's  view  of  the  situation: 

Santiago,  June  25,  1898. 
Captain-General  Blanco, 

(Through  Admiral  Manterola,  Chief  of  the  Navy  Yard),  Havana: 
Since  my  last  dispatch  to  you,  I  have  received  a  letter  from  General 
Linares,  transmitting  to  me  a  dispatch  from  you,  in  which  you  say  you  desire 
to  know  my  opinion  on  the  situation.  In  my  former  letter  I  indicated  what  it 
was,  and  on  the  present  occasion  I  shall  go  into  details.  It  is  not  true  that  the 
blockading  squadron  has  even  been  reduced  to  only  seven  ships.  Even  the 
six  principal  ones  represent  a  force  three  times  greater  than  mine.  The  lack 
of  long-range  guns  in  the  fortifications  at  the  mouth  of  the  harbor  prevents  us 
from  keeping  the  American  ships  at  a  great  distance.  It  therefore  happens 
that  they  are  always  near  to  the  mouth  of  the  harbor,  and  with  their  strong 
searchlights  they  make  it  impossible  for  me  to  escape,  except  by  giving  them 
battle  and  overpowering  them.  In  my  judgment,  an  attempt  to  leave  this 
port  would  surely  involve  the  loss  of  the  squadron,  the  death  of  a  majority  of 
the  crews  of  all  the  ships,  a  course  which  I  would  never  take  upon  myself, 
but  if  you  order  it  I  will  execute  it.  In  my  opinion,  the  loss  of  the  squadron 
was  settled  when  I  was  ordered  to  come  here,  so  that  the  present  grievous 
situation  is  not  a  surprise  to  me.  You  will  command  whether  or  not  we  shall 

go  forward  to  this  sacrifice,  which  I  think  will  be  useless. 

CERVERA. 


Admiral  Cervera  a  subordinate : 

Santiago,  June  25,  1898. 
Captain-General  Blanco,  Havana: 

The  government  orders  me  to  place  myself  under  your  orders,  in  accord- 


STORY    OF    THE    SECRET    OFFICIAL    CIPHER.  439 

ance  with  the  decree  of  November  13,  1872,  which  I  do  with  the  greatest  of 
pleasure,  believing  it  to  be  my  duty,  and  I  shall  explain  to  you  the  condition 
of  the  squadron. 

Of  three  thousand  shells  for  the  Hontoria  guns  of  fourteen  centimeters, 
only  six  hundred  and  twenty  are  available,  the  others  being  absolutely  useless, 
not  having  been  replaced  by  good  ones  because  of  the  lack  of  facilities  at  the 
time  of  our  departure  from  Spain.  Two  Hontoria  guns  of  fourteen  centi 
meters  on  the  Oquendo  are  not  good,  and  I  have  ordered  them  changed  for 
others.  The  greater  number  of  the  quick  matches  are  useless,  as  they  lack 
their  caps.  The  Colon  is  without  her  main  batteries.  The  Vizcaya's  bottom 
is  foul,  and  the  ship  has  therefore  lost  her  speed.  The  Maria  Teresa  has  no 
guns  for  landing  parties,  and  those  of  the  Vizcaya  and  Oquendo  are  worthless. 
Moreover,  we  have  very  little  coal  and  provisions  for  the  month  of  July.  The 
blockading  squadron  is  four  times  superior.  Therefore,  our  attempt  to  leave 
this  port  would  mean  our  immediate,  absolutely  sure  destruction.  A  great 
part  of  my  crews  are  on  land,  reinforcing  the  garrison  there.  On  the  23d  I 
considered  it  to  be  my  duty  to  place  before  the  government  the  information 
contained  in  the  following  telegram:  "The  enemy  is  at  sea.  He  has  captured 
Baiquiri.  To-day  he  will  surely  capture  Siboney,  in  spite  of  the  brilliant 
defense  which  will  be  offered.  Yesterday  five  battalions  left  Manzanillo. 
They  will  arrive  in  time  to  prolong  the  agony,  for  I  very  much  doubt  if  they 
will  be  able  to  save  the  city.  As  it  is  absolutely  impossible  for  the  squadron 
to  escape  under  these  circumstances,  I  expect  to  offer  all  the  resistance  in  my 
power  in  the  event  of  necessity,  and  to  destroy  the  ships  as  a  last  resort." 
This  is  the  expression  of  my  opinion,  which  agrees  with  the  opinion  of  the 
commanders  of  all  my  ships.  I  await  your  instructions. 

CERVERA. 


General  Blanco  orders  Cervera  out  (copyright,  1898,  by  W.  R.  Hearst) : 

Havana,  June  26,  1898. 
Admiral  Cervera,  Santiago: 

Your  two  telegrams  received.  I  reciprocate  highly  the  satisfaction  which 
you  express  at  being  placed  under  my  orders,  and  I  consider  myself  highly 
honored,  and  I  desire-  that  you  shall  regard  me  more  as  a  companion  than  as 
a  chief.  It  appears  to  me  that  you  exaggerate  somewhat  the  difficulties  of 
leaving  Santiago.  There  is  no  necessity  of  fighting.  All  that  you  are  asked 


440  STORY    OF    THE    SECRET    OFFICIAL    CIPHER. 

to  do  is  to  escape  from  that  prison  in  which  the  squadron  now  finds  itself,  and 
I  do  not  think  it  is  impossible,  if  you  take  advantage  of  opportune  circum 
stances,  such  as  a  dark  night,  stormy  weather,  etc.  Thus  you  might  be  able 
to  mock  the  vigilance  of  the  enemy  and  to  take  whatever  course  you  might 
deem  best.  Moreover,  in  the  case  of  your  being  detected,  remember  that  the 
aim  at  night  is  uncertain,  and  although  you  may  sustain  some  damage,  yet 
they  would  be  trivial  when  the  saving  of  the  ships  is  taken  into  consideration. 
You  tell  me  that  the  loss  of  Santiago  is  assured,  in  which  case  you  would 
destroy  the  ships — and  this  is  all  the  more  reason  why  you  should  endeavor  to 
escape,  since  it  is  always  preferable  for  a  soldier  to  succumb  in  a  battle  where 
he  would  have  many  chances  of  success.  For  my  part,  I  repeat  that  I  think 
it  would  be  very  difficult,  indeed,  even  admitting  the  strength  of  the  enemy's 
ships,  that  leaving  the  port  on  a  dark  night  and  taking  advantage  of  a  good 
opportunity,  the  departure  or  temporary  reduction  of  the  enemy's  squadron 
for  any  purpose,  they  would  cause  much  damage.  A  proof  of  this  is  the 
departure  of  the  Montevideo  and  Santo  Domingo  from  this  port,  with  nine 
ships  on  the  blockading  station,  the  departure  of  the  Purisima  Concepcion 
from  Casilda,  with  three,  and  the  arrival  of  the  Regina  Christina  in  Cienfu- 
egos,  with  three  also.  If  your  ships  should  be  captured  in  any  way  whatever 
in  a  Cuban  port,  the  effect  in  all  the  world  would  be  disastrous  and  the  war 
would  then  be  held  to  be  ended  in  favor  of  the  enemy.  To-day  all  the  nations 
of  the  earth  have  their  eyes  fixed  on  your  squadron,  and  in  it  is  wrapt  up  the 
honor  of  the  nation,  as  I  am  sure  you  understand.  The  government  is  of  the 
same  opinion.  The  situation  offers  no  doubt  to  my  mind,  for  indeed,  I  have 
great  confidence  in  the  success  of  it.  I  shall  leave  completely  to  your  discre 
tion  the  course  which  you  will  have  to  take,  even  though  some  ships  will  have 
to  be  sacrificed.  As  a  favorable  sign  I  will  'say  to  you  that  the  captain  of  the 
German  cruiser  Geier  has  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  squadron  can  effect 
its  departure  from  Santiago  without  exposing,  itself  to  great  risks. 

BLANCO. 

Admiral  Cervera's  reply  to  Blanco: 

Santiago,  June  27,  1898. 
Captain-General  Blanco,  Havana: 

Your  cable  of  yesterday  received.  Many  thanks  for  your  very  kind  words. 
I  ought  to  bow  to  your  judgment  without  discussing  it,  the  more  so,  having 
already  given  you  my  full  opinion  after  mature  reflection.  I  have  always 


HORROR1 
VIEWS  OF  THE  NOTORIOUS  PRISON  AT  SANTIAGO. 


CAST  IRON   PROJECTILES  USED  IN  THE  NAW 


PETTY  OFFICERS  OF  THE  U.  S.  S.  "NEW  YORK.' 


STORY    OF    THE    SECRET    OFFICIAL    CIPHER.  443 

believed  that  there  were  more  competent  sailors  than  I,  and  I  am  very  sorry 
that  none  of  them  can  come  to  take  command  of  the  squadron,  making  me  his 
subordinate.  I  consider  your  telegram  as  an  order  to  leave  the  port,  and  in 
consequence  I  shall  ask  General  Linares  to  re-embark  the  forces  which  were 
landed  from  my  ships  in  conformity  with  your  orders.  I  beg  you  to  confirm 
the  order  to  leave  the  port,  because  it  is  not  stated  in  explicit  terms,  and  I 
should  be  very  sorry  not  to  interpret  your  orders  correctly. 

CERVERA. 


Santiago,  June  28,  1898. 
Captain-General  Blanco,  Havana: 

Impossible  to  reembark  troops  from  Cervera's  ships  until  the  arrival  of 
reinforcements.  LINARES. 

Madrid  presses  Cervera  to  escape: 

Madrid,  June  26,  1898. 
Captain-General  Blanco,  Havana: 

The  government  believes  that  on  the  first  opportunity  offering  all  the  ships 
of  the  squadron,  or  those  whose  condition  would  lead  to  the  hope  that  they 
may  be  able  to  save  themselves,  should  leave  the  port,  and  that  the  Admiral 
should  be  given  full  liberty  to  take  whichever  direction  he  pleases. 

CORREA. 

Blanco  orders  a  postponement  of  the  fleet's  "departure"  : 

Havana,  June  28. 
Admiral  Cervera,  Santiago: 

I  desire  to  improve  as  much  as  possible  the  situation  in  Santiago.  I  am 
doing  all  I  can  to  send  you  rations,  and  if  I  can  get  them  I  will  send  you 
more  reinforcements,  thus  prolonging  the  defense  and  perhaps  raising  the 
siege,  with  the  result  of  saving  the  squadron.  In  the  event  of  not  securing 
reinforcements  for  you,  you  will  have  to  leave  the  port  in  spite  of  the  diffi 
culties,  which  I  recognize.  My  decision  is  that  the  squadron  remain  there 
quietly  until  the  rations  are  received,  watching  a  favorable  opportunity  to 
depart,  going  wherever  you  may  think  convenient,  but  in  the  event  of  affairs 
becoming  grave,  even  to  the  point  of  your  believing  the  fall  of  Santiago  to  be 
imminent,  the  squadron  must  leave  immediately  as  best  it  can,  its  destination 


444  STORY    OF    THE    SECRET    OFFICIAL    CIPHER. 

to  be  determined  by  you  and  the  distinguished  officers  who  command  the 
ships,  and  undoubtedly  they  will  confirm  with  their  acts  the  reputation  which 
they  enjoy.  BLANCO. 

Cervera  accepts  his  doom : 

Santiago,  June  28,  1898. 
Captain-General  Blanco,  Havana: 

Your  telegram  received.  Please  repeat  it  from  the  word  "grave"  to  the 
end  of  the  sentence,  as  I  do  not  understand  it  perfectly  at  that  point.  All 
the  rest  will  be  complied  with  as  well  as  possible,  notwithstanding  the  fact 
that  the  scarcity  of  coal  wTill  make  it  difficult.  These  ships  require  twelve 
hours  of  firing  up,  and  if  the  fires  are  ready  to  enable  them  to  take  advantage 
of  any  opportunity  which  may  offer,  they  will  each  burn  up  fifteen  tons  a  day ; 
but  I  believe  I  understand  the  purport  of  your  order,  which  is  that  if  I  can 
get  a  favorable  opportunity  we  shall  make  the  best  of  it,  and  if  not,  at  the  last 
hour  it  is  to  be  done  even  though  the  loss  of  the  squadron  will  be  inevitable. 

CERVERA. 

Blanco  orders  Cervera  to  leave: 

Havana,  July  i,  1898. 
Admiral  Cervera,  Santiago: 

I  have  learned  of  the  advance  made  by  the  enemy  in  spite  of  the  heroic 
defense  of  the  troops  at  Santiago,  and  in  accordance  with  the  opinion  of  the 
government  you  must  reembark  those  of  your  crew  who  were  landed,  and 
you  must  take  advantage  of  the  earliest  possible  opportunity  to  leave  the  port 
with  all  your  ships.  You  arc  to  follow  whatever  course  you  may  consider 
opportune,  and  you  arc  authorized  to  leave  there  any  of  your  ships  which, 
because  of  its  slowness  or  for  other  reasons,  would  have  no  chance  of  saving 
itself.  I  must  inform  you  that  in  Cicnfuegos  there  are  only  three  blockading 
ships  and  at  Havana  nine,  none  of  them  of  any  importance. 

BLANCO. 

Cervera  seeks  delay: 

Santiago,  July  i,  1898. 
Captain-General  Blanco,  Havana: 

As  a  continuation  of  my  cable  of  yesterday,  I  have  to  inform  you  that 
General  Linares  has  answered  me  that  he  cannot  return  the  sailors  because 
they  occupy  positions  on  the  firing  line  and  in  the  trenches,  and  that  if  they 
are  removed  the  Americans  would  be  able  to  advance  through  the  places  thus 


STORY    OF    THE    SECRET    OFFICIAL    CIPHER.  445 

vacated.     Without  these  men  the  squadron  cannot  leave  the  port.     I  request 
further  instructions  from  you.  CERVERA. 

Santiago,  July  i,  1898. 
Captain-General  Blanco,  Havana: 

From  General  Toral  you  know  of  the  battle  of  to-day.  General  Toral 
thinks  that  the  withdrawal  of  my  sailors  would  result  in  the  loss  of  Santiago, 
and  without  them  I  cannot  attempt  to  escape.  My  opinion  is  the  same  as 
that  of  Toral,  and  our  departure  would  in  that  event  be  like  a  flight.  My  cap 
tains  also  think  so.  Send  instructions  for  which  I  have  asked. 

CERVERA. 


Squadron  given  twelve  hours  to  leave : 

Havana,  July  2,  1898. 
Admiral  Cervera,  Santiago: 

Ship  with  the  greatest  haste  all  your  sailors  and  leave  immediately  with 
the  squadron.  BLANCO. 

(In  his  own  handwriting  Blanco  added  the  following  words  to  this  dis. 
patch,  writing  them  on  the  back  of  the  telegram:  "Twelve  hours  only  are 
necessary  for  Cervera  to  get  ready.") 


Madrid  approves: 

Madrid,  July  3,  1898. 
Captain-General  Blanco,  Havana: 

Instructions  given  to  Cervera  are  approved.  CORREA. 

General  Toral,  of  Santiago,  reports  Cervera's  flight: 

Santiago,  July  3,  1898. 
Captain-General  Blanco,  Havana: 

At  half-past  nine  this  morning  Cervera's  squadron  departed  in  perfect  for 
mation,  firing  like  the  devil  on  the  ships  of  the  enemy,  including  the  Indiana, 
Massachusetts,  Iowa,  Texas,  Brooklyn,  New  York,  and  a  number  of  con 
verted  yachts,  which  were  near  the  mouth  of  the  harbor.  After  an  hour  of 
sharp  firing  our  squadron  disappeared  from  sight,  going  toward  the  west, 
having  maneuvered  with  the  greatest  celerity  and  without  losing  a  single 
minute.  The  enemy's  squadron  was  thrown  into  confusion  and  was  not  able 
to  approach  our  ships,  notwithstanding  their  superiority,  and  it  was  only  after 
our  squadron  had  run  the  blockade  that  the  enemy's  ships  followed  in  pur 
suit.  I  regret  to  have  to  report  the  loss  of  the  two  torpedo  boat  destroyers. 


446  STORY    OF    THE    SECRET    OFFICIAL    CIPHER. 

One  of  them  ran  on  the  rocks  near  Punta  Cabrera,  and  the  other  received  such 
injuries,  including  the  loss  of  its  rudder,  that  it  was  in  vain  that  it  endeavored 
to  return  to  port.  Attacked  by  a  ship  of  the  enemy,  it  sustained  the  battle 
and  then  was  compelled  to  ship  its  crew  in  two  boats.  One  of  them  was 
captured,  while  the  other  reached  the  shore.  A  short  time  afterward  the 
destroyer  blew  up.  From  Morro  it  was  impossible  to  see  whether  the  crew  of 
the  one  that  was  stranded  at  Punta  Cabrera  was  able  to  save  themselves.  As 
this  battle,  which  was  distinguished  by  heroic  conduct  on  the  part  of  all  our 
sailors,  much  to  the  glory  of  our  navy,  may  awaken  in  the  Admiral  command 
ing  the  enemy's  squadron  a  desire  to  force  the  entrance  to  the  harbor  and 
bombard  the  city,  which  I  think  would  be  easy,  I  have  decided  to  block  the 
mouth  of  the  harbor.  TORAL. 

Cienfuegos  ordered  to  congratulate  Cervera: 

Havana,  July  3,  1898. 
General  Aguirre,  Military  Commander,  Cienfuegos: 

Make  preparations  for  the  reception  of  the  squadron  commanded  by 
Admiral  Cervera,  which  left  Santiago  this  morning,  and  which  may  arrive  at 
any  moment  at  Cienfuegos.  Facilitate  the  Admiral  with  whatever  he  may 
need,  and  congratulate  him  for  me  for  the  distinguished  victory  over  the 
enemy.  BLANCO. 

First  news  of  the  squadron's  destruction: 

Santiago,  July  3,  1898. 
Captain-General  Blanco,  Havana: 

A  number  of  shipwrecked  sailors  from  the  destroyers  and  one  from  the 
Maria  Teresa  presented  themselves  this  evening  in  Zocapa  Castle.  The  sailor 
from  the  Maria  Teresa  said  that  when  far  from  Santiago  that  cruiser  was  lost, 
and  that  the  Oquendo  was  on  fire  at  the  time.  A  number  of  other  sailors 
from  the  Maria  Teresa  have  made  their  way  here.  It  is  not  known  what  has 
been  the  fate  of  the  Admiral.  TORAL. 

Santiago,  July  4,  1898. 
Captain-General  Blanco,  Havana: 

The  American  General  tells  me  that  our  squadron  has  been  destroyed 
and  that  Cervera  is  a  prisoner.  TORAL. 


STORY    OF    THE    SECRET    OFFICIAL    CIPHER.  447 

Madrid  hears  of  the  squadron's  fate: 

Havana,  July  4,  1898. 
General  Correa,  Minister  of  War,  Madrid: 

According  to  advices  received  from  the  military  commander  of  Santiago 
de  Cuba,  a  number  of  sailors  from  the  Maria  Teresa  have  arrived  here,  and 
they  say  that  their  ship,  the  Oquendo,  the  Pluton  and  the  Furor  were  beached 
with  fire  on  board,  and  that  the  Colon  and  Vizcaya  were  lost  to  sight  with  the 
enemy  in  full  pursuit.  BLANCO. 

Cervera  reports  his  capture : 

Playa  del  Este,  July  5,  1898. 
Captain  General  Blanco,  Havana: 

I  left  Santiago  de  Cuba  yesterday  morning  with  all  the  squadron,  and, 
after  an  unequal  combat  and  against  forces  more  than  three  times  greater 
than  my  own,  my  entire  squadron  was  destroyed,  I  having  given  orders  to  run 
them  on  the  rocks.  The  Maria  Teresa,  the  Oquendo  and  the  Vizcaya  blew 
lip,  and  the  Colon,  according  to  information  given  me  by  the  Americans, 
beached  and  turned  over,  and  the  destroyers  were  sunk.  I  am  not  yet  aware 
of  the  number  of  lives  lost,  but  it  will  undoubtedly  exceed  six  hundred  dead 
and  many  wounded,  although  not  in  such  a  great  proportion.  We,  the  sur 
vivors,  are  all  prisoners  of  the  Americans.  My  men  behaved  with  the  greatest 
courage,  and  they  won  the  plaudits  even  of  the  enemy.  The  commander  of 
the  Vizcaya  was  permitted  to  retain  his  sword.  I  am  highly  pleased  with  the 
generosity  with  which  they  treated  us.  Villamil  is  among  the  dead,  and  I 
believe  that  Lagaza  was  also  killed.  And  among  the  wounded  is  Eulate. 
We  have  lost  everything,  and  need  funds. 

CERVERA  (a  prisoner  at  that  time). 

Blanco  tries  to  shift  blame: 

Havana,  July  5,  1898. 
Admiral  Cervera,  Playa  del  Este : 

I  have  read  your  telegram  with  great  sorrow,  and  I  admire  the  bearing  of 
the  chief  officers  and  crew.  Perhaps  if  you  had  selected  some  other  hour  to 
leave  port  the  result  would  have  been  different.  Sampson  says  in  his  tele 
gram  that  he  has  not  suffered  more  than  three  killed  and  wounded.  Is  that 
possible?  Tell  me-  what  funds  you  need,  and  where  and  how  I  can  remit  to 


4-jS  vSTORY    OF    THE    SECRET    OFFICIAL    CIPHER. 

you.  I  beg  you,  as  well  as  all  the  chiefs  and  officers  and  men  under  your 
command,  to  receive  the  expression  of  my  lively  interest  and  desire  to  allevi 
ate  your  situation  to  the  full  extent  of  my  ability.  BLANCO. 

Madrid  cables  "great  joy": 

Madrid,  July  6,  1898. 
Captain-General  Blanco,  Havana: 

The  departure  of  the  squadron  has  caused  great  joy  here. 

CORREA. 

Blanco  advises  holding  out: 

Havana,  July  8,  1898. 
General  Correa,  Minister  of  War,  Madrid : 

The  army,  always  ready  for  any  sacrifice  for  the  sake  of  the  nation, 
remains  intact  up  to  the  present  time,  and  is  still  full  of  spirit,  for  it  is  main 
taining  itself  in  Santiago  de  Cuba  with  vigor.  After  many  brilliant  battles, 
in  which,  although  some  ground  has  been  lost,  every  inch  of  territory  was 
disputed  with  great  valor,  severe  losses  have  been  inflicted  upon  the  enemy. 
It  is  my  opinion  that  the  majority  of  the  military  classes  would  listen  with 
little  patience  to  any  peace  proposition,  much  less  to  any  proposition  for  the 
abandonment  of  territory  which  the  army  has  been  defending  so  valorously. 
With  provisions  and  ammunition  we  could  maintain  our  position  for  many 
months,  and  still  render  very  dear  the  victory  to  our  enemies,  although  the 
absolute  possession  of  the  sea,  which  the  Americans  enjoy,  will  make  life 
painful  for  the  lack  of  food,  battles  extremely  difficult  by  reason  of  the 
scarcity  of  ammunition,  and  hamper  the  government  considerably,  because  of 
the  frequent  disturbances  of  public  order,  which  will  result  from  a  famishing 
condition  on  the  part  of  the  people.  To  sum  up,  then,  permit  me  to  say 
that  the  army  in  general  desires  war  for  the  honor  of  arms  as  well  as  for  its 
own  honor,  and  that  it  would  be  exceedingly  sorrowful  to  them  to  abandon  to 
the  enemy  without  fighting  a  land  which  it  has  been  preserving  for  so  many 
long  years  at  the  cost  of  its  own  blood.  That  is  the  opinion  I  also  hold,  and 
that  I  have  always  held.  BLANCO. 


Blanco's  tribute  of  admiration  to  Cervera: 

Havana,  July  9,  1898. 

Admiral  Cervera,'  Care  French  Consul,  New  York : 

Insisting  on  my  desire  to  alleviate  the  condition  of  those  brave  defenders 
of  the  nation  who  so  valorously  succumbed  in  unequal  combat,  and  to  whom, 


STORY    OF    THE    SECRET    OFFICIAL    CIPHER.  449 

as  to  you,  I  offer  a  tribute  of  admiration,  I  beg  you  to  let  me  know  what  sum 
of  money  you  need,  and  where  I  can  send  it  to  you,  which  end  and  to  save 
time  I  am  directing-  this  telegram  to  the  care  of  the  French  Consul  in  New 
York.  BLANCO. 

*• 

Madrid,  July  14,  1898. 
General  Blanco,  Havana: 

Your  telegram  received.  CORREA. 

Prime  Minister  Sagasta's  appeal: 

Madrid,  July  12,  1898. 
Blanco,  Governor-General,  Havana: 

Absolute  masters  of  the  siege,  the  Americans,  knowing  by  experience 
how  costly  it  has  been  to  them  to  engage  our  brave  soldiers  in  battle,  will 
limit  themselves  in  the  future  to  extending  and  strengthening  the  blockade 
and  to  bombarding  ports,  at  the  same  time  detaching  ships  to  attack  Porto 
Rico,  the  Canaries,  the  Balearic  Islands,  and  even  cities  on  the  coast  of  the 
Peninsula,  expecting  that,  aided  by  the  Indians,  they  will  secure  possession  of 
the  Philippines,  and  surely  also  disturb  public  order  in  the  nation.  The 
unmistakable  duty  of  any  government  is  to  avoid  such  great  and  such 
irremediable  evil  by  seeking  by  all  means  the  end  of  such  an  unequal  and 
disastrous  combat.  Peace  could  be  obtained  to-day  on  conditions  that  would 
be  accepted  and  honorable  to  the  army.  But  once  Cuba  has  been  reduced  by 
starvation,  Manila  lost,  a  part,  if  not  all,  of  Porto  Rico  occupied  and  the  most 
important  cities  on  our  coast  bombarded,  it  will  not  be  possible  to  think  of 
peace.  The  discomposure  and  ruin  of  this  calamitous  country  would  be  the 
result.  I  trust  that  in  view  of  these  reasons  you  and  the  generals  under  your 
orders,  to  whom  oiu~  institutions  and,  above  all,  our  country,  are  so  dear,  will 
know  how  to  respond  to  the  discipline  of  the  ever  valorous  army,  and  to 
render  obedience  to  the  resolutions  of  the  government  regarding  peace.  I 
await  with  anxiety  your  reply  which  I  beg  you  to  send  me  with  all  possible 
haste.  SAGASTA. 


Correa  explains  Madrid's  position: 

Madrid,  July  12,  1898. 

Captain-General  Blanco,  Havana: 

Your  telegram  No.  202  received.     I  am  surprised  that  the  honor  of  your 
indomitable  army  being  already  saved,  as  undoubtedly  and  to  the  admiration 


45o  STORY    OF    THE    SECRET    OFFICIAL    CIPHER. 

of  the  whole  world,  as  well  as  to  the  great  glory  of  the  nation,  it  has  been,  that 
the  forces  at  Santiago  persist  in  continuing  a  war  in  which  they  surely  can 
gain  no  more  laurels  nor  arrive  at  any  other  result  than  that  of  being  com 
pelled  to  surrender  in  a  short  time  for  lack  of  provisions  and  ammunition.  It 
is  not  to  be  believed  that  the  enemy,  being  fully  aware  of  the  lamentable 
conditions  existing  among  the  troops  at  Santiago,  wTill  be  in  any  hurry  to 
suffer  or  risk  new  losses,  especially  since  being  able,  by  means  of  the  block 
ade,  to  prevent  any  help  being  sent  from  here,  they  can  possess  themselves  of 
the  island  without  new  sacrifices  of  blood  on  their  part. 

Neither  can  I  explain  to  myself  your  tenacity  in  maintaining  a  position  in 
an  ungrateful  land  which  repels  us  and  makes  itself  odious  to  us  by  its  desire 
to  separate  itself  from  the  mother  country.  I  should  think  that  the  army 
would  prefer  the  grief  of  abandoning  it  to  the  ruin  and  desolation  which  such 
a  disastrous  persistenc)7  would  bring  to  this  unfortunate  country,  which,  in 
view  of  the  future  which  awaits  it,  is  clamoring  for  peace  with  honor,  the  pres 
ent  being  the  time  when  it  could  be  secured. 

But  let  it  be  whatever  it  will,  and  without  ceasing  to  feel  in  the  bottom  of 
my  heart  the  real  pride  of  a  Spaniard  and  a  soldier  in  the  exalted  sentiments 
of  your  unrivaled  army,  I  conceive  and  deduce  that  it  will  not  permit  its 
noble  aims  to  interfere  with  discipline,  and  that  the  soldiers  will  never  forget 
their  duties  of  obedience  and  submission  to  the  decrees  of  the  government, 
giving  such  attention  to  them  as  will  be  sure  to  preserve  the  honor  of  the 
army. 

I  therefore  believe  that  whatever  may  be  the  decrees  of  the  government 
the  army  will  execute  them,  and  that  it  will  not  pretend  to  constitute  itself  a 
danger  to  the  nation,  thus  bringing  upon  itself  the  great  misfortune  of  hav 
ing  to  surrender  for  lack  of  provisions  and  other  means  of  sustaining  itself. 

I  nevertheless  desire  to  have  an  absolute  assurance  of  this,  and  this  you 
alone  can  give  me.  Be  so  kind  as  to  let  me  have  it  as  soon  as  possible,  for 
these  are  critical  moments.  CORREA. 


Havana,  July  13,  1898. 
General  Correa,  Minister  of  War,  Madrid : 

The  matters  you  discuss  in  your  confidential  telegram  No.  107,  addressed 
to  me,  being  of  supreme  gravity  and  importance,  and  as  the  majority  of  the 
generals  are  absent  at  the  front  from  their  commands,  it  will  not  be  possible 


STORY    OF    THE    SECRET    OFFICIAL    CIPHER.  451 

for  me   to  answer  you   before  to-morrow.     Please  excuse  this  short  delay, 
which  I  trust  will  be  for  the  better.  BLANCO. 


Blanco  demands  a  continuation  of  the  war: 

Havana,  July  14,  1898. 
Scnor  Sagasta,  Prime  Minister,  Madrid: 

The  ruling-  opinion  in  the  army  in  Cuba,  in  which  we  the  generals  all 
share,  demands  a  continuation  of  the  war.  We  believe  that  the  honor  of  the 
army  demands  several  more  sacrifices,  but  the  army  will  never  present  itself 
an  obstacle  to  the  fulfillment  of  the  orders  of  the  government,  which  it  will 
obey,  as  it  is  its  duty  to  do.  Profoundly  grateful  on  my  part  for  the  very 
flattering  phrases  which  you  direct  to  me  in  your  telegram  of  the  i2th,  it  is 
exceedingly  painful  for  me  to  inform  you  that  I  can  no  longer  continue  at 
the  head  of  this  array  in  the  event  of  the  government  deciding  to  sue  for 
peace.  BLANCO. 

Havana,  July  14,  1898. 
General  Correa,  Minister  of  War,  Madrid : 

The  ruling  opinion  of  the  army,  which  we  the  generals  all  share,  is  for 
the  continuation  of  the  war,  believing  that  enough  has  not  yet  been  done  for 
the  preservation  of  its  honor.  It  would  therefore  view  with  shame  the 
abandonment  of  the  island  which  it  is  occupying  and  defending  with  such 
bravery,  but  you  may  be  sure  that  it  will  respect  the  orders  of  the  govern 
ment,  and  will  not  oppose  its  decisions.  This  much  the  generals  promise  you. 
In  these  most  difficult  circumstances  I  beg  to  assure  you  of  my  best  wishes. 

BLANCO. 

Blanco  reports  Santiago's  fall: 

Havana,  July  17,  1898. 
General  Correa,  Minister  of  War,  Madrid : 

The  surrender  of  Santiago  was  effected  this  morning  without  any  inter 
vention  whatever  of  my  authority,  according  to  information  which  I  have 
transmitted  to  you.  In  spite  of  this  dismemberment  of  the  island,  the  army 
continues  spirited  and  the  war  can  be  continued  if  you  will  only  send  us  pro 
visions,  which  would  be  advisable  under  ships  flying  a  neutral  flag,  seeking 
:.Vo  the  means  of  sending  us  ammunition.  The  fall  of  Santiago  has  no  true 


45-'  STORY    OF    THE    SECRET    OFFICIAL    CIPHER. 

military  importance,  and  it  can  be  said  that  the  war  has  not  in  reality  begun 
yet.  Several  days  ago  I  issued  orders  for  the  concentration  of  the  divisions  of 
Holguin  and  Puerto  Principe  to  maneuver  according  to  the  movements  of  the 
enemy.  The  decisive  campaign  will  have  to  be  fought  out  on  this  side  of  the 
trocha,  and  the  enemy  will  have  to  suffer  very  severe  losses  in  order  to  pene 
trate  this  section.  BLANCO. 


These  dispatches  are  confessions  of  the  incompetency  of  the  Spaniards  for 
peace  or  war.  The  colonial  system  that  stimulated  their  arrogance  disturbed 
their  balances,  and  they  became  profligates  in  public  business.  The  fatal  loss 
was  that  of  the  honesty  of  the  servants  of  the  government  in  dealing  with  the 
people,  and  the  immediate  natural  consequence  was  the  people  became  false 
to  their  government — hence  disorderly  revolution. 

The  character  of  Spain  was  impaired  by  her  injustice  to  her  colonies. 
The  degradation  that  she  imposed  upon  them  reacted  on  herself.  It  has 
appeared  in  weakness  for  the  preservation  of  domestic  order,  as  well  as  in 
asserting  her  ancient  authority  beyond  the  lines  of  the  peninsula;  and  it 
has  been  still  more  signally  displayed  in  fighting  a  foreign  foe.  The  dis 
patches  of  Sagasta,  Blanco,  Cervera,  Correa  and  Linares,  telegrams 
written  in  the  cipher  code  of  Spain,  are  in  every  sense  official.  They  betray, 
as  hardly  anything  else  could,  the  decadence  of  the  country,  not  only  in  the 
facts  they  reveal,  but  in  the  fact  of  publicity.  There  is  no  doubt  that  it  was 
public  opinion  in  Spain,  for  years  before  the  war  with  us  came,  that  the  Span 
ish  navy  was  more  powerful  than  that  of  the  United  States — that  they  had 
battleships  superior  to  ours  in  armor  and  arms,  cruisers  that  were  swifter  and 
equally  staunch,  and  torpedo  boats  and  destroyers  that  greatly  overmatched 
our  gunboats.  It  was  the  policy  of  the  Government  to  misinform  the  people. 

It  appears  in  the  plain  English  of  the  secret  Spanish  cipher  that  the  fleets 
of  Spain  were  largely  shams.  They  failed  in  the  equipments  essential  in 
modern  warfare.  They  had  but  one  thing  left.  On  the  defensive — not  asked 
to  brave  the  terrors  of  bushwhacking,  the  honor  of  the  Spanish  infantry,  once 
equal  to  any  in  Europe,  was  sustained,  and  the  crews  of  the  doomed  ships  at 
Manila  and  Santiago,  beaten  and  crushed,  burning  and  sinking,  behaved  with 
intrepidity  to  the  last.  Spain  was  not  able  to  send  east  or  west  a  squadron 
that  could  cope  with  ours,  and  the  only  advantage  they  got  from  their  navy 
Hras  that  they  had  so  deceived  themselves  as  to  persuade  others  that  their 


STORY    OF    THE    SECRET    OFFICIAL    CIPHER. 


45.5 


illusions  were  real,  and  we  were  for  a  time  embarrassed  by  apprehensions. 
We  made  the  safe  mistake  of  over-valuing-  the  ability  of  our  enemy,  and 
yet  we  had  so  neglected  our  army  that  the  fate  of  the  day  at  Santiago 
depended  upon  a  thin  and  strained  line.  The  Spaniards  dealt  with  themselves 
badly  when  they  believed  the  fancies  that  were  the  foolishness  of  their  pride, 
and  as  their  last  step  before  collapse  was  taken,  their  condition  was  incom 
prehensible  by  them.  When  Cervera  was  ordered  from  Madrid  and  Havana 
to  flee  from  Santiago,  there  was  no  real  plan  that  had  a  promise  in  it,  of  more 
than  a  few  days'  respite  from  ruin,  for  the  utmost  success  expected  was  that 
some  of  the  fugitives  might  get  into  the  harbor  of  Cienfuegos. 


CHAPTER   XX. 

The  Santiago  Situation  After  the  Spanish  Fleet  was  Gone. 

Cipher  Dispatches — Too  Much  Publicity— Shafter  Demands  the  Help  of  the  Navy,  and  is 
Supported  by  the  War  Department — He  Heard  Firing  at  Midnight  and  Hoped  it  was 
Sampson — Garcia's  Men  who  were  Always  Going  to  do  Something  To-morrow — 
"Terrible  Fight"  July  ist — Reinforcements,  Lighters  and  Tugs  Wanted — An  En 
ergetic  Rush  to  Aid  Shafter,  but  not  by  the  Navy — Cable  Direct  to  Corbin — The 
Yellow  Fever  Appears — Preliminaries  to  the  Capitulation — The  President  Sticks 
to  It  that  Spaniards  Must  Unconditionally  Surrender— Fortunate  Arrival  of  Miles  in 
the  Blue  Rains. 

The  anxieties  of  the  War  Office  to  receive  the  very  latest  news  from 
General  Shafter's  headquarters  during-  the  fighting  at  Santiago,  and  at  the 
same  time  to  so  far  control  the  publications  about  the  battles  as  to  interfere 
with  recklessly  panicky  communications,  caused  repeated  "hurry"  sugges 
tions  from  Washington  and  orders  to  send  that  which  was  important  in  cipher. 

The  following  dispatches  have  the  effect  of  a  searchlight : 

Playa  del  Este,  July  4,  1898 — 1:13  a.  m. 
Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  A.,  Washington: 

Camp  near  Santiago,  3. — I  will  send  important  dispatches  hereafter  in 
cipher,  when  possible,  but  you  must  understand  that  we  have  no  time  to 
spare,  no  facilities  for  the  work.  Messages  sent  you  this  afternoon  would 
require  until  to-morrow  to  workout.  Captain  Alger  is  10  miles  from  here ; 
also  my  staff  officer  in  charge  of  cipher  is  absent,  on  duty. 

SHAFTER,  Major-General. 

Adjutant-General's  Office,  Washington,  July  4,  1898 — 1 145  a.  m. 
Major-General  Shafter,  Playa  del  Este,  Cuba: 

Secretary  War  directs  me  to  say  for  you  to  exercise  your  own  judgment 
about  using  cipher  and  not  inconvenience  yourself  in  any  way,  as  it  is  fully 
understood  how  you  are  occupied.  H.  C.  CORBIN,  Adjutant-General. 

Captain  Alger,  the  son  of  the  Secretary,  was  an  expert  in  ciphers,  but 

454 


AFTER    THE    SPANISH    FLEET    WAS    GONE.  455 

there  was  no  time  for  the  exercise  of  his  skill,  and  there  was  a  good  deal  of 
circulation  of  intelligence. 

The  extreme  activity  enforced  upon  the  army  headquarters  in  the  field 
may  perhaps  account  for  this  paragraph  in  the  report  of  Admiral  Sampson, 
explaining  that  he  did  not  refuse  to  endeavor  to  force  his  way  into  the  Santi 
ago  Harbor.  The  Admiral  was  aroused  to  remark:  "I  here,  moreover, 
would  animadvert  upon  the  apparently  extraordinary  openness  with  which 
every  detail  of  hope,  effort,  or  suggestion  on  the  part  of  the  army  has 
been  published.  The  unwisdom  of  such  procedure  is  too  manifest  for 
discussion." 

When  Cervera's  fleet  was  smashed,  burned,  wrecked  on  the  rocks,  and  Shaf- 
ter  was  demanding  the  surrender  of  the  Spanish  garrison,  the  wires  were  ting 
ling  with  hotly  rushed  telegrams  driving  the  officers  in  charge  of  transportation 
by  rail  and  steamers  to  hasten  reinforcements  and  supplies  to  sustain  the  boys 
who  had  been  in  the  thick  of  the  fight,  and  were  waiting  through  the  long 
days  of  a  truce,  subject  to  the  vicissitudes  of  calculations  whether  they 
should  be  thrown  in  storming  columns  upon  the  Spanish  lines,  to  save  them 
from  the  fearful  blight  of  the  yellow  fever.  July  5th,  Shafter  said  if  Sampson 
would  force  an  entrance  to  the  harbor,  which  did  not  seem  to  ordinary  obser 
vation  utterly  beyond  reason  after  the  annihilation  of  Cervera's  fleet,  the  city 
would  be  taken  "in  a  few  hours."  If  the  army  was  to  take  it,  15,000  troops 
were  "wanted  speedily,"  and  it  was  not  certain  about  the  landing,  "as  it  is 
getting  stormy."  The  "sure  and  speedy"  way,  the  General  said,  was 
"through  the  bay" — and  Shafter  wired  he  was  "now  in  position"  to  do  his 
part.  The  President  wanted  cooperation  between  the  army  and  navy,  and 
telegraphed  accordingly. 

July  5th,  Shafter  wired:  "Navy  should  go  Santiago  Harbor  at  any  cost. 
If  they  do.  I  believe  they  will  take  the  city  and  all  the  troops  that  are  there. 
If  they  do  not,  the  country  should  be  prepared  for  heavy  losses  among  our 
troops." 

Meantime,  Shafter  had  talked  wi*h  the  French  Consul  and  others,  and 
concluded  to  "keep  up  fire  on  the  trenches,"  but  not  on  the  town,  for  "if  it 
was  simply  a  going  out  of  the  women,  and  to  outside  places  where  they  could 
be  cared  for,  it  would  not  matter  much,  but  now  it  means  their  going  out  to 
starve  to  death  or  be  furnished  with  food  by  us,  and  the  latter  is  not  possible 
now." 


456  AFTER    THE    SPANISH    FLEET    WAS    GONE. 

The  General  wanted  the  Secretary's  views  very  much,  and  the  President 
interposed — if  that  may  be  said  of  one  whose  hand  was  all  the  time"  visible  and 
busy  and  nigh — that  "it  was  the  part  of  wisdom  to  await  reinforcements,  the 
embarkation  of  which  you  have  already  been  advised,"  and  Shafter  and 
Sampson  were  directed  to  "have  a  conference  and  determine  a  course 
of  cooperation,"  that  there  might  be  secured  "desirable  results  with  the  least 
sacrifice." 

As  an  example  of  the  promotion  of  movement  in  spite  of  difficulties,  we 
quote  General  Wilson  at  Chickamauga,  July  5th,  3  145  p.  m. : 

"Just  leaving  for  Charleston.  No  signal  officers  or  men.  No  engineers' 
supplies.  No  intrenching  tools,  and  no  funds  for  any  of  the  supply  depart 
ments,  except  commissary.  Please  arrange  at  Charleston  to  meet  these 
requirements.  Place  to  my  credit  at  Charleston  at  least  $5,000  for  each 
department,  total,  $30,000,  with  check  books." 

Here  is  a  stirring  suggestion  from  the  Adjutant-General's  office  that  the 
army  might  get  along  without  the  navy : 

Adjutant-General's  Office,  Washington,  July  5,  1898 — 4:30  p.  m. 
Maj.  Gen.  W.  R.  Shafter,  Playa  del  Este,  Cuba: 

Your  telegram  concerning  the  navy  entering*  Santiago  Harbor  is 
received,  and  your  action  thoroughly  approved.  The  Secretary  of  Wai- 
suggests  that  if  the  navy  will  not  undertake  to  break  through,  take  a  trans 
port,  cover  the  pilot  house  in  most  exposed  points  with  baled  hay,  attach  an 
anchor  to  a  towline,  and,  if  possible,  grapple  the  torpedo  cables,  and  call  for 
volunteers  from  the  army — not  a  large  number — to  run  into  the  harbor,  thus 
making  a  way  for  the  navy.  Before  acting,  telegraph  what  you  think  of  it. 
One  thing  is  certain;  that  is,  the  navy  must  get  into  the  harbor,  and  must 
save  the  lives  of  our  brave  men  that  will  be  sacrificed  if  we  assault  the  enemy 
in  his  intrenchments  without  aid.  This  is  strictly  confidential  to  you. 

H.  C.  CORBIN,  Adjutant-General. 

Shafter's  dispatch  to  the  Adjutant-General  on  the  same  day  mentioned  the 
large  number  of  women  and  children  coming  out  of  Santiago,  and  touched  the 
harp  again  as  to  Sampson : 

"Heavy  firing  about  midnight,  which  continued  an  hour,  at  entrance  to 
bay.  Don't  know  cause.  Hope  it  was  Sampson  clearing  the  entrance  of 
torpedoes.  Appearance  of  fleet  in  harbor  will  settle  Santiago." 


AFTER    THE    SPANISH    FLEET    WAS    GONE.  457 

Admiral  Sampson  goes  into  an  exhaustive  explanation  of  his  relations 
with  General  Shafter  at  Santiago,  and  it  is  of  exceeding  interest.  The 
General  commanding  the  expedition  testified  in  terms  of  enthusiastic  appreci 
ation,  that  the  landing  of  the  troops  was  handsomely  supported  by  the  fleet. 
The  disagreements  developed  after  the  battles  of  the  ist  and  2d  of  July,  and 
became  intensified  when  the  fleet  of  Spain  ceased  to  be  a  factor  in  the  war. 
The  Admiral  had  met  General  Garcia,  who  thought  he  had  "4,000  men  back 
in  the  country,"  and  he  "left  behind  him  3,000  men."  The  Admiral  seemed 
to  think  that  these  forces  made  7,000  men,  but  the  surface  show  is  that  3,000 
men  were  counted  twice  in  order  to  make  up  the  7,000.  The  4,000  men 
were  about  forty-five  miles  away,  and  as  General  Miles  would  say,  perfectly 
"equipped  in  every  respect,"  the  Florida  expedition  that  landed  at  Banes 
having  supplied  all  deficiencies.  The  Admiral  paid  this  compliment  to  the 
insurgent  chieftain  in  a  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War: 

•  "My  impressions  of  General  Garcia  are  of  the  most  pleasant  character. 
He  is  a  large,  handsome  man,  of  most  frank  and  engaging  manners,  and  of 
most  soldierly  appearance.  He  remained  some  time  on  board,  though,  unfor 
tunately,  so  seasick  that  he  was  obliged  to  lie  down  during  the  whole  of  his 
visit. " 

There  is  no  opportunity  lost  in  paying  compliments  to  the  Cubans,  but 
the  50,000  auxiliary  forces  General  Miles  put  down  in  his  first  plan  of  cam 
paign  did  not  materialize.  The  few  that  came  were  "amply  provided"  with 
food  and  enjoyed  the  change — eating  abundantly  and  leaving  fighting  to  the 
Americans. 

June  26th  the  Admiral  dispatched  to  the  Secretary  of  War: 

"Channel  was  not  obstructed  by  the  Merrimac,  and  we  must  be  prepared 
to  meet  the  Spanish  fleet  if  they  attempt  to  escape.  I  am  preparing  torpedo 
attack  in  order  to  hasten  their  destruction.  Regret  to  resort  to  this  method 
because  of  its  difficulties  and  small  chance  of  success,  torpedo  boats  being 
subject  to  small  arms  and  rapid-fire  guns  from  the  shore  for  a  long  distance. 
I  should  not  do  this  were  present  force  to  be  kept  here,  as  it  now  insures  a 
capture  which  I  believe  will  terminate  the  war." 

The  explanation  of  the  last  line  is  that  it  was  proposed  to  send  some  of 
the  heavy  ships  to  attack  Spain. 

June  3oth  Shafter  sent  Sampson  a  communication  dated  Camp  near  San 
Juan  River,  as  follows: 


453  AFTER    THE    SPANISH    FLEET    WAS    GONE. 

"Sir:  I  expect  to  attack  Santiago  to-morrow  morning.  I  wish  you  would 
bombard  the  forts  at  Aguadores  in  support  of  a  regiment  of  infantry  which  I 
shall  send  there  early  to-morrow,  and  also  make  such  demonstration  as  you 
think  proper  at  the  mouth  of  the  harbor,  so  as  to  keep  as  many  of  the  enemy 
there  as  possible." 

July  ist  Shafter  sent  his  compliments  to  Sampson,  saying: 

"General  Shafter's  compliments  to  Admiral  Sampson.  Wishes  him  to 
keep  up  his  fire  on  Santiago  on  the  water  front.  Enemy  has  6-inch  guns 
there,  annoying  us  very  much  in  our  moves.  Our  troops  watching  within  a 
hundred  yards  of  city  on  the  east  side.  Will  assault  at  daylight  to-morrow 
morning." 

On  this  day  Sampson's  official  report  states:  "The  New  York  and 
Oregon  took  up  position  and  fired  a  number  of  8 -inch  shell  over  the  hills  in 
the  direction  of  Santiago  and  the  ships  in  the  bay.  using  a  range  of  from  $}4 
to  4  miles." 

Shafter  recognized  the  shooting  in  these  uncertain  terms:  "A  few  shells 
of  large  size  fell  some  distance  behind  our  lines  to-day.  It  is  hardly  possible 
that  they  come  from  your  ships,  but  I  cannot  account  for  them  unless  they 
come  from  the  enemy's  navy." 

Shafter's  report  to  Sampson  of  the  battle  of  July  ist  is  brief  but  forcible: 

"July  2. — Terrible  fight  yesterday,  but  my  line  is  now  strongly  intrenched 
about  three-fourths  of  a  mile  from  town.  I  urge  that  you  make  effort 
immediately  to  force  the  entrance  to  avoid  future  losses  among  my  men,  which 
are  already  very  heavy.  You  can  no\v  operate  with  less  loss  of  life  than  I  can. 
Please  telephone  answer." 

Lieutenant  Staunton  telephoned  Shafter:  "Admiral  Sampson  has  this 
morning  bombarded  forts  at  entrance  of  Santiago,  and  also  Punta  Gorda 
Battery  inside,  silencing  their  fire.  Do  you  wish  further  firing  on  his  part? 
He  began  at  5:30,  finished  at  7:30.  Your  message  to  him  here.  Impossible 
to  force  entrance  until  we  can  clear  channel  of  mines — a  work  of  some  time 
after  forts  are  taken  possession  of  by  your  troops.  Nothing  in  this  direction 
accomplished  yesterday  by  the  advance  on  Aguadores." 

Shafter  telephoned  in  return:  "It  is  impossible  for  me  to  say  when  I  can 
take  batteries  at  entrance  to  harbor.  If  they  are  as  difficult  to  take  as  those 
which  we  have  been  pitted  against,  it  will  be  some  time  and  a  great  loss  of 
life.  I  am  at  a  loss  to  see  why  the  navy  cannot  work  under  a  destructive  fire 


STONE  FORT  AT  EL  CANEY.     EFFECT  OF  CANNONADING. 


.*&$SSft 


SNAP  SHOT  OF  GENERAL  SHAFTER  IN  THE  FIELD. 


AFTER    THE    SPANISH    FLEET    WAS    GONE.  461 

as  well  as  the  army.  My  loss  yesterday  was  over  500  men.  By  all  means 
keep  up  fire  on  everything  in  sight  of  you  until  demolished.  I  expect,  how 
ever,  in  time  and  with  sufficient  men,  to  capture  the  forts  along  the  bay." 

Sampson  reports  that  he  wrote  General  Shafter  and  "began  making 
preparations  to  countermine,  and,  with  the  object  of  arranging  an  attack  upon 
the  batteries  at  the  entrance,  a  visit  was  arranged  to  General  Shafter,  so  that 
the  matter  might  be  thoroughly  discussed,  and  combined  action  take  place.  I 
had  in  view  the  employment  of  the  marines  for  an  assault  on  either  the  Morro 
or  Socapa  battery,  while  at  the  same  time  assaulting  the  defenses  at  the 
entrance  with  the  fleet." 

In  his  letter  to  Shafter  at  this  time  Sampson  said:  "Our  trouble  from  the 
first  has  been  that  the  channel  to  the  harbor  is  well  strewn  with  observation 
mines,  which  would  certainly  result  in  the  sinking  of  one  or  more  of  our  ships 
if  we  attempted  to  enter  the  harbor,  and  by  the  sinking  of  a  ship  the  object  of 
the  attempt  to  enter  the  harbor  would  be  defeated  by  the  preventing  of 
further  progress  on  our  part. 

"It  was  my  hope  that  an  attack  on  your  part  of  these  shore  batteries, 
from  the  rear,  would  leave  us  at  liberty  to  drag  the  channel  for  torpedoes. 

"If  it  is  your  earnest  desire  that  we  should  force  our  entrance,  I  will  at 
once  prepare  to  undertake  it.  I  think,  however,  that  our  position  and  yours 
would  be  made  more  difficult  if,  as  is  possible,  we  fail  in  our  attempt. 

"We  have  in  our  outfit  at  Guantanamo  40  countermining  mines,  which  I 
will  bring  here  with  as  little  delay  as  possible,  and  if  we  can  succeed  in 
freeing  the  entrance  of  mines  by  their  use,  I  will  enter  the  harbor. 

"This  work,  which  is  unfamiliar  to  us,  will  require  considerable  time. 

"It  is  not  so  much  the  loss  of  men  as  it  is  the  loss  of  ships  which  has  until 
now  deterred  me  from  making  a  direct  attack  upon  the  ships  within  the  port." 

This  was  written  on  the  day  before  the  incident  of  the  departure  and 
removal  of  Cervera's  fleet.  The  distance  Admiral  Sampson  was  from  the 
scene  of  action  is  accounted  for  in  his  official  statement  in  these  quiet  terms 
suppressing  sensibility : 

"I  started  the  morning  of  the  3d  July, by  prearrangement,  to  confer  with 
the  General  as  to  a  plan  of  combined  attack,  but  this  conference  was  pre 
vented  by  the  battle  with  the  Spanish  fleet." 

Later  the  Admiral  made  a  more  particular  statement  as  follows: 

"In  consequence  of  General  Shafter's  request  for  assistance,  a  consultation 


462  AFTER    THE    SPANISH    FLEET    WAS    GONE. 

was  arranged  to  take  place  the  morning  of  July  3,  and  horses  were  sent  to 
Siboney  for  that  purpose.  I  started  for  Siboney  about  9  o'clock,  but  the  sortie  of 
Admiral  Cervera's  fleet,  of  course  prevented  my  carrying  out  the  arrangement. 

"The  plans  which  I  had  proposed  laying  before  General  Shafter,  and 
which  had  been  very  thoroughly  discussed  on  board  by  myself  and  staff, 
included  the  countermining  of  the  harbor  entrance,  the  immediate  entrance 
of  the  fleet,  and  the  carrying  of  the  Morro  by  assault  with  a  thousand  marines 
landed  in  Estrella  Cove ;  or,  using  the  marines  for  carrying  the  western  bat 
tery,  the  Morro  to  be  attacked  by  a  detachment  of  the  army,  the  advance 
being  from  the  direction  of  Aguadores.  Orders  had  been  sent  to  Guantanamo 
June  28th  ordering  up  the  Resolute,  with  a  view  of  using  the  mines  stored  on 
board  of  her. 

4 'These  facts  are  given  to  show  how  early  the  matter  of  forcing  the  har 
bor  entrance  was  taken  in  hand  with  a  view  to  assisting  the  army.  My  own 
views  had  always  been  that  the  first  effort  of  the  army  should  have  been 
toward  the  carrying  of  the  batteries  at  the  harbor  entrance  to  enable  us  to 
enter  and  countermine  without  a  loss  of  ships,  and  this  was,  in  fact,  the  view 
of  General  Shafter  when  he  first  arrived,  as  expressed  to  my  chief  of  staff 
when  he  first  went  on  board  the  headquarters  ship,  and  also  stated  by 
General  Shafter  on  consultation  with  General  Garcia  and  myself  at  Acerraderos 
the  same  day.  The  reasons  for  change  on  his  part  I  do  not  know. ' ' 

General  Shafter's  Fourth  of  July  greeting  to  Admiral  Sampson  irmst 
appear  with  all  the  tassels  on  it : 

Headquarters  Fifth  Army  Corps,  July  4 
Admiral  Sampson,  Commanding  United  States  Navy  Forces: 

Through  negligence  of  our  Cuban  allies,  Pando,  with  5,000  men,  entered 
the  city  of  Santiago  last  night.  This  nearly  doubles  their  forces.  I  have 
demanded  their  surrender,  which  they  refuse,  but  I  am  giving  them  some 
wounded  prisoners  and  delaying  operations  to  let  foreign  citizens  get  out,  and 
there  will  be  no  action  before  the  6th  and  perhaps  the  yth.  Now,  if  you  will 
force  your  way  into  that  harbor  the  town  will  surrender  without  any  further 
sacrifice  of  life.  My  present  position  has  cost  me  1,000  men,  and  I  do  not 
wish  to  lose  any  more.  With  my  forces  on  one  side  and  yours  on  the  other — 
and  they  have  a  great  terror  of  the  navy,  for  they  know  they  cannot  hurt  you 
— we  shall  have  them.  I  ask  for  an  early  reply.  Very  respectfully, 

WM.  R.  SHAFTER,  Major-General,  U.  S.  V. 


AFTER    THE    SPANISH    FLEET    WAS    GONE.  463 

On  this  the  annotation  of  the  Admiral  is: 

"This  dispatch  shows  a  complete  misapprehension  of  the  circumstances 
which  had  to  be  met. 

"On  the  night  of  July  4,  the  Reina  Mercedes  was  sunk  by  the  Spaniards 
in  a  manner  which  would  certainly  obstruct  the  larger  ships  and  possibly  the 
smaller  ones.  Extensive  shore  batteries  were  known  to  exist,  and  if  our 
smaller  vessels  were  sent  in  and  were  sunk,  either  by  the  mines  or  by  the  fire 
of  the  batteries,  the  harbor  would  be  effectually  closed  to  us.  It  was 
essential  to  the  new  scheme  of  attack  of  this  mine  field  that  the  positions  occu 
pied  by  the  eastern  and  western  batteries  should  be  carried,  and  this  was  the 
scheme  of  action  first  proposed  by  General  Shafter  in  his  discussion  with  my 
chief  of  staff,  who  was  sent  by  me  to  meet  General  Shafter  the  day  of  his 
arrival.  The  chief  of  staff  carried  with  him  a  chart  of  the  harbor  and 
explained  the  situation,  stating  that  it  was  regarded  by  us  as  a  movement  of 
primal  importance  that  these  points  should  be  carried  before  any  attention 
was  paid  to  the  city.  The  possession  of  these  points  insured  the  destruction 
of  the  mines  by  us,  the  entrance  of  our  heavy  ships  in  the  harbor,  and  the 
assault  on  Admiral  Cervera's  squadron  inside.  To  this  General  Shafter  gave 
most  cordial  assent,  and  stated  that  he  had  no  intention  of  attacking  the  city 
proper,  that  here  (pointing  to  the  entrance)  was  the  key  to  the  situation,  and 
that  when  we  had  this  we  had  all.  This  was  repeated  in  his  interview  with 
General  Garcia  at  Acerraderos. " 

Shafter's  few  days  before  Santiago  were  full  of  troubles — for  instance: 

Playa,  July  7,  1898 — 2:05  p.  m. 
Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  A.,  Washington: 

The  failure  to  have  tugs  and  lighters  for  use  in  handling  the  fleet  is  of  so 
serious  a  nature  that  I  must  again  refer  to  it.  Transports  go  off  miles  from 
shore  and  there  is  no  way  of  reaching  them  or  compelling  them  to  come  in. 
It  is  a  constant  struggle  to  keep  them  in  hand.  Had  it  not  been  for  the 
lighter  Laura,  the  army  could  not  have  moved.  It  is  with  the  greatest  diffi 
culty  that  one  day's  food  can  be  issued  at  a  time. 

SHAFTER,  Major-General,  Commanding. 

Two  more  dispatches  of  the  7th  show  it  was  a  bad  day: 

Playa,  July  7,  1898 — 4:50  p.  m. 
Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  A.,  Washington: 

Had  consultation  with  Sampson.      Navy  disinclined    to   force    entrance 


464  AFTER    THE    SPANISH    FLEET    WAS    GONE. 

except  as  a  last  resource.  They  will  bombard  the  city,  which  is  within  easy 
range  of  their  big  guns,  beginning  at  noon  of  the  9th,  and  if  that  is  not  effect 
ive,  after  twenty-four  hours,  will  then  force  entrance  with  some  of  the 
smallest  ships.  I  still  have  hopes  they  will  surrender.  Made  a  second 
demand  on  them  yesterday,  calling  attention  to  the  changed  conditions 
because  of  the  loss  of  the  Spanish  fleet,  and  offering  to  give  them  time  to  con 
sult  their  home  government,  which  General  Toral  has  accepted,  asking  that 
the  British  consul  return  to  the  city  with  employe's  of  the  cable  company  to 
permit  him  to  do  so.  Meanwhile,  I  hope  my  reinforcements  will  arrive.  Not 
one  in  sight  yet  except  the  200  recruits  for  the  Second  Infantry,  who  came  a 
week  ago.  As  a  last  resource  I  will  try  running  in  transports.  I  do  not 
consider  my  force  sufficient  to  warrant  an  assault  on  the  city,  though  I  believe 
it  would  be  successful,  but  at  a  fearful  loss.  Of  course,  it  would  be  criminal 
to  hope  for  the  end  to  be  gained,  which  is  merely  the  capture  of  a  few  thou 
sand  men,  and  when  we  see  we  are  getting  them  by  siege.  Nothing  has  yet 
been  seen  of  tugs,  lighters,  and  launches  promised  ten  days  ago. 

SHAFTER,  Major-General,  Commanding. 

Playa,  July  7,  1898—4:55  p.  m. 
Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  A.,  Washington: 

When  ought  I  to  expect  reinforcements?     They  sadly  needed.     Nothing 
in  sight  to-day.  SHAFTER,  Major-General. 


War  Department,  July  7,  1898 — 5:30  p.  m. 
Major-General  Shafter,  Playa  del  Este,  Cuba: 

The  President  directs  that  you  order  transports  to  stand  in  by  the  shore 
and  enforce  demand,  so  that  they  may  be  able  to  get  supplies  more  easily. 
We  are  distressed  about  the  tugs  and  lighters,  which  were  ordered  long  since 
and  ought  to  have  reached  you  before  now.  Your  long  dispatch  concerning 
second  demand  on  city  received  and  approved.  We  will  be  very  glad  if  you 
can  finish  up  that  work  without  another  assault. 

By  order  Secretary  of  War: 

H.  C.  CORBIN,  Adjutant-General. 


Adjutant-General's  Office,  Washington,  July  7,  1898. 
Major-General  Shafter,  Playa  del  Este,  Cuba: 

One  tug  should  reach   you  to-day.     A  large,  powerful  one  leaves  New 


AFTER    THE    SPANISH    ELEET    WAS    GONE.  467 

Orleans  to-night.     Fifty  laborers  went  on  the  St.  Paul,  leaving  New  York  to 
day,  and  stevedores  are  on  boats  going  to  you. 

H.  C.  CORBIN,  Adjutant-General. 


Playa  del  Este,  via  Haiti,  July  7,  1898 — 7:42  p.  m. 
Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  A.,  Washington: 

Headquarters  Fifth  Army  Corps,  Camp  near  Santiago,  Cuba,  7. — Please 
send  some  fast  ship  from  nearest  point  with  100  stevedores,  100  drivers,  and 
as  many  medicines  and  dressings  as  can  be  obtained.  It  is  reported  to  me 
medicines  are  very  scarce.  Two  steam  launches  should  be  bought.  Too 
much  trouble  to  get  things  from  navy,  and  we  have  but  partial  control  of 
them  when  we  do  get  them.  This  is  not  a  matter  to  be  put  off.  Sent  90,000 
rations  ashore  to-day.  SHAFTER,  Major-General. 


Playa  del  Este,  July  7,  1898—8:35  p.  m. 
Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  A,,  Washington: 

Headquarters  Fifth  Army  Corps,  near  Santiago,  Cuba. — The  hospital 
ship  Relief  just  arrived  with  a  large  amount  of  medical  stores.  Want  the 
teamsters,  stevedores,  and  steam  lighters  as  wired  you,  and  the  sooner  they 
can  be  gotten  here  the  better.  W.  R.  SHAFTER. 

General  Miles  left  Washington  at  10:40  the  night  of  July  yth  on  the  way 
to  Santiago  and  Porto  Rico,  with  instructions  not  to  supersede  Shafter  if  he 
was  able  for  duty.  At  Rockhill,  South  Carolina,  he  telegraphed  the  Secre 
tary  of  War  request  "20,000  .30  caliber  rifles,  using  government  ammunition, 
be  sent  at  once,  to  be  used  at  Santiago  or  other  places,  with  strong  canvas 
web  belts  and  ammunition,  and  that  all  troops  sent  to  Cuba  be  supplied  with 
smokeless  powder  rifles.  The  Winchester  and  Remington  companies  furnish 
arms  and  ammunition.  The  Lee  rifle  does  good  service  for  the  navy. 
Horstman's,  military  dealers,  Philadelphia,  has  12,000  Mauser  rifles  and 
ammunition  for  sale.  Modern  rifles  can  be  obtained  from  other  parties." 

Corbin  telegraphed  Miles:  "There  are  12,000  Krag-Jorgensen  rifles  at 
Tampa  available,  with  1,800,000  rounds  of  ammunition,  with  larger  amount  in 
hands  of  General  Shafter  at  Santiago.  The  output  of  new  ammunition  of  this 
caliber  is  250,000  rounds  per  day." 

Jtily  8th  Corbin  telegraphed  Shafter:  "Do  you  recommend  the  arming  of 


463  AFTER    THE    SPANISH    FLEET    WAS    GONE. 

Henry's  division,  or  any  other  volunteers  of  your  command,  with  Krag- 
Jorgensen  rifles?  We  have  1,800,000  rounds  of  ammunition  at  Tampa,  and 
manufacture  250,000  per  day,  so  you  may  know  what  the  supply  will  be. 
What  are  your  wishes?" 

Shafter  replied:  "By  all  means  arm  in  field  Henry's  division  and  the 
volunteer  regiments  now  here  with  Krag-Jorgensen  rifle.  The  use  of  black 
powder  instantly  brought  volleys  against  regiments  using  Springfield,  and  was 
very  demoralizing  on  those  regiments." 

The  President's  telegram  to  Shafter  on  the  battle  of  July  ist  got  lost  on 
the  wires,  and  was  repeated  on  the  8th  as  follows: 

"The  President  directs  me  to  say  you  have  the  gratitude  and  thanks  of 
the  Nation  for  the  brilliant  and  effective  work  of  your  noble  army  on  Friday, 
July  i.  The  steady  valor  and  heroism  of  officers  and  men  thrill  the  American 
people  with  pride.  The  country  mourns  the  brave  men  who  fell  in  battle. 
They  have  added  new  names  to  our  roll  of  heroes. ' ' 

The  fact  is  not  obscure  in  the  official  dispatches,  that  General  Shafter  was 
exceedingly  anxious  to  have  the  Spaniards  in  Santiago  surrender  to  him. 
Indeed,  when  he  made  the  demand  he  was  sick  and  despondent,  and  his 
correspondence  with  Admiral  Sampson  shows  that  he  was  not  in  high  spirits. 
July  9  at  i  p.  m.,  he  got  a  proposition  from  the  commandant  in  Santiago  to 
march  out  of  the  city  with  arms  and  baggage,  not  to  be  molested  until  he 
reached  Holguin,  surrendering  the  territory  to  the  Americans.  This,  Shafter 
remarked,  was,  as  the  Spaniards  stated  it,  to  save  the  city  and  avoid  useless 
bloodshed.  Shafter  closed  his  communication:  "This  will  give  me  another 
day  to  get  up  troops  from  Siboney,  the  first  transports  of  reinforcements  hav 
ing  just  arrived.  In  my  opinion,  they  will  have  to  surrender  unconditionally 
very  soon  after  I  open  fire  on  them." 

The  General  received  this  conclusive  dispatch: 

Adjutant-General's  Office,  Washington,  July  9,  1898 — 1:50  p   m. 
Major-General  Shafter,  Playa  del  Este,  Cuba: 

Your  telegram  setting  forth  terms  on  which  the  enemy  will  evacuate 
Santiago  has  been  submitted  to  the  President  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  who 
instructs  me  to  say  that  you  will  accept  nothing  but  an  unconditional  sur 
render,  and  should  take  extra  precautions  to  prevent  the  enemy's  escape. 

By  order  Secretary  of  War : 

H.  C.  CORBIN,  Adjutant-General. 


AFTER    THE    SPANISH    FLEET    WAS    GONE.  469 

Playa  del  Este,  via  Haiti,  July  9,  1898 — 9  p.  m. 
Secretary  of  War,  Washington: 

Headquarters  Fifth  Army  Corps,  near  Santiago. — I  forwarded  General 
Toral's  proposition  to  evacuate  the  town  this  morning  without  consulting  any 
one.  Since  then  I  have  seen  the  general  officers  commanding  divisions,  who 
agree  with  me  that  it  should  be  accepted.  First,  it  releases' at  once  the  har 
bor;  second,  it  permits  the  return  of  thousands  of  women,  children,  and  old 
men,  who  have  left  the  town  fearing  bombardment,  and  who  are  now  suffer 
ing  where  they  are,  though  I  am  doing  my  best  to  supply  them  with  food; 
third,  it  saves  the  great  destruction  of  property  which  a  bombardment  would 
entail,  most  of  which  belongs  to  Cubans  and  foreign  residents;  fourth,  it  at 
once  relieves  the  command,  while  it  is  in  good  health,  for  operations  else 
where.  There  are  now  three  cases  of  yellow  fever  at  Siboney,  in  Michigan 
regiment ;  and  if  it  gets  started,  no  one  knowrs  where  it  will  stop.  We  lose  by 
this  simply  some  prisoners  we  do  not  want  and  the  arms  they  carry.  I 
believe  many  of  them  will  desert  and  return  to  our  lines.  I  was  told  by  sen 
tinel,  who  deserted  last  night,  that  200  men  want  to  come,  but  were  afraid  our 
men  would  fire  upon  them.  W.  R.  SHAFTER,  General. 


Adjutant-General's  Office,  Washington,  July  9,  1898 — 11:15  p.  m. 
Major-General  Shafter,  Playa  del  Este,  Cuba: 

In  reply  to  your  telegram  recommending  terms  of  evacuation  as  proposed 
by  the  Spanish  commander,  after  careful  consideration  by  the  President  and 
Secretary  of  War,  I  am  directed  to  say  that  you  have  repeatedly  been  advised 
that  you  would  not  be  expected  to  make  an  assault  upon  the  enemy  at  Santi 
ago  until  you  were  prepared  to  do  the  work  thoroughly.  When  you  are  ready, 
this  will  be  done.  Your  telegram  of  this  morning  said  your  position  was 
impregnable,  and  that  you  believed  the  enemy  would  yet  surrender  uncondi 
tionally.  You  have  also  assured  us  that  you  could  force  their  surrender  by 
cutting  off  the  supplies.  Under  these  circumstances  your  message  recom 
mending  that  Spanish  troops  be  permitted  to  evacuate  and  proceed  without 
molestation  to  Holguin  is  a  great  surprise  and  is  not  approved.  The  responsi 
bility  of  destruction  and  distress  to  the  inhabitants  rests  entirely  with  the 
Spanish  Commander.  The  Secretary  of  War  orders  that  when  you  are  strong 
enough  to  destroy  the  enemy  and  take  Santiago  that  you  do  it.  If  you  have 
not  force  enough,  it  will  be  dispatched  to  you  at  the  earliest  moment  practi- 


470  AFTER    THE    SPANISH    FLEET    WAS    GONE. 

cable.     Reinforcements  are  on  the  way,   of  which  you   have   already   been 
advised.     In  the  meantime,  nothing  is  lost  by  holding  the  position  you  now 
have  and  which  you  regard  as  impregnable.     Acknowledge  receipt. 
By  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War : 

H.  C.  CORBIN,  Adjutant-General. 

The  annexed  telegram  is  of  no  little  significance : 

Adjutant-General's  Office,  Washington,  July  9,  1898 — 11:20  p.  m. 
Major-General  Shafter,  Playa  del  Este,  Cuba: 

It  is  suggested  that  all  official  telegrams,  particularly  those  requiring 
action,  be  addressed  to  the  Adjutant-General.  This  will  insure  more  prompt 
action,  as  the  office  is  kept  open  twenty-four  hours  a  day. 

H.  C.  CORBIN,  Adjutant-General. 

General  Corbin  has  been  likened  to  the  engineer  of  a  locomotive,  or  the 
fireman.  He  certainly  fed  the  fires  and  pulled  the  lever  day  and  night,  and 
did  a  grand  work,  being  on  duty  about  two-thirds  of  the  twenty-four  hours 
per  day. 

July  loth  Shafter  telegraphed  Corbin,  1:303.  m.  :  "If  two  lighters  and 
tugs  have  arrived,  navy  must  have  them.  They  have  not,  up  to  sundown, 
reported  at  Siboney  or  Daiquiri." 

The  tug  and  lighters  had  stuck  at  Guantanamo,  and  the  Quartermaster- 
General  asked  the  naval  authorities  to  send  them  to  Shafter,  who  "needs  them 
badly."  Shafter  telegraphed  July  loth,  2:50  p.  m.,  that  his  position  was 
impregnable  against  attack,  but  he  had  not  troops  enough  to  surround  the 
town,  adding,  "The  Cuban  troops  are  not  to  be  depended  upon  for  severe 
fighting."  General  Wilson  telegraphed  from  Charleston,  as  he  was  about 
sailing  for  the  seat  of  war,  that  if  they  had  to  go  out  of  sight  of  transports 
there  would  be  a  paralysis  by  the  absence  of  Miles.*  Corbin  caught  this  on 
the  first  bounce,  and  replied:  "The  transports  that  will  take  the  First  Bri 
gade  of  your  division  will  carry,  in  addition  to  the  men,  800  mules,  without 
interfering  with  the  comfort  of  soldiers.  General  Brooke  has  been  directed  to 
send  you  your  wagon  transportation. ' ' 

July  nth  Shafter  telegraphed:  "Navy  fired  few  shots  from  the  sea  near 
Aguadores.  Effect  not  perceptible."  Major  General  Miles  commanding 
arrived  off  Santiago  July  i2th.  On  the  next  day  Corbin  telegraphed  him: 

"Contracting  party,  with  steamship,   two  powerful  sea  tugs,  steam  sea- 

*  Not  the  Commanding  General. 


AFTER    THE    SPANISH    FLEET    WAS    GONE.  471 

going  barges,  and  fleet  of  lighters,  supplied  with  timber,  iron,  bolts,  black 
smith's  outfit,  pile-drivers,  derrick,  etc.,  for  dock  building,  also  100  mechanics 
and  skilled  laborers  and  250  common  laborers,  will  sail  from  New  York  late 
to-morrow  afternoon  or  early  Thursday  morning  direct  for  Santiago." 

General  Miles  never  knew  heavier  rains.  Shafter  telegraphed,  if 
rains  continued  roads  would  be  impassable.  There  had  been  "no  attempt 
to  enter  the  harbor  by  the  navy.  They  should  be  required  to  make  a 
determined  effort  at  once."  If  roads  stopped  rations,  the  town  would  have  to 
be  assaulted.  Jose  Toral,  commander  of  the  forces  in  Santiago,  July  i2th 
wanted  a  solution  that  would  leave  the  honor  of  his  troops  intact,  and  Shafter 
asked  the  Adjutant-General: 

"Will  any  modification  of  the  recent  order  be  permitted?  I  have  been 
perfectly  satisfied  that  he  can  be  taken,  but  if  he  fights,  as  we  have  reason  to 
believe  he  may,  it  will  be  at  fearful  cost  of  life;  and  to  stay  here  with  disease 
threatening  may  be  as  great  loss  from  that  cause.  The  suffering  of  the 
people  who  left  the  town  is  intense.  I  can  only  supply  food  enough  to  keep 
them  from  starvation,  and  if  blue  rains  continue  I  do  not  know  how  long  I  can 
do  that. ' ' 

The  reply  was  there  could  be  no  modification  of  former  orders.  General 
Miles  telegraphed  July  isth,  the  Spanish  General  "offers  to  surrender  Santi 
ago  province,  force,  batteries,  munitions  of  war.,  etc.,  all  except  the  men  and 
small  arms.  Under  ordinary  circumstances  would  not  advise  acceptance,  but 
this  is  a  great  concession,  and  would  avoid  assaulting  intrenching  lines  with 
every  device  for  protecting  his  men  and  inflicting  heavy  loss  on  assaulting 
lines.  The  siege  may  last  many  weeks,  and  they  have  the  provisions  for  two 
months.  There  are  20,000  starving  people  who  have  fled  the  city  and  were 
not  allowed  to  take  any  food. 

Behind  this  urgency  were  100  cases  of  yellow  fever  in  the  army  and  the 
certainty  of  its  rapid  increase.  The  Secretary  of  War  wrote  to  the  Secretary 
of  the  Navy  requesting  him  to  order  the  fleet  off  Santiago  to  force  its  way  into 
the  bay.  The  reasons  for  immediate  action  were  these:  "First,  the  very 
heavy  rains  that  are  falling  almost  constantly  have  made  the  roads  nearly 
impassable  and  threaten  to  cut  off  our  supply  of  provisions  for  the  army  in  the 
trenches  altogether;  second,  the  rains  are  making  the  holding  of  our  lines 
almost  impossible,  as  the  trenches  are  filled  with  water;  third,  the  lives  of  our 
men  are  in  great  danger  from  yellow  fever,  which  has  broken  out  among  our 


472  AFTER    THE    SPANISH    FLEET    WAS    GONE. 

troops  and  is  spreading-  rapidly,  and,  fourth,  the  character  of  the  works  of  the 
enemy  is  such  that  to  take  them  by  assault  would  be  a  terrible  sacrifice  of 
life." 

General  Shafter's  position  before  Santiago  after  the  Spanish  fleet  was 
extinguished  was  dangerous.  There  can  be  no  doubt  of  it.  The  strain  upon 
our  small  army  in  fighting  through  tropical  jungles,  with  insufficient  artillery, 
under  the  frightful  fire  from  Mauser  rifles  of  range  almost  equal  to  field  guns, 
using  smokeless  powder,  so  that  the  messenger  of  wounds  and  death  seemed 
to  be  a  killing  storm  from  clear  air,  had  been  almost  unbearable.  The  kill 
ing  and  wounding  of  more  than  1,500  men  was  unexpected,  and  for  that  reason 
made  the  greater  impression,  though  the  percentage  of  loss  was  but  a  fraction 
of  that  often  suffered  on  both  sides  when  our  national  and  confederate  armies 
confronted  each  other.  Shafter's  illness  was  distressing,  and,  his  dispatches 
show,  affected  his  moral  as  well  as  physical  condition.  He  hung  on  with 
fierce  resolution  to  his  job,  but  gave  the  impression  in  the  War  Office  of  an 
uncertain  quantity,  so  that  he  was  admonished  daily  by  inquiries  as  to  his 
health,  that  there  was  the  gravest  personal  solicitude  about  him,  and  several 
times  he  was  pressed  as  to  what  should  be  done  if  he  had  to  give  up.  It  could 
not  well  be  told  at  a  distance  what  percentage  of  a  sick  man's  petulance  and 
fanciful  confidence  there  was  in  his  asserted  betterments  in  health.  His  pro 
posal  at  the  close  of  the  hardest  fighting  to  yield  five  miles  of  ground  seemed 
like  the  retreat  across  the  Rappahannock  after  Chancellorsville,  and  there  was 
a  crispness  in  the  calm  phrase  in  which  the  Secretary  of  War  cabled  that  it 
would  be  much  better  to  stay  where  he  was.  He  thought  so  himself  on  the 
Fourth  of  July.  Though  George  Washington  was  a  paroled  prisoner  on  that 
date  at  Fort  Necessity,  it  was  when  he  was  a  young  man,  before  the  conse 
cration  of  the  day.  That  the  navy  was  not  doing  what  it  might  to  help  the 
siege,  when  there  was  no  more  blockading  to  do.  was  an  opinion  Shafter 
shared  with  the  country.  The  slender  army  had  lost  in  killed,  wounded, 
missing,  sick  and  exhausted,  2,000  men,  and  the  navy  two  killed  and  six 
wounded.  The  evidence  was  not  easily  made  to  appear  of  a  full  performance  of 
duty,  though  the  entrance  to  the  harbor  of  Santiago  was  very  narrow  and 
strongly  fortified,  and  a  Spanish  ship  had  been  sunk  July  4th  to  block  the  way 
against  our  battleships.  Farragut  and  Dewey  disregarded  torpedoes,  but  the 
former  lost  a  ship  with  its  crew  at  Mobile,  and  the  latter  had  a  broad 
entrance  to  Manila  Bay.  The  conditions  were  certainly  not  the  same  at  New 


AFTER    THE    SPANISH    FLEET    WAS    GONE.  473 

Orleans,  Mobile  and  Manila,  but  in  those  cases  the  navy  was  foremost  in  the 
fray,  and  gloriously  cleared  the  path  for  the  army;  so  it  was  not  unreasonable 
to  feel  that  the  spirit  of  aggression  at  Santiago  in  handling  our  ships  was  not 
according  to  the  most  illustrious  precedents.  General  Shafter,  however,  had 
been  painfully  willing  to  allow  the  Spanish  troops  to  get  away,  without  insist 
ing  upon  the  "U.  S. "  preliminary  insisted  upon  at  Fort  Donaldson  by  U.  S. 
Grant,  that  of  "unconditional  surrender,"  but  the  President  supplied  the 
deficiency,  and  used  the  very  words,  as  there  were  none  suitable  or  stronger. 
Shafter  had  been  keenly  disappointed  by  the  Cubans,  who  became  at  last 
more  numerous  than  valuable  when  they  were  fed,  armed,  clothed',  and 
treated  with  much  consideration,  but  they  were  still  deficient  in  every  military 
service  but  that  of  scouting,  and  managed  to  be  in  at  the  coffee  and  out  of  the 
fight.  They  were  not  adapted,  as  Shafter  said,  to  severe  fighting.  They  let 
Spaniards  into  Santiago,  and  did  not  help  to  put  them  out.  The  fifty  thou 
sand  Cubans  General  Miles  had  regarded  as  one  wing  of  his  grand  army  when 
he  planned  a  great  campaign,  dissolved,  except  in  a  small  way,  when  their 
bodies  needed  nourishment.  However,  as  General  Miles  arrived  late  at 
Santiago,  and  did  not  take  command,  for  he  found  Shafter  able  to  ride,  he 
managed  to  retain  his  early  kindness  for  the  Cubans  as  soldiers.  The  last  and 
worst  blow  to  Shafter  was  the  dreadful  presence  and  rapid  development  of  the 
yellow  fever,  with  the  "blue  rains,"  the  torrents  from  the  skies  that  threat 
ened  the  pork  and  cracker  line.  It  cannot  be  denied  that  there  was  a  combi 
nation  of  discouraging  circumstances.  General  Miles,  according  to  his  soldierly 
way,  supported  the  views  of  Shafter,  and  gave  him  wholesome  encouragement. 
Indeed,  the  arrival  of  the  General  at  Santiago  was  as  timely  as  it  had  been 
carefully  and  wisely  planned.  The  presence  of  the  military  head  of  the  army 
of  the  United  States  meant  to  the  Santiago  Spaniards  that  while  they  were 
utterly  forsaken,  all  the  forces  that  seventy  million  people  could  array  were 
centering  there.  The  arrival  of  the  head  of  the  army  was  an  appeal  to  the 
imagination,  and  the  watchmen  of  the  beleaguered  city  at  the  signal  stations 
by  the  sea  reported  fifty-seven  ships,  many  of  them  swarming  with 
troops.  General  Jose*  Toral  had  to  say  in  his  explanation  that,  in  his  opinion, 
the  garrison  could  have  held  the  reserve  lines  against  Shafter's  army,  but 
there  was  no  hope  as  against  the  fresh  forces  pouring  in.  And  so  Santiago 
surrendered.  "All  is  well  that  ends  well." 


CHAPTER    XXI. 

The  Lesson  for  the  Country  of  the  Hills  of  Santiago. 

Value  of  the  Reports  of  the  Inspector-General — His  Keen  Suggestions  and  Brilliant  Sketches 
with  Expert  Information — Tribute  of  Breckenridge  to  Shafter — The  Volunteers  in 
Camps— Chickamauga  as  an  Illustration— The  Location  of  the  Wrongs  that  the  Sol 
diers  Suffered  Unduly — We  Must  Build  Regiments  as  We  do  Battleships — The  Fault 
of  Poor  Preparation  not  Personal — Let  Congress  for  the  Country  Mend  it. 

There  is  extraordinary  value,  professional  and  literary,  in  the  official 
papers  of  Major  General  of  Volunteers,  Inspector  General  J.  C.  Breckenridge. 
His  military  intelligence  is  constantly  manifested  in  what  he  says,  and  his 
vigor  of  expression  presents  information  clear-cut  and  in  a  strong  light,  the 
outlines  sharp,  the  color  vivid.  He  said  of  the  earliest  military  expedition 
out  of  this  country,  that  to  Santiago,  that  it  was  composed  of  "the  flower  of 
the  American  army" — and  writing  as  it  was  getting  under  way,  he  said: 

"Despite  the  newspaper  freedom  of  assertion,  its  purpose  is  said  to  be 
definitely  known  to  but  few,  but  it  is  doubtless  worthy  of  its  high  quality. 
America  has  no  fighting  force  of  equal  size,  worthy  to  represent  her,  if  this  is 
not.  Every  general  and  line  officer  has  come  up  through  the  different  grades 
in  her  military  service,  and  is  as  ripe  as  any  we  have  for  their  respective  com 
mands;  and  many  of  the  staff  officers  have  had  broad  experience  perhaps  even 
in  their  present  particular  positions.  The  adaptability  of  Americans  is  illus 
trated  by  the  admirable  work  being  done  by  many  officers  outside  their  own 
legitimate  field.  Officers  of  the  line  are  doing  every  kind  of  staff  duty  in  a 
manner  it  is  impossible  to  too  highly  appreciate.  The  elasticity  and  adven- 
turousness  of  youthful  vigor  may  occasionally  be  somewhat  lacking,  and  the 
siege  artillery  material  may  lack  preliminary  adjustment  and  practice  in 
expeditions  seaward,  or  even  in  the  ordinary  experience,  in  the  practical 
maneuvers  of  large  bodies  of  men,  and  under  a  questionable  policy  is  partic 
ularly  deficient  in  military  transportations.  An  immobile  army  is  ridiculous. 

474 


THE    LESSON    OF    THE    HILLS    OF    SANTIAGO.  477 

"Many  foreign  countries  are  also  studying  every  detail  and  the  varying 
phases  of  this  expedition  with  most  critical  care,  for  few  are  exempt  from 
similar  possibilities.  The  Fifth  Corps  is  not  alone  in  need  of  all  the  benefits 
that  can  be  gleaned  from  such  experience;  the  whole  army  should  derive  full 
advantage  from  it.  The  difficulties  have  been  immense,  and  have  been  over 
come  with  remarkable  energy.  Only  the  ultimate  result  can  fully  approve 
how  well  or  how  ill  every  possible  contingency  has  been  provided  for  and 
met.  The  careful,  painstaking  preparation  and  study  of  every  detail  of  the 
problem  to  be  met,  and  the  persistent  exertion  to  fully  meet  it  to  the  utmost 
limit  of  the  powers  of  a  great  department  of  the  government,  and  with  the 
combined  provision  and  united  effort  of  every  bureau,  which  was  so  admirably 
illustrated  in  the  naval  expedition  to  the  Philippines,  is,  of  course,  also  to  be 
expected  in  this." 

One  of  the  lessons  of  the  war  of  the  sections  and  states  was  sharply 
applied  by  General  Breckenridge  to  this: 

"It  is  believed  that  special  attention  should  be  called  to  the  general 
absence  of  intrenching  tools  as  a  regular  part  of  the  equipment  of  the  troops. 
Hardly  any  intrenching  tools,  save  the  usual  small  number  of  picks  and  shovels 
for  public  purposes,  accompany  this  expedition ;  though  this  nation,  in  the  war 
of  the  rebellion,  brought  the  use  of  hasty  intrenchments  into  such  prominence 
as  to  materially  affect  the  tactics  and  strategy  of  its  armies.  If  the  use  of  the 
bayonet  or  other  makeshifts  for  this  purpose  was  formerly  inadequate,  it  is 
no  longer  so.  The  modern  shelter  trench  for  skirmishers  is  normally  2^  feet 
in  thickness,  for  protection  against  the  penetration  of  modern  small  arms,  and 
this  would  seem  to  require  the  use  of  a  tool  specially  adapted  for  the  purpose 
required.  So  patent  has  this  need  become  that  one  young  company  com 
mander  is  said  to  have  purchased  masons'  trowels  at  Tampa,  for  the  use  of  his 
company  in  Cuba. " 

In  regard  to  the  volunteers,  General  Breckenridge  refers  to  their  "zeal, 
rare  intelligence  and  adaptability  and  the  having  of  many  of  them  in  some  of 
the  more  excellent  schools  of  the  National  Guard,"  and  remarks  that  these 
qualities  are  evident  all  along  the  line,  and  that  "every  advantage  should  be 
taken  of  all  the  military  instruction  which  our  military  system  affords,  and 
perhaps  full  use  is  not  being  made  of  the  graduates  of  our  hundred  of  military 
colleges,  nor  of  the  army  itself  as  a  training  school  for  young  officers. 
Doubtless  we  could  promptly  commission  several  hundred  bright  young  citi- 


478  THE    LESSON    OF    THE    HILLS    OF    SANTIAGO. 

zens  in  our  regular  regiments,  and  put  them  into  thorough  training  immedi 
ately,  and  so  release  and  utilize  more  of  the  superbly  trained  regular  officers, 
and  have  them  serve  with,  and  perhaps  command,  volunteer  regiments  and 
brigades — men  of  the  age  of  Sheridan  and  Custer  when  they  won  their  fame 
— and  we  could  attract  many  more  graduates  of  our  military  colleges  into 
places  of  command;  so  the  whole  situation  might  be  benefited  and  much  less 
discomfort  be  felt  and  quicker  efficiency  for  battle  be  attained.  Already 
there  is  progress  everywhere.  The  work  is  devolving  upon  the  better  officers, 
and  a  general  insight  as  to  how  and  when  it  is  to  be  done  and  the  best  way  to 
do  it  is  spreading  rapidly. ' ' 

This  was  especially  applicable  to  the  first  stage  of  preparation  in  the 
camps,  and  meant  for  the  encouragement  of  those  bearing  the  burdens  of 
those  preliminaries.  The  General  struck  a  common  experience  in  this  state  of 
things  at  Chickamauga  Park  in  May:  "The  worst  from  some  States  are  better 
equipped  than  the  best  from  others,  and  they  are  apt  to  know  how  to  continue 
to  get  things.  The  struggle  and  delay  in  supplies  is  still  apparent,  and  the 
more  inexperienced  suffer."  In  one  division  were  two  regiments  without 
arms,  and  "some  other  regiments  have  none  for  30  to  40  per  cent  of  men,  and 
guards  walk  posts  with  wands.  Many  rifles,  especially  older  models,  even  if 
not  already  unserviceable,  can  hardly  be  expected  to  last  through  a  campaign. 
An  issuing  arsenal  and  repair  shop  seem  needed." 

On  the  way  to  Tampa  the  General  wrote  that  "brigade  and  division  com 
manders,  rather  under  than  over  45  (alert,  vigorous,  and  experienced,  but  not 
stale),  are  especially  needed  for  instruction  and  leading  an  improvised  army  to 
promptly  and  successfully  meet  the  requirements  of  the  modern  battle  lines, 
and  well-instructed  staff  officers  for  these  subordinate  commands,  even  if  not 
so  young,  are  also  needed.  There  are  almost  none  with  the  brigades." 

General  Breckenridge  urged  striking  Spain  a  blow  at  home  in  order  to 
make  an  impression  on  her  where  she  lives,  "and  if  possible  the  solar  plexus 
blow,  now  that  the  pace  is  set."  July  25th  the  General  wrote:  "Daiquiri 
having  been  selected,  the  landing  could  not  have  been  effected  with  less  loss, 
and  the  movements  of  the  troops  thereafter  were  merely  limited  by  the  speed 
with  which  supplies  could  be  gotten  from  the  vessels,  even  with  the  advan 
tage  of  Siboney  also,  both  of  which  were  little  more  than  indentations  on  an 
open  coast  without  landing  facilities.  And  it  was  seldom,  indeed,  that  the 
supplies  were  brought  up  to  the  fighting  lines  in  any  great  excess  of  their 


THE    LESSON    OF    THE    HILLS    OF    SANTIAGO.  479 

immediate  needs,  and  the  entire  absence  of  the  usual  comforts  and  conven 
iences  of  even  the  simplest  army  life  during  the  whole  of  this  expedition,  and 
sometimes  medical  essentials,  even  in  the  hour  of  utmost  need,  was  one  of  the 
most  marked  features  of  the  landing." 

In  a  few  sentences  the  General  gives  the  story  of  the  fighting  on  land  for 
Santiago: 

"The  remarkable  marksmanship  of  our  trained  soldiers  was  hardly  more 
exploited  than  the  gross  ignorance  of  our  recruits.  The  books  say  that  it 
ought  not  to  be  possible  to  successfully  assault  in  front  unshaken,  still  more, 
well-fortified  infantry,  under  modern  conditions.  But  in  this  instance  dis 
mounted  cavalry,  as  well  as  its  confrere  of  the  infantry  arm,  did,  without 
bayonets,  successfully  assault  infantry  posted  on  commanding  ground,  behind 
water,  well  intrenched,  valiant  and  unshaken,  and  the  severity  of  the  task  is 
indicated  by  the  list  of  casualties,  as  compared  with  the  actual  numbers 
the  immediately  opposing  trenches  will  hold.  And  when  the  fight  was  over, 
though  successful  everywhere,  we  had  no  reserves. 

"Doubtless,  through  telegrams  and  otherwise,  there  have  been  sufficient 
indications  of  the  intense  strain  in  the  whole  military  situation  on  the  field  of 
operations  which  led  to  the  consultation  at  the  El  Poso  house  on  the  night  of 
July  2d,  and  to  some  of  the  general  officers  favoring  a  retrograde  movement 
during  the  day  or  two  prior  to  our  intrenchments  taking  shape  and  the 
armistice  being  agreed  upon,  which  latter  remained  almost  unbroken  until  the 
surrender.  Probably  it  is  now  evident  to  all  that  it  was  far  better  to  stand 
steadfast,  and  perhaps  quite  possible  to  advance  rather  than  retreat,  so  near 
the  4th  of  July;  and  certainly  we  have  demonstrated  our  ability  to  hold  our 
own.  Indeed,  the  fighting  of  this  army  came  up  to  the  highest  expectations, 
and  accomplished  results  beyond  what  it  is  usual  to  expect  of  a  force  so 
constituted." 

General  Breckenridge  has  been  quoted  without  authority  as  having  given 
personal  encouragement  to  General  Shafter  in  moments  of  doubt  as  to  the 
demands  of  the  hour,  and  to  have  been  steadily  urgent  to  stand  firm  until  the 
word  could  be  given  to  advance,  and  some  of  the  language  quoted  above  may 
be  taken  to  refer  to  his  exertions  and  confirm  in  part  the  general  statement  of 
his  timely  tenacity.  His  accounts  of  the  fighting  days  contain  this  reference 
to  the  action  of  Las  Guasimas : 

"The    First    and    Tenth    regiments    of    regular    cavalry    (dismounted) 


480  THE    LESSON    OF    THE    HILLS    OF    SANTIAGO. 

deployed,  and  charged  up  the  hill  in  front;  the  First  Volunteer  Cavalry 
deployed  upon  the  other  or  ridge  road  from  Siboney,  which  forks  at  this  point 
with  the  valley  road,  and  charged  in  flank  on  the  left,  driving  the  enemy  from 
his  position,  but  not  until  we  had  sustained  severe  losses  in  both  killed  and 
wounded.  Our  forces  pushed  on,  and  at  nightfall  occupied  a  line  a  mile  or 
more  in  advance  of  the  position  occupied  by  the  enemy  in  the  morning.  The 
conduct  of  the  troops,  both  white  and  colored,  regular  and  volunteer,  was 
most  gallant  and  soldierly,  and  General  Young's  dispositions,  plan,  and  execu 
tion  were  skillful,  dashing,  and  successful." 

The  soil  of  the  portion  of  Cuba  containing  the  battlefields,  he  says,  "is 
rich  and  supports  a  luxuriant  growth  of  trees,  brush,  and  vines,  making  a 
chaparral  rather  noticeably  thorny  and  poisonous,  that  is  often  impossible  to 
penetrate  unaided  by  the  machete.  The  streams  in  this  vicinity  are  for  the 
most  part  readily  fordable,  except  for  a  few  hours  immediately  after  heavy 
and  long-continued  rains.  The  roads  become  then  almost  impassable,  but  dry 
up  very  quickly." 

The  movements  of  the  troops  were  between  the  fighting  days  favored  by 
the  moon,  and  many  hours  of  the  night  were  useful  for  changes  that  could 
not  have  been  possible  in  darkness.  In  the  preliminaries  to  the  battle  of  El 
Caney,  "General  Ludlow's  brigade  took  up  a  position  west  of  the  village,  in 
order  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  Spaniards  when  they  should  be  driven  out 
and  attempt  to  retreat  to  the  city  of  Santiago.  But  with  soldierly  instinct  and 
admirable  effect,  he  closed  in  upon  the  defenses  of  the  village,  and  his  white 
sailor  hat  became  a  target  for  the  enemy  during  the  hours  he  hugged  the 
blockhouses  on  his  flank  of  the  well-defended  village." 

The  artillery  was  on  this  occasion  served  with  great  effect.  The  division 
commander,  between  one  and  two,  directed  the  battery  "to  concentrate  its 
fire  upon  the  stone  fort,  or  blockhouses,  situated  on  the  highest  point  in  the 
village  on  the  northern  side,  and  which  was  the  key  point  to  the  village. 
This  fort  was  built  of  brick,  with  walls  about  a  foot  thick,  about  45  by  35  feet, 
with  semicircular  bastions  diagonally  opposite  each  other.  The  practice  of 
the  artillery  against  this  was  very  effective,  knocking  great  holes  into  the  fort 
and  rendering  it  untenable." 

At  about  6:30,  after  the  El  Caney  fight,  "General  Lawton  went  forward 
with  his  staff  to  find  and  definitely  locate  the  position  which  his  troops  were  to 
occupy,  and  continued  along  the  road  to  within  about  a  mile  of  the  city,  when 


COL.  JOHN  JACOB  ASTOR,  OF  ASTOR  BATTERY  FAME,  NEAR  SPANISH  TRENCHES. 


THE    LESSON    OF    THE    HILLS    OF    SANTIAGO.  483 

he  was  fired  into  by  the  Spanish  pickets.  He  then  returned  and  sent  forward 
a  strong  patrol  of  Cubans  to  find  out  the  condition  of  affairs.  He  then 
reported  the  matter  to  corps  headquarters  and  waited  until  about  2:30  a.  m., 
and  not  receiving  any  report  from  the  Cubans,  or  any  further  direction  from 
headquarters,  he  started  forward  again,  and  was  ordered  to  take  a  position 
on  the  right." 

Nothing  was  heard  from  the  Cubans  after  they  were  directed  to  do  some 
thing.  General  Breckenridge  says: 

"Firing  was  kept  up  during  the  whole  of  the  2d  of  July  by  both  sides,  our 
troops  having  thrown  up  hasty  intrenchments  in  many  positions  the  night 
previous.  During  the  26.  of  July  there  were  a  great  many  casualties,  result 
ing  not  entirely  from  aimed  fire,  but  from  bullets  clearing  the  crest  of  our 
intrenchments  and  going  far  beyond,  striking  men  as  they  were  coming  up  to 
gather  into  position,  or  as  they  were  going  back  and  forth,  bringing  water, 
caring  for  the  wounded,  and  so  on.  Many  casualties  also  resulted  from  the 
fire  of  sharpshooters,  stationed  in  trees  with  such  thick  foliage  that  the  sharp 
shooters  could  not  be  seen.  It  seemed  incredible  that  men  should  be  so 
reckless  as  to  remain  within  our  lines  and  continue  firing,  and  it  was  believed 
by  many  that  what  was  reported  to  be  fire  from  sharpshooters  was  simply 
spent  bullets  that  came  over  the  crest  of  our  works.  But  I  and  the  members 
of  my  staff  can  testify  to  the  fact  that,  in  many  places  along  the  road  leading 
up  to  the  center  of  our  lines,  the  sharp  crack  of  the  Mauser  rifle  could  be  heard 
very  close  to  the  road ;  and  there  were  all  the  usual  indications  of  the  near 
and  selected  aim  against  individuals.  Scouting  parties  were  sent  out  from 
time  to  time  to  get  hold  of  these  fellows,  and  a  number  of  them  were  captured 
or  shot.  It  was  not  until  a  day  or  two  afterwards,  however,  that  they  were 
all  cleared  out. 

"On  the  morning  of  the  2d,  three  batteries  of  artillery  went  into  action 
near  San  Juan,  right  behind  the  infantry  intrenchments,  and  about  600 
yards  from  the  enemy's  intrenchments.  Firing  black  powder,  instead 
of  smokeless,  they,  of  course,  instantly  drew  all  fire  in  that  vicinity,  and 
being  unable  to  work  the  guns,  were  obliged  to  withdraw.  The  question 
as  to  smokeless  powder,  intrenchments,  and  batteries  of  both  light  and 
siege  artillery,  were  matters  of  the  highest  moment  to  the  men  most  nearly 
exposed  to  the  steady  fire  from  the  intrenched  lines,  so  admirably  laid  out 
and  stoutly  defended  as  in  this  fight.  During  the  night  of  the  ad  our  troops 


484  THE    LESSON    OF    THE    HILLS    OF    SANTIAGO. 

continued  intrenching  on  a  crest  from  500  to  1,500  yards  distant  from  the 
crest  occupied  by  the  Spanish  intrenchments,  and  in  more  cases  having  higher 
command.  The  Spaniards  made  an  attack  on  the  night  of  the  ad  upon  our 
lines,  which  was  repulsed  with  very  little  loss  to  ourselves." 

These  are  remarkable  accounts  of  Spaniards,  who  not  only  remained 
within  our  lines  to  do  sharp-shooting  from  tree  tops,  but  ventured  upon  a 
night  attack.  General  Breckenridge  says  the  bravery  of  the  Spanish  soldier 
fighting  on  the  defensive  is  beyond  doubt,  and  the  Mauser  rifle  "an  excellent 
and  rapid  weapon,"  while  the  smokeless  cartridge  adds  to  its  special  efficacy. 
It  is  loaded  with  five  cartridges  at  a  time,  held  in  a  clip  "detached  from  the 
belt  and  placed  in  the  rifle  in  one  motion." 

The  account  General  Breckenridge  gives  of  the  Cubans  is  discriminating 
and  judicial,  and  we  quote  the  words  herewith: 

* '  In  the  beginning  the  Cuban  soldiers  were  largely  used  as  outposts  on  our 
front  and  flanks.  There  has  been  a  great  deal  of  discussion  among  officers  of 
this  expedition  concerning  the  Cuban  soldiers  and  the  aid  they  have  rendered. 
They  seem  to  have  very  little  organization  or  discipline,  and  they  do  not,  of 
course,  fight  in  the  battle  line  with  our  troops. 

"Yet  in  every  skirmish  or  fight  where  they  are  present  they  seem  to  have 
a  fair  proportion  of  killed  and  wounded.  They  were  of  undoubted  assistance 
in  our  first  landing,  and  in  our  scouting  our  front  and  flanks.  It  is  not  safe, 
however,  to  rely  upon  their  fully  performing  any  specific  duty,  according  to 
our  expectation  and  understanding,  unless  they  are  under  the  constant  super 
vision  and  direction  of  one  of  our  own  officers,  as  our  methods  and  views  are 
so  different,  and  misunderstanding  or  failure  so  easy. ' ' 

The  General  says:  "We  were  told  when  we  entered  upon  this  campaign 
that  it  was  necessary  above  all  things  not  to  sleep  on  the  ground,  and  hammocks 
were  recommended  to  secure  this  end.  Some  were  seen  in  the  original  bales 
on  the  transports,  and  it  is  doubtful  whether  the  soldiers  could  have  carried 
hammocks  in  addition  to  what  they  already  had  to  carry.  Even  such  heavy 
intrenching  tools  as  were  on  hand  were  felt  to  be  a  burden.  The  Kahki 
quickly  loses  its  shape  and  dand)'  color,  and  is  not  strong  enough  to  withstand 
thorns.  There  were  many  lost  packs,  and  apparently  the  Cubans  and  the 
sick  found  some  comfort  from  the  owners'  loss.  Bayonets  were  found 
useless  in  this  war  except  to  dig  with. 

"It  has  certainly  been  clearly  demonstrated  that  smokeless  powder  is  an 


-THE    LESSON    OF    THE    HILLS    OF    SANTIAGO.  485 

absolute  necessity  for  both  small  arms  and  field  guns.  Often  we  fought  for 
hours  against  an  invisible  enemy  who  was  firing  fatally  upon  us  all  the  time. 
The  volunteers,  as  soon  as  the  Springfields  were  fired,  at  once  revealed  their 
position  and  drew  the  fire  of  the  enemy,  besides  hiding  the  enemy  from  their 
view.  They  found  it  difficult  to  contend  with  an  invisible  enemy,  pouring  in 
an  effective  fire  from  a  position  impossible  to  determine. 

"The  Spanish  blockhouse  is  ubiquitous  and  a  more  elaborate  structure 
than  we  had  been  led  to  expect.  It  has  the  air  of  an  evolution  during  a  course 
of  years  for  dominating  an  inimical  and  insurgent  country  at  every  high  point 
and  crossroad.  It  is  usually  placed  upon  a  commanding  position  and  affords 
a  lookout,  the  lower  part  built  of  stones  and  earth,  and  two  tiers  of  fire,  and 
the  upper  part  of  wood,  the  top  of  the  parapet  being  the  top  of  the  stone  wall, 
so  that  up  to  the  height  of  the  breast  there  is  complete  protection  against 
small -arms  fire. 

"Around  the  blockhouses  and  connected  with  it  by  intrenchments  are 
sometimes  several  successive  lines  of  field  intrenchments.  These  intrench 
ments  are  very  narrow  in  profile,  and  instead  of  earth  being  thrown  to  the 
front  it  is  more  often  thrown  to  the  rear,  to  one  side,  so  that  the  protection  in 
front  of  the  trench  is  natural  solid  earth.  The  soil  is  of  such  a  nature  that  it 
will  stand  almost  vertical  in  its  natural  condition,  so  that  the  slope  of  the 
trench  is  very  slight. 

"Such  a  trench  as  this  is  extremely  difficult  to  injure,  even  in  artillery 
fire,  and  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  reach  men  in  the  intrenchments,  as  they 
are  thoroughly  protected,  even  from  artillery  fire,  by  crouching.  The 
trenches  are  usually  very  short,  so  that  there  is  not  much  chance  of  bringing 
an  enfilading  fire  upon  them. 

"The  old  Springfield  seemed  a  begrimed  and  suicidal  blunderbuss,  upon 
the  battlefield.  Of  course  it  can  still  administer  death  to  enemies,  like  the 
obsolete  cannon  in  the  enemy's  trenches  did  to  us,  as  a  pitiful  makeshift. 

"Among  the  telling  features  frequently  remarked  upon  by  those  present 
were  the  conspicuous  gallantry  of  the  gray-haired  officers  (General  Hawkins 
at  San  Juan  and  Captain  Haskell  at  the  Caney  blockhouse),  when  they  led 
their  commands  to  the  final  assaults,  and  the  courage  and  conduct  of  the 
colored  troops  and  First  United  States  Volunteers  seemed  always  up  to  the 
best.  The  admiration  certain  other  organizations  also  elicited  from  their 
comrades  was  noticeable  where  all  were  such  good  soldiers. ' ' 


486  THE    LESSON    OF    THE    HILLS    OF    SANTIAGO. 

The  concluding  lines  of  the  report  of  the  battles  of  Santiago  by  the 
Inspector  General  are  personal.  General  Lawton  is  referred  to  as  in  "every 
exigency  of  campaign  and  battle  capable  of  adequately  performing  more  than 
was  ever  assigned  to  him,  though  some  of  the  severest  military  tasks  and 
duties  were  performed  by  him.  This  judgment  still  stands  well  established, 
though  the  command  of  a  division  of  regulars  and  the  front  and  swinging  right 
wing  of  an  invading  and  assaulting  army  has  been  intrusted  confidently  to  his 
command.  The  reserve  force  and  quiet  self-control  with  which  every  step  in 
action  was  conducted  equaled  his  proverbial  energy,  endurance,  courage,  and 
tenacity." 

General  Shafter  is  characterized  as  of  phenomenal  force  and  activity,  and, 
"if  permitted  me,  it  seems  due  that  I  should  bear  willing  testimony  to  the 
remarkable  energy,  decision,  and  self-reliance  which  characterized  General 
Shafter's  course  during  this  distinguished  military  adventure  throughout  its 
arduous  course  to  its  most  honorable  conclusion.  At  every  stage  of  this 
proceeding  General  Shafter  was  the  dominant  spirit  at  the  scene  of  action. 

"Oppressed  with  sickness  and  overweighted  with  responsibilities  and  care, 
he  carried  the  fate  of  his  army  to  a  successful  and  glorious  issue.  And  any 
precedent  is  rare  where,  amidst  such  natural  obstacles  and  dangers  and 
limited  means  and  opposing  defenses,  a  more  numerous,  well  disciplined,  and 
gallant  force  capitulated  to  invaders  who  had  upon  their  fighting  line  a  smaller 
force  than  that  surrendered.  The  glory  of  this  belongs  to  General  Shafter 
and  his  army  and  the  administration  sustaining  it.  And  whatever  influence 
was  felt  from  this  army  toward  the  driving  out  and  destruction  of  the  Spanish 
fleet  may  also  go  to  its  credit." 

That  the  volunteers  who  got  to  the  front  at  Santiago  were  of  the  same 
sort  that  have  established  themselves  in  the  public  confidence  and  the  favor 
able  opinion  of  the  masters  and  leaders  of  armies,  goes  without  saying.  They 
were,  as  a  rule,  under  the  direction  of  men  who  knew  something  of  the  busi 
ness  of  war,  but  suffered  from  inexperience.  They  were  hurried  from 
camps  that  had  not  been  found  particularly  healthful,  because  the  sorrows  of 
embarrassing  troubles  that  could  not  be  provided  against,  were  encountered 
everywhere  the  men  were  gathered  for  the  instruction  of  discipline  and  the 
accouterments  of  army  life.  They  in  the  flush  of  enthusiasm  chose  officers 
who  could  not  draw  requisitions  or  give  the  convenient  tips  for  the  ameliora 
tion  of  hardships  or  even  the  preparation  of  rations  for  consumption.  The 


THE    LESSON    OF    THE    HILLS    OF    SANTIAGO.  487 

average  thought  of  the  average  citizen  of  the  United  States  was,  when  Chick 
amauga  Park  became  a  camp  for  volunteers  and  regulars  too,  it  was  an  ideal 
selection  for  the  schooling  into  soldiership  of  an  army  of  the  people.  It  was 
the  battle-ground  that  in  a  higher  degree  than  any  other — all  points  included 
—had  illustrated  the  devoted  spirit  and  desperate  endurance  of  American 
manhood  on  the  fields  smitten  under  the  stress  of  the  grim  game  of  war. 
There  were  higher  percentages  of  losses  of  both  sides  at  Chickamauga,  on 
those  terrible  and  glorious  Sepfomber  days,  that  all  then  and  now  living 
in  this  country  remember  so  well,  and  that  those  born  since,  here  and  else 
where,  must  know  all  about  if  they  would  comprehend  the  perseverance  of 
valor,  and  the  capacities  of  sacrifice,  that  is  in  the  nerve  of  the  men  of  the 
nation,  and  it  seemed  that  our  young  men  assembled  there  from  the  States 
north  and  south,  whose  regiments  lost  most  heavily  by  the  stream  that  the 
Creeks  called  "the  river  of  death"  (Chickamauga),  would  find  in  the  atmos 
phere  an  inheritance  of  the  inspiration  of  heroism. 

In  the  order  of  recommendations  was  the  presence  a  few  miles  to  the 
north  of  the  splendid  River  Tennessee,  and  on  the  spot  was  the  Cherokee 
Spring,  pouring  forth  an  unfailing  pure  broad  stream,  that  managed  with 
knowledge  and  energy  and  guarded  with  vigilance  would  water  an  army 
greater  than  that  of  Xerxes.  There  was  also  the  mountain  air  of  Georgia, 
and  the  farmers'  fields  and  the  breezy  woods,  and  great  spaces  where  army 
corps  could  be  mustered  and  put  through  their  evolutions. 

Even  into  this  paradise  of  soldiers'  schools  came  plagues  of  flies  and  other 
plagues,  and  with  the  Chickamauga  River  and  the  Crawfish  Spring  and  wells 
by  the  score,  each  yielding  inexhaustible  supplies  of  the  better  beverage  of 
man,  there  were  bitter  complaints  of  the  water  as  well  as  of  the  insects. 
There  was,  counting  all  the  circumstances  of  the  crisis,  no  quick  and  certain 
help  for  these  things.  They  must  all  be  considered  in  the  argument  for  a  real 
army,  not  necessarily  for  a  monstrous  host,  but  a  sufficient  force  to  prevent 
the  awful  expensiveness  of  the  profligate  system  of  accepting  challenges  to 
war,  or  galloping  into  it,  as  the  unthinking  horse  goes  to  battle,  headlong^ 
and  squandering  in  a  few  summer  weeks,  and  then  with  disappointing  results, 
the  substance  of  the  people,  the  gain  of  laborious  and  thrifty  years  and  the 
lives  of  the  youth  just  grown  up  into  usefulness. 

In  those  profuse  outlays  that  the  zeal  of  patriotism  and  the  pride  of 
manliness  and  the  gracious  sympathies  of  womanliness  call  for  irresistibly 


488  THE    LESSON    OF    THE    HILLS    OF    SANTIAGO. 

and  without  stint,  there  cannot  be  full  compensation  found.  Lost  time  is 
irrecoverable,  and  we  have  put  off  for  the  mystical  to-morrows  those  pro 
visions  for  bad  weather  that  must  come  to  us  as  to  all  others,  and  that  the 
story  of  every  age  foreshadows. 

If  we  had  been  as  presciently  thoughtful  for  the  army  as  on  behalf  of  the 
navy  we  would  not  have  depended  in  the  days  big  with  destiny  in  July,  1898, 
upon  the  thin  lines  of  indomitable  sufferers,  who  stormed  and  held  the  hills 
beyond  Santiago  and  were  a  great  salvation.  If  we  had  been  really  ready  for 
entrance  upon  such  a  campaign,  as  all  other  nations  of  thirty  per  cent  of  our 
ability,  with  the  exception  of  China,  are,  we  would  have  sent  troop  ships  with 
lighters  and  tugs,  laborers,  and  all  the  well  known  wants  of  such  an  enter 
prise  and  the  requirements  of  life  in  southern  Cuba.  We  would  have  had 
shipped  a  narrow-gauge  railroad,  rails,  cars,  locomotives,  engineers,  all  but 
conductors,  with  expert  railroad  builders  to  put  it  down,  and  our  soldiers  could 
have  been  and  would  have  been  supplied  with  full  rations  and  medicines,  their 
packs  delivered  on  the  firing  lines  with  all  their  shelter  tents,  blankets, 
tobacco,  and  all  the  other  little  comforts,  the  sum  of  which  is  so  great,  and 
along  with  these  full  advanced,  swiftly  placed,  and  provided  long  range  and 
rapid  fire  guns  to  sweep  away  the  Spanish  blockhouses  and  score  and  search 
the  ridges,  thickets  and  ditches  with  an  intolerable  flight  of  iron  hail. 

But  such  things  cannot  be  extemporized  at  Tampa,  Camp  Alger,  Chicka- 
mauga,  or  anywhere  else.  What  artillery  might  have  done  may  be  seen  in 
what  one  battery  did  at  El  Caney.  It  was  only  with  extreme  exertion  that 
the  fateful  battery  that  prepared  the  victory  was  placed  where  it  wiped  away 
the  Spaniards  with  their  smokeless  Mausers,  that  scourged  our  lines  as  if  with 
swarms  of  hornets,  flying  from  invisible  nests  with  stings  of  death.  Our 
shells  smashed  their  blockhouses,  killing  the  defenders,  or  the  decisive  charge 
could  not  have  been  made. 

Our  Congress,  and  it  is  another  way  of  saying  our  public  opinion,  seeing 
our  ocean  and  gulf  coasts  exposed  to  modern  squadrons,  and  apprised  of  the 
nature  and  power  of  the  armaments  of  the  great  powers  abroad,  made  the 
navy  more  than  the  army  a  non-partisan  and  non-sectional  matter,  and  appro 
priations  were,  after  due  discussion,  given  for  battleships,  a  fact  that  stands  out 
and  shines  forth  in  honor  of  the  States  that  are  far  from  salt  water,  or 
the  mountains  where  the  rivers  run  to  the  great  river,  the  Father  of  floods  and 
the  greater  ocean  of  the  globe.  The  national  American  spirit  was  abroad  in 


THE    LESSON    OF    THE    HILLS    OF    SANTIAGO.  489 

them,  and  they  began  in  time  the  magnificent  machines  of  steel,  that  are  fit 
for  ocean  service,  bearing  enormous  burdens,  endowed  with  prodigious  forces, 
equipped  with  thunderbolts  as  volcanoes  are — such  marvels  of  mechanism  as 
the  Oregon,  her  voyages  no  less  renowned  than  her  fights,  and  her  speed 
sends  her  where  her  artillery  smashes  the  foe  that  stands  or  flees.  Gigantic 
embodiments  like  this  could  not  be  built  and  sent  booming  forward  and 
back,  around  Cape  Horn,  from  Washington  to  Florida,  and  New  York  to 
Manila,  unless  for  years  the  furnaces  flamed  and  the  hammers  rang. 

Now,  if  Congress  will  come  to  the  realizing  sense  that  it  takes  as  long  to 
make  out  of  our  matchless  material  of  men  a  battle  regiment,  as  it  does  to 
delve  in  the  mines  for  iron  and  coal  and  build  a  battleship,  and  construct  a 
navy,  we  shall  no  more  be  grieved  over  the  privations  of  the  camps,  as  well 
as  the  perils  of  those  who  form  the  fire  line.  When  the  thunders  of  hostile 
guns  deliver  the  messengers  of  death  and  immortality  in  the  ranks  of  our 
heroes,  we  shall  not  again  mourn  that  precious  lives  were  lost,  that  might 
have  been  saved  by  the  aggregate  will  and  wisdom  of  the  people  at  large, 
whose  government  we  have  and  whose  army  is  their  own — their  flesh  and 
blood,  as  the  navy  is  bone  of  their  bone.  Regular  regiments  must  be 
enlisted,  officered,  drilled  and  altogether  uplifted  to  competency,  and  live  to 
the  straight  line  and  the  broad  precept  of  faith  and  glory  of  the  fathers — as  the 
steel  broadsides  from  which  the  far-flashing  guns  send  their  armor-piercing 
bolts,  and  the  crackling  shells  that  light  the  stormy  gloom  of  battle. 

There  was  a  great  wrong  in  that  our  army  at  Santiago  was  so  small  and 
so  poorly  furnished  when  they  stood  between  the  nation  and  humiliation,  and  it 
is  to  be  hoped  the  war  has  educated  us  so  that  we  have  surely  located  the 
fault  and  seriously  mean  to  find  and  apply  the  remedy  that  experience  has 
once  more  revealed.  Was  it  the  negligence,  the  indifference,  the  incompe- 
tency,  the  ruthless  selfishness,  the  ambition  that  would  deal  destruction, 
hoping  to  harvest  lucrative  reputation  and  forward  private  ends,  of  the 
Secretary  of  War,  the  Major-General  who  commanded  the  army  of  the  United 
States,  the  Adjutant-General  of  the  army,  the  Major-General  Commanding 
at  Santiago,  or  the  Adjutant-General  or  some  commissary  or  quartermaster? 

Those  who  answer  yes  belittle  the  great  and  grave  facts.  It  is  due  the 
dignity  of  the  country  that  the  tirade  of  personalities,  in  and  outside  journal 
ism,  the  screeching  demagogues,  in  and  out  of  public  life,  the  chatter  of 
speculators  in  unwholesome  exciting  agitations  should  cease.  There  are 


490  THE    LESSON    OF    THE    HILLS    OF    SANTIAGO. 

before  us  volumes  of  reports  of  investigation,  all  of  which  must  be  useful,  and 
yet  all  could  have  been  spared,  but  for  the  fact  that  there  was  a  popular 
demand  for  fair  and  full  information  as  to  the  grievances  of  all  who  had  stepped 
forward  to  serve  the  country  whether  they  reached  the  fire  line  or  not. 

The  "clamor  for  investigation"  was  one  of  the  forms  of  the  appearance 
of  public  opinion  that  the  records  of  the  war  demanded  "army  reform." 
Unquestionably  that  is  true  judgment,  and  the  concrete  mass  of  it,  hammered 
down  to  a  solid  proposition,  is  that  the  regular  army  should  be  enlarged,  and 
that  the  improvements  of  recent  years  having  such  excellent  and  admirable 
results  in  the  army  already,  shall  be  extended  and  continued. 

Concerning  the  innumerable  incidents  of  a  disagreeable,  distressing  and 
exasperating  nature  that  have  aroused  indignation,  and  provoked  unseemly 
differences  and  recriminations,  there  is  to  say  that  the  Santiago  expedition 
was,  with  the  exception  of  the  invasion  of  Mexico,  the  first  ever  undertaken 
by  our  military  organizations  in  a  tropical  country,  and  that  Vera  Cruz  was 
not  so  distant  or  difficult  a  point  to  disembark  and  meet  the  enemy  as  Santi 
ago.  More  than  this,  the  pressure  of  time  was  not  so  acute  in  Mexico  as  in 
Cuba,  nor  was  the  race  with  the  yellow  fever  so  close. 

It  was  not  the  Spaniards  in  front  that  shook  the  fortitude  of  General 
Shafter,  but  the  precarious  nature  of  the  landing.  He  realized  the  peril  of 
bad  weather  in  the  obliteration  of  inadequate  roads,  the  exhaustion  of  those 
who  were  handling  the  supplies,  the  certainty  that  the  army  would  melt  away 
if  a  regular  siege  was  attempted ;  that  it  was  unable  to  dig  trenches,  stewed 
in  the  heat  by  day,  or  soaked  by  rains  and  chilled  at  night.  Sleeping  on  the 
ground  because  the  hammocks  could  not  be  carried,  the  soldiers  knew  that 
they  were  being  saturated  with  poison.  Unable  to  charge  through  the  sultry 
air  and  thorny  thickets  upon  the  Spanish  intrenchments  and  entanglements, 
bearing  packs  and  tools,  blankets  and  tents,  for  the  ways  were  steep  and 
the  heat  horrible,  our  boys  stripped  for  the  fighting,  and  were  nearly 
naked,  and  yet  must  sleep  in  the  mud.  It  was  hard  to  say  which  was  the 
worst  trial — the  burning  sun  or  the  pouring  rain  by  day,  or  the  chill  earth  and 
the  heavy  dew  by  night. 

It  is  no  wonder  the  Commanding  General,  himself  ill,  viewed  with  dismay 
the  prospect  of  the  total  failure  of  the  wretched  roads,  and  thought  seriously 
of  falling  back,  or  letting  the  Spaniards  go  on  easy  terms. 

The  surroundings  justified  apprehension,  and  the  wires  at  Washington 


THE    LESSON    OF    THE    HILLS    OF    SANTIAGO. 


491 


sent  only  firm  words,  and  spurred  fainting  resolution,  while  the  country  was 
in  a  frenzy  of  wrath  that  war  was  a  horror  and  glory  so  dearly  won,  that  the 
machinery  that  made  up  and  moved  armies  was  broken  here  and  there  under 
the  stress  of  unaccustomed  emergencies. 

The  victory  was  won  at  last,  and  the  teachings  of  its  costliness  will  have 
a  value  beyond  price  if  there  is  consent  that  the  truth  is  true,  and  the  remedy 
easily  in  the  hands  of  Congress ;  and  if  there  is  a  victim  demanded,  let  the 
sacrifice  be  the  folly  that  has  found  favor  with  many,  that  we  are  not  as  other 
people,  amenable  to  the  laws  of  progress  and  of  destiny,  and  to  the  domestic 
and  international  obligations,  to  be  armed  that  we  may  defend  ourselves,  by 
taking  care  that  we  are  ready  for  war  if  a  foeman  seeks  us  or  we  have  to  go 
beyond  the  seas  to  find  him,  for  the  field  is  the  world  in  war  for  warriors  as 
well  as  for  the  preachers  of  peace.  The  sword  has  its  missions  divine. 


CHAPTER   XXII. 

The  Day  of  Doom  for  Cervera's  Fleet. 

The  Cape  Verde  Squadron  Smashed,  Burned  and  Sunk  and  Admiral  Sampson  Makes  a 
Present  of  the  Wrecks  to  the  Nation — The  Reports  of  the  Admiral  and  Commodore 
Schley — Their  Difference  in  Opinions,  Methods  and  Manners — Intensely  Interesting 
Extracts  from  Reports  by  Captains  and  Executive  Officers — A  Series  of  Startling 
Pictures —Admiral  Cervera's  Official  Lamentation — Extracts  from  the  Spanish  Diary 
of  Uncommon  Value — The  Story  of  Fugitives  from  the  Fleet  Who  Found  Their 
Way  to  the  Spanish  Trenches — Admiral  Omits  to  Improve  Opportunity  of  His  Life. 

Admiral  Sampson  announced  the  destruction  of  Cervera's  fleet  in  the 
following  message : 

July  3,  1898. 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Washington : 

The  fleet  under  my  command  offers  the  nation  as  a  Fourth  of  July 
present  the  whole  of  Cervera's  fleet.  It  attempted  to  escape  at  9:30  this 
morning.  At  2  the  last  ship,  the  Cristobal  Colon,  had  run  ashore  75  miles 
west  of  Santiago  and  hauled  down  her  colors.  The  Infanta  Maria  Teresa, 
Oquendo,  and  Vizcaya  were  forced  ashore,  burned,  and  blown  up  within  20 
miles  of  Santiago.  The  Furor  and  Pluton  were  destroyed  within  four  miles 
of  the  port.  SAMPSON. 

The  President  and  Secretary  of  War  responded  in  these  telegrams: 

Executive  Mansion,  Washington,  July  4,  1898. 

You  have  the  gratitude  and  congratulation  of  the  whole  American 
people.  Convey  to  noble  officers  and  crews,  through  whose  valor  new  honors 
have  been  added  to  the  American  Navy,  the  grateful  thanks  and  appreciation 
of  the  Nation.  WILLIAM  McKINLEY. 


Navy  Department,  Washington,  July  4,  1898. 
The  Secretary  of  the  Navy  sends  you  and  every  officer  and  man  of  your 

fleet,  remembering  equally  your  dead  comrade,  grateful  acknowledgment  of 

492 


THE    DAY    OF    DOOM    FOR    CERVERA'S    FLEET. 


493 


30  PA*, 


494     THE  DAY  OF  DOOM  FOR  CERVERA'S  FLEET. 

your  heroism  and  skill.     All  honor  to  the  brave.     You  have  maintained  the 
glory  of  the  American  Navy.  JOHN  D.   LONG. 

On  the  second  day  of  July  Admiral  Sampson  had  arranged  to  meet  Gen 
eral  Shafter  to  consult  about  the  cooperation  of  the  army  and  navy,  and  was 
on  his  flagship  New  York,  four  miles  east  of  his  usual  position,  three  miles 
east  of  the  harbor  entrance,  going  on  that  errand.  Commodore  Schley,  on  his 
flagship  Brooklyn,  was  two  miles  west  of  the  harbor  and  the  flight  of  the 
Spaniards'  fleet  was  his  way.  Admiral  Sampson  says  the  speed  of  the  Spanish 
vessels  was  from  eight  to  ten  knots  as  they  came  out  "shrouded  in  the  smoke 
from  their  guns,"  and  "turned  to  the  westward  in  column,  increasing  their 
speed  to  the  full  power  of  their  engines,"  firing  vigorously  upon  the  block 
ading  vessels.  The  American  crews  were  at  Sunday  quarters  for  inspection 
and  "cheered  as  they  sprang  to  their  guns,"  those  in  range  opening  fire  in 
eight  minutes.  The  Admiral  relates  that  the  New  York  toward  the  end  of 
the  chase  made  sixteen  and  one-half  knots,  but  "was  not,  at  any  time,  within 
the  range  of  the  heavy  Spanish  ships,  and  her  only  part  in  the  firing  was  to 
receive  the  undivided  fire  from  the  forts  in  passing  the  harbor  entrance,  and 
to  fire  a  few  shots  at  one  of  the  destroyers,  thought  at  the  moment  to  be 
attempting  to  escape  from  the  Gloucester. ' ' 

"It  was,"  the  Admiral  says,  "the  heavy  vessels  that  speedily  over 
whelmed  and  silenced  the  Spanish  fire."  The  Brooklyn  and  Texas  "had  at 
the  start  the  advantage  of  position,"  and  "the  Brooklyn  maintained  this  lead;" 
the  Oregon,  however,  "steaming  with  amazing  speed  from  the  commencement 
of  the  action,  took  first  place.  The  skillful  handling  and  gallant  fighting  of 
the  Gloucester  excited  the  admiration  of  every  one  who  witnessed  it,"  says 
Admiral  Sampson,  and  her  fire  upon  the  destroyer  was  "accurate,  deadly  and  of 
great  volume."  At  11:15  the  Vizcaya  was  on  fire,  "turned  in  shore  and  was 
beached  at  Assenderos,  fifteen  miles  from  Santiago,  burning  fiercely  and  with 
her  reserves  of  ammunition  on  deck  already  beginning  to  explode."  The 
Admiral  says  the  rescue  of  prisoners,  including  wounded,  "from  the  burning 
Spanish  vessels  was  the  occasion  of  some  of  the  most  daring  and  gallant  con 
duct  of  the  day.  The  ships  were  burning  fore  and  aft,  their  guns  and  reserve 
ammunition  were  exploding,  and  it  was  not  known  at  what  moment  the  fire 
would  reach  the  main  magazines.  In  addition  to  this  a  heavy  surf  was 
running  just  inside  of  the  Spanish  ships.  But  no  risk  deterred  our  officers 
and  men  until  their  work  of  humanity  was  complete." 


THE    DAY    OF    DOOM    FOR    CERVERA'S    FLEET. 


495 


I 


» 


496  THE    DAY    OF    DOOM    FOR    CERVERA'S    FLEET. 

The  Cristobal  Colon  is  called  by  the  Admiral  "the  best  and  fastest 
vessel"  of  the  Spaniards.  The  Brooklyn  and  Oregon,  overhauling  her  slowly, 
opened  fire  at  12:50  and  an  Oregon  shell  struck  beyond  her,  and  at  1:20  she, 
the  last  survivor  of  the  fleet,  hauled  down  her  colors  and  ran  ashore  forty- 
eight  miles  from  Santiago.  This  fine  ship,  not  injured  by  shots  or  fire,  was 
treacherously  sunk  by  the  opening  and  breaking  of  her  sea  valves  and 
Sampson  says:  "When  it  became  evident  that  she  could  not  be  kept  afloat, 
she  was  pushed  by  the  New  York  bodily  up  on  the  beach,  the  New  York's 
stem  being  placed  against  her  for  this  purpose — the  ship  being  handled  by 
Captain  Chad  wick  with  admirable  judgment. ' ' 

It  is  the  opinion  of  the  Admiral  that  the  blockade  had  been  made  so 
"stringent  and  effective  during  the  night  that  the  enemy  was  deterred  from 
making  the  attempt  to  escape  at  night,  and  deliberately  elected  to  make  the 
attempt  in  daylight.  That  this  was  the  case  I  was  informed  by  the  com 
manding  officer  of  the  Cristobal  Colon." 

The  special  feature  of  the  blockade  was  the  search  light,  and  of  it  the 
Admiral  says:  "To  the  battleships  was  assigned  the  duty,  in  turn,  of 
lighting  the  channel.  Moving  up  to  the  port,  at  a  distance  of  from  one  to 
two  miles  from  the  Morro — dependent  upon  the  condition  of  the  atmosphere 
— they  threw  a  search  light  beam  directly  up  the  channel,  and  held  it  steadily 
there.  This  lighted  up  the  entire  breadth  of  the  channel,  for  half  a  mile 
inside  of  the  entrance,  so  brilliantly  that  the  movement  of  small  boats  could 
be  detected.  Why  the  batteries  never  opened  fire  upon  the  search  light  ship 
was  always  a  matter  of  surprise  to  me ;  but  they  never  did.  Stationed  close  to 
the  entrance  of  the  port  were  three  picket  launches  and,  at  a  little  distance 
farther  out,  three  small  picket  vessels — usually  converted  yachts — and, 
when  they  were  available,  one  or  two  of  our  torpedo  boats.  With  this 
arrangement  there  was  at  least  a  certainty  that  nothing  could  get  out  of  the 
harbor  undetected. 

"After  the  arrival  of  the  army,  when  the  situation  forced  upon  the  Spanish 
admiral  a  decision,  our  vigilance  increased.  The  night  blockading  distance 
was  reduced  to  two  miles  for  all  vessels,  and  a  battleship  was  placed 
alongside  the  search  light  ship,  with  her  broadside  trained  upon  the  channel 
in  readiness  to  fire  the  instant  a  Spanish  ship  should  appear.  The  com 
manding  officers  merit  the  greatest  praise  for  the  perfect  manner  in  which 
they  entered  into  this  plan  and  put  it  into  execution.  The  Massachusetts, 


THE    DAY    OF    DOOM    FOR    CERVERA'S    FLEET. 


497 


f*ty  top  rp 


1 


y 


498  THE    DAY    OF    DOOM    FOR    CERVERA'S    FLEET. 

which,  according  to  routine,  was  sent  that  morning  to  coal  at  Guantanamo, 
like  the  others  had  spent  weary  nights  upon  this  work,  and  deserved  a  better 
fate  than  to  be  absent  that  morning." 

On  the  point  of  absence  that  morning  the  Admiral  was  naturally  sensitive, 
as  he  happened  to  be  fated  to  have  placed  himself  out  of  the  combat  on 
business  that  was  the  most  important  matter  on  hand  until  the  Spaniards 
sought  to  escape.  The  Admiral  only  mentions  Commodore  Schley  to  say  that 
he  did  not  modify  an  order  that  officer  issued,  giving  the  Spanish  officers  their 
personal  effects.  Of  course  it  was  unpleasant  and  unfortunate  for  the 
Admiral  to  be  out  of  the  combat,  but  this  was  not  in  any  sense  a  fault,  and 
as  he  had  been  sharply  critical  of  the  Commodore  for  a  miscalculation  as  to 
the  movements  of  the  Spanish  fleet,  it  would  have  been  handsome  to  have 
pleasantly  characterized  the  good  fortune  of  Schley  in  being  so  well  placed, 
and  as  this  has  been  quite  visible  there  has  been  a  strong  public  feeling  that 
there  should  be  made  up  to  the  Commodore  anything  lacking  in  the  apprecia 
tion  of  his  services  on  the  great  occasion  by  his  superior  in  rank — and  the 
frigid  temperature  of  the  Admiral  toward  the  officer  and  ship  leading  the  way 
in  the  running  fight,  is  compensated  by  superheated  admiration. 

Admiral  Sampson's  remark  on  the  failure  of  the  fire  of  the  Spanish  ships 
is  highly  interesting.  He  says:  "Our  loss  was  one  man  killed  and  one 
wounded,  both  on  the  Brooklyn.  It  is  difficult  to  explain  this  immunity 
from  loss  of  life  or  injury  to  ships  in  a  combat  with  modern  vessels  of  the 
best  type,  but  Spanish  gunnery  is  poor  at  the  best,  and  the  superior  weight 
and  accuracy  of  our  fire  speedily  drove  the  men  from  their  guns  and  silenced 
their  fire.  This  is  borne  out  by  the  statements  of  prisoners  and  by 
observation.  The  Spanish  vessels  as  they  dashed  out  of  the  harbor,  were 
covered  with  the  smoke  from  their  own  guns,  but  this  speedily  diminished  in 
volume  and  soon  almost  disappeared.  The  fire  from  the  rapid-fire  batteries 
of  the  battleships  appears  to  have  been  remarkably  destructive.  An 
examination  of  the  stranded  vessels  shows  that  the  Almirante  Oquendo 
especially  had  suffered  terribly  from  this  fire.  Her  sides  are  everywhere 
pierced  and  her  decks  were  strewn  with  the  charred  remains  of  those  who 
had  fallen. ' ' 

The  preparations  the  Admiral  had  made  for  contingencies  of  the  blockade 
were  remarkably  thorough.  June  yth  he  ordered:  "The  weather  permitting, 
three  picket  launches,  detailed  from  the  ships  of  the  squadron  each  evening, 


THE  NAVAL  HEROES  OF  SANTIAGO. 


THE    DAY    OF    DOOM    FOR    CERVERA'S    FLEET. 


^VVVM\M\\\^^^ 


502  THE    DAY    OF    DOOM    FOR    CERVERA'S    FLEET. 

will  occupy  positions  one  mile  from  the  Morro,  one  to  the  eastward,  one  to 
the  westward,  and  one  to  the  south  of  the  harbor  entrance.  On  a  circle 
drawn  with  a  radius  of  two  miles  from  the  Morro  will  be  stationed  three 
vessels — the  Vixen  to  the  westward,  from  one-half  to  one  mile  from  the  shore, 
the  Suwanee  south  of  Morro,  and  the  Dolphin  to  the  eastward,  between  one- 
half  mile  and  one  mile  from  the  shore.  The  remaining  vessels  will  retain  the 
positions  already  occupied ;  but  they  will  take  especial  care  to  keep  within  a 
four-mile  circle. 

44 All  vessels  may  turn  their  engines  whenever  desirable,  to  keep  them 
in  readiness  for  immediate  use,  and  while  so  doing  may  turn  in  a  small 
circle,  but  without  losing  proper  bearing  or  distance. 

"The  signal  for  an  enemy  will  be  two  red  Very  lights  fired  in  rapid  suc 
cession.  If  the  enemy  is  a  torpedo  boat,  these  two  red  lights  will  be  followed 
by  a  green  light." 

In  this  connection  attention  was  called  in  the  strongest  terms  to  the 
impatience  of  the  service — closing:  "The  end  to  be  obtained  justifies  the 
risk  ^ of  torpedo  attack,  and  that  risk  must  be  taken.  The  escape  of  the 
Spanish  vessels  at  this  juncture  would  be  a  serious  blow  to  our  prestige  and 
to  a  speedy  end  of  the  war." 

The  duties  of  each  ship  were  minutely  defined.  Three  battleships  took 
turns  of  two  hours  each  during  the  dark  hours  in  keeping  one  search  light 
directly  on  the  harbor  entrance.  The  order  of  June  8th  closes  with  this 
admonition : 

"Attention  is  called  to  bad  and  careless  handling  of  seach  lights.  Last 
night  some  of  the  lights  were  kept  high  in  the  air,  and  were  again  swept 
rapidly  from  side  to  side.  Under  such  circumstances  a  search  light  is  worse 
than  useless. 

"The  beams  must  be  directed  to  the  horizon,  and  must  be  moved  very 
steadily  and  slowly.  Not  less  than  three  minutes  should  be  employed  in 
sweeping  through  an  arc  of  90  degrees. 

"The  best  way  to  discover  a  torpedo  boat  is  by  its  smoke,  and  even  this 
will  not  be  seen  unless  the  light  is  very  well  handled." 

Commodore  Schley  reports:  "The  concentration  of  fire  of  the  squadron 
upon  the  ships  coming  out  was  most  furious  and  terrific,  and  great  damage 
was  done  them." 

As  to  the  close  of  the  combat  he  says:      "The  Oregon  having  proved 


THE    DAY    OF    DOOM    FOR    CERYERA'S    FLEET 


»  ! 


i! 


n 


504  THE    DAY    OF    DOOM    FOR    CERVERA'S    FLEET. 

vastly  faster  than  the  other  battleships,  she  and  the  Brooklyn,  together  with 
the  Texas  and  another  vessel  which  proved  to  be  your  flagship,  continued 
westward  in  pursuit  of  the  Colon.  This  pursuit  continued  with  increasing 
speed  in  the  Brooklyn,  Oregon  and  other  ships,  and  soon  the  Brooklyn  and 
Oregon  were  within  long  range  of  the  Colon,  when  the  Oregon  opened  fire 
with  her  1 3-inch  guns,  landing  a  shell  close  to  the  Colon.  A  moment  after 
wards  the  Brooklyn  opened  fire  with  her  8-inch  guns,  landing  a  shell  just 
ahead  of  her.  Several  other  shells  were  fired  at  the  Colon,  now  in  range 
of  the  Brooklyn's  and  Oregon's  guns.  Her  commander,  seeing  all  chances 
of  escape  cut  off,  and  destruction  awaiting  his  ship,  fired  a  lee  gun  and 
struck  her  flag  at  1:15  p.  m.,  and  ran  ashore  at  a  point  some  50  miles  west  of 
Santiago  harbor.  Your  flagship  was  coming  up  rapidly  at  the  time.  I 
would  mention,  for  your  consideration,  that  the  Brooklyn  occupied  the  most 
westward  blockading  position,  with  the  Vixen,  and,  being  more  directly  in 
the  route  taken  by  the  Spanish  squadron,  was  exposed  for  some  minutes, 
possibly  ten,  to  the  gun  fire  of  three  of  the  Spanish  ships  and  the  west 
battery,  at  a  range  of  1,500  yards  from  the  ships  and  about  3,000  yards  from 
the  batteries,  but  the  vessels  of  the  entire  squadron,  closing  in  rapidly,  soon 
diverted  this  fire  and  did  magnificent  work  at  close  range. 

"I  have  never  before  witnessed  such  deadly  and  fatally  accurate  shooting 
as  was  done  by  the  ships  of  your  command  as  they  closed  in  on  the  Spanish 
squadron,  and  I  deem  it  a  high  privilege  to  commend  to  you,  for  such  action 
as  you  may  deem  proper,  the  gallantry  and  dashing  courage,  the  prompt  decis 
ion,  and  the  skillful  handling  of  their  respective  vessels  of  Captain  Philip, 
Captain  Evans,  Captain  Clark,  and  especially  of  my  chief  of  staff,  Captain 
Cook,  who  was  directly  under  my  personal  observation  and  whose  coolness, 
promptness,  and  courage  were  of  the  highest  order.  The  dense  smoke  of  the 
combat  shut  out  from  my  view  the  Indiana  and  the  Gloucester,  but,  as  these 
vessels  were  closer  to  your  flagship,  no  doubt  their  part  in  the  conflict  \vas 
under  your  immediate  observation.  The  torpedo  boats  were  destroyed  early  in 
the  action,  but  the  smoke  was  so  dense  in  their  direction  that  I  cannot  say 
to  which  vessel  or  vessels  the  credit  belongs.  This,  doubtless,  was  better  seen 
from  your  flagship." 

The  one  American  killed,  G.  H.  Ellis,  Chief  Yeoman,  and  the  one 
wounded,  J.  Burns,  fireman,  in  the  engagement,  were  on  the  Brooklyn,  and 
the  Commodore  says:  "The  marks  and  scars  show  that  the  ship  was  struck 


ADMIRAL  CERVEKA,  WHO  COMMANDED  THE  ILL-FATED  SPANISH  FLEET  AT  SANTIAGO. 


SIDE  OF  THE  "CRISTOBAL  COLON."    AFTER  THE  BATTLE. 


THE    DAY    OF    DOOM    FOR    CERVERA'S    FLEET. 


507 


/ 

- 

1 

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5o8  THE    DAY    OF    DOOM    FOR    CERVERA'S    FLEET. 

about  twenty-five  times,  and  she  bears  in  all  forty-one  scars  as  the  result  of 
her  participation  in  the  great  victory  of  your  force  on  July  3,  1898.  The 
speed-cone  halyards  were  shot  away,  and  nearly  all  the  signal  halyards.  The 
ensign  at  the  main  was  so  shattered  that  in  hauling  it  down  at  the  close  of 
the  action  it  fell  in  pieces. 

|'I  congratulate  you  most  sincerely  upon  this  great  victory  to  the 
squadron  under  your  command,  and  I  am  glad  that  I  had  an  opportunity  to 
contribute  in  the  least  to  a  victory  that  seems  big  enough  for  all  of  us." 

There  is  a  strong  contrast  between  the  reports  of  the  Admiral  and  the 
Commodore,  that  appears  most  positively  in  the  references  the  distinguished 
officers  make  to  each  other.  There  is  something  that  approaches  neglect  in 
the  observations  of  Sampson  and  it  is  difficult  to  say  whether  the 
repetitions  in  Schley's  remarks  as  to  the  excellent  views  the  Admiral  had 
at  various  times  of  the  combat,  have  a  tone  of  courteous  attention  or 
patronage  rather  too  highly  flavored  to  be  pleasant  to  the  taste.  The  Com 
modore  says  that  in  conversation  with  Captain  Eulate  of  the  Vizcaya  and 
Commodore  Canheras  of  the  Colon  he  learned  the  Spanish  Admiral's  scheme 
was  to  concentrate  all  fire  for  awhile  on  the  Brooklyn  and  the  Vizcaya  to  ram 
her,  in  hopes  that  if  they  could  destroy  her  the  chance  of  escape  would  be 
increased,  as  it  was  supposed  she  was  the  swiftest  ship  of  our  squadron. 
This  explains  the  heavy  fire  mentioned  and  the  Vizcaya 's  action  in  the  earlier 
moments  of  the  engagement.  The  execution  of  this  purpose  was  promptly 
defeated  by  the  fact  that  all  the  ships  of  the  squadron  advanced  into  close 
range  and  opened  an  irresistibly  furious  and  terrific  fire  upon  the  enemy's 
squadron  as  it  was  coining  out  of  the  harbor. 

Captain  Cook  of  the  Brooklyn,  adds:  "The  Brooklyn  was  engaged  with 
the  three  leading  ships  of  the  enemy,  which  were  forging  ahead,  the 
Texas,  Iowa  and  Indiana  keeping  up  a  heavy  fire,  but  steadily  dropping 
astern.  The  Oregon  was  keeping  up  a  steady  fire  and  was  coming  up  in  the 
most  glorious  and  gallant  style,  outstripping  all  others.  It  was  an  inspiring 
sight  to  see  this  battleship,  with  a  large  white  wave  before  her,  and  her 
smokestacks  belching  forth  continued  puffs  from  her  forced  draft.  We 
were  making  fourteen  knots  at  the  time,  and  the  Oregon  came  up  off  our 
starboard  quarter  at  about  600  yards  and  maintained  her  position,  though 
we  soon  after  increased  our  speed  to  fifteen  knots,  and  just  before  the 
Colon  surrendered  were  making  nearly  sixteen." 


THE    DAY    OF    DOOM    FOR    CERVERA'S    FLEET.  509 

Captain  Cook  adds:  "The  8-inch  guns  worked  satisfactorily;  some 
trouble  and  delay  was  caused  by  jamming  of  locks.  The  turrets  worked 
well.  The  5 -inch  battery  gave  great  trouble  with  the  elevating  gear.  At 
the  end  several  were  rendered  useless  for  battle.  Two  are  bulged  at  the 
muzzle.  This  ship  should  have  new  elevating  gear  for  5 -inch  as  soon  as 
practicable.  We  fired  100  rounds  of  8-inch,  473  of  5-inch,  1,200  of  6-pounder, 
and  200  of  i -pounder  ammunition." 

Captain  Clark  of  the  Oregon  says  of  the  firing  of  the  ship:  "We 
soon  passed  all  of  our  ships  except  the  Brooklyn,  bearing  the  broad 
pennant  of  Commodore  Schley.  At  first  we  only  used  our  main  battery, 
but  when  it  was  discovered  that  the  enemy's  torpedo  boats  were  following 
their  ships  we  used  our  rapid-fire  guns,  as  well  as  the  6-inch,  upon  them  with 
telling  effect.  As  we  ranged  up  near  the  sternmost  of  their  ships  she 
headed  for  the  beach,  evidently  on  fire.  We  raked  her  as  we  passed,  pushing 
on  for  the  next  ahead,  using  our  starboard  guns  as  they  were  brought  to 
bear,  and  before  we  had  her  fairly  abeam,  she  too  was  making  for  the  beach. 
The  two  remaining  vessels  were  now  some  distance  ahead,  but  our  speed  had 
increased  to  sixteen  knots  and  our  fire,  added  to  that  of  the  Brooklyn,  soon 
sent  another,  the  Vizcaya,  to  the  shore  in  flames.  The  Brooklyn  signaled, 
'Oregon,  well  done. '  Only  the  Cristobal  Colon  was  left,  and  for  a  time  it 
seemed  as  if  she  might  escape;  but  when  we  opened  with  our  forward  turret 
guns  and  the  Brooklyn  followed  she  began  to  edge  in  toward  the  coast 
and  her  capture  or  destruction  was  assured.  As  she  struck  the  beach 
her  flag  came  down  and  the  Brooklyn  signaled,  'Cease  firing,'  following 
it  with  'Congratulations  for  the  grand  victory,  thanks  for  your  splendid 
assistance.'  ' 

The  effect  of  a  shot  on  the  Texas  is  thus  stated  by  an  executive  officer : 

"A  shell  of  about  6  inches  in  diameter  entered  the  starboard  side  above 
the  main  deck  near  top  of  hammock  berthing  immediately  forward  of  ash- 
hoist,  angle  of  entrance  being  about  20  degrees  forward  of  the  beam ;  shell 
apparently  exploded  immediately  after  passing  through  the  outer  plating  of 
hammock  berthing,  passing  into  the  forward  air  shaft  to  forced  draft  blower, 
destroying  doors  of  both  air  shafts  and  the  adjacent  bulkheads.  Several 
pieces  passed  through  the  doorway  of  after  shaft  and  penetrated  the  after 
bulkhead  of  the  shaft.  The  mass  of  shell  pieces  passed  on  through 
bulkhead  and  casing  of  starboard  smoke  box,  producing  an  aperture 


5io     THE  DAY  OF  DOOM  FOR  CERVERA'S  FLEET. 

therein,  irregular  in  form,  measuring"  about  3  feet  vertically,  2  feet  fore  and 
aft.  The  ash  hoist  machinery  was  badly  damaged." 

The  effect  upon  the  Texas  of  her  own  guns  this  officer  relates:  "The 
steel  deck  has  in  several  places  become  separated  from  the  beams  through 
the  stretching  or  breaking  of  rivets,  and  there  are  now  leaks  in  several 
places. 

"The  rivets  securing  the  head  of  midship  stanchions  to  the  web  of 
beams  of  frames  55  and  56  have  been  sheared  off. 

"The  condition  of  starboard  side  of  the  main  deck  is  attributed  partly  to 
the  firing  of  the  1 2-inch  turret  guns  over  the  deck  during  the  engagement, 
as  mentioned  in  my  report  of  June  6,  but  mainly  by  similar  causes  during  the 
battle  of  yesterday. 

"The  marked  increase  in  the  injuries  to  the  deck  may  be  attributed  not 
only  to  the  repetition  of  great  strains  over  a  surface  wrhose  support  was  already 
weakened,  but  to  an  increase  in  the  charge  of  powder ;  i.  e. ,  reduced  charge 
previously  used  to  full  charge  used  during  this  battle. 

"I  am  of  opinion  that  the  framing  of  the  deck  in  this  ship  is  too  light  to 
permit  the  further  firing  of  the  1 2-inch  guns  over  the  decks  without  serious 
injury." 

The  reason  given  by  Admiral  Sampson  for  ordering  the  Indiana  to  turn 
back  when  the  Brooklyn  had  the  Colon  well  in  hand  is:  "There  were  still 
some  armed  vessels  remaining  in  the  harbor  of  Santiago — at  least  two,  and  we 
did  not  know  then  how  many  more — which  could  have  come  out  in  the 
absence  of  the  fleet  and  produced  great  havoc  among  the  troopships,  which 
were  defenseless  in  the  absence  of  an  armed  vessel. ' ' 

Commodore  Eaton  of  the  Resolute  says  of  the  fire  of  the  Indiana, 
which  he  had  an  excellent  opportunity  to  observe:  "As  the  Vizcaya  came 
out,  I  distinctly  saw  one  of  the  Indiana's  heaviest  shells  strike  her  abaft  the 
funnels,  and  the  explosion  of  this  shell  was  followed  by  a  burst  of  flame, 
which,  for  the  moment,  obscured  the  after  part  of  the  Vizcaya. 

"The  Cristobal  Colon,  as  soon  as  she  was  clear  of  Morro  Point,  fired  her 
first  broadside  at  the  Indiana. 

"The  Oquendo,  in  coming  out,  also  fired  her  first  broadside  at  the 
Indiana,  and  I  could  see  some  of  the  Indiana's  shells  strike  the  Oquendo 
as  she  steamed  south. 

"Following  close  astern  of  the  Colon  and  the  Oquendo  came  the  destroyer 


THE    DAY    OF    DOOM    FOR    CERVERA'S    FLEET.  511 

Furor,  and  I  distinctly  saw  her  struck  by  an  8-inch  or  1 3-inch  shell  from  the 
Indiana,  which  was  followed  by  an  explosion  and  flames  on  board  of  the 
Furor. 

"The  Spanish  officers  who  were  prisoners  from  the  Colon  and  the  Vizcaya 
have  since  told  me  that  the  fire  from  the  Indiana  and  the  Oregon  as  they 
passed  from  the  harbor  was  deadly  in  its  destructiveness,  and  that  although 
the  Colon  escaped  with  small  injury,  due  to  her  greater  speed  and  being  in  a 
measure  covered  by  other  ships,  the  Vizcaya  was  hopelessly  crippled  before 
she  had  gone  a  mile  from  the  Morro. ' ' 

The  way  the  Iowa  dealt  destruction  to  the  Maria  Teresa — Admiral 
Cervera's  flagship — is  thus  related  by  Captain  Evans:  "When  it  was  certain 
that  the  Maria  Teresa  would  pass  ahead  of  us,  the  helm  was  put  to  starboard, 
and  the  starboard  broadside  delivered  at  a  range  of  2,500  yards.  The  helm 
was  then  put  to  port  and  the  ship  headed  across  the  bow  of  the  second  ship, 
and  as  she  drew  ahead  the  helm  was  again  put  to  starboard  and  she  received 
in  turn  the  full  weight  of  our  starboard  broadside  at  a  range  of  about  1,800 
yards.  The  Iowa  was  again  headed  off  with  the  port  helm  for  the  third  ship, 
and  as  she  approached  the  helm  was  put  to  starboard  until  our  course  was 
approximately  that  of  the  Spanish  ship.  In  this  position  at  a  range  of  1,400 
yards  the  fire  of  the  entire  battery,  including  rapid-fire  guns,  was  poured  into 
the  enemy's  ship. 

"The  fire  of  the  main  battery  of  this  ship  when  the  range  was  below  2,500 
yards  was  most  effective  and  destructive,  and  after  a  continuance  of  this  fire 
for  perhaps  twenty  minutes  it  was  noticed  that  the  Maria  Teresa  and  Oquendo 
were  in  flames  and  headed  for  the  beach." 

The  ammunition  expended  by  the  Iowa  was:  1 2-inch  semi-armor-piercing 
shell,  with  full  charges,  31;  8-inch  common  shell,  with  full  charges,  35. 4-inch 
cartridges,  common  shell,  251;  6-pounder  cartridges,  common  shell,  1,056; 
i -pounder  cartridges,  common  shell,  100. 

Captain  Evans  says  of  his  crew  that  they  were  "magnificent"  and  "so 
long  as  the  enemy  showed  his  flag  they  fought  like  American  seamen;  but 
when  the  flag  came  down  they  were  as  gentle  and  tender  as  American 
women." 

The  Gloucester  had  a  special  combat  with  the  Spanish  torpedo  destroyers 
and  the  executive  officer  reports  an  exchange  of  fire  between  automatic  guns: 
"The  monotonous  reports  of  an  automatic  gun  could  be  heard  after  the  2,500 


512  THE    DAY    OF    DOOM    FOR    CERVERA'S    FLEET. 

yard  range  was  passed  and  the  zone  of  fire  could  be  distinctly  traced  by  a 
line  of  splashes  describing  accurately  the  length  of  the  ship  and  gradually 
approaching  it.  But  at  a  distance,  variously  estimated  from  10  to  50  yards, 
the  automatic  firing  suddenly  ceased.  It  was  afterwards  found  to  be  from  a 
i -pounder  Maxim,  and  the  execution  aboard  would  have  been  terrible  during 
the  few  minutes  that  must  have  elapsed  before  the  ship  was  sunk  had  the 
fire  reached  us.  Meanwhile  the  service  of  our  own  guns  was  excellent,  and 
at  range  of  1,200  yards,  the  two  6-millimeter  automatic  Colt  rifles  opened 
on  the  enemy." 

When  the  fight  was  over  there  was  found  "a  horrible  state  of  affairs" 
on  the  Furor.  "The  vessel  was  a  perfect  shambles.  As  she  was  on  fire  and 
burning  rapidly,  they  took  off  the  living  and  then  rescued  all  they  could  find 
in  the  water  and  on  the  beach.  The  Pluton  was  among  the  rocks  in  the  surf 
and  could  not  be  boarded,  but  her  crew  bad  made  their  way  ashore  or  were 
adrift  on  life  buoys  and  wreckage.  These  were  all  taken  on  board.  I  have 
since  learned  that  the  New  York  passed  a  number  of  men  in  the  water  who 
had  doubtless  jumped  overboard  from  the  destroyers  to  escape  our  fire.  All 
these  were  probably  drowned. 

"While  this  work  was  going  on  several  explosions  took  place  on  the 
Furor,  and  presently — at  about  11:30 — she  threw  her  bows  in  the  air,  and 
turning  to  port  slowly  sank  in  deep  water." 

The  Spanish  lieutenants  Cabellero  and  Bustamente  commanded  the 
Spanish  destroyers,  so  summarily  destroyed,  and  escaped.  Cabellero  of  the 
Pluton  says  that  when  the  Furor  sank  "We  were  making  a  great  deal  of 
water;  we  continued  close  to  the  shore  to  reach  Punta  Cabrera,  and  when  we 
were  close  to  the  headland  which  it  forms,  we  received  a  3  2 -centimeter 
projectile  which  exploded  the  forward  group  of  boilers,  blowing  up  the  whole 
deck  and  cutting  off  communication  between  the  two  ends.  She  then  veered 
to  starboard  and  struck  on  the  headland,  tearing  off  a  great  part  of  the  bow. 
The  shock  threw  her  back  some  distance ;  then  she  struck  again.  I  jumped 
into  the  water  and  reached  the  shore. 

"I  climbed  up  on  the  headland  of  Punta  Cabrera  and  lay  there  for  about 
fifteen  minutes,  during  which  the  fire  continued.  When  it  was  at  an  end  I 
went  into  the  mountains  and  gathered  up  such  personnel  of  the  ship  as  I 
met — about  20  or  25 — and  with  them  I  went  around  a  small  hill  for  the  pur 
pose  of  hiding  from  the  coast  and  took  the  road  to  Santiago  de  Cuba,  avoiding 


THE    DAY    OF    DOOM    FOR    CERVERA S    FLEET.  513 

the  roads  and  seeking  the  densest  thickets  and  woods.  The  pilot,  on  pretext 
that  the  road  which  I  was  following  was  not  a  good  one,  left  us  and  did  not 
again  put  in  an  appearance.  We  continued  walking  in  an  easterly  direction 
— some  clothed,  others  naked,  and  the  rest  half  clothed — for  two  hours,  resting 
now  and  then,  and  trying  to  keep  close  to  the  coast." 

"This  troop  of  fugitives  reached  the  Spanish  trenches  that  night.  Busta- 
mente  of  the  Furor  reported  that  one  of  the  American  projectiles  struck  one 
of  the  hatches  of  the  boiler  ventilators,  thereby  reducing  the  pressure  and 
consequently  the  speed  of  the  ship.  By  this  time  the  projectiles  were 
falling  on  board  in  large  numbers.  One  of  the  shells  struck  Boatswain 
Duenas,  cutting  him  in  two;  one  part  fell  between  the  tiller  ropes, 
interrupting  them  momentarily,  and  it  was  necessary  to  take  it  out  in  pieces. 
Another  projectile  destroyed  the  engine  and  the  servo-motor,  so  that  the 
ship  could  neither  proceed  nor  maneuver.  Another  had  struck  the  after 
shell  room,  exploding  and  destroying  it. 

"Our  torpedoes  had  their  war  heads  on  and  were  ready  to  be  used,  but  we 
did  not  launch  them  because  we  were  never  at  a  convenient  distance  from 
the  enemy.  Under  these  circumstances  the  commander  of  the  destroyers, 
Captain  Fernando  Villaamil,  gave  orders  to  abandon  the  ship,  and  I  with 
part  of  the  crew  jumped  into  the  water,  about  three  miles  from  the  coast.  In 
the  water,  one  of  the  men  near  me,  I  believe  the  first  boatswain,  was  struck  by 
a  bullet  in  the  head  and  buried  in  the  water  forever.  The  ship  in  the  mean 
time,  after  a  horrible  series  of  explosions,  went  down.  When  we  reached  the 
land,  we  went  in  an  easterly  direction  towards  Santiago.  Shortly  after  we 
met  Lieutenant  Caballero  and  with  him  and  his  men  we  reached  Santiago." 

The  Heraldo  of  Madrid,  August  22d,  published  the  report  of  Cervera. 
He  says  the  Brooklyn  was  "on  account  of  her  speed  the  vessel  most 
dreaded"  and  when  the  departure  was  effected  "we  steered  the  prearranged 
course  in  view  of  the  disadvantages  that  existed  for  us,  which  became  evi 
dent  as  soon  as  the  exit  had  been  accomplished.  The  enemy's  fire  produced 
terrible  damages  on  board  the  Infanta  Maria  Teresa,  destroying  the 
elements  of  defense— among  others  the  net  for  protection  against  fire.  In  this 
critical  moment  the  captain  of  the  ship,  Senor  Concas,  fell  wounded,  and  it 
was  necessary  to  withdraw  him,  I  taking  command  of  the  vessel,  because  it 
was  impossible  to  find  the  second  commandant  of  the  Maria  Teresa. 
Immediately  afterwards  they  reported  to  me  that  my  cabin  was  burning 


5U  THE    DAY    OF    DOOM    FOR    CERVERA'S    FLEET. 

in  consequence  of  an  explosion.  The  fire  soon  became  very  great  and  ignited 
other  parts  of  the  ship.  I  gave  orders  to  my  aid  to  flood  the  after  magazines, 
but  it  was  impossible.  Dense  clouds  of  smoke  impeded  walking  in  the 
passages  and  practicing  any  kind  of  operations.  In  this  situation  I  could  only 
think  of  beaching  the  ship,  and  did  so,  running  aground  on  Punta  Cabrera. 
The  contest  was  impossible  on  our  side,  and  there  was  nothing  more  to  be 
done  but  to  save  as  much  as  possible.  I  thought  to  lower  the  flag,  but  that 
was  not  possible  on  account  of  the  fire,  which  prevented  all  operations.  In 
these  anxious  moments  two  boats  came  to  the  aid  of  the  Maria  Teresa,  into 
which  a  number  of  us  jumped.  Those  that  were  not  dying  were  saved  with 
nothing. 

"The  Teresa  lowered  a  small  boat,  which  sank  before  it  could  be  of  any 
service.  Subsequently  they  succeeded  in  launching  a  steam  launch,  but  this 
also  sank  after  making  one  voyage  to  the  beach.  I  succeeded  in  saving 
myself  with  nothing,  two  sailors  helping  me,  one  named  Andres  Sequeros 
and  the  officer  D.  Angel  Cervera,  all  of  us  arriving  on  board  the  American 
ship  Gloucester  naked.  At  this  time  we  were  all  naked. 

"It  remains  to  communicate  to  you  that  our  enemies  behaved  toward 
us  with  great  chivalry,  providing  us  with  good  clothes,  and  suppressing 
almost  entirely  the  usual  hurrahs,  to  prevent  hurting  our  self-respect.  The 
3d  day  of  July  has  been  to  us  a  horrible  disaster,  as  I  had  foreseen.  The 
number  of  the  dead,  nevertheless,  is  less  than  what  I  feared.  The  country 
has  been  defended  with  honor,  and  the  satisfaction  of  the  duty  done  leaves 
our  conscience  tranquil." 

According  to  the  purser  of  the  Oquendo,  the  history  of  this  ill-fated  ship 
was  as  follows:  "The  unequal  battle  became  more  so  when  a  hostile  projectile 
entered  the  forward  turret,  killing  the  whole  personnel,  with  the  exception  of 
one  gunner,  who  was  badly  wounded..  Of  the  i4-cm.  battery  2  guns  only 
remained  in  action,  and  these  fought  with  incomparable  energy.  The  after 
turret  was  soon  without  a  commanding  officer;  he  had  been  killed  as  he 
opened  the  door,  being  almost  asphyxiated  inside  of  the  turret.  There  were 
two  fires  on  board  the  Oquendo,  one  in  the  orlop  deck  forward,  which  was 
soon  gotten  under  control,  and  the  other  in  the  stern,  which  could  not  be  sup 
pressed,  the  pumps  failing -to  give  water.  From  the  very  beginning  of  the 
battle  the  i4-cm.  ammunition  hoists  failed  to  work.  When  oar  commander, 
Mr.  Lazaga,  saw  that  the  fire  could  not  be  controlled  and  that  all  the  guns 


THE    DAY    OF    DOOM    FOR    CERVERA'S    FLEET.  517 

were  out  of  action,  he  prepared  to  beach  the  ship,  first  giving  orders  to 
discharge  all  the  torpedoes  in  order  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  approaching. 
Driven  to  the  last  extreme,  and  after  consulting  with  all  the  officers  present, 
he  ordered  the  flag  to  be  hauled  down.  The  second  and  third  commanders 
and  three  lieutenants  had  already  been  killed,  and  while  Mr.  Lazaga  was 
directing  the  rescue  of  the  crew  he  gave  his  own  life  for  his  country.  The 
men  of  the  Oquendo  witnessed  calmly  and  without  becoming  terrified,  the 
constant  explosions  on  board,  determined  above  all  things  that  the  enemy 
should  not  set  foot  on  the  ship." 

The  secret  cipher  official  telegrams  of  the  Spanish  premier,  Sagasta,  the 
Captain  General  of  Cuba,  Blanco,  the  Minister  of  the  Navy  of  Spain,  and  the 
military  commander  of  Santiago,  given  in  the  chapter  of  this  book  relating  to 
them,  should  be  read  in  connection  with  the  extracts  from  our  own  official 
papers,  touching  the  Santiago  expeditions  and  the  battles  on  land  and  sea. 
The  two  collections  of  the  papers  that  are  of  absolute  sincerity,  verity  and 
inwardness,  perfect  the  accounts  of  the  episode  that  was  demonstrative  that 
the  fortunes  of  the  war  were  all  against  Spain.  This  was  so  certain,  that  it 
would  have  been  irrational  not  to  surrender.  The  secret  ciphers  of  the 
Spanish  officers  complete  the  explanation  of  the  almost  incredible  inferiority 
of  the  ships  of  Spain  as  against  ours.  Admiral  Cervera  was  not  duped  by 
vanity  011  this  subject  and  did  not  condescend  to  boastfulness,  or  conceal  the 
truth  from  those  higher  than  himself  in  authority,  yet  he  confessed  after  the 
annihilation  of  his  squadron  that  he  would  not  have  believed  the  ships  he 
commanded  could  have  been  knocked  in  pieces  so  rapidly.  The  fire  of  the 
American  fleet  was  overwhelming — battleships,  protected  cruisers,  gunboats, 
heavy  and  light,  participating  with  equal  vigor,  efficiency  and  immunity 
from  harm. 

The  identification  of  the  Spanish  ships  of  war  in  the  harbor  of  Santi 
ago  de  Cuba  as  Admiral  Cervera's  fleet  was  reported  by  Commodore 
Schley.  The  War  Department  was  able  to  inform  General  Miles,  then  at 
Tampa,  of  it,  on  the  2nd  of  June,  one  month  and  one  day  before  the  day 
of  the  doom  of  the  squadron.  The  movements  of  the  Spanish  cruisers  and 
torpedo  boats  commanded  by  Cervera,  had  been  managed  with  such  skill  to 
prevent  their  precise  location  that  they  had  an  extraordinary  degree  of  the 
public  attention  and  there  was  the  gravest  concern  that  they  might  be  located 
and  that  no  pains  should  be  spared  to  put  them  out  of  the  possibility  of  action. 


THE    DAY    OF    DOOM    FOR    CERVERA'S    FLEET. 

The  campaign  plans  in  Cuba  were  disturbed  by  the  existence  of  Spanish 
war  ships  in  West  India  waters.  One  swift  and  heavil}T  armed  cruiser  could 
sink  an  army  of  unprotected  transports.  The  news  that  the  flitting  squadron 
of  Spain  had  become  fugitives  and  taken  refuge  in  Santiago  Bay  was  of  the 
greatest  consequence.  The  next  thing'  was  to  assemble  off  Santiago  an  over 
whelming  blockading  fleet,  and  this  done,  the  organization  was  in  two 
squadrons : 

First  squadron  (under  the  personal  command  of  Admiral  Sampson) :  New 
York,  Iowa,  Oregon,  New  Orleans,  Mayflower,  Porter. 

Second  squadron  (Commodore  Schley) :  Brooklyn,  Massachusetts,  Texas, 
Marblehead,  Vixen. 


Morro. 


i 
i 
i 

'.     2.. 

I 


\|  Vixen.  ^  c^  Mayflower.     \\ 

\  fe^  ^  / 


/ 


\  i 

>  New  Or/cans.  •  / 
\.  */ 


™  / 

'  '<  ! 

\ 

\j|  Brooklyn.  Porten^      |/ 

y  y 

\f7eAiW.  New  York. 

\ 

^^^^Masa.    Iowa.  Oregon.^   ,"' 


The  order  was:  "The  vessels  will  blockade  Santiago  de  Cuba  closely,  keep 
ing  about  six  miles  from  the  Morro  in  the  daytime,  and  closing  in  at  night,  the 
lighter  vessels  well  in  shore.  The  first  squadron  will  blockade  on  the  east 
side  of  the  port,  and  the  second  squadron  on  the  west  side.  If  the  enemy  tries 
to  escape,  the  ships  must  close  and  engage  as  soon  as  possible,  and  endeavor 
to  sink  his  vessels  or  force  them  to  run  ashore  in  the  channel." 

One  thing  that  contributed  greatly  to  the  success  of  the  blockade  was  the 
use  of  search  lights  held  steadily  on  the  mouth  of  the  harbor.  The  diagram 


THE    DAY    OF    DOOM    FOR    CERVERA'S    FLEET.  5 '9 

annexed  was  drawn  to  accompany  the  order  of  battle,  dated  June  2nd,  and 
shows  the  method  of  the  formation. 

The  Spanish  Office  of  Naval  Intelligence  has  published  the  diary  of 
Lieutenant  Jose  Muller  y  Tejeiro,  second  in  command  of  Naval  forces  of  the 
province  of  Santiago  de  Cuba.  We  quote  the  opening  passages: 

"On  the  1 8th  of  May  the  first  hostile  ships  were  sighted  from  the  Morro 
of  Santiago  de  Cuba  and  the  first  gunshots  were  heard,  which  since  that  date, 
for  the  space  of  two  months,  have  hardly  ceased  for  a  single  day. 

"On  the  following  day,  the  iQth,  the  Spanish  fleet,  commanded  by  Rear 
Admiral  Cervera,  entered  with  very  little  coal,  which  it  was  absolutely 
necessary  to  replenish. 

"From  that  time  on  I  have  kept  an  exact  diary  *  *  *  of  everything  I 
saw,  or  that  came  to  my  notice,  or  that  passed  through  my  hands  in  my  official 
capacity,  or  that  I  knew  to  be  accurate  and  trustworthy." 

A  part  of  the  entry,  under  the  date  of  July  the  4th,  has  special  significance : 

"July  4. — Opposite  the  mouth  of  the  harbor,  the  New  York,  Brooklyn, 
Indiana,  Massachusetts,  Minneapolis,  Vesuvius,  i  yacht,  and  17  merchant 
vessels.  At  8  p.  m.  the  cruiser  Reina  Mercedes  started  up. 

"As  the  interior  of  the  harbor  did  no  longer  have  the  safeguard  of  tJie  fleet, 
as  the  Bustamente  torpedoes  (six  of  them)  had  been  taken  up  so  that  the  fleet 
could  go  out  and  had  not  yet  been  replaced,  and  as ,  finally,  the  first  line  of  mines 
no  longer  existed,  the  commander  of  marine  decided — General  Toral  also  being 
of  his  opinion — to  sink  the,  Mercedes  (the  only  ship  that  was  suitable  for  that 
purpose)  in  the  narrow  part  of  the  channel ;  consequently  the  commander  of 
the  cruiser  received  orders  to  do  so.  Hurriedly,  for  time  was  pressing,  the 
wounded  and  sick  from  the  lost  fleet  were  transferred  to  the  steamer  Mejico, 
which  had  been  converted  into  a  hospital,  and  hoisted  the  flag  of  the  Red 
Cross.  Important  papers  that  had  been  saved,  memoranda,  portable  arms, 
beds,  and  the  most  necessary  things,  were  taken  off  the  Mercedes,  and  at  8 
p.  m.,  with  her  commander,  Ensign  Nardiz,  a  few  engineers,  the  necessary 
sailors,  and  Pilots  Apolonio  Nunez  and  Miguel  Lopez,  started  toward  the 
entrance,  with  her  bow  anchor  and  stern  spring  on  the  cable  ready. ' ' 

The  ship  was  sunk  under  a  heavy  fire  by  the  American  fleet,  but  the 
Spanish  diary  we  quote  says:  "Unfortunately,  the  ship  did  not  come  to  lie 
across  the  channel,  because  it  seems  a  projectile  cut  the  spring  on  the  cable; 
the  sacrifice  was  useless  and  the  harbor  was  not  obstructed.  Yet  it  was  not 


520 


THE  DAY  OF  DOOM  FOR  CERVERA'S  FLEET. 


entirely  useless,  since  the  enemy  could  not  take  possession  of  her,  as  she  is 
all  riddled  by  bullets  which  she  received  that  night,  and  I  do  not  believe  she 
can  ever  again  be  used." 

One  thing  that  is  of  the  utmost  importance  and  that  has  escaped  critical 
notice,  is  the  fact  that  when  Admiral  Sampson  ordered  the  Indiana  to  turn 
back  to  protect  our  transports,  he  missed  the  opportunity  of  his  life.  He 
was  alarmed  quite  unnecessarily  by  the  fancy  that  there  was  danger  more 
Spanish  war  ships  would  come  out  and  avenge  the  loss  of  Cervera's  squadron. 
That  was  not,  after  the  experiences  of  the  day,  possible.  The  Admiral  was 
right  to  turn  the  Indiana  back  from  the  pursuit,  but  wrong  in  not  discon 
tinuing  the  long  chase  after  the  Brooklyn  and  Oregon,  then  steadily  overhaul 
ing  the  Colon.  There  was  no  business  demand  for  the  Admiral  to  be  a  per 
sonal  spectator  of  the  surrender  of  the  Colon,  and  to  hold  a  reception  for 
the  prisoners. 

It  is  plain  now,  and  ought  to  have  been  then,  that  the  Indiana  should 
have  gone  in  where  the  Spaniards  came  out.  There  were  no  torpedoes  to 
fear.  The  batteries  were  not  alarming — would  not  have  been  to  Farragut  or 
Dewey  or  Lord  Nelson.  The  torpedoes  had  not  been  replaced,  the  mines  no 
longer  existed.  Our  fleet  was  not  damaged.  The  Indiana  and  New  York 
should  have  gone  at  full  speed  for  the  open  door,  signaling  the  battleships  to 
follow,  and  the  Fourth  of  July  would  have  seen  the  harbor  and  city  in  pos 
session  of  the  fleet,  and  the  Spanish  army's  surrender  must  have  been 
immediate  and  unconditional,  There  was  a  gate  of  glory  open,  unseen. 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 

The  Scenes  and  Significance  of  the  Surrender  of  Santiago. 

The  Appearance  of  General  Miles  at  Santiago — His  Moral  as  well  as  Military  Force — 
Spanish  Obstinacy  in  the  Negotiation  for  Capitulation — The  Iron  Hand  at  Washing 
ton — The  Practical  Question  was,  How  Much  Would  Victory  Cost  Us? — The  Spanish 
Case  was  Hopeless — They  Sought  to  Save  their  Military  Honor — The  Scenes  and 
Terms  of  the  Surrender — An  Inspector  General's  Picturesque  Story— Telegrams  that 
are  Photographs — The  President's  Proclamation  of  Principles  and  Purpose  in  Cuban 
Government — Comparative  Proportions  of  Great  Surrenders. 

It  was  July  yth  that  the  Major-General  commanding  the  army  of  the 
United  States  left  Washington  City  for  the  seat  of  war  in  Cuba,  and  with  the 
aid  of  a  fast  train  to  Columbia,  South  Carolina,  and  a  "special"  for  Charles 
ton,  took  the  "Yale,"  having  1,500  troops  aboard,  and  arrived  at  Santiago  on 
the  morning  of  the  nth,  finding  Admiral  Sampson  bombarding  the  Spaniards 
at  the  mouth  of  the  harbor,  but  not  forcing  his  way  in,  as  Shafter  desired. 
The  General  was  en  route  four  nights  and  three  days. 

There  had  been  a  good  deal  of  conjecture  whether  the  real  intention  of 
the  war  office  in  hastening  the  transit  of  the  head  of  the  army  from  the 
national  capital  to  the  scene  of  action,  might  not  to  be  to  supersede  Shafter, 
who  was  a  sick  man,  sorely  perplexed;  and  within  the  horizon  of  the  popular 
observation  there  were  heavy  clouds,  though  the  navy  of  the  Spaniards  was 
no  longer  considered.  The  purpose  of  General  Miles — his  plan  presumably— 
was  to  assist  in  the  capture  of  Santiago  and  press  on  to  Porto  Rico,  precisely 
that  which  he  did.  Santiago  was  to  him  a  spectacular  episode. 

The  General  commanding  the  United  States  army  and  the  Admiral  com 
manding  the  North  Atlantic  squadron  soon  got  together.  General  Miles 
desired  to  land  troops  west  of  Santiago,  and  make  a  diversion  in  that  quarter, 
the  Cubans  not  getting  up  in  our  fashion  of  fighting.  In  his  note  to  Samp 
son,  Miles  did  not  take  into  view  that  a  force  comprising  the  greater  part  of 
fifty  or  sixty  thousand  Cubans  ought  to  be,  according  to  his  original  plan, 

523 


524    THE    SIGNIFICANCE    OF    SURRENDER    OF    SANTIAGO. 

somewhere  in  the  neighborhood  to  storm  the  Spaniards  out  of  Santiago. 
Shafter  had  cabled  Miles  July  4th:  "I  am  delighted  to  know  that  you  are 
coming  that  you  may  see  for  yourself  the  obstacles  which  this  army  had  to 
overcome.  My  only  regret  is  the  great  number  of  gallant  souls  who  have 
given  their  lives  for  our  country's  cause." 

A  telegram  of  congratulation  sent  by  General  Miles  July  3d  was  read  at 
the  head  of  each  of  the  regiments  that  had  been  engaged.  Miles  told  Samp 
son  that  he  desired  the  cooperation  of  the  navy  in  the  west  end  movement,  and 
Sampson  cordially  acquiesced,  offering  every  assistance  of  his  fleet  to 
cover  the  debarkation  of  the  troops  and  also  to  enfilade  the  Spanish  position 
with  the  guns  of  the  ships. 

It  will  be  noted  that  it  was  the  plan  of  Miles,  and  not  the  plan  of  Shafter, 
in  which  Sampson  so  cordially  acquiesced.  There  was  one  thing  about  which 
the  Admiral  held  positive  opinion,  and  that  was,  as  the  Spaniards  had  done 
what  the  gallant  Hobson  had  not,  blockaded  the  mouth  of  the  harbor,  he 
did  not  mean  to  risk  the  sinking  of  a  battleship  in  attempting  a  '4no  thorough 
fare."  After  meeting  Sampson,  Miles  went  on  shore  and  communicated  with 
Shafter,  who  said  he  had  troops  enough  to  hold  his  position,  and  Miles  gave 
the  orders  for  the  movement  on  the  west. 

The  next  morning,  July  i2th,  Miles  rode  to  Shafter's  headquarters,  and 
the  news  of  the  arrival  of  the  Major-General  commanding  was  sent  the  Spanish 
General,  also  the  fact  that  large  reinforcements  had  arrived,  and  that  others 
were  on  the  way,  and  that  Shafter  and  Miles  desired  to  meet  him  between  the 
lines  at  any  time  agreeable  to  him.  The  Spanish  General  courteously  replied 
that  he  would  see  the  American  generals  at  12  o'clock  on  the  following  day. 
On  that  day  Shafter  announced  "nervousness"  in  the  army  on  account  of  the 
yellow  fever,  "which  is  among  us  certainly,  twenty-nine  new  cases  yesterday 
and  probably  one  hundred  and  fifty  all  told." 

General  Toral  had  been  seen  and  "a  good  impression  made  on  him,"  and 
Shafter  supplemented  that  information  with  these  words:  "I  will  open  on 
him  at  twelve  noon  to-morrow  with  every  gun  I  have  and  the  assistance  of  the 
navy  with  thirteen-inch  shells."  The  Spanish  General  agreed  to  surrender  on 
the  basis  of  being  returned  to  Spain — the  proposal  including  all  eastern  Cuba. 
There  were  about  12,000  Spanish  troops  in  Santiago,  and  as  many  at  other 
points.  The  Spaniards  were  eagerly  urgent  to  be  allowed  to  have  their  arms 
shipped  with  them. 


THE    SIGNIFICANCE    OF    SURRENDER    OF    SANTIAGO,     525. 

July  1 6th  the  Spaniards  surrendered,  the  main  point  with  them  being 
111  it  they  were  to  go  home  with  their  side  arms  and  that  they  were  to  take 
with  their  military  archives,  the  arms  they  had  so  valiantly  defended. 
General  Shafter  did  not  seem  to  think  it  an  essential  matter  whether  the  old 
Spanish  guns  went  to  Spain  or  not,  but  Secretary  Alger  insisted  that  it  was 
not  possible  to  concede  that  the  arms  should  go.  The  letter  of  General  Toral 
notifying  Shafter  of  Blanco's  acceptance  of  the  terms  that  had  been  definitely 
agreed  upon,  was  wired  to  the  Adjutant-General  of  the  United  States  at 
Washington  by  the  American  General  commanding  in  the  field,  who  added: 
"I  have  stood  the  delay,  as  I  believe  it  will  come  out  all  right,  and  a  fight 
which  we  can  have  at  any  time  will  cost  a  lot  of  men."  The  letter  was  as 
follows : 

Santiago,  Cuba,  14. 
General  in  Chief  of  the  American  Forces. 

Honored  Sir:  His  excellency  the  general  in  chief  of  the  army  of  the  island 
of  Cuba  telegraphs  from  Havana  yesterday  at  7  p.  m.  the  following:  "Believ 
ing  that  business  of  such  importance  as  the  capitulation  of  that  place  should 
be  known  and  decided  upon  by  the  government  of  His  Majesty,  I  give  you 
notice  that  I  have  sent  the  conditions  of  your  telegram,  asking  immediate 
answer,  and  enabling  you  also  to  show  this  to  the  general  of  the  American 
army  to  see  if  he  will  agree  to  await  the  answer  of  the  government,  which  can 
not  be  as  soon  as  the  time  wThich  he  has  decided,  as  communication  by  way  of 
Bermuda  is  more  slow  than  Key  West.  In  the  meanwhile  your  honor  and  the 
general  of  the  American  army  may  agree  upon  capitulation  on  the  basis  of 
returning  to  Spain."  I  have  the  honor  to  transmit  this  to  you  that  in  case 
you  may  find  the  foregoing  satisfactory  he  may  designate  persons  representa 
tive  of  himself,  who,  with  those  in  my  name,  may  agree  to  the  clauses  of 
capitulation  upon  the  basis  of  return  to  Spain,  accepted  already  in  the  begin 
ning  by  the  general  in  chief  of  this  army.  Awaiting  a  reply,  I  am, 
Very  respectfully,  your  servant,  JOSE  TORAL, 

Commanding,  Chief  of  the  Fourth  Army  Corps. 

July  i4th,  3 :24  p.  m.,  General  Miles  telegraphed  Toral  had  formally  surren 
dered  on  the  understanding  that  his  troops  should  be  returned  to  Spain. 
The  General  pronounced  that  this  was  "very  gratifying" — and  "General 
Shafter  and  the  officers  and  men  of  this  command  are  entitled  to  great  credit 
for  their  sincerity,  fortitude,  and  in  overcoming  almost  insuperable  obstacles 


526     THE    SIGNIFICANCE    OF    SURRENDER    OF    SANTIAGO. 

which  they  encountered.      A  portion  of  the  army  has  been  infected  with  yellow 
fever." 

Then  came  to  the  Santiago  army  headquarters  this  important  dispatch 

from  the  White  House :  Executive  Mansion, 

Washington,  July  15,  1898 — 12:35  P-  m- 
Major-General  Shafter,  Camp  before  Santiago,  Cuba: 

Have  you  received  the. absolute  surrender  of  the  enemy?  We  are  await 
ing  the  conditions  with  impatience.  R.  A.  ALGER,  Secretary  of  War. 

Shafter  announced  that  the  discussion  as  to  terms  lasted  until  ten  o'clock 
the  night  of  the  i4th,  and  was  to  be  settled  on  the  evening  of  the  i5th  at  9:30, 
and  that  the  great  point  of  the  Spaniards  was  to  have  their  arms  "shipped  to 
them."  It  was  not  possible  for  them  to  fail  to  complete  arrangements.  The 
following  telegrams  complete  the  links  of  the  chain  of  events : 

Adjutant-General's  Office, 
Washington,  July  15,  1898 — 4:45  p.  m. 
Major-General  Shafter,  Playa  del  Este : 

Secretary  of  War  suggests,  is  it  not  possible  that  Toral  is  gaining  time  to 
get  reinforcements  that  may  be  on  the  way  to  assist  him? 

H.  C.  CORBIN,  Adjutant-General. 


Playa  del  Este,  via  Hayti. 

(Received  at  Washington  July  15,  1898 — 9  p.  m.) 
Adjutant-General  United  States  Army,  Washington: 

Headquarters  near  Santiago,  Cuba,  15. — I  do  not  believe  that  Toral  is 
trying  to  gain  time  in  hopes  of  getting  reinforcements.  Cubans  have  forces 
in  vicinity  of  all  Spanish  troops.  Toral  asked  to-day  to  send  messages  to 
Guantanamo  and  to  Palmas  to  notify  Spanish  troops  of  condition.  Wheeler, 
Lawton,  and  Miley  are  thoroughly  convinced  that  they  are  earnest,  and  they 
have  been  in  consultation  with  the  Spaniards  twenty-four  hours.  Am  told  by 
reliable  persons  Santiago  the  Spanish  officers  are  greatly  pleased  at  the 
thought  of  going  home,  but  generals  are  afraid  of  the  consequences  with 
themselves  unless  terms  of  surrender  are  sanctioned  by  the  Madrid  govern 
ment.  SHAFTER,  Major-General. 
Executive  Mansion,  Washington,  July  15,  1898 — 5:59  p.  m. 
Major-General  Shafter,  Camp  near  Santiago,  Playa: 

Is  it  not  possible  that  you  are  entertaining  the  proposition  of  permitting 
the  Spanish  to  carry  away  their  arms?     Such  a  suggestion  should  be  rejected 


THE    SIGNIFICANCE    OF    SURRENDER    OF    SANTIAGO      527 

instantly.      You  have  been  instructed  the  terms  of  surrender  acceptable  to  the 
President,  and  they  must  be  concluded  on  these  lines. 

R.  A.  ALGER,  Secretary  of  War. 


Playa  del  Este,  via  Hayti. 

(Received  Washington  July  15,  1898 — 11:20  p.  m.) 
Adjutant-General  U.  S.  Army,  Washing-ton: 

Headquarters  near  Santiago,  15. — I  do  not  entertain  the  proposition  for 
the  Spanish  to  retain  their  arms.  They  are  to  surrender  them  absolutely 
immediately  after  articles  of  capitulation  are  signed,  but  they  beg,  as  an  act  of 
consideration  to  them,  that  I  will  intercede  with  my  government  that  they  be 
shipped  with  them  to  Spain.  I  regard  this  as  a  small  matter  that  in  no  way 
binds  the  government,  but  is  one  I  would  not  let  stand  between  clearing  20,000 
Spanish  soldiers  out  of  Cuba,  or  leaving  them  there  to  be  captured  later,  and 
probably  with  much  loss  to  ourselves.  SHAFTER,  Major-General. 

The  text  of  the  terms  agreed  upon  is  as  follows: 

Terms  of  the  military  convention  for  the  capitulation  of  the  Spanish  forces 
occupying  the  territory  which  constitutes  the  division  of  Santiago  de  Cuba, 
and  described  as  follows:  All  that  portion  of  the  island  of  Cuba  east  of  a  line 
passing  through  Aserradero,  Dos  Palmas,  Cauto  Abajo,  Escondida,  Tanamo, 
and  Agtiiclora,  said  troops  being  in  command  of  Gen.  Jose  Toral,  agreed  upon 
by  the  undersigned  commissioners:  Brig. -Gen.  Don  Federico  Escario,  lieuten 
ant-colonel  of  staff;  Don  Ventura  Fontan,  and,  as  interpreter,  Mr.  Robert 
Mason,  of  the  city  of  Santiago  de  Cuba,  appointed  by  General  Toral,  com 
manding  the  Spanish  forces  on  behalf  of  the  kingdom  of  Spain,  and  Maj.-Gen. 
Joseph  Wheeler,  U.  S.  V. ;  Maj.-Gen.  H.  W.  Lawton,  U.  S.  V.;  and  First 
Lieut.  J.  D.  Miley,  Second  Artillery,  A.  D.  C.,  appointed  by  General  Shafter, 
commanding  the  American  forces,  on  behalf  of  the  United  States: 

1.  That  all  hostilities  between  American  and  Spanish  forces  in  this  dis 
trict  absolutely  and  unequivocally  cease. 

2.  That  this  capitulation  includes  all  the  forces  and  war  material  in  said 
territory. 

3.  That  the  United  States  agrees  with  as  little  delay  as  possible  to  trans 
port  all  the  Spanish  troops  in  said  district  to  the  kingdom  of  Spain,  the  troops 
being  embarked,  as  far  as  possible,  at  the  port  nearest  the  garrisons  they  now 
occupy. 


528     THE    SIGNIFICANCE    OF    SURRENDER    OF    SANTIAGO. 

4.  That  the  officers  of  the  Spanish  army  be  permitted  to  retain  their  side 
arms  and  both  officers  and  private  soldiers  their  personal  property. 

5.  That  the  Spanish  authorities  agree  to  remove,  or  assist  the  American 
navy  in  removing,  all  mines  or  other  obstructions  to  navigation  now  in  the 

'harbor  of  Santiago  and  its  mouth. 

6.  That  the  commanders  of  the  Spanish  forces  deliver,  without  delay,  a 
complete  inventory  of  all  arms  and  munitions  of  war  of  the  Spanish  forces  in 
above-described  district  to  the  commander  of  the   American   forces;    also  a 
roster  of  said  forces  now  in  said  district. 

7.  That  the  commander  of  the  Spanish  forces,  in  leaving  said  district,  is 
authorized  to  carry  with  him  all  military  archives  and  records  pertaining  to 
the  Spanish  army  now  in  said  district. 

8.  That  all  that  portion  of  the  Spanish  forces  known  as  volunteers,  mov- 
ilizadoes,  and  guerrillas  who  wish  to  remain  in  the  island  of  Cuba  are  permitted 
to  do  so  upon  condition  of  delivering  up  their  arms  and  taking  a  parole  not  to 
bear  arms  against  the  United  States  during  the  continuance  of  the  present  war 
between  Spain  and  the  United  States. 

9.  That  the   Spanish   forces  will  march  out  of  Santiago  de  Cuba  with 
honors  of  war,  depositing  their  arms  thereafter  at  a  point  mutually  agreed 
upon,  to  await   their   disposition-  by  the  United  States  government,  it  being 
understood   that   the   United  States  commissioners,  will  recommend  that  the 
Spanish  soldier  return  to  Spain  with  the  arms  he  so  bravely  defended. 

10.  That  the  provisions  of  the  foregoing  instrument  become  operative 
immediately  upon  its  being  signed. 

Entered  into  this  i6th  day  of  July,  1898,  by  the  undersigned  commission 
ers,  acting  under  instructions  from  their  respective  commanding  generals  and 
with  the  approbation  of  their  respective  governments. 

JOSEPH  WHEELER, 
Major-General,  United  States  Volunteers. 

-H.  W.  LAWTON, 
Major-General,  United  States  Volunteers. 

J.  D.  MILEY, 

First  Lieutenant,  Second  Artillery,  A.  D.  C.  to  General  Shafter. 

FEDERICO  ESCARIO. 
VENTURA  FONTAN. 
ROBERT  MASON. 


THE    SIGNIFICANCE    OF    SURRENDER    OF    SANTIAGO.     529 

The  President  sent  this  eloquent  message  of  congratulation  : 

Washington,  D.  C.,  July  16,  1898. 
General  Shafter,  Commanding-,  Front  near  Santiago,  Playa: 

The  President  of  the  United  States  sends  to  you  and  your  brave  army  the 
profound  thanks  of  the  American  people  for  the  brilliant  achievements  at 
Santiago,  resulting  in  the  surrender  of  the  city  and  all  of  the  Spanish  troops 
and  territory  under  General  Toral.  Your  splendid  command  has  endured  not 
only  the  hardships  and  sacrifices  incident  to  campaign  and  battle,  but  in  stress 
of  heat  and  weather  has  triumphed  over  obstacles  which  would  have  overcome 
men  less  brave  and  determined.  One  and  all  have  displayed  the  most  con 
spicuous  gallantry  and  earned  the  gratitude  of  the  nation.  The  hearts  of  the 
people  turn  with  tender  sympathy  to  the  sick  and  wounded.  May  the  Father 
of  Mercies  protect  and  comfort  them.  WILLIAM  McKINLEY. 


Adjutant-General's  Office, 
Washington,  July  17,  1898 — 9:55  a.  m. 
General  Shafter,  Playa  del  Este,  Cuba: 

Your  telegram  saying  thaJL  our  flag  would  be  hoisted  in  Santiago  at  9  this 
morning  was  received  by  the  President  and  Secretary  of  War  and  members  of 
the  Cabinet  with  a  sense  of  profound  satisfaction.  This  feeling  is  general 
with  all  the  people.  I  hope  you  are  well. 

H.  C.  CORBIN,   Adjutant-General. 


Shafter  telegraphed  Corbin : 

"Upon  coming  into  the  city  I  discovered  a  perfect  entanglement  of 
defenses.  Fighting  as  the  Spaniards  did  the  first  day,  it  would  have  cost 
5,000  lives  to  have  taken  it." 

Major  and  Inspector-General  Reade  reported: 

"Fighting  famine  and  fever  extorted  from  even  such  a  man  as  Col.  Theo 
dore  Roosevelt  the  statement:  'Twenty-five  per  cent  of  my  Rough  Riders 
can't  carry  a  pail  of  water  from  the  creek  to  the  trenches.  No  man  can  decry 
me  or  my  regiments,  but  we  must  accede  to  the  next  proposition  from  the 
enemy. '  One  characteristic  of  our  soldiers  is  their  unwillingness  to  go  upon 
the  sick  report.  The  regulars  do  duty  when  really  not  fit  to  perform  it,  but 
they  do  duty  all  the  same.  Regiments  have  a  pride  in  maintaining  on  paper 
a  small  percentage  of  sick." 


530    THE    SIGNIFICANCE    OF    SURRENDER    OF    SANTIAGO. 

General  Reade  wrote  this  most  interesting  account  of  the  raising-  of  the 
flag  of  the  United  States  over  the  Governor's  Palace  of  the  ancient  capital  of 
Cuba. 

It  was  9  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  July  lyth.  Within  a  few  feet  of  Gen 
erals  Shafter,  Wheeler  and  Kent  "were  three  officers  wearing  Panama  hats, 
dressed  in  cotton,  having  narrow  stripes  of  blue  and  white;  their  hats  had 
rosettes  on  the  side,  and  they  wore  either  top  boots  of  black  leather  or  white 
canvas  slippers,"  and  "a  fine  looking  man  with  a  gray  moustache  was  General 
Toral,  who  saluted  General  Shafter  like  a  graceful,  dignified  soldier." 

"Just  then  Lieutenant  Miley,  Fifth  Artillery,  aid-de-camp  to  General 
Shafter,  dashed  to  the  rear,  shouting  to  an  orderly  to  'Bring  up  the  sword.' 
After  some  delay,  a  sword,  having  the  belt  and  slings  twisted  around  the  hilt, 
was  handed  to  General  Shafter.  It  was  then  by  him  turned  over  to  General 
Toral.  Our  trumpets  then  sounded,  after  which,  by  Captain  Brett's  order,  the 
hundred  cavalry  executed  left  front  into  line,  forming  in  single  rank,  on  our 
left,  facing  some  dismounted  Spanish  infantry  soldiers,  armed  with  Mauser 
rifles.  The  lines  were  not  fifty  yards  apart. 

'  'Present  sabers!'  by  our  cavalry  was  immediately  followed  by  a  like  com 
pliment  by  the  Spanish.  It  was  then  9:25  o'clock.  General  Toral  shouted 
out  something  in  Spanish.  The  Spanish  trumpets  then  sounded  a  march. 
We  were  then  told  by  Mr.  A.  C.  Nunez  that  the  tune  was  played  only  for  the 
King  of  Spain  or  the  Captain-General  of  Cuba.  We  were  also  told  that  the 
soldiers  facing  our  cavalry  comprised  the  bodyguard  of  General  Toral.  A 
little  later  the  Spanish  infantry  forged  down  the  road,  eastward,  without  their 
rifles,  to  the  point  where  the  Thirteenth  Regiment,  United  States  Infantry, 
received  them  as  prisoners  of  war.  I  counted  them.  Their  number  was  330. 

"As  they  filed  along  I  wheeled  my  horse  and  noted  trifling  things.  They 
had  to  step  over  the  vulture-picked  carcass  of  a  horse  lying  in  the  road. 
Across  the  tall  Guinea-Panama  grass  came  the  warbling  trill  of  a  mocking 
bird,  imitating  the  'Plant!  plant'  chut,  chut-a-dee!'  so  familiar  to  the  New 
England  ears.  A  few  hundred  feet  to  the  westward,  hiding  Campo  de  Marte 
from  sight,  the  crest  was  lined  with  the  now  empty  trenches,  from  which 
thousands  of  guns  had  belched  torrents  of  lead  at  the  United  States  lines, 
after  the  First  Division  had  assaulted,  captured  and  held  Fort  San  Juan,  the 
principal  Spanish  stronghold,  during  the  seventeen  days  of  battle  and  siege, 
which  had  cost  us,  in  killed  and  wounded,  nearly  2,000  officers  and  men. 


THE    SIGNIFICANCE    OF    SURRENDER    OF    SANTIAGO.     53* 

<l  All  of  the  Americans  were  silent  for  perhaps  two  or  three  minutes.  After 
General  Toral's  surrendered  bodyguard  had  passed  us  our  generals  led  the 
way  through  a  gap  that  had  been  made  in  the  wire-fence,  and  we  filed  out  into 
the  road  leading  to  Santiago.  In  order  to  get  there,  distance  about  two  miles, 
we  had  to  pass  through  the  outlying  military  suburb  called  Campo  de  Marte. 
It  is  made  up  entirely  of  barracks,  military  storehouses,  and  hospitals. 

"These  latter  are  very  large  buildings,  and  throughout  the  siege  numerous 
white  flags,  each  having  the  red  cross,  sacred  to  neutrals,  had  fluttered  prom 
inently  from  the  roof  of  every  hospital.  No  doubt  the  charge  will  be  made 
that  during  the  siege  our  forces  did  not  respect,  but  fired  upon  and  into  the 
buildings  displaying  the  Geneva  flag. 

"Thousands  of  us  can  testify  to  two  facts:  First,  that  the  most  damaging 
battery  of  artillery  of  the  enemy,  one  shell  from  which  put  eleven  men  of  the 
Sixteenth  United  States  Infantry  out  of  action,  was  so  located  that  our  return 
fire  imperiled  the  hospital  buildings;  second,  that  the  trenches  of  the  enemy 
were,  in  part,  directly  between  these  hospital  buildings  and  our  own  trenches, 
so  that  the  direct  return  fire  of  our  infantry  brought  the  hospitals,  Geneva 
flags  and  all,  into  line. 

"Moreover,  in  the  course  of  our  triumphal  entry  from  the  field  of  surren 
der  to  Santiago,  through  Campo  de  Marte,  we  noted  that  the  hospitals  had 
trenches  about  them,  close  in,  and  the  street  barricades  of  tierces  filled  with 
earth;  also  the  barbed-wire  entanglements  were  constructed  with  evident 
defensive  purposes  by  the  enemy  if  driven  from  their  outer  intrenchments. 
The  structures  were  carefully  scanned  to  see  if  their  plastered  surfaces  showed 
any  bullet  marks.  Few  indications  were  observable  of  bullet  impact  or  pene 
tration. 

• 

"The  cavalcade  of  army  officers  passed  Spanish  refugees  who  were  wend 
ing  their  way  back  into  town.  Most  were  afoot.  A  few  carretas,  two-wheeled 
vehicles,  drawn  by  a  single  mule  or  Cuban  pony  in  shafts,  were  passed.  Some 
had  as  many  as  ten  children  huddled  in  one ;  only  one  four-wheeled  carriage, 
a  sort  of  barouche,  hauled  by  a  pair  of  undersized  Cuban  ponies,  contained 
one  or  two  adults  and  eight  or  ten  juveniles.  The  streets  are  mostly  paved 
and  quite  narrow,  not  wide  enough  for  a  field  battery  of  artillery. 

"Santiago  is  built  upon  a  siding.  Some  of  the  houses  were  built  of  brick, 
then  plastered;  some  were  built  of  adobe,  or  sun-dried  brick,  and  then  plas 
tered;  some  were  mud-and-stick  houses.  Many  had  blue  fronts.  The  front 


532     THE    vSIGNIFICANCE    OF    SURRENDER    OF    SANTIAGO. 

doors  were  of  double  or  triple  layers  of  wood  studded  with  nails  and  of  great 
strength.  Many  resembled  a  jail  entrance,  because  supplemented  with  iron 
doors.  Barred  windows  were  common.  Nearly  every  residence  showed  both 
door  and  window  gratings,  from  behind  which  many  women  and  children 
peered  at  us;  a  few  men  also  peered.  Shops  were  numerous,  but  the  major 
ity  were  closed  on  July  17. 

"Here  and  there  floated  the  flag  of  a  foreign  consulate.  The  Spanish  flag 
was  not  anywhere  seen.  Soldiers  were  numerous.  At  the  principal  street 
corners  armed  sentinels  with  Maus'er  rifles  were  posted.  They  appeared  to  be 
doing  police  patrol  duty.  All  of  the  Spanish  privates  were  what  we  term 
undersized  men.  We  passed  sad-eyed  women,  scowling-eyed  women,  and 
coquettish-eyed  women.  Many  of  these  latter  smiled  at  the  procession  of 
American  officers  from  second-story  balconies.  As  a  rule,  the  women  were 
thin,  uncomely,  and  slatternly;  only  a  few  had  their  hair  neatly  arranged ; 
less  than  five  per  cent  wore  mantillas;  their  faces  were  more  wan  than 
handsome. 

"Absolutely  naked  children  stood  in  doorways,  on  the  balconies,  in  win 
dows,  or  in  the  streets.  A  general  paucity  existed  of  decent  clothes  or 
necessities.  Numerous  starveling  cats  and  kittens  were  visible.  On  the 
ground  porch  of  one  house  a  burro  was  lariated  to  the  front  door.  More 
negroes,  I  should  call  them,  than  Spaniards  were  seen.  Lines  of  refugee 
Cubans,  carrying  bundles,  pails,  furniture,  even  trunks,  upon  their  heads 
were  seen.  All  appeared  to  be  entering  the  city,  none  departing.  Perhaps 
they  were  of  the  15,000  non-combatants  who  fled  from  Santiago  to  avoid  the 
perils  of  the  bombardment.  A  few,  a  very  few,  led  or  drove  poor-looking 
milch  cows. 

"We  were  impressed  by  the  marked  physical  contrast  between  the  under 
sized,  wiry,  cotton-clad  Spanish  soldiers  and  our  men.  Nobody  braced  up,  so 
far  as  I  noticed.  I  was  surprised  to  see  so  many  well-stocked  stores,  although 
the  warehouses  of  the  pawnbrokers  were  more  abundantly  filled  with  furniture 
and  other  household  belongings  than  any.  Santiago  has  several  stores  whose 
shelves  display  what  good  judges  say  are  $10,000  worth  of  general  merchandise 
on  sale.  There  is  a  hardware  store  in  Santiago  de  Cuba  carrying  a  $20,000 
stock  of  goods.  One  warehouse  had  500,000  pounds  of  rice  in  2oo-pound 
sacks.  Great  quantities  of  olive  oil,  mostly  in  tin  cans,  are  on  hand. 

"We  had  heard  such  touching  tales  of  the  general  destitution  prevailing  in 


THE    SIGNIFICANCE    OF    SURRENDER    OF    SANTIAGi  .     533 

Santiago,  as,  for  instance,  that  the  Spanish  soldiers  were  subsisting-  on  horse 
meat  to  avoid  starving,  that  the  evidences  of  sale  goods  were  especially 
noted.  Capt.  E.  F.  Taggart,  commissary  of  subsistence,  United  States  Vol 
unteers,  also  called  my  attention  to  a  kind  of  parched  barley  put  up  in  metal- 
lined  cans. 

"But  to  resume.  Reaching  a  plaza,  the  generals  dismounted,  we  of  the 
staff  following  suit.  All  in  order  of  rank  entered  a  large  building.  For  a  few 
minutes  we  wandered  about  without  let  or  hindrance.  This  is  what  I  saw: 
Tiled  floors,  marble  freshly  wet.  The  floors  of  the  halls  and  the  rooms  that 
I  visited  were  not  all  alike.  Some  had  black  and  white  tiles  alternating. 
Some  of  the  rooms  had  planked  floors.  All  of  the  windows  had  Venetian 
shutters.  All  of  the  rooms  were  cool.  The  windows  had  lambrequins.  There 
were  also  portieres,  and  an  abundance  of  chairs — arm-chairs,  cane-seated,  and 
cane-backed. 

"In  the  great  reception  room  was  a  life-sized  oil  painting,  probably  of  some 
Spanish  Queen.  Quantities  of  bamboo  furniture,  iron-barred  windows,  glass 
chandeliers,  crystal  pendants  of  the  old  style,  something  like  mother's  can 
delabra,  marble-topped  tables,  green-topped  tables,  irresistibly  suggestive  of 
poker,  several  cheval  glasses  six  feet  high  outside  the  frame,  and  perhaps  four 
feet  six  inside,  were  conspicuous.  Strolling  back,  I  passed  into  bedrooms. 
There  were  no  closed  doors.  The  beds"  all  had  canopies.  Decorated  china 
toilet  sets,  eau  de  quinine,  puff  boxes,  'Roger  Gallet'  French  soap. 

"Servants  were  engaged  in  setting  a  table  for  ten.  It  had  a  floral  center 
piece,  cut-glass  decanters,  three  sizes  of  wine-glasses,  and  the  usual  china  and 
cutlery  appointments  of  civilization.  Later  our  ranking  generals  lunched 
there.  An  electric  push  button  hung  on  the  wall  of  the  hall." 

This  is  official,  and  more,  a  bit  of  color,  and  an  admirable  pencil  painting. 

A  little  before  noon  the  generals  and  their  respective  staffs  massed  in  the 
Plaza  facing  the  governor's  palace.  On  the  roof  of  the  palace  were  three 
officers — Lieutenant  Miley  held  the  halyards  attached  to  our  national  flag.  It 
was  about  the  size  of  the  recruiting  or  storm  flag,  only  shorter.  General 
Chambers  McKibben  was  with  a  military  band  behind,  and  gave  the  command 
"Present  arms, "  and  the  command  was  repeated  by  General  Breet  just  as 
twelve  o'clock  chimed  out  of  the  cathedral  clock — the  flag,  our  flag,  was  raised 
to  the  top  of  the  staff,  the  band  played  "The  Star-Spangled  Banner."  Three 
cheers  called  for  by  a  soldier  were  given  General  Sh after. 


534     THE    SIGNIFICANCE    OF    SURRENDER    OF    SANTIAGO. 

The  Inspector-General  Reade,  from  whom  we  have  quoted,  writes  a  shock 
ing  account  of  the  sick  army  after  its  movement  when  the  city  surrendered,  to 
get  out  of  the  infected  camps: 

"The  change  of  camping  ground  demonstrated  sadly  the  enfeebled  condi 
tion  of  our  men.  They  straggled  along  the  roads ;  some  fell  out  and  pros 
trated  themselves  anywhere  where  shade  could  be  obtained.  Some  of  General 
Ames's  men,  Thirteenth  Infantry,  completed  the  march  and  then  dropped 
unconscious  or  went  crazy.  He  has  a  wall  tent  as  his  headquarters  and  for 
personal  occupancy.  In  that  tent  he  sheltered  and  cared  for  several  exhausted 
or  delirious  privates.  He  said  that  during  his  entire  military  experience  and 
command,  1861  and  succeeding  years,  he  never  saw  as  heavy  a  percentage  of 
used-up  men.  Unless  more  food  and  a  greater  variety  of  food  is  furnished 
these  soldiers  their  condition  will  become  pitiable  indeed.  They  also  need  to 
be  relieved  of  the  necessity  of  having  to  travel  a  mile  and  a  half  for  a  canteen 
full  of  water. 

''They  have  no  camp  kettles;  all  were  left  aboard  the  transports  25th  of 
last  month,  and  have  remained  at  Siboney,  twelve  miles  from  here,  ever  since. 
Ditto  as  to  extra  clothing.  They  need  better  shelter  than  shelter  tents.  All 
canvas  beyond  what  could  be  carried  upon  the  person  was  ordered  left  behind 
when  the  army  of  invasion  left  the  transports.  That  was  June  24th  and  25th. 
The  tents  are  still  on  the  vessels,  and  it  is  much  to  be  hoped  that  they  will  be 
landed  at  Santiago,  together  with  other  supplies.  Major  McLaughlin,  com 
manding  Sixteenth  United  States  Infantry,  says  that  his  men  can  no  longer 
stomach  canned  bacon. 

"According  to  the  statement,  soldiers  vomit  at  the  sight  of  a  label  having 
printed  on  it  the  name  of  Libby  or  Armour.  They  lived  on  it  during  a  sea 
voyage  of  eighteen  days;  have  lived  on  it  since,  and  now  want  some  nourish 
ing  food  that  their  stomachs  can  retain.  Major  McLaughlin  says  that  he 
would  like  vinegar  and  tobacco  for  his  regiment.  Regarding  vinegar, 
Colonel  Miner,  commanding  Sixth  United  States  Infantry,  says:  'My  men 
drank  what  vinegar  was  issued  them  like  hungry  wolves.'  The  officer  last 
named  says  that  what  is  issued  as  canned  beef  is  refuse  from  which  all  nour 
ishment  has  been  extracted.  Dr.  Calhoun  says  that  it  is  not  possible  for 
officers  to  buy  pure  lime  juice  at  twenty-seven  cents  per  large  bottle.  He 
believes  that  the  article  sold  by  the  Subsistence  Department  as  such  is 
injurious. 


THE    SIGNIFICANCE    OF    SURRENDER    OF    SANTIAGO.      535 

"Asst.-Surg.  W.  D.  McCaw,  Medical  Department,  on  duty  with  the  Sixth 
United  States  Infantry,  reports  that  symptoms  of  scurvy  are  showing  them 
selves  in  certain  fever  cases,  and  asks  that  issue  be  made  of  vinegar,  onions, 
potatoes,  tomatoes,  etc.  Dr.  McCaw  states  that  he  has  not  shelter  or  canvas 
enough  for  his  sick.  Wants  cans  of  beef  extract.  He  predicts  that  a  startling 
increase  in  the  sick  list  will  occur,  due  to  lack  of  the  essentials,  food  and  rest, 
and  proper  clothing.  All  of  the  indications  sustain  this  prediction,  and  the 
sooner  the  sick  are  placed  aboard  transports,  the  better." 

Such  was  the  sad  state  of  United  States  troops  after  the  Spaniards,  made 
hopeless  by  the  loss  of  their  fleet  and  overawed  by  the  arrival  of  our  reinforce 
ments,  surrendered. 

The  exchange  of  observations  between  General  Shafter  and  Admiral 
Sampson 'put  a  strain  on  their  courtesies  as  the  siege  of  Santiago  was 
about  to  terminate.  The  Secretary  of  the  Navy  cabled  Sampson  that  the 
Commanding  General  of  the  army  and  the  Secretary  of  War  requested  "that 
navy  force  harbor."  The  matter  was  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  Admiral, 
"except  that  the  United  States  armored  vessels  must  not  be  risked. — Long." 
Sampson  cabled  that  published  telegrams  of  General  Shafter  reflected  on  the 
navy,  and  added:  "I  wish  the  Department  and  the  President  to  understand 
that  the  first  requisite  to  opening  harbor  of  Santiago  de  Cuba  is  the  occupa 
tion  of  forts  and  intrenchments  at  its  entrance  guarding  mine  fields,  and  that 
the  general  has  never  made  a  move  to  do  this,  although  before  his  army 
landed  he  stated  that  such  was  the  primary  object  of  his  operations." 

The  next  thing  was  the  capitulation.  Sampson,  informed  of  articles 
about  to  be  agreed  upon,  wanted  the  stipulation  added  that  the  Spaniards 
should  remove  all  torpedoes  from  the  harbor  entrance  and  the  harbor  itself. 
Miles  had  Sampson  signal  that  he  should  send  ashore  an  officer  to  represent 
him  "during  negotiations  for  evacuation."  The  use  of  the  word  "evacuation" 
is  an  indication  that  Miles  did  not  think  unconditional  surrender  could  be 
exacted.  Sampson  wished  to  know  when  his  representative  was  wanted  and 
where  he  could  get  a  horse. 

The  next  signal  from  shore  to  flagship  was  that  Santiago  had  been  surren 
dered,  and  then  Shafter  signaled,  "Hitch  in  negotiations.  We  may  have  to 
fight  them  yet."  July  loth  Shafter  telegraphed  "Surrendered,"  and  asked 
whether  a  navy  representative  would  be  sent,  and  Miles  telegraphed  that 
there  was  "a  little  delay,"  but  the  Spaniards  had  surrendered  "in  a  formal, 


536     THE    SIGNIFICANCE    OF    SURRENDER    OF    SANTIAGO. 

positive  manner."  A  copy  of  the  agreement  was  sent  Sampson,  who,  quoting 
the  Commanding  General's  communication,  says:  "The  foregoing  certainly 
shows  clearly  the  most  absolute  joint  action,  and  I  took  for  granted  that  we 
should  be  joint  signatories  of  any  capitulations,  as  is  customary  in  all  services 
in  such  circumstances." 

The  Admiral's  representative,  Captain  Chadwick,  "arrived  at  the  front  at 
the  earliest  hour  it  was  possible  for  him  to  do  so,  and  informed  General 
Shafter  of  my  expectancy  in  the  matter,  but  General  Shafter  peremptorily 
refused.  The  convention  had  already  been  signed,  and  he  stated  as  one 
reason  that  nothing  had  been  said  of  the  army  in  my  report  of  the  fleet  action 
of  July  3d.  There  would  have  been  as  much  reason  for  mentioning  the  navy 
in  the  report  of  the  land  action  of  July  ist,  when  assault  was  made  by  our 
army  on  the  Spanish  lines. 

"No  mention  was  made  of  the  shipping  in  the  capitulations,  and  Captain 
Chadwick  informed  General  Shafter  that  all  Spanish  ships  would  be  regarded 
by  us  as  property  to  be  turned  over  to  the  navy.  He  said  he  would  refer  such 
a  matter  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  but  that,  of  course,  could  have  no  bearing 
upon  what  I  considered  my  duty  in  the  matter,  particularly  in  the  view  of  our 
late  experience  of  Spanish  perfidy  in  regard  to  injury  of  ships,  which,  in  my 
opinion,  made  it  necessary  to  look  after  their  safety  at  once.  I  thus,  after  the 
hauling  down  of  the  Spanish  flag,  sent  prize  crews  on  board  the  gunboat 
Alvarado  and  to  the  five  merchant  steamers  in  the  harbor.  An  officer  of  the 
army  was  found  on  board  the  Alvarado,  who  stated  he  had  been  sent  to  take 
charge  of  her,  whereupon  I  addressed  the  following  letter  to  General  Shafter: 

"  'U.  S.  Flagship  New  York,  July  17,  1898. 

"  'Sir:  Upon  sending  in  an  officer  to  take  charge  of  the  captured  Spanish 
gunboat,  the  Alvarado,  it  was  found  that  one  of  your  officers  was  on  board, 
evidently  with  the  expectation  of  taking  charge  of.  her.  It  should  hardly  be 
necessary  to  remind  you  that  in  all  joint  operations  of  the  character  of  those 
which  have  resulted  in  the  fall  of  Santiago  all  floating  material  is  turned  over 
to  the  navy,  as  all  forts,  etc.,  go  to  the  army.  I  have  been  lying  within  500 
yards  of  the  Morro,  from  which  the  Spanish  flag  was  hauled  down  at  9  o'clock 
and  upon  which  the  United  States  flag  has  not  yet,  at  2  p.  m.,  been  hoisted 
Although  my  forces  have  frequently  engaged  these  forts  and  yours  have  not 
exchanged  a  shot  with  them,  I  await  the  arrival  of  a  detachment  of  your 


THE    SIGNIFICANCE    OF    SURRENDER    OF    SANTIAGO.     537 

troops  to  take  possession,  as  they  must  eventually  occupy  them.      I  expect  the 
same  consideration. 

14  'I  request  that  you  will  relieve  Lieutenant  Caruthers  of  the  duty  given 
him,  as  I  have  directed  Lieutenant  Marble  to  assume  command  of  the 
Alvarado.  Very  respectfully,  etc.' 

4 'Early  on  the  morning  of  the  i8th  I  received  from  the  senior  naval 
officer  in  the  harbor  a  paper  sent  him,  of  which  the  following  is  a  copy: 

"  'Santiago,  July  17,  1898. 

"  'Lieutenant  Doyle  can  keep  his  men  on  the  ships  for  the  night,  and  in 
the  morning  one  of  the  tugs  will  get  up  steam  and  transfer  him  with  his 
officers  and  men  to  their  respective  ships.  C.  McKIBBINS, 

"  'Brigadier-General,  Commanding.'  ' 

The  Admiral  quoted  this,  and  remarked: 

"I  will  not  enter  into  any  expression  of  surprise  at  the  reception  of  such 
a  paper. 

"No  mention  of  the  shipping  was  made  in  the  articles  of  capitulation, 
though  I  specially  requested  that  it  be  included  by  my  message  to  you  of 
July  i3th. 

"Our  operations  leading  to  the  fall  of  Santiago  have  been  joint,  so  directed 
by  the  President  and  so  confirmed  by  their  character.  All  propriety  and 
usage  surrenders  the  floating  material  in  such  cases  to  the  naval  force,  and  I 
have  taken  possession  of  it. 

"I  am  unable  to  recognize  the  authority  of  the  Secretary  of  War  over  my 
actions.  I  have  telegraphed  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  and  await  his 
instructions. 

"In  the  event  of  a  difference  of  opinion  between  the  departments,  the 
question  will,  of  course,  be  decided  by  the  President  of  the  United  States; 
until  then  my  prize  crews  must  remain  in  charge,  and  I  have  so  directed. 

"Very  respectfully, 

"W.  T.  SAMPSON,  Rear  Admiral  U.  S.  N. 
"Commander  in  Chief  U.  S.  Naval  Force,  North  Atlantic  Station. 

"Maj.-Gen.  W.  R.  Shatter,  U.  S.  V., 
"Commanding  Fifth  Army  Corps." 


Shafter's  explanation  of  his  refusal  to  allow  a  naval  officer's  signature  on 
the  capitulation  agreement  is  this: 


538     THE    SIGNIFICANCE    OF    SURRENDER    OF    SANTIAGO. 

"Santiago,  August  i,  1898. 

"I  do  not  acknowledge  the  authority  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  in  the 
matter  in  which  you  wire  me.  The  surrender  of  Santiago  was  made  to  me  by 
General  Toral  in  person,  in  surrendering  verbally  all  the  prisoners  and  public 
property  of  Spain  in  the  district  commanded  by  him,  and  I  accepting  the 
same  in  the  presence  of  troops  representing  all  the  respective  armies.  The 
details  for  carrying  this  into  effect  were  arranged  by  three  commissioners  on 
each  side.  These  articles  were  signed  by  the  respective  commissioners  in 
duplicate,  one  copy  of  handed  to  General  Toral  and  the  other  was  sent  by  me 
to  the  Secretary  of  War.  Neither  General  Toral  nor  myself  signed  them. 
Certainly  could  not  and  would  not  permit  these  articles  to  any  officer  for 
signature,  my  own  not  being  affixed,  and  I  shall  protest  to  the  Secretary  of 
War  against  your  signature  to  that  document.  I  respectfully  invite  your 
attention  to  the  fact  that  no  claim  for  any  credit  for  the  capture  of  Cervera  and 
his  fleet  has  been  made  by  the  army,  although  it  is  a  fact  the  Spanish  fleet  did 
not  leave  the  harbor  until  the  investment  of  the  city  was  practically  completed, 
and  Cervera  had  sufficient  losses  on  land  on  July  i  and  2,  notably  among 
them  his  chief  of  staff.  W.  R.  SHAFTER,  Major-General." 

^ 

The  President's  proclamation  of  the  iSth  of  July  was  of  a  character  that 
gives  it  permanent  interest.  It  is  the  foundation  of  the  policy  of  the 
government  of  the  United  States  with  respect  to  Cuba,  which  is  by  the  treaty 
of  peace  with  Spain  our  military  possession.  President  McKinley's  declaration 

is  as  follows: 

"Adjutant-General's  Office, 

"Washington,  July  18,  1898 — 6:30  p.  m. 
"General  Shafter,  Santiago,  Cuba: 

"The  following  is  sent  you  for  your  information  and  guidance.     It  will 
be  published  in  such  manner  in  both  English  and  Spanish  as  will  give  it  the 
widest  circulation  in  the  territory  under  your  control: 
'To  the  Secretary  of  War: 

"  'Sir:  The  capitulation  of  the  Spanish  forces  in  Santiago  de  Cuba  and  in 
the  eastern  part  of  the  province  of  Santiago,  and  the  occupation  of  the 
territory  by  the  forces  of  the  United  States,  render  it  necessary  to  instruct 
the  military  commander  of  the  United  States  as  to  the  conduct  which  he  is  to 
observe  during  the  military  occupation. 

c'  'The  first  effect  of  the  military  occupation  of  the  enemy's  territory  is 


THE    SIGNIFICANCE    OF    SURRENDER    OF    SANTIAGO.     5^1 

the  severance  of  the  former  political  relations  of  the  inhabitants  and  the  estab 
lishment  of  a  new  political  power.  Under  this  changed  condition  of  things,  the 
inhabitants,  so  long-  as  they  perform  their  duties,  are  entitled  to  security  in 
their  persons  and  property,  and  in  all  their  private  rights  and  relations.  It  is 
my  desire  that  the  inhabitants  of  Cuba  should  be  acquainted  with  the  purpose 
of  the  United  States  to  discharge  to  the  fullest  extent  its  obligations  in  this 
regard.  It  will  therefore  be  the  duty  of  the  commander  of  the  army  of  occupa 
tion  to  announce  and  proclaim  in  the  most  public  manner  that  we  come,  not  to 
make  war  upon  the  inhabitants  of  Cuba,  nor  upon  any  party  or  faction  among 
them,  but  to  protect  them  in  their  homes,  in  their  employments,  and  in  their 
personal  and  religious  rights.  All  persons  who,  either  by  active  aid  or  by 
honest  submission,  cooperate  with  the  United  States  in  its  efforts  to  give 
effect  to  this  beneficent  purpose  will  receive  the  reward  of  its  support  and 
protection.  Our  occupation  should  be  as  free  from  severity  as  possible. 

"  'Though  the  powers  of  the  military  occupant  are  absolute  and  supreme, 
and  immediately  operate  upon  the  political  condition  of  the  inhabitants,  the 
municipal  laws  of  the  conquered  territory,  such  as  affect  private  rights  of 
person  and  property,  and  provide  for  the  punishment  of  crime,  are  considered 
as  continuing  in  force,  so  far  as  they  are  compatible  with  the  new  order  of 
things,"until  they  are  suspended  or  superseded  by  the  occupying  belligerent; 
and  in  practice  they  are  not  usually  abrogated,  but  are  allowed  to  remain  in 
force,  and  to  be  administered  by  the  ordinary  tribunals,  substantially  as  they 
were  before  the  occupation.  This  enlightened  practice  is,  so  far  as  possible, 
to  be  adhered  to  on  the  present  occasion.  The  judges  and  the  other  officials 
connected  with  the  administration  of  justice  may,  if  they  accept  the  supremacy 
of  the  United  States,  continue  to  administer  the  ordinary  law  of  the  land,  as 
between  man  and  man,  under  the  supervision  of  the  American  commander- 
in-chief.  The  native  constabulary  will,  so  far  as  may  be  practicable,  be  pre 
served.  The  freedom  of  the  people  to  pursue  their  accustomed  occupations 
will  be  abridged  only  when  it  may  be  necessary  to  do  so. 

"  'While  the  rule  of  conduct  of  the  American  commander-in-chief  will  be 
such  as  has  just  been  defined,  it  will  be  his  duty  to  adopt  measures  of  a 
different  kind,  if,  unfortunately,  the  course  of  the  people  should  render  such 
measures  indispensable  to  the  maintenance  of  law  and  order.  He  will  then 
possess  the  power  to  replace  or  expel  the  native  officials  in  part  or  altogether, 
to  substitute  new  courts  of  his  own  constitution  for  those  that  now  exist,  or  to 


542     THE    SIGNIFICANCE    OF    SURRENDER    OF    SANTIAGO. 

create  such  new  or  supplementary  tribunals  as  may  be  necessary.  In  the 
exercise  of  these  high  powers  the  commander  must  be  guided  by  his  judg 
ment  and  his  experience  and  a  high  sense  of  justice. 

'  'One  of  the  most  important  and  most  practical  problems  with  which  it 
will  be  necessary  to  deal  is  that  of  the  treatment  of  property  and  the  collection 
and  administration  of  the  revenues.  It  is  conceded  that  all  public  funds  and 
securities  belonging  to  the  government  of  the  country  in  its  own  right,  and  all 
arms  and  supplies  and  other  movable  property  of  such  government,  may  be 
seized  by  the  military  occupant  and  converted  to  his  own  use.  The  real 
property  of  the  State  he  may  hold  and  administer,  at  the  same  time  enjoying 
the  revenues  thereof,  but  he  is  not  to  destroy  it  save  in  the  case  of  military 
necessity.  All  public  means  of  transportation,  such  as  telegraph  lines, 
cables,  railways,  and  boats  belonging  to  the  State  may  be  appropriated  to 
his  use,  but  unless  in  case  of  military  necessity  they  are  not  to  be  destroyed. 
All  churches  and  buildings  devoted  to  religious  worship  and  to  the  arts  and 
sciences,  all  school  houses,  are,  as  far  as  possible,  to  be  protected,  and  all 
destruction  or  intentional  defacement  of  such  places,  of  historical  monuments, 
or  of  archives,  or  of  works  of  science  or  art,  is  prohibited,  save  when  required 
by  urgent  military  necessity. 

"  'Private  property,  whether  belonging  to  individuals  or  corporations,  is  to 
be  respected,  and  can  be  confiscated  only  for  cause.  Means  of  transportation, 
such  as  telegraph  lines  and  cables,  railways  and  boats,  may,  although  they 
belong  to  private  individuals  or  corporations,  be  seized  by  the  military 
occupant,  but,  unless  destroyed  under  military  necessity,  are  not  to  be 
retained. 

"  'While  it  is  held  to  be  the  right  of  the  conqueror  to  levy  contributions 
upon  the  enemy  in  their  seaports,  towns,  or  provinces  which  may  be  in  his 
military  possession  by  conquest,  and  to  apply  the  proceeds  to  defray  the 
expense  of  the  war,  this  right  is  to  be  exercised  within  such  limitations  that 
it  may  not  savor  of  confiscation.  As  the  result  of  military  occupation  the 
taxes  and  duties  payable  by  the  inhabitants  to  the  former  government  become 
payable  to  the  military  occupant,  unless  he  sees  fit  to  substitute  for  them 
other  rates  or  modes  of  contribution  to  the  expenses  of  the  government.  The 
moneys  so  collected  are  to  be  used  for  the  purpose  of  paying  the  expenses  of 
government  under  the  military  occupation,  such  as  the  salaries  of  the  judges 
and  the  police,  and  for  the  payment  of  the  expenses  of  the  army. 


THE    SIGNIFICANCE    OF    SURRENDER    OF    SANTIAGO.     543 

"  'Private  property  taken  for  the  use  of  the  army  is  to  be  paid  for,  when 
possible,  in  cash  at  a  fair  valuation ;  and  when  payment  in  cash  is  not 
possible  receipts  are  to  be  given. 

"  'All  ports  and  places  in  Cuba  which  may  be  in  the  actual  possession  of 
our  land  and  naval  forces  will  be  opened  to  the  commerce  of  all  neutral 
nations,  as  well  as  our  own,  in  articles  not  contraband  of  war,  upon  payment 
of  the  prescribed  rates  of  duty  which  may  be  in  force  at  the  time  of 
importation. 

'"WILLIAM  McKINLEY.' 

"By  order  Secretary  of  War: 

"H.  C.  CORBIN,  Adjutant-General." 

The  Spanish  soldiers  surrendered  at  Santiag-o  by  General  Toral  with  the 
approval  of  Captain-General  Blanco  and  the  Spanish  government  outnumbered 
two  to  one  the  combined  armies  of  Burgoyne  and  Cornwallis  surrendered  at 
Saratoga  and  Yorktown,  and  were  a  larger  force  than  was  engaged  on  either 
side  in  our  two  wars  with  England,  and  forty  per  cent  greater  than  the 
armies  of  Taylor  that  crossed  the  Rio  Grande  and  won  at  Monterey  and 
Buena  Vista;  and  of  Scott,  the  conqueror  of  the  city  of  Mexico,  who  unfurled 
over  the  "Halls  of  the  Montezumas"  the  flag  that  now  floats  at  Havana. 


'.•my&£**" 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

The  Joint  Work  of  the  Army  and  Navy  at  Manila. 

The  Reasons  Why  Admiral  Devvey  Remained  After  Destroying  the  Spanish  Fleet — Why 
there  Was  Not  a  Slaughter  at  Manila  Like  that  at  Santiago — The  Old  Fort  that  Was  the 
Key  of  the  City  —The  American  Army  Drove  the  Spaniards  and  Dusted  the  Insurgents 
Out  of  the  Way — A  Very  Neat  Job — W7e  Did  Not  Make  War  on  the  Spaniards  for  the 
Sake  of  the  Tagalos. 

We  have  seen  in  the  official  communications  by  cable  between  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  of  the  United  States  and  the  Commander  of  the 
American  fleet  on  the  Asiatic  station,  that  before  the  declaration  of  war 
there  were  forceful  and  particular  preparations  to  strike  a  blow  at  the 
Spaniards  in  the  East  Indies  as  soon  as  the  war  hurricane  broke  in  the  West 
Indies.  The  great  possessions  of  Spain  in  Asian  waters  seemed  almost 
literally  at  the  end  of  the  world,  and  were  little  known.  The  duty  confided 
to  Admiral  George  Dewey  was  first  the  protection  of  American  commerce 
with  China  and  Japan  from  the  Spanish  squadron  known  to  be  maintained  at 
Manila,  and  in  the  channels  and  harbors  of  the  Philippines,  and  it  was 
strongly  expressed  over  the  wires  from  Washington  to  the  squadron  of  U.  S. 
cruisers  at  anchor  in  Hongkong  harbor  that  the  way  to  defend  our  commerce 
on  the  other  side  of  the  globe,  was  to  destroy  the  Spanish  war  ships. 

There  was  extraordinary  energy  in  the  Navy  Department.  Mr.  Long, 
the  Secretary,  is  a  man  of  high  attainments  and  forecasting  intellect.  He 
had  for  Assistant  Secretary,  Governor  Theodore  Roosevelt  of  New  York,  who 
was  a  grizzly-bear  killer  before  he  was  a  Rough  Rider;  and  indeed  the 
strong,  keen  and  brilliant  character  that  was  a  dominant  factor  in  the  admin 
istration  of  the  Navy,  itself  a  high  school  of  heroes. 

Admiral  Dewey  was  substantially  instructed  to  clear  for  action  and  strike 
the  squadron  of  Spain  before  the  declaration  of  war.  "Fill  up  with  coal— 

the  best  to  be  had,"  was  the   first  order  issued   that  had   the  ring  of  battle 

544 


TREE  UNDER  WHICH  SURRENDER  OF  SPANISH  FORCES  AT  SANTIAGO  WAS  MADE. 


WORK  OF  THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY  AT  MANILA.    547 

thunder  in  it.  Coal  is  even  more  essential  in  providing  a  war  ship  for  active 
service,  than  gunpowder.  There  is  no  more  inert  mass  of  matter  than  a 
battleship  without  steam.  With  coal  steam  can  be  raised,  and  the  ponderous 
structure  of  iron  becomes  a  thing  of  life  that  parts  the  waters  with  enormous 
power,  and  drives  through  stormy  seas,  an  engine  of  wrath  and  violence, 
crushing  whatever  floats  in  its  way,  but  the  utmost  accurate  range  of  a 
rifle  is  half  a  dozen  miles. 

"Fill  up  with  coal — the  best  to  be  had"  is  a  good  phrase,  the  very  thing 
for  a  beginning.  It  was  followed  up  and  the  Spanish  Asiatic  fleet  in  a  fevr 
days  passed  away.  It  will  be  a  welcome  task  for  Americans  to  tell  the  story 
of  the  glory  of  the  battle  of  the  Bay  of  Manila,  for  the  gallant  Dewey  and 
his  captains  bold,  and  sailors  and  gunners,  and  all  the  officers  and  crews, 
the  Chinese  waiters  included,  who  waited  on  the  boys  at  the  flaming  guns 
with  ammunition  as  cheerfully  as  they  served  the  tables  at  one  time — but  we 
have  to  recite  another  story  now. 

When  Admiral  Dewey  left  Hongkong  he  had  no  home  for  his  ships 
nearer  than  San  Francisco.  He  had  no  boarding  house,  no  tavern  in  which 
he  could  take  his  time  and  his  ease.  He  found  himself  on  the  evening  of  the 
first  of  May  destroyer  of  a  fleet,  the  conqueror  of  a  broad  bay  with  heavy 
batteries  still  frowning  upon  him  from  the  shores,  a  great  city  held  by  an 
army  of  thirteen  thousand  men  amply  armed  under  his  guns,  a  litter  of 
wrecks  where  the  fleet  of  his  enemies  had  been,  his  own  command  less 
numerous  than  the  crews  of  the  ships  he  had  annihilated  and  his  ammunition 
seriously  reduced  by  hours  of  rapid  firing,  it  being  one  of  the  characteristics 
of  war  ships  that  they  consume  stores  of  powder,  shells  and  bolts  at  a  rate 
never  in  old  times  thought  possible. 

What  should  he  do?  Run  to  Singapore  and  be  permitted  to  take  coal 
enoiigh  to  move  him  to  the  next  port  and  so  on  home,  getting  into  American 
waters  in  two  months,  leaving  a  lot  of  Spanish  gunboats  known  to  be  hidden 
about  the  islands  to  go  out  and  prey  upon  our  commerce?  Or  would  it  be 
the  better  way  to  hold  the  Bay  of  Manila,  make  it  a  place  of  shelter  for  his 
fleet  and  a  base  of  operations,  implying  as  the  situation  did,  that  we  had 
gained  command  of  a  group  of  islands  extensive  as  New  York,  Pennsylvania 
and  New  Jersey,  one  of  them  more  spacious  than  the  State  of  Ohio,  the 
group  rich  as  our  Gulf  States?  The  Admiral  of  course  remained,  and  announc 
ing  that  he  would  lay  waste  the  city  if  again  fired  on,  established  a  con- 


5-+S    WORK  OF  THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY  AT  MANILA. 

dition  that  was  satisfactory  until  the  re-enforcements,  the  ships,  provisions, 
coal  and  fixed  ammunition  cabled  for  after  the  Spanish  fleet  was  removed, 
arrived. 

The  alternative  to  go  away  and  allow  the  Spanish  gunboats  to  do  us  a 
great  mischief  was  not  chosen.  The  Admiral  could  have  proceeded  to  Singapore 
and  cabled  for  further  orders,  but  it  was  cheaper  and  stronger  to  stay,  hold 
Cavite,  use  the  insurgents  to  employ  the  Spaniards,  protect  our  interests  as  a 
nation,  and  "possess"  what  his  artillery  dominated.  The  Administration  did 
not  order  him  to  sail  away  from  islands  equal  in  soil,  climate,  minerals,  fruits 
and  agricultural  productions  to  all  the  West  Indies.  The  Admiral  saw  no 
departure  from  duty  in  the  service  of  a  Republican  government,  in  a  conquest. 
As  for  the  government  of  the  people  by  a  majority  of  the  heads  or  hands  shown 
we  cannot  profess  to  do  that  indiscriminately,  and  never  have  done  so.  We 
depend  upon  votes,  but  it  is  desirable  to  mix  votes  with  brains  before  casting 
them,  and  to  measure  the  rights  of  the  people  by  the  American  standard, 
and  base  the  qualifications  of  statehood  in  an  indissoluble  union,  upon 
American  manhood. 

-  The  Admiral  had  to  stay  at  Manila,  and  he  was  glad  to  stay.  He  could 
not  in  honor  get  away,  either  to  leave  the  Spaniards  in  possession,  or  to  turn 
over  the  civilized  communities  to  the  insurgents,  whose  first  idea  was  to 
avenge  in  a  few  months  the  wrongs  that  had  been  endured  for  centuries.  The 
United  States  is  like  the  Admiral.  It  has  a  duty  to  preserve  order  until  there 
appears  a  people  capable  of  caring  for  themselves  and  governing  themselves. 
Those  who  have  that  capacity  will  not  begin  the  redemption  of  their  race  by 
acts  of  barbarism — neither  of  robbery,  nor  brutal  destructiveness.  The  same 
class  of  people  who  were  always  distressed  by  more  territory,  terrified  because 
they  were  so  much  superior  to  others  that  the  country  ought  to  be  small  and 
select  for  their  special  use  and  fashioned  according  to  their  personal 
peculiarities,  which  were  not  of  generous  proportions,  grieved  over  Dewey's 
protection  of  his  own  and  the  national  honor. 

We  have  a  territorial  system  that  will  serve  excellently  as  a  colonial 
system,  for  the  assimilation  of  elements  from  regions  remote,  and  we  can 
govern  them  through  our  executive  and  legislative  departments  with  such 
measure  of  military  force  as  may  be  necessary  to  preserve  peace  and 
promote  tendencies  to  civilization.  There  is  no  hurry  about  more  states. 
Indeed  it  would  be  a  sound  conservation  to  refuse,  henceforth  to  organize 


WORK    OF    THE    ARMY    AND    NAVY    AT    MANILA.         549 

territories  into  states,  unless  they  are  so  Americanized  as  to  come  into  our 
Union  so  naturally  that  opposition  would  be  to  antagonize  ourselves  and 
assail  the  precedents  that  arc  behind  our  laws  and  customs. 

The  President  of  the  United  States  has  sustained  Admiral  Dewey  and 
honored  him  at  every  step,  from  the  first  day  of  the  war  when  they  made 
their  acquaintance  intimate  over  the  cable,  but  he  reserved  one  decision  until 
he  was  able  to  consult  public  opinion.  That  was  what  we  should  do  with  the 
Philippines  when  the  time  came  to  make  the  treaty  that  must  follow  the  war 
with  Spain.  All  questions  were  settled  in  the  Protocol  but  that  of  the  Spanish 
East  Indies.  That  was  absolutely  but  not  expressly  referred  to  the  matured 
judgment  of  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  and  the  result  was  the  decision 
that  we  should  hold  the  islands.  There  are  but  few  against  the  verdict.  If 
there  had  been  a  popular  vote  on  it  the  majority  would  have  been  ten 
millions  to  keep  the  prize  so  gallantly  won.  Those  opposed  to  raising 
the  objections  are,  the  survivals  of  the  antique  ideas  of  the  delightful 
symmetry  of  small  countries  and  the  delicious  refinement  of  little  things, 
and  in  addition  there  are  those  who  think  that  they  can  gain  something  by  the 
vulgarity  of  figuring  on  the  twenty  millions  of  indemnity  to  Spain,  the 
expense  of  three  weeks  of  war ;  and  there  is  the  soft,  flabby  demagogy  of 
suffering  for  the  sake  of  the  people  we  have  relieved  from  the  Spanish  yoke. 

The  line  that  we  draw  is  that  we  are  quite  prepared  to  consent  to  the 
government  of  Cuba  by  Cubans  and  of  the  Philippines  by  the  Filipinos,  but 
we  hold  they  would  improve  rapidly  in  the  art  of  government  by  the 
experience  of  liberty  under  our  guidance.  We  shall  not  fight  them  as  against 
self-government,  but  they  must  not  fall  prey  to  a  class  of  Spaniards  inferior  to 
those  who  fought  for  Spain,  and  of  Malay  chiefs,  whose  vanity,  inflamed  by 
possible  prosperity  and  modified  by  material  aid,  is  conspicuous  with  gilt  and 
titles  of  distinction.  We  want  to  find  the  real  people  of  the  islands  of 
Cuba  and  Luzon,  and  others,  and  we  have  not  evidence  that  Aguinaldo  and 
Gomez  are  men  of  the  people.  They  are  powerful  in  letters  and  proclamations 
that  have  the  tropical  features  of  literature,  so  floridly  tinctured  that  it 
needs,  to  assume  a  wholesome  aspect,  to  be  tinged  with  the  tones  and 
strengthened  with  the  American  air  of-  the  North  Temperate  Zone. 

We  are  content  that  the  islanders  in  question  shall  have  the  government 
that  pleases  them,  as  soon  as  they  show  that  they  have  a  people  whose 
policy  has  not  been  that  of  firebugs,  and  ravenous  seekers  of  spoil.  There 


550         WORK    OF    THE    ARMY    AND    NAVY    AT     MANILA. 

are  people  in  Cuba  and  Luzon;  let  them  step  to  the  front.  Distinction  in 
superstition  or  accomplishment  in  assassination  are  not  sufficient  to  constrain 
the  United  States  to  set  up  mutual  administration  and  speculation  societies 
of  insurgents  as  a  ruling  class  who  shall  govern  over  us  as  well  as  the 
Cubans  and  the  Filipinos.  This  insufficiency  is  not  held  in  favor  by  those 
who  studied  the  art  of  government  in  swamps  and  the  thorny  underbrush  of 
the  wilderness.  Those  both  in  Cuba  and  Luzon  who  are  threatening  us  with 
guerrilla  warfare,  if  we  do  not  submit  to  their  presumption,  appear,  as  the  war 
manifested,  to  have  voracity  for  the  official  privileges  the  Spaniards  enjoyed, 
and  would  be  willing,  in  consideration  of  our  war  of  humanity,  to  aid  us  in  a 
zealous  and  lucrative  manner  to  carry  on  the  government  of  the  United 
States. 

The  elementary  principles  of  the  policy  of  expansion,  are  to  improve  the 
opportunities  that  occur  for  the  appropriation  of  more  land  for  the  people, 
our  people — we  the  people  of  the  United  States.  George  Dewey  held  the 
prize  he  won  and  William  McKinley  has  sustained  him  handsomely  for  the 
sake  of  the  people,  and  the  people  will  stand  with  them  while  there  is  land 
for  labor  and  power  for  guns. 

Admiral  Dewey  knew  General  Merritt  was  coming.  He  had  helped 
Aguinaldo  against  the  Spaniards,  but  had  ignored  or  opposed  his  fantastic 
pretensions.  Then  the  insurgent  chief  was  pleased  to  be,  in  the  language  of 
the  Admiral,  "threatening"  toward  Americans.  The  chief  is  surrounded  by 
a  queer  assortment  of  fanatics,  some  of  whom  hold  that  he  has  a  "charm" 
that  makes  him  proof  against  bullets  and  poison,  but  he  has  to  obtain  the 
consent  of  certain  persons  before  he  can  do  anything.  The  great  grievance 
against  the  Americans  by  the  insurgents  was,  after  the  Spaniards  surrendered 
Manila,  that  they  were  not  allowed  to  enter  the  town  in  triumph  and  indulge 
the  passions  of  revenge  and  looting. 

They  had  been  boasting  that  they  could  take  Manila,  but  that  was  not  in 
their  power.  It  was  the  fleet  of  the  United  States  in  the  bay  that  allowed 
the  insurgents  to  blockade  the  city.  It  was  the  fleet  too,  that  by  drawing 
the  line  between  the  city  and  Forte  Malate,  preserving  the  former  and 
crushing  the  latter,  broke  the  Spanish  line  of  defense  without  such  loss  of  life 
as  occurred  at  Santiago.  We  were  the  master  of  Manila  with  a  loss  small 
compared  with  the  experience  of  carrying  trenches  in  Cuba,  because  the  navy 
forced  the  mouth  of  the  harbor  and  made  an  end  of  the  fleet  in  the  bay  with- 


WORK  OF  THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY  AT  MANILA.    551 

out  harming  the  city  In  storming  the  Spanish  lines  after  the  naval  bombard 
ment  had  cleared  the  entrance  by  the  shore,  the  American  forces  were 
about  one-third  the  Spaniards  and  Filipinos  counted  together.  With  two 
divisions  of  our  troops  engaged,  one  drove  the  Spanish  and  the  other  held 
back  the  insurgents.  It  \vas  a  divided  duty  and  a  double  job,  and  an 
altogether  artistic  and  effective  piece  of  work.  This  event  took  place,  it  will 
be  remembered,  after  the  Protocol  negotiated  by  the  French  Minister  had 
been  signed,  but  before  knowledge  of  peace  had  reached  the  Oriental  seat  of 
war. 

One  of  the  dangers  in  sending  an  American  army  across  the  Pacific  was 
that  there  were  loose  Spanish  gunboats,  that  might  attack  transports  that 
were  without  convoys  or  effective  batteries  and  crowded  with  troops. 
When  the  peril  was  realized,  there  were  in  several  instances  rifled  cannon 
mounted  on  deck  and  men  trained  to  handle  the  guns.  General  Greene  pre 
pared  the  China  in  her  voyage  out  to  Manila  with  rifles  that  it  was  believed 
would  stand  off  a  gunboat,  and  the  same  provision  was  made  on  the  boat  that 
carried  Major  General  Otis,  who  had  an  artillery  company  of  regulars  on  board, 
but  the  steamers  with  the  soldiers,  while  stanch  in  encountering  bad  weather, 
were  frail  vehicles  to  be  extemporized  for  ships  of  war.  The  voyages 
were  according  to  orders  on  lines  easily  followed.  This  cable  will  explain 
the  method: 

Washington,  June  27,  1898. 
Dewey  (care  American  consul),  Hongkong: 

The  Monadnock  sailed  June  25  from  San  Francisco,  accompanied  by  collier 
Nero.  Was  ordered  to  proceed  at  utmost  speed  safely  possible,  and  stops  as 
short  as  possible,  and  to  make  the  best  of  way  to  a  point  600  nautical  miles 
east  true  from  Cape  Engano,  and  thence  to  run  to  the  west  true  until  up  to 
Cape  Engano.  If  then  she  has  not  received  from  you  a  message  to  the 
contrary,  she  will  proceed  at  once  to  Manila.  This  enables  you  to  meet  the 
Monadnock  or  to  send  a  message  to  her  within  600  nautical  miles  of  Cape 
Engano,  if  you  desire  to  do  so.  Furthermore,  General  Merritt's  third  division 
of  transports  will  leave  about  June  27  from  San  Francisco  with  about  4,000 
men  and  not  convoyed,  but  he  has  been  advised  to  make  and  to  sail  the 
600  knots  east  and  west  line  as  described  for  the  Monadnock. 

LONG. 

The  Spaniards  were  not  enterprising,  and  there   was  no  danger  visibly 


552    WORK  OF  THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY  AT  MANILA. 

threatened.  Admiral  Dewey  was  kept  well  advised  of  the  movement  of 
reinforcements.  The  Secretary  of  the  Navy  cabled  him  June  i8th:  "Second 
division  of  the  army  expedition,  about  3,500  men,  in  four  steamers,  sailed 
from  San  Francisco  [at]  noon  on  June  15.  The  army  estimates  they  will 
make  average  speed  10  knots  per  hour,  and  touch  two  days  at  Honolulu. 
Sustained  sea  speed  seems  doubtful." 

June  25th  the  Secretary  cabled  Dewey  via  Hongkong':  "Second  army 
division,  Gen.  F.  V.  Greene  commanding,  left  San  Francisco  to  touch  at 
Honolulu  and  Guam.  Estimated  to  arrive  at  Guam  July  10  and  expects  to 
meet  convoying  vessel  from  you  at  Guam.  If  practicable,  send  one.  If  you 
cannot  do,  then  charter  vessel  and  send  naval  officer  Guam.  Inform  com 
manding  officer  expedition  to  come  to  Engano  or  Manila  without  convoy. 
The  War  Department  states  Greene  would  not  touch  Guam,  but  now 
announces  he  will  touch  there. " 

The  Secretary  of  the  Navy  cabled: 

"The  Spanish  fleet  from  Cadiz  passed  Cape  Bon,  going  to  the  east,  June 
22,  3  p.  m.  Expected  to  go  to  Manila.  Comprise  Pelayo,  Emperor  Carlos 
Y.,  three  torpedo-boat  destroyers,  three  auxiliary  armed  steamers,  and  seven 
transports.  In  all  15  sail. 

"Monterey  and  the  collier  sailed  [for]  Manila  from  San  Diego  on  June  n. 
The  Monadnock  and  the  collier  will  follow  June  20  if  possible.  Could  not  you 
have  a  vessel  at  Hongkong  to  receive  notice  concerning  Spanish  fleet 
passing  Suez?" 

June  29th  Long  wired  to  Dewey  as  follows:  "The  different  re- 
enforcements  sent  to  you  are  as  follows:  First  army  detachment  and  the 
Charleston  sailed  May  21  from  San  Francisco  via  Honolulu  and  Guam. 
Estimated  sea  speed,  10  knots.  The  Monterey  sailed  June  u  from  San  Diego, 
Cal.,  via  Honolulu  and  Guam,  probably  estimated  sea  speed,  10  knots  per 
hour.  The  Monadnock  sailed  June  25  from  San  Francisco  for  Honolulu  and 
then  direct.  Estimated  sea  speed,  6  knots  per  hour,  perhaps  more.  Third 
army  detachment  sailed  June  27  from  San  Francisco;  was  recommended  to 
go  direct.  Squadron  under  Watson,  the  Iowa  and  Oregon,  the  Yankee  and 
the  Dixie,  the  Newark  and  the  Yosemite,  and  four  colliers  preparing  with 
all  possible  dispatch  to  start  for  Spanish  coast.  The  Spaniards  know  this." 

Twenty  thousand  tons  of  coal  were  reported  to  be  aboard  supply  vessels 
for  the  war  boats  announced  to  Dewey  June  2;th  in  these  terms: 


WORK  OF  THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY  AT  MANILA.    55;, 

"Camara's  fleet  arrived  off  Port  Said  June  26,  and  is  reported  by  our  agent 
there  as  follows:  Pelayo,  Carlos  Y.,  Audaz,  Osada,  Proserpina,  Patriota,  12 
guns,  and  three  unarmed  transports,  Colon,  Covadonga,  and  San  Francisco. 
They  will  coal  immediately — to  be  supplied  by  Cory  Brothers,  whose  agents 
are  Savon  Bazui. " 

There  was  according  to  all  appearances  a  serious  line  of  business  in  this 
movement,  but  it  evaporated.  Dewey's  purpose  was  to  evacuate  the  harbor  at 
Manila  if  the  Spanish  fleet,  too  strong  to  fight  without  getting  the  worst  of  it, 
should  pass  into  the  China  Sea  and  reach  the  Babujan  Islands  north  of 
Luzon.  Long's  cable  to  Dewey  July  ist  is  proof  of  this. 

General  Merritt,  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Philippine  expedition,  sailed 
from  San  Francisco  June  29th  and  arrived  at  Cavite,  Manila  Bay,  July  25th. 
General  Thomas  M.  Anderson  was  in  command  of  the  United  States  troops 
up  to  that  time,  his  headquarters  being  in  Cavite.  General  F.  Y.  Greene 
with  his  brigade  was  encamped  along  the  bay  near  the  village  of  Paranague, 
"about  five  miles  by  water  and  twenty-five  miles  by  the  roads  from  Cavite, 
and  a  strip  as  described  by  General  Merritt,  "of  sand)'  land  running  parallel 
to  the  shore  of  the  bay  and  not  far  distant  from  the  beach,  but  owing  to  the 
great  difficulties  of  landing  supplies,  the  greater  portion  of  the  force  had 
shelter  tents  only  and  were  suffering  many  discomforts,  the  camp  being 
situated  in  a  low,  flat  place,  without  shelter  from  the  heat  of  the  tropical  sun 
or  adequate  protection  during  the  terrific  downpours  of  rain  so  frequent  at 
this  season. ' ' 

General  Merritt  was  "at  once  struck  by  the  exemplary  spirit  of  patient, 
even  cheerful,  endurance  shown  by  the  officers  and  men  under  such  circum 
stances,  and  this  feeling  of  admiration  for  the  manner  in  which  the  American 
soldiers,  volunteer  and  regular  alike,  accept  the  necessary  hardships  of  the 
work  they  have  undertaken  to  do,  has  grown  and  increased  with  every  phase 
of  the  difficult  and  trying  campaign  which  the  troops  of  the  Philippine 
expedition  have  brought  to  such  a  brilliant  and  successful  conclusion." 

The  General  found  that  the  left  or  north  flank  of  Greene's  command 
"extended  to  a  point  on  the  'Calle  Real,'  about  3,200  yards  from  the  outer 
line  of  Spanish  defenses  of'the  city  of  Manila.  This  Spanish  line  began  at 
the  powder  magazine,  or  old  Fort  San  Antonio,  within  a  hundred  yards  of 
the  beach  and  just  south  of  the  Malate  suburb  of  Manila,  and  stretched 
away  to  the  Spanish  left  in  more  or  less  detached  works,  eastward,  through 


554         WORK    OF    THE    ARMY    AND    NAVY    AT    MANILA. 

swamps  and  rice  fields,  covering  all  the  avenues  of  approach  to  the  town  and 
encircling  the  city  completely." 

This  fact  was  the  key  of  the  defensive  position  of  the  Spaniards  and  their 
lines  were  formidable.  There  were  marshes,  rice  fields  and  trenches,  and  mud 
barricades,  and  the  advance  would  have  to  be  over  open  ground,  covered 
completely  by  the  Spanish  rifle  fire.  The  position  of  the  Spaniards  was 
stronger  than  that  of  Santiago,  for  here  they  were  well  protected  and 
storming  columns  could  not  be  sheltered  in  the  least,  but  the  old  fort  by  the 
seaside  was  not  tenable  under  the  fire  of  the  American  fleet.  As  to  General 
Aguinaldo,  whose  forces  had  surrounded  the  city  with  irregular  skirmish 
lines,  and  who  was  publishing  proclamations  of  independence  and  belief  that 
he  was  about  to  capture  Manila,  he  seems  to  have  thought  it  was  General  Mer- 
ritt's  object  in  coming  to  place  the  United  States  army  at  the  disposition  of 
the  insurgent  Junta.  General  Merritt  says  in  his  official  report  that  at  the 
time  of  his  arrival  "the  entire  edifice  of  executive  and  legislative  department 
and  subdivision  of  territory  for  administrative  purposes  had  been  accomplished 
at  least  on  paper,  and  the  Filipinos  held  military  possession  of  many  points 
in  the  islands  other  than  those  in  the  vicinity  of  Manila. 

"As  General  Aguinaldo  did  not  visit  me  on  my  arrival  nor  offer  his  services 
as  subordinate  military  leader,  and  as  my  instructions  from  the  President  fully 
contemplated  the  occupation  of  the  islands  by  the  American  land  forces,  and 
state  that  'the  powers  of  the  military  occupant  are  absolute  and  supreme  and 
immediately  operate  upon  the  political  condition  of  the  inhabitants, '  I  did  not 
consider  it  wise  to  hold  any  direct  communication  with  the  insurgent  leader 
until  I  should  be  in  possession  of  the  city  of  Manila,  especially  as  I  would  not 
until  then  be  in  position  to  issue  a  proclamation  and  enforce  my  authority,  in 
the  event  that  his  pretensions  should  clash  with  my  designs. 

"For  these  reasons  the  preparations  for  the  attack  on  the  city  were 
pressed  and  military  operations  conducted  without  reference  to  the  situation 
of  the  insurgent  forces.  The  wisdom  of  this  course  was  subsequently  fully 
established  by  the  fact  that  when  the  troops  of  my  command  carried  the 
Spanish  intrench  men  ts^  extending  from  the  sea  to  the  Pasay  road,  on  the  ex 
treme  Spanish  right,  we  were  under  no  obligations,  by  prearranged  plans  of 
mutual  attack,  to  turn  to  the  right  and  clear  the  front  still  held  by  the  insur 
gents,  but  were  able  to  move  forward  at  once  and  occupy  the  city  and 
suburbs." 


RIFT  IN  THE  JUNGLES  THAT  LINE  THE  ("OAST  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES. 


ROADWAY  IN  BOTANICAL  GARDENS,  MANILA. 


WORK    OF    THE    ARMY    AND    NAVY    AT    MANILA.       557 


REDUCED  FROM  OFFICIAL  PLAN  PREPARED  BY  WAR  DEPARTMENT. 


55?    WORK  OF  THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY  AT  MANILA. 

At  the  part  of  the  defenses  of  Manila  that  must  be  carried  to  possess  the 
city,  the  insurgents  were  gathered  in  considerable  numbers  and  had  imper 
fectly  intrenched  themselves,  occupying  space  that  they  had  not  the  capa 
bility  of  using  offensively.  Under  General  Merritt's  instructions  General 
Greene,  by  finesse  and  crowding,  dispossessed  the  Filipinos  from  the  grounds 
they  could  not  use  with  decisive  advantage,  and  advanced  the  trenches,  coming 
into  sharp  conflict  with  the  Spaniards,  who  used  at  Santiago  the  Mauser  and 
Remington  rifles,  the  former  especially  with  smokeless  powder,  and  there  were 
no  men  so  brave  as  not  to  admit  that  when  under  this  fire  the  tingling  whir 
of  the  projectiles  was  "very  disagreeable/' 

The  expenditure  of  cartridges  by  the  Spaniards  was  a  surprise,  but  the 
astonishment  cleared  up  when  they  finally  surrendered  22,000  stand  of  arms 
and  10,000,000  cartridges.  The  usual  supposition  that  the  Spaniards  \vere  on 
the  point  of  starvation  was  contradicted  by  the  presence  of  large  quantities  of 
rice.  The  fatal  flaw  of  the  Spanish  position,  the  one  that  demoralized  them 
so  that  they  were  even  intimidated  by  the  insurgents,  was,  that  the  city  was 
under  the  guns  of  the  American  fleet.  If  they  opened  their  batteries  for  the 
defense  of  Manila  on  our  fleet,  they  knew  the  shells  from  our  heavy  ship-guns 
would  fire  the  town ;  and  they  were  also  aware  that  our  gunners  had  the 
range  of  objects  in  the  city,  the  walled  city  in  particular,  so  that  they  could, 
as  one  of  them  said,  "aim  at  the  batteries  on  the  point  and  hit  the  Arch 
bishop's  palace  every  shot." 

Nothing  had  escaped  the  vigilance  and  studious  observation  of  o.ur  naval 
officers  The  commander  of  each  ship  had  his  orders  in  case  the  signal  to 
destroy  Manila  was  made,  and  knew  the  spot  where  he  was  to  go,  and  the 
angle  at  which  the  guns  were  to  be  fired  and  the  direction  the  shells  were 
to  take  to  sweep  the  streets  and  smash  buildings.  There  was  apparently 
nothing  out  of  the  sight  of  Admiral  Dewey.  The  Spaniards  were  guided  in 
their  treatment  of  him  by  their  experience  with  him.  They  judged  what  he 
would  do  by  what  he  had  done.  He  had  an  understanding  with  them  that  as 
long  as  the  ships  were  not  fired  upon  he  would  not  shell  the  city,  and  this  was 
construed  during  the  siege  by  American  troops,  to  mean  that  the  fighting 
ashore  was  exempt  from  attention  by  the  Lavetta  battery  and  the  fleet.  This 
was  no  secret.  Everybody  knew  all  about  it,  except  some  of  the  report 
ers  who  interpreted  the  old  peace  basis  Dewey  had  established,  to  mean  there 
was  a  bargain  between  the  armies  that  the  fighting  was  to  be  a  sham,  and 


WORK    OF    THE    ARMY    AND    NAVY    AT    MANILA.  559 


COPY  OF  MAP 
niiiini  TI  niiiiDin  orriuij. 

2nd  BRIG.,  2nd  01 V.,  8th  ARMY  CORPS, 
ON  *uaurr'i*.  '»ot 


BRIG   GEN    f  V    GREENE, 


REDUCED  FROM  OFFICIAL  PLAN  PREPARED  BY  WAR  DEPARTMENT. 


56o    WORK  OF  THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY  AT  MANILA. 

therefore  the  fight  a  fake.     The  old  convention  was  not  disturbed  and  that 
was  all.     The  Spaniards  fought  all  they  could. 

General  Greene  had  entered  actively  into  the  work  of  opening  trenches 
to  drive  out  the  Spaniards  and  found  he  was  losing  men  in  the  long  range 
Mauser  fire,  and  that  at  the  same  time  the  troops  were  harassed  exceedingly 
by  the  torrents  of  rain  to  which  they  were  exposed,  and  he  became  impatient 
for  the  action  of  the  navy.  General  Merritt  sympathized  with  him  and  officers 
waited  upon  Admiral  Dewey  to  urge  opening  fire  upon  the  enemy  by  the 
ships  of  war.  The  army  and  navy  are  sometimes  sensitive  as  to  their  relative 
rights  and  duties,  as  there  is  but  one  man,  the  President,  whose  authority  to 
command  both  is  given  in  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  itself,  and 
Admiral  Dewey  was  not  approached  to  invite  his  immediate  cooperation  in 
the  manner  to  which  he  was  accustomed.  There  was  no  serious  disagree 
ment,  but  a  rub,  not  of  flint  and  steel,  but  of  two  edges  of  steel,  slight  but 
distinct.  General  Greene,  one  of  the  old  friends  of  the  Admiral,  was  able  to 
make  an  adjustment  that  was  satisfactory  to  all.  The  leading  feature  was 
that  the  combined  action  of  the  army  and  navy  should  be  defined  for  the  per 
fection  of  a  giant  plan,  and  meantime,  if  the  position  of  our  troops  was 
endangered,  and  General  Greene  burned  a  blue  light  as  arranged,  the  fleet 
should  proceed  to  bombard  the  town.  The  emergency  did  not  arrive. 

The  surrender  of  Manila  was  demanded,  that  the  foreign  residents  and 
women  and  children  might  find  places  of  safety.  The  Spanish  answer  was  a 
refusal  to  submit,  but  an  admission  that  the  non-combatants  had  no  place 
to  go.  This  was  correctly  interpreted,  that  the  Spanish  officers  were  aware  of 
their  helplessness,  but  felt  that  they  must  make  a  show  of  fight  in  deference 
to  public  and  official  opinion  at  home.  It  was  the  same  notion  that  had 
possessed  the  Spanish  officers  when  they  were  in  the  act  of  surrendering  San 
tiago,  to  be  so  pathetic  in  their  insistence  that  they  should  have  their  arms 
shipped  with  them. 

When  General  Merritt  had  8,500  men  in  position  he  thought  the  time  had 
come  to  strike  and  had  a  meeting  with  the  Admiral.  The  correspondence 
followed  relative  to  the  capitulation  of  Manila,  and  a  joint  note  by  Merritt  and 
Dewey  opened  it.  Merritt,  when  the  wording  of  the  letter  was  discussed, 
proposed  to  give  time  to  get  the  non-combatants  out  of  the  way  of  harm,  or  the 
city  at  a  given  hour  be  bombarded.  This  was  changed  by  the  Admiral  with 
the  cheerful  consent  of  the  General  to  read  that  i{the  defenses"  of  the  city 


=  1 


WORK    OF    THE    ARMY    AND    NAVY    AT    MANILA.      563 


REDUCED  FROM  OFFICIAL  PLAN  PREPARED  BY  WAR  DEPARTMENT. 


564    WORK  OF  THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY  AT  MANILA. 

would  be  bombarded.  This  kept  up  the  truce  as  to  the  pacific  attitude  of  the 
fleet  and  the  city  batteries  with  respect  to  each  other.  General  Merritt 
officially  says:  "The  seacoast  batteries  in  defense  of  Manila  are  so  situated 
that  it  is  impossible  for  ships  to  engage  them  without  firing  into  the  town,  and 
as  the  bombardment  of  a  city  filled  with  women  and  children,  sick  and 
wounded,  and  containing  a  large  amount  of  neutral  property,  could  only  be 
justified  as  a  last  resort,  it  was  agreed  between  Admiral  Dewey  and  myself 
that  an  attempt  should  be  made  to  carry  the  extreme  right  of  the  Spanish  line 
of  intrenchinents  in  front  of  the  positions  at  that  time  occupied  by  our  troops, 
which,  with  its  flank  on  the  seashore,  was  entirely  open  to  the  fire  of  the  navy. 

"It  was  not  my  intention  to  press  the  assault  at  this  point,  in  case  the 
enemy  should  hold  it  in  strong  force,  until  the  navy  had  made  practicable 
breaches  in  the  works  and  shaken  the  troops  holding  them,  which  could  not  be 
done  by  the  army  alone,  owing  to  the  absence  of  siege  guns.  This  is  indi 
cated  fully  in  the  orders  and  memorandum  of  attack  hereto  appended.  It  was 
believed,  however,  as  most  desirable,  and  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of 
civilized  warfare,  that  the  attempt  should  be  made  to  drive  the  enemy  out  of 
his  entrenchments  before  resorting  to  the  bombardment  of  the  city. 

'About  9  a.  m.  on  that  day  our  fleet  steamed  forward  from  Cavite  and 
before  10  a.  m.  opened  a  hot  and  accurate  fire  of  heavy  shells  and  rapid-fire 
projectiles  on  the  sea  flank  of  the  Spanish  intrenchinents  at  the  powder 
magazine  fort,  and  at  the  same  time  the  Utah  batteries,  in  position  in  our 
trenches  near  the  'Calle  Real,'  began  firing  with  great  accuracy." 

At  10:25  a.  m.  the  fleet  had  done  its  work,  so  that  when  our  troops 
advanced  at  that  hour  the  fort,  which  was  the  key  of  the  city,  was  found 
deserted;  also  the  flanking  trenches,  but  the  second  line  of  the  Spaniards  was 
defended  for  a  few  minutes,  and  among  our  men  killed  was  the  soldier  who 
pulled  down  the  Spanish  colors  still  flying  on  the  fort  and  raised  our  own. 
General  Merritt  records  his  "appreciation  of  the  admirable  manner  in  which 
the  orders  for  attack  and  the  plan  of  occupation  of  the  city  were  carried  out 
by  the  troops  exactly  as  contemplated.  I  submit  that  for  troops  to  enter  under 
fire  a  town  covering  a  wide  area,  to  rapidly  deploy  and  guard  all  principal 
points  in  the  extensive  suburbs,  to  keep  out  the  insurgent  forces  pressing  for 
admission,  to  quietly  disarm  an  army  of  Spaniards  more  than  equal  in  num 
bers  to  the  American  troops,  and  finally  by  all  this  to  prevent  entirely  all 
rapine,  pillage,  and  disorder,  and  gain  entire  and  complete  possession  of  a 


WORK    OF    THE    ARMY    AND    NAVY    AT    MANILA.    ,     565 

city  of  300,000  people,  filled  with  natives  hostile  to  European  interests,  and 
stirred  tip  by  the  knowledge  that  their  own  people  were  fighting  in  the  outside 
trenches,  was  an  act  which  only  the  law-abiding,  temperate,  resolute  Ameri 
can  soldier,  well  and  skillfully  handled  by  his  regimental  and  brigade  com 
manders,  could  accomplish. " 

The  insurgents  were  "dusted  out  of  the  way,"  and  there  was  developed 
among  them  a  good  deal  of  resentment.  Three  days  after  the  Spaniards  had 
surrendered,  the  final  article  of  the  capitulation  being: 

"This  city,  its  inhabitants,  its  churches,  and  religious  worship,  its  educa 
tional  establishments,  and  its  private  property  of  all  descriptions,  are  placed 
under  the  special  safeguard  of  the  faith  and  honor  of  the  American  army." 
That  is  to  say,  on  the  i6th  the  President's  proclamation  directing  a  suspension 
of  hostilities  was  cabled. 

The  casualties  in  the  Army  of  the  United  States  during  the  operations 
before  Manila  were  seventeen  enlisted  men  killed,  ten  officers  and  ninety-six 
enlisted  men  wounded.  The  insurgents  were  much  irritated  because  they  were 
not  permitted  to  be  joint  occupants  of  the  city.  They  have  continued  their 
false  pretenses  of  ability  to  capture  Manila,  but  the  only  thing  to  say  of 
that  is  that  it  would  be  extremely  discreditable  to  the  military  spirit  of  the 
Spaniards  that  they,  when  equal  in  numbers  to  the  native  assailants,  allowed 
themselves  to  be  driven  into  Manila,  holding  only  the  suburbs,  but  for  the 
facts  the  Filipinos  had  been  supplied  with  arms  by  the  Americans  and  allowed 
to  help  themselves  at  the  arsenals  of  Cavite  to  cannon  and  ammunition,  and  the 
Spaniards  were  aware  when  their  fleet  was  destroyed  and  our  fleet  anchored 
in  the  bay  and  reinforcements  had  arrived,  that  the  Americans  were  masters 
of  the  situation.  The  Spaniards  were  disheartened  by  the  fire  of  the  Ameri 
can  fleet  on  the  first  of  May,  which  was  more  rapid,  certain  and  crushing  than 
they  imagined  possible.  It  was  this  special  dejected  condition  of  the  Span 
iards  and  their  general  weakness  on  the  offensive  that  caused  them  to  permit 
the  insurgents  to  press  upon  them  and  at  last  forced  surrender. 

It  was  necessary  to  suppress  the  Filipinos  in  their  ardent  desire  to  assume 
the  role  of  conquerors  at  the  expense  of  the  Americans,  precisely  as  it  has 
been  required  by  common  sense  and  decent  humanity  to  chill  the  tropical 
temper  of  the  alleged  Cuban  army,  since  their  bombardment  of  Havana 
by  Key  West  reports  of  fake  fights  was  extinguished  by  the  news  of 
the  surrender  of  the  Spanish  armies  and  the  obliteration  of  Spanish 


566    WORK  OF  THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY  AT  MANILA. 

fleets  by  the  American  army  and  navy  on  the  shores  of  Cuba — the  Cubans 
looking  on. 

General  Merritt's  proclamation  to  the  people  of  the  Philippines  was  a 
document  concerning  the  construction  of  which  the  Filipinos  were  not  con 
sulted.  The  General  used  this  language  assuring  "the  people"  of  the  islands 
—not  alone  the  army  that  was  of  far  more  considerable  force  than  appeared  to 
represent  the  Cuban  "Nation,"  when  they  were  excited  to  do  military  work- 
but  all  the  peaceably  disposed  people,  that  "so  long  as  they  preserve  the  peace 
and  perform  their  duties  toward  the  representatives  of  the  United  States  they 
will  not  be  disturbed  in  their  persons  and  property,  except  in  so  far  as  may  be 
found  necessary  for  the  good  of  the  service  of  the  United  States  and  the 
benefit  of  the  people  of  the  Philippines." 

Here  are  the  paragraphs  of  promise  in  the  proclamation: 

"The  government  established  among  you  by  the  United  States  is  a 
government  of  military  occupation  and  for  the  present  it  is  ordered  that  the 
municipal  laws,  such  as  affect  private  rights  of  persons  and  property,  regulate 
local  institutions  and  provide  for  the  punishment  of  crime,  shall  be  considered 
as  continuing  in  force  so  far  as  is  compatible  with  the  purposes  of  military 
government,  and  that  they  be  administered  through  the  ordinary  tribunals 
substantially  as  before  occupation,  but  by  officials  appointed  by  the  govern 
ment  of  occupation. 

"The  Port  of  Manila,  and  all  other  ports  and  places  in  the  Philippines 
which  may  be  in  the  actual  possession  of  our  land  and  naval  forces,  will  be 
open,  while  our  military  occupation  may  continue,  to  the  commerce  of  all 
neutral  nations  as  well  as  our  own,  in  articles  not  contraband  of  war,  and 
upon  payment  of  the  prescribed  rates  of  duty  which  may  be  in  force  at  the 
time  of  the  importation. ' ' 

There  is  a  likeness  between  the  disturbance  of  mind  of  General  Aguin- 
aldo  at  Manila  and  that  of  General  Garcia  at  Santiago,  a  great  difference  to 
note  in  the  men.  Both  Aguinaldo  and  Garcia  wanted  to  participate  as  repre 
sentatives  of  an  independent  power  in  an  American  triumph.  Also  they 
desired  to  figure  in  the  procession,  to  participate  in  the  ceremonies,  to  put 
their  names  into  the  papers  as  parties  to  the  transaction. 

The  insurgents  wanted  at  Manila  and  Santiago,  after  an  almost  impercep 
tible  show  of  themselves  in  the  fields  during  the  sieges,  to  have  a  joint  occu 
pation.  General  Garcia  expected  to  be  Governor  of  Santiago,  General 


WORK    OF    THE    ARMY    AND    NAVY    AT    MANILA.          567 

Aguinaldo  would  be  dictator  at  Manila.  In  the  two  cities  the  military 
supremacy  of  the  United  States  tolerated  no  companionship.  The  Americans 
had  conquered  in  Cuba  and  Luzon,  and  divided  authority  and  responsibility 
with  no  pretenders  to  statesmanship,  given  to  proclamations  as  in  the  Philip 
pines;  and  not  even  a  character  heroic  as  that  of  Garcia  could  be  made  an  ex 
ception  to  an  imperative  and  inviolable  rule. 


CHAPTER    XXV. 

The  Porto  Rico  Campaign. 

The  Preliminary  Plans  and  Movements  of  General  Miles — Sharp  but  Courteous  Correspond 
ence  with  General  Shafter,  Closing  Cuban  Experiences — Place  of  Landing  in  Porto 
Rico  Changed  at  Sea — The  Progress  of  the  Campaign  Ended  by  the  Peace  News — The 
Constant  and  Conclusive  Success  of  the  American  Arms — Some  of  the  Cablegrams  that 
Passed  that  Remain  of  Historical  Interest. 

We  have  been  at  pains  to  trace  the  plans  and  the  movements  of  the  Major 
General  Commanding  from  the  earliest  evolutions  of  campaigns  in  his  mind 
to  the  surrender  of  Santiago,  and  we  have  found  that  he  began  with  the  idea  of 
thoroughly  preparing  a  great  army  of  fifty  thousand  in  a  mass,  to  be  sup 
ported  by  a  Cuban  auxiliary  force  of  equal  number  and  reinforcements  as 
might  be  required.  It  was  in  the  General's  view  absolutely  necessary  to  keep 
the  main  body  of  our  troops  out  of  Cuba  until  the  rainy  season  was  over  and 
the  virulence  of  the  yellow  fever  had  abated.  This  meant  the  commencement 
of  decided  operations  in  the  late  autumn,  and  it  was  proposed  to  strike  blows 
meantime  at  the  Isle  of  Pines,  Porto  Rico  and  the  north  shore  of  the  east  end 
of  Cuba,  and  also  clear  the  West  India  seas  of  Spanish  ships  so  that  all  salt 
water  would  serve  for  a  secure  basis  of  operations.  However,  it  was  held  to 
be  essential  that  we  should  use  our  regular  army  of  something  over  twenty 
thousand  effective  soldiers  as  soon  as  our  sea  power  was  established,  and  press 
the  organization,  equipment  and  advancement  of  volunteers,  so  as  to  push 
forward  and  aid  whatever  enterprises  lingered,  owing  to  the  lack  of  numbers 
of  the  regular  force 

The  country  could  not  have  tolerated  the  course  of  preparations  that  the 
Commanding  General  recommended,  and  he  was  overwhelmed  by  the  Admin 
istration  and  the  course  of  events.  It  was  the  visible  line  and  logic  of  the  plan 
of  the  Commanding  General,  that  while  movements  of  secondary  consideration 
interested  the  public  and  harassed  and  damaged  the  Spaniards,  the  grand 

army,  to  be  commanded  by  himself,  should  be  'in  due  time  landed  in  the  west 

568 


THE    PORTO    RICO    CAMPAIGN.  569 

end  of  Cuba,  and  move  under  his  personal  direction  upon  Havana,  after  the 
pestilence  and  the  floods  from  the  skies  had  abated.  As  a  military  mechanism 
this  plan  of  the  Major-General  was  perfect,  and  as  the  country  was  not  pre 
pared  for  putting  in  motion  great  armies  within  a  few  weeks,  there  was  no 
difficulty  in  presenting  for  the  course  of  proceedings  contemplated  a  very  fair 
seeming  sort  of  argument,  but  science  had  to  yield  to  a  sense  of  exigency  and 
the  war  was  ended  before,  as  General  Miles  desired  to  manage  it,  the  real 
struggle  should  be  made,  and  Havana  was  captured  by  the  destruction  of 
Cervera's  fleet,  and  the  surrender  of  armies  of  Spain,  one  thousand  and  ten 
thousand  miles  away  from  the  capital  of  Cuba. 

Just  when  it  had  been  determined  to  strike  Spain  in  Porto  Rico  and  the 
insurrectionary  end  of  Cuba,  on  the  north  side  of  the  island  by  preference, 
the  retreat  of  the  fleet  of  Cervera  to  the  harbor  of  Santiago  forced  the  dispatch 
to  that  city  of  our  regular  army  and  concentrated  there  our  Atlantic  fleet  with 
the  exception  of  the  vessels  necessary  to  preserve  the  legal  existence  of  the 
blockade  of  the  principal  ports  of  the  island.  General  Miles  was  present  at 
the  embarkation  of  the  troops  at  Tampa  and  saw  plainly  \vhat  Shafter  had 
already  made  out  as  a  tendency,  that  the  most  important  campaign  of  the 
war  would  be  when  the  land  forces  of  the  hostile  nations  first  came  in 
conflict,  and  the  Major-General  expressed  his  liking  to  take  personal  charge  of 
the  enterprise,  but  it  did  not  seem  according  to  usage  or  just  to  deprive 
Shafter  of  his  assignment  when  he  had  been  the  first  officer  of  his  rank  on  the 
ground,  and  General  Miles  was  recalled  to  Washington  as  Shafter  was  sailing, 
and  took  in  hand  the  Porto  Rico  campaign  (No.  2)  to  overrun  that  wholesome 
and  beautiful  island. 

He  arrived  at  Santiago  in  time  to  make  a  perceptible  impression  on  the 
enemy,  whose  surrender,  as  rescue  was  impossible,  could  soon  be  exacted  by 
overwhelming  forces.  The  next  thing  was  to  hasten  the  movement  of  the 
victorious  soldiers  who  had  sickened  under  the  exposure  in  the  infected  villages 
and  the  horror-haunted  camps  upon  the  soil  whose  rankness  made  it  poisonous. 
Then  General  Miles  gathered  a  competent  force  and  sailed  for  Porto  Rico. 
Commander  C.  H.  Davis,  of  the  U.  S.  S.  Dixie,  reported  to  Admiral  Sampson, 
from  Guantanamo,  Cuba,  August  2d,  giving  information  regarding  the 
island  of  Potto  Rico,  "gathered  by  me  on  my  recent  visit  to  the  island,  partly 
through  intercourse  with  natives  and  residents,  and  partly  through  personal 
observation,  as  follows: 


570  THE    PORTO    RICO    CAMPAIGN. 

4 'There  are  about  7,000  regular  Spanish  troops  on  the  island.  The  num 
ber  of  volunteers  and  irregular  troops  is  indefinite,  but  those  would  not  count 
against  our  invading  force,  as  popular  sentiment  in  the  island  is  overwhelm 
ingly  in  favor  of  the  United  States.  The  people  struck  me  as  being  superior 
intellectually  to  the  Cubans. 

44  After  the  occupation  of  Guanica  and  Ponce  by  our  navy  and  army  the 
Spanish  forces  began  to  concentrate  on  San  Juan  de  Porto  Rico,  the  seat  of 
the  colonial  government.  This  will  be  the  last  stronghold  of  Spanish 
authority  on  the  island.  It  will  be  difficult  to  take  San  Juan  by  a  land  invest 
ment  unsupported  by  the  fleet. 

44 General  Miles'  headquarters  are  now  at  Ponce.  All  transports  are  being 
collected  there  and  reinforcements,  material,  and  baggage  landed  as  rapidly 
as  possible.  The  troops  which  landed  at  Giianica  will  march  overland  to 
Ponce  to  join  the  main  army.  I  understand  that  General  Miles'  plan  of  cam 
paign  is  an  advance  in  force  across  the  island  from  Ponce  to  San  Juan  and  a 
regular  investment  of  that  place.  The  distance  is  about  60  miles  in  a  straight 
line.  It  must  be  much  more  by  the  windings  of  the  road.  The  roads  are  good. 

4 'The  natives  assured  me  that  General  Miles  would  meet  with  very  little 
opposition  before  reaching  the  vicinity  of  San  Juan.  San  Juan  is  the  key  to 
the  island.  It  would  be  the  natural  policy  of  the  enemy  to  concentrate  for  its 
defense.  The  Governor-General  of  Porto  Rico  has  telegraphed  Madrid  that 
he  cannot  hold  the  colony  for  Spain  unless  strongly  reinforced,  and  San  Juan 
is  already  beginning  to  suffer  for  want  of  food.  The  people  of  the  country 
would  rise  against  the  Spanish  authority  if  stimulated.  The  Spanish  official 
class  and  Spanish  sympathizers  will  take  refuge  in  San  Juan,  which  may  be 
regarded  as  a  purely  Spanish  city.  General  Miles  cannot  hold  the  island  until 
he  takes  the  city  of  San  Juan  de  Porto  Rico  and  compels  the  surrender  of  the 
colonial  government. 

44I  am  strongly  of  the  opinion  that  San  Juan  de  Porto  Rico  could  be  taken 
by  the  fleet  under  your  command  and  by  a  coup  de  main  without  the  assistance 
of  the  army  and  in  advance  of  its  approach  from  the  south  and  the  complete 
conquest  of  the  island  of  Porto  Rico  accomplished  by  this  means.  The  plan 
would  be  to  send  a  flag  of  truce  in  advance  of  the  fleet  with  the  usual  notice 
of  bombardment.  The  monitors  might  occupy  the  western  end  of  the  line 
and  engage  the  batteries  on  and  to  the  westward  of  Morro  Point.  The  battle 
ships  and  cruisers  would  continue  the  line  from  the  position  of  the  monitors 


THE    PORTO    RICO    CAMPAIGN.  571 

easterly  nearly  to  Necambron  Point  and  bombard  the  city  itself  and  the  land 
defenses  and  suburbs,  and  command  the  road  by  which  alone  egress  may  be 
had  from  the  city. 

"Two  or  three  light-draft  vessels  mounting  5 -inch  guns  stationed  near  El 
Soquoron  could  sweep  and  destroy  San  Antonio  bridge  and  its  approaches  and 
command  the  San  Antonio  Channel  and  Isla  Grande.  The  landing  force  of 
marines,  convoyed  by  gunboats,  could  land  a  mile  to  the  westward  of  Paloseco 
and  occupy  the  shore  on  the  west  side  of  the  harbor  within  easy  range  of  the 
town  for  field  pieces,  automatic  guns,  and  small  arms,  or  the  marines  could 
be  held  in  reserve  to  land  and  garrison  the  town  on  its  reduction  by  the  fire 
from  the  ships,  whose  volume  would,  I  believe,  insure  an  immediate  surrender 
of  the  city  and  with  it  the  possession  of  the  whole  island,  or  would  entirely 
destroy  the  place." 

There  is  something  very  clever  and  positive  about  this,  but  the  Navy  was 
not  destined  to  pick  up  the  golden  sheaves  in  the  harvest  field  of  glory. 
Before  getting  away  from  Cuba  General  Miles  had  this  interesting  and 
instructive  correspondence  with  General  Shafter. 

Headquarters  of  the  Army,  Playa  del  Este,  July  17,  1898 — 7  p.  m. 
General  Shafter: 

What  is  the  condition  of  your  command  to-day?  Sent  you  report  of  medical 
board,  with  direction  for  changing  camps,  etc.  If  it  is  thought  more  advisable 
to  move  troops  to  fresh  camps  on  the  foothills  or  mountain  sides,  and  surgeons 
advise,  act  accordingly. 

The  St.  Paul  should  be  unloaded  immediately,  and  every  transport 
unloaded  and  returned  as  soon  as  possible,  as  they  are  needed. 

MILES,  Major-General  Commanding. 


Siboney,  July  17,  1898—8:48  p.  m.  (Received  July  18,  1898.) 
General  Miles,  On  Board  Yale: 

Letters  and  orders  in  reference  to  movement  of  camp  received  and  will 
be  carried  out.  None  is  more  anxious  than  myself  to  get  away  from  here.  It 
seems,  from  your  orders  given  me,  that  you  regard  my  force  as  a  part  of  your 
command.  Nothing  will  give  me  greater  pleasure  than  serving  under  you, 
General,  and  I  shall  comply  with  all  your  requests  and  directions,  but  I  was 
told  by  the  Secretary  that  you  were  not  to  supersede  me  in  command  here.  I 


Si?-  THE    PORTO    RICO    CAMPAIGN. 

will  furnish  the  information  called  for   as  to  condition  of  command  to  Gil- 
more,  Adjutant-General,  Army  Headquarters. 

SHAFTER,   Major-General. 

Headquarters  of  the  Army, 

Playa  del  Este,  July  18,  1898.      (Sent  about  n  130  a.  m.) 
General  Shafter: 

Telegram  received.  Have  no  desire  and  have  carefully  avoided  any 
appearance  of  superseding  you.  Your  command  is  a  part  of  the  United 
States  Army,  which  I  have  the  honor  to  command,  having  been  duly  assigned 
thereto,  and  directed  by  the  President  to  go  wherever  I  thought  my  presence 
required,  and  give  such  general  directions  as  I  thought  best  concerning  mili 
tary  matters,  and  especially  directed  to  go  to  Santiago  for  a  specific  purpose. 
You  will  also  notice  that  the  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War  of  July  13  left  the 
matter  to  my  discretion.  I  should  regret  that  any  event  should  cause  you  or 
any  part  of  your  command  to  cease  to  be  a  part  of  mine. 

NELSON  A. MILES, 
Major-General  Commanding. 

Half  an  hour  later  than  the  date  of  the  above  Miles  wrote  to  the  Secretary 
of  War,  that  he  thought  it  "important  to  go  direct  to  Pt.  Fajardo,  Cape  de 
San  Juan,"  and  he  wanted  "a  strong,  fast,  sea-going  dispatch  boat  to  be  sent 
to  Porto  Rico, "  and  he  also  wanted  Keifer's  Division,  from  Miami,  Florida,  "or 
troops  from  Texas,  Louisiana,  Mississippi,  Alabama,  Georgia  and  Florida,"  as 
"a  part  of  the  command  of  Porto  Rico."  Before  leaving  Siboney  he  said  in 
general  field  orders  No.  i  of  the  Santiago  army:  "Under  drenching  storms, 
intense  and  prostrating  heat,  within  a  fever-afflicted  district,  with  little  com 
fort  or  rest,  either  by  day  or  night,  they  purstied  their  purpose  of  finding  and 
conquering  the  enemy.  Many  of  them,  trained  in  the  severe  experience  of  the 
great  war,  and  in  frequent  campaigns  on  the  western  plains,  officers  and  men 
alike  exhibited  a  great  skill,  fortitude,  and  tenacity,  with  results  which  have 
added  a  new  chapter  of  glory  to  their  country's  history.  Even  when  their 
own  generals  in  several  cases  were  temporarily  disabled,  the  troops  fought  on 
with  the  same  heroic  spirit  until  success  was  finally  achieved. 

"In  many  instances  the  officers  placed  themselves  in  front  of  their  com 
mands,  and  under  their  direct  and  skillful  leadership  the  trained  troops  of  a 
brave  army  were  driven  from  the  thickets  and  jungles  of  an  almost  inaccessible 


THE    PORTO    RTCO    CAMPAIGN.  573 

country.  In  the  open  field  the  troops  stormed  intrenched  infantry,  and  car 
ried  and  captured  fortified  works  with  an  unsurpassed  during  and  disregard  of 
death.  By  gaining  commanding  ground  they  made  the  harbor  of  Santiago 
untenable  for  the  Spanish  fleet,  and  practically  drove  it  out  to  a  speedy 
destruction  by  the  American  navy." 

The  General  proceeded  to  say:  "While  enduring  the  hardships  and 
privations  of  such  a  campaign,  the  troops  generously  shared  their  scanty  food 
with  the  5,000  Cuban  patriots  in  arms  and  the  suffering  people  who  had  fled 
from  the  besieged  city." 

It  should  be  stated  that  if  there  were  five  thousand  native  troops  seen  by 
the  American  forces,  the  Spaniards  did  not  get  sight  of  that  number  of  them. 

The  General  continued:  "With  the  twenty  -  four  regiments  and  four 
batteries,  the  flower  of  the  United  States  army,  were  also  three  volunteer 
regiments.  These,  though  unskilled  in  warfare,  yet,  inspired  with  the  same 
spirit,  contributed  to  the  victory,  suffered  hardships,  and  made  sacrifices  with 
the  rest." 

Instead  of  going  to  Pt.  Fajardo,  Porto  Rico,  General  Miles  concluded 
to  land  at  Guanica.  The  reason  the  General  assigned  for  this  change,  which 
was  a  surprise,  he  states:  "As  all  cablegrams  concerning  our  landing  place 
had  passed  over  foreign  cables,  and  as  it  was  important  to  deceive  the  enemy 
(who,  I  afterwards  learned,  were  marching  to  and  intrenching  the  ground  we 
were  expected  to  occupy,  at  the  very  time  we  were  taking  possession  of  the 
southern  coast  of  Porto  Rico)." 

While  at  sea,  he  wrote  to  Captain  Higginson:  "Our  objective  point  has 
been  Pt.  Fajardo  or  Cape  San  Juan,  but  so  much  time  has  occurred  since  the 
movement  was  decided  in  that  direction  and  such  publicity  has  been  given  the 
enterprise,  that  the  enemy  has  undoubtedly  become  apprised  of  our  purpose. 
While  it  was  advisable  to  make  a  demonstration  near  the  harbor  of  San  Juan 
near  Pt.  Fajardo,  or  Pt.  Figueroa,  I  am  not  decided  as  to  the  advisability  of 
landing  at  either  of  these  places,  as  we  may  find  them  well  occupied  by  strong 
Spanish  forces.  If  we  draw  them  to  that  vicinity,  we  might  find  it  judicious 
to  quickly  move  to  Puerto  Guanica,  where  there  is  a  deep  water  near  the  shore 
—four  and  one  half  fathoms — and  good  facilities  for  landing." 

The  correspondence  of  the  General  makes  clear  the  completeness  of  his 
information.  The  General  says  in  his  report  to  the  Secretary  of  War  that  he 
arrived  off  Guanica  near  daylight  July  25th,  and  entered  the  harbor  unopposed. 


57  ^  THE    PORTO    RICO    CAMPAIGN. 

4 'The  guns  of  the  Gloucester,  Commander  Wainwright  commanding,  fired 
several  shots  at  some  Spanish  troops  on  shore.  The  landing  of  the  marines, 
sailors,  and  our  troops  immediately  commenced,  and  after  a  short  skirmish 
the  Spanish  troops  were  driven  from  the  place,  and  the  flag  of  the  United 
States  was  raised  on  the  island. 

"In  this,  and  in  subsequent  movements,  I  was  very  ably  and  cordially 
assisted  by  the  navy,  which  rendered  invaluable  aid  in  disembarking  troops 
and  supplies  from  the  transports,  using  their  steam  launches  to  tow  the 
lighters  loaded  with  men  and  animals  from  the  transports  to  the  shore.  Ten 
lighters  were  captured  at  Guanica  and  seventy  at  Ponce." 

Major-General  Wilson  arrived  July  27th.  Commander  Davis  of  the  Dixie 
entered  the  Port  of  Ponce  on  the  same  day  and  found  it  was  not  fortified.  In 
order  to  encourage  the  dissatisfaction  with  the  Spaniards  on  the  island,  Gen 
eral  Miles  issued  a  proclamation  "To  the  Inhabitants  of  Porto  Rico,"  stating 
that  our  war  against  Spain  was  "in  the  cause  of  liberty,  justice  and  human 
ity,"  and  the  United  States  forces  "came  bearing  the  banner  of  freedom,"  and 
he  closed  with  this  sounding  sentence,  equal  to  the  Spanish  style  in  sonorous 
phrase:  "This  is  not  a  war  of  devastation,  but  one  to  give  to  all  within  the 
control  of  its  military  and  naval  forces  the  advantages  and  blessings  of  enlight 
ened  civilization." 

The  General  seems  to  have  hit  his  audience  squarely.  Major-General 
Brooke  arrived  July  3ist.  There  were  several  sharp  skirmishes  on  August 
8th,  9th  and  loth.  In  the  affair  of  the  gth  the  Spanish  commanding  officer 
and  the  second  in  command  were  killed  and  one  hundred  and  sixty-seven 
prisoners  taken.  There  were  six  engagements  during  the  campaign  when  at 
Asomante,  on  the  i2th  of  August,  the  artillery  of  General  Wilson's  com 
mand  began  shelling  the  enemy's  position  preparatory  to  an  advance  in  front, 
while  a  rear  attack  was  to  be  made  by  General  Ernst's  brigade.  This  com 
mand  was  under  arms  and  ready  to  move  August  i3th,  when  orders  were 
received  suspending  hostilities. 

July  3oth  General  Miles  telegraphed  from  the  Port  of  Ponce  of  the  prog 
ress  of  the  Porto  Rico  campaign:  "We  have  now  landed  in  a  perfectly 
healthy  country,  well  settled,  and  where,  if  necessary,  a  large  amount  of  beef 
can  be  obtained,  and  also  transportation. 

"Marching  across  country,  rather  than  under  the  guns  of  the  fleet,  will 
have  in  every  way  a  desirable  effect  upon  the  inhabitants  of  this  country.  At 


THE    PORTO    RICO    CAMPAIGN.  575 

least  four-fifths  of  the  people  will  hail  with  great  joy  the  arrival  of  United 
States  troops,  and  requests  for  our  national  flag  to  place  over  public  buildings 
come  in  from  every  direction. 

"This  is  a  prosperous  and  beautiful  country.  The  army  will  soon  be  in 
mountain  region;  weather  delightful;  troops  in  best  of  health  and  spirits; 
anticipate  no  insurmountable  obstacles  in  future  results." 

July  3ist  the  General  telegraphed:  "Volunteers  are  surrendering  them 
selves  with  arms  and  ammunition.  Four-fifths  of  the  people  are  overjoyed  at 
the  arrival  of  the  army;  2,000  from  one  place  have  volunteered  to  serve  with 
it.  They  are  bringing  in  transportation,  beef  cattle,  and  other  needed  sup 
plies.  The  custom  house  has  already  yielded  $14,000." 

General  Miles  remarked  by  wire  August  2d:  "Abundance  of  beef, 
cattle,  coffee,  sugar,  and  supplies  of  that  character  can  be  obtained  in  the 
country.  Request  that  no  more  fresh  meat  be  sent,  as  it  cannot  be  used  more 
than  a  day  from  the  coast.  I  also  recommend  that  the  manufacture  of  Spring 
field  rifles,  .45 -caliber  ammunition,  all  white  canvas  tentage  and  black  leather 
equipments  of  every  description  be  discontinued,  as  they  are  obsolete  and 
should  not  be  part  of  the  army  equipment. ' ' 

August  3d  General  Alger  replied:  "As  you  ought  to  know,  the  last 
caliber  .45  Springfield  rifle  was  manufactured  in  ninety-three.  Smokeless 
powder  cartridges  are  now  being  manufactured  and  will  be  forwarded.  I  sug 
gest  that  you  get  along  with  what  the  government  has  on  hand. ' ' 

August  1 4th  General  Miles  telegraphed  from  "near  Los  Morias;  notice  on 
map  our  troops  occupy  best  part  of  Porto  Rico.  They  were  moving  in  such 
strong  column  in  concert  that  nothing  could  check  their  progress.  They 
would  have  occupied  the  entire  island  within  four  days  if  they  had  not  been 
stopped  by  order  to  suspend  hostilities." 

One  of  the  difficulties  of  the  war  was  the  scarcity  of  supplies  of  pure 
water,  and  the  vehement  demand  for  it.  At  last,  as  the  original  difficulties 
had  passed  away  in  great  measure,  there  was  a  gleam  of  humor  in  the  four 
brief  dispatches  appended: 

New  York,  August  26,  1898 — 12:51  p.  m. 
Hon.  H.  C.  Corbin,  Adjutant-General  U.  S.  A.,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

Please  see  that  Troops  A  and  C,  New  York  Volunteer  Cavalry,  about  to 
embark  on  return  voyage  from  Ponce,  are  not  overcrowded  and  are  supplied 
with  abundance  of  water,  T.  C.  PLATT. 


576  THE    PORTO    RICO    CAMPAIGN. 

Adjutant-General's  Office,  Washington,  August  26,  1898 — n  p.  in. 
Hon.  T.  C.  Platt,  Manhattan  Beach  Hotel,  Long  Island: 

Will  give  instructions  that  A  and  C  troops  are  not  crowded  on  return 
voyage      Pray  tell  me  when  they  took  to  water? 

H.  C    CORBIN,  Adjutant-General. 


New  York,  August  26,  1898 — 2:25  p.  m. 
Henry  C.  Corbin,  Adjutant-General  U.  S.  A.,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

Troops  A  and  C.  New  York  Volunteer  Cavalry,  are  coming  home  from 
Ponce.     Please  do  not  overcrowd,  and  give  them  plenty  of  water. 

GILBERT  E.  JONES. 

Adjutant-General's  Office,  Washington,  August  26,  1898 — n  p.  rn. 
Gilbert  E.  Jones,  222  Madison  Avenue,  New  York  City: 

I  will  see  that  your  darling  pets  are  not  crowded,  but  since  when  did  they 
take  to  water?  H.  C.  CORBIN,  Adjutant-General. 


This  is  in  another  vein : 

New  York,  August  26,  1898 — 4:33  p.  m. 

Adjutant-General  Corbin,  War  Department,  Washington,  D.  C. : 
Please  wire  Porto  Rico  to  find  when  schools  will  be  open. 

D.  BUTTERFIELD. 
Corbin  replied,  Porto  Rico  cables  "School  opened  August  i5th." 

Ponce,  August  8,  1898 — 1:50  p.  m. 
Adjutant-General,  Washington : 

Replying  to  General  Butterfield's  inquiry  concerning  public  schools  in 
Porto  Rico,  there  are  546  public  and  38  private.  GILMORE. 

The  schools  opened  two  days  after  the  Stars  and  Stripes  appeared  as  the 
sovereign  standard  of  Porto  Rico. 

General  Butterfield  was  instrumental  in  sending  a  large  supply  of  the 
Stars  and  Stripes  to  Porto  Rico,  and  they  were  gladly  received. 

Ponce,  via  Bermuda,  August  21,  1898 — 7:28  p.m. 
Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  A.,  Washington: 

The  arrangements  for  supplying  flags  through  Butterfield  and  Bake  well, 
Lafayette  Post,  satisfactory.  The  larger  of  the  sizes  sent  will  be  acceptable. 
Please  notify  them.  NELSON  A.  MILES,  Major-General. 


THE    PORTO    RICO    CAMPAIGN.  577 

Ponce,  via  Bermuda,  August  14,  1898 — 9:30  p.  m. 
Secretary  of  War,  Washington: 

Messrs.  Potter,  Van  Rennsaller,  Vanuxem,  and  Groff  arrived  on  private 
yacht  May  with  load  of  supplies,  which  will  greatly  contribute  to  the  comfort 
of  the  troops,  and  especially  the  sick  and  wounded.  They  also  brought  a 
large  number  of  American  flags,  which  have  been  sent  to  the  different  towns 
and  cities,  and  soon  will  be  waving  over  the  best  part  of  Porto  Rico.  The 
action  of  these  patriotic  and  philanthropic  gentlemen,  and  the  National  Relief 
Commission,  which  they  represent,  is  highly  appreciated  by  a  grateful  army, 
while  the  display  of  our  national  colors  will  give  great  joy  to  the  people. 

NELSON  A.   MILES,  Major-General  Commanding. 


Ponce,  via  Bermuda,  August  21,  1898 — 8:05  p.  m. 
Secretary  of  War,  Washington: 

Everything  accomplished  that  could  be  desired.  Only  details  to  be 
arranged  by  commission  for  evacuation  of  Spanish  troops.  Some  Spanish 
troops  now  marching  to  San  Juan  preparatory  to  embarking  for  Spain.  I 
have  1 06  guns,  mortars,  and  howitzers,  field  and  siege.  I  intended  to  use 
at  San  Juan  if  Spanish  had  not  been  captured  outside,  which  our  troops 
were  doing.  These  available  if  needed  elsewhere.  Among  number  are  ten 
light,  very  powerful  dynamite  guns.  If  desirable,  any  of  above,  with  ammu 
nition  and  men,  can  be  shipped,  via  New  Orleans  and  San  Francisco,  to 
Manila.  I  expect  very  soon  to  return  to  Washington.  MILES. 

General  Miles  said  in  concluding  his  report:  "The  success  of  the  enter 
prise  was  largely  due  to  the  skill  and  good  generalship  of  the  officers  in 
command  of  the  different  divisions  and  brigades.  Strategy  and  skillful  tactics 
accomplished  what  might  have  occasioned  serious  loss  to  achieve  in  any  other 
way.  The  loss  of  the  enemy  in  killed,  wounded  and  captured  was  nearly  ten 
times  our  own,  which  was  only  3  killed  and  40  wounded.  Thus  the  island  of 
Puerto  Rico  became  a  part  of  the  United  States.  It  embraces  nearly  3,700 
square  miles,  and  has  a  population  of  nearly  a  million  souls. 

"It  is  gratifying  to  record  that  during  the  war  not  a  single  defeat  has 
been  met,  and  not  a  prisoner,  color,  gun  or  rifle  has  been  captured  by  the 
enemy.  In  this  respect  the  war  has  been  most  remarkable,  and,  perhaps, 
unparalleled.  Under  all  circumstances  and  in  spite  of  many  most  trying 


57«  THE     PORTO    RICO    CAMPAIGN. 

difficulties  the  troops  have  maintained  the  fortitude  of  the  American  character 
and  the  honor  of  their  arms." 

After  planning  many  campaigns  it  was  not  the  good  fortune  of  General 
Miles  to  conduct  the  one  which  he  commanded  to  the  surrender  of  the  army  of 
opposition.  Suddenly  there  was  peace.  The  "war  drums  throbbed  no 
longer."  It  is  conceded  that  when  the  intelligence  that  Porto  Rico  was  ceded 
to  us  by  Spain  reached  the  Commanding  General  he  had  played  to  the  win 
ning  point  a  very  handsome  game  of  war  chess,  and  had  announced  checkmate 
in  three  moves,  though  nearly  all  the  pieces  were  on  the  board. 


CHAPTER    XXVI. 

After  the  Fighting  Was  Over  in  Cuba. 

The  Casualties  at  Santiago — Haste  to  Ship  the-  Spaniards  to  Spain  and  the  Americans 
North — The  Parting  of  the  Armies  that  Met  in  Bloody  Strife— Shafter's  Opinion  of 
Immunes — A  Curious  Proclamation  from  Spanish  Soldiers — 23,726  Spanish  Soldiers 
Surrendered — American  Volunteers  Begging  to  be  Hurried  to  the  Front  While  the 
War  Lasted,  and  When  it  was  Over  They  Wanted  to  Go  Home. 

The  fighting  in  Cuba  with  the  Spaniards  was  at  an  end  when  the  sur 
render  of  the  Spanish  army  took  place.  The  report  of  casualties  in  the 
United  States  army  in  the  actions  of  July  i,  2,  and  3  were:  killed,  23  officers 
and  208  enlisted  men;  wounded,  80  officers  and  1,203  men;  missing,  Si  men; 
and  there  was  included  in  a  supplementary  return  15  additional  names,  the 
grand  total  being,  killed,  wounded  and  missing,  1,610.  General  Miles,  before 
going  to  Porto  Rico,  stated  in  a  telegram : 

"There  is  not  a  single  regiment  of  regulars  or  volunteers  with  General 
Shafter's  command  that  is  not  infected  with  yellow  fever,  from  one  case  in 
the  Eighth  Ohio  to  thirty-six  cases  in  the  Thirty-third  Michigan.  After 
consulting  with  best  medical  authorities,  it  is  my  opinion  that  the  best  mode 
of  ridding  the  troops  of  the  fever  will  be  as  I  have  directed,  namely,  the 
troops  to  go  up  as  high  into  the  mountains  as  possible,  selecting  fresh  camp 
every  day.  If  this  does  not  check  the  spread  of  the  disease,  the  only  way  of 
saving  a  large  portion  of  the  command  will  be  to  put  them  on  transports  and 
ship  them  to  New  England  coast." 

The  sanitary  report  August  i4th  at  Santiago,  telegraphed  the  Surgeon- 
General,  was:  sick,  2,715;  fever  cases,  1,506;  new  cases,  129;  number  of  fever 
cases  returned  to  duty,  226.  August  i6th  General  Shafter  wired  General 
Corbin  reporting  taking  customs  duties,  $20,000  on  the  day  before,  and 
$19,000  that  day,  $80,000  since  occupation. 

General  Shafter  reported  on  Cuban  and  immune  regiments  as  follows: 

58' 


582  AFTER    THE    FIGHTING    WAS    OVER    IN    CUBA. 

"I  have  asked  no  questions  whatever  whether  a  man  was  a  Cuban  or  a 
Spaniard.  Most  of  the  officials  are  Cuban  officers,  or  Cuban  born.  I  hope  that 
in  a  short  time  things  will  quiet  down.  The  whole  trouble  here  is  that  there 
is  nothing  for  men  to  do  in  the  country.  It  has  absolutely  returned  to  its  wild 
state,  and  has  got  to  be  settled  and  made  anew.  The  attitude  of  the  pro 
nounced  Cubans  is  hostile.  They  so  far  show  no  disposition  to  disband  and 
go  to  work,  and  until  they  do  there  will  be  trouble,  for  they  have  got  to  live, 
and  they  will  have  to  live  by  robbery — there  is  no  other  way.  A  dual  govern 
ment  can't  exist  here;  we  have  got  to  have  full  sway  of  the  Cubans.  It  is 
sincerely  to  be  hoped  that  wise  counsels  will  prevail  among  the  Cubans,  and, 
as  war  is  no  longer  possible  to  them  except  with  ourselves,  that  they  will 
resume  their  peaceful  vocations  and  without  delay,  but  it  is  hard  for  those 
who  have  been  living  by  violence  and  without  working  to  resume  their  former 
conditions.  The  immune  regiments  that  have  reached  here  are,  I  think, 
among  the  worst  that  I  have  ever  seen,  being  poor  material,  without  discip 
line,  vicious,  and  degraded.  I  think  it  will  be  necessary  to  muster  them  out 
as  soon  as  danger  from  disease  is  over,  and  replace  them  with  better  men." 

At  Baracoa  and  Suquade  Tonamo  there  were  surrendered  7,756  officers 
and  men,  2,321  stands  of  arms,  413,000  rounds  of  ammunition,  and  five 
Krupp  guns.  The  Spaniards  had  not  heard  then  of  the  destruction  of 
Cervera's  fleet,  and  thought  Dewey  had  been  whipped  at  Manila. 

The  telegrams  following  show  exertions  made  to  succor  the  sick  and  send 
home  the  boys  no  longer  needed  at  the  front: 

Adjutant-General's  Office,  Washington,  August  18,  1898. 
Commanding  Officer  Twenty-third  Kansas  Volunteer  Infantry,  Topeka,  Karis.  : 

-Secretary  of  War  directs  that  you  proceed  by  rail  with  your  regiment, 
fully  armed  and  equipped,  to  New  York  city,  in  time  to  reach  there  next 
Wednesday,  24th  instant,  to  embark  upon  a  transport  to  be  provided  to  take 
your  command  to  Santiago,  where,  upon  arrival,  you  will  report  to  the 
commanding  general,  Department  of  Santiago,  for  duty.  Communicate  with 
the  chief  commissary  at  Omaha,  Neb.,  concerning  your  travel  rations,  and 
with  chief  quartermaster  at  the  same  point  for  your  transportation.  Take 
every  precaution  for  the  comfort  and  convenience  of  your  men,  and  sufficient 
stores  of  all  kinds  for  the  journey.  Acknowledge  receipt,  and  communicate 
to  this  office  from  time  to  time  progress  in  execution. 

HEISTAND,  Assistant  Adjutant-General. 


AFTER    THE    FIGHTING    WAS    OVER    IN    CUBA.  583 

Santiago  de  Cuba,  via  Haiti,  August  19,  1898 — 1:15  a.  m. 
Picrson,  War  Department,  Washington: 

Tell  Secretary  Alger  I  appreciate  to  the  greatest  possible  extent  his 
responsive  and  practical  sympathy.  His  suggestions  are  better  than  I  had 
asked,  and  are  promptly  adopted.  If  the  Clinton  is  unloaded  in  time,  I  will 
leave  here  Saturday  morning.  Will  take  40  mules.  Fago  here.  Need  two 
additional  wagons  and  harness  for  all  my  mules.  Please  give  me  some  horse 
feed  from  here.  CLARA  BARTON. 


Camp  Wikoff,  Montauk  Point,  N.  Y.,  August  19,  1898 — 6:30  p.  m. 
Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  A.,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

Many  sick  on  Mobile.  Ship  is  at  pier  and  sick  men  being  taken  to  hospital 
in  ambulances.  The  well  men  will  remain  aboard  until  weather  clears.  We 
are  providing  for  them.  I  specially  request  that  Colonel  Weston  be  ordered 
to-day  to  be  chief  commissary  here;  if  not  permanently,  until  organization  is 
perfected.  I  have  arranged  to  have  full  benefit  of  services  of  Generals 
Young,  Rand,  and  Williston.  They  are  active  and  efficient. 

JOSEPH    WHEELER,  Major-General. 

Pennsylvania  Depot,  Jersey  City,  N.  J.,  August  20,  1898 — 9:i8  a.  m. 
Adjutant-General  Corbin,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

Reported  arrival  of  Mobile  with  1,600  on  board;  300  sick;  2  died  on  the 
way.  She  ought  never  to  have  carried  over  half  the  number.  This  is 
against  positive  orders,  which  were  to  give  men  plenty  of  room  and 
crowd  no  ship.  Have  to  investigate  at  once.  Cable  Shafter.  Relief  here. 
Order  her  to  Santiago  to-morrow.  The  hospital  ship  Missouri  will  sail 
Monday.  R.  A.  ALGER,  Secretary  of  War. 

Corbin  telegraphed  Alger: 

"Find  the  Mobile  had  carrying  capacity  of  1,000  men  and  like  number  of 
animals.  As  there  were  no  animals  it  is  not  thought  that  the  ship  was  over 
crowded.  Have  wired  General  Shafter  your  instructions  that  abundant  room 
be  given  on  every  transport.  Also  informed  him  of  the  reported  bad  condi 
tion  of  the  Mobile. ' ' 

Shafter  telegraphed : 

"Referring  to  your  telegram  about  overcrowding  the  Mobile,  her  captain 
reported  that,  loaded  as  she  was,  going  to  Porto  Rico  he  could  carry  3,000 


584  AFTER    THE    FIGHTING    WAS    OVER    IN    CUBA. 

men,  and  that  he  could  carry  2,000  comfortably,  therefore  did  not  consider  a 
few  less  than  1,700  as  too  many.  Ship  was  carefully  inspected  by  a  board  of 
officers,  and  Dr.  Ives,  a  member  of  the  board,  states  it  was  not  overcrowded. 
Accommodations  for  officers  were,  however,  somewhat  deficient.  The  large 
number  of  deaths  can  probably  be  accounted  for  by  the  fact  that  this  brigade 
took  nearly  all  their  sick  with  them.  Greatest  care  has  been  taken  in  this 
respect.  Transports  have  been  loaded  with  from  200  to  300  men  less  than  the 
same  ship  brought  down." 

The  total  number  of  Spaniards  who  surrendered  in  and  about  Santiago 
was  23,726.  The  following  very  curious  Spanish  document  from  the  depart 
ing  Spaniards  seems  to  show  a  Spanish  preference  for  United  States  soldiers 
over  Cubans  in  arms: 

Santiago,  via  Haiti,  August  22,  1898 — 11:17  p.  m. 
H.  C.  Corbin,  Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  A.,  Washington: 

The  following  letter  has  just  been  received  from  the  soldiers  who  are  now 
embarking  for  Spain : 

"To  Major-General  Shafter,  Commanding  the  American  Army  in  Cuba. — 
Sir:  The  Spanish  soldiers  who  capitulated  in  this  place  on  the  i6th  of  July 
last,  recognizing  your  high  and  just  position,  pray  that  through  you  all  the 
courageous  and  noble  soldiers  under  your  command  may  receive  our  good 
wishes  and  farewell,  which  we  send  them  on  embarking  for  our  beloved 
Spain.  For  this  favor,  which  we  have  no  doubt  you  will  grant,  you  will  gain 
the  everlasting  gratitude  and  consideration  of  11,000  Spanish  soldiers,  who 
are  your  most  humble  servants. 

"PEDRO  LOPEZ  DE  CASTILLO,   Private  of  Infantry." 

Also  the  following  letter  addressed  to  the  soldiers  of  the  American 
Army : 

"Soldiers  of  the  American  Army:  We  would  not  be  fulfilling  our  duty  as 
well-born  men,  in  whose  breasts  there  lives  gratitude  and  courtesy,  should  we 
embark  for  our  beloved  Spain  without  sending  to  you  our  most  cordial  and 
sincere  good  wishes  and  farewell.  We  fought  you  with  ardor,  with  all  our 
strength,  endeavoring  to  gain  the  victory,  but  without  the  slightest  rancor  or 
hate  toward  the  American  nation.  We  have  been  vanquished  by  you  (so  our 
generals  and  chiefs  judged  in  signing  the  capitulation),  but  cur  surrender  and 
the  bloody  battles  preceding  it  have  left  in  our  souls  no  place  for  resentment 
against  the  men  who  fought  us  nobly  and  valiantly.  You  fought  and  acted  in 


r 


, 


AFTER    THE    FIGHTING    WAS    OVER    IX    CUBA.  587 

compliance  with  the  same  call  of  duty  as  we,  for  we  all  but  represent  the 
power  of  our  respective  States. 

"You  fought  us  as  men,  face  to  face,  and  with  great  courage,  as  before 
stated,  a  quality  which  we  had  not  met  with  during  the  three  years  we  have 
carried  on  this  war  against  a  people  without  religion,  without  morals,  without 
conscience,  and  of  doubtful  origin,  who  could  not  confront  the  enemy,  but, 
hidden,  spot  their  noble  victims  from  ambush  and  then  immediately  fled. 
This  was  the  kind  of  warfare  we  had  to  sustain  in  this  unfortunate  land.  You 
have  complied  exactly  with  all  the  laws  and  usages  of  war  as  recognized  by  the 
armies  of  the  most  civilized  nations  of  the  world,  have  given  honorable  burial 
to  the  dead  of  the  vanquished,  have  cured  their  wounded  with  great  humanity, 
have  respected  and  cared  for  your  prisoners  and  their  comfort,  and,  lastly,  to 
us  whose  condition  was  terrible,  you  have  given  freely  of  food,  of  your  stock 
of  medicines,  and  you  have  honored  us  with  distinction  and  courtesy,  for  after 
the  fighting  the  two  armies  mingled  with  the  utmost  harmony. 

"With  this  high  sentiment  of  appreciation  from  us  all,  there  remains  but 
to  express  our  farewell,  and  with  the  greatest  sincerity  we  wish  you  all  happi 
ness  and  health  in  this  land  which  will  no  longer  belong  to  our  dear  Spain, 
but  will  be  yours,  who  have  conquered  it  by  force  and  watered  it  with  your 
blood,  as  your  conscience  called  for,  under  the  demand  of  civilization  and 
humanity,  but  the  descendants  of  the  Congo  and  of  Guinea,  mingled  with  the 
blood  of  unscrupulous  Spaniards  and  of  traitors  and  adventurers,  these 
people  are  not  able  to  exercise  or  enjoy  their  liberty,  for  they  will  find  it  a 
burden  to  comply  with  the  laws  which  govern  civilized  communities. 

"From  11,000  Spanish  soldiers. 

"PEDRO  LOPEZ  DE  CASTILLO, 

"Soldier  of  Infantry,  Santiago  de  Cuba,  2ist  August,  1898." 

SHAFTER,   Major-General. 

Three  days  later,  August  25th,  Shafter  cabled  the  War  Office:  "Com 
mand  all  embarked  this  morning  except  Twenty-fourth  United  States 
Infantry,  detachment  of  recruits  for  First  Illinois  Volunteer  Infantry,  and  a 
part  of  the  Ninth  Massachusetts  Volunteer  Infantry,  all  of  which  will  embark 
to-morrow  morning  on  transport  now  here,"  and  at  noon  of  August  25th 
General  Shafter  sailed  for  Montauk  Point,  where  he  arrived  September  ist, 
and  wrote  the  Secretary  of  War  September  3rd : 

"I  am  very  sorry  not  to  be  able  to  come  to  meet  you  and  the  President 


588  AFTER    THE    FIGHTING    WAS    OVER    IN    CUBA. 


on  your  arrival  this  morning,  but  I  am  still  in  detention  camp,  anc1 

for  the  first  time,   had  considerable  fever.     I  am  feeling-  much  better,  how 

ever,  this  morning-,  though  rather  weak." 

The  American  armies    that  fought  at  Santiago  hastened  away  to   East 
Long  Island,  where  there  was  at  least  pure  air  and  sand,  and  the  Spaniards 
were  glad  to  go  home.     The  captive  Spaniards  far  outnumbered  the  conquer 
ing  Americans,  and  the  Fifth  Corps  was  disbanded. 
(General  Orders,  No.  50.)  Headquarters  Fifth  Army  Corps, 

Camp  Wikoff,  Long  Island,  October  3,  1898. 

In  compliance  with  instructions  of  this  date  from  the  Secretary  of  War, 
the  disbandment  of  the  Fifth  Army  Corps  is  hereby  announced. 

The  short  and  successful  campaign  of  this  corps  before  Santiago  de  Cuba 
will  fill  a  brilliant  page  in  the  history  of  our  country. 

By  command  Major-General  Miles.  E.  ].  McCLERNAND, 

Assistant  Adjutant-General. 

The  official  dispatches  arc  full  of  evidence  of  the  high  spirit  of  the  young 
men  of  the  country,  showing  in  a  special  and  striking  way  the  eagerness,  as 
the  war  seemed  about  to  close,  to  find  some  fighting  to  do  before  the  end 
came.  The  War  Office  received  a  shower  of  telegrams  soliciting  the  privilege 
of  being  in  the  last  events  of  the  war,  if  peace  had  to  come.  The  following 
are  specimens  of  these  patriotic  messages: 

Chickamauga  Park,  Ga.,  August  i,  1898  —  11:05  a.  m. 
Secretary  of  War,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

In  assigning  troops  and  officers  to  expedition  for  Porto  Rico,  won't  you 
allow  the  State  of  Texas  a  representation  and  give  me  a  command  with  at 
least  one  Texas  regiment?  ].  R.  WATIES,  Brigadier-General. 


Austin,  Tex.,  August  i,  1898 — 12:48  p.  m. 
vSecretary  of  War,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

I  respectfully  indorse  the  request  of  Brigadier-General  Waties. 

C.  A.  CULBERSON,  Governor. 


St.  Louis,  Mo.,  August  i,  1898 — 1:25  p.  m. 
Secretary  of  War,  Washington,  D.  C. 

Dear  General  Alger:  If  you  can,  send  Fifth  Missouri  with  General  Wade. 
Company  H  is  Sons  of  Veterans  company,  and  the  regiment  is  first  class. 

JNO.  W.  NOBLE. 


AFTER    THE    FIGHTING    WAS    OVER    IN    CUBA. 

Indianapolis,  Ind.,  August  i,  1898 — 2:10  p.  m. 
Hon.  R.  A.  Alger,  Secretary,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

The  One  Hundred  and  Fifty-eighth  Indiana  was  among  the  first  to  reach 
Chickamauga.  Only  three  regiments  have  been  there  longer.  Will  be 
obliged  if  they  can  go  with  Wade;  they  are  a  splendid  lot  of  men. 

CHAS.  W.  FAIRBANKS. 


Rockbridge  Alum  Springs,  Va.,  August  i,  1898 — 3:20  p.  m. 
Secretary  Alger,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

Please  send  Fifth  Missouri  to  Porto  Rico.     My  son,  Ralph,  lieutenant, 
Company  F,  that  regiment,  anxious  to  join  expedition. 

JOHN  J.  INGALLS. 


New  York,  August  i,  1898 — 8:10  p.  m. 
Gen.  H.  C.  Corbin,  War  Department,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

Do  send  the  First  Missouri,  now  at  Chickamauga,  to  the  front  with 
General  Wade.  This  regiment  are  nearly  all  St.  Louis  boys.  There  is  a 
tremendous  appeal  from  influential  men  in  St.  Louis  in  their  behalf.  Why 
not  send  them  with  General  Wade?  R.  C.  KERENS. 


Indianapolis,  Ind.,  August  i,  1898 — 8:45  P-  m- 
Hon  R.  A.  Alger,  Secretary  of  War,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

I  earnestly  urge  acceptance  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Fifty-eighth  Indiana 
regiment,  now  at  Chickamauga,  for  the  Porto  Rico  expedition. 

JESSE  OVERSTREET. 


Fort  Grant,  Ariz.,  August  i,  1898 — 10:33  P-  m- 
Gen.  H.  C.  Corbin,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

Will  the  Adjutant-General  help  in  the  matter  referred  to  in  my  official 
message  of  to-day?  Have  written  so  many  letters  and  made  so  many  efforts 
in  other  ways  that  I  venture  to  address  him  personally  and  beg  his  assistance. 

GRESHAM,  Captain. 


Fort  Grant,  Ariz.,  August  i,  1898 — 10:30  p.  m. 
Adjutant-General  of  the  Army,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

One  hundred  and  thirty-seven  men  and  one  officer,  constituting  L  and 
M  troops,  Seventh  Cavalry,  at  this  post,  beg  to  be  part  of  the  50,000  volun- 


59o  AFTER    THE    FIGHTING    WAS    OVER    IN    CUBA. 

teers  to  occupy  Porto  Rico,  Cuba,  and  Philippines.  They  are  a  fine  set  of 
men,  fairly  drilled,  equipped,  and  most  eager  to  go  to  the  front.  Shortage 
of  officers  can  be  supplied  if  necessary  by  good  non-commissioned  officers. 

GRESHAM, 
Captain,  Seventh  Cavalry,  Commanding  L  and  M  troops. 


St.  Louis,  Mo.,  August  i,  1898 — 5:05  p.  m. 
Secretary  of  War,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

The    undersigned    respectfully  urge  that    the   First  Regiment  Missouri 
Volunteers  be  included  in  General  Wade's  selection  for  Porto  Rico  service. 

HENRY  ZIEGENHEIN, 

Mayor. 

CHRIS  SHARP, 
President  Merchants'  Exchange. 

JNO.  C.  WILKINSON, 
President  Business  Men's  League. 

L.  D.  KINGSLAND, 
President  Manufacturers'  Association. 
I.  W.  MORTON, 

President  Commercial  Club. 


French  Lick,  Ind.,  August  i,  1898 — 5:30  p.  m. 
Hon.  R.  A.  Alger,  Secretary  of  War,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

The  men  and  officers  of  One  Hundred  and  Fifty-eighth  Indiana  Regiment 
urgently  request  that  they  be  detailed  for  Porto  Rico  expedition,  and  I  second 
their  request.  DAVID  TURPIE. 

Van  Wert,  Ohio,  August  2,  1898 — 1:12  a.  m. 
Hon.  R.  A.  Alger,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

Second  Ohio  was  one  of  the  first  regiments  mustered.  They  beg  to  go  to 
Porto  Rico.  I  earnestly  urge  their  prayer.  G.  L.  MARBLE. 


Minneapolis,  Minn.,  August  2,  1898 — 11:45  a-  m- 
Hon.  R.  A,  Alger,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

Minnesota  boys  at  Chickamauga  impatient  to  go  to  front.     Can  you  not 
befriend  them  and  place  them  where  they  may  face  the  foe?     Their  sires 


AFTER    THE    FIGHTING    WAS    OVER    IN    CUBA.  591 

fought  and  fell  at  Gettysburg.      If  there  be  more  fighting,  their  sons  seek  the 
field  of  honor  and  danger.  W.   H.   EUSTIS. 

Prescott,  Ark.,  August  2,  1898 — 11:45  a-  m- 
vSecretary  of  War,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

I  sincerely  trust  you  will  allow  the   Arkansas  troops  to  participate  in 
the  Porto  Rico  expedition.  .  THOS.  C.  McRAE. 


Northfield,  Minn.,  August  2,  1898 — 11:49  a-  m- 
Hon.  R.  A.  Alger,  Secretary,  Washington: 

Respectfully  urge  that  Fourteenth  Minnesota  Regiment  be  sent  on  Porto 
Rico  expedition.     Men  anxious  to  go.      Sincerely  hope  you  will. 

JOEL  P.  HEATWOLE, 
Member  Congress,  Third  District. 


North  Tonawanda,  N.  Y.,  August  2,  1898 — 12  m. 
Hon.  George  D.  Meiklejohn, 

Assistant  Secretary  of  War,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

If  possible,  please  have  Third  Regiment  New  York  Volunteers  included 
in  Porto  Rico  expedition.  J.  P.  LINDSAY. 

Little  Rock,  Ark.,  August  2,  1898 — 1:31  p.  m. 
Hon.  G.  D.  Meiklejohn,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

Please   do   all  you  can  to  have   First  Arkansas,    now  at  Chickamauga, 
ordered  out  with  next  expedition.  HENRY  M.  COOPER. 

Little  Rock,  Ark.,  August  2,  1898 — 2:02  p.  m. 
Hon.  Russell  A.  Alger,  Secretary  of  War,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

Second  Arkansas,  Colonel  Cook,  anxious  to  go  with  General  Wade.     Will 
highly  appreciate  it  if  you  will  give  Arkansas  boys  a  chance  for  active  service. 

A.  S.  FOWLER. 
JOHN  McCLURE. 

Port  Chester,  N.  Y.,  August  2,  1898—3:08  p.  m. 
General  Alger,  Secretary  of  War,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

Eighth  New  York  most  anxious  for  immediate  service.     Can't  you  send 
them  to  Porto  Rico  and  oblige  them  and  yours? 

JOHN  MURRAY  MITCHELL. 


592  AFTER    THE    FIGHTING    WAS    OVER    IN    CUBA. 

Atlanta,  Ga.,  August  2,  1898 — 3:18  p.  m. 
Gen.  R.  A.  Alger,  Secretary  of  War,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

Please  favor  number  of  your  Georgia  friends  by  sending  First  Georgia  to 
the  front.  W.   H.  JOHNSON. 


Eureka  Springs,  Ark.,  August  2,  1898 — 4:03  p.  m. 
Hon.  Russell  A.  Alger,  Secretary  of  War,  Washington.  D.  C.  : 

Officers  and  men  of  First  and  Second  Arkansas  Volunteers,  now  at  Chick- 
amauga,  are  ready  and  anxious  to  go  to  Porto  Rico.  Hope  you  can  send 
them.  J.  H.  BERRY. 

Indianapolis,  Ind.,  August  2,  1898 — 4:15  p.  m. 
Hon.  R.  A.  Alger,  Secretary  of  War,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

I  cordially  indorse  Colonel  Durbin's  application  to  have  the  One  Hundred 
and  Sixty-first  Regiment  Indiana  Volunteer  attached  to  General  Wade's 
expedition  to  Porto  Rico.  JAMES  A.  MOUNT,  Governor. 


Indianapolis,  Ind.,  August  2,  1898 — 4:16  p.m. 
Hon.  H.  C.  Corbin,   Adjutant-General  U.  S.  A.,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

I  cordially  indorse  Colonel  Durbin's  application  to  have  the  One  Hundred 
and  Sixty-first  Indiana  Volunteer  Infantry  attached  to  General  Wade's  expe 
dition  to  Porto  Rico.  JAMES  A.  MOUNT,  Governor. 


Chattanooga,  Tenn.,  August  2,  1898 — 7:50  p.  m. 
Gen.  Henry  C.  Corbin,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

Third  Brigade,  including  Second  Ohio,  want  to  be  sent  to  Porto  Rico.  I 
was  transferred  on  assurance  that  my  brigade  would  move.  Others  are  work 
ing  to  supersede  us.  Can't  you  push  us  along  to  join  our  commander? 

ABE  S.  BICKAM. 

Minneapolis,  Minn.,  August  2,  1898 — i  105  p.  m. 
Hon.  G.  D.  Meiklejohn: 

The  Fourteenth  Minnesota,  now  at  Chickamauga,  very  anxious  to  go  to 
Porto  Rico  next  expedition.  Won't  you  see  that  they  go? 

L.   FLETCHER. 


AFTER    THE    FIGHTING    WAS    OVER    IN    CUBA.  593 

New  York,  August  3,  1898 — i  p.  m. 
Gen  H.  C.  Corbin,  Adjutant-General,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

If  you  have  the  disposition  to  confer  lasting  favor  upon  me  and  friends  of 
Fourteenth  New  York,  Wilder 's  regiment,  please  send  same  to  Porto  Rico. 
The  command  full,  well  equipped.  Its  career  in  your  hands. 

HENRY  H.  ADAMS. 


St.  Paul,  Minn.,  August  4,  1898. 
Hon.  R.  A.  Alger,  Secretary  of  War,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

It   is  thought  by  our  people   that  one   of   the    Minnesota   regiments   at 
Chickamauga  ought  to  be  sent  to  Porto  Rico,  and  I  think  so,  too. 

C.   K.   DAVIS. 

Augusta,  Me.,  August  4,  1898 — 1:37  p.  m. 
Gen.  R.  A.  Alger,  Secretary  of  War,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

I  earnestly  recommend  the  sending  of  General  Mattocks  and  his  brigade 
to  Porto  Rico,  and  his  appointment  to  the  military  and  civil  governorship. 

E.   C.   BURLEIGH. 


Bangor,  Me.,  August  4,  1898 — 2:06  p.  m. 
Hon.  R.  A.  Alger,  Secretary  of  War,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

General  Mattocks  earnestly  desires  his  brigade,   including  Maine  regi 
ment,  be  ordered  to  Porto  Rico.     Hope  you  will  send  his  brigade. 

C.  A.  BOUTELLE. 


New  York,  August  4,  1898 — 5:56  p.  m. 
Hon.  Russell  A.  Alger,  Secretary  of  War,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

We  respectfully  request  and  urge  that  our  well-drilled  and  able-bodied 
Fourteenth  New  York  Regiment,  commanded  by  a  Regular  Army  officer, 
Colonel  Wilder,  be  included  in  any  "command  to  be  sent  to  Porto  Rico  or  into 
active  service.  No  regiment  better  fitted  or  commanded. 

C.  P.  Huntington,  F.  D.  Tappin,  Howard  Gould,  W.  L.  Strong, 
Edward  E.  Poore,  H.  W.  Cannon,  Charles  A.  Moore,  R.  A.  C.  Smith, 
Charles  Stewart  Smith,  J.  Edward  Simmons,  Dumont  Clark,  and  25 
others. 

This  telegram  tells  the  story  about  the  going  home  of  the  sick  soldiers 
from  Cuba. 


504  AFTER    THE    FIGHTING    WAS    OVER    IN    CUBA. 

Santiago  de  Cuba,  August  14,  1898 — 12:41  a.  m. 
H.  C.  Corbin,  Adjutant-General  U.  S.  A.,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

Rio  Grande,  Seneca,  and  Comanche,  with  Ninth  and  Tenth  Cavalry,  Fourth 
and  Twenty-fifth  Infantry  all  loaded,  and  will  go  out  this  afternoon  unless 
hurricane,  of  which  reports  have  been  had  as  blowing  south  of  Jamaica,  pre 
vents.  The  Breakwater,  City  of  Macon,  and  Arkadia  will  go  to-morrow  with 
two  light  batteries  and  Twelfth  and  Seventeenth  Infantry.  One  of  the  hard 
est  rainstorms  we  have  yet  Had  is  raging  this  afternoon.  Am  getting  the  sick 
left  behind  in  very  comfortable  condition.  Two  thousand  Spanish  troops  to 
be  loaded  to-morrow,  and  only  other  ship  that  is  in  as  soon  as  it  can  coal, 
probably  two  days.  My  own  health  is  excellent;  not  been  better  for  years. 
Hope  to  get  troops  off  so  as  to  be  able  to  start  the  latter  part  of  the  week  for 
the  United  States.  As  you  see,  number  taken  sick  rapidly  decreasing  for 
lack  of  fuel,  nearly  all  of  three  divisions  having  left,  but  we  have  a  large 
number  of  sick  men.  Are  doing  the  very  best  by  them  possible.  Will  ship 
400  convalescents  on  Catania  Monday.  SHAFTER,  Major-General. 

It  was  a  great  mercy  peace  was  made  so  soon  as  to  allow  those  who  were 
ready  to  perish  from  Cuban  fevers  to  go  where  the  sanitary  conditions  were 
good  and  hope  helped  to  save.  In  this  telegram  is  a  cheerful  tone  and  happy 
promise : 

Montauk,  N.  Y.,  August  14,  1898 — 2:15  p.  m. 
Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  A.,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

Sailed  from  Santiago,  Cuba,  Monday  last,  8th  instant;  arrived  this  morn 
ing.  Condition  of  troops  on  board  (Sixth  and  Thirteenth  Infantry,  regulars) 
much  improved  by  voyage ;  no  new  cases  of  sickness  developed ;  no  yellow 
fever;  no  deaths.  A.  AMES, 

Brigadier-General  Volunteers,  Commanding. 

The  emergency  for  moving  the  troop£  north,  even  from  Florida,  is  seen 
in  the  telegram  of  General  Rogers,  Chief  of  Artillery,  from  Tampa, 
August  yth: 

"The  Secretary  of  War  having  stopped  the  further  shipment  of  the  siege 
train  to  General  Miles,  I  now  request  instructions  as  to  the  disposition  to  be 
made  of  the  batteries  serving  with  the  train,  the  ordnance  material,  and  quar 
termaster's  transportation.  There  are  about  1,800  men,  1,300  animals,  and  a 
large  amount  of  artillery  material  collected  here.  A  considerable  time  will 


SUGAR  MILL.    SCENE  OF  SAN  LUIS  RIOT,  NOV.  4,  1898. 


SOLDIEHS  IN  INSURCKNT  ARMY  OF  CUBA. 


AFTER    THE    FIGHTING    WAS    OVER    IN    CUBA.  597 

be  necessary  to  complete  the  shipment  of  the  command.  After  consulting 
with  General  Coppinger  and  the  chief  surgeon,  I  report  that  the  condition  of 
health  of  the  men  and  animals  requires  their  removal  at  once  from  the  South, 
and  if  it  is  considered  advisable  to  maintain  any  portion  of  this  siege  train  for 
service  or  future  instructions,  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  the  interests  of  the 
service  will  be  subserved  by  moving  it  to  a  point  at  least  as  far  north  as 
Washington.  The  chief  surgeon,  Fourth  Army  Corps,  informs  me  that  the 
sanitary  conditions  at  Jacksonville,  Fernandina,  or  other  points  along  Gulf  or 
South  Atlantic  coast  would  not  afford  relief  from  conditions  existing  here ; 
also  that  there  are  many  cases  of  typhoid  fever  in  camp,  and  although  it  is 
the  healthiest  camp  at  Tampa,  a  rapid  depletion  of  the  command  may  be 
expected  from  this  disease,  if  not  from  infection." 

There  was  much  of  wholesome  significance  in  this  brief  telegram: 

Adjutant-General's  Office, 
Washington,  August  13,  1898 — 11:30  p.  m. 

General  Shafter,  Santiago: — You  may  discontinue  press  censorship. 

H.  C.  CORBIN,  Adjutant-General. 

The  Surgeon-General  issued  a  circular  the  wisdom  of  which  has  been 
shown  by  experience.  He  said: 

"No  doubt  typhoid  fever,  camp  diarrhoea,  and  probably  yellow  fever  are 
frequently  communicated  to  soldiers  in  camp  through  the  agency  of  flies, 
which  swarm  about  fecal  matter  and  filth  of  all  kinds  deposited  upon  the 
ground  or  in  shallow  pits,  and  directly  convey  infectious  material,  attached  to 
their  feet  or  contained  in  their  excreta,  to  the  food  which  is  exposed  while 
being  prepared  at  the  company  kitchens  or  while  being  served  in  the  mess 
tent.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  a  strict  sanitary  police  is  so  important.  Also 
because  the  water  supply  may  be  contaminated  in  the  same  way  or  by  surface 
drainage. 

4 'It  is  unsafe  to  eat  heartily  or  drink  freely  when  greatly  fatigued  or  over 
heated. 

"Ripe  fruit  may  be  eaten  in  moderation,  but  green  or  over-ripe  fruit  will 
give  rise  to  bowel  complaints.  Food  should  be  thoroughly  cooked  and  free 
from  fermentation  or  putrefactive  changes." 

The  Surgeon-General  said,  in  accounting  for  sickness  in  the  army,  that  the 
strength  of  the  many  men  was  undermined  by  dissipation,  the  temptations  of 


593  AFTER    THE    FIGHTING    WAS    OVER    IN    CUBA. 

great  cities,  and  though  there  was  supposed  to  be  inspection,  so  many  men 
were  found  in  the  camps  unfit  for  service,  from  causes  existing  prior  to  enlist 
ment,  that  special  arrangements  had  to  be  made  for  their  discharge. 

Soon  after  the  newly  raised  levies  were  aggregated  in  large  camps  sickness 
began  to  increase  progressively  from  causes  that  were  so  general  in  their  oper 
ation  that  scarcely  a  regiment  escaped.  These  may  largely  be  referred  to 
ignorance  on  the  part  of  officers  of  the  principles  of  camp  sanitation,  and 
of  their  duties  and  responsibilities  as  regards  the  welfare  of  the  enlisted  men 
in  their  commands.  Medical  officers,  as  a  rule,  were  also  without  experience 
in  the  sanitation  of  camps  and  the  prevention  of  disease  among  troops.  The 
few  who  knew  what  should  be  done  were  insufficient  to  control  the  sanitary 
situation. 

Officers  and  men  in  these  camps  were  rife  for  war,  and  drill,  parades, 
practice  marches,  and  military  camp  duties  occupied  the  whole  of  their  time 
and  energies.  Considerations  of  domestic  economy  and  sanitation  in  the  com 
panies  and  regiments  were  not  given  proper  attention,  and  men  who  were 
being  taught  to  meet  the  enemy  in  battle  succumbed  to  the  hardships  and 
insanitary  conditions  of  life  in  their  camps  of  instruction. 

The  sites  of  certain  of  the  camps  have  been  instanced  in  the  newspapers 
as  the  cause  of  the  sickness  which  was  developed  in  them ;  but  a  review  of  the 
whole  situation  shows  that  it  was  not  the  site,  but  the  manner  of  its  occupa 
tion  which  must  be  held  responsible  for  the  general  spread  of  disease  among 
the  troops.  The  density  of  the  military  population  on  the  area  of  these  con 
tracted  camps  prevented  the  possibility  of  a  good  sanitary  condition.  Camps 
of  this  character  may  be  occupied  for  a  week  or  two  at  a  time  without  serious 
results,  as  in  the  case  of  National  Guardsmen  out  for  ten  days'  field  practice 
during  the  summer,  but  their  continued  occupation  will  inevitably  result  in 
the  breaking  down  of  the  command  by  diarrhoea,  dysentery,  and  typhoid  fever. 

Practically  nothing  was  done  to  make  the  men  comfortable  or  to  remedy 
the  insanitary  conditions  until  these  were  brought  to  the  attention  of  the 
Secretary  of  War,  by  inspectors  sent  out  by  special  orders  from  the  War 
Department.  Then  the  camps  held  for  so  long  were  abandoned,  but  not  before 
the  manifestations  of  typhoid  infection  were  rife  in  them.  New  sites  were 
carefully  selected,  regimental  camps  were  expanded,  company  tentage 
increased,  and  board  flooring  provided.  Then,  for  the  first  time,  the  troops 
went  into  camps  suitable  for  continued  occupation. 


AFTER    THE    FIGHTING    WAS    OVER    IN    CUBA. 


599 


Malarial  fevers  added  to  the  sick  lists  of  camps  in  Florida  and  of  Southern 
regiments  in  the  camps  in  Georgia  and  Virginia. 

It  was  typhoid  fever  which  broke  down  the  strength  of  the  commands 
generally,  the  outbreak  becoming  distinctly  manifest  in  July.  Sporadic 
cases  appeared  in  most  of  the  regiments  in  May  and  June,  these  cases  having 
been  brought  in  many  instances  from  the  State  camps.  In  fact,  some  regi 
ments,  as  the  Fifteenth  Minnesota,  suffered  more  from  this  disease  at  their 
State  rendezvous  than  any  of  the  regiments  in  the  large  Federal  camps. 

In  view  of  the  necessity  for  the  return  of  the  troops  of  the  Fifth  Army 
Corps  from  Santiago,  Cuba,  preparations  were  made  for  encamping  them  at 
Montauk  Point,  Long  Island.  These  included  the  establishment  of  temporary 
tent  hospitals,  not  only  for  the  treatment  of  the  large  number  of  sick  brought 
by  each  command,  from  Cuba,  but  for  the  isolation  and  treatment  of  those 
from  transports  lying  under  the  suspicion  of  yellow  fever  infection. 

The  difficulties  in  the  way  of  administering  the  affairs  of  the  detention 
hospital  were  very  great,  owing  to  the  rapidity  with  which  the  transports 
followed  each  other  in  their  arrival.  As  many  as  four  reached  the  Point  on 
some  days  from  August  13  to  31,  most  of  them  bringing  sick  requiring 
detention  for  medical  observation.  But  the  sick  men  were  as  well  cared  for 
and  as  comfortable  in  their  cots  here  as  afterwards  when  transferred  to  the 
general  hospital  at  Montauk  Point. 

The  Secretary  of  War  remarks  under  this  head:  "The  Red  Cross  and 
other  relief  associations  contributed  in  a  very  large  degree  to  the  care  and 
comfort  of  our  sick  soldiers,  and  should  receive  the  grateful  thanks  of  the 
nation  for  the  work  they  so  nobly  and  unselfishly  performed." 

Thousands  of  valuable  lives  were  saved  by  the  wonderful  intelligence  and 
energy  displayed  in  shifting  the  fever  infected  troops  from  Santiago  to  East 
Long  Island,  and  it  was  one  of  the  rare  things  in  history  that  so  much 
courage,  address  and  liberality,  as  well  as  executive  ability,  have  been  displayed 
in  war  with  such  beneficent  results  in  saving,  not  destroying  heroic  men. 

IB 


CHAPTER    XXVII. 

The  Public  Opinion  That  Advanced  the  Navy. 

The  Marvelous  Improvement  of  the  Artillery  on  Our  Ships  of  War — The  Splendid  Equip 
ment  of  the  Several  Vessels — Full  Particulars  of  the  Armament  of  All  Our  Ships — 
Vigilance  of  the  Ordnance  Bureau  to  Continue  Progress — The  Thirteen-Inch  Guns 
to  be  Superseded  in  the  New  Navy  by  Twelve-Inch — Important  Recommendations 
— The  Way  the  Navy  Was  Prepared  to  Win — Plans  for  Continued  Progress — The 
Spanish  Side  as  Seen  and  Described  by  One  of  Her  Officers — Hopes  and  Happenings 
in  Bombarded  Santiago — Service  of  Cervera's  Fleet — Mystery  of  the  Merrimac — 
Earthquake-Throwing  Vesuvius — German  Opinion — Work  of  the  Marines. 

Nations  abroad  have  persistently  undervalued  our  navy,  and  remember 
ing  the  great  armies  with  which  our  sectional  and  state  war  was  fought, 
have  over-estimated  our  military  resources  immediately  available.  This 
country  has  been  slow  in  the  construction  and  equipment  of  battleships,  but 
there  has  been  thoughtful  and  highly-educated  service  in  the  Navy  Depart 
ment.  We  have  been  fortunate  in  secretaries  of  the  navy,  for  many  years, 
and  the  organization  of  the  several  bureaus  has  been  exceptionally  strong, 
alert  and  progressive.  The  very  costly  experiments  of  England,  France, 
Germany,  Italy  and  Russia  in  armored  vessels  and  high-power  guns,  have 
been  intelligently  followed  by  our  naval  experts,  and  the  lessons  attainable 
regarded  studiously  and  developed. 

It  happened,  not  by  accident,  that  as  we  turned  out  first-class  fighting 
ships,  in  hull,  armor  and  machinery,  there  were  ready  for  them  guns  that 
were  formidable  weapons  of  the  finest  finish,  and  in  the  hands  of  marksmen 
capable  of  being  more  destructive  at  greater  distances  than  any  of  which 
there  were  records  of  the  armament  for  sea-firing  of  other  powers.  The 
traditions  of  our  navy  were  so  brilliant  that  its  history  appealed  especially  to 
the  pride  of  the  people,  and  to  the  imagination  of  all  our  countrymen. 

When  the  voting  tests  came  it  was  apparent  that  the  dwellers  in   the 

Mississippi  valley  and  the  mountains,  on  the  head-waters  east  and  west  of  the 

600 


EFFECT  OF  8-INCH  SHOT  THROUGH  PORT  HEAD  OF  "VIZCAYA. 


STARBOARD  SIDE  OF  "  VIZCAYA/1     AFTER  THE  HATTLK. 


PUBLIC    OPINION    THAT    ADVANCED    THE    NAVY.         603 

Great  River,  had  idealized  the  ocean  and  were  fonder  of  the  ships  and  sailors 
they  never  saw  than  the  inhabitants  of  lands  watered  by  tidal  rivers  and  beside 
trie  sea,  to  whom  salt  water  and  the  iron  leviathans  of  the  great  deep  were 
familiar.  The  grandeurs  and  mysteries  of  the  oceans  are  profounder  and 
more  fascinating  to  mountaineers  and  those  whose  homes  are  in  the  green 
valleys  far  from  the  surf,  than  to  those  who  have  been  rocked  from  infancy  on 
the  waves  or  looked  out  in  all  stages  of  life  upon  the  majestical  expanses  of 
mighty  waters. 

It  is  not  the  boy  or  girl  who  sees  the  Atlantic  or  Pacific  every  day,  or  so 
often  that  the  splendors  have  faded  in  fancy,  who,  looking  out  toward  sunrise 
or  sunset  from  the  shore,  thinks  of  it  that  the  first  land  over  there  eastward  is 
Spain,  or  there  westward  is  Asia.  The  youth  born  a  thousand  miles  inland  is 
fired  by  the  first  glimpse  of  the  everlasting  glory  of  the  ocean,  and  thinks  of 
the  galleys  of  the  Carthaginians  and  Romans,  the  galleons  of  the  Spaniards, 
or  the  privateers  and  thundering  liners  of  England.  The  votes  of  the  moun 
tain  states,  those  of  the  central  valley,  will  join  those  from  the  borders  of  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico  and  from  the  "unsalted  seas"  of  the  North  and  from  the  ocean 
fronts,  to  put  'the  nation  behind  the  navy. 

Looking  over  the  reports  of  the  Bureaus,  to  the  Congress  that  adjourned 
in  war  to  meet  in  peace,  we  find  much  information  that  re-assures  us  that  the 
care  taking  of  the  navy  that  has  been  so  superbly  justified  in  the  conflict  with 
Spain,  is  the  manifestation  of  a  system  that  is  to  be  continued,  a  part  of  the 
permanent  policy  of  the  people  of  the  United  States. 

The  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance  reports,  October  i,  1898,  the  total 
guns  ordered  for  the  navy  were  790.  Of  these  four  ic-inch  and  two  6-inch 
guns  were  "lost  on  the  Maine."  Of  the  790  guns  ordered  thirty-nine  were  at 
the  date  of  the  report  completed,  and  131  forgings  were  ordered.  Of  the 
i3-inch  guns  'there  are  assigned  four  each  to  the  Indiana,  Massachusetts, 
Oregon,  Kearsarge,  Kentucky,  Illinois,  Alabama  and  Wisconsin.  The  num 
ber  of  guns  completed,  with  their  calibers,  were  as  follows:  i3-inch,  35 
caliber,  29;  i2-inch,  35  caliber,  14;  lo-inch,  30  caliber,  24;  10  inch,  35  cali 
ber,  2;  8-inch,  30  caliber,  9;  8-inch,  35  caliber,  65;  8-inch,  40  caliber,  2; 
6-inch,  30  caliber,  123;  6-inch,  35  caliber,  6;  6-inch,  40  caliber,  43;  5-inch,  30 
caliber,  2;  5-inch,  40  caliber,  171;  4-inch,  40  caliber,  130;  4-inch,  50  caliber,  o. 
The  total  is  620  guns.  A  "caliber"  is  the  calibers  of  the  length  of  the  gun. 

The  total  guns  for  the  new  navy  are  564.     Of  these  133  are  4-inch,  8  are 


604 


PUBLIC    OPINION    THAT    ADVANCED    THE    NAVY. 


4.7-inch,  127  are  5-inch,  160  are  6-inch,  74  are  8-inch,  18  are  lo-inch,  4  are 
i2-inch,  and  32  are  i3-inch.  The  total  number  of  guns,  made,  in  progress, 
or  ordered,  is  790,  237  being  4-inch,  199  are  5-inch,  197  are  6-inch,  83  are 
8-inch,  26  are  lo-inch,  14  are  i2-inch,  and  34  are  i3-inch.  The  new  navy  get 
544  guns — old  vessels,  18;  training  ships,  19;  available  for  auxiliary  cruisers 
or  reserves,  209.  The  batteries  of  the  New  Orleans  and  Albany  were  pur 
chased  with  those  vessels,  and  are  to  be  considered  separately  from  our  own 
proportion.  The  full  strength  of  our  navy  is  shown  with  admirable  intelli 
gence  in  the  table  following: 


BATTERIES    PLACED    ON    VESSELS    PURCHASED,    CHARTERED 

AND  TURNED  OVER  TO  THE  NAVY  BY 

OTHER  DEPARTMENTS. 


NAME. 

Displacement. 

Type. 

Main  battery. 

Secondary  battery. 

1 

6-inch. 

5-inch. 

A 

0 

n 

60-pounder. 

14 

,; 

ii 

3 
~  »i 

—  u 

s~ 
t^ 

<L> 
9 
~  t-l 

~  <y 

3" 
£ 

Machine- 
guns. 

20-pound< 

3-inch. 

•a 

1 

"Z 

I 

~. 

V 

'O 

a 

1 

3-poundei 

o  |  1-poundei 

Aileen.  . 

Tons. 

289 

Yacht 

I 

2 

5 

12 

6 
14 
19 

IO 

6 

2 
2 
2 

4 

IO 

16 
6 
6 
9 

2 

6 

18 
6 
14 
7 
1  6 

4 

12 

3 

4 

Badger  

Cruiser           .      ... 

| 

6 

Buccaneer.  .  .  . 

Yacht 

2 

6 

2 

2 

Buffalo  . 

7,500 
7,500 
594 
492 
173 
136 
192 
506 
786 
11,550 
545 
494 
494 
185 
175 

Cruiser           
do.             

IO 

2 

4 

2 
3 

Dixie  
Dorothea  
Eagle  
Elfrida  

6 

Yacht            

4 

2 

4 

do. 

2 

do             

2 

Enquirer  
Free  Lance.  .  . 
Frolic  .... 

do. 

7 

do 

2 

do 

2 

2 

Gloucester.  .  .  . 
Harvard  
Hawk  .  . 

do 

4 

8 

4 

.... 

2 

Cruiser           

8 

Yacht 

2 

o 

2 

I 
2 
2 
2 

I 

4 
i 

Hist  

do. 

I 

4 
o 

Hornet  
Huntress  

do. 

2 

do. 

Kanawha  
Inca  

do.            

i 

3 

T 

do.            

Mayflower.  .  .  . 
Oneida  

2,690 

273 

625 
7,500 
194 

850 

315 

Cruiser           

? 

12 

Yacht             

I 

Panther  
Peoria  

Cruiser 

6 

2 

6 
4 

do. 

'• 

2 

i 

Prairie  

do. 

to 

6 

Restless  

Yacht 

j 

3 

2 

Scorpion  
Shearwater.  .  . 
Siren  

do. 

4 

6 

do.            

3 
i 

3 

do.            

PUBLIC    OPINION    THAT    ADVANCED    THE    NAVY. 


605 


Batteries   Placed  on    Vessels  Purchased,  Chartered  and    Turned   Over   to   tJie 
Navy  by  Other  Departments — CONTINUED. 


NAME. 

Displacement. 

Type. 

Main  battery. 

Secondary  battery. 

1 

X 

'^ 
B 

'•1 

fl 

u 

.r. 

4-inch. 

60-pounder. 

20-pounder. 

3-inch. 

14-pounder. 

9-pounder. 

6-pounder. 

3-pounder. 

L 

-J 
H 

a 

: 

a 

a 

1  37-millime 
ter. 

Machine- 
guns. 

St   Louis 

Tons. 
16,000 
16,000 
546 

Cruiser 

1 

8 

12 

IS 
5 
8 
6 
13 
4 
8 
6 
16 
18 
9 
18 

2 

5 

2 

6 
I 
i 

2 
2 

7 
i 

2 

4 
4 
3 

3 

2 

3 

2 
I 

2 

I 

5 

i 

4 
3 
4 

2 

5 

2 

4 

3 

2 

3 
6 
6 

2 

St    Paul 

do 

6 

6 

2 

6 

2 

... 

Stranger      .    . 

Yacht 

T 

Svlph 

do. 

6 

2 

3 
4 
i 

—  J1    r       

Sylvia 

302 
1,700 

271 
800 
750 
11,550 
7,500 
879 
7,500 
187 
296 

do. 

i 

2 

2 
I 

3 

Topeka 

Cruiser          

6 

Viking 

Yacht 

Vixen  . 

do.              

4 

1 

Wasp 

do.             

4 

2 

Yale 

Cruiser 

B 

8 

Yankee  
Yankton  
Yosemite  
Accomac  
Active 

do. 

10 

6 

2 
2 
2 
I 
I 

Yacht 

T 

6 

T<  > 

6 

Tuir 

i 

&                
do 

2 

2 

Alice 

do 

2 

Apache  
Cheyenne 

5i6 

do 

2 

2 

I 

2 

do             

Chickasaw 

do 

Chocktaw  .... 
Hercules  
Iroquois 

151 

198 
702 

"156 

631 
401 

677 
194 

do 

I 

I 

do. 

I 

I 
2 

••;• 

do. 

Massasoit  
Nezinscot  

do 

T 

do 

I 

i 
i 

2 

i 

Piscataqua  .... 
Pontiac 

do 

? 

2 

do 

2 

T 

Potomac  
Powhatan  
Seminole 

do. 

2 

I 
T 

I 

do             

do 

T 

2 
I 

Sioux 

155 
196 
214 
441 
300 

do 

I 

Tacoma 

do 

I 

Tecumseh  .... 

do 

T 

I 

do 

I 

Vigilant 

do 

2 

1 

do 

T 

Wompatuck  ... 
Arctic* 

462 

do 

3 

I 

I  .  . 

2 

Abarenda  
Alexander.  .  .  . 

6,782 
7,492 

Collier 

4 

do 

2 

Wator  Knat 

5 

2 

5,834 

do 

2 

j 

do 

I 

2 

City  of  Pekin  . 

2 

•; 

East  Boston  .  . 
Gov.  Russell.  . 
Hannibal  

4,181 

FVrrvhnnt 

.: 
T 

.... 

4 

2 

Collier            

2 

606        PUBLIC    OPINION    THAT    ADVANCED    THE    NAVY. 


Batteries   Placed  on    Vessels   Purchased,    Chartered  and  Turned  Over   to   the 
Navy  by  Other  Departments — CONTINUED. 


NAME. 

Displacement. 

Type. 

Main  battery. 

Secondary  battery. 

1 

~ 
- 

'•1 

5-inch. 

4-inch. 

60-pounder. 

20-pounder. 

3-inch. 

14-pounder. 

1 

I 

6-pouuder. 

3-pounder. 

! 

47-millime 
ter. 

a*' 

Machine- 
guns. 

Hector  

Tons. 

do. 

2 
2 

4 

4 

3 

2 
2 

4 

4 

2 
I 

3 
3 
7 
i 
6 
6 
7 

2 

5 
7 

7 

6 

Justin 

4,857 
3,375 
6,034 

7,500 

4,925 
4,640 

2,975 
3,712 
5,420 
5,294 
4,729 
2,549 

do. 

Lebanon  . 

do. 

Leonidas  
Marcellus  
Merrimac  .... 
Nero  

do.               

2 

Steamer 

2 
2 

do. 
do.             

I 

Niagara  
Pompey 

do  

3 

Collier 

2 

Resolute.  . 

Transport     

2 

Saturn  

Collier            

2 

Scindia  

do.           

2 

2 
2 

Southery  

do.            

Sterling 

do 

2 
2 

2 

Supply  . 

Supply  ship 

Vulcan  

3,543 
174 
250 
174 
980 
1,280 
397 
525 
370 
i,  600 
620 
700 
2,185 

Steamer 

2 

Calumet 

Revenue-cutter    . 

i1 

Hamilton  .... 
Hudson 

do.             

T 

I 

I 
•  '  I 

do. 

2 
2 

Manning  
McCulloch.... 
Morrill  

do. 

i 

2 

do. 

I 

do. 

2 

2 

.... 

Windom  
Woodbury.  .  .  . 
Armeria  

do. 

T 

3 
6 

2 

do.            

Light-house  tender 
do.             

2 

Mangrove  .... 
Maple  . 

2 

do. 

2 

2 

I 
I 
2 

Suwanee  ..... 
Albatross  .  . 

do. 

4 

Fish      commission 
vessel           

2 

I 

2 

Fish  Hawk  .  .  . 
Total  107  ships 



(, 

do.             

in 

(>2 

2o 

67 

26 

1 

2 

24 

I 

2 

1  60 

10 

2O 

70 

576 

PUBLIC    OPINION    THAT    ADVANCED    THE    NAVY. 


607 


ASSIGNMENT   OF   SECONDARY    BATTERIES— THE    SMALLER 

GUNS    FOUND    EXCEEDINGLY    EFFECTIVE    IN   THE 

ACTUAL    SERVICE   WE    HAVE    RECENTLY 

EXPERIENCED. 


VESSEL. 

14-pound- 
er. 

6-  pound 
er 

7 

2 
6 
2 

8 
4 

2 

3-pound- 
er. 

1  -pound 
er. 

2 
2 
4 

37-mil 
limeter 

47-mil 
limeter 

Ma 
chine 
guns. 

2 
2 
2 
4 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 

Field 
guns. 

I 
I 
I 

I 

I 
I 
I 
I 

I 
I 

I 
I 
I 
I 
I 

I 
I 
I 

2 

I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 

2 
2 
I 

I 

Total 

Chicago  
Boston    

12 
13 
13 

8 
17 
15 
ii 
8 
15 
24 
25 
5 
3 
18 
18 
9 
9 
13 
13 
15 
ii 
ii 
ii 

12 

M 
II 

13 
14 
II 
II 

8 
8 
4 
31 
30 
29 
17 
4 
17 
3« 
22 

9 

13 

II 

3 
3 
3 

8 
8 

2 

2 

2 

Atlanta 

Dolphin 

2 

2 

4 

6 

2 
I 
2 

7 
6 

Newark 

Charleston                     .  .  . 

2 
2 
2 
2 

2 
2 
4 

4 



Yorktown             

Petrel             

Baltimore       

4 
14 

12 

Olympia       ...    

Texas 

Vesuvius 

5 

Gushing    ....              .... 

3 

2 
2 

3 
3 
2 
o 

4 

4 

2 
2 

2 

2 
2 
2 
I 
2 

Philadelphia  

4 

4 

2 
2 
6 

8 
8 
6 
6 
6 

2 

8 
6 

2 
2 
2 
2 
4 

4 
4 
20 

20 
20 
12 

4 

4 

2 

2 

San  Francisco  

Concord 

Bennington 

4 

2 

4 

2 
2 
2 
I 
2 
2 
6 
6 
2 
2 
2 
2 

Monterey 

Cincinnati               .  . 

Raleigh 

.... 

.... 

Montgomery   . 

Detroit     * 

Marblehead 

Bancroft 

8 

New  York    ... 

Puritan 

2 

Miantonomoh 

2 
2 
2 
2 

2 
I 
2 
2 

I 
I 

2 
2 
2 
2 

Amphitrite  

2 
2 
2 

Monadnock     

Terror  

Machias 

Castine 

Kitihdin 

Indiana 

7 
6 
6 

2 

4 

2 

4 
4 

2 

4 
4 

3 
3 
3 

2 
2 
2 

Massachusetts 

Oregon                   .    . 



.... 

Columbia 

Ericsson 

Minneapolis 

12 
2O 
12 

4 
4 
4 



2 

4 
4 

2 

4 

2 

I 
2 
2 
I 
I 
I 

Iowa 

Brooklyn 

.... 

.... 

Nashville 

AVilminsyton 

.... 

.... 

Helena 

Foote 

4 
4 
4 

I 
I 

I 

Newport  

6o8        PUBLIC    OPINION    THAT    ADVANCED    THE    NAVY. 
Assignment  of  Secondary  Batteries — CONTINUED. 


VESSEL. 

14-pound 
er. 

6-  pound 
er 

3-pound- 
er. 

l-pound- 
er. 

37-mil 
limeter 

47-mil 
limeter 

Ma 
chine 
guns. 

Field 
guns. 

Total. 

Princeton             

4 
4 
4 
2O 
20 

2 
2 

2 

6 

6 
4 
4 
4 

I 

I 
I 
4 
4 

I 

I 
I 
2 
2 

8 
8 
8 
32 
32 
4 
4 
4 
8 
7 
9 
8 

13 

5 
7 
8 

10 

6 
5 
5 
26 
26 
26 
n 
4 
4 
24 
7 
24 
4 
3 
3 
3 
i 
i 
i 
i 
3 
4 
4 
4 

1,021 

\Vheeling           •       •  •  • 

Marietta  .             

.... 

Kearsarge                 •  •  • 

Kentucky 

Porter                

Du  Pont         

2 

4 
2 



2 
2 

2 

2 
I 
2 
I 
I 
2 

4 
4 
4 

2 

I 
I 

2 
2 
2 

I 

Alert                    

2 

4 

4 
6 

4 
4 
6 

4 
i 

Essex                 



2 
2 

4 
I 

Alliance      

I 



Vermont     

I 

Hartford    .  .  .  .'  

2 

Michigan        

2 

Ranger                  

Pensacola  

I 
3 

I 

.... 

pinta                   

Illinois              

16 
16 
16 
6 

4 
4 
4 

2 

4 
4 
4 

2 

4 

.... 

.... 

Dahlgren       .... 

Craven        

New  Orleans 

10 

4 
4 
4 

.... 

.... 

4 

I 

4 

2. 
2 

Topeka   

10 

4 

Farragut  

Davis  

3 
3 
3 

i 
i 
i 
i 

Fox                             .    . 

Morris  

Talbot                

Gwin                        

Mackenzie       

McKee         

Fern                   

3 
4 
4 
4 

. 

Torpedo  boat  No.  19..  .. 

Torpedo  boat  No.  20  — 
Torpedo  boat  No.  21  — 

Total.  . 



71 

TO 

2 

472                   62 

211 

2 

iao 

The  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance,  Charles  O'Neil,  reports: 
4 'Since  the  date  of  last  report,  112  guns  of  various  calibers  from  4  to  13 
inch  have  been  completed  at  the  naval  gun  factory,  viz. :  Sixteen  4-inch,  fifty- 
four  5-inch,  twenty-nine  6-inch,  one  1 2-inch,  and  twelve  1 3-inch,  and  thirty- 
three  6-inch  and  two  8- inch  guns  of  ordinary  type  have  been  converted  into 
quick-firing  guns. 

"Thirty-seven  4-inch  guns  and  mounts  under  contract  with  private  firms 


PUBLIC    OPINION    THAT    ADVANCED    THE    NAVY.         609 

nave   also   been    partly  completed.      Forgings    have  been    ordered   for  five 
8-inch,  twenty  5-inch,  twenty-six  4-inch,  and  one  3-inch  (i4-pounder)  guns. 

"While  no  material  change  has  been  made  during  the  year  in  the  general 
system  of  construction  of  guns  under  manufacture,  new  designs  have  been 
prepared  for  future  guns  of  all  calibers,  calculated  to  insure  a  much  greater 
muzzle  energy  than  is  now  obtained  from  guns  of  the  same  caliber  at  present 
in  service.  The  first  of  these  new  guns  will  be  installed  on  board  the  battle 
ships  Maine,  Ohio,  and  Missouri,  and  on  board  of  the  four  harbor-defense 
monitors  authorized  at  the  last  session  of  Congress. 

"The  guns  and  mounts  and  their  appurtenances  in  service  have  been 
severely  tested  during  the  recent  war,  and  it  is  gratifying  to  be  able  to  report 
that  their  performance  has  been  in  general  thoroughly  satisfactory.  Some 
minor  defects  in  the  details  of  some  of  the  mounts  for  guns  of  small  caliber 
developed,  and  were  quickly,  or  are  being,  corrected. 

"Reports  have  been  received  from  the  various  vessels  as  to  the  perform 
ance  of  their  ordnance,  and  the  general  tenor  of  them  has  been  that  guns, 
mounts,  turrets,  and  ammunition  worked  well.  That  such  should  be  the  case 
in  so  complex  a  structure  as  is  a  battleship  and  its  equipment  is  certainly 
gratifying.  Improvements  are  constantly  being  made,  and  each  new  vessel  is 
superior  to  her  predecessor  in  many  details  of  her  armament  and  ordnance 
outfit." 

It  is  proposed  in  future  to.  expand  the  electric  plant  in  our  ships.  This 
is  owing  to  the  "facility  of  running  cables  as  compared  with  steam,  pneumatic 
or  hydraulic  pipes,  the  absence  of  heat,  perfection  of  control  and  ease  of 
manipulation,"  of  which  electricity  is  susceptible.  The  electric  system  is 
"immeasurably  preferable  to  any  other  which  depends  upon  long  leads  of 
pipes  under  high  pressure  with  numerous  packed  pistons,  valves  and 
joints." 

One  great  advantage  of  the  use  of  electricity  is  because  it  is  in  a  barely 
perceptible  degree  heating.  There  must,  of  course,  be  an  auxiliary  sys 
tem  to  serve  when  wires  are  broken.  "Guns  in  turrets,"  the  Chief  of 
Ordnance  says,  "operated  by  electric  power  can  be  more  accurately  laid  upon 
and  made  to  follow  a  moving  target  than  when  operated  by  steam,  hydraulic, 
or  pneumatic  power.  There  are  no  water  pipes  to  freeze,  no  steam  pipes  to 
burst,  and  no  delay  in  obtaining  a  full  working  pressure,  and  no  troublesome 
or  noisy  exhaust  pipes  to  deal  with.  A  burnt-out  fuse  can  be  quickly 


6io        PUBLIC    OPINION    THAT    ADVANCED    THE    NAVY. 

replaced  or  a  broken  wire  repaired,  and  as  the  wires  can  be  led  below  the 
armored  deck,  there  is  little  liability  of  the  latter  becoming  necessary. 

"Guns  of  over  four  inches  in  caliber  are  fitted  with  attachments  for  using 
either  electric  or  percussion  primers,  but  the  Bureau  will  use  only  percussion 
ammunition  in  guns  of  and  below  five  inches  in  caliber."  The  electric  firing 
is  preferable,  but  the  production  more  elaborate  and  the  faults  more  difficult 
to  locate.  The  fuses  of  shells  are  to  be  made  more  sensitive,  as  it  can  be  done 
safely.  The  Chief  of  Ordnance  reports : 

"All  new  guns  of  and  above  four  inches  in  caliber  are  fitted  with  tele 
scopic  sights,  and  in  addition  an  auxiliary  horizontal  bar  sight  is  supplied  to 
ship  in  place  of  the  telescope  in  case  of  accident  to  the  latter. 

"As  the  weakest  part  of  a  turret  is  its  sighting  hood,  in  which  has  hitherto 
been  located  the  only  means  of  sighting  the  turret  guns,  the  Bureau  has 
decided  to  attach  to  all  turret  guns  a  bar  sight  to  be  used  through  a  slit  in  the 
armor,  in  addition  to  the  telescope  in  the  sighting  hood.  A  6-inch  projectile 
at  moderate  range  would  probably  destroy  any  sighting  hood  if  fairly  struck, 
and,  while  the  turret  and  guns  might  still  be  intact,  the  means  of  sighting 
would  be  gone. 

"The  Bureau  has  in  process  of  manufacture  at  the  Naval  Gun  Factory  100 
heavy  i -pounder  automatic  guns,  nearly  half  of  which  are  practically  com 
pleted.  These  guns  fire  at  the  rate  of  250  shots  per  minute,  but  are  nearly  as 
heavy  and  as  large  as  a  6-pounder,  and  have  the  disadvantage  of  using  their 
ammunition  from  belts,  which  is  always  a  source  of  more  or  less  trouble." 

The  i -pounder  guns  are  regarded  as  useful  for  boats  but  not  for  ships. 

The  6-pounder  semi-automatic  gun  is  favorably  considered.  One  was 
recently  fired  one  thousand  rounds  without  hitch  or  failure.  This  class  of 
weapon  is  especially  meant  for  torpedoes  and  torpedo  boat  destroyers.  We 
quote  again  the  report: 

"A  new  high-powered  3-inch  gun  (i4-pounder)  has  been  designed,  calcu 
lated  to  have  a  muzzle  velocity  of  3,000  foot-seconds,  and  the  forgings  for  the 
type  gun  have  been  ordered.  A  new  mount  is  also  being  made  for  this  gun. 

"Several  years  ago  when  the  Bureau  began  the  manufacture  of  rapid- 
firing  guns,  it  had  two  6-inch  guns  made  with  the  ordinary  obturator  and 
quick-working  breech  mechanism  operated  by  a  lever,  which  worked  admir 
ably,  but  as  brown  powder  alone  was  then  in  vogue,  it  was  considered  neces 
sary  to  use  a  brass  case  to  contain  the  charge  to  prevent  fouling  of  the  powder 


PUBLIC    OPINION    THAT    ADVANCED    THE    NAVY.         6n 

chamber,  and  in  order  that  sponging  the  gun  might  be  dispensed  with ;  hence 
the  general  adoption  of  the  brass  cartridge  case  for  all  rapid-firing  guns.  The 
advent  of  smokeless  powder  has  changed  the  conditions,  and  fouling  of  the 
bore  and  sponging  are  no  longer  factors  in  the  case,  and  the  Bureau  has 
recently  designed,  built,  and  tested  a  6-inch  rapid-firing  gun  that  does  not 
require  a  brass  cartridge  case ;  and  this  will  be  a  feature  of  all  6-inch  rapid- 
firing  guns  hereafter.  In  smaller  calibers,  where  the  ammunition  is  complete 
and  handled  as  a  whole — that  is,  where  the  projectile  is  inserted  .in  the  case— 
the  brass  cases  will  be  retained  to  facilitate  rapidity  of  loading.  The  new 
type  of  6-inch  gun  is  45  calibers  in  length  and  weighs  8  tons,  and  is  designed 
for  a  muzzle  velocity  of  3,000  foot-seconds." 

It  is  evident  throughout  this  remarkable  report  that  the  Ordnance  Bureau 
was  never  more  active  than  now  in  progressive  work,  and  has  made  a  study 
with  a  view  to  improvements  of  every  pertinent  incident  in  the  recent  war. 
Decisive  as  was  the  efficiency  attained,  there  is  a  fine  enthusiasm  to  cultivate 
advantages  and  to  reach  conclusions  from  experiments.  There  is  made  a 
constant  study  of  experimental  battle  order  indicators  and  range  finders.  The 
nice  questions  as  to  the  thickness  of  armor  and  how  it  shall  be  located  are 
under  consideration.  The  merits  of  turrets  are  also  discussed.  "The  lessons 
of  the  day,"  the  report  says,  "indicate  that  the  greatest  execution  (except 
against  the  heaviest  armor)  may  be  expected  from  the  quick  firing  guns  of 
small  caliber."  The  larger  the  gun  the  greater  the  sacrifice  of  space  and 
weight.  Heavy  guns  in  turrets  are  a  recognized  necessity,  but  the  turret  is 
horribly  hot  and  the  field  of  view  from  the  sighting  hood  limited,  and  the 
i3-inch  gun  is  not  popular  as  it  was;  and  these  paragraphs  show  that  an 
important  change  has  been  substantially  decided  upon  after  "much  thought" 
has  been  bestowed. 

"Heretofore  the-  1 3-inch  rifle  of  60^  tons  weight,  35  calibers  in  length, 
having  a  muzzle  velocity  of  2,400  foot-seconds,  with  smokeless  powder,  and  a 
capacity  to  penetrate  with  a  capped  projectile  19  inches  of  face-hardened  armor 
at  a  distance  of  2,500  yards,  has  been  regarded  as  the  best  type  for  the  heavy 
turret  guns  of  our  first-class  battleships,  and  all  heretofore  built  (excepting 
the  Iowa,  which  has  1 2-inch  guns),  have  been  equipped  with  guns  of  this  class. 

"The  development  of  the  1 2-inch -gun  has  been  so  great  and  its  power  so 
much  increased  that  the  Bureau  is  of  the  opinion  that  hereafter  it  will  be  the 
maximum  caliber  that  it  will  be  advisable  to  install  on  future  battleships, 


612         PUBLIC    OPINION    THAT    ADVANCED    THE    NAVY. 

and  that  these  should  be  supplemented  by  an  auxiliary  battery  of  6-inch 
quick-firing  guns  in  casemates,  with  a  secondary  battery  of  6-pounders  and 
1 2 -pounders. 

"The  reduction  in  weight  of  the  1 2-inch  gun  alone  is  not  great,  being  but 
71^  tons  less  than  is  that  of  the  present  i3-inch  gun;  but  the  reduction  in  the 
size  of  and  consequently  in  the  weight  of  the  turrets,  barbettes  and  ammuni 
tion  is  very  great." 

There  has  been  a  notable  exemption  from  mishaps  during  the  hurry  and 
inexperience  of  the  war,  in  the  handling  of  fixed  ammunition,  this  notwith 
standing  "the  recent  great  increase  of  our  naval  force,  by  the  introduction  of 
so  many  new  and  untrained  officers  and  men,  seriously  aggravated  the  danger 
of  mistakes  and  accidents,  and  the  urgent  pressure." 

Among  the  most  urgent  recommendations  by  the  Bureau  is  that  a  uni 
form  caliber  and  standard  small-arm  cartridge  should  be  adopted  for  the 
army,  navy,  Marine  corps,  and  militia.  The  gratifying  statement  is  made 
that  the  "resources  of  the  country  to  supply  war  material  were  scarcely 
touched,  and  unquestionably  there  is  no  limit  to  the  amount  that  can  be  pro 
cured  of  all  kinds,  in  case  of  need,  provided  time  is  not  too  important  a 
factor. "  And  the  way  to  provide  that  time  is  not  too  important  a  factor  is  to 
improve  the  times  of  peace  to  prepare  for  those  of  war. 

One  of  the  great  features  has  been  the  old  style  "columbiads, "  a  genera 
tion  ago  our  most  powerful  shooting  iron,  and  the  pyramids  of  cannon  balls. 
In  the  report  under  review  this  appears: 

"While  a  number  of  smoothbore  guns  were  prepared  for  service,  none 
were  put  in  use  during  the  late  war  except  such  XV-inch  guns  as  were  on 
board  the  coast-defense  monitors.  The  Bureau  is  convinced  that  it  is  useless 
to  longer  retain  the  old  cast-iron  smoothbore  guns  that  are  on  hand  in  large 
numbers  at  all  the  navy  yards  with  their  mounts  and  ammunition,  and  will 
take  steps  to  have  them  surveyed  with  a  view  to  disposing  of  them,  as  no 
contingency  is  likely  to  arise  which  could  render  them  of  any  use  whatever, 
and  it  is  useless  to  regard  them  as  a  part  of  the  country's  naval  assets." 

Here  is  the  official  presentation  of  the  fact  that  the  old  smoothbores  and 
their  big  pot-metal  bullets  are  as  obsolete  as  the  monstrous  thunderers  of  the 
Hellespont  and  those  used  in  the  siege  of  Constantinople  that  first  illustrated 
the  power  of  gunpowder;  and  the  huge  marble  balls  that  were  held  to  be  the 
most  irresistible  missiles  ever  hurled  at  a  ship  or  wall.  The  better  way  to  get 


PUBLIC    OPINION    THAT    ADVANCED    THE    NAVY.         613 

rid  of  the  old  smoothbores  and  spheres  made  for  cannonades  that  will  never 
come,  is  to  give  them  away  to  every  town,  village  and  schoolhouse  where  they 
would  be  held  to  be  decorative  and  markers  of  the* events  that  testify  the 
progress  of  the  times. 

In  the  annual  report  of  the  superintendent  of  the  naval  gun  factory  at 
the  United  States  navy  yard  at  Washington  is  this  honorable  mention  of  the 
workingmen : 

4 'The  extraordinarily  large  amount  of  inspection  and  other  work  done  in 
the  short  time  of  six  months  could  not  have  been  accomplished  except  for  the 
prompt  and  ready  compliance  of  the  various  mechanics  to  the  instructions 
received  and  attention  to  their  work,  and  taking  into  account  the  relative 
number  of  hours  worked,  fully  20  per  cent  more  has  been  accomplished  than 
ordinarily  the  case,  and  the  men  did  more  work  in  the  same  time  under  the 
stimulus  of  a  patriotic  object  to  be  gained." 

In  giving  an  account  of  the  work  turned  out  in  the  gun  factory  at  the 
navy  yard,  this  paragraph,  related  to  the  one  above,  occurs: 

"Of  the  above  guns,  twenty  6-inch,  thirty-three  5 -inch,  and  sixteen  4-inch 
40  caliber  guns  have  been  built  since  the  declaration  of  war  against  Spain, 
and  sixteen  ordinary  6-inch  guns  have  been  converted  into  rapid  fire.  This 
represents  about  one  year's  work  on  ordinary  working  hours." 

Under  the  head  of  "Sights"  there  is  this  very  interesting  statement  of 
work: 

"Since  March  i,  twenty-eight  6-inch  pedestal  mounts,  sixty- seven  5 -inch 
pedestal  mounts,  and  twenty  4-inch  recoil  slides  have  had  telescope  sights 
adjusted;  eight  6-inch  recoil  mounts,  two  5-inch  pedestal  mounts,  three  4-inch 
pedestal  mounts,  two  4-inch  recoil  mounts,  and  fifteen  of  the  American 
Ordnance  Company's  mounts  have  had  their  telescope  sights  readjusted  on 
the  mounts;  two  Mark  I  4-inch  guns,  two  Mark  I  5-inch  guns,  six  Mark  III 
6-inch  guns  have  had  their  bar  sights  overhauled  and  readjusted  on  the  guns; 
six  telescope  sights  were  adjusted  to  the  Princeton's  4-inch  pedestal  mounts, 
when  her  mounts  were  overhauled,  and  top  carriages  replaced  and  all  the 
auxiliary  bar  sights  above  mentioned  have  been  made. 

"This  large  amount  of  work  in  the  sighting  line  has  never  before  been 
accomplished  in  any  one  year,  and  it  has  been  done  in  five  months  by  often 
working  on  Sundays,  including  the  twenty-four  hour  work  of  week  days." 

In  addition  to  the  showing  of  the  high  spirit  and  effective  zeal  of  the 


614        PUBLIC    OPINION    THAT    ADVANCED    THE    NAVY. 

mechanics,  this  declares  that  our  workmanship,  now  so  celebrated,  is  to  have 
all  possible  facilities  for  improvement. 

Of  the  class -of  seamen  gunners  this  is  said: 

"The  men  have  generally  exhibited  zeal  and  intelligence,  and  fully 
appreciate  the  benefits  to  be  derived  from  making  a  good  record  in  study  and 
work,  much  of  which  has  been  due  to  the  examples  set  by  the  instructors, 
who  have  given  a  great  deal  of  their  time  out  of  work  hours  in  explaining  and 
helping  in  difficult  matters.  Much  of  the  ambition  of  the  present  class  seems 
to  be  due  to  the  fact  that  three  of  the  instructors  are  seamen  gunners  with 
warrant  rank. ' ' 

Of  the  smokeless  powder  manufactory  it  is  remarked: 

"A  small-arm  powder  promising  satisfactory  results  when  cut  and 
graphited  after  twenty  hours'  drying  in  the  sheet  between  blotting  paper  has 
been  made  and  tested.  This  powder  has  a  dried  grain  of  o.on  to  0.012  inch 
thickness.  Experiments  are  now  in  progress  for  the  manufacture  of  this 
powder  on  a  larger  and  more  economical  scale. 

"Experimental  work  on  i -pounder,  6-pounder,  and  3-inch  powders  have 
included  nitration,  kind  and  proportion  of  metallic  nitrates,  composition  of 
solvent,  proportion*  of  solvent  to  dry  ingredients,  dimensions  of  strips,  and 
methods  of  manufacture. 

"Marked  improvements  have  been  made  recently  in  the  methods  of  manu 
facture  of  these  thin  ribbon  powders.  Pyrocellulose  as  a  base  and  ether  alco 
hol  as  a  solvent  has  been  used  only  in  experiments.  But  little  data  was 
available  as  a  guide  to  the  regular  manufacture  of  smokeless  powder  for  the 
various  calibers. 

"In  addition  to  various  experimental  work,  smokeless  powder  has  been 
manufactured,  October  i,  1898,  as  follows: 

6-pounder Rounds,    10,351 

3-inch 13,008 

i-pounder ,     .  2,623 

"With  the  beginning  of  the  hostilities  a  demand  was  made  for  special 
countermines  for  use  in  the  operations  of  the  fleet. 

"Suitable  mine  cases,  primer  cases,  etc.,  were  designed,  and  orders  for 
the  construction  of  the  heavy  mine  cases  were  placed  with  two  separate 
establishments. 


PUBLIC    OPINION    THAT    ADVANCED    THE    NAVY.         615 

''Mine  cases  were  sent  to  the  station  as  fast  as  they  were  made.  They 
were  quickly  loaded,  and  all  other  parts  and  appurtenances  of  the  outfit  were 
assembled  rapidly. 

"Loading  was  begun  within  five  days,  and  within  ten  days  from  the 
receipt  of  the  order  forty  mines  were  loaded  with  guncotton  and  ready  for 
shipment. 

"The  countermining  outfit  sent  to  the  North  Atlantic  fleet  included  forty 
mines  (each  containing  about  530  pounds  of  gun  cotton),  with  18,000  feet  of 
insulated  electric  cable,  and  all  necessary  ropes,  batteries,  buoys,  primers, 
testers,  exploders,  and  instructions  for  handling  them  in  five  separate  parts. 
They  were  loaded  with  21,160  pounds  of  gun  cotton.  The  total  boxed  weight 
of  this  outfit  was  37,186  pounds." 

Commander  A.  B.  Condin,  Inspector  of  Ordnance,  at  the  proving  ground, 
Indian  Head,  Maryland,  says: 

'The  supply  of  smokeless  powder  has  been  small  in  comparison  with  the 
needs  of  the  service,  though  considerable  quantities  of  5  and  6  inch  powder 
have  been  supplied.  There  seems  to  be  no  difficulty  in  supplying  an  entirely 
satisfactory  powder.  Trials  are  necessary  to  determine  the  size  of  grain 
suitable  for  each  caliber,  in  order  to  reach  a  combination  of  burning  all  the 
powder  in  the  charge,  high  velocity,  and  moderate  pressures. 

"Large  numbers  of  armor-piercing  projectiles  of  all  calibers  have  been 
tested  during  the  year;  very  few  rejections  have  been  necessary.  A  distinct 
improvement  in  the  quality  of  these  projectiles  is  a  gratifying  evidence  that 
the  makers  are  making  every  endeavor  to  carry  out  the  clause  of  their  con 
tract  which  binds  them  to  supply  the  best  article  possible  and  to  incur  any 
expense  necessary  for  this  purpose.  There  is  on  the  ground  here  a  hand 
some  array  of  projectiles  of  all  main  battery  calibers  which  have  stood  very 
severe  tests  and  are  absolutely  unaltered  in  dimensions." 

The  Secretary  of  the  Navy  gives  in  his  annual  report  the  names  of  the 
auxiliary  vessels  purchased,  their  names  before  and  after  purchase,  the  date 
of  purchase,  the  purchase  price,  and  the  previous  owners.  This  would  seem 
to  the  senatorial  current  historian  great  news,  if  pulled  out  of  the  pigeon 
holes  by  a  committee  of  investigation,  but  it  is  quite  commonplace  now. 

The  Hornet  was  purchased  from  Henry  M.  Flagler  for  $117,500;  the 
Mampatuck  from  the  Standard  Oil  Company  for  $65,000;  the  Mayflower  from 
the  Ogden  Goelet  estate  for  $430,000;  the  Nicthcroy,  El  Cid,  renamed 


616         PUBLIC    OPINION    THAT    ADVANCED    THE    NAVY. 

Buffalo,  from  the  Brazilian  government  for  $575,000;  the  Amazonas,  renamed 
New  Orleans,  from  the  Brazilian  government  for  $1,429,215;  the  Almirante 
Abru,  renamed  the  Albany,  from  the  Brazilian  government  for  $1,205,000; 
the  Merrimac  from  the  Hogan  Line  for  $342,000.  The  Gloucester,  purchased 
from  Pierpont  Morgan,  price  $225,000,  was  in  the  thick  of  the  fight  at  San 
tiago,  and  a  very  effective  vessel.  H.  M.  Hannah  sold  the  Comanche,  which 
came  out  the  Frolic,  for  $115,000. 

The  number  of  enlisted  men  in  the  navy  was  raised  during  the  war  from 
12,500  to  24,123.  The  maximum  fighting  force  of  the  navy,  classified,  was  as 
follows:  Battleships  (first  class),  4;  battleships  (second  class),  i;  armored 
cruisers,  2 ;  coast  defense  monitors,  6 ;  armored  ram,  i ;  protected  cruisers, 
12;  unprotected  cruisers,  3;  gunboats,  18;  dynamite  cruiser,  i;  torpedo 
boats,  ii ;  vessels  of  old  navy  (including  monitors),  14.  Auxiliary  navy: 
auxiliary  cruisers,  n;  converted  yachts,  28;  revenue  cutters,  15;  lighthouse 
tenders,  4;  converted  tugs,  27;  converted  colliers,  19;  miscellaneous,  19. 

The  Secretary's  report  says  that  in  contemplating  the  work  during  the 
past  year  "the  country  as  well  as  the  service  has  cause  for  congratulation  in 
the  results  which  have  followed,  and  which  have  been  so  generally  approved, 
and  in  the  further  fact  that  no  personal  feeling  has  arisen  to  mar  the  glorious 
victories  and  magnificent  work  of  the  service." 

The  casualties  of  the  Navy  are  shown  in  the  following  table: 

Number  of  casualties.     Killed.         Wounded. 

Action  of  Manila  Bay 9  o  9 

Action  of  Cienfuegos 12  i  n 

Action  off  Cardenas       ......           8  5  3 

Action  off  San  Juan,  Porto  Rico     .     .           8  i  7 

Engagement  at  Guantanamo,  Cuba    .22  6  16 

Engagement  off  Santiago  (June  22)     .          10  i  9 

Engagement  off  Santiago  (July  3)        .11  i  10 

Eagle  (July  12) i  0  i 

Bancroft  (August  2) i  i  o 

Amphitrite  (August  6) i  i  o 

Yankee  (August  n) i  o  i 

Total 84  17  67 

Efforts  to  improve  the  signal  system  are  earnestly  pressed  by  the  Navy 
Department,  guided  by  the  experiences  of  the  war,  and  yet  this  example  of 


PUBLIC    OPINION    THAT    ADVANCED    THE    NAVY.         617- 

was  clone  between  the  fleet  and  army  at  Santiago  indicates  that  this 

important  work  is  pretty  well  done. 

Signal  messages  received  and  sent: 

July  n,  7:50  a.  in.     Shore  to  ship:    "General  Shafter's  compliments  to 

Captain  Chadwick,  and  he  wishes  fire  commenced  early  this  morning.     Two 

maps  have  been  sent  to  Admiral  Sampson  which  give  the  distance  to  the 

cathedral.     .     .     ." 

8:10  a.  m.     From  ship  to  shore:  "We  are  about  to  commence  firing;  will 

fire  very  slowly,  and  wish  every  shot  reported." 

8:40  a.  m.     From  flag  to  shore:  "Where  did  that  shot  fall?" 
8:45  a-  m-     From  shore  to  flag:  "We  are  waiting  report  from  front." 
9  a.  m.     From  flag  to  shore:  "Ask  front  if  fall  of  shot  was  observed." 
9:15  a.  m.     From  flag  to  shore:  "Next  shot  will  be  fired  at  9:25;  keep 

sharp  look-out. ' ' 

9:30  a.  m.     From  shore  to  ship:  "Your  shot  fell  200  yards  east  of  Del 

Loute  Hospital.     Shot  should  be  directed  half  mile  farther  west." 

9:45  a.  m.     From  ship  to  shore:  "Give  us  the  fall  as  quickly  as  possible." 
9:50  a.  m.      From   shore   to  ship:    "Second   shot  was   well    placed.      A 

vigorous  bombardment  until  12  noon  requested." 

10:20  a.  m.     From  ship  to  Vesuvius:  "Fire  shot  every  five  minutes.     Our 

shot  are  falling  right,  using  range  8,500  yards,  NNW. ,  from  our  position." 
11:25  a.  m.     From  ship  to  Vesuvius:  "Please  fire  three  shots  every  five 

minutes." 

11:25  a.  m.     From  ship  to  shore:  "How  is  our  firing?" 

11:32  a.  m.     Shore  to  ship:  "Striking  city,   with  no  apparent  result.      I 

think  firing  with  big  guns  should  begin. — Shafter." 

11:40  a.  m.     Ship  to  shore:  "Shall  we  cease  firing  at  12  o'clock?" 

ii  :45  a.  m.     Vesuvius  to  flag:  "Do  you  know  how  shells  are  falling?" 

11  :5o  a.  m.     From  flag  to  Vesuvius:  "Striking  in  city." 

12  m.     Shore  to  ship:  "Please  continue  firing  with  heavy  guns  until  one 
o'clock;  then  cease  firing  until  further  orders." 

12:35  p.  m.     "General  Castillo  reports  that  Santa  Anna  church  has  been 
turned  into  a  powder  magazine. — Shafter. " 

1 2:45  p.  m-      Shore  to  ship:    "The  church  is  west  of  Reina  Mercedes 

Barracks.      Discontinue   at   once;    am  going   to   put   up   a  flag   of   truce. - 
Shafter." 


618         PUBLIC    OPINION    THAT    ADVANCED    THE    NAVY. 

4:45  p.  m.  Vesuvius  to  flag:  "General  Shafter  states  fire  from  ships 
very  accurate,  shell  falling  in  city.  Lines  have  been  advanced.  Flag  of  truce 
went  forward  to  demand  unconditional  surrender.  Will  communicate  with 
you  fully  directly  to  Aguadores  as  to  time  of  firing  and  result  of  truce." 

The  congratulatory  paragraphs  in  the  annual  report  of  the  Chief  of  the 
Bureau  of  Construction  and  Repair  are  full  of  the  dignities  of  moderation  in 
the  statement  of  a  great  and  signal  success  that  is  conspicuous  before  the 
world : 

"The  behavior  of  all  classes  of  our  naval  vessels  throughout  the  various 
conditions  of  war  under  which  they  served  during  the  past  months  is  a  source 
of  gratification  to  the  Bureau,  in  which  the  designs  of  the  greater  part  of 
them  have  been  developed.  The  many  complicated  and  inter-dependent 
considerations  involved  in  the  several  classes,  together  with  the  large  amount 
of  petty  detail,  could  not  but  afford  opportunity  for  criticism  from  various 
standpoints,  as  well  as  for  actual  errors  of  judgment  in  applying  too  little  or 
too  great  weight  to  any  of  the  many  considerations  referred  to. 

"Moreover,  the  lack  of  reliable  data  regarding  the  behavior  of  the  modern 
ship  of  war  in  action  lent  a  very  considerable  amount  of  uncertainty  to  the 
expectations  regarding  the  conduct  of  our  own  vessels  in  an  engagement  with 
the  enemy.  Although  the  results  of  the  encounters  in  which  our  fleets  have 
engaged  demonstrated  their  superiority  so  overwhelmingly  as  to  throw  doubt 
upon  the  value  of  any  deductions  which  might  be  made  therefrom,  the 
behavior  of  all  classes  of  vessels,  both  in  action  and  in  general  service  on  the 
blockade,  appears  to  have  been  such  as  to  thoroughly  demonstrate  their 
integrity  and  their  suitability  for  the  service  for  which  they  were  designed." 

The  work  of  Lieutenant  Jose  Muller,  of  the  Spanish  navy,  contains  much 
that  is  of  the  deepest  interest  of  the  conditions  within  Santiago,  and  the 
means  and  details  of  her  defense.  The  best  artillery  the  Spanish  had  was 
taken  from  the  cruiser,  the  "Reina  Mercedes, "  and  Lieutenant  Muller  says 
there  was  substantially  no  other  artillery,  and  "we  who  witnessed  and  sus 
tained  the  blockade  of  Santiago,  feel  satisfaction  and  pride  in  being  able  to  say 
that  we  kept  the  American  fleet,  notwithstanding  its  power  and  the  number  of 
its  guns,  for  seventy  days,  namely,  from  May  18  to  July  17,  in  front  of  the 
mouth  of  the  harbor,  on  the  sea,  and  at  a  respectable  distance  from  our  bat 
teries,  which  they  were  unable  to  silence,  and  not  daring  to  force  the  entrance. 

"It  is  only  just  to  say,  and  I  take  pleasure  in  doing  so,  that  this  result  is 


BUST  OF  COLUMBUS,   FOUND  ON   "CRISTOBAL  COLON/'     NOW  JN  WAR 
DEPARTMENT  AT  WASHINGTON. 


PUBLIC    OPINION    THAT    ADVANCED    THE    NAVY.         621 

due,  in  the  first  place,  to  the  cruiser  Reina  Mercedes,  under  the  command  of 
Captain  Rafael  Micon,  and  in  the  second  place,  to  our  fleet  anchored  in  the 
bay,  and  which  the  enemy  would  have  had  to  fight  after  forcing  the  harbor, 
provided  they  had  succeeded  in  doing  so,  but  they  do  not  appear  to  have 
thought  of  it." 

Further  information  will  show  the  gallant  Spaniard  that  it  was  not  for  the 
lack  of  thinking  of  it  that  it  was  not  attempted.  The  Mercedes  was  detained 
at  Santiago  by  bad  boilers,  when  on  the  way  to  Havana.  The  Lieutenant 
remarks  of  Spanish  belief  in  their  fleets  before  the  trial  by  battle : 

"When  the  war  between  Spain  and  the  United  States  became  a  fact,  it  is 
hard  to  tell  how  much  was  said  and  written  about  the  Spanish  fleet,  or  rather, 
fleets;  everybody  knows  of  the  thousands  of  items  which  appeared  in  the 
newspapers  concerning  the  purchase  of  ships,  to  such  an  extent  that,  if  all 
could  have  been  believed,  our  navy  would  have  been  vastly  superior  to  that 
of  the  United  States,  in  number  and  quality.  And  this  is  so  true  that  the 
least  optimistic,  the  most  reasonable  people,  those  whom  we  considered  best 
informed  as  belonging  to  the  profession,  and  who  knew  to  a  certain  extent 
what  we  could  expect,  counted  on  not  less  than  eight  battleships  leaving  the 
Peninsula." 

When  Cervera  ran  into  Santiago  May  19,  famishing  for  coal,  and  hoped  to  get 
it  and  get  away,  it  was  "one  of  those  beautiful  mornings  that  are  so  frequent 
in  tropical  countries;  not  the  slightest  breeze  rippled  the  surface  of  the  water, 
not  the  least  cloud  was  to  be  seen  in  the  deep  blue  sky,  and  still,  notwith 
standing  all  that  the  local  papers  have  said,  very  few  were  the  people  who 
came  down  to  witness  the  arrival  of  the  ships.  With  the  exception  of  the 
official  element  and  a  small  number  of  Peninsulars,  the  arrival  of  our  warships 
inspired  no  interest,  nor  even  curiosity." 

The  Peninsulars  alone  were  enthusiasts.  Coaling  facilities  were  such 
that  the  fleet  was  detained  until  blockaded.  The  troops  required  360,000 
rations  a  month,  enough  with  economy  for  half  a  month.  This  would  seem 
to  mean  that  there  were  24,000  troops,  but  this  must  be  a  miscalculat  on.  As 
to  the  business  men,  this  example  is  sufficient : 

"The  man  who  had  the  contract  of  furnishing  water  at  the  bay,  relying 
on  the  letter  of  his  contract,  tried  to  charge  the  ships  of  the  fleet  for  the 
water  which  they  were  getting  at  Las  Cruces  pier,  this  water  being  the 
property  of  the  American  company  of  the  Juragua  mines,  for  which  the 


622         PUBLIC    OPINION    THAT    ADVANCED    THE    NAVY. 

Spanish  government  could  therefore  not  contract,  and  was  conveyed  on  board 
by  means  of  the  water  pipes,  which  are  there  for  that  purpose,  the  pump 
being  kept  going  night  and  day  by  the  soldiers  of  Colonel  Borry's  column. 
Nearly  all  the  ships  took  over  500  pipes  of  water  each,  which,  at  4  pesetas  a 
pipe,  amounts  to  several  thousand  dollars.  The  contractor  in  question, 
whose  name  I  do  not  wish  to  remember,  is  from  the  Peninsula,  a  captain  of 
volunteers,  and,  as  he  says  himself,  'a  better  Spaniard  than  Pelayo.'  ' 

Before  the  siege  was  over  this  writer  says  there  was  famine  in  Santiago, 
and  many  persons  starved  to  death.  He  saw  a  man  at  the  entrance  to  the 
Brook  House  who  "died  because  he  had  nothing  to  eat,"  and  "horses,  dogs 
and  other  animals  were  dying  from  hunger  in  the  streets  and  public  places, 
and  the  worst  thing  was  that  their  carcasses  were  not  removed.  I  also  saw 
—this  is  significant  on  account  of  the  fatal  consequences  that  might  follow — I 
saw,  I  repeat,  a  dog  throw  himself  upon  a  smaller  one  and  kill  and  devour 
him.  The  water  from  the  aqueduct  had  been  cut  off,  and  the  city  was 
exposed  to  the  danger  of  the  dogs  going  mad." 

The  Lieutenant  continues:  "We  who  belonged  to  the  captaincy  of  the 
port  finally  dined,  breakfasted  and  slept  there — or  rather,  did  not  sleep  there, 
for  there  never  was  a  night  when  it  was  not  necessary  to  transmit  to  the 
Admiral  two  or  three  urgent  papers,  orders,  or  other  cablegrams,  at  all 
hours,  and  the  telephone  did  not  stop  a  minute  and  did  not  give  us  any  rest." 

Of  what  service  to  Spain  was  the  Spanish  fleet  in  Santiago?  This  ques 
tion  Lieutenant  Muller  answers: 

"Compelling  the  enemy  to  sustain  with  superior  forces  the  blockade  of 
Santiago  de  Cuba,  with  all  its  difficulties  and  dangers.  While  our  ships  were 
in  port,  safe  fron*  the  ordinary  dangers  of  the  sea,  using  hardly  any  coal,  not 
exhausting  their  engines,  and  waiting  for  a  favorable  opportunity  to 
maneuver,  when  and  as  best  they  could,  the  hostile  fleet  was  obliged  to  cruise 
on  the  coast  day  and  night,  using  a  great  deal  of  coal,  constantly  doing  sea 
service,  which  is  always  laborious,  especially  in  time  of  war,  exhausting  their 
engines,  and  exposed  to  the  danger  of  having  to  abandon  the  blockade  in  case 
of  a  storm  from  the  south  or  east,  still  more  if  the  season  of  cyclones  should 
come."  And,  "If  it  had  been  possible  for  us,  besides  the  ships  that  were  at 
Santiago,  to  have  two  at  Cienfuegos,  for  instance,  and  two  more  at  Nuevitas, 
which  ports  are  well  suited  for  placing  lines  of  torpedoes,  owing  to  their  nar 
row  entrances,  there  is  no  doubt  but  that  the  Americans,  who,  outside  of  the 


PUBLIC    OPINION    THAT    ADVANCED    THE    NAVY.         623 

ships  they  had  in  the  Philippines,  had  sent  their  whole  fleet  to  the  island  of 
Cuba,  would  have  had  to  blockade  those  three  ports  with  forces  superior  to 
ours  and  to  keep  watch  at  Key  West  if  they  did  not  want  to  expose  themselves 
to  a  serious  disaster,  or  would  have  had  to  force  one  of  the  ports,  thereby 
exposing  themselves  to  a  hecatomb;  and  we  only  need  think  of  the  number  of 
their  ships  to  understand  that  they  could  not  successfully  threaten  so  many 
points ;  though  they  only  had  to  deal  with  Santiago  and  had  almost  all  the 
ships  of  the  fleet  in  front  of  it,  they  would  have  found  it  necessary  to  desist 
from  taking  the  offensive. " 

The  Americans,  the  Spaniards  thought,  never  before  Santiago  lacked 
secret  information,  and  the  sinking  of  the  Merrimac  was  a  mystery  to  the 
Spaniards.  The  Spanish  writer  visited  Hobson  to  take  his  deposition,  and 
Hobson  wanted  to  know  why  the  British  Consul  was  not  present,  as  he  had 
charge  of  the  American  Consulate,  and  also,  "by  whose  authority  he  was 
being  examined;  and  he  stated  that,  since  he  had  been  taken  prisoner  by 
Admiral  Cervera  himself  in  his  own  boat  (as  was  true),  it  was  his  understand 
ing  that  he  could  and  should  answer  only  Admiral  Cervera,  or  some  one 
delegated  by  him.  And  although  all  this  was  said  in  the  very  best  form  and 
\vith  a  thousand  protestations  of  his  respect  and  deference  for  me,  it  did  not 
prevent  our  positions  from  being  reversed,  and  far  from  my  asking  the  pris 
oner  questions,  it  was  he,  on  the  contrary,  who  asked  them  of  me. 

"I  told  him  so,  asking  him  through  the  interpreter  to  state  categorically 
whether  he  was  disposed  to  answer.  He  replied  he  was  ready  to  answer  the 
questions  which  he  thought  he  ought  to  answer,  but  not  those  which  he 
deemed  untimely.  Therefore,  and  in  order  not  to  lose  time,  I  at  once  asked 
him  one  question  which  I  knew  beforehand  he  would  refuse  to  answer, 
namely,  by  whose  order  and  for  what  purpose  he  entered  the  harbor;  he 
replied:  'By  order  of  Admiral  Sampson;  the  second  part  I  cannot  answer.'  I 
then  deemed  my  mission  at  an  end." 

Having  finished  with  Hobson,  the  Spanish  officer  stood  on  the  esplanade 
in  front  of  the  Morro  and  admired  the  American  fleet.  It  was  a  beautiful 
evening,  and  seventeen  American  ships  were  in  sight.  June  6th  the  Ameri 
can  fleet  opened  fire,  and  "it  was  so  intense  and  the  shots  followed  each  other 
in  such  quick  succession  that  it  might  have  seemed  like  a  fusillade  if  the 
mighty  thunder  of  guns  can  be  compared  with  the  crackling  of  small  arms. 

"By  9  o'clock  it  became  somewhat  slower,  shortly  after  reaching  again  the 


624         PUBLIC    OPINION    THAT    ADVANCED    THE    NAVY. 

same  intensity,   then    decreasing  once  more  at    10:15,   and  again   becoming 
terribly  intense. 

"At  2  p.  m.  there  arrived  at  the  royal  pier  a  boat  from  the  Reina  Mer 
cedes,  towed  by  her  steam  launch,  with  Lieutenant  Ozamiz,  bringing  three 
seriously  wounded  sailors,  who  were  taken  to  the  military  hospital.  This 
officer  reported  the  death  of  Commander  Emilio  de  Acosta  y  Eyermann, 
second  in  command  of  the  cruiser,  and  of  five  sailors;  also,  that  Ensign 
Molins,  one  boatswain,  and  several  other  sailors  had  been  wounded." 

Again,  the  writer  says,  "the  fire  resembled  one  prolonged  thunder,"  and 
he  "had  no  idea  that  any  firing  could  be  as  terrific  as  that  of  those  ten  ships," 
and  he  "does  not  believe  the  bombardment  of  Sebastopol  and  Alexandria 
could  be  as  terrible  as  that  suffered  at  Santiago."  It  was  computed  that  the 
Americans  fired  eight  thousand  projectiles.  The  belief  of  the  writer  was  that 
the  insurgents  had  located  everything,  and  he  was  sure  when  he  saw  the  aim 
of  the  Americans,  who  fired  so  close  to  the  Maria  Teresa  and  Vizcaya,  that  it 
was  a  miracle  they  were  not  hit.  The  Mercedes,  though  protected  by  a  hill, 
was  hit  thirty-five  times. 

"Commander  Emilio  de  Acosta  y  Eyermann  was  directing  the  extinguish 
ing  of  the  fire  in  the  forecastle,  when  a  large  shell  cut  off  his  right  leg  at  the 
hip  and  also  his  right  hand,  mutilating  him  horribly.  But  he  lived  for  half  an 
hour  after  that,  and  kept  on  looking  after  the  fire,  as  I  was  told  by  Mr.  Ozamiz, 
who  was  close  to  him  in  those  critical  moments.  I  do  not  like  to  think  of  it ; 
he  had  been  a  fellow-student  of  mine  at  college,  and  our  old  friendship  had 
always  remained  the  same.  As  there  was  no  safe  place  in  the  ship,  his  body 
was  placed  on  a  cot  and  taken  to  the  Socapa  coast ;  five  soldiers  who  had  been 
killed  the  same  day  were  also  carried  there,  and  all  of  them  were  covered 
with  the  flag  which  they  had  been  defending  and  for  which  they  had  died. 

"The  large  projectiles  shot  through  the  space  across  the  bay,  causing  a 
tremendous  noise  which  only  those  who  heard  it  can  understand ;  some  fell  on 
the  opposite  coast  (to  the  westward),  raising,  as  they  exploded,  clouds  of  dust 
and  smoke;  others  could  not  be  seen  falling,  which  proves  that  they  must  have 
dropped  in  the  hills  at  a  great  distance.  This  explains  that  they  did  not  only 
reach  the  city,  but  went  thousands  of  meters  beyond. 

"The  inhabitants  of  Cay  Smith  had  to  take  refuge  in  the  northern  part, 
which  is  very  abrupt,  and  many  were  in  the  water  up  to  the  waist;  if  they 
had  not  gone  there,  most  of  them  would  have  been  killed,  for  nearly  all  the 


PUBLIC    OPINION    THAT    ADVANCED    THE    NAVY.         625 

dwellings  which  were  located  in  the  southern  part  suffered  from  the  effects  of 
the  shells.  The  following  day  the  Cay  was  abandoned." 

June  2ist  it  was  found  out  that  forty-two  ships  had  during-  the  day  before 
sailed  and  proceeded  eastward.  They  were  the  transports  bearing  Shafter's 
army,  on  June  23. 

"Opposite  the  Morro ' entrance,  and  at  a  distance  of  about  six  miles  from 
it,  8  battleships,  2  destroyers,  the  Vesuvius,  and  8  merchant  vessels.  The 
rest,  as  many  as  63,  continued  the  landing  on  the  coast,  protected  by  some  of 
the  war  ships. 

"Every  night,  with  great  regularity  (between  n  and  2),  the  Vesuvius 
threw  her  three  dynamite  bombs  on  the  batteries  at  the  mouth  of  the  harbor, 
with  the  greatest  humanity  possible,  for  it  will  be  remembered  that  such  was 
the  pretext  of  this  war.  For  that  purpose  she  would  come  close  to  the  coast, 
accompanied  by  another  ship,  usually  a  battleship — for  the  mission  of  the 
Vesuvius  is  only  the  offensive,  she  has  no  defensive  qualities — and  as  soon  as 
she  was  within  convenient  distance  she  would  discharge  three  tubes  at  regular 
intervals.  If  the  projectiles  dropped  close  to  a  battery  its  ruin  was 
certain,  for  one  must  see  the  effects  of  one  of  these  projectiles  to  under 
stand  them. 

"This  ship  is  the  only  one  of  her  class;  her  projectiles  and  the  apparatus 
throwing  them  are  not  known,  and  she  has  made  her  debut  here.  One  of  the 
projectiles  which  fell  on  the  northern  slope  of  the  Socapa  tore  up  trees  right 
and  left  for  a  distance  of  about  20  meters.  From  a  certain  distance,  as  I  could 
see  the  day  I  went  to  the  Mercedes,  it  looked  as  though  a  road  had  been 
opened  across  the  mountain. 

"Another,  which  fell  a  short  distance  from  the  one  just  referred  to,  made 
an  excavation,  not  very  deep,  but  very  wide;  I  was  told  that  it  would  hold 
twenty  horses." 

The  sound  of  the  battle  in  which  Cervera's  fleet  perished  is  thus  related: 
"A  terrific  cannonade  commenced,  such  as  I  have  never  heard,  nor  will  prob 
ably  ever  hear  again,  a  cannonade  more  intense  than  that  of  June  6,  a  thing 
which  I  believed  impossible,  shaking  the  building,  thundering  through  the  air. 
I  could  not  think  coherently.  I  kept  looking  at  Mr.  Bustamente  like  an 
imbecile,  and  he  looked  at  me  and  didn't  say  a  word.  I  felt  something  that 
commenced  at  my  feet  and  went  up  to  my  head,  and  my  hair  must  have  stood 
on  end.  Then  suddenly,  without  taking  leave,  I  went  out,  got  on  my  horse 


626         PUBLIC    OPINION    THAT    ADVANCED    THE    NAVY. 

and  rode  down  the  hill  at  breakneck  speed,  and  I  hardly  understand  how  it 
was  that  I  did  not  break  my  neck.  I  arrived  at  the  captaincy  of  the  port, 
where  I  found  them  all,  from  the  commander  of  marine  to  the  last  clerk,  with 
emotion  painted  on  every  face,  and  all  looking  in  the  direction  of  the  mouth 
of  the  harbor.  The  noise  caused  by  the  gunshots,  which  the  mountains  and 
valleys  echoed,  was  truly  infernal  and  comparable  to  nothing." 

The  pilot  who  took  out  the  Spanish  flagship  tells  of  his  personal  experi 
ence.  His  name  is  Miguel  Lopez,  and  he  says: 

"I  was  in  the  forward  tower  by  the  side  of  Admiral  Cervera,  who  was  as 
calm  as  though  he  had  been  at  anchor  in  his  own  cabin,  and  was  observing 
the  channel  and  the  hostile  ships,  and  only  said  these  words : 

"  'Pilot,  when  can  we  shift  the  helm?'  He  had  reference  to  turning  to 
starboard,  which  could  only  be  done  after  we  had  passed  Diamante  Bank. 
After  a  few  seconds  he  said : 

"    Pilot,  advise  me  when  we  can  shift  the  helm.' 

"  'I  will  advise  you,  Admiral,'  I  answered. 

"A  few  moments  later  ^  said:  'Admiral,  the  helm  may  be  shifted  now.' 

"In  a  moment  the  Admiral,  without  shouting,  without  becoming  excited, 
as  calm  as  usual,  said:  'To  starboard,'  and  the  next  minute,  'Fire!'  At  the 
same  moment,  simultaneously,  the  two  guns  of  the  turret  and  those  of  the 
port  battery  fired  on  a  ship  which  seemed  to  me  to  be  the  Indiana.  I  thought 
the  ship  was  sinking.  I  cannot  tell  you,  Don  Jose,  all  that  passed.  By  this 
time  there  were  already  many  dead  and  wounded  in  the  battery,  and  I  believe 
that  in  spite  of  the  water  that  was  in  the  ship  she  was  already  on  fire  then. 
The  Admiral  said  to  me: 

'  'Good-by,  pilot;  go  now;  go,  and  be  sure  you  let  them  pay  you,  because 
you  have  earned  it  well . '  And  he  continued  to  gi  ve  orders. ' ' 

It  was  for  eight  hours  believed  in  Santiago  that  Cervera's  fleet  had 
escaped.  There  was  at  first  four  great  clouds  of  smoke.  The  mountains,  as 
the  ships  passed  westward,  presented  a  view  of  the  sea  except  from  a  few 
points,  and  no  ship  was  burned  or  disabled  within  the  range  of  vision.  The 
Spanish  officers  confirmed  the  view  taken  by  Admiral  Sampson  of  the  value 
of  the  incessant  use  at  night  of  the  searchlights. 

The  effect  of  the  cannonades  by  the  fleet  was  more  serious  when  we  read, 
the  Spanish  story  than  in  the  American  accounts.  The  reason  Cervera  ran 
into  Santiago  harbor  was  lack  of  coal,  and  the  reason  he  did  not  get  out  at  first 


PUBLIC    OPINION    THAT    ADVANCED    THE    NAVY.         627 

was  because  he  could  not  fill  the  bunkers  in  time.  There  was  scarcity  of 
baskets  to  handle  coal,  for  one  thing.  The  American  fleet  came  in  force  to 
Santiago  because  the  Spanish  fleet  was  there,  and  our  army  arrived  because 
the  fleets  were  there.  Hence  the  fame  forever  of  Santiago. 

Rear  Admiral  Pluddeman,  of  the  German  navy,  has  published  critical 
"comments"  on  the  main  features  of  the  command 'in  Spain,  and  we  have  a 
translation  from  the  November  number  .of  the  Marine  Rundschau.  The 
Admiral  opens  with  the  remark  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  events  of  the  war 
which  might  lead  to  a  radical  revolution  of  present  ideas,  but  while  the  war 
has  "enriched  former  experiences,"  no  essentially  new  appliances  have  been 
made  use  of.  The  torpedo  and  ram  have  not  been  used,  but  they  have  no 
doubt  been  found  less  formidable  in  fact  than  in  imagination.  Torpedoes 
have  been  tried  and  found  wanting,  and  it  appears  that  in  the  state  of 
efficiency  of  artillery  the  use  of  the  ram  has  become,  like  cavalry  charges 
upon  steady  infantry  with  magazine  long-range  rifles,  impracticable. 

The  supremacy  of  the  battleship,  with  a  few  heavy  guns  and  a  greater 
array  of  secondary  batteries,  is  hardly  disputed.  The  Oregon  would  have 
great  chances  to  destroy  all  the  torpedo  boats  and  torpedo  boat  destroyers 
that  could  be  launched  against  her.  There  is  a  general  conviction  that  our 
thirteen-inch  guns  are  too  big,  that  eight  and  ten  inch  guns  to  the  same 
amount  of  weight  are  better,  and  that  the  smaller  rapid-fire  guns  are  weapons 
that  have  a  way  of  doing  a  greater  share  of  execution  than  the  huge  steel 
tubes  that  shiver  and  shatter  their  own  foundations. 

It  is  said  by  the  Admiral  that  many  of  our  shells  did  not  explode,  and  our 
Navy  Department  is  already  making  provision  for  more  sensitive  shells. 
Our  monitors  are  slightingly  spoken  of,  and  Admiral  Sampson  thought  he 
found  them  a  nuisance,  holding  back  his  fleet,  yet  the  Monterey  and  the 
Monadnock  crossed  the  Pacific  Ocean,  and  Admiral  Dewey  was  extremely 
glad  to  add  them  to  his  squadron,  for  they  gave  him  the  ability  to  smash 
batteries  that  had  caused  him  uneasiness,  and  if  Camara's  fleet  had  appeared 
in  the  waters  of  Asia,  he  proposed  to  wait  for  the  monitors  on  the  way  before 
undertaking  the  sinking  of  a  second  Spanish  squadron. 

The  Colonel  Commandant  of  the  United  States  Marine  Corps  states : 

"During  the  war  57  vessels  had  marine  guards,  varying  in  strength  from 
80  down  to  6  men,  making  a  total  of  2,055  enlisted  men  at  sea.  There  were 
623  in  the  battalion  and  50  at  Key  West,  making  a  total  of  2,728." 


628         PUBLIC    OPINION    THAT    ADVANCED    THE    NAVY. 

A  battalion  of  marines  saw  very  active  service  at  Guantanamo.  Land 
ing  on  the  loth  of  June  at  Guantanamo  Bay,  they  were  on  the  nth  attacked 
by  a  superior  force  of  Spaniards,  and  a  constant  fire  was  kept  up  for  three 
days.  The  bay  was  important,  as  it  was  the  only  one  where  the  vessels  could 
take  shelter  in  the  hurricane  season.  The  necessity  for  the  marines  to  hold 
their  position  is  stated  in  the  official  report  of  the  commander:  "Owing  to  the 
dense  undergrowth,  affording  safe  shelter  to  the  Spanish  sharpshooters,  it 
would  have  been  impossible  for  the  vessels,  by  shelling  the  shore,  to  keep  the 
enemy  from  harassing  those  on  board  the  ships  with  their  Mauser  rifles  to 
such  an  extent  as  to  make  it  dangerous  for  them  to  remain  there. ' ' 

Admiral  Pluddeman  has  written  critically  on  the  matters  of  interest  in 
our  naval  experience,  and  says  of  Guantanamo:  "In  the  entrance  of  Guanta 
namo  Bay  the  Americans  found  quite  a  number  of  mines.  These  might  have 
caused  considerable  damage  if  they  had  operated,  for  the  Americans  entered 
the  bay  without  any  precautionary  measures,  and  the  screws  of  the  Marble- 
head  tore  two  of  the  mines  loose  from  their  anchorages  so  that  they  rose  to 
the  surface  of  the  water.  Then  the  whole  bay  was  systematically  searched 
for  mines.  This  was  done  on  June  2 1  by  the  boats  of  the  Marblehead  and 
Newark.  Four  steam  launches,  under  the  fire  of  Spanish  infantry  hiding  on 
the  shore,  fished  up  thirteen  mines  on  the  first  day  with  light  chains  they 
were  towing.  The  ships,  of  course,  fired  on  the  hostile  position,  which  was 
soon  abandoned. 

"During  the  next  few  days  thirty-five  more  mines  were  found  and  taken 
ashore.  These  proved  to  be  charged  with  120  pounds  of  guncotton  each. 
Many  of  them  showed  evidences  of  having  been  in  contact  with  ships'  bottoms 
or  screws,  but  the  firing  mechanism  was  not  capable  of  operating.  The 
fuses  showed  such  grave  defects  that  it  was  quite  evident  that  the  work  of 
constructing  them  had  not  been  done  under  the  supervision  of  a  superior. 

"The  mines  raised  in  Santiago  Harbor  after  the  surrender  of  the  place 
proved  on  the  whole  to  be  in  better  condition.  Still,  the  outer  row  contain 
ing  contact  mines  was  of  doubtful  value.  One  mine  was  found,  for  instance, 
in  which  half  of  the  guncotton  had  been  burned,  leaving  no  doubt  that  it  had 
been  in  contact  with  some  object — probably  the  Merrimac — and  that  the  fuse 
had  acted,  but  that  the  guncotton  charge  had  become  spoiled. 

"The  second  row  of  mines  (electric)  was  in  pretty  good  condition,  and 
might  easily  have  destroyed  one  or  more  ships  if  an  attempt  had  been  made 


PUBLIC    OPINION    THAT    ADVANCED    THE    NAVY.         629 

to  force  the  entrance.  These  latter  mines  contained  a  charge  of  200  pounds 
of  guncotton  each.  All  the  mines  in  Guantanamo  as  well  as  Santiago  Bay 
were  thickly  overgrown  with  barnacles  and  seaweeds." 

This  covers  a  point  of  some  delicacy,  owing  to  the  controversy  over  the 
management  of  the  fleet  off  Santiago  in  confining  the  assaults  at  the  mouth  of 
the  harbor  to  cannonading.  A  study  of  the  whole  matter  of  the  reports  from 
both  sides  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  Admiral  Sampson  was  right  in  his 
objection  to  Shafter's  change  of  plans  after  arrival,  the  weak  point  of  the 
defense  being  at  the  mouth  of  the  harbor,  which  could  have  been  forced 
easily  if  troops  had  been  landed  to  drive  the  Spaniards  from  their  lower 
batteries,  those  of  the  old  guns  on  the  castle  not  being  serious  in  modern  war 
fare.  It  appears,  however,  that  the  dangers  of  driving  into  the  mouth  of  the 
harbor  were  not  as  great  as  imagined.  All  experiences  with  Spanish  tor 
pedoes  and  mines  discredit  them,  and  plainly,  if  after  Cervera's  fleet  had  dis 
appeared  during  the  hours  the  harbor  was  open,  the  only  grave  peril  was  in 
the  navigation  of  the  difficult  channel.  However,  it  was  Secretary  Long's 
order  that  a  battleship  should  not  be  "risked,"  but  he  evidently  did  not  mean 
a  literal  interpretation  of  the  caution. 

It  is  ungracious  to  find  fault  systematically,  and  to  award  praise  in  stinted 
measure  of  either  Sampson  or  Shafter,  when  the  closing  scenes  were  the 
annihilation  of  the  fleet  of  Spain  and  the  surrender  of  her  army  and  of  the 
ancient  capital  of  Cuba;  however,  the  distinguished  Admiral  and  General 
are  responsible  for  the  rather  fierce  exchange  of  letters  that  so  grounded  and 
inflamed  controversy  that  the  grounds  upon  which  it  was  established  and  the 
temper  with  which  it  was  conducted  cannot  be  neglected.  The  abundance  of 
glory  is  insufficient  to  establish  harmony. 


CHAPTER     XXVIII. 

The  Army  of  the  United  States. 

Its  Organization  and  Numbers  Before  and  During  the  War — The  Strength  and  Location 
of  the  Several  Army  Corps— The  Distribution  of  the  Military  Forces  and  their  Num 
bers — Casualties  During  the  War,  in  Cuba,  Porto  Rico  and  the  Philippines — Deaths 
in  the  Camps — The  Incidents  of  Hardship  and  the  Yellow  Scandals — Spanish  Account 
of  the  Valor  of  their  Troops  and  Story  of  the  Conflict — Scarcity  of  Provisions— Cruel 
Battles  at  El  Caney  and  San  Juan — Suffering  in  Santiago. 

The  regular  army  of  the  United  States  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  with 
Spain  was  composed  of  2,143  officers  and  26,040  enlisted  men.  Of  general 
officers  and  staff  corps  there  were  532,  with  2,026  enlisted  men;  cavalry,  437 
officers,  6,047  enlisted  men;  artillery,  288  officers,  4,486  enlisted  men; 
infantry,  886  officers,  enlisted  men  12,828. 

The  army  was  increased  in  March  and  April,  1898.  In  the  four  months 
following  the  declaration  of  war  with  Spain,  the  enlisted  men  in  the  regular 
army  numbered,  in  May,  41, 934;  June,  49,5I3 ;  Jul>T,  53,9s1;  August,  56,365. 
These  figures  include  5,365  men  of  the  hospital  corps.  The  regular  officers 
were  2,191  in  May,  and  2,323  in  August.  The  enlistments  in  the  regular 
army  were,  in  May,  9,569;  June,  9,311;  July,  6,586;  August,  3,400.  There 
were  387  regular  officers  appointed  in  the  volunteer  army.  There  were  15 
major-generals,  45  brigadier-generals,  86  officers  of  volunteer  regiments. 
The  enlisted  men  in  the  infantry  of  the  volunteer  army  were,  in  May,  118,580; 
June,  153,  355;  July,  203,461;  August,  188,947. 

The  searching  care  taken  in  filling  the  ranks  of  the  regular  army  appears 
in  a  strong  light  in  the  remarkable  figures  of  this  paragraph  from  the  Ad 
jutant-General's  report: 

Of  the  29,521  accepted  applicants,  24,490  were  native  born  and  5,031  of 
foreign  birth;  27,140  were  white,  2,345  colored,  and  36  Indians  (scouts).  The 
enlistments  numbered  24,248,  and  the  reenlistments,  5,273.  Excluding 
reenlistments,  the  percentage  of  native-born  applicants  for  original  enlistment 

was  87,  the  balance  being  naturalized  citizens.     The  reports  show  that  the 

630 


THE    ARMY    OF    THE    UNITED    STATES.  631 

recruiting  officers  making  the  29,207  enlistments  embraced  in  the  first  two 
items  of  the  foregoing  list  rejected  98,277  applicants — a  little  over  77  percent 
of  the  number  seeking  enlistment — as  lacking  in  legal,  mental,  and  moral  or 
physical  qualifications;  5,209  of  these  were  rejected  as  aliens,  and  4,788  for 
illiteracy. 

The  aggregate  strength  of  the  regular  and  of  the  volunteer  armies  foi 
each  of  the  months  of  May,  June,  July  and  August  was  as  follows: 

May—  Officers.     Enlisted  men.     Grand  total. 

Regular  army        .     .     .      2,191  41,934  44,125 

Volunteer  army    .     .     .     6,224  118,580  124,804 


Aggregate  .  .  .  8,415  160,514  168,929 
June- 
Regular  army  .  .  .  2,198  49,5i3  5M11 
Volunteer  army  .  .  .  7,169  153,355  160,524 


Aggregate  .  .  .  9,367  202,868  212,235 

July- 
Regular  army  .  .  .  2,327  53,93i  56,258 
Volunteer  army  .  .  .  8,633  203,461  212,094 


Aggregate  .  .  .  10,960  257,392  268,352 

August — 

Regular  army  .  .  .  2,323  56,365  58,688 

Volunteer  army  .  .  .  8,785  207,244  216,029 


•     •     .   11,108  263,609  274,717 

The  Adjutant-General's  report  states  that  May  31,  a  month  and  te^  J 
after  the  declaration  of  war,  nearly  125,000  volunteers  were  mustered  into 
service,  and  ''the  suspension  of  hostilities,  resulting  from  the  short  but  bril 
liant  operations  of  the  army  against  Santiago,  Cuba,  leading  to  its  capture  and 
of  that  of  the  Spanish  forces  defending  the  city,  the  surrender  of  Spanish 
troops  in  Porto  Rico,  no  less  than  the  successful  operations  of  our  troops  in 
the  Philippines,  led  to  the  determination  to  muster  out  100,000  men,  nearly 
one-half  of  the  entire  volunteer  force,  and  the  first  order*looking  to  that  end 
was  issued  on  the  i8th  of  August." 

The  Adjutant-General  speaks  of  the  delicate  duty  of  selecting  the  organi 
zations  to  be  mustered  out,  it  being  impossible  "to  preserve  the  absolutely 
correct  arithmetical  proportion,  in  the  first  instance,  to  the  State  quotas,  and, 
in  the  second,  to  the  actual  number  of  troops  from  the  several  states,"  and  he 


632  THE    ARMY    OF    THE    UNITED    STATES. 

adds:  "Since  the  signing  of  the  Protocol  the  officers  and  men  of  the  volunteer 
regiments  have  remained  at  their  posts  of  duty,  in  most  cases  at  great  per 
sonal  sacrifice.  That  they  have  done  this  cheerfully  and  without  complaint 
makes  it  all  the~more  desirable  that  a  speedy  increase  of  the  regular  army  be 
provided  for  in  order  that  the  volunteers  may  be  released  from  further  service 
and  be  allowed  to  return  to  their  peaceful  vocations." 

Relating  to  staff  organization,  the  Adjutant-General  remarks:  "If,  as 
recommended,  additional  officers  are  given  the  line  of  the  army,  so  as  to  give 
plenty  of  trained  officers  for  staff  duty  in  time  of  war,  the  main  objection  will 
have  been  met;  and  it  is  doubtful  if,  under  all  the  conditions  peculiar  to  this 
government,  a  general  reorganization  of  the  staff,  or  the  adoption  of  new 
systems,  will  be  found  to  be  desirable;  certainly  nothing  radical  should  be 
entered  upon. 

"Under  the  present  system,  Grant,  Sherman,  and  Sheridan  conducted 
great  and  successful  campaigns;  it  has  worked  well  in  our  Indian  wars,  and 
it  is  confidently  asserted  that,  when  the  work  of  the  staff  departments  in  this 
war  is  more  fully  understood,  it  will  receive  the  approval  of  military  men  and 
of  the  people  generally.  That  there  can  be  improvements  in  many  ways 
there  is  no  doubt;  that  this  should  be  done  as  the  result  of  experience  is  also 
true." 

The  regiments  of  the  regular  army,  with  few  exceptions,  got  their  orders 
to  proceed  to  southern  points  April  i5th,  and  considering  the  situation  of  the 
army  the  extent  of  territory  over  which  the  posts  were  scattered  in  small 
detachments,  the  movements  of  concentration  were  executed  with  remarkable 
swiftness,  order  and  ease.  It  was  an  excellent  lesson  of  mobilization,  and  the 
complete  success  of  this  initial  step  made  practicable  the  stroke  at  Santiago 
which  proved  fatal  to  Spanish  pretension,  preventing  a  lingering  schooling  of 
volunteers  in  the  several  camps  for  a  greater  enterprise  under  the  Major- 
General  Commanding,  to  resemble  the  important  instruction  imparted  when  for 
many  months  of  "masterly  inactivity"  under  McClelland  all  was  "quiet  on 
the  Potomac."  The  infantry  regiments'  changes  were  made  in  the  general 
shifting  in  this  order: 

First  United  States  Infantry,  California,  to  New  Orleans. 
Second  United  States  Infantry,  Montana  and  North  Dakota,  to  Chicka- 
mauga  Park,  Ga. 

Third  United  States  Infantry,  Minnesota,  to  Mobile,  Ala. 


THE    ARMY    OF    THE    UNITED    STATES.  633 

Fourth  United  States  Infantry,  Illinois,  to  Tampa,  Fla. 

Fifth  United  States  Infantry,  Georgia,  to  Tampa,  Fla. 

Sixth  United  States  Infantry,  Kentucky,  to  Tampa,  Fla. 

Seventh  United  States  Infantry,  Colorado,  to  Chickamauga  Park,  Ga. 

Eighth  United^  States  Infantry,  Wyoming,  to  Chickamauga  Park,  Ga. 

Ninth  United  States  Infantry,  New  York,  to  Tampa,  Fla. 

Tenth  United  States  Infantry,  Oklahoma,  to  Tampa,  Fla. 

Eleventh  United  States  Infantry,  Missouri  and  Arkansas,  Mobile,  Ala. 

Twelfth  United  States  Infantry,  Nebraska,  to  Chickamauga  Park,  Ga. 

Thirteenth  United  States  Infantry,  New  York,  to  Tampa,  Fla. 

Sixteenth  United  States  Infantry,  Idaho  and  Washington,  to  Chicka 
mauga  Park,  Ga. 

Seventeenth  United  States  Infantry,  Ohio,  to  Tampa,  Fla. 

Eighteenth  United  States  Infantry,  Texas,  to  New  Orleans.  La. 

Nineteenth  United  States  Infantry,  Michigan,  to  Mobile,  Ala. 

Twentieth  United  States  Infantry,  Kansas,  to  Mobile,  Ala. 

Twenty-first  United  States  Infantry,  New  York,  to  Tampa,  Fla. 

Twenty-second  United  States  Infantry,  Nebraska,  to  Tampa,  Fla. 

Twenty-third  United  States  Infantry,  Texas,  to  New  Orleans,  La. 

Twenty-fourth  United  States  Infantry,  Utah,  to  Chickamauga  Park,  Ga. 

Twenty-fifth  United  States  Infantry,  Montana,  to  Chickamauga  Park,  Ga. ' 

Company  E,  Engineers,  West  Point,  to  Tampa,  Fla. 

Seven  army  corps  were  formed  by  order  of  the  President,  May  yth,  com 
bining  both  regulars  and  volunteers,  and  the  Philippine  expeditionary  force 
was  June  2ist  the  Eighth  Corps.  The  First  and  Third  corps  were  organized 
at  Camp  Thomas,  Ga. ,  Major-General  John  R.  Brooke  commanding  the  First, 
and  Major-General  James  F.  Wade  the  Third.  The  combined  strength  of 
these  corps,  on  the  last  day  of  the  month  of  April,  May,  June,  July  and 
August,  was:  Qfficers  Enlisted  men 

April 383  6,328 

May 2,I9I  42,036 

June 2,004  56,544 

July i,  563  42,260 

August      .     : 436  J  2,725 

In  July  the  First  Division  of  the  First  Corps,  under  General  Wilson,  was 

detailed  for  duty  in  Porto  Rico,  and  August  22  the  Second  and  Third  divisions 

of  that  corps  were  sent  to  Lexington,  Ky.,  and  Knoxville,  Tenn.,  respectively. 
The  Third  Army  Corps  was  transferred  early  in  September  to  the  camp 

established   at  Anniston,   Ala.,  and  by  the  end  of  the  month  but  a  small 

detachment  remained  at  Camp  Thomas,  Ga. 


634  THE    ARMY    OF    THE    UNITED    STATES. 

The  Second  Corps,  Major-General  William  M.  Graham  commanding, 
was  organized  at  Camp  Alger,  Virginia,  and  removed  when  that  camp  was 
discontinued  in  July  to  Camp  Meade,  Middletown,  Pa.  The  Strength  of  the 

Corps  was: 

Officers.  •  Enlisted  men. 

May 903  17,406 

June 887  22,624 

July 802  21,373 

August      . 768  20,686 

The  headquarters  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  Major-General  John  J.  Coppinger 
commanding,  were  at  Mobile,  and  the  strength  present  was : 

Officers.  Enlisted  men. 

May 343  7,456 

June 763  20,053 

July 548  13,485 

August 413  9,933 

The  Fifth  Army  Corps,  Major-General  William  R.  Shafter  commanding, 
was  organized  June  7th  at  Tampa,  and  embarked  for  Santiago  June  i4th. 
The  strength  of  this  corps  for  the  months  indicated  was  as  follows : 

Officers.  Enlisted  men. 

May 769  i5,657 

June 791  14,945 

July 840  18,619 

August 518  14,347 

This  corps,  seventy  days  after  embarking  from  Tampa,  was  returned  to 
the  United  States,  owing  to  the  prevalence  of  sickness.  They  had  in  the 
meantime  received  the  surrender  of  nearly  double  their  number  of  Spaniards 
at  Santiago. 

The  Sixth  Corps  was  not  organized.  General  Wilson,  who  was  to  have 
commanded  it,  was  assigned  to  the  first  division  of  the  first  corps. 

The  Seventh  Corps  was  commanded  by  Major-General   Fitzhugh  Lee. 

Its  strength  was : 

Officers.  Enlisted  men. 

May 496  8,847 

June 781  18,375 

July 909  23,193 

August 1,025  27,817 

The  Eighth  (Philippine  Corps),  Major-General  Wesley  Merritt  command 
ing,  sailed  from  San  Francisco  for  Manila  in  seven  expeditions,  the  first, 
under  General  Thomas  Anderson,  115  officers  and  2,386  enlisted  men.  They 


THE    ARMY    OF    THE    UNITED    STATES. 


635 


sailed  May  25th  and  arrived  June  3oth.  The  second  expedition,  General  F. 
V.  Green,  158  officers  and  3,428  men,  sailed  June  i5th  and  arrived  July  lyth. 
The  third  expedition,  General  Merritt,  197  officers  and  4,650  enlisted  men, 
sailed  June  2yth  and  29th,  and  arrived  July  25th  and  3ist.  The  fourth,  Gen 
eral  E.  S.  Otis,  42  officers  and  1,640  enlisted  men,  sailed  July  i5th  and  arrived 
August  2ist.  The  fifth  expedition,  Colonel  H.  C.  Kessler,  54  officers  and 
1,294  men,  sailed  July  igth  and  arrived  August  24th. 

The  sixth  expedition,  General  H.  G.  Otis,  sailed  July  23d  and  arrived 
August  24th,  50  officers  and  846  men.  The  seventh  expedition,  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Lee  Stover,  25  officers  and  814  enlisted  men,  sailed  July  29th  and 
arrived  August  3ist.  The  total  of  the  seven  expeditions  was  641  officers  and 
15,058  enlisted  men.  Since  that  date,  October  19,  27,  28  and  30,  the  troops 
that  sailed  for  Manila  were  99  officers  and  2,565  men.  The  grand  total  of 
United  States  officers  and  enlisted  men  who  have  made  the  voyage  from  San 
Francisco  to  Manila  is  17,363. 

The  subjoined  table  exhibits  the  strength  and  distribution  of  the  Army  of 
the  United  States  through  the  Spanish  war: 

RESUME  OF  STRENGTH  AND  DISTRIBUTION  OF  TROOPS. 


Command. 

May. 

June. 

July. 

August. 

Officers. 

Enlisted 
men. 

Officers. 

Enlisted 
men. 

e 

0) 

1 

O 

70 
4i 
4i 

67 
577 
249 
28 

20 
1,563 
802 
548 
890 
909 
917 

377 

Enlisted 
men. 

Officers. 

Enlisted 
men. 

Department  of  California  
Department  of  Colorado  

98 
45 

21 

24 
530 
230 

18 

23 
2,191 
903 
342 
769 
496 
636 

2,176 
956 

43i 
662 
12,093 
4,921 

221 

757 
42,036 
17,406 
7.456 
15,657 
8,847 
13,179 

87 
39 
38 
16 
586 
232 
3i 

20 
2,OO4 

867 

763 

79  1 
781 
865 

1,716 
1,250 

997 
722 

15,576 
5,792 
597 
59i 
56,544 
22,624 
20,058 
M,945 
18,375 
22,124 

i,745 
1,329 
1,256 
2,056 
17,240 
7,228 
646 

598 
42,260 

21,378 
13.485 
18,619 

23,193 
22,536 
9,084 

IOO 

40 

43 
32 
804 
280 

20 
19 
438 
768 
413 
518 
1,025 
899 
641 
299 

4,771 

2,390 
1,516 
1,416 

955 

23,248 
7,262 

i*5 

522 

12,725 
20,688 

9-933 
14,347 

27,817 
22,046 
16,332 

6,748 

95,479 

Department  of  Columbia  

Department  of  Dakota  

Department  of  the  East  

Department  of  the  Gulf  

Department  of  the  Lakes  

Department  of  the  Missouri  
First  and  Third  Corps  

Second  Corps  

Fourth  Corps  

Fifth  Corps.                 

Seventh  Corps  .                    ... 

Eighth  Corps  (Dept.  of  Pacific) 
Porto  Rico 

Department  of  Santiago 

At  State  Camps,  en  route,  at 
recruiting    stations,     on     fur 
lough,  etc. 

2,089 

33,7i6 

2,227 

20,957 

3,861 

74,739 

Grand  total 

8,415 

160,514 

9,3<>7 

202,868 

10,960 

257,932 

11,108 

263,609 

636  THE    ARMY    OF    THE    UNITED    STATES. 

Casualties. — The  following  is  a  statement  of  the  several  actions  in  which 
United  States  troops  were  engaged  during  the  war  with  Spain,  and  of  the 
losses  sustained  by  them  from  April  21  to  August  13,  1898: 

Operations  in  Cuba. — May  2  :  Point  Arbolitos,  Companies  E  and  G, 
First  Infantry,  under  Capt.  J.H.  Dorst, Fourth  Cavalry.  No  casualties. 

Siege  and  Surrender  of  Santiago,  June  22  to  July  17.  (Maj.-Gen.  Wil 
liam  R.  Shafter,  commanding  Fifth  Army  Corps) : 

June  24. — La  Quasina:  Cavalry  division,  Maj.-Gen.  Joseph  Wheeler, 
commanding.  Second  Cavalry  Brigade,  Brig. -Gen.  S.  B.  M.  Young. 

Present  for  duty,  June  20,  74  officers  and  1,067  enlisted  men.  Killed,  one 
officer  and  15  enlisted  men;  wounded,  6  officers  and  44  enlisted  men. 

Officers  killed  and  wounded,  7.  Killed:  Capt.  A.  K.  Capron,  First 
United  States  Volunteer  Cavalry.  Wounded:  Majs.  J.  M.  Bell,  First 
Cavalry,  and  A.  O.  Brodie,  First  United  States  Volunteer  Cavalry ;  Capts.  T. 
T.  Knox,  First  Cavalry,  and  J.  H.  McClintock,  First  United  States  Volunteer 
Cavalry;  First  Lieuts.  G.  L.  Byram,  First  Cavalry,  and  J.  R.  Thomas,  Jr., 
First  United  States  Volunteer  Cavalry. 

July  1-12. — Operations  against  Santiago,  embracing  the  actions  at  San 
Juan,  El  Caney,  and  Aguadores,  July  1-3,  and  actions  around  Santiago, 
July  10-12.  Present  for  duty,  June  30,  858  officers  and  17,358  enlisted 
men. 

Killed:  22  officers  and  222  enlisted  men;  wounded,  93  officers  and  1,288 
enlisted  men. 

Officers  killed  and  wounded,  122.  Killed:  Col.  C.  A.  Wikoff,  Twenty- 
second  Infantry;  Lieut. -Col.  J.  M.  Hamilton,  Ninth  Cavalry;  Maj.  A.  G. 
Forse,  First  Cavalry;  Capts.  C.  W.  Rowell,  Second  Infantry;  A.  M. 
Wetherill,  Sixth  Infantry;  John  Drum,  Tenth  Infantry;  T.  W.  Morrison, 
Sixteenth  Infantry,  and  William  O'Neill,  First  United  States  Volunteer 
Cavalry;  First  Lieuts.  W.  E.  Shipp  and  W.  H.  Smith,  Tenth  Cavalry;  J.  G. 
Ord,  Sixth  Infantry;  G.  H.  Field,  Second  Massachusetts  Infantry;  Second 
Lieuts.  J.  J.  Bernard,  Fourth  Infantry;  E.  N.  Benchley,  Sixth  Infantry;  T. 
A.  Wansboro,  Seventh  Infantry;  L.  H.  Lewis,  Ninth  Infantry;  W.  A. 
Sater,  Thirteenth  Infantry;  D.  M.  Michie,  Seventeenth  Infantry;  J.  A. 
Guerney  and  J.  N.  Augustin,  Twenty-fourth  Infantry;  H.  L.  McCorkle, 
Twenty-fifth  Infantry,  and  Acting  Assistant  Surgeon  H.  W.  Danforth,  who 
was  on  duty  with  Ninth  Cavalry. 


-.•/  3rl    /I 

•$i  $b$M  I* 


GENERAL  W.  F.  RANDOLPH. 


BOB  WRENN  AND  BILLY  LARXED. 


;^:i^V:?^:^.;:'--:.vy  "^4 


TRAIN  OF  PACK  MULES. 


I 


SERGEANT  DAN  HEWITT 


THE    ARMY    OF    THE    UNITED    STATES.  639 

Wounded:  Brig-. -Gen.  H.  S.  Hawkins.  Lieut. -Cols.  Henry  Carroll, 
Ninth  Cavalry;  H.  C.  E^':>ert,  Sixth  Infantry;  W.  S.  Worth,  Thirteenth 
Infantry;  J.  T.  Haskell,  Seventeenth  Infantry ;  E.  H.  Liscum,  Twenty-fourth 
Infantry;  J.  H.  Patterson,  Twenty-second  Infantry.  Majs.  H.  W.  Wessells, 
Third  Cavalry;  T.  J.  Wint,  Tenth  Cavalry;  J.  H.  Smith,  Second  Infantry; 
A.  W.  Corliss,  Seventh  Infantry;  S.  H.  Lincoln  and  R.  I.  Eskridge,  Tenth 
Infantry;  P.  H.  Ellis,  Thirteenth  Infantry,  and  W.  C.  Hayes,  First  Ohio 
Cavalry.  Capts.  H.  L.  Mills,  A.  A.  G.  Volunteers  (first  lieutenant,  First 
Cavalry);  G.  K.  Hunter  and  G.  A.  Dodd,  Third  Cavalry;  J.  B.  Kerr  and  A. 
P.  Blocksom,  Sixth  Cavalry;  C.  W.  Taylor,  Ninth  Cavalry;  John  Bigelow, 
Jr.,  Tenth  Cavalry;  C.  D.  Parkhurst,  Second  Artillery;  W.  J.  Turner, 
Second  Infantry;  Z.  W.  Torrey  and  G.  B.  Walker,  Sixth  Infantry;  J.  B. 
Jackson,  Seventh  Infantry;  R.  C.  Van  Vliet,  Tenth  Infantry;  James 
Fornance,  J.  B.  Guthrie,  and  H.  G.  Cavanaugh,  Thirteenth  Infantry;  William 
Lassiter,  W.  C.  McFarland,  and  T.  C.  Woodbury,  Sixteenth  Infantry;  H.  B. 
Moon  and  J.  B.  Rodman,  Twentieth  Infantry;  F.  B.  Jones,  J.  J.  Crittenden, 
and  Theodore  Mosher,  Twenty-second  Infantry;  A.  C.  Ducat  and  J.  J. 
Brereton,  Twenty-fourth  Infantry;  W.  S.  Warrener,  Second  Massachusetts 
Infantry,  and  Capt.  M.  J.  Henry,  commissary  of  subsistence  volunte^ 
First  Lieuts.  Arthur  Thayer,  A.  C.  Merrillat,  and  O.  B.  Meyer,  1  hird 
Cavalry;  W.  S.  Wood,  Ninth  Cavalry;  R.  L.  Livermore,  E.  D.  Anderson, 
and  M.  H.  Barnum,  Tenth  Cavalry;  W.  C.  Neary,  Fourth  Infantry;  J.  S. 
Grissard,  Seventh  Infantry;  J.  R.  Seyburn,  Eighth  Infantry;  Carl  Koops, 
Tenth  Infantry;  A.  B.  Scott,  Thirteenth  Infantry;  S.  W.  Dunning,  Sixteenth 
Infantry;  W.  M.  Dickinson,  Seventeenth  Infantry;  G.  J.  Godfrey,  Twenty- 
second  Infantry;  H.  G.  Lyon  and  J.  E.  Brett,  Twenty-fourth  Infantry;  R. 
C.  Day  and  J.  A.  Carr,  First  United  States  Volunteer  Cavalry.  Second 
Lieuts.  W.  C.  Short,  Sixth  Cavalry;  F.  R.  McCoy,  T.  A.  Roberts,  H.  C. 
Whitehead,  and  H.  O.  Williard,  Tenth  Cavalry;  B.  H.  Wells  and  W.  J.  Lutz, 
Second  Infantry;  J.  H.  Hughes,  Fourth  Infantry;  L.  H.  Gross,  C.  N. 
Purdy,  John  Robertson,  R.  S.  Turman,  and  W.  H.  Simons,  Sixth  Infantry; 
H.  A.  Lafferty,  Seventh  Infantry;  M.  C.  Saville,  Tenth  Infantry;  W.  E. 
Dove  and  Clark  Churchman,  Twelfth  Infantry;  L.  S.  Sorley  and  R.  E. 
Spence,  Sixteenth  Infantry;  B.  F.  Hardaway,  Seventeenth  Infantry;  F.  R. 
Meadc,  Twenty-first  Infantry;  W.  H.  Wassell,  Twenty-second  Infantry; 
Albert  Laws,  Twenty-fourth  Infantry;  J.  S.  Murdock  and  H.  L.  Kinnison, 


64o  THE    ARMY    OF    THE    UNITED    STATES. 

Twenty-fifth  Infantry;  D.  J.  Moynehan  and  C.  D.  Hapgood,  Second  Massa 
chusetts  Infantry;  W.  E.  Trull,  Seventy-first  New  York  Infantry;  D.  J. 
Leahy  and  H.  K.  Devereaux,  First  United  States  Volunteer  Cavalry,  and 
Acting  Second  Lieut,  (cadet  M.  A.)  Ernest  A.  Haskell,  First  United  States 
Volunteer  Cavalry. 

Operations  in  Porto  Rico,  July  25  to  August  13  (Maj.-Gen.  Nelson  A. 
Miles,  commanding) : 

July  25. — Guanica  road:   i  officer  and  3  enlisted  men  wounded. 

August  5. — Guayamo:  4  enlisted  men  wounded. 

August  8. — Four  miles  north  of  Guayamo:  5  enlisted  men  wounded. 

August  9. — Near  Coamo:  6  enlisted  men  wounded. 

August  10. — Hormigueros:  i  enlisted  man  killed;  i  officer  and  15  enlisted 
men  wounded.  Officer  wounded:  First  Lieut.  J.  C.  Byron,  Eighth  Cavalry, 
A.  D.  C.  to  General  Schwan. 

August  12. — Pass  near  Arbonito:  2  enlisted  men  killed;  2  officers  and  3 
enlisted  men  wounded.  Officers  wounded:  Capt.  F.  T.  Lee,  Third  Wisconsin 
Infantry,  and  Lieut.  J.  P.  Hains,  Third  Artillery. 

August  13. — At  crossing  of  the  Rio  Prieto,  near  Las  Marias:  No 
casualties. 

The  total  casualties  in  Porto  Rico  were  3  enlisted  men  killed  and  4 
officers  and  36  enlisted  men  wounded. 

Operations  in  Manila,  Philippines,  July  30  to  August  13  (Maj.-Gen. 
Wesley  Merritt,  commanding) : 

July  30  -  August  5. — In  the  trenches  ..before  Manila:  Thirteen  enlisted 
men  killed;  7  officers  and  57  enlisted  men  wounded. 

Officers  wounded :  Capts.  C.  V.  Hobbs,  Third  Artillery,  Reinhold  Richter, 
First  California  Infantry,  and  J.  A.  Loar,  Tenth  Pennsylvania  Infantry; 
First  Lieuts.  E.  F.  Davis,  First  California  Infantry,  and  R.  D.  Laird,  Tenth 
Pennsylvania  Infantry;  Second  Lieuts.  A.  J.  Buttermore  and  G.  L.  Gordon, 
Tenth  Pennsylvania  Infantry. 

August  13.— Assault  on  Manila:  4  enlisted  men  killed;  3  officers  and  39 
enlisted  men  wounded. 

Officers  wounded:  Capts.  Oscar  Seabach,  A.  W.  Bjornstad,  and  First 
Lieut.  C.  G.  Bunker,  Thirteenth  Minnesota  Infantry. 

The  total  casualties  in  Manila  were:  17  enlisted  men  killed,  10  officers  and 
96  men  wounded. 


THE    ARMY    OF    THE     UNITED    STATES. 


641 


Grand  total  of    casualties  in   killed  and   wounded  during  the  war  witlf 
Spain: 

, Killed ,  , Wounded , 

Enlisted  Enlisted 

Where —  Officers.       men.  Officers.        men. 

Cuba 23  237  99  1,332 

Porto  Rico 3  4  36 

Manila .  .  17  10  96 


Total   . 


•      •     •         23  257  113  1,464 

The  number  of  deaths  from  all  causes,  between  May  i  and  September  30 
inclusive,  as  reported  to  the  Adjutant-General's  office  up  to  October  3,  were: 
Killed,  23  officers  and  257  enlisted  men;  died  of  wounds,  4  officers  and  61 
enlisted  men;  died  of  disease,  80  officers  and  2,485  enlisted  men.  Total,  107 
officers  and  2,803  enlisted  men,  being  an  aggregate  of  2,910  out  of  a  total 
force  of  274,717  officers  and  men,  or  a  percentage  of  ijof^. 

Statement  showing  the  embarkation  of  Spanish  prisoners,  officers,  and 
enlisted  men,  and  the  wives  of  officers  and  their  children  over  5  years  of  age, 
priests,  monks,  and  sisters  of  charity,  from  Cuba  to  Spain,  as  reported  to  the 
Quartermaster-General's  office  by  Mr.  Solon  F.  Massey,  agent,  Quarter 
master's  Department: 


Name  of  vessel. 

Where 
embarked. 

Date  of 
embarkation. 

li 

Officers. 

Number  of  persons. 

Enlisted 
men. 

|| 

Women. 

Children. 

:  :  |  Priests  and 
to  '  :  _p>  «  1  monks. 

Sisters 
of  charity. 

1 

1,124 

2,237 
2,336 
651 
1,729 
2,555 
2,368 
960 
1,475 
754 
2,43" 
1,499 
1,133 
86 
910 
617 

Alicante          

Santiago 
Santiago 
Santiago 
Santiago 
Santiago 
Santiago 
Santiago 
Santiago 
Santiago 
Guantanamo 
Guantanamo 
Guantanamo 
Guantanamo 
Guantanamo 
Guantanamo 
Guantanamo 

Aug.    9 
Aug.  14 
Aug.  16 
Aug.  19 
Aug.  19 
Aug.  22 
Aug.  25 
Aug.  27 
Aug.  28 
Aug.  30 
Sept.     i 
Sept.     3 
Sept.     6 
Sept.  12 
Sept.  17 
Sept.  17 

38 
137 
109 

52 

99 
128 
136 

18 

100 

23 
113 

59 
15 

53 
65 
1  8 

1,163 

1,069 
2,056 
2,148 
565 
1,599 
2,359 
2,108 
905 
1,316 
726 
2,209 
1,408 
1,118 

1,107 
2,193 
2,257 

617 
1,698 

2,487 
2,244 
923 

1,416 

749 
2,322 
1,467 
i,i33 

53 
865 
606 

1  6 

34 

18 

19 

53 

12 

36 

2 
10 

I 
24 
45 
16 

7 
37 
69 
25 
23 

2 

57 
10 

3 

Isle  de  Luzon  

Covadonga 

Villaverde  

Isla  de  Panay 

P.  de  Satrustegui  
Montevideo        ..  .. 

2 

Cheribon          

Colon 



Colon 

Leo  XIII 

San  Ignacio 

i 

ii 

Leonora 

Ciudad  de  Cadiz 

14 
9 

e 
21 

i 

13 

San  Augustin 

800 

588 

20,974 

San  Francisco  

Total..., 

22,137 

331 

348 

21 

27 

22,864 

642 


THE    ARMY    OF    THE    UNITED    STATES. 


Principal  camps  of  United  States  troops,  dates  of  establishment,  and 
number  of  deaths  by  disease,  accidents,  etc.,  at  each  to  September  30,  as 
reported  to  the  Adjutant-General's  Office: 


Camps — 

Camp  Thomas,  Chickamauga  Park,  Ga.  .  . 
Camp  Cuba  Libre,  Jacksonville,  Fla. 

Tampa,  Fla 

Cuba  (not  including  killed  or  died  of  wounds) 
At  sea,  en  route  from  Cuba  to  Montauk  Point 
Camp  Wikoff,  Montauk  Point,  N.  Y. 

Manila,  Philippine  Islands 

Porto  Rico 

Camp  Alger,  near  Falls  Church  and  vicinity 

Camps  in  San  Francisco 

Camp  Poland,  Knoxville,  Tenn 

Camp  Shipp,  Anniston,  Ala 

Camp  Meade,  near  Middletown,  Pa.  .  .  . 
Camp  Hamilton,  Lexington,  Ky.  .  .  . 

Camp  Wheeler,  Huntsville,  Ala 

At  posts,  minor  camps,  etc 


Date  of 
establishment. 

Apr.  14 

May  26 

May     2 
June  22 
Aug.  and  Sept. 
Aug.     7 
June  30 

July  25 

May  1 8 

May  7 
Aug.  21 
Sept.  3 
Aug.  24 
Aug.  23 
Aug.  17 


Total 


Deaths. 

425 
246 

56 
427 

87 

257 

63 

'137 

107 

i39 
23 

12 
64 
29 

35 
378 

2,485 


The  report  of  the  Quartermaster-General,  M.  J..  Ludington,  gives  an  idea 
of  the  magnitude  of  the  problem  of  supplying  an  army  of  275,000  men  with 
the  machinery  and  stores  provided  for  an  army  of  25,000.  The  General  says: 

"This  Department  set  upon  this  task  without  a  moment's  delay;  every 
known  expedient  was  at  once  resorted  to  with  a  view  to  obtaining  the  neces 
sary  quartermaster  supplies.  Many  difficulties  were  in  the  way.  Contracts 
were  promptly  entered  into  for  all  the  articles  of  clothing  and  camp  equipage 
for  which  there  would  be  an  early  demand,  great  care  being  taken  to  prevent 
the  supply  of  articles  of  inferior  quality.  The  kerseys  and  flannels  of  stand 
ard  quality  used  for  making  army  blouses  and  trousers  were  not  to  be  had  in 
the  market,  and  it  was  necessary  to  have  them  manufactured.  In  the  mean 
time,  the  Department,  as  far  as  possible,  endeavored  to  procure  articles  con 
forming  as  nearly  as  practicable  to  existing  standards,  but  had  to  resort,  at 
first,  to  some  extent,  to  the  purchase  of  dark-blue  trousers,  so  that  the  men 
might  be  quickly  supplied." 


THE     ARMY    OF    THE    UNITED    STATES. 


643 


The  peace  and  war  figures  of  the  principal  articles  purchased  or  con 
tracted  for  are  instructive  when  the  two  periods  are  contrasted : 

July    I,    1897,     to  May    1,    1898,     to 

Apr.  30,  1898,  10  Aug.  15.  1898,  3"2 

mouths  peace  months  war 

period.  period. 

lyankets,  wool 22,000  546,338 

Blouses       274,232 

Caps,  forage 77,000  230,000 

Canvas,  fatigue  coats  .     .     .     .              31,601 

Canvas  fatigue  trousers,  pairs  .     .         3 1,590 

Drawers,  canton  flannel,  pairs       50,000 

Drawers,  summer,  pairs  ....         43,340  1,056,990 

Field  and  summer  uniforms      153,169 

Hats,  campaign 18,040  476,705 

Leggins 11,000  588,800 

Overcoats        129,000 

Ponchos,  rubber 32,925  325,385 

Shirts,  dark  blue  flannel        548,634 

Shoes,  barrack,  pairs        76,093 

Shoes,  calfskin,  pairs 27,950  782,303 

Stockings,  cotton,  pairs         1,996,699 

Stockings,  woolen,  pairs       .     .     .         40,006  150,942 

It  is  not  surprising  to  learn  that  "the  shoes  procured  at  the  outbreak  of 
hostilities,  and  which  were  found  to  be  essential  for  the  immediate  equipment 
of  the  organizations  then  being  rapidly  mustered  into  service,  did  not  conform 
altogether  to  the  newly  adopted  army  shoe." 

This  does  not  look  like  inattention:  "The  clothing  of  part  of  the  troops 
returning  from  Cuba  was  ordered  to  be  destroyed  to  prevent  contagion,  and 
the  issue  to  each  of  the  men,  free  of  charge,  of  another  suit  in  lieu  of  the  one 
destroyed  was  authorized.  Similar  issue  was  also  made  to  the  men  in  hos 
pitals  whose  clothing  was  destroyed  for  the  same  reason." 

There  is  much  said  in  few  words  in  this  paragraph : 

"Fourteen  ships  were  chartered  to  June  30,  1898,  on  the  Pacific  coast, 
having  a  total  tonnage  of  41,152  and  carrying  capacity  of  629  officers  and  13,059 
men,  with  their  complete  outfit  of  camp  and  garrison  equipage,  arms,  ammu 
nition,  medical  and  subsistence  stores  for  a  voyage  of  over  7,000  miles. "  And 
this  was  without  a  serious  accident.  The  movements  of  troops  up  to  Septem 
ber  15  was:  to  Cuba,  28,195;  to  Porto  Rico,  17,460;  to  Manila,  16,405;  to 


644  THE    ARMY    OF    THE    UNITED    STATES. 

Honolulu,  629;  returned  from  Cuba,  21,686;  returned  from  Porto  Rico,  5,541; 
civilian  employe's  transported,  2,920;  the  total  being  92,863. 

A  resume  of  the  work  done  by  the  Quartermaster's  Department  at 
Tampa  in  the  short  space  of  four  months  is  as  follows:  Army  corps  equipped, 
2;  freight  cars  handled  (loaded  or  unloaded),  13,239;  officers  and  men  trans 
ported,  66,478;  horses  and  mules  transported,  15,309;  horses  and  mules 
received,  11,389;  horses  and  mules  issued,  9,919;  wagons  "set  up,"  604; 
teams  "broken  out"  (6  mules),  141 ;  teams  "broken  out"  (4  mules),  520;  pack 
trains  equipped,  21;  wagons  and  ambulances  repaired,  699;  transports  fitted 
out,  33;  transports  cleared,  78. 

The  Quartermaster  in  his  general  summary  observes:  "Practically  every 
thing  needed  for  the  largely  increased  army  had  to  be  purchased  or  manu 
factured  and  then  transported  to  the  numerous  camps." 

During  the  fiscal  year  ending  June  30,  1898,  transportation  was  furnished 
for  709,617  persons,  60,632  animals,  and  1,529,585  tons  of  war  material. 

One  of  the  public  complaints,  widespread  and  bitter,  of  the  disadvantages 
to  which  our  soldiers  were  exposed  when  facing  the  enemy  at  Santiago  and 
Manila,  was  that  the  Spaniards  had  the  advantage  of  us  in  smokeless  powder, 
and  that  their  rifle,  the  Mauser,  was  an  excellent  long-range  gun.  General 
D.  W.  Flagler,  Chief  of  Ordnance,  gives  in  his  report  to  the  Secretary  of 
War  this  interesting  information: 

"The  especial  advantage  of  the  magazine  rifle  is  its  reserve  of  five 
cartridges  in  the  magazine,  the  very  important  advantage  of  its  flatter  tra 
jectory,  and  the  lighter  weight  of  its  ammunition,  which  enables  the  soldier 
to  carry  more  cartridges.  The  most  serious  defect  of  the  Springfield  rifle 
during  the  war  was  the  fact  that  at  the  origin  nothing  but  charcoal  powder 
could  be  furnished  for  it.  As  rapidly  as  possible  this  defect  was  overcome, 
and  the  manufacture  of  smokeless  ammunition  for  the  caliber  .45  rifle  was 
carried  on  extensively.  The  large  reserve  of  Springfield  rifles  on  hand  will 
be  supplied  with  smokeless-powder  cartridges  should  their  use  become  neces 
sary  in  the  future,  a  use  which  is  not  now  anticipated.  The  arms,  however, 
are  being  cleaned  and  repaired  and  made  fit  for  service  as  rapidly  as 
turned  in. 

"Reports  of  officers  who  were  in  the  Santiago  campaign,  as  received  by 
a  speci-al  board  which  proceeded  to  Montauk  Point  to  investigate  the  subject, 
confirm  the  excellence  of  the  magazine  rifle,  caliber  .30,  in  all  respects. 


THE    ARMY    OF    THE    UNITED    STATES.  645 

Notwithstanding  rough  usage,  unusual  exposure  in  a  bad  climate,  which  pre 
vented  the  exercise  of  the  usual  care  in  preserving  the  arm,  the  breech 
mechanism  is  reported  to  have  worked  smoothly  and  well." 

The  American  magazine  rifle  has  had  fastened  upon  it  the  name  Krag- 
Jorgensen.  General  Flagler  says: 

"At  Springfield  Arsenal  there  were  manufactured  up  to  June  30,  1898, 
some  30,000  magazine  rifles,  12,000  magazine  carbines,  an  output  of  about 
11,000  more  than  during  the  last  fiscal  year,  but  this  does  not  show  the  large 
increase  incident  to  the  war.  The  maximum  was  not  reached  until  August 
13,  when  about  370  per  day,  or  over  100,000  per  year,  were  being  manufac 
tured.  The  average  daily  output  before  March  15  was  about  120.  This  out 
put  was  gradually  increased  to  the  maximum  by  working  double  shifts  of  men 
and  putting  them  on  as  rapidly  as  was  practicable.  The  utmost  output  at 
Springfield  with  the  present  plant  would  not  exceed  about  500  per  day.  In 
February  the  manufacturers  were  given  orders  to  work  on  smokeless  powder  to 
their  full  capacity.  Under  these  orders,  with  the  charcoal  powder  obtained, 
the  amount  on  hand  brought  the  supply  up  to  a  reasonably  safe  point.  The 
first  issues  of  powder  for  field  and  siege  guns  were  made  from  charcoal  powder 
on  hand;  but  before  the  end  of  May  the  supply  of  smokeless  powder  was 
ready,  and  this  was  issued  thereafter." 

The  Secretary  of  War  remarks: 

"The  supply  of  powder  was  a  most  troublesome  question  at  the  outbreak 
of  the  war.  There  are  only  two  establishments  in  this  country  which  manu 
facture  smokeless  powder,  and  they  own  patents  upon  the  process.  These, 
however,  like  all  other  companies  called  to  aid  the  government,  responded 
with  alacrity,  ran  their  works  day  and  night,  and  produced  in  a  short  time  an 
ample  supply.  The  same  can  be  said  for  all  manufacturers  of  tents,  cloth 
ing,  all  kinds  of  guns,  cartridges,  and  other  war  material,  and  but  for  their 
most  energetic  exertions  we  would  have  been  sadly  deficient." 

The  Secretary  recommends  that  there  should  be  500,000  magazine  rifles 
in  our  arsenals.  General  Greeley,  in  his  report  on  the  Signal  Service,  says 
the  work  of  the  corps  "affords  a  beautiful  example  of  the  rapidity  and 
efficiency  with  which  electrical  communications  can  be  established  and  main 
tained  between  military  posts  and  advancing  armies  when  the  commanding 
general  of  such  armies  takes  proper  eq'.nrv.-  ;>nd  instances:  "The  peace 

protocol  reached  the  outposts  of  Generals  Kr  n.ke.  Wilson,  and  Henry  within 


646  THE    ARMY    OF    THE    UNITED    STATES. 

thirty-three  minutes  of  the  time  it  was  received  at  Ponce,  and  thus  prevented 
battles  at  two  points  where  the  troops  were  moving  out." 

One  hundred  and  seventy  miles  of  line  were  operated  in  Porto  Rico  when 
the  end  of  the  war  came.  General  Greeley  says: 

"Cables  had  to  be  manufactured  to  order,  steamer  chartered,  cable  gear 
obtained,  and  the  Chief  Signal  Officer  opened  negotiations  with  commercial 
telegraph  companies  whereby  the  whole  system  would  be  harmonious.  As  a 
result  of  two  months'  labor,  the  Signal  Corps  opened  a  station  at  Cainanera, 
Guantanamo  Bay,  June  20,  a  day  in  advance  of  the  landing  of  General 
Shafter's  army,  and  within  five  minutes  telegraphically  of  the  Executive 
Mansion  and  War  Department." 

The  pages  of  this  volume  given  to  telegrams  prove  that  this  marvelous 
connection  between  the  President  and  headquarters  in  the  field  did  not,  as  has 
been  the  rule  in  wars,  cripple  the  armies,  taking  the  initiative  out  of  the  gen 
erals  commanding  and  confronting  the  enemy,  but,  on  tlie  contrary,  energized 
them,  and  constantly  facilitated  rather  than  retarded  the  decisive  movements. 

Next  to  the  belated  and  scandalous  disturbance  about  fresh  meat,  there 
was  the  most  disheartening  palaver  and  clamorous  outcry  relating  to  water 
in  the  camps,  and  the  spot  selected  to  overwhelm  this  storm  was  the  camp  at 
Chickamauga  Park.  And  yet  twenty-seven  wells  were  drilled  through  the 
solid  rock  underlying  the  park,  though  springs  abounded.  General  H.  V. 
Boynton,  of  the  Park  Commission,  says: 

"By  casing  and  surrounding  the  wells  at  the  surface  with  masonry  set  in 
hydraulic  cement,  surface  contamination  was  rendered  impossible.  While 
this  work  was  in  progress  an  emergency  pipe  line,  designed  primarily  to  pro 
vide  water  for  cooking,  for  the  large  number  of  animals,  and  for  washing,  was 
recommended  and  authorized  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  constructed  by  the 
engineer  of  the  park.  The  intake  was  established  on  Chickamauga  Creek  at 
the  farthest  point  of  park  ownership  of  the  stream,  and  above  any  possible 
wash  from  the  camps,  in  spite  of  all  that  has  been  asserted  to  the  contrary. 
This  stream  is  fed  entirely  from  mountain  springs,  arid  the  valley  it  flows 
through  is  exceptionally  clean  and  wholesome.  Ten  miles  of  mains  and 
laterals  were  expeditiously  laid,  furnishing  abundant  water  to  nearly  all  the 
camps,  and  shower  baths  for  all  who  cared  to  arrange  them. 

"All  the  springs  and  wells  on  the  park,  and  the  water  of  the  pipe  line, 
were  analyzed  by  competent  chemical  authority  as  soon  as  any  question  was 


THE    ARMY    OF    THE    UNITED    STATES.  647 

raised  as  to  the  purity  of  the  water  supply,  and  all  in  use  by  troops  pro 
nounced  fit  for  domestic  use,  except  two  wells,  which  at  first  were  regarded 
as  doubtful,  and  their  use  stopped,  but  which  were  found  by  more  thorough 
analyses  to  be  good.  The  pipe-line  water  was  twice  analyzed  chemically,  and 
once  bacteriologically  by  Dr.  C.  F.  Craig  of  the  army,  a  recognized  authority, 
and  pronounced  good.  While  the  water  supply  of  the  park  was  abundant  and 
wholesome,  the  outcry  against  it,  though  not  based  on  analyses,  became  so 
general  as  to  lead  to  much  hauling  of  spring  water  for  considerable  distances, 
to  the  great  inconvenience  of  the  troops  and  the  hospitals,  and  the  unneces 
sary  disturbance  of  the  country." 

There  is  no  doubt  that  a  good  deal  of  bad  stuff  called  "beef"  was  sent  to 
the  army,  and  it  has  been  decorated  with  the  descriptive  word  "embalmed," 
while  it  is  asserted  that  "chemicals"  were  used,  and  frightful  fluids  injected 
— something  different  from  the  common  chemistry  of  salt,  we  infer.  The 
magnificent  energies  of  the  modern  journalism  were  largely  bestowed  upon 
this  chemical  terror,  and  after  a  war  into  which  the  Administration  of  the 
Government  was  forced  when  there  was  a  plentiful  lack  of  preparation  and 
through  which  the  Nation  passed  triumphantly,  there  was  a  sensation  that 
rivaled  the  Dreyfus  scandal  in  France,  but  fortunately  Americans  are  less 
excitable  and  fantastic  in  expression  than  Frenchmen. 

The  motive  forces  of  the  emotion  seemed  to  spring  from  the  soil  where 
there  was  a  failure  to  cultivate  the  primary  opportunities  in  the  season  when 
the  seed  was  sown  for  the  harvest  of  events.  The  personalities  that  figured 
in  the  unseemly  proceedings  need  not  be  noticed.  They  were  embodiments  of 
vanities  and  other  weaknesses  of  ostentation  that  lacks  substantiality.  The  pose 
of  passion  that  was  full  of  tears  and  has  a  tendency  to  tatters  may  be  forgiven 
sooner  than  the  pride  that  stooped  to  folly  and  fancies  cloudy  campaigns. 

Napoleon  and  Wellington  had  tormenting  troubles  with  the  providers  of 
provisions,  meats  in  particular,  for  their  armies,  and  prescribed  the  shooting 
of  the  commissaries;  and  Patrick  Henry  heaped  an  immortality  of  ridicule 
upon  a  contractor  who  had  sold  beef  to  the  old  Continentals,  filling  the  air 
with  cries  of  "Beef,  beef!"  Some  of  the  journals  that  in  their  majestic  pre 
sumption  not  only  conducted  the  war,  but  claimed  the  honor  of  causing  it, 
and  indulged  in  the  tropical  luxuriance  of  their  imagination,  sounded  the 
brasses,  and  blowed  the  wind  about  their  luxuriant  theme. 

There  was  enough  shown  of  carelessness,  experimental  or  speculative,  or 


648  THE    ARMY    OF    THE    UNITED    STATES. 

of  a  lack  of  executive  intelligence  in  discrimination,  to  warrant  anger,  but  the 
exaggeration  of  details  that  offend,  distort  and  magnify  until  wrath  is  wasted 
in  weariness,  and  there  is  a  stage  set  with  strange  scenery,  reminding  one  of 
the  poetry  of  a  lunatic  describing  a  wilderness  in  which  his  mind  was  lost : 

"Yonder  indigenous  endogen  wave 

Banner-like  blades  from  a  mystical  bole, 
And  with  a  vigor  perennial,  brave 
Boreal  blasts  from  the  Alien  pole." 

Fresh  meat  is  hard  to  manage  in  hot  countries  in  good  form,  whatever 
may  be  the  experimental  chemistry  of  speculation.  The  ship  anchored  near 
est  the  flagship  of  Admiral  Dewey  in  Manila  Bay  was  a  Belgian  cold-storage 
iron  steamer  from  Australia,  filled  with  frozen  beef  and  mutton.  A  boat-load 
of  it  was  conveyed  to  the  deck  of  the  Olympia  every  day,  placed  on  and  cov 
ered  by  a  sail,  that  it  might  slowly  thaw.  If  the  flesh  is  released  from  the  ice 
suddenly,  if  cooked  before  the  process  of  thawing  is  complete,  it  turns  black 
and  cannot  be  eaten,  loses  flavor  and  acts  like  something  "embalmed."  Let 
the  thaw  occur  gradually,  and  the  beef  and  mutton  become — it  is  the 
Admiral's  word — "delicious." 

The  fact  as  to  the  embalmed  beef  is  that,  as  it  was  known  the  meat  of 
steers  became  ill-flavored  in  from  twelve  to  sixteen  hours,  there  was  offered 
an  experiment  in  fresh  meat  alleged  to  have  been  prepared  so  that  it  would 
remain  good  seventy  hours.  It  was  referred  to  General  Young,  who  reported 
against  the  experiment.  Then  permission  was  asked  to  put  some  of  it  on  two 
transports  for  trial.  That  was  granted.  The  experiment  failed,  and  the 
stuff  was  thrown  overboard. 

Lieutenant  Jose  Muller  is  the  Spanish  officer  who  called  on  Lieutenant 
Hobson  in  Morro  Castle  and  insisted  upon  asking  him  questions  with  an  air  of 
severity,  but  was  questioned  himself,  and  it  finally  developed  that  he  had  been 
playing  a  part  of  intimidation,  he  and  Hobson  separating  as  good  friends  in 
pleasant  fellowship.  His  account  of  the  battles  and  capitulation  of  Santiago 
de  Cuba  is  valuable,  and  we  quote  from  his  work  passages  of  interest  to  the 
American  army  and  all  students  of  its  history.  He  says  of  the  situation  of 
the  city  in  the  middle  of  June: 

"One  of  the  first  articles  that  gave  out  was  flour,  and  no  bread  could  be 
baked.  Hardtack  (galleta)  was  used  instead,  but  only  a  few  people  could  pay 
for  it;  there  was  no  milk  to  be  had,  indispensable  for  the  sick  and  for  babie? 


THE    ARMY    OF    THE    UNITED    STATES.  649 

The  soldiers  commenced  to  eat  bread  made  of  rice  and  rice  boiled  in  water, 
which  weakened  them  very  much ;  and  though  they  were  not  suffering  actual 
hunger,  everybody  knew  that  calamity  was  not  far  off  and  was  inevitable,  for 
no  provisions  could  be  expected,  either  by  land  or  sea." 

It  was  the  scarcity  of  provisions,  Lieutenant  Muller  says,  that  "compelled 
General  Linares  to  defend  the  line,  which,  beginning  at  Ermitano  and  pass 
ing  through  El  Caney,  San  Miguel  de  Lajas,  Quintero  Hill  and  the  hills  of  La 
Caridad  and  Veguita,  would  protect  the  railway  to  Sabanilla  and  Moron  and 
the  aqueduct.  If  the  troops  could  have  maintained  this  line,  they  would  not 
have  suffered  for  lack  of  wrater,  as  they  did  in  some  positions,  nor  would  the 
food,  as  long  as  we  remained  in  possession  of  the  cultivated  region,  have  been 
reduced  to  rice  bread  and  rice  boiled  in  water,  which  the  soldiers  could  not 
stand  and  which  made  them  unfit  for  active  operations.  There  was  nothing 
left  in  Santiago  except  rice,  and  only  500,000  extra  cartridges  outside  of  the 
regular  supply  of  the  soldiers,  namely,  150  each;  for  although  there  were 
many  more  included  in  the  surrender  of  the  Park,  they  are  of  the  Remington, 
Argentine  Mauser,  and  other  types,  and  of  calibers  differing  from  those  of  the 
Spanish  Mauser,  which  is  the  weapon  carried  by  almost  all  of  our  forces.  Of 
course,  150  cartridges  are  used  up  very  rapidly. 

"If  El  Caney  and  the  San  Juan  position  had  not  been  taken  we  should  not 
have  lost  our  communications  with  the  cultivated  region,  nor  would  the 
aqueduct  have  been  cut,  and  it  is  easy  enough  to  understand  how  much  these 
two  things  had  to  do  with  later  events. 

"The  ships  would  no  doubt  have  reduced  the  city  to  ashes  and  ruin,  but 
there  would  have  been  water  and  more  provisions,  and  the  army  would  have 
been  able  to  maintain  itself  and  fight,  at  least  until  the  last  cartridge  was  gone. " 

Here  the  lamentation  comes  in  that  the  insurgent  Cubans  had  held  back 
Escario's  column,  with  which  it  is  assumed  that  the  long  line  could  have  been 
maintained  on  the  2yth  of  June. 

"The  Vesuvius  had  discharged  two  bombs  the  preceding  night,  one  com 
pletely  destroying  the  house  of  the  lighthouse  keeper,  the  other  seriously 
damaging  the  fortress,  wounding  three  sailors  of  the  Mercedes,  and  a  soldier 
of  the  garrison."  And  yet  the  German  Admiral  who  has  been  writing  of  the 
lessons  of  America  for  the  benefit  of  our  countrymen  pronounces  the  dyna 
mite  boat  as  without  value.  The  Spaniards  by  watching  the  transport  ships 
Vere  able  to  tell  approximately  the  number  of  the  Americans  on  hand. 


650  THE    ARMY    OF    THE    UNITED    STATES. 

This  account  is  given  of  the  numbers  and  organization  of  the  defenders 
of  Santiago: 

"The  advance  post  of  Caney  (a  league  and  a  half — about  6  miles — from 
the  city),  in  command  of  General  Vara  del  Rey,  was  defended  by  three  com 
panies  of  the  battalion  'Constitucion'  (the  29th),  one  company  of  guerrillas 
on  foot,  in  all  430  men,  40  soldiers  of  the  Santiago  regiment,  and  50  of  the 
mobilized  troops,  being  a  total  of  520  men. 

"The  line  of  the  precinct  (9  kilometers),  extending  from  Dos  Caminos  del 
Cobre,  west  of  the  city,  to  the  fort  of  Punta  Blanca,  to  the  east,  on  the  sea 
shore,  was  defended  by  the  following  forces: 

Corps  of  sailors  from  the  fleet  (four  second  companies)  ...  458 

Four  companies  of  the  Provisional  Battalion  of  Puerto  Rico     .  450 

Talavera  Battalion,  No.  4  (Peninsular)          850 

Four  companies  of  the  San  Fernando  Battalion,  No.  u       .  440 

Total,  army 2,J98 

Three  companies  of  mobilized  troops 330 

Volunteers 440 

Total 2,968 

"Also  a  small  number  of  gunners,  for  there  was  not  a  sufficient  number 
to  serve  the  guns  installed.  It  may  therefore  be  said  that  there  were,  in 
round  numbers,  3,000  men.  This  was  the  fighting  force."  There  was  also 
the  cavalry,  the  firemen  and  970  men  at  the  mouth  of  the  harbor. 

The  Spanish  story  of  the  battles  of  El  Caney  and  San  Juan  is  intensely 
interesting.  General  Vara  del  Rey  had  520  men,  with  two  Plasincia  guns, 
and  the  position  of  San  Juan  was  occupied  by  250  men.  They  claimed  that 
General  Wheeler  had  12,000  men,  a  remarkable  exaggeration.  Another 
statement  is  that  Wheeler's  command  was  3,500  men,  supported  by  another 
brigade,  "while  Colonel  Chaff ee,  with  2,000  men,  attacked  the  hill  and  fort  of 
San  Juan."  Lieutenant  Muller  says: 

"The  Americans,  it  must  be  acknowledged,  fought  that  day  \vith  truly 
admirable  courage  and  spirit.  The  houses  of  El  Caney,  which  General  Vara 
with  his  520  men  converted  into  as  many  fortresses,  threw  forth  a  hail  of  pro 
jectiles  upon  the  enemy,  while  one  company  after  another,  without  any  pro 
tection,  rushed  with  veritable  fury  upon  the  city.  The  first  company  having 
been  decimated,  another  appeared,  then  a  third,  and  still  another,  and  those 


THE    ARMY    OF    THE    UNITED    STATES.  651 

soldiers  resembled  moving  statues  (if  I  may  be  permitted  that  expression  for 
want  of  a  better)  rather  than  men ;  but  they  met  heroes,  and  although  the 
houses  had  been-  riddled  with  bullets  by  the  artillery  and  musketry,  and 
although  the  streets  were  obstructed  with  dead  and  wounded,  El  Caney  had 
been  converted  into  a  veritable  volcano,  vomiting  forth  lava  and  making  it 
impossible  to  go  near  it. 

"Both  sides  being  short  of  forces  and  out  of  breath,  almost  without  having 
stirred  from  their  relative  positions,  the  battle  ceased  for  some  time,  and 
General  Vara  del  Rey  took  advantage  of  this  circumstance  to  have  his  sol 
diers  re-form  the  lines  and  again  get  ready  for  the  battle. 

'General  Linares,  who  was  repulsing  the  attacks  at  the  position  of  San 
Juan,  upon  learning  the  result  of  these  assaults,  warmly  congratulated  the 
handful  of  lions  in  these  words:  'When  the  American  army  attacked  El  Caney 
they  had  not  counted  on  a  general  of  Vara  del  Rey's  stamp  and  on  troops  as 
fiery  and  inured  to  warfare  as  those  he  had  under  his  command.' 

"The  fighting  commenced  once  more,  and  the  enemy  attacked  again  and 
again,  being  always  repulsed,  but  as  we  had  no  reserve  forces,  and  the 
Americans,  on  the  contrary,  had  a  great  many,  the  battle  was  no  longer  pos 
sible  under  these  circumstances.  The  General  was  wounded  almost  simul 
taneously  in  both  legs  by  two  musket  balls,  and  as  he  was  being  carried  away 
on  a  stretcher,  the  bullets  falling  around  him  like  hail,  he  was  killed  by  a 
third  one,  at  the  same  moment  as  two  of  the  men  who  were  carrying  him. 

"The  greater  part  of  the  commanders  and  officers  (among  them  two  rela 
tives  of  the  General)  were  dead  or  wounded,  as  also  the  majority  of  the  sol 
diers.  Finally,  at  7  p.  in.,  the  commander  being  dead  and  those  520  men 
having  been  reduced  to  less  than  100,  and  most  of  these  slightly  wounded  and 
bruised,  that  handful  of  heroes,  for  want  of  forces  and  a  commander,  retreated 
from,  the  site,  which  for  ten  hours  they  had  been  defending  without  being  able 
to  get  any  reinforcements,  for  there  were  none  to  be  had,  and  the  enemy 
occupied  the  position  in  which  he  in  his  turn  had  made  such  a  bold  attack." 

Only  eighty  of  the  520  Spaniards  who  fought  at  El  Caney  returned.  The 
Spaniards  organized  and  entrenched  at  San  Juan,  and  "the  Americans 
attacked  about  noon  with  cannon,  machine  gun  and  musket  fire.  The  Spanish 
position  became  critical,"  as  "one  half  of  the  officers  had  fallen  under  the 
action  of  the  lead  that  wras  pouring  down  upon  the  line.  The  enemy  was 
advancing  in  large  and  compact  masses,  firmly  resolved  to  take  the  positions, 


652  THE    ARMY    OF    THE     UNITED    STATES. 

but  Baquero,  the  brave  soldier  who  had  distinguished  himself  so  highly  in  the 
campaign,  was  there,  keeping  up  by  his  example  the  spirit  of  the  troops, 
almost  annihilated  by  hunger  and  fatigue,  and  decimated  by  the  clouds  of  bul 
lets  and  grapeshot. 

"At  this  critical  moment  the  cavalry  was  ordered  to  advance  rapidly  in 
order  to  protect  the  retreat  of  Colonel  Baquero 's  forces  and  save  the  artillery 
if  possible.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Sierra  hastened  to  carry  out  the  order,  as 
Commander  Arraiz  had  done  before  him  at  San  Juan. 

"The  line  which  General  Linares  commanded  personally  now  formed  the 
vanguard.  With  his  assistance  the  General's  aids  and  his  chief  of  staff  had  to 
organize  the  remnants  of  the  first  line. 

"It  was  necessary  to  maintain  that  position  at  any  cost,  for  its  loss  would 
give  the  enemy  free  entrance  into  the  city.  The  brave  men  of  the  first  line 
were  retreating.  Colonel  Baquero  had  disappeared,  killed,  no  doubt,  when  he 
led  that  retreat  under  the  hail  of  grapeshot  and  lead.  The  enemy  was 
advancing  in  compact  masses,  and  rushing  upon  what  was  now  the  first  line. 
Fortunately,  the  fire  of  our  infantry,  accurately  aimed,  compelled  the  Ameri 
cans  to  recede,  and  they  retreated  behind  the  positions  of  San  Juan.  At  that 
moment  General  Linares  and  the  brave  commander  of  infantry,  Arraiz,  fell 
wounded;  the  latter  officer,  who  had  already  shed  his  blood  at  Cacarajicara, 
was  one  of  the  most  beautiful  examples  of  the  army. 

"The  San  Juan  forces  tried  once  more  to  recover  themselves.  Others  came 
to  their  assistance,  among  them  the  company  of  marines  which  had  been 
stationed  at  the  Plaza  de  Toros  with  Captain  Bustamente ;  but  the  enemy  was 
already  strongly  occupying  the  position,  our  forces  were  scant,  and  success 
was  impossible. ' ' 

The  Spanish  writer  speaks  of  "the  cruel  battles  of  El  Caney  and  San 
Juan."  At  3:30,  at  the  Plaza  de  Dolores,  he  met  General  Linares.  He* was 
on  a  stretcher  being  carried  to  his  house.  The  battle  was  at  an  end,  and 
"many  commanders  and  officers  were  arriving  all  tired  out  and  almost  dying 
from  thirst."  The  Spanish  hospital  was  near  the  trenches,  and  "musket 
balls  were  falling  in  great  quantities  in  the  court  and  on  the  roof.  Later  on 
shells  were  flying  in  all  directions."  The  loss  of  El  Caney  was  the  loss  of 
both  provisions  and  water  by  the  Spaniards,  and  the  writer  we  are  quoting 
gave  up  the  ghost  of  a  chance  in  these  words: 

"We  had  to  confine  ourselves  to  the  defense  of  the  precinct,  knowing  full 


THE    ARMY    OF    THE    UNITED    STATES.  653 

well  that,  though  the  sad  end  might  be  held  off  for  a  day  or  two  longer,  there 
was  no  possibility  of  avoiding  it." 

He  claims  that  the  Americans  were  inspired  by  the  fighting  of  the  Span 
iards  with  respectful  admiration;  and  says  the  Americans  did  not  after  the  ist 
of  July  expose  themselves  as  on  that  day,  but  "entrenched  themselves  and  set 
up  their  artillery  as  fast  as  they  received  it,  and  did  not  again  come  out  from 
behind  their  fortifications."  And  "it  was  difficult  to  convince  them  that  only 
520  men  had  been  defending  El  Caney  for  ten  hours.  When  doubt  was  no 
longer  possible,  their  admiration  had  no  limits.  When  they  entered  Santiago 
de  Cuba  the  American  soldiers  and  ours  looked  upon  each  other  without  any 
prejudice  or  jealousy,  perhaps  because  they  knew  that  both  had  fought  like 
brave  men,  and  whenever  the  Americans  saw  one  of  our  men  of  the  Twenty- 
ninth  (the  number  of  the  battalion  'Constitucion, '  which  had  defended  the 
city,  and  has  been  referred  to  so  many  times)  they  would  call  him,  look  at 
him,  and  treat  him  with  great  admiration,  wondering,  perhaps,  how  so  simple 
a  soldier  could  do  such  great  things. 

"The  men  of  the  Twenty-ninth,  known  to  have  done  something  worth 
doing,  were  loved  and  feasted  by  every  one  and  spent  whole  hours  with  the 
Americans,  who  did  not  understand  them,  but  applauded  everything  they  said, 
on  the  assumption,  perhaps,  that  he  who  is  brave  must  also  be  bright. 

"Incidents  like  these  1  saw,  not  once,  but  a  hundred  times,  and  they  have 
made  me  believe  and  say  what  I  have  stated.  I  may  be  mistaken,  but  I  do 
not  believe  it,  because  I  have  also  noticed  that  the  Yankees  treat  the  insur 
gents,  although  they  are  their  allies,  very  differently." 

According  to  their  own  list,  the  casualties  of  the  Spaniards  were: 

Killed:  Brigadier-General  Joaquin  Vara  del  Rey,  3  commanders,  12 
officers,  and  78  men. 

Missing:  Colonel  of  Infantry  Jose  Baquero,  4  officers,  and  116  men. 
The  Colonel  was  probably  killed,  but  this  could  not  be  verified. 

Prisoners:  Two  officers. 

Wounded:  Lieutenant-General  Arsenio  Linares  Pombo,  6  commanders, 
30  officers,  and  339  men. 

(Among  the  wounded  officers  was  Colonel  of  Engineers  Caula  and  Colonel 
of  Artillery  Ordonez).  Total,  595. 

The  Spanish  story  of  the  siege  is  that  the  Americans  opened  fire  by  land 
and  sea.  "Each  hour  that  elapsed  fortified  the  circle  that  enclosed  us,"  and 


654  THE    ARMY    OF    THE    UNITED    STATES. 

in  the  night  the  Americans  "kept  up  most  incessantly  a  violent  musket  and 
terrific  gun  fire."  bombarded  the  city,  dismounted  one  of  the  two  effective 
guns  on  the  Socapa,  and  on  the  26.  of  July  the  companies  of  the  fleet 
embarked,  and  "a  pilot  was  sent  to  each  one  of  the  ships,  which  latter  took  in 
their  boats  and  steam  launches  and  loosened  the  spring  on  their  cables,  and 
the  gunboat  Alvarado,  which  had  come  out  of  the  slip  and  was  afloat,  raised 
at  night  the  six  Bustamente  torpedoes  that  were  obstructing  the  channel  to 
the  west.  Everything  indicated,  without  leaving  room  for  doubt,  that  the 
fleet  was  about  to  go  out;  but  when  and  how?"  That  question  was  answered 
the  next  morning.  Even  that  night  the  Spaniards  believed  there  was  a  fleet 
coming  from  Spain  to  the  rescue  of  Santiago.  On  the  next  day  after  the 
destruction  of  Cervera's  fleet,  July  4th,  Lieutenant  Muller  says,  the  Mercedes 
was  sunk  to  obstruct  the  harbor  channel. 

"As  the  interior  of  the  harbor  did  no  longer  have  the  safeguard  of  the 
fleet,  as  the  Bustamente  torpedoes  (six  of  them)  had  been  taken  up  so  that  the 
fleet. could  go  out,  and  had  not  yet  been  replaced,  and  as,  finally,  the  first  line 
of  mines  no  longer  existed,  the  commander  of  marine  decided — General  Toral 
also  being  of  his  opinion — to  sink  the  Mercedes." 

This  took  place  about  noon,  the  harbor  having  been  open  twenty-four 
hours  for  our  victorious  and  unharmed  squadron,  and  one  of  the  two 
guns  that  fought  our  fleet  at  the  mouth  of  the  harbor  was  dismounted.  If 
advantage  had  been  taken  of  the  situation,  the  controversy  between  Shafter 
and  Sampson,  representing  the  army  and  the  navy,  might  have  been 
avoided. 

After  the  departure  of  Cervera's  fleet  from  the  harbor,  and  from  life,  the 
streets  of  Santiago  were  "dark  as  wolves'  dens,"  and  infested  by  robbers. 
General  Toral  issued  a  decree  that,  "All  soldiers  who  shall  destroy  or  set  on 
fire  buildings  or  property,  or  commit  any  acts  of  violence  on  persons,  shall  be 
punished  by  confinement  in  the  penitentiary  for  life,  after  previous  degrada 
tion,  in  conformity  with  Article  239  of  the  Code  of  Military  Justice.  The 
penalty  of  death  shall  be  imposed  upon  the  instigators,  or  persons  employing 
soldiers  for  this  purpose." 

This  was  dated  July  16.     On  the  loth  the  Americans  opened  a  lively  fire 
from  their  trenches,  and  the  fleet  also.     The  Spanish  loss  was  7  killed  and  47 
wounded.     A  single  shell  from  the  fleet  completely  ruined  a  house  in  the  city 
Twenty-three   projectiles  fell  within  a  small   space.      On  the   i2th  of  July 


THE    ARMY    OF    THE    UNITED    STATES.  657 

General  Linares,  wounded  and  in  his  bed,  telegraphed  the  Commander-in-Chief 
and  Minister  of  War : 

"The  situation  is  fatal;  surrender  inevitable;  we  are  only  prolonging  the 
agony;  the  sacrifice  is  useless;  the  enemy  knows  it,  fully  realizing  our  situa 
tion.  Their  circle  being  well  established,  they  will  exhaust  our  forces  without 
exposing  theirs  as  they  did  yesterday,  bombarding  on  land  by  elevation  with 
out  our  being  able  to  see  their  batteries,  and  from  the  sea  by  the  fleet,  which 
has  full  advices,  and  is  bombarding  the  city  in  sections  with  mathematical 
accuracy. 

"There  is  a  limit  to  the  honor  of  arms,  and  I  appeal  to  the  judgment  of 
the  government  and  the  whole  nation ;  for  these  long-suffering  troops  have 
saved  that  honor  many  times  since  the  i8th  day  of  May,  when  they  sustained 
the  first  bombardment. 

"If  it  should  be  necessary  to  consummate  the  sacrifice  for  reasons  which  I 
ignore,  or  if  there  is  need  of  some  one  to  assume  the  responsibility  of  the 
denouement  anticipated  and  announced  by  me  in  several  cablegrams,  I  offer 
myself  loyally  on  the  altar  of  my  country  for  the  one  purpose  or  the  other, 
and  I  will  take  it  upon  myself  to  perform  the  act  of  signing  the  surrender." 

The  vaunted  volunteers  fought  well  in  the  first  battle,  but  became  dis 
couraged,  and  many  of  them  put  away  their  uniforms  and  guns  and  retired. 
The  Spanish  historian  says  of  the  scenes  after  the  surrender:  "When  a 
Yankee  officer  of  artillery  and  another  of  engineers  took  possession  of  the 
Morro,  they  inquired  about  the  defenses  and  artillery  of  the  fort.  'There 
they  are, '  said  the  governor,  pointing  to  the  land  batteries  and  old  guns.  The 
American  officers  did  not  believe  him ;  personally  they  went  all  over  the  place 
in  search  of  guns  and  more  important  works  of  fortification.  And  wrhen  they 
had  convinced  themselves  that  they  had  been  told  the  truth,  they  exclaimed: 
'That  fleet'  (pointing  to  Admiral  Sampson's)  'has  no  excuse  for  not  having 
gained  possession  of  the  harbor  and  defeated  the  city  and  its  defenses  in  so 
many  days.'  ' 

It  is  perfectly  apparent  by  the  Spanish  accounts  that  the  sufferings,  the 
exposures  and  privations  of  the  defenders  of  Santiago  were  even  greater  than 
those  of  the  assailants,  and  the  situation,  regarded  after  the  battle  df  El  Caney 
and  the  flight  of  the  fleet,  as-  not  containing  a  chance  of  success.  On  each 
side  there  was  surprise  and  apprehension  at  the  proven  fighting  qualities  of 
the  other. 


CHAPTER   XXIX. 

The  Insurgents  in  Arms  of  Cuba  and  the  Philippines. 

Our  Relations  with  and  Responsibilities  for  Them— The  Cuban  Soldiers  Found  on  the 
Pay  Roll — A  Military  Service  of  Importance  and  the  Only  One  Performed  by  Armed 
Cubans  in  Our  War — The  Spanish  Account  of  It — Cubans  Kept  3,500  of  the  Best 
Troops  of  Spain  Away  from  El  Caney — Testimony  Taken  at  Paris  by  the  American 
Commission  of  the  True  Character  of  the  Philippines— General  Merritt,  General 
Greene  and  Major  Bell  State  the  Facts. 

All  the  Spaniards  in  Cuba  during  the  dreary  wars  that  culminated  in  the 
decisive  struggle  between  the  United  States  and  Spain,  were  not  engaged  in 
the  cause  of  the  Peninsulars.  The  insular  Spaniards  were  not  in  many 
respects  unlike  their  oppressors  and  antagonists.  Though  in  conflict  about 
government,  their  idea  about  systems  of  governing  were  kindred.  The  hope 
of  better  days  in  Cuba  is  -in  the  people  of  the  island,  not  in  either  wing  of  the 
Spaniards.  The  supporters  of  the  Junta  closely  resemble  in  views  of  adminis 
tration  the  representatives  of  the  regency.  The  destroyers  of  the  industries 
of  Cuba,  that  were  prosperous  under  misgovernment,  are  themselves  the  vic 
tims  of  false  education,  and  are  incapable  of  organizing  reformation. 

Liberty  with  order,  fair  play  for  all,  and  integrity  in  official  life,  is  not 
within  the  comprehension  of  those  who  burned  the  cane  and  trampled  the 
tobacco.  Those  golden  productions  were  transferred  from  Hayti  to  Cuba, 
while  the  horrors  of  barbarism  ruined  the  former  island,  when  the  abolition  of 
slavery  established  anarchy;  and  in  the  latter  and  greater  island  the  inherit 
ance  of  the  torch  has  perished  by  the  torch  in  the  hands  of  the  Dominican 
chieftain,  Maximo  Gomez. 

It  is  the  repeatedly  expressed  opinion  of  Admiral  Dewey  that  the  Fili 
pinos  are  more  capable  of  self-government  than  the  Cubans,  and  they  might 
be  that  if  we  confounded  the  Cuban  name  with  the  Key  West  and  New  York 

syndicates,  gotten  up  in  the  old  Junta  form,  and  employed  with  the  facility  of 

658 


INSURGENTS    OF    CUBA    AND    THE    PHILIPPINES.        659 

experience,  in 'the  accomplishments  of  the  pomps  and  vanities  of  the  Spanish 
language,  including  the  fables  of  history  and  the  follies  of  freedom. 

Gomez  had  two  objects  in  firing  the  fields  from  which  the  wealth  of  the 
island  he  invaded  from  Dominica  comes — one  was  to  destroy  property,  because 
it  was  an  expression  of  civilization,  and  the  other  to  destroy  labor,  because 
he  wanted  men  to  abandon  the  productive  occupations  to  become  destroyers. 

General  Miles  expected  50,000  Cubans  to  line  up  with  his  grand  army  for 
the  siege  of  Havana,  but  there  would  not  have  been  as  many  of  them  there  as 
appeared  at  Santiago.  They  have,  however,  materialized  in  regard  to  the 
pay-roll,  and  Gomez  and  his  bodyguard  and  recruits  after  the  war  assume 
that  they  are  a  people  and  that  the  object  of  the  United  States  in  conquering 
the  island  was  to  give  it  up  to  them  to  rule  after  the  manner  of  the  Spaniards. 
The  difference  between  one  class  of  Spaniards  and  another,  in  the  cultivation 
of  the  art  of  government,  does  not  matter  much  to  the  cultivators  of  the  soil 
and  the  managers  in  the  ways  of  enterprise  that  are  conducted  according  to 
the  methods  of  civilization  and  yield  fruitful  harvests  to  the  labor  that  gains 
bread  in  the  sweat  of  the  face. 

No  doubt  it  was  the  judgment  of  Gomez  of  Dominica  that  the  way  to  free 
fertile  land  was  to  burn  the  crops,  and  that  one  savagery  must  be  met  by 
another,  one  victim  of  an  outrage  compensated  by  another  victim.  The 
Cubans  burned  the  fine  houses  and  the  Spaniards  the  cottages,  and  both  sides 
plied  the  chopping-knife  to  massacre  domestic  animals.  This  was  the  broad 
road  of  bloody  ashes  to  famine.* 

In  the  Philippines  we  do  not  have*  as  many  Spaniards  of  any  sort  as  in 
Cuba,  but  the  Malay  makes  up  for  any  lack  of  the  elements  of  mischief;  and 
the  Tagalo  rivals  the  Cuban  Spaniard  as  an  adventurer  to  claim  what  the 
sword  of  America  has  conquered.  He  wanted  joint  occupation  of  Manila,  and 
tickled  himself  that  he  was  about  to  make  reprisals  in  days  of  the  accumulated 
wrongs  of  centuries.  If  he  had  been  logical  in  action  he  would  have  applied 
the  torch  to  the  city  instead  of  firing  the  country,  and  the  property  of  Eng 
lish,  Germans,  and  Chinese  would  have  been  burned  in  the  name  of  liberty, 
after  the  capacity  of  the  insurgents  for  booty  had  been  determined  by  the 
occurrence  of  physical  exhaustion. 

There  is  a  notable  difference  in  the  racial  questions  between  the  isles  of 
Cuba  and  Luzon.  There  is  no  negro  blood  in  the  Philippines.  The  Spanish 
monarch  for  whom  they  were  named  did  not  permit  African  slavery  in  his 


.66o         INSURGENTS    OF    CUBA    AND    THE    PHILIPPINES. 

Indian  possession,  but  Spanish  officialism  is  the  same  in  the  East  Indies  as  in 
the  West.  Incidents  in  the  cities  of  Manila  and  Santiago,  under  military 
government,  will  indicate  the  likeness. 

Some  of  the  men  of  affairs  of  Manila  were  importing  goods  upon  which 
there  were  duties,  and  they  were  so  accustomed  to  paying  their  respects  to  the 
officers  who  consented  to  the  importations,  in  pecuniary  compliments,  that 
they  did  not  know  any  other  style  of  transacting  business.  They  gathered  a 
few  hundred  new  Mexican  dollars,  and  for  several  days  carried  it  around  in 
bags  to  find  "the  right  man,"  to  whom  was  to  be  confided  the  little  testimonial 
of  their  respectful  confidence,  and  they  asked  many  tentative  questions,  and 
began  to  feel  at  last  that  their  modesty  must  have  become  offensive.  When, 
at  last,  they  referred  in  plain  terms  to  the  custom  of  the  country,  and  their 
desire  to  conform  to  it,  and  were  told  they  would  be  forgiven  just  once  but 
never  more,  there  was  amazement.  The  deputation  of  gentlemen  tottered 
away  bearing  bright  silver  dollars  refused,  and  then  they  wondered  whether 
they  did  not  make  a  mistake  in  not  having  their  silver  converted  into  gold. 

In  Santiago  there  was  a  little  dinner  party  in  which  the  representative  of 
the  American  Republic  was  entertained,  and  his  guests  had  arranged  for  him 
a  pleasant  surprise.  They  wanted  to  do  certain  things  in  which  they  judged 
money  was  to  be  made,  and  they  were  provided  with  thousands,  when  the 
Manila  people  had  but  hundreds,  and  when  the  time  for  talking  came,  they 
offered  their  visible  means  according  to  the  ancient  Cuban  custom,  and  heard 
the  incredible  response  that  the  Americans  did  not  do  public  business  in  that 
way,  that  the  request  they  made  was  proper  and  there  was  no  reason  why 
they  should  pay  a  dollar  for  the  privilege,  for  it  was  already  their  right,  and 
they  must  not  allow  such  a  mistake  to  occur  again,  for  if  it  did  they  would  be 
held  to  have  committed  a  misdemeanor. 

The  Cuban  army  on  the  pay-rolls,  hearing  that  money  was  rolling  in  at  the 
custom  houses,  had  no  notion  of  going  home  to  work,  and  of  course  they  held 
that  the  Americans  were  shoveling  the  cash  into  their  own  pockets.  They 
no  doubt  believed  they  were  entitled  to  pay  for  several  years'  picnics,  and 
would  go  back  to  the  Ten  Years'  War  rather  than  have  nothing  to  be  so 
unhappy  about,  as  to  take  away  their  appetite  for  employment.  These 
are  examples  of  Asiatic  and  African  sentimentalities  and  of  the  thrift  of 
the  mixed  races,  as  developed  under  Spanish  instruction  for  a  dozen 
generations. 


INSURGENTS    OF    CUBA    AND    THE    PHILIPPINES.          66 1 

In  a  Spanish  pamphlet  translated  and  issued  by  the  office  of  Naval  Intel 
ligence,  Lieut.  Jose  M tiller  y  Tejrio,  the  writer  on  the  battles  and  capitulations 
of  Santiago  de  Cuba,  there  is  evidence  of  the  usefulness  of  the  Cubans  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Santiago.  It  is  stated  by  the  Spanish  officers  that  the 
insurgents  firing  from  ambush  on  Escario's  column,  "succeeded  in  delaying 
its  march  long  enough  so  that  it  could  not  arrive  before  the  first  of  July. 
Fate  is  not  always  just."  It  is  important  in  fairness  to  the  Cuban  soldiery  to 
give  what  the  Spanish  reinforcements  on  the  way  to  Santiago  have  to  say  of 
the  opposition  they  met.  The  Spaniards'  column,  commanded  by  Escario, 
arrived  in  Santiago  July  3d  after  marching  fifty-two  leagues;  the  troops  nearly 
all  the  way  "had  to  inarch  in  single  file,  opening  the  way  with  machetas." 
Their  starting  place  was  Man  Janillo,  and  the  column  comprised  a  total  of 
3,752  men.  On  the  Yara  River  and  camping  at  dark,  the  Spanish  diary,  the 
one  we  quote,  says:  "The  column  had  been  harassed  all  day,  especially  while 
preparing  to  encamp,  when  the  enemy  opened  a  steady,  lively  fire,  which 
lasted  ten  minutes,  killing  one  man  and  wounding  three."  The  next  day  the 
column  had  one  man  killed  and  one  wounded. 

Bayamo,  the  stronghold  of  the  insurgents,  was  taken  with  a  rush  and 
without  loss,  and  "we  learned  afterward  that  the  enemy  had  ten  killed  and 
nine  wounded. "  On  the  28th,  "the  rebels  appeared  again,"  and  near  the  town 
of  Baire  they  "opened  a  galling  musket  fire.  Colonel  Ruiz,  the  second  in  com 
mand  of  the  column,  was  wounded  and  his  horse  killed  under  him,  four  soldiers 
killed  and  five  wounded."  On  the  29th  the  column  rested  and  had  three  more 
wounded.  On  the  3oth  there  was  hot  skirmishing,  the  rebels  numerous. 
The  Spanish  losses  during  the  day  were  five  killed  and  ten  wounded,  among 
the  latter  the  captain.  July  ist  there  was  a  sharp  fight  at  Aguacate.  The 
Spanish  diary  says: 

"The  enemy  did  not  wait  to  be  surprised,  but  opened  fire  at  once  from 
Aguacate  hill,  the  station  of  our  heliograph,  and  adjoining  hills  to  the  right 
and  left  in  an  extensive  intrenched  line.  Our  soldiers  maneuvered  "as  though 
,  on  drill,  and  advancing  steadily,  two-thirds  of  the  column  entered  the  battle, 
and  that  hail  of  lead  which  strewed  death  in  its  path  was  not  sufficient  to 
make  them  retreat  or  even  check  them.  Calmly,  with  fearless  heroism,  they 
advanced,  protected  by  the  frequent  and  sure  fire  of  the  artillery,  and  skill 
fully  guided  by  their  chiefs,  and  with  the  cry,  'Long  live  Spain!'  and  charging 
with  bayonets,  they  simultaneously  took  those  heights  which  were  so  difficult 


662          INSURGENTS    IN.    CUBA    AND    THE    PHILIPPINES. 

and  dangerous  to  scale,  beating  the  enemy  into  precipitate  retreat,  so  that 
they  could  not  gather  up  their  dead  and  wounded. 

"Seventeen  dead  were  left  on  the  field,  also  ammunition  of  various  mod 
ern  types.  There  were  moments  during  that  battle  when  the  tenacity  of  the 
enemy  and  the  order  with  which  they  fought  gave  the  impression  that  they 
belonged  to  our  own  column.  This  report  spread  rapidly  and  reached  Colonel 
Escario's  ears,  who,  fearing  that  this  might  really  be  the  case,  gave  orders  to 
suspend  the  fire,  and  tried  to  make  himself  known  by  bugle  signals.  But  this 
precaution  was  useless,  and  the  commander,  becoming  convinced  that  he  was 
fighting  rebel  forces,  ordered  the  attack  to  be  renewed  and  the  hostile  posi 
tions  to  be  taken. 

"To  do  the  enemy  justice,  it  must  be  stated  that  they  defended  these 
well-chosen  positions  with  persistency  and  in  good  order,  and  that  they  rose 
to  unusual  heights  that  day,  making  this  the  fiercest  battle  which  we  sustained 
on  the  march  from  Manzanillo  to  Santiago,  and  one  of  the  most  remarkable 
ones  of  the  present  campaign.  Our  casualties  consisted  of  7  dead,  and  i 
lieutenant  and  42  privates  wounded.  Large  pools  of  blood  on  the  battlefield 
showed  the  severe  chastisement  the  enemy  suffered." 

The  3d  of  July  the  troops  started  at  2  a.  m.  and  got  to  Santiago  with 
"slight  skirmishes,"  and  "here  it  was  learned  that  on  the  same  day  our  fleet 
had  gone  out  in  search  of  death;"  and  the  column  "had  arrived  at  the  post  of 
honor  after  a  supreme  effort  and  after  victoriously  crossing  the  Alps  of  Cuba. 
It  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  that,  when  they  came  in  sight  of  the  city,  they 
took  off  their  hats,  and  with  tears  in  their  eyes  opened  their  lips  in  a  unani 
mous  shout  of  'Long  live  Spain!'  which  rose  spontaneously  from  those  noble 
hearts. 

"The  casualties  during  the  whole  march  were  i  colonel,  2  officers,  and  68 
privates  wounded  and  27  killed.  Twenty-eight  thousand  six  hundred  and 
seventy  Mauser  cartridges  had  been  used,  and  38  rounds  of  artillery  fired." 

The  insurgent  troops  in  this  case  were  of  Garcia' s  command,  and  the 
Spanish  column  of  less  than  four  thousand  men  had  forced  their  way  through 
the  most  rebellious  part  of  the  island  and  arrived  just  when  the  fighting  was 
over.  Garcia' s  estimate  of  his  forces  opposed  to  Escario  has  been  counted 
as  five  thousand  men.  There  were  not  so  many,  but  they  made  a  resistance 
that  kept  Escario  from  being  on  the  Spanish  lines  at  El  Caney,  Santiago. 

The  Spanish  pamphlet  says:  "When  520  men  maintained  themselves  at 


INSURGENTS    IN    CUBA    AND    THE    PHILIPPINES.         663 

El  Cancy  for  ten  hours,  and  250  at  San  Juan  for  four  hours,  if  Escario  could 
have  been  there  that  clay,  so  that  there  had  been  3,000  men  more  in  our  lines, 
neither  El  Caney  nor  San  Juan  would  have  been  lost,  though  attacked  by 
almost  the  whole  hostile  army."  The  detention  of  Escario  was  the  best 
work  done  for  us  during  the  war  by  the  Cubans,  and  indeed  the  only  impor 
tant  diversion  they  made,  and  justice  demands  full  credit  shall  be  awarded. 

The  statements  made  before  the  American  Commission  at  Paris  may  be 
classed  as  the  most  striking  presentation  of  the  attitude  of  the  Philippine 
insurgents  that  has  been  given.  General  Merritt  was  before  the  Commission 
August  4th,  and  was  first  asked  about  General  Frank  V.  Greene,  of  whom  he 
said: 

"He  was  out  on  the  lines  all  the  time,  and  took  a  great  deal  of  interest  in 
investigating  with  the  citizens  and  soldiers.  He  knew  some  of  the  ranking 
officers,  although  he  did  not  know  Aguinaldo  nor  have  anything  to  do  with 
him.  It  was  part  of  my  policy  that  we  should  keep  ourselves  aloof  from 
Aguinaldo  as  much  as  possible,  because  we  knew  trouble  would  occur  from 
his  wanting  to  go  to  Manila  at  the  time  of  its  surrender." 

General  Merritt  said  further  he  would  greatly  rely  on  General  Greene's 
judgment,  who  "wrote  the  best  and  most  authentic — the  best  received — book 
on  the  Russian-Turkish  war  published  yet.  He  is  a  man  who  reads  a  great 
deal,  quite  a  student,  a  very  bright  man." 

General  Greene's  memorandum,  made  August  27th,  and  handed  General 
Merritt,  opened  with  these  trenchant  statements : 

"If  the  United  States  evacuate  these  islands,  anarchy  and  civil  war  will 
immediately  ensue  and  lead  to  foreign  intervention.  The  insurgents  were 
furnished  arms  and  the  moral  support  of  the  navy  prior  to  our  arrival,  and  we 
cannot  ignore  obligations,  either  to  the  insurgents  or  to  foreign  nations,  which 
our  own  acts  have  imposed  upon  us.  The  Spanish  government  is  completely 
demoralized,  and  Spanish  power  is  dead  beyond  possibility  of  resurrection. 
Spain  would  be  unable  to  govern  these  islands  if  we  surrendered  them. 
Spaniards  individually  stand  in  great  fear  of  the  insurgents.  The  Spanish 
government  is  disorganized  and  their  treasury  bankrupt,  with  a  large  floating 
debt.  The  loss  of  property  has  been  great.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Filipinos 
cannot  govern  the  country  without  the  support  of  some  strong  nation.  They 
acknowledge  this  themselves,  and  say  their  desire  is  for  independence  under 
American  protection ;  but  they  have  only  vague  ideas  as  to  what  our  relative 


664         INSURGENTS    IN    CUBA    AND    THE    PHILIPPINES, 

positions  would  be — what  part  we  should  take  in  collecting  and  expending  the 
revenue  and  administering  the  government. 

"The  hatred  between  the  Spanish  and  natives  is  very  intense,  and  cannot 
be  eradicated.  The  natives  are  all  Roman  Catholics  and  devoted  to  the 
church,  but  have  bitter  hatred  for  monastic  orders — Dominican,  Franciscan, 
and  Recollects.  They  insist  that  these  be  sent  out  of  the  country  or  they  will 
murder  them.  These  friars  own  the  greater  part  of  the  land,  and  have  grown 
rich  by  oppressing  the  native  husbandmen." 

General  Merritt  said  the  Philippines  would  have  to  be  educated  up  to 
self-government,  and  he  added:  "They  want  a  protectorate,  but  "they  do  not 
exactly  understand  what  that  means.  Their  idea  is  that  they  should  collect 
the  revenues  and  keep  them  in  their  treasury,  and  that  we  should  be  at  the 
expense  of  maintaining  an  army  and  a  navy  there  for  their  protection,  which 
is  the  kind  of  a  protectorate  they  would  like  very  much." 

Major  Frank  Barnes  stated:  "The  masses  of  the  people  will  accept  our 
government  as  soon  as  they  understand  the  form  of  government  that  we 
would  offer.  The  people  are  for  the  most  part  easily  controlled  by  proper 
methods,  the  essence  of  which  can  be  expressed  in  two  words — justice  and 
firmness.  I  have  definite  information  also  that  at  least  three  or  four  of  the 
leading  men  of  the  provinces  to  the  north  and  east  of  Manila  are  not  at  all  in 
harmony  with  those  in  authority  around  Manila." 

It  was  the  opinion  of  the  Major  that  if  a  few  of  the  ambitious  chieftains 
were  disposed  of,  those  who  controlled  the  insurgent  army,  "the  masses  of 
the  people  could  be  handled  without  difficulty.  At  the  present  it  is  my  opin 
ion  that  these  chieftains  find  themselves  in  a  difficult  position  on  account  of 
the  promises  made  to  their  followers  in  regard  to  looting  Manila,  said  promises 
being  so  far  unfulfilled.  Their  troops  have  been  serving  up  to  the  present 
time  almost  without  remuneration,  promises  being  made  that  their  reward 
would  come  when  Manila  capitulated.  I  have  availed  myself  of  every  oppor 
tunity  to  talk  with  natives  and  half-castes,  both  in  the  insurgent  territory  and 
in  Manila.  I  find  that  many  of  them  would  be  perfectly  willing  to  accept  an 
American  government,  and  many  of  them  are  very  anxious  that  we  should 
take  full  possession  of  the  islands.  Many  others  hold  to  the  desire  of  the 
insurgent  chiefs  for  a  Philippine  government  under  the  protection  of  the 
United  States." 

Major  J.  F.  Bell,  of  the  Bureau  of  Information,  reported  to  General  Mer- 


INSURGENTS    IN    CUBA    AND    THE    PHILIPPINES.         665 

ritt  in  Manila  Bay,  that  Aguinaldo  had  about  $200,000,  and  in  Baccoar 
$220,000  in  public  funds.  Major  Bell  catalogues  and  describes  the  leaders 
among  Aguinaldo's  following  in  this  highly  interesting  way: 

"Aguinaldo. — Honest,  sincere,  and  poor,  not  well  educated,  but  a  natural 
leader  of  men,  with  considerable  shrewdness  and  ability;  has  the  power  of 
creating  among  the  people  confidence  in  himself,  and  is  undoubtedly  a  very 
popular  man,  highly  respected  by  all ;  but  there  are  many  better  educated  and 
richer  natives  who  do  not  think  he  has  sufficient  education  or  experience  to 
be  a  suitable  president.  He  was  a  'little  governor'  of  a  small  town  in  one 
of  the  provinces.  It  is  also  said  that  he  was  a  school  teacher,  but  I  have 
been  unable  to  verify  this  assertion. 

"There  is  no  Secretary  of  State,  the  place  being  kept  open  for  one  Caye- 
tano  S.  Arellano,  a  prominent  native  citizen  who  is  said  to  be  the  best  lawyer 
and  best  man  among  the  native  prominent  men.  He  is  now  in  Pagsanjan, 
and  has  been  repeatedly  sent  for,  but  does  not  return,  stating  as  an  excuse 
that  he  cannot  get  through  Santa  Cruz,  which  is  held  by  the  Spanish.  He  is 
an  avowed  annexationist,  and  does  not  believe  the  Filipino  people  sufficiently 
advanced  in  the  arts  and  laws  of  civilization  to  govern  themselves. 

"Baldomero  Aguinaldo,  a  first  cousin  of  Don  Emilio,  is  Secretary  of  War, 
and  is  a  swelled  dunce,  and  was  once  a  schoolmaster. 

"Mariano  Trias,  an  educated,  honest  man,  of  mediocre  capacity,  is  Secre 
tary  of  the  Treasury.  He  was  the  Vice-President  of  a  former  revolution,  and 
of  all  the  insurgent  leaders,  he  stands  next  to  Aguinaldo  in  popularity  with 
the  people. 

"Leandro  Y.  Barra,  a  lawyer  and  good,  honest  man,  is  Secretary  of  the 
Interior. 

"One  Estefan  de  la  Rama,  a  rich  and  educated  man,  who  speaks  English, 
is  commandante  de  marina,  or  commander-in-chief  of  the  navy.  He  is 
reported  honest  and  capable. 

"Aguinaldo's  interpreter  and  secretary  is  one  Escamilla,  a  good  linguist, 
speaking  Latin,  French,  Spanish,  and  English— Spanish  fluently  and  English 
well,  to  my  personal  knowledge.  He  was  a  teacher  of  the  piano  in  Hong 
kong,  and  is  one  of  the  best  interpreters  I  have  ever  seen. 

"One  Malabini,  a  student  of  law  and  notary  public,  honest,  but  not  espe 
cially  talented,  is  one  of  his  councilors.  There  is  a  prominent  and  wealthy 
citizen  of  this  city  who  is  also  a  councilor,  but  I  prefer  not  to  mention  his 


666         INSURGENTS    IN    CUBA    AND    THE    PHILIPPINES. 

name.  He  is  an  avowed  annexationist,  and  sincerely  hopes  the  Americans 
may  remain  here. 

"Don  Felipe  Agoncillo  is  a  highly  respected  lawyer,  and  has  for  some 
time  been  the  Filipino  agent  in  Hongkong.  I  understand  it  is  he  who  has 
been  designated  by  Aguinaldo  to  go  to  Paris  and  America  to  represent  the 
insurgent  cause. 

"C.  Sandico,  a  skilled  and  well-educated  machinist,  who  speaks  English 
quite  well,  is  a  prominent  man,  and  coadjutor  of  Aguinaldo.  His  present 
commission  is  to  appear  on  behalf  of  political  prisoners  before  the  officer 
charged  with  investigating  such  cases.  He  has  been  generally  useful  to 
Aguinaldo  as  a  delegate  and  negotiator  with  Americans. 

"Lieut. -Gen.  Emiliano  Riego  De  Dios,  the  military  governor  of  Cavite, 
is  said  to  be  an  honest  man,  but  with  little  education. 

"Major-General  Ricati,  in  command  of  operations  along  the  southern  zone 
of  trenches,  appears  and  is  said  to  be  a  well-meaning,  honest  man,  with  a 
fair  education. 

"Maj.-Gen.  Pantelon  Garcia,  in  command  of  operations  along  the  north 
ern  zone,  is  not  educated  very  well,  but  is  an  able,  honest,  polite,  and  agree 
able  man,  who  has  been  a  schoolmaster  of  the  primary  grade. 

"Brig. -Gen.  Pio  Del  Pilar,  a  vicious,  uneducated  ignoramus  and  highway 
robber. 

"General  Estrella,  commanding  the  military  forces  in  Cavite,  has  the 
credit  of  being  an  honest  man  with  little  education. 

"Brigadier-General  Mascardo,  fairly  educated  and  honest,  but  possesses 
little  ability. 

"Gen.  Gregorio  Del  Pilar  is  young,  well  educated,  and  honest,  but  with 
little  experience.  He  belongs  to  a  wealthy  family  of  Nueva  Ecija. 

"General  Noriel,  an  honest,  fairly  educated,  well-meaning,  reasonable, 
and  agreeable  fellow,  who  has  done  good  service  and  gained  the  reputation  of 
a  good  soldier. 

"Colonel  Montenegro,  a  very  conciliatory  fellow  to  meet.  Young,  small, 
and  well  educated.  Speaks  French,  English,  and  Spanish,  the  latter  fluently; 
the  others  very  well.  He  is  a  considerable  of  a  'talk  a  heap. '  Is  'kinder'  hon 
est  and  was  a  clerk  in  Lalla's  hotel,  where  he  received  his  lessons  in  honesty. 

"There  are  other  leaders  of  lesser  grade  whom  it  is  hardly  necessary  to 
mention  here.  Aguinaldo  has  many  adjutants,  most  of  whom  are  young, 


INSURGENTS    IN    CUBA    AND    THE    PHILIPPINES.         667 

smart,  and  well  educated.  In  fact,  nearly  all  of  the  adjutants  of  all  the 
generals  belong  to  the  jeunesse  doree  Filipino,  in  whom  insurrectionary  ideas 
seem  to  breed  spontaneously.  They  are  all  bright,  ambitious,  active,  and 
well  educated.  Among  them  is  one  Captain  Are  vela,  Noriel's  adjutant,  who 
is  a  dentist,  having  learned  his  profession  from  an  American,  who  also  taught 
him  very  good  English.  He  has  always  possessed  great  partiality  for 

Americans. ' ' 

NOTE. — It  appears,  however,  that  Maximo  Gomez,  the  old  soldier  of  fortune,  has  in  the 
schools  of  misfortune  been  taught  the  lessons  of  sorrow,  and  when  throwing  off  his  reserve 
after  the  war  was  over  he  knew  the  light  of  reason  when  he  saw  it,  and  was  not  disposed  to 
join  in  playing  a  bunco  game  upon  the  people  of  the  United  States.  He  may  yet  exploit  his 
ambition  to  found  a  confederacy  of  the  West  Indies,  but  he  has  shown  great  dignity  and  com 
mands  respect  by  his  qualities  of  statesmanship. 


CHAPTER     XXX. 

The  Treaty  of  Peace. 

The  Official  Terms  in  Which  the  Spaniards  Sued  for  Peace  and  Accepted  the  Demands 
of  the  Peace  Protocol  of  August  12 — "The  Demand  Strips  Us  of  the  Very  Last  Memory 
of  a  Glorious  Past" — The  Treaty  Commissioners  that  Met  in  Paris — Official  Text  of 
the  Treaty  of  Peace  of  December  10 — The  Spaniards  Contend  that  the  Philippine 
Insurgents  Constantly  Change  the  Status  Quo  and  that  Americans  Must  Stop  Them — 
Contention  that  the  Transfer  of  Sovereignty  Meant  Transfer  of  Debts — Protracted 
Debate  over  the  Cuban  Obligations — Claim  the  Capture  of  Manila  was  not  Lawful — 
Insinuation  that  General  Merritt  had  Heard  of  the  Protocol  Before  Storming  the 
Town— Spaniards  Able  and  Adroit — Americans  Firm  but  Courteous — The  Official 
History  of  the  Preparation  of  the  Peace  Protocol — The  Part  Taken  by  the  President 
— His  Strong  Hand  Felt  in  Paris. 

The  government  of  Spain,  on  July  22,  1898,  submitted  through  the 
Ambassador  of  France  a  message  to  the  President,  saying  Spain  wished  to 
show  again  that  in  this  war,  as  well  as  in  the  one  she  carried  on  against  the 
Cuban  insurgents,  she  had  but  one  object,  "the  vindication  of  her  prestige, 
her  honor,  and  her  name."  She  had  desired  to  "spare  the  great  island  from 
the  dangers  of  premature  independence,"  and  her  sentiments  were  rather 
inspired  by  ties  of  blood  than  by  her  interests.  "Spain, "  the  message  con 
tinued,  "is  prepared  to  spare  Cuba  from  the  continuation  of  the  horrors  of 
war  if  the  United  States  is  likewise  disposed."  This  paper  was  signed  by 
the  Spanish  Minister  of  State,  the  Duke  of  Almodovar  del  Rio.  In  reply 
Secretary  Day  wrote,  July  3oth : 

"The  President  witnessed  with  profound  disappointment  the  frustration  of 
his  peaceful  efforts  by  events  which  forced  upon  the  people  of  the  United 
States  the  unalterable  conviction  that  nothing  short  of  the  relinquishment  by 
Spain  of  a  claim  of  sovereignty  over  Cuba  which  she  was  unable  to  enforce 
would  relieve  a  situation  that  had  become  unendurable. 

"For  years  the  government  of  the  United  States,  out  of  regard  for  the 
susceptibilities  of  Spain,  had  by  the  exercise  of  its  power  and  the  expenditure 
of  its  treasure  preserved  the  obligations  of  neutrality.  But  a  point  was  at 

length  reached  at  which,  as  Spain  had  often  been  forewarned,  this  attitude 

668 


THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE.  669 

could  no  longer  be  maintained.  The  spectacle  at  our  very  doors  of  a  fertile 
territory  wasted  by  fire  and  sword,  and  given  over  to  desolation  and  famine, 
was  one  to  which  our  people  could  not  be  indifferent.  Yielding,  therefore,  to 
the  demands  of  humanity,  they  determined  to  remove  the  causes  in  the  effects 
of  which  they  had  become  so  deeply  involved." 

Secretary  Day  proceeded  to  state  substantially  the  points  of  the  Protocol 
that  was  the  basis  of  the  treaty  of  peace.  The  reply  from  Madrid,  August 
7th,  by  the  Minister  of  State,  was: 

"The  necessity  of  withdrawing  from  the  territory  of  Cuba  being  impera 
tive,  the  nation  assuming  Spain's  place  must,  as  long  as  this  territory  shall  not 
have  fully  reached  the  conditions  required  to  take  rank  among  other  sovereign 
powers,  provide  for  rules  which  will  insure  order  and  protect  against  all  risks 
the  Spanish  residents,  as  well  as  the  Cuban  natives  still  loyal  to  the  mother 
country. 

"In  the  name  of  the  nation  the  Spanish  government  hereby  relinquishes 
all  claim  of  sovereignty  over  or  title  to  Cuba,  and  engages  to  the  irremeable 
evacuation  of  the  island,  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  Cortes — a  reserve 
which  we  likewise  make  with  regard  to  the  other  proffered  terms — just  as 
these  terms  will  have  to  be  ultimately  approved  by  the  Senate  of  the  United 
States. 

"The  United  States  require,  as  an  indemnity  for  or  an  equivalent  to  the 
sacrifices  they  have  borne  during  this  short  war,  the  cession  of  Porto  Rico  and 
of  the  other  islands  now  under  the  sovereignty  of  Spain  in  the  West  Indies, 
and  also  the  cession  of  an  island  in  the  Ladrones,  to  be  selected  by  the 
Federal  government. 

"This  demand  strips  us  of  the  very  last  memory  of  a  glorious  past,  and 
expels  us  at  once  from  the  prosperous  island  of  Porto  Rico  and  from  the 
Western  Hemisphere,  which  became  peopled  and  civilized  through  the  proud 
deeds  of  our  ancestors.  It  might,  perhaps,  have  been  possible  to  compensate 
by  some  other  cession  for  the  injuries  sustained  by  the  United  States.  How 
ever,  the  inflexibility  of  the  demand  obliges  us  to  cede,  and  we  shall  cede,  the 
island  of  Porto  Rico  and  the  other  islands  belonging  to  the  Crown  of  Spain  in 
the  West  Indies,  together  with  one  of  the  islands  of  the  archipelago  of  the 
Ladrones,  to  be  selected  by  the  American  government. 

"The  terms  relating  to  the  Philippines  seem,  to  our  understanding,  to  be 
quite  indefinite." 


67o  THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE. 

Secretary  Day  put  the  case  of  the  United  States  in  these  simple  and 
effective  terms  to  the  Spanish  Minister  of  State,  before  the  submission  of  the 
terms,  referred  to  with  such  pathetic  dignity  in  the  letter  of  submission  by 
the  Duke  of  Almodovar  del  Rio : 

"As  the  result  of  the  patriotic  exertions  of  the  people  of  the  United 
States,  the  strife  has,  as  your  excellency  observes,  proved  unequal,  inclines 
the  President  to  offer  a  brave  adversary  generous  terms  of  peace. 

"The  President,  therefore,  responding  to  your  excellency's  request,  will 
state  the  terms  of  peace  which  will  be  accepted  by  him  at  the  present  time, 
subject  to  the  approval  of  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  hereafter. 

"Your  excellency  in  discussing  the  question  of  Cuba  intimates  that  Spain 
has  desired  to  spare  the  island  the  dangers  of  premature  independence.  The 
government  of  the  United  States  has  not  shared  the  apprehensions  of  Spain 
in  this  regard,  but  it  recognizes  the  fact  that  in  the  distracted  and  prostrate 
condition  of  the  island,  aid  and  guidance  will  be  necessary,  and  these  it  is  pre 
pared  to  give. ' ' 

Secretary  Day  was  precise  in  drawing  the  Protocol,  and  yet  the  Spaniards 
persuaded  themselves  that  they  could  find  much  in  it,  especially  in  the  clause 
about  the  Philippines,  susceptible  of  construction  remote  from  the  purpose  of 
the  President.  August  i2th  the  French  Ambassador  addressed  these  lines  to 
the  American  Secretary  of  State : 

"Mr.  Secretary  of  State:  I  have  the  honor  to  inform  you  that  I  have 
just  received,  through  the  intermediation  of  the  Department  of  Foreign 
Affairs  at  Paris,  a  telegram,  dated  Madrid,  August  n,  in  which  the  Duke  of 
Almodovar  del  Rio  announces  to  me  that,  by  order  of  Her  Majesty  the  Queen 
Regent,  the  Spanish  government  confers  upon  me  full  powers  in  order  that  I 
may  sign,  without  other  formality  and  without  delay,  the  Protocol  whereof  the 
terms  have  been  drawn  up  by  common  accord  between  you  and  me. " 

The  instrument  that  made  this  authorization  regular  was  the  following : 

DON    ALFONSO  XIII., 

BY  THE  GRACE  OF  GOD   AND   THE   CONSTITUTION,  KING    OF   SPAIN,    AND 
IN  HIS  NAME  AND  DURING  HIS  MINORITY, 

DONA    MARIA   CRISTINA, 
QUEEN  REGENT  OF  THE  KINGDOM. 

Whereas  it  has  become  necessary  to  negotiate  and  sign  at  Washington  a 
Protocol  in  which  the  preliminaries  of  peace  between  Spain  and  the  United 


THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE.  671 

States  of  America  shall  be  settled,  and  as  it  is  necessary  for  me  to  empower 
for  that  purpose  a  person  possessing  the  requisite  qualifications:  Therefore, 
I  have  decided  to  select,  after  procuring  the  consent  of  His  Excellency  the 
President  of  the  French  Republic,  you,  Don  Julio  Cambon,  Ambassador 
Extraordinary  and  Plenipotentiary  of  the  French  Republic  in  the  United 
States  of  America,  as  I  do,  by  these  presents,  select  and  appoint  you  to  pro 
ceed,  invested  with  the  character  of  my  plenipotentiary,  to  negotiate  and  sign 
with  the  plenipotentiary  whom  His  Excellency  the  President  of  the  United 
States  of  America  may  designate  for  that  purpose  the  aforesaid  Protocol. 
And  I  declare,  from  the  present  moment,  all  that  you  may  agree  upon, 
negotiate,  and  sign  in  the  execution  of  this  commission  acceptable  and  valid, 
and  I  will  observe  it  and  execute  it,  and  will  cause  it  to  be  observed  and 
executed  as  if  it  had  been  done  by  myself,  for  which  I  give  you  my  whole  full 
powers  in  the  most  ample  form  required  by  law.  In  witness  whereof  I  have 
caused  these  presents  to  be  issued,  signed  by  my  hand,  duly  sealed  and 
countersigned  by  the  undersigned,  my  Minister  of  State.  Given  in  the  palace 
at  Madrid,  August  n,  1898. 

(L.  S.)  MARIA   CRISTINA. 

JUAN  MANUEL  SANCHEZ  Y  GUTIERREZ  DE  CASTRO, 

Minister  of  State. 

The  city  of  Manila  fell  into  our  hands  two  days  after  the  suspension  of 
hostilities,  and  during  the  discussion  of  the  Commissioners  at  Paris  the 
Spaniards  made  a  plea  that  as  Admiral  Dewey  cut  the  cable,  the  failure  to 
get  the  news  at  Manila  before  the  Americans  possessed  the  town  was  an 
American  fault.  The  report  of  the  French  Ambassador  of  his  interviews  with 
the  President  was  much  quoted  by  the  Spanish  Commissioners,  but  the 
American  Commissioners  were  inflexible  from  the  first  for  the  plain  mean 
ing  of  the  treaty. 

OFFICIAL  TEXT  OF  THE  TREATY  OF  PEACE  WITH  SPAIN, 
SIGNED  DECEMBER  12,   1898: 

The  United  States  of  America  and  Her  Majesty  the  Queen  Regent  of 
Spain,  in  the  name  of  her  august  son  Don  Alfonso  XIII. ,  desiring  to  end  a 
state  of  war  now  existing  between  the  two  countries,  have  for  that  purpose 
appointed  as  plenipotentiaries : 

The  President  of  the  United  States, 


672  THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE. 

William  R.  Day,  Cushman  K.  Davis,  William  P.  Frye,  George  Gray,  and 
Whitelaw  Reid,  citizens  of  the  United  States; 

And  Her  Majesty  the  Queen  Regent  of  Spain, 

Don  Eugenio  Montero  Rios,  President  of  the  Senate ;  Don  Buenaventura 
de  Abarzuza,  Senator  of  the  Kingdom  and  ex-Minister  of  the  Crown;  Don 
Jose  de  Garnica,  deputy  to  the  Cortes,  and  Associate  Justice  of  the  Supreme 
Court;  Don  Wenceslao  Ramirez  de  Villa-Urrutia,  Envoy  Extraordinary  and 
Minister  Plenipotentiary  at  Brussels,  and  Don  Rafael  Cerero,  General  of 
Division ; 

Who,  having  assembled  in  Paris,  and  having  exchanged  their  full  powers, 
which  were  found  to  be  in  due  and  proper  form,  have,  after  discussion  of  the 
matters  before  them,  agreed  upon  the  following  articles: 

Article  I. 

Spain  relinquishes  all  claim  of  sovereignty  over  and  title  to  Cuba. 

And  as  the  island  is,  upon  its  evacuation  by  Spain,  to  be  occupied  by  the 
United  States,  the  United  States  will,  so  long  as  such  ^occupation  shall  last, 
assume  and  discharge  the  obligations  that  may  under  international  law  result 
from  the  fact  of  its  occupation,  for  the  protection  of  life  and  property. 

Article   II. 

Spain  cedes  to  the  United  States  the  island  of  Porto  Rico  and  other 
islands  now  under  Spanish  sovereignty  in  the  West  Indies,  and  the  island  of 
Guam  in  the  Marianas  or  Ladrones. 

Article  III. 

Spain  cedes  to  the  United  States  the  archipelago  known  as  the  Philippine 
Islands,  and  comprehending  the  islands  lying  within  the  following  line : 

A  line  running  from  west  to  east  along  or  near  the  twentieth  parallel  of 
north  latitude,  and  through  the  middle  of  the  navigable  channel  of  Bachi, 
from  the  one  hundred  and  eighteenth  (n8th)  to  the  one  hundred  and  twenty- 
seventh  (127  th)  degree  meridian  of  longitude  east  of  Greenwich,  thence  along 
the  one  hundred  and  twenty-seventh  (i2yth)  degree  meridian  of  longitude 
east  of  Greenwich  to  the  parallel  of  four  degrees  and  forty-five  minutes 
(4°  45' )  north  latitude,  thence  along  the  parallel  of  four  degrees  and  forty- 
five  minutes  (4°  45')  north  latitude  to  its  intersection  with  the  meridian  of 
longitude  one  hundred  and  nineteen  degrees  and  thirty-five  minutes  (119°  35') 
east  of  Greenwich,  thence  along  the  meridian  of  longitude  one  hundred  and 


THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE.  675 

nineteen  degrees  and  thirty-five  minutes  (119°  35')  east  of  Greenwich  to  the 
parallel  of  latitude  seven  degrees  and  forty  minutes  (7°  40')  north,  thence 
along  the  parallel  of  latitude  of  seven  degrees  and  forty  minutes  (7°  40') 
north  to  its  intersection  with  the  one  hundred  and  sixteenth  (i  i6th)  degree 
meridian  of  longitude  east  of  Greenwich,  thence  by  a  direct  line  to  the  inter 
section  of  the  tenth  (loth)  degree  parallel  of  north  latitude  with  the  one  hun 
dred  and  eighteenth  (n8th)  degree  meridian  of  longitude  east  of  Greenwich, 
and  thence  along  the  one  hundred  and  eighteenth  (n8th)  degree  meridian  of 
longitude  east  of  Greenwich  to  the  point  of  beginning. 

The  United  States  will  pay  to  Spain  the  sum  of  twenty  million  dollars 
($20,000,000)  within  three  months  after  the  exchange  of  the  ratifications  of 
the  present  treaty. 

Article  IV. 

The  United  States  will,  for  the  term  of  ten  years  from  the  date  of  the 
exchange  of  the  ratifications  of  the  present  treaty,  admit  Spanish  ships  and 
merchandise  to  the  ports  of  the  Philippine  Islands  on  the  same  terms  as  ships 
and  merchandise  of  the  United  States. 

Article  V. 

The  United  States  will,  upon  the  signature  of  the  present  treaty,  send 
back  to  Spain,  at  its  own  cost,  the  Spanish  soldiers  taken  as  prisoners  of  war 
on  the  capture  of  Manila  by  the  American  forces.  The  arms  of  the  soldiers 
in  question  shall  be  restored  to  them. 

Spain  will,  upon  the  exchange  of  the  ratifications  of  the  present  treaty, 
proceed  to  evacuate  the  Philippines,  as  well  as  the  island  of  Guam,  on  terms 
similar  to  those  agreed  upon  by  the  Commissioners  appointed  to  arrange  for 
the  evacuation  of  Porto  Rico  and  other  islands  in  the  West  Indies,  under  the 
Protocol  of  August  12,  1898,  which  is  to  continue  in  force  till  its  provisions  are 
completely  executed. 

The  time  within  which  the  evacuation  of  the  Philippine  Islands  and  Guam 
shall  be  completed  shall  be  fixed  by  the  two  governments.  Stands  of  colors, 
uncaptured  war  vessels,  small  arms,  guns  of  all  calibers,  with  their  carriages 
and  accessories,  powder,  ammunition,  livestock,  and  materials  and  supplies  of 
all  kinds,  belonging  to  the  land  and  naval  forces  of  Spain  in  the  'Philippines 
and  Guam,  remain  the  property  of  Spain.  Pieces  of  heavy  ordnance,  exclu 
sive  of  field  artillery,  in  the  fortifications  and  coast  defenses,  shall  remain  in 
their  emplacements  for  the  term  of  six  months,  to  be  reckoned  from  the 


676  THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE. 

exchange  of  ratifications  of  the  treaty;  and  the  United  States  may,  in  the 
meantime,  purchase  such  material  from  Spain,  if  a  satisfactory  agreement 
between  the  two  governments  on  the  subject  shall  be  reached. 

Article  VI. 

Spain  will,  upon  the  signature  of  the  present  treaty,  release  all  prisoners 
of  war,  and  all  persons  detained  or  imprisoned  for  political  offenses,  in  con 
nection  with  the  insurrections  in  Cuba  and  the  Philippines  and  the  war  with 
the  United  States. 

Reciprocally,  the  United  States  will  release  all  persons  made  prisoners  of 
war  by  the  American  forces,  and  will  undertake  to  obtain  the  release  of  all 
Spanish  prisoners  in  the  hands  of  the  insurgents  in  Cuba  and  the  Philippines. 

The  government  of  the  United  States  will  at  its  own  cost  return  to  Spain 
and  the  government  of  Spain  will  at  its  own  cost  return  to  the  United  States, 
Cuba,  Porto  Rico,  and  the  Philippines,  according  to  the  situation  of  their 
respective  homes,  prisoners  released  or  caused  to  be  released  by  them, 
respectively,  under  this  article. 

Article    VII. 

The  United  States  and  Spain  mutually  relinquish  all  claims  for  indemnity, 
national  and  individual,  of  every  kind,  of  either  government,  or  of  its  citizens 
or  subjects,  against  the  other  government,  that  may  have  arisen  since  the 
beginning  of  the  late  insurrection  in  Cuba  and  prior  to  the  exchange  of  ratifi 
cations  of  the  present  treaty,  including  all  claims  for  indemnity  for  the  cost  of 
the  war. 

The  United  States  will  adjudicate  and  settle  the  claims  of  its  citizens 
against  Spain  relinquished  in  this  article. 

Article    VIII. 

In  conformity  with  the  provisions  of  Articles  I,  II,  and  III,  of  this  treaty, 
Spain  relinquishes  in  Cuba,  and  cedes  in  Porto  Rico  and  other  islands  in  the 
West  Indies,  in  the  island  of  Guam,  and  in  the  Philippine  Archipelago,  all  the 
buildings,  wharves,  barracks,  forts,  structures,  public  highways  and  other 
immovable  property  which,  in  conformity  with  law,  belong  to  the  public 
domain,  and  as  such  belong  to  the  Crown  of  Spain. 

And  it  is  hereby  declared  that  the  relinquishment  or  cession,  as  the  case 
may  be,  to  which  the  preceding  paragraph  refers,  cannot  in  any  respect 
impair  the  property  or  rights  which  by  law  belong  to  the  peaceful  possession 


THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE.  677 

of  property  of  all  kinds,  of  provinces,  municipalities,  public  or  private  estab 
lishments,  ecclesiastical  or  civic  bodies,  or  any  other  associations  having  legal 
capacity  to  acquire  and  possess  property  in  the  aforesaid  territories  renounced 
or  ceded,  or  of  private  individuals,  of  whatsoever  nationality  such  individuals 
may  be. 

The  aforesaid  relinquishment  or  cession,  as  the  case  may  be,  includes  all 
documents  exclusively  referring  to  the  sovereignty  relinquished  or  ceded  that 
may  exist  in  the  archives  of  the  Peninsula.  Where  any  document  in  such 
archives  only  in  part  relates  to  said  sovereignty,  a  copy  of  such  part  will  be 
furnished  whenever  it  shall  be  requested.  Like  rules  shall  be  reciprocally 
observed  in  favor  of  Spain  in  respect  of  documents  in  the  archives  of  the 
islands  above  referred  to. 

In  the  aforesaid  relinquishment  or  cession,  as  the  case  may  be,  are  also 
included  such  rights  as  the  Crown  of  Spain  and  its  authorities  possess  in 
respect  of  the  official  archives  and  records,  executive  as  well  as  judicial,  in  the 
islands  above  referred  to,  which  relate  to  said  islands  or  the  rights  and  prop 
erty  of  their  inhabitants.  Such  archives  and  records  shall  be  carefully  pre 
served,  and  private  persons  shall  without  distinction  have  the  right  to 
require,  in  accordance  with  law,  authenticated  copies  of  the  contracts,  wills 
and  other  instruments  forming  part  of  notarial  protocols  or  files,  or  which  may 
be  contained  in  the  executive  or  judicial  archives,  be  the  latter  in  Spain  or  in 
the  islands  aforesaid. 

Article  IX. 

Spanish  subjects,  natives  of  the  Peninsula,  residing  in  the  territory  over 
which  Spain  by  the  present  treaty,  relinquishes  or  cedes  her  sovereignty, 
may  remain  in  such  territory  or  may  remove  therefrom,  retaining  in  either 
event  all  their  rights  of  property,  including  the  right  to  sell  or  dispose  of 
such  property  or  of  its  proceeds ;  and  they  shall  also  have  the  right  to  carry 
on  their  industry,  commerce  and  professions,  being  subject  in  respect 
thereof  to  such  laws  as  are  applicable  to  other  foreigners.  In  case  they 
remain  in  the  territory  they  may  preserve  their  allegiance  to  the  Crown 
of  Spain  by  making,  before  a  court  of  record  within  a  year  from  the  date  of 
the  exchange  of  ratifications  of  this  treaty,  a  declaration  of  their  decision  to 
preserve  such  allegiance;  in  default  of  which  declaration  they  shall  be  held 
to  have  renounced  it  and  to  have  adopted  the  nationality  of  the  territory  in 
which  they  may  reside. 


678  THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE. 

The  civil  rights  and  political  status  of  the  native  inhabitants  of  the  terri 
tories  hereby  ceded  to  the  United  States  shall  be  determined  by  the  Congress. 

Article    X. 

The  inhabitants  of  the  territories  over  which  Spain  relinquishes  or  cedes 
her  sovereignty  shall  be  secured  in  the  free  exercise  of  their  religion. 

Article    XI. 

The  Spaniards  residing  in  the  territories  over  which  Spain  by  this  treaty 
cedes  or  relinquishes  her  sovereignty  shall  be  subject  in  matters  civil  as  well 
as  criminal  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  courts  of  the  country  wherein  they  reside, 
pursuant  to  the  ordinary  laws  governing  the  same ;  and  they  shall  have  the 
right  to  appear  before  such  courts,  and  to  pursue  the  same  course  as  citizens 
of  the  country  to  which  the  courts  belong. 

Article  XII. 

Judicial  proceedings  pending  at  the  time  of  the  exchange  of  ratifications 
of  this  treaty  in  the  territories  over  which  Spain  relinquishes  or  cedes  her 
sovereignty  shall  be  determined  according  to  the  following  rules: 

1.  Judgments  rendered  either  in  civil  suits  between  private  individuals, 
or  in  criminal  matters,  before  the  date  mentioned,  and  with  respect  to  which 
there   is  no  recourse  or  right  of    review  under  the   Spanish  law,    shall  be 
deemed  to  be  final,  and  shall  be  executed  in  due  form  by  competent  authority 
in  the  territory  within  which  such  judgments  should  be  carried  out. 

2.  Civil  suits  between  private  individuals  which  may  on  the  date  men 
tioned  be  undetermined  shall  be  prosecuted  to  judgment  before  the  court  in 
which  they  may  then  be  pending  or  in  the   court  that  may  be  substituted 
therefor. 

3.  Criminal  actions  pending  on  the  date  mentioned  before  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Spain  against  citizens  of  the  territory  which  by  this  treaty  ceases  to 
be  Spanish  shall  continue  under  its  jurisdiction,  until  final  judgment;  but, 
such  judgment  having  been  rendered,  the  execution  thereof  shall   be  com 
mitted  to  the  competent  authority  of  the  place  in  which  the  case  arose. 

Article  XIII. 

The  rights  of  property  secured  by  copyrights  and  patents  acquired  by 
Spaniards  in  the  island  of  Cuba  and  in  Porto  Rico,  the  Philippines  and  other 
ceded  territories,  at  the  time  of  the  exchange  of  the  ratifications  of  this  treaty. 


THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE.  679 

shall  continue  to  be  respected.  Spanish  scientific,  literary,  and  artistic  works, 
not  subversive  of  public  order  in  the  territories  in  question,  shall  continue  to 
be  admitted  free  of  duty  into  such  territories,  for  the  period  of  ten  years,  to 
be  reckoned  from  the  date  of  the  exchange  of  the  ratifications  of  this  treaty. 

Article  XIV. 

Spain  will  have  the  power  to  establish  consular  officers  in  the  ports  and 
places  of  the  territories,  the  sovereignty  over  which  has  been  either  relin 
quished  or  ceded  by  the  present  treaty. 

Article  XV. 

The  government  of  each  country  will,  for  the  term  of  ten  years,  accord  to 
the  merchant  vessels  of  the  other  country  the  same  treatment  in  respect  of 
all  port  charges,  including  entrance  and  clearance  dues,  light  dues,  and  ton 
nage  duties,  as  it  accords  to  its  own  merchant  vessels,  not  engaged  in  the 
coastwise  trade. 

This  article  may  at  any  time  be  terminated  on  six  months'  notice  given 
by  either  government  to  the  other. 

Article  XVI. 

It  is  understood  that  any  obligations  assumed  in  this  treaty  by  the  United 
States  with  respect  to  Cuba  are  limited  to  the  time  of  its  occupancy  thereof; 
but  it  will  upon  the  termination  of  such  occupancy,  advise  any  government 
established  in  the  island  to  assume  the  same  obligations. 

Article  XVII. 

The  present  treaty  shall  be  ratified  by  the  President  of  the  United  States, 
by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate  thereof,  and  by  Her  Majesty 
the  Queen  regent  of  Spain ;  and  the  ratifications  shall  be  exchanged  at  Wash 
ington  within  six  months  from  the  date  hereof,  or  earlier  if  possible. 

In  faith  whereof,  we,  the  respective  Plenipotentiaries,  have  signed  this 
treaty  and  have  hereunto  affixed  our  seals. 

Done  in  duplicate  at  Paris,  the  tenth  day  of  December,  in  the  year  of  Our 
Lord  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  ninety-eight. 

[Seal]     WILLIAM  R.  DAY.          [Seal]     EUGENIO  MONTERO  Rl'OS. 

[Seal]     CUSHMAN  K.  DAVIS.    [Seal]     B.  DE  ABARZUZA. 

[Seal]     WILLIAM  P.   FRYE.    '  [Seal]     J.  DE  GARNICA. 

[Seal]     GEO.   GRAY.  [Seal]     W  R  DE  VILLA  URRUTIA. 

[Seal]     WHITELAW  REID.         [Seal]     RAFAEL  CERERO. 


68o  THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE. 

When  the  conference  met  at  Paris,  October  ist,  the  President  of  the 
Spanish  Commission  stated  he  was  charged  by  his  government  to  lay  before 
the  American  Commission  a  proposition  of  a  pressing  nature.  It  was  that  the 
status  quo  was  altered  and  continued  to  be  with  daily  increasing  gravity  "to 
the  prejudice  of  Spain,  by  the  Tagalo  rebels  who  formed  an  auxiliary  force  to 
the  regular  American  troops,  and  the  Spanish  Commission  demanded  of  the 
American  Commissioners  that  the  American  forces  in  the  Philippines  must 
proceed  fully  and  absolutely  to  restore  the  said  status  quo,  and  must^  abstain 
from  preventing  by  any  means,  direct  or  indirect,  the  restoration  thereof  by 
the  Spanish  authorities  and  forces  in  the  territory  not  occupied  by  those  of 
the  United  States."  The  commissions  of  American  Plenipotentiaries  were  in 
these  terms: 

William  McKinley,  President  of  the  United  States  of  America,  to  all 
who  shall  see  these  presents,  Greeting:  Know  ye,  that  reposing  special  trust 
and  confidence  in  the  integrity  and  ability  of  William  R.  Day,  of  Ohio,  I  do 
appoint  him  a  Commissioner  Plenipotentiary  of  the  United  States,  under  the 
Protocol  signed  at  Washington  of  the  i2th  day  of  August,  1898,  to  negotiate 
and  conclude  a  Treaty  of  Peace  between  the  United  States  and  Spain,  and  do 
authorize  and  empower  him  to  execute  and  fulfill  the  duties  of  this  Commis 
sion,  with  all  the  powers,  privileges,  and  emoluments  thereunto  of  right 
appertaining,  during  the  pleasure  of  the  President  of  the  United  States. 

In  testimony  whereof,  I  have  caused  these  letters  to  be  made  patent,  and 
the  seal  of  the  United  States  to  be  hereunto  affixed. 

Given  under  my  hand  at  the  city  of  Washington  the  i3th  day  of  Septem 
ber  in  the  year  of  Our  Lord  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  ninety-eight, 
and  the  i23rd  year  of  the  Independence  of  the  United  States  of  America. 

Signed:     WILLIAM  McKINLEY. 

By  the  President : 

Signed:  J.  B.  MOORE,  Acting  Secretary  of  State. 

The  Commissions  of  the  other  American  Plenipotentiaries  were  in  the 
same  form,  their  names  being  as  follows : 
Cushman  K.  Davis,  of  Minnesota. 
William  P.  Frye,  of  Maine. 
George  Gray,  of  Delaware,  and 
Whitelaw  Reid,  of  New  York. 


THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE. 


681 


682  THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE. 

FULL   POWER   OF    AMERICAN    PLENIPOTENTIARIES. 

William  McKinley,  President  of  the  United  States  of  America,  to  all  who 
shall  see  these  presents,  Greeting: 

Know  Ye :  That,  reposing  special  trust  and  confidence  in  the  Integrity, 
and  Ability  of  the  Honorable  William  R.  Day,  of  Ohio,  lately  Secretary  of 
State  of  the  United  States,  the  Honorable  Cushman  K.  Davis,  of  Minnesota, 
a  Senator  of  the  United  States,  the  Honorable  William  P.  Frye,  of  Maine,  a 
Senator  of  the  United  States,  the  Honorable  George  Gray,  of  Delaware,  a 
Senator  of  the  United  States,  and  the  Honorable  Whitelaw  Reid,  of  New 
York,  lately  Minister  Plenipotentiary  of  the  United  States  to  France,  I  do 
appoint  them  jointly  and  severally  to  be  Commissioners  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States  under  the  Protocol  signed  at  Washington  on  the  twelfth  day  of 
August,  1898,  to  negotiate  and  conclude  a  Treaty  of  Peace  between  the 
United  States  and  Spain,  hereby  empowering  them  jointly  and  severally  to- 
meet  the  Commissioners  appointed  or  to  be  appointed  under  said  Protocol  on 
behalf  of  Spain,  and  with  them  to  negotiate  and  sign  a  Treaty  of  Peace 
between  the  United  States  and  Spain,  subject  to  the  ratification  of  their 
government;  and  the  said  Commission  to  hold  and  exercise  during  the  pleas 
ure  of  the  President  of  the  United  States  for  the  time  being. 

In  testimony  whereof,  I  have  caused  these  letters  to  be  made  patent  and 
the  seal  of  the  United  States  to  be  hereunto  affixed. 

Given  under  my  hand  at  the  city  of  Washington  this  i3th  day  of  Septem 
ber,  in  the  year  of  Our  Lord  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  ninety-eight, 
and  of  the  Independence  of  the  United  States  of  America  the  one  hundred 
and  twenty-third.  Signed:  WILLIAM  McKINLEY. 

By  the  President: 

Signed:  J.  B.  MOORE,  Acting  Secretary  of  State. 

The  authorization  of  the  Spanish  Commission  was  in  the  terms  and  form 
following: 

DON  ALFONSO  XIII., 

BY  THE  GRACE  OF  GOD  AND   THE   CONSTITUTION,    KING   OF   SPAIN,    AND 
IN  HIS  NAME  AND  DURING  HIS  MINORITY, 

DOftA  MARIA  CRISTINA, 
QUEEN  REGENT  OF  THE  KINGDOM: 

Whereas  the  occasion  has  arisen  for  the  concluding  between  Spain  and 
the  United  States  of  America  a  Treaty  of  Peace,  and  it  being  necessary  that 
to  such  end  I  should  duly  confer  authority  upon  persons  who  shall  merit  my 


THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE.  683 

royal  confidence,  and  you,  Don  Eugenio  Montcro  Rios,  Knight  of  the  Worthy 
Order  of  the  Golden  Fleece,  decorated  with  the  Collar  of  the  Royal  and  dis 
tinguished  Order  of  Charles  III.,  President  of  the  Senate,  ex-Minister  of  the 
Crown,  ex-President  of  the  Supreme  Tribunal  of  Justice,  Academician  of  the 
Moral  and  Political  Sciences,  embody  the  characteristics  which  meet  the 
requirements  of  the  case.  I  have  therefore  chosen  and  appointed,  and  by  these 
presents  do  choose  and  appoint  you  to  the  end  that,  pursuant  to  the  stipula 
tions  of  Article  V.  of  the  Protocol  signed  in  Washington  on  the  twelfth  day  of 
the  month  of  August  last,  and  invested  with  the  character  of  my  Plenipo 
tentiary,  you  may  in  unison  with  the  other  Plenipotentiaries  I  have  appointed 
under  this  date  and  those  who  may  be  designated  by  the  President  of  the 
United  States  for  the  same  purpose,  confer  and  agree  upon  what  may  be  best 
and  most  advisable.  And  everything  you  may  so  confer  and  agree  upon, 
negotiate,  conclude  and  sign,  I  now  confirm  and  ratify,  I  will  observe  and 
execute,  will  cause  to  be  observed  and  executed,  the  same  as  if  I  myself  had 
conferred  and  agreed  upon,  negotiated,  concluded  and  signed  it,  for  all  of 
which  I  confer  upon  you  ample  authority  to  the  fullest  extent  required  by  law. 
In  witness  whereof  I  have  caused  these  presents  to  issue  signed  by  my  hand, 
duly  sealed  and  attested  by  the  undersigned,  my  Minister  of  State. 

Given  in  the  Palace  of  Madrid  on  the  twenty-second  day  of  September  of 
eighteen  hundred  and  ninety-eight. 

Signed:     MARIA  CRISTINA. 
Signed:  JUAN  MANUEL  SANCHEZ  Y  GUTIERREZ  DE  CASTRO, 

Minister  of  State. 

The  commissions  and  full  powers  of  the  other  Spanish  Plenipotentiaries 
were  in  the  same  form;  their  names  and  titles  fully  given.  The  Crown 
Minister  led  the  list:  Don  Buenaventura  Abarzuza,  Senator  of  the  Kingdom 
and  some  time  Ambassador  and  Minister  of  the  Crown.  Another  Commis 
sioner  was:  Don  Jose  de  Garnica  y  Diaz,  Associate  Justice  of  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Justice,  Deputy  of  the  Cortes,  Member  of  the  General  Codification 
Commission,  ex-Vice-President  of  the  Congress  of  Deputies;  and  most  dis 
tinguished  by  his  title  was:  Don  Wenceslao  Ramirez  de  Villa- Urrutia,  Knight 
Grand  Cross  of  the  Royal  Order  of  Isabel  the  Catholic,  Knight  Commander 
of  the  Royal  and  Distinguished  Order  of  Charles  III.,  decorated  with  the 
White  Cross  of  the  second  class  of  Naval  Merit,  Grand  Cross  of  the  Dutch 
Lion  of  the  Netherlands,  Oak  Crown  of  Luxemburg,  the  Majidieh  of  Turkey, 


684 


THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE. 


THE  SPANISH  PEACE  COMMISSIONEES. 


THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE.  685 

Knight  Commander  of  the  Legion  of  Honor  of  France,  of  the  Concepcion  de 
Villaviciosa  of  Portugal,  decorated  with  the  Cross  of  the  second  class  of  the 
Bust  of  Bolivar,  Knight  of  St-Maurice  and  St-Lazarus  of  Italy,  of  the  Crown  of 
Prussia,  of  the  Crown  of  Christ  of  Portugal,  Licentiate  in  civil  and  canonical 
law,  and  through  competitive  examination,  in  administrative  law  Academician 
Professor  of  the  Royal  Academy  of  Jurisprudence  and  Legislation,  my  Min 
ister  Plenipotentiary  to  His  Majesty  the  King  of  the  Belgians. 

John  Bassett  Moore  of  New  York  was  appointed  Secretary  and  counsel  to 
the  Commissioners  of  the  United  States.  In  his  reply  to  the  opening  prop 
osition  of  the  Spanish  Commission  relating  to  the  aggressions  of  the 
Tagalo  rebels,  Mr.  Moore  said:  "The  American  Commissioners  can  see 
nothing  but  a  proposal  and  demand  to  divert  the  conference  from  the  object 
for  which  it  has  met  to  the  consideration  of  a  subject  which  properly  belongs 
to  the  two  governments,  and  not  to  the  Commissioners  here  assembled. 
The  American  Commissioners  do  not  intend  to  intimate  that  the  proposal  was 
made  with  this  design,  but  they  think  it  evident  that  this  would  be  the  neces 
sary  result  of  its  discussion."  And  "The  American  Commissioners,  with  a 
view  to  prevent  the  diversion  and  failure  of  the  present  negotiations,  as  well 
as  on  the  ground  of  a  want  of  power,  deem  themselves  obliged  to  reply  that 
the  questions  involved  in  the  present  proposals  and  demands  of  the  Spanish 
Commissioners  having  heretofore  been  presented  to  the  government  of  the 
United  States  and  answered  in  notes  of  the  Department  of  State,  any  further 
demands  as  to  military  operations  in  the  Philippines  must  be  addressed  by  the 
government  of  Spain  to  the  government  of  the  United  States  at  Washington, 
and  consequently  that  they  cannot  join  in  the  proposed  declarations." 

To  this  the  Spanish  Commissioners  replied  that  they  understood  it  was 
their  "duty  to  make  known  to  the  American  Commissioners  that  if  the  status 
quo  existing  in  the  Philippines  on  August  12  last,  far  from  being  restored, 
continues  to  be  disturbed  to  the  prejudice  of  Spain,  the  government  of  Her 
Catholic  Majesty,  and  in  her  name  its  plenipotentiaries  in  this  conference, 
reserve  the  right  to  act  as  they  may  deem  the  rights  of  Spain  shall  require, 
since  they  cannot  conceive  how  the  treaty  of  peace  they  are  charged  with 
arranging  with  the  American  Commissioners  upon  the  immutable  basis  of 
the  Protocol  of  Washington  of  August  12  last,  can  be  concluded  if  this  basis  is 
being  constantly  altered  in  one  of  its  parts,  and  continually  to  the  greater 
prejudice  of  Spain." 


686  THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE. 

The  first  words  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace  of  December  10,  1898,  are:  "Spain 
relinquishes  all  claims  of  sovereignty  over  and  title  to  Cuba,"  and  the 
island  upon  evacuation  by  Spain  was  to  be  occupied  by  the  United  States, 
*  and  while  the  occupation  lasted  the  United  States  assume  and  discharge 
the  obligations  that  under  international  law  resulted  from  the  fact  of  its 
occupation  for  the  protection  of  life  and  property."  The  second  article 
is  simply  that  "Spain  ceded"  certain  islands,  including  Porto  Rico  and 
Guam. 

The  Spanish  Commission  began  by  claiming  that  under  the  Protocol  of 
Peace  with  the  United  States  it  was  our  duty  to  see  that  "the  insurgents  in  the 
Philippines  did  not  change  the  situation."  This  shadowy  point  was  sus 
tained  with  an  elaboration  of  phrases,  and  discussed  by  the  American  Com 
mission  as  curtly  as  the  courtesies  of  peace-making  permitted.  Of  course  the 
Spaniards  reserved  all  rights  of  protest. 

The  Spanish  Commission  proceeded  to  propose  articles  as  an  amendment 
to  the  proposals  of  the  American  Commissioners  on  the  subject  of  the  relin- 
quishment  by  Spain  of  sovereignty  over  Cuba  and  the  cession  of  Porto  Rico. 
The  first  article  presented  by  the  Spaniards  was  that  the  relinquishment  and 
cession  was  to  be  accepted  by  the  United  States,  "that  they  may  in  their 
turn  transfer  it  at  the  proper  time  to  the  Cuban  people  upon  the  conditions 
established  in  this  treaty"  ;  and  the  second  article  was  that  the  relinquishment 
and  transfer  embraced : 

"First.  All  the  prerogatives,  powers,  and  rights,  which,  as  an  integral 
part  of  the  sovereignty,  belong  to  Her  Catholic  Majesty  both  over  the  island 
of  Cuba  and  over  its  inhabitants. 

"Second.  All  charges  and  obligations  of  every  kind  in  existence  at  the 
time  of  the  ratification  of  this  treaty  of  peace,  which  the  Crown  of  Spain 
and  her  authorities  in  the  island  of  Cuba  may  have  contracted  lawfully  in  the 
exercise  of  the  sovereignty  hereby  relinquished  and  transferred,  and  which 
as  such  constitute  an  integral  part  thereof." 

The  English  of  this  was  that  the  United  States  should  pay  the  debts  Spain 
had  charged  to  Cuba.  Article  Third  of  the  Spanish  propositions  detailed  the 
property,  immovable  and  other,  to  be  relinquished,  and  Article  Fourth  made 
the  material  proposal  more  definite,  saying: 

"First:  The  charges  and  obligations  to  be  transferred  must  have  been 
levied  and  imposed  in  constitutional  form  and  in  the  exercise  of  its  legitimate 


THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE.  687 

powers  by  the  Crown  of  Spain,  as  the  sovereign  of  the  island  of  Cuba,  or  by 
its  lawful  authorities  in  the  exercise  of  their  respective  powers  prior  to  the 
ratification  of  this  treaty. 

"Second:  The  creation  or  establishment  of  such  charges  or  obligations 
must  have  been  for  the  service  of  the  island  of  Cuba,  or  chargeable  to  its  own 
individual  treasury." 

Article  Fifth  was: 

"Pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  the  foregoing  Article,  there  shall  be 
embraced  in  the  said  transfer  all  debts,  of  whatsoever  kind,  lawful  charges, 
the  salaries  or  allowances  of  all  employes,  civil  and  ecclesiastical,  who  shall 
continue  to  render  services  in  the  island  of  Cuba,  and  all  pensions  in  the  civil 
and  military  services  and  of  widows  and  orphans;  provided  that  they  conform 
to  the  requirements  prescribed  in  the  foregoing  Article." 

Therefore  the  "relinquishment"  was  interpreted  to  provide  that  the  pen 
sions  and  salaries  of  the  priests,  among  others,  should  be  paid  by  the  United 
States  until  turned  over  to  the  people  of  Cuba  as  a  part  of  their  free  inherit 
ance.  The  American  Commission  rejected  (October  u)  the  Spanish  articles, 
and  filed  a  memorandum  reciting  the  Peace  Protocol,  saying: 

"In  the  place  of  the  unconditional  relinquishment  agreed  to  in  the 
Protocol,  it  is  proposed  that  the  relinquishment  now  offered  shall  embrace  all 
charges  of  every  kind  which  Spain  and  her  authorities  in  Cuba  have  .lawfully 
contracted  heretofore,  and  may  hereafter  contract,  prior  to  the  ratification  of 
the  treaty  of  peace;  and  these  'charges  and  obligations,'  past,  present  and 
future,  which  it  is  proposed  to  'transfer'  to  the  United  States,  are  declared  to 
include  debts,  civil  and  ecclesiastical  salaries,  and  civil  and  military  pensions, 
ostensibly  in  arrears,  as  well  as  yet  to  accrue. 

"To  the  American  Commissioners  this  appears  to  be  not  a  proposition  to 
*  relinquish  all  claim  of  sovereignty  over  and  title  to  Cuba,'  but  in  substance  a 
proposition*  to  'transfer'  to  the  United  States  and  in  turn  to  Cuba  a  mass  of 
Spanish  charges  and  obligations. 

"It  is  difficult  to  perceive  by  what  logic  an  indebtedness  contracted  for 
any  purpose  can  be  deemed  part  of  the  sovereignty  of  Spain  over  the  island 
of  Cuba.  In  the  Article  proposed  it  is  attempted  to  yoke  with  the  transfer  of 
sovereignty  an  obligation  to  assume  an  indebtedness  arising  out  of  the  rela 
tions  of  Spain  to  Cuba.  The  unconditional  relinquishment  of  sovereignty  by 
Spain  stipulated  for  in  the  Protocol  is  to  be  changed  into  an  engagement  by 


688  THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE. 

the  United  States  to  accept  the  sovereignty  burdened  with  a  large  mass  of 
outstanding  indebtedness. 

"It  is  proper  to  say  that  if  during  the  negotiations  resulting  in  the  con 
clusion  of  the  Protocol  Spain  had  proposed  to  add  to  its  stipulations  in  regard 
to  Cuba  such  as  those  now  put  forward,  the  proposal,  unless  abandoned, 
would  have  terminated  negotiations. 

"The  American  Commissioners,  therefore,  speaking  for  their  govern 
ment,  must  decline  to  accept  the  burden  which  it  is  now  proposed  shall  be 
gratuitously  assumed. 

"The  American  Commissioners  further  observe  that  in  Article  III.  of  the 
draft  there  is  a  negative  clause,  by  which  property  not  belonging  to  the  Crown 
of  Spain  is  excepted  from  the  proposed  relinquishment  and  transfer  of 
sovereignty.  In  one  respect  this  exception  appears  to  be  unnecessary,  and  in 
another  illogical.  So  far  as  it  affects  the  question  of  legal  title  it  is  unneces 
sary,  since  such  title,  if  not  held  by  Spain,  would  not  pass  to  the  United  States 
by  Spain's  transfer  of  sovereignty.  On  the  other  hand,  so  far  as  it  affects  the 
question  of  sovereignty,  it  is  illogical,  since  the  sovereignty,  which  includes 
the  right  of  eminent  domain,  would,  if  excepted  from  the  relinquishment, 
remain  with  Spain.  We  would  thus  have  the  singular  spectacle  of  Spain 
relinquishing  her  sovereignty  over  property  belonging  to  the  Crown,  but 
retaining  it  over  all  other  property. 

"Thus  again  we  should  witness  the  utter  defeat  of  the  explicit  engage 
ment  in  the  Protocol  that  Spain  would  'relinquish  all  claim  of  sovereignty 
over  and  title  to  Cuba. ' 

"In  the  articles  presented  by  the  American  Commissioners  there  were 
stipulations  in  relation  to  archives  and  official  records,  which  stipulations  were 
intended  to  secure,  and,  as  the  American  Commissioners  believe,  would 
effectually  secure,  the  object  of  preserving  and  of  furnishing  to  those  in  inter 
est  evidence  of  title  to  property  in  the  islands  in  question. 

"In. the  articles  submitted  by  the  Spanish  Commissioners,  it  is  provided 
that  documents  and  papers  relating  to  sovereignty  to  be  found  in  the  archives 
of  the  Peninsula  shall  be  furnished  to  the  United  States;  also  'copies  of  such 
portions  of  other  documents  and  papers  relating  to  other  subjects  foreign  to 
the  island  of  Cuba  and  the  sovereignty  aforesaid  as  may  exist  in  the  said 
archives. ' 

"It  is  difficult  for  the  Americans  to  understand  this  latter  clause;  perhaps 


THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE.  689 

its  exact  meaning  is  not  conveyed  in  the  English  translation  of  the  Spanish 
text. 

"It  is  to  be  further  observed  that  in  the  provisions  of  the  Spanish  articles 
relating  to  the  furnishing  of  record  evidence  of  titles  to  lands  in  Cuba  and 
Porto  Rico,  it  is  stip.ulated  that  the  archives  and  records  shall  be  at  the  dis 
posal  of  the  United  States  'with  the  same  rights  and  obligations  as  now  attach 
to  them  while  at  the  disposal  of  the  Spanish  government  and  its  said  (insular) 
authorities.'  This  restriction,  the  object  of  which  is  not  perceived,  would 
seem  to  limit  the  control  over  archives  and  official  records,  after  Spain's  relin- 
quishment  of  sovereignty,  to  the  same  power,  both  in  kind  and  in  extent,  as 
was  formerly  possessed  by  the  Spanish  government.  This  appears  to  be 
inconsistent  with  the  right  of  control  which  every  sovereign  power  should 
possess  over  its  archives  and  official  records. 

"All  the  conditions  and  qualifications  above  referred  to  are  by  general 
reference  incorporated  in  the  articles  relating  to  the  cession  of  Porto  Rico  and 
other  islands  in  the  West  Indies,  and  render  these  articles  equally  inadmissible. ' ' 

It  would  be  troublesome  to  find  a  more  conclusive  "annex"  to  a  "Proto 
col"  than  this.  The  Spanish  Commission  came  back  with  a  memorandum 
that  displayed  the  resources  of  their  noble  language.  First  they  defined  the 
difference  between  "relinquishment"  and  "abandonment,"  saying: 

"The  government  of  the  American  Union  never  demanded  that  the  Span 
ish  government  abandon  (abandonar)  the  sovereignty  over  Cuba,  but  that  it 
relinquish  (renunciar)  the  same,  so  that  the  island  should  become  independ 
ent.  It  so  appears  from  the  diplomatic  correspondence  in  the  possession  of 
the  government  of  Her  Catholic  Majesty  relating  to  the  negotiation  between 
the  two  contracting  parties  prior  to  the  declaration  of  war.  It  was  also  thus 
declared  by  the  American  Congress  in  the  Joint  Resolution  of  April  19  last, 
subsequently  approved  by  the  President  of  the  United  States.  The  first 
clause  of  that  resolution  reads  'that  the  people  of  Cuba  are  and  of  right 
ought  to  be  free  and  independent. '  ' 

There  followed  the  official  text  of  the  Protocol  in  Spanish,  and  remarks: 

"To  undertake  to  explain  the  essential  difference  which  according  to  the 
elementary  principles  of  public  international  law  and  the  usage  of  nations 
exists  between  the  abandonment  (abandono)  and  the  relinquishment 
(renuncia)  of  sovereignty,  would  be  to  offend  the  intelligence  of  the  learned 
American  Commissioners. 


690  THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE. 

"Abandoned  territories  can  of  right  be  acquired  by  the  first  occupant, 
while  relinquished  territories  necessarily  pass  unto  him  to  whom  relinquish- 
ment  is  made.  And  the  United  States  demanded  that  Spain  relinquish  in 
order  that  the  Cuban  people  might  become  independent. 

"Although  it  is  true  that  the  United  States  of  America  demanded  this 

o 

of  Spain  in  the  present  case,  they  also  demanded  that  such  relinquishment 
must  be  made  through  them.  The  United  States  were  to  receive  the  island 
of  Cuba  and  retain  the  possession  thereof,  governing  it  until  its  pacification 
was  secured,  asserting  its  'determination  to  leave  [no  one  can  leave  what  he 
does  not  hold]  the  government  and  control  of  the  island  to  its  people,  as  soon 
as  the  said  pacification  is  accomplished.'  So  was  it  solemnly  set  forth  in 
Section  4  of  the  Joint  Resolution  of  the  American  Congress  and  in  the  des 
patch  of  the  Secretary  of  State  to  the  American  Minister  at  Madrid.  And 
if  the  United  States  are  not  to  leave  the  government  and  control  of  the 
island  until  the  pacification  thereof  is  accomplished  it  is  self-evident  that  in 
the  meantime  the  United  States  are  called  upon  to  administer  the  one  and 
retain  the  other." 

This  was  followed  by  learned  observations  about  the  rights  of  sovereignty 
and  the  variance  of  the  ancient  world  with  the  modern  and  Christian  world, 
the  maxims  observed  by  cultured  nations  and  the  eternal  principles  of  justice, 
more  or  less  labored,  and  of  vague  application,  saying: 

"The  special  obligations  of  the  particular  territories  ceded  which  were 
contracted  by  its  legitimate  authorities,  in  no  single  case,  not  even  in  those 
treaties  in  which  the  victor  has  shown  himself  most  merciless  towards  the 
vanquished,  have  the  individual  and  separate  charges  and  obligations  of  a 
ceded  territory  failed  to  pass  therewith.  Thus  it  may  be  considered  as  an 
absolutely  essential  condition  that  the  cession  of  territory  carries  with  it  the 
cession  of  the  departmental,  communal,  and,  generally  speaking,  individual 
obligations  and  debts  of  the  ceded  territory." 

The  "great  conqueror  of  the  century"  (Napoleon)  never  dared  to  violate 
this  eternal  rule  of  justice  and,  "The  territories  discovered  by  Columbus  and 
other  illustrious  Spanish  explorers  who  have  rendered  such  great,  though  not 
always  appreciated,  services  to  civilization  being  divided  into  vice-royalties 
and  captaincies-general,  each  of  these  small  states  collected  its  own  revenues 
and  met  its  own  expenses,  or  contracted  obligations  to  meet  the  necessities  of 
its  own  separate  government;  and  when  one  of  these  territories  found  itself 


iu  tlu* 


I  '' r/y  </ /////<" yr/////s/y  t/// •       "/////,  i    rf-'////sy.>//r/f//    /r/f//y///y 

'     ///,/    /  ' />.////////  ///,/,.  ;,    ,///'/ /,//////V.  ,///  fyy/rr/.j,   •////////<    ////,/       '/////ttt.j.  ////sd;  //s.  /    f/  //////// //////   // 

^i^MtinU  "•'/«•  ft.**/*  ///tf//t//r,t  .<//'•/,  {'„/,,.,,//,, 

//<//,  //,„,  /,  /////,  ^-///  .,//,///  ,,<,//,/,,„,  „,,    ,  /  //// ///////,  JRRKttaMDfJT/////  '///////// //,//,./  , , 

/.  /  /  /  ^         '  /    V'  '     /     • 

////// // /////.  X  ,         M»^      /    ^1]    -i"1 — 


, 


"TO  GEORGE  DEVVEY,  WITH  THE  COMPLIMENTS  OF  THE  PRESIDENT,  CONGRESS  AND 
THE  PEOPLE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES." 


THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE.  693 

with  a  permanent  deficit,  as  was  the  case  in  the  island  of  Cuba,  the  nearest 
sister-colony  came  to  its  rescue.  The  vice-royalty  of  Mexico,  from  1766  to 
1806,  annually  assisted  the  island  of  Cuba  with  heavy  sums  for  its  govern 
mental  needs  and  the  development  of  its  natural  resources,  at  the  time  unex- 
ploited,  which  expenses  it  could  not,  at  such  time,  meet  from  its  own 
revenues.  Not  less  that  108  millions  of  pesos  came  into  Cuba  from  Mexico 
during  that  period,  this  assistance  being  known  in  the  Spanish  colonial  admin 
istration  under  the  name  of  'Situado  de  Mexico.'  " 

The  Spanish  Commission  proceeded  to  state  that  grave  errors  were  fallen 
into  "owing  to  the  Spanish  colonial  system  being  unknown."  The  Spanish 
Commission  at  this  point  paid  this  tribute  to  the  Spanish-American  peoples: 
"What  has  been  said  up  to  this  point  regarding  the  nature  of  the  colonial 
obligations  and  those  bound  thereby,  has  never  been  disregarded  (to  their 
honor  be  it  said)  by  the  Spanish-American  peoples.  They  achieved  their 
independence  through  their  own  efforts,  and  the  majority  of  them,  before 
Spain  had  recognized  it,  had  by  prior  and  solemn  act  of  their  legislatures, 
declared  as  their  own  and  as  having  preference  those  debts  which  the  Crown 
of  Spain  had  contracted  during  the  continuance  of  its  sovereignty  for  the 
service  of  such  territories,  and  which  debts  were  recorded  in  their  respective 
treasury  books. 

"Very  few  of  the  Spanish- American  republics  delayed  so  honorable  a 
declaration  until  the  mother  country  had  recognized  their  independence,  as 
was  said  by  the  Argentine  Republic  in  the  treaty  concluded  with  Spain  on 
September  21,  1863,  and  by  Uruguay,  in  that  concluded  on  July  19,  1870:  'Just 
as  they  acquired  the  rights  and  privileges  belonging  to  the  Crown  of  Spain, 
they  also  assume  all  its  duties  and  obligations.' 

"Note  that  the  Spanish-American  republics  without  exception  recognized 
and  assumed  as  their  own  these  debts  of  every  kind  whatsoever,  specifying 
them  in  the  treaty  of  peace  with  Bolivia  of  July  21,  1847,  wherein  it  is  stated 
that  they  'include  all  debts  for  pensions,  salaries,  supplies,  advances,  trans 
portation,  forced  loans,  deposits,  contracts,  and  any  other  debt  incurred  during 
war  times  or  prior  thereto,  chargeable  to  said  treasuries;  provided  they  were 
contracted  by  direct  orders  of  the  Spanish  government  or  its  constituted 
authorities  in  said  territories. ' 

"Spain  did  not  recognize  the  independence  of  any  American  state  which 
had  previously  been  her  colony  save  upon  this  condition,  which  those  states 


694 


THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE. 


spontaneously  incorporated  in  their  respective  treaties,  as  of  right  they 
should. 

"Her  right  and  her  dignity  will  not  permit  her  to  recognize — without  this 
condition,  which  now  more  than  ever  if  possible  is  still  just  and  proper — the 
independence  of  the  Cuban  and  Porto  Rican  peoples,  which  they  have  not 
been  able  to  achieve  by  their  own  unaided  efforts." 

The  Spanish  Commission  desired  a  modification  of  the  sentence  in  the 
American  .Commissioners'  Protocol  No.  4,  that  the  Spanish  Article  was  a 
proposition  not  to  relinquish  sovereignty,  but  to  "transfer  to  the  United 
States  a  mass  of  Spanish  charges  and  obligations,"  and  modification  was 
desired  "on  the  ground  that  it  might  be  thought  to  imply  that  they  were  not 
acting  in  good  faith."  Out  of  deference  to  the  Spanish  Commissioners  this 
was  changed,  though  the  sentence  did  not  sustain  the  Spanish  construction,  to 
read,  "a  mass  of  charges  and  obligations  which,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Ameri 
can  Commissioners,  properly  belong  to  Spain."  October  i4th  the  American 
Commission  replied  to  the  Spanish  Commission  as  to  the  distinction  between 
relinquishment  and  abandonment,  the  contention  being  based  upon  the  fact 
that  "in  the  various  documents  referred  to  the  United  States  required  Spain  to 
'relinquish'  her  sovereignty,  but  did  not  demand  that  she  'abandon'  it. 

"A  distinction  is  thus  made  between  a  'relinquishment'  and  an  'aban 
donment';  and  it  is  argued  that  while  'abandoned  territories'  become 
derelict,  so  that  they  may  be  acquired  by  the  first  occupant,  'relinquished 
territories'  necessarily  pass  to  him  to  whom  relinquishment  is  made. 

"The  American  Commissioners  are  unable  to  admit  that  such  a  distinc 
tion  between  the  words  in  question  exists  either  in  law  or  in  common  use. 

"The  word  'relinquish,'  as  defined  in  the  English  dictionaries,  means  4to 
give  up  the  possession  or  occupancy  of;  withdraw  from;  leave;  abandon; 
quit.'  Again:  'to  renounce  a  claim  to;  resign;  as,  to  relinquish  a  debt.' 

"On  the  other  hand,  we  find  in  that  great  monument  of  Spanish  learning, 
the  law  dictionary  of  Escriche  (Diccionario  de  Legislacion  y  Jurisprudencia), 
under  the  word 'renunciar, '  which  the  Spanish  memorandum  declares  to  be 
the  equivalent  of  the  French  word  'renoncer'  (used  in  Spain's  version  of  the 
Protocol)  and  of  the  English  word  'relinquish,'  the  following  definition:  'The 
voluntary  giving  up  of  a  right  exercised  or  expected  to  be  exercised,  or  of  a 
thing  held  or  possessed  or  expected  to  be  held  or  possessed. '  " 

Commenting  upon  this  definition,    Escriche  says:    "The   relinquishment 


THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE.  695 

differs  from  the  cession  in  that  the  latter  requires  for  its  completion  the  con 
currence  of  the  wills  of  the  grantor  and  tiie  grantee  and  a  just  cause  for  the 
transfer,  while  the  former  is  perfect  with  only  the  will  of  the  relinquisher. 
The  effect  of  the  relinquishment  is  confined  to  the  abdication  or  dropping  of 
the  right  or  thing  relinquished.  The  effect  of  the  cession  is  the  conveyance 
of  the  right  to  the  grantee." 

The  American  Commissioners  noted  the  declaration  in  the  Spanish 
memorandum  that  there  was  no  purpose  now  to  transfer  with  the  sovereignty 
of  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  a  proportional  part  of  the  national  debt  of  Spain,  but 
''only  the  obligations  and  charges  attaching  individually  to  the  islands,"  which 
obligations  and  charges  it  likens  to  the  local  debts  which  pass  with  ceded  ter 
ritory;  but  it  appears,  however,  by  the  explanation  given  in  the  memorandum 
of  the  origin  of  these  charges  and  obligations,  and  of  the  manner  in  which 
they  were  contracted,  that  they  included  the  whole  of  what  is  commonly 
called  the  Cuban  debt.  And  it  was  shown  that  this  debt  did  not  exist 
prior  to  1861,  and  the  American  memorandum  concluded  with  the  statement 
that  the  government  of  the  United  States  had  at  a  great  sacrifice  ot  life  and 
treasure  prosecuted  a  conflict  to  cause  the  relinquishment  by  Spain  of  sover 
eignty  over  Cuba,  and  one  of  the  results  was  the  unconditional  agreement 
embodied  in  the  first  article  of  the  Peace  Protocol  that  Spain  "will  relinquish 
all  claim  of  sovereignty  over  and  title  to  Cuba, M  and  "upon  the  simple  fulfill 
ment  of  that  stipulation  the  American  Commissioners  are  obliged  to  insist." 

The  formation  of  the  Cuban  debt  was  thus  related  by  the  Commissioners: 

"The  revenues  of  the  island  were,  as  a  rule,  far  more  than  sufficient  to 
pay  the  expenses  of  its  government,  and  produced  in  each  year  a  surplus. 
This  surplus  was  not  expended  for  the  benefit  of  the  island,  but  vva~  sent  to 
Madrid.  The  surpluses  thus  disposed  of  amounted,  from  1856  to  .861  in 
clusive,  to  upwards  of  $20,000,000. 

"In  1864,  in  order  to  meet  the  national  expenses  of  the  attempt  i->  'rein- 
corporate1  San  Domingo  into  the  Spanish  dominions,  and  of  the  'expedition  to 
Mexico,'  the  Spanish  authorities  issued  bonds  to  the  amount  of  $3,000,000. 
Subsequently  new  loans  were  made,  so  that  the  so-called  Cuban  debt  had 
swollen  by  1868  to  $18,000,000. 

"In  that  year  the  ten  years'  war  for  Cuban  independence  broke  out,  a  war 
produced  by  causes  so  generally  conceded  to  be  just  as  to  need  no  exposition 
on  this  occasion.  All  the  expenses  of  this  war  were  imposed  upon  Cuba,  so 


696  THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE. 

that  in  1880,  according  to  a  statement  made  at  Madrid  in  that  year  by  a  Span 
ish  Secretary  for  the  Colonies,  the  sq-called  Cuban  debt  amounted  to  upwards 
of  $170,000,000. 

"Subsequently  the  Spanish  government  undertook  to  consolidate  these 
debts,  and  to  this  end  created  in  1886  the  so-called  Billetes  hipotecarios  de  la 
Isla  de  Cuba,  to  the  amount  of  620,000,000  pesetas,  or  $124,000,000.  The 
vSpanish  government  undertook  to  pay  these  bonds  and  the  interest  thereon 
out  of  the  revenues  of  Cuba,  but  the  national  character  of  the  debt  was  shown 
by  the  fact  that,  upon  the  face  of  the  bonds,  'the  Spanish  nation'  (la  Naci6n 
Espanola)  guarantee  their  payment.  The  annual  charge  for  interest  and 
sinking  fund  on  account  of  this  debt  amounted  to  the  sum  of  39,191,000 
pesetas,  or  $7,838,200,  which  was  disbursed  through  a  Spanish  financial  insti 
tution,  called  the  Banco  Hispano-Colonial,  which  is  said  to  have  collected  daily 
from  the  custom  house  at  Havana,  through  an  agency  there  established,  the 
sum  of  $33,339- 

"In  1890  a  new  issue  of  bonds  was  authorized  by  the  Spanish  government 
to  the  amount,  as  it  is  understood,  of  875,000,000  pesetas,  or  $175,000,000, 
with  the  same  guarantee  as  before,  apparently  with  a  view  to  refund  the  prior 
debt,  as  well  as  to  cover  any  new  debts  contracted  between  1886  and  1890.  It 
seems,  however,  that  only  a  small  number  of  these  bonds  had  been  disposed  of 
when,  in  February,  1895,  the  last  insurrection  and  movement  for  independence 
broke  out.  The  government  of  Spain  then  proceeded  to  issue  these  new 
bonds  for  the  purpose  of  raising  funds  with  which  to  suppress  the  uprising,  so 
that  those  outstanding  on  January  i,  1898,  amounted,  according  to  published 
reports,  to  858,550,000  pesetas,  or  $171,710,000.  In  addition  to  these  a  further 
loan,  known  as  the  'Cuban  War  Emergency  Loan,'  was,  as  the  American 
Commissioners  are  advised,  floated  to  the  amount  of  800,000,000  pesetas,  or 
$160,000,000,  represented  by  what  are  called  'five  per  cent  peseta  bonds.' 

"Although  it  does  not  appear  that  any  mention  is  made  in  these  bonds  of 
the  revenues  of  Cuba,  it  is  understood  that  they  are  regarded  in  Spain  as 
properly  constituting  apart  of  the  'Cuban  debt,'  together  with  various  unliqui 
dated  debts,  large  in  amount,  incurred  by  the  Spanish  authorities  in  opposing 
by  arms  the  independence  of  Cuba. 

"From  no  point  of  view  can  the  debts  above  described  be  considered  as 
local  debts  of  Cuba  or  as  debts  incurred  for  the  benefit  of  Cuba.  In  no  sense 
are  they  obligations  properly  chargeable  to  that  island.  They  are  debts 


THE    TREATY    OF     PEACE.  697 

created  by  the  government  of  Spain,  for  its  own  purposes  and  through  its  own 
agents,  in  whose  creation  Cuba  had  no  voice." 

In  reply  to  this  the  Spanish  Commission  asserted  that,  "as  a  general  rule, 
the  island  of  Cuba  has  not  since  its  discovery  covered  its  own  expenses. 

"As  long  as  Spain  kept  the  American  colonies  the  island  was  sustained 
by  the  pecuniary  aid  of  her  sisters  and  specially  by  that  of  the  Vice-Royalty 
of  Mexico.  In  this  century,  for  a  very  few  years,  she  had  a  surplus,  thanks 
to  the  development  of  her  natural  resources,  at  last  obtained  through  this 
assistance,  and  it  is  true  that  this  surplus  was  turned  over  to  the  treasury  of 
the  Peninsula.  But  with  this  exception  it  is  patent  that  the  general  accounts 
of  the  Spanish  state  from  1896-1897  show  that  the  treasury  of  the  Peninsula 
advanced  to  Cuba,  in  the  years  preceding  that  recent  period,  a  sum  amounting 
to  429,602,013.08  pesetas.  There  also  appears  an  advance  to  Porto  Rico  of 
3,220,488.67  pesetas,  and  to  Santo  Domingo  1,397,161.69  pesetas. 

"The  prosperity  of  Cuba  was  of  short  duration;  for  the  greater  part  of 
the  time  from  the  days  of  Columbus,  by  reason  either  of  the  scarcity  of  its 
inhabitants  or  of  the  slavery  of  the  black  race,  which. formed  the  majority,  or 
lastly  because  Spaniards  preferred  to  colonize  other  parts  of  America,  the 
island  was  unable  to  develop  its  natural  resources;  and  it  was  nevertheless 
constantly  necessary  to  expend  in  the  island  the  large  sums  which  were 
required  for  the  establishment  of  reform  and  the  creation  of  the  institutions 
which  are  the  essential  conditions  of  modern  life." 

The  Spanish  Commission  protested  against  an  assertion  in  the  American 
memorandum  that  the  insurrections  in  Cuba  were  the  outcome  of  just  griev 
ances,  and  regretted  that  such  an  assertion  should  have  been  made.  The 
American  Commission  "would  surely,  and  with  good  reason,  regret  that  the 
Spanish  Commission  should  say  anything  here  without  an  imperative  necessity 
of  the  justice  of  the  rebellions  of  the  natives  of  the  immense  American  territory 
which  the  United  States  had  so  often  to  suppress  with  an  iron  hand,  and  if  it 
should  also  say  anything  of  the  right  by  which  the  Southern  States  attempted 
to  break  the  federal  bond  by  the  force  of  arms. ' ' 

It  was  "very  natural,"  the  Spaniards  proceeded,  "that  the  American 
Commissioners  should  not  have  such  accurate  knowledge  as  is  requisite  for 
precise  judgment  of  the  acts  of  the  Spanish  administration  in  the  Peninsula  or 
in  its  colonies. 

"And  we  find  a  confirmation  of  this  in  the  facts. 


698  THE    TREATY    OF     PEACE. 

"In  regard  to  the  argument  against  the  recognition  of  a  certain  part  of 
the  Cuban  debt,  on  the  ground  that  the  rebellion  of  a  minority  of  the  Cuban 
people  to  obtain  their  independence  was  just,  we  have  only  to  make  the  fol 
lowing  remark : 

"The  insurgent  minority,  it  is  true,  rose  up  in  arms  to  secure  the  inde 
pendence  of  the  island.  The  United  States  erroneously  believed  that  their 
cause  was  just,  and  by  force  of  arms  caused  it  to  prevail  against  Spain.  But 
now  the  facts  have  shown  that  Spain  was  right,  as  the  United  States  them 
selves  have  had  to  recognize  that  the  Cuban  people  are  not  as  yet  in  such  con 
ditions  as  are  necessary  to  entitle  them  to  the  enjoyment  of  full  liberty  and 
sovereignty.  It  is  upon  this  ground  that  the  United  States  have  decided  to 
withhold  from  that  people  the  said  privileges  and  to  hold  them  under  Ameri 
can  control,  until  they  become  able  to  enjoy  that  liberty  prematurely 
demanded  by  them. " 

In  order  to  define  the  debts  the  Americans  should  assume  the  Spaniards 
presented  an  article,  providing : 

"All  pecuniary  charges  and  obligations  outstanding  upon  the  ratification 
of  this  treaty  of  peace  which,  after  a  minute  examination  into  their  origin, 
purpose  and  the  conditions  of  their  creation,  should  be  held,  pursuant  to  strict 
law  and  undeniable  equity,  to  be  distinct  from  such  as  are  properly  and 
peculiarly  chargeable  to  the  treasury  of  the  Peninsula,  and  to  have  been 
always  properly  and  peculiarly  Cuban. 

"To  make  the  strict  examination  provided  for  in  the  foregoing  paragraph, 
the  two  High  Contracting  Parties  shall  name  a  Commission  of  competent  and 
impartial  persons  in  the  manner  to  be  determined  in  the  proper  article  of  this 
treaty. ' ' 

As  to  the  powers  of  the  Commissioners,  the  Spanish  Commission  quoted 
the  Secretary  of  State  and  the  President,  as  follows : 

"After  the  three  conditions  which  the  Secretary  of  State  at  Washington, 
replying  on  July  30  last  to  the  message  of  the  government  of  Her  Catholic 
Majesty  of  the  226  of  the  said  month,  proposed  to  Spain  for  the  termination  of 
the  war,  he  said:  'If  the  terms  hereby  offered  are  accepted  in  their  entirety 
commissioners  will  be  named  by  the  United  States  to  meet  similarly  author 
ized  commissioners  on  the  part  of  Spain  for  the  purpose  of  settling  the  details 
of  the  treaty  of  peace  and  signing  and  delivering  it  under  the  terms  above 
indicated. '  These  details  do  not  appear  to  be  circumscribed  to  the  archipelago. 


THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE.  699 

"The  very  President  of  the  American  Republic  in  the  conference  he  held 
on  August  10  with  the  Ambassador  of  France,  representing- Spain  for  the  time 
being,  made  an  absolute  distinction  between  the  Protocol  and  the  treaty  of 
peace,  stating  that  the  former  should  only  be  a  mere  preliminary  document 
which  should  have  no  object  or  effect  other  than  to  record  without  any  delay 
the  agreement  of  the  two  governments  upon  the  principles  themselves  of  the 
peace,  and  that,  therefore,  it  would  not  be  necessary  to  reserve  therein  either 
the  rights  of  the  Cortes  or  those  of  the  Federal  Senate,  who  were  charged 
only  with  the  ratification  of  the  final  treat)^. 

"The  President,  it  is  true,  spoke  of  the  Philippine  question  to  state  that  it 
was  reserved  for  the  Paris  conference;  but  he  never  said,  or  even  intimated, 
that  this  subject  should  be  the  only  one  to  be  treated  by  this  conference  " 

This  was  followed  up  with  these  interesting  observations: 

"The  American  Commission,  in  order  to  sustain  its  inadmissible  opinion 
regarding  the  abandonment  by  Spain  of  the  island  of  Cuba,  relies  on  the 
difference  which  appears  in  the  Protocol  itself.  They  say  that  Spain  agreed 
to  cede  only  Porto  Rico  to  the  United  States,  while  she  bound  herself  to  relin 
quish  the  island  of  Cuba.  From  this  they  deduce  that  the  effects  of  the  obli 
gation  of  Spain  with  respect  to  one  are  broader  than  with  respect  to  the 
other.  We  have  already  proved  by  the  very  text  of  the  draft  of  articles 
presented  by  the  said  gentlemen  that  when  they  drew  it  up  they  did  not  even 
perceive  this  difference  in  the  effects  with  respect  to  Spain.  The  difference, 
nevertheless,  is  well  understood  under  another  aspect.  The  United  States 
made  a  demand  on  Spain  and  afterwards  declared  war  on  her  that  Cuba  might 
become  free  and  independent.  And  it  is  clear  that  having  conquered  they 
could  not  demand  that  the  island  be  ceded  to  them,  ignoring  the  liberty  and 
independence  thereof,  as  this  would  give  cause  to  the  world  to  believe  that 
such  liberty  and  independence  had  not  been  the  true  cause  of  the  conflict. 
They  did  not  make  the  same  demand  regarding  Porto  Rico,  and  did  subse 
quently  claim  the  sovereignty  of  the  latter  island  and  of  the  others  surround 
ing  Cuba  (which  will  render  impossible  its  independence  without  the  will  and 
gracious  consent  of  the  United  States,  which  will  always  have  it  at  their 
mercy  owing  to  their  control  over  the  islands  surrounding  it  like  a  band  of 
iron)  in  the  way  of  indemnity  for  the  expenses  of  the  war  and  of  the  damages 
which  they  said  American  citizens  had  suffered  during  the  colonial 
insurrection.  This  is  the  natural  explanation  of  why  in  the  Protocol  the 


7oc  THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE. 

sovereignty  of  one  island  appears  as  relinquished  and  that  of  the  others 
as  ceded." 

The  Spaniards  proceeded  to  state  the  fact  that  we  had  repeatedly  paid 
for  land,  citing  the  cases  of  Louisiana,  Texas,  New  Mexico  and  Alaska,  and 
now  we  were  demanding  from  Spain,  in  the  way  of  war  indemnity,  not  only 
the  cession  of  islands  but  additionally  that  the  burdens  which  encumbered 
them,  "as  well  as  their  sister  Cuba,  be  thrown  upon  the  mother  country,  who 
with  her  own  hands  introduced  them  into  the  life  of  the  civilized  world." 

In  concluding  their  very  lengthy  and  able  memorandum  the  Spanish 
Commission  remarked,  with  eloquent  impressiveness,  it  is  only  fair  to  say : 

"It  results,  in  recapitulation,  that  the  only  question  up  to  now  in  existence 
between  the  two  Commissions  and  awaiting  their  decision  is  a  question  of 
money,  which  as  far  as  one  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  is  concerned  is 
relatively  of  secondary  importance.  That  question  is  the  one  which  relates 
to  the  colonial  debt. 

"The  Spanish  Commissioners  understand  that  a  question  of  such  a  nature 
as  this  cannot  fail  to  be  solved  satisfactorily  between  two  parties,  one  of 
which  is  the  greatest  nation  of  the  new  world,  immensely  rich  and  prosperous, 
blessed  with  inexhaustible  resources,  whether  due  to  nature  or  to  the 
prodigious  activity  of  its  inhabitants,  which  on  the  other  hand  acquires  by  this 
treaty  territories  of  great  importance,  and  thereby  fulfills  an  aspiration  of  its 
policy  in  America,  while  the  other  party  is  a  great  and  noble  nation  of  the  old 
world,  a  cordial  friend  of  her  late  antagonist  in  days  for  her  more  prosperous, 
but  now  impoverished  through  the  misfortunes  heaped  upon  her  during  the 
century  which  is  about  to  terminate;  whose  treasury  is  overburdened  by 
obligations,  and  for  whom  the  present  treaty  will  mean  the  solemn  confirma 
tion  of  the  loss  of  the  last  remnants  of  her  American  empire,  although  through 
her  discovery  of  the  new  world  she  was  instrumental  in  the  very  existence  of 
the  Great  American  Republic,  and  to  the  enrichment  of  the  modern  nations, 
perhaps  at  the  expense  of  her  own  welfare  and  to  the  detriment  of  the  full 
development  ot"  the  great  elements  of  wealth  accumulated  in  her  own  bosom 
but  neglected  through  her  desire  preferentially  to  attend  to  her  colonies, 
creatures  who  like  others  in  the  order  of  nature  enlist  the  utmost  solicitude 
on  the  part  of  their  mother,  who  feeds  and  supports  them  at  the  sacrifice  of 
her  own  welfare." 

In  replying  to  this  remarkable  manifesto  in  a  memorandum,   which  is 


THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE, 


701 


marked  by  the  passionate  dignity  of  an  uncommon  and  transcendent  sorrow, 
the  American  Commission  said  that  in  offering  the  precise  stipulations  of  the 
Protocol  they  "sought  to  put  aside  the  controversy  raised  by  the  Spanish 
proposals  as  to  the  relinquishment  of  sovereignty  and  the  assumption  of  the 
Cuban  debt,  and  to  afford  the  Spanish  Commissioners  an  opportunity  to  meet 
them  on  the  common  ground  of  what  the  two  governments  had  unmistakably 
agreed  to.  It  was  and  is  now  apparent  that  on  the  composite  subject,  as  the 
Spanish  Commissioners  consider  it  to  be,  of  the  relinquishment  of  sovereignty 
over  Cuba  and  the  assumption  of  the  Cuban  debt,  the  views  expressed  on  the 
one  side  and  on  the  other  are  irreconcilable,  and  that,  unless  some  common 
ground  is  found,  the  conference  is  at  an  end.  In  this  crisis  the  American 
Commissioners  conceived  that  both  sides  might,  without  any  compromise  of 
principle  or  of  opinion,  agree  that,  instead  of  amplifying  the  words  of  the 
Protocol,  or  substituting  for  them  argumentative  stipulations,  they  would 
execute  the  promise  in  the  words  in  which  it  was  made.  They  regret  that 
the  Spanish  Commissioners  rejected  this  conciliatory  proposition. 

"The  Spanish  Commissioners,  in  the  memorandum  now  under  considera 
tion,  recur  to  the  distinction  which  they  have  sought  to  make  between  the 
words  'abandon'  and  'relinquish.'  On  this  verbal  question,  which  was 
raised  by  the  Spanish  Commissioners  in  their  memorandum  of  the  nth  of 
October,  the  American  Commissioners  find  no  occasion  to  add  anything  to 
what  they  have  already  said;  but  they  feel  called  upon  to  repel  the  imputa 
tion  that  they  have  sought  either  to  leave  Cuba  in  a  derelict  condition  or  to 
evade  any  responsibility  to  which  their  government  is  by  its  declarations  or 
its  course  of  conduct  committed." 

Touching  the  Spanish  claims  that  they  had  made  recent  "advances"  to 
Cuba,  the  American  Commission  observed : 

"It  is  to  be  regretted  that  details  were  not  given.  But,  by  the  very  term 
'advances'  it  is  evident  that  the  Spanish  memorandum  does  not  refer  to  gifts, 
but  to  expenditures  for  the  reimbursement  of  which  Cuba  was  expected  ulti 
mately  to  provide;  and  the  American  Commissioners  do  not  doubt  that  these 
expenditures'  were  made  for  the  carrying  on  of  the  war,  or  the  payment  of  war 
expenses,  in  Cuba. 

"When  the  American  Commissioners,  in  their  memorandum  of  the  i4th 
instant,  referred  to  the  Cuban  insurrection  of  1868  as  the  product  of  just 
grievances,  it  was  not  their  intention  to  offend  the  sensibilities  of  the  Spanish 


7o2  THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE. 

Commissioners,  but  to  state  a  fact  which  they  supposed  to  be  generally 
admitted.  They  might,  if  they  saw  fit  .to  do  so,  cite  the  authority  of  man) 
eminent  Spanish  statesmen  in  the  support  of  their  remark. 

"The  American  Commissioners  have  read  without  offense  the  reference 
in  the  Spanish  memorandum  to  the  Indian  rebellions  which  it  has  been 
necessary  for  the  United  States  to  suppress,  for  they  are  unable  to  see  any 
parallel  between  the  uprisings  of  those  barbarous  and  often  savage  tribes, 
which  have  disappeared  before  the  march  of  civilization  because  they  were 
unable  to  submit  to  it,  and  the  insurrections  against  Spanish  rule  in  Cuba, 
insurrections  in  which  many  of  the  noblest  men  of  Spanish  blood  in  the  island 
have  participated. 

"Nor  are  the  American  Commissioners  offended  by  the  reference  of  the 
Spanish  memorandum  to  the  attempt  of  the  Southern  States  to  secede.  The 
Spanish  Commissioners  evidently  misconceive  the  nature  and  the  object  of 
that  movement.  The  war  of  secession  was  fought  and  concluded  upon  a 
question  of  constitutional  principle,  asserted  by  one  party  to  the  conflict  and 
denied  by  the  other.  It  was  a  conflict  in  no  respect  to  be  likened  to  the 
uprisings  against  Spanish  rule  in  Cuba. 

"The  American  Commissioners  are  unaware  of  the  ground  on  which  it  is 
asserted  in  the  Spanish  memorandum  that  the  United  States  has  been  com 
pelled  to  admit  that  the  Cuban  people  are  as  yet  unfit  for  the  enjoyment  of 
full  liberty  and  sovereignty.  It  is  true  that  an  intimation  of  such  unfitness 
was  made  in  the  note  of  the  Spanish  government  on  the  226.  of  July  last. 
The  government  of  the  United  States,  in  its  reply  of  the  3oth  of  July,  declared 
that  it  did  not  share  the  apprehensions  of  Spain  in  this  regard,  but  that  it 
recognized  that  in  the  present  distracted  and  prostrate  condition  of  the 
island,  brought  about  by  the  wars  that  had  waged  there,  aid  and  guidance 
would  be  necessary." 

The  Spaniards  had  said  publicists  had  declared  that  the  thirteen  original 
colonies  of  the  United  States  had  paid  Great  Britain  ^15,000,000.  The  Amer 
icans  replied : 

"The  American  Commissioners  are  not  acquainted  with  the  works  of  the 
publicists  who  maintain  that  the  thirteen  original  United  States  paid  to  Great 
Britain  ^15,000,000  sterling,  presumably  for  the  extinguishment  of  colonial 
debts.  The  American  Commissioners,  however,  feel  no  interest  in  the 
matter,  since  the  statement  is  entirely  erroneous.  The  preliminary  and 


THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE.  ;o3 

definitive  treaties  of  peace  between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  of 
1782  and  1783  were  published  soon  after  their  conclusion,  and  have  since  been 
republished  in  many  forms.  They  are  the  only  treaties  made  between  the 
two  countries  as  to  American  independence,  and  they  contain  no  stipulation 
of  the  kind  referred  to." 

The  American  memorandum  closes  with  these  simple  sentences: 
"If  it  could  be  admitted,  as  is  argued  in  the  memorandum  submitted  by 
the  Spanish  Commissioners,  that  the  United  States  in  this  relation  stands  as 
the  agent  of  the  Cuban  people,  the  duty  to  resist  the  assumption  of  these 
heavy  obligations  would  be  equally  imperative.  The  decrees  of  the  Spanish 
government  itself  show  that  these  debts  were  incurred  in  the  fruitless 
endeavors  of  that  Government  to  suppress  the  aspirations  of  the  Cuban  people 
for  greater  liberty  and  freer  government." 

The  next  move  of  the  Spaniards  was  to  assume  and  assert  a  policy  in  the 
cases  of  the  Philippines  and  the  West  Indian  islands.  The  reply  of  the 
American  Commission  was: 

"The  American  Commissioners  are  not  disturbed  by  this  charge  of  incon 
sistency,  since  they  deem  it  obviously  groundless.  They  based  their  demands 
in  regard  to  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  upon  the  precise  terms  of  the  Protocol, 
because  it  was  in  those  very  terms  that  the  United  States  had  made  its 
demands  and  Spain  had  conceded  them,  by  promising  to  'relinquish  all  claim 
of  sovereignty  over  and  title  to  Cuba,'  and  to  'cede'  to  the  United  States  Porto 
Rico  and  certain  other  islands.  The  United  States,  in  insisting  upon  the 
words  of  the  Protocol  on  these  subjects,  merely  asked  that  the  precise  con 
cessions  of  Spain  be  made  good. 

"In  the  case  of  the  Philippines,  the  United  States,  except  as  to  the  bay, 
city,  and  harbor  of  Manila,  confined  itself  to  demanding  that  the  subject 
should  be  left  in  the  widest  and  fullest  sense  for  future  negotiations.  While 
it  did  not,  with  the  exception  referred  to,  demand  specific  concessions,  it 
reserved  and  secured  the  right  to  demand  them.  Its  position,  therefore,  is, 
not  that  its  present  demands  in  respect  of  the  Philippines  were  specifically  set 
out  in  the  Protocol,  but  that  they  are  justified  by  and  included  in  the  right  which 
it  therein  expressly  reserved  and  secured  to  make  demands  in  the  future." 

The  Spanish  Commission  had  been  sensitive  from  the  first  meeting  of  the 
Commissioners  about  the  fate  of  the  Philippines,  and  protested  October  iyth 
against  the  sending  of  American  reinforcements  to  Manila,  the  president  of 


7o4  THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE. 

the  Spanish  Committee  stating  "that  he  had  received  from  his  government  a 
telegram  referring  to  reports  to  the  effect  that  two  American  men-of-war 
were  about  to  leave  American  ports  with  reinforcements  of  troops  for  the  gar 
rison  at  Manila,  and  that  Spanish  prisoners  in  the  possession  of  the  Tagalos 
are  ill-treated."  But  the  telegram  was  not  read. 

There  is  a  curious  passage  in  one  of  the  memorandums,  charging  that 
General  Merritt,  "after  the  Protocol  was  signed,  contrary  to  what  had  been 
agreed  upon,  forcibly  took  possession  of  Manila,"  and  in  the  terms  of  the 
capitulation  the  words  occurred  "or  when  the  American  army  evacuates," 
and  the  Spanish  memorandum  goes  on  to  say : 

"In  the  conference  held  on  August  4  last,  between  Mr.  Cambon, 
Ambassador  from  France,  and  President  McKinley,  in  the  presence  of  the 
United  States  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Cambon  made  some*  remarks  as  to  the 
session  of  Porto  Rico  in  compensation  for  the  expenses  of  the  war,  and  the 
President,  showing  himself  inflexible  upon  that  point,  repeated  his  assertion 
that  the  Philippine  question  was  the  only  one  not  finally  settled  in  his  mind. 
It  was  then  that  Mr.  Cambon  asked  for  an  explanation  about  the  meaning  of 
the  above  cited  phrases  in  Article  III.  of  the  Protocol,  relating  to  the  Philip 
pine  Archipelago,  as  the  language  of  said  Article  might  lend  itself  to  inspire 
fear  in  Spain  in  regard  to  her  sovereignty  over  these  islands.  President 
McKinley  answered  him,  verbatim,  as  follows: 

'  'I  do  not  want  any  ambiguity  to  be  allowed  to  remain  on  this  point. 
The  negotiators  of  both  countries  are  the  ones  who  shall  resolve  upon  the 
permanent  advantages  (notice  that  he  said  "advantages,"  and  not  "rights") 
which  we  shall  ask  in  the  archipelago,  and  decide  upon  the  intervention  (con- 
trole),  disposition  and  government  of  the  Philippine  Islands.' 

"He  further  said :  'The  Madrid  government  can  rest  assured  that  up  to 
now  nothing  is  decided  a  priori,  in  my  own  mind,  against  Spain,  nor  do  I 
consider  anything  decided  by  it  against  the  United  States. ' 

"Is  it  therefore  doubtful  that  on  the  i2th  of  August,  when  the  Secretary 
of  State  of  the  United  States  signed  the  Protocol,  the  President  of  the  United 
States  had  no  idea  of  demanding  from  Spain  the  cession  to  the  United  States 
of  her  sovereignty  over  the  archipelago?" 

There  was  further  comment  upon  the  President's  open-mindedness  as  to 
the  Philippines,  and  this  gave  rise  to  the  most  interesting  episode  of  the 
arduous  and  contentious  negotiations,  which,  stated  by  the  American  Com- 


THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE.  705 

mission,  in  constant  communication  by  the  cable  with  the  President  himself, 
has  every  authenticity  of  authority,  and  is  official  history.  The  Spanish  Com 
mission  had  gone  so  far  as  to  say  that  on  the  i3th  of  August,  "General  Mer- 
ritt,  commander  of  the  American  forces  in  Manila,  and  the  Admiral  of  the 
fleet  in  that  bay,  demanded  the  surrender  of  the  place,  and  as  its  authorities 
did  not  agree  thereto,  the  said  forces  opened  fire  on  the  San  Antonio  Abaci 
powder  magazine  and  on  the  trenches  which  defended  the  city  on  the  land 
side,  unnecessarily  causing  a  considerable  number  of  losses  to  the  Spanish 
forces,  who  would  have  peacefully  delivered  the  city  over  to  the  Americans 
in  obedience  to  the  third  basis  of  the  Protocol  that  they  might  hold  it  as  a 
guaranty  pending  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty  of  peace. 

"General  Merritt  entered  Manila  by  force,  he  made  prisoners  of  war  of  its 
garrison  made  up  of  eight  or  nine  thousand  men,  he  took  possession  of  the 
public  funds  and  the  collection  of  taxes,  including  customs  receipts,  he  named 
as  Intendant  General  and  Administrator  of  the  Public  Treasury,  and  Tax 
Collector,  the  officers  of  his  army  he  saw  fit,  thereby  displacing  the  Spanish 
officials.  He  relieved  the  Spanish  Commander  of  the  civil  guard  charged  with 
the  maintenance  of  public  order;  he  constituted  military  courts;  he  opened 
the  port  of  Manila  and  all  the  other  ports  of  the  Philippines  in  the  possessicn 
of  his  land  and  naval  forces  to  the  commerce  of  his  nation  and  of  neutral 
nations,  conditioned  on  the  payment  of  the  dues  in  force  at  the  time  of  his 
arrival,  which  were  collected  by  his  officials.  All  of  this  is  recorded  in  the 
preliminary  minute  of  the  capitulation  of  August  13,  in  the  capitulation  of  the 
i4th  itself,  in  the  proclamation  of  General  Merritt  of  like  date,  in  his  orders  of 
the  22d  and  23cl  of  the  same  month,  and  in  the  others  dictated  by  the  Ameri 
can  authorities  and  officials  in  Manila. 

"The  Spanish  government  remonstrated  to  that  of  Washington  through 
the  French  Embassy  against  everything  that  occurred  there  on  August  29  and 
the  3d  and  nth  of  September  last,  repeating  such  remonstrances  since  and 
down  to  the  present  time,  signally  insisting  upon  the  immediate  release  of  the 
garrison  held  prisoners  in  Manila  and  upon  the  return  of  their  arms,  since,  on 
the  one  hand,  it  could  not  send  reinforcements  from  the  Peninsula  to  the 
archipelago,  nor  would  the  United  States  look  favorably  upon  such  an 
action,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  it  needed  those  forces  to  liberate  the  thou 
sands  of  Spanish  prisoners  of  the  Tagalo  insurgents,  victims  of  their  ill-treat 
ment,  and  to  combat  and  dominate  that  insurrection  of  its  own  subjects.  The 


7o6  THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE. 

remonstrances  of  the  Spanish  government  have  been  tip  to  the  present  fruit 
less.  These  acts  are  daily  assuming-  a  worse  phase.  On  September  21 
Captain  W.  P.  Moffatt,  appointed  by  the  American  Provost  Marshal  in  charge 
of  the  Bilibid  prisons,  with  authority  to  regulate  the  entrance  and  release  of 
all  kinds  of  prisoners,  released  two,  named  Silvestre  Lacoy  and  Marcos 
Alarcon,  charged  with  the  offense  of  highway  robbery;  two  others  charged 
with  desertion;  six  charged  with  contempt  of  authority;  another  charged 
with  assault  and  robbery,  and  three  others  charged  with  homicide.  As  is 
seen,  all  these  prisoners  were  in  jail  for  common  crimes.  This  unheard-of 
act  was  communicated  to  the  government  of  Her  Catholic  Majesty  by  the 
Commandant  General's  Office  of  the  station  of  Manila." 

The  American  Commission  says  of  this:  "The  American  Commissioners 
are  loth  to  assume  that  the  Spanish  'proposition'  employs  these  words  for  the 
purpose  of  intimating  that  General  Merritt  could  at  the  time  of  the  capture 
of  Manila  have  had  knowledge  of  the  Protocol.  It  is  a  fact  doubtless  well 
known  to  the  Spanish  government  that  on  the  i6th  of  August  last,  four  days 
after  the  signature  of  the  protocol,  and  four  days  before  the  receipt  at  Wash 
ington  of  frhe  news  of  the  capture  and  capitulation  of  Manila,  the  Depart 
ment  of  State  addressed  to  the  French  Ambassador  a  note  soliciting  the 
consent  of  the  Spanish  government  to  the  restoration  of  cable  communica 
tion  between  Manila  and  Hongkong,  in  order  that  continuous  telegraphic 
connection  with  the  Philippines  might  be  reestablished." 

The  Spaniards  descended  from  their  pose  of  dignity  in  this  instance.  The 
President  of  the  United  States  could  just  as  well  have  forced  the  cession  of 
the  Philippines  as  of  Porto  Rico,  but  deemed  it  his  duty  to  refer  the  question 
of  our  permanency  in  the  archipelago  to  the  people  of  the  United  States. 
The  raid  of  the  Spanish  Commission  upon  the  facts  as  to  the  Philippines 
exhibits  a  weakness  that  takes  away  sympathy  from  the  Commissioners  when 
representing  the  misfortunes  of  their  country;  they  were  from  the  beginning 
conscious  that  however  adroit  their  ability,  or  vigorous  their  protests,  the 
inevitable  end  was  Spain's  surrender. 

There  is  compensation  for  the  general  reader  in  the  narration  the  Ameri- 
can^Commissioners  give  of  the  part  of  the  President  in  the  preparation  of  the 
Peace  Protocol. 

The  President  on  the  26th  of  July  received  a  note  asking  him  to  name  the 
terms  on  which  peace  might  be  obtained.  This  note  was  presented  to  the 


THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE.  707 

President  of  the  United  States  on  the  26th  day  of  July,  1898,  by  Mr.  Cambon, 
Ambassador  of  the  French  Republic  at  Washington,  authorized  to  make  the 
application,  and  represent  the  Spanish  government  in  the  subsequent  negotia 
tions  which  led  up  to  the  execution  of  the  Protocol.  At  that  meeting,  the 
President  received  the  note  of  July  22  from  the  Spanish  government,  and 
advised  Mr.  Cambon  that  after  consultation  with  his  Cabinet  he  would  pre 
pare  an  answer  which  could  be  transmitted  to  the  Spanish  government.  On 
July  30,  following,  the  terms  of  peace  having  been  carefully  considered  and 
agreed  upon  by  the  President  and  his  Cabinet,  the  President  received  Mr. 
Cambon  at  the  Executive  Mansion  in  Washington,  at  which  meeting  were 
also  present  Mr.  Thiebault,  Secretary  of  the  French  Embassy  in  Washington, 
and  the  then  Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States.  The  answer  of  the 
President  to  the  communication  of  the  Spanish  government,  dated  July  30, 
1898,  was  then  read  to  Mr.  Cambon.  This  note  was  in  the  exact  form  in 
which  it  was  afterwards  signed  and  delivered  to  Mr.  Cambon  to  be  sent  to  the 
Spanish  government,  with  a  single  exception.  After  some  discussion  of  the 
terms  of  the  note  as  to  Cuba,  and  Porto  Rico,  and  other  West  Indian  islands, 
Mr.  Cambon  said  he  did  not  know  what  the  Spanish  government  would  desire 
as  to  the  Philippines,  and  no  matter  what  the  note  might  say  as  to  the  Com 
mission,  the  Spanish  government  would  regard  the  purpose  of  the  United 
States  as  being  fixed  to  acquire  not  only  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico,  but  the  Philip 
pines  as  well.  The  President  said  that  as  to  the  Philippines  the  note 
expressed  the  purposes  of  this  government,  and  their  final  disposition  would 
depend  upon  the  treaty  to  be  negotiated  by  the  Commissioners  and  ratified  by 
the  interested  governments. 

After  further  discussion,  in  which  the  President  reiterated  that  the 
treaty  must  determine  the  fate  of  the  Philippines,  and  the  note  of  the  Presi 
dent  on  that  subject  reading  then  as  now  with  the  single  exception  that  the 
word  "possession"  was  then  in  Article  III.,  so  that  it  read  "control,  possession 
and  government  of  the  Philippines,"  where  it  now  reads  "control,  disposition 
and  government  of  the  Philippines,"  Mr.  Cambon  said  that  the  word  "pos 
session"  translated  into  Spanish  in  such  a  way  as  to  be  regarded  as  of  a 
severe  and  threatening  nature,  and  suggested  a  change  in  that  word.  He 
suggested  the  word  "condition."  The  President  declined  to  change  the  word 
except  for  a  word  of  similar  import  or  meaning.  The  word  "disposition" 
oeing  suggested,  after  considerable  talk  the  President  consented  that  that 


7o8  THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE. 

word,  not  changing  the  meaning,  being  indeed  a  broader  one  and  including 
possession,  might  be  substituted.  Thereupon  the  note  at  the  close  of  the 
interview  of  July  30,  in  exactly  the  form  it  was  originally  cast  with  the 
single  change  of  the  word  "disposition"  for  "possession,"  was  delivered  to 
Mr.  Cambon  to  be  communicated  to  the  Spanish  government. 

On  Wednesday,  August  3,  in  the  afternoon,  Mr.  Cambon  having  inti 
mated  a  desire  for  a  further  interview  with  the  President,  another  meeting 
between  the  same  persons  was  held  at  the  Executive  Mansion.  Mr.  Cambon 
said  the  Spanish  government  had  received  the  answer  of  the  President,  and 
that  it  was  regarded  by  Spain  as  very  severe.  After  asking  a  modification  as 
to  Porto  Rico,  to  which  the  President  promptly  answered  that  he  could  not 
consent,  Mr.  Cambon  said  there  was  a  disposition  to  believe  in  Spain  that  the 
United  States  intended  to  take  the  Philippine  group;  that  the  Spanish  govern 
ment  appreciated  that  reforms  were  necessary  in  the  government;  that  Amer 
ican  privileges  should  be  granted;  but  that  Spanish  sovereignty  should  not  be 
interfered  with  was  a  matter  which  Spain  would  insist  upon.  The  President 
answered  that  the  question  of  Cuba,  Porto  Rico  and  other  West  India  islands, 
and  the  Ladrones,  admitted  of  no  negotiation;  that  the  disposition  of  the 
Philippine  Islands,  as  he  had  already  said  to  Mr.  Cambon,  must  depend  upon 
the  treaty  which  might  be  negotiated,  and  that  he  could  not  make  any  change 
in  the  terms  theretofore  submitted.  Mr.  Cambon  called  attention  to  the 
wording  of  the  note  as  to  the  possession  of  the  city,  bay  and  harbor  of  Manila 
to  be  retained  during  the  pendency  of  the  treaty,  and  asked  what  was  to  be 
done  with  them  afterwards.  The  President  said  that  must  depend  upon  the 
terms  of  the  treaty. 

This  is  the  same  interview  alluded  to  in  the  memorandum  of  the  Span 
ish  Commissioners  as  having  occurred  on  the  4th  of  August.  It  in  fact 
occurred  on  the  afternoon  of  August  3,  the  difference  in  date  arising  from  the 
fact,  no  doubt,  that  it  was  reported  on  the  4th  of  August.  This  could  make 
but  little  difference,  as  there  was  but  one  interview  at  that  time. 

In  reporting  the  conversations,  and  comparing  the  memoranda  made  by 
Mr.  Cambon  with  those  made  by  the  representative  of  the  American  govern 
ment  then  present,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  Mr.  Cambon  did  not  speak 
or  understand  English,  but  communicated  with  the  President  through  the 
medium  of  an  interpreter,  his  Secretary,  and  that  neither  of  the  American 
representatives  understood  or  spoke  the  French  language.  Making  this  allow- 


MALACANAN  PALACE  AND  PASIG  RIVER,  MANILA. 


GENERAL  OTIS  AND  STAFF.    DINING  ROOM.  MALACANAN  PALACE.   MANILA. 


THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE. 


711 


ance,  it  is  perfectly  apparent  that  the  American  President,  even  in  the  version 
reported  and  transcribed  in  the  memorandum  of  the  Spanish  Commission,  at 
all  times  maintained  that  the  treaty  of  peace  should  determine  the  control, 
disposition  and  government  of  the  Philippines      The  President  did  say  that 
the  Philippine  question  was  the  only  one  left  open  for  negotiation  and  settle 
ment  in  the  treaty.      It  is  undoubtedly  true  that  it  was  not  then  fully  settled 
in  his  own  mind  as  to  what  disposition  should  be  made  of  the  Philippines. 
Had   it  been,  there   would  have   been   nothing  to  leave  to  negotiation  and 
settlement  in  the  treaty.     It  was  the  purpose  of  the  President  in  everything 
A'ritten  and  spoken  of  to  leave  to  the  negotiators  of  the  treaty  the  most  ample 
freedom  with   reference  to  the  Philippines,  and  to  settle,  if  their  negotiations 
should  result  in   an  agreement,  the  control,   disposition  and  government  of 
those  islands  in  the  treaty  of  peace.     When  Mr.  Cambon  spoke  of  Spain's 
purpose  to  retain   sovereignty  over  those  islands,  the   President  did  say  he 
wanted   it  clearly  understood   that  no  ambiguity  should    remain   upon  that 
point,  but  that  the  whole  matter  should  be  decided  as  set  forth  in  the  treaty 
of  peace,  which  should  determine  the  control,  disposition  and  government  of 
the  Philippine  Islands.     He  certainly  did  not  use  the  word  "intervention,"  nor 
limit  the  subject  of  negotiation  to  "advantages"  in  the  Philippines;  nor  could  it 
be  claimed  that  any  report  was  made  to  the  Spanish  government  of  the  precise 
English  words  used  by  the  President.     In  the  same  paragraph  quoted  in  the 
memorandum  of  the  Spanish  Commission  in  which   it  is  said  he   used  the 
words  above  quoted,  it  is  added  that  the  President  also  said  the  negotiators 
should  decide  upon  the  "intervention"  (controle),  disposition  and  government 
of  the  Philippine  Islands.     Even  this  version  of  th*e  conversation  is  ample 
proof  that  the  President  showed  no  uncertainty  as  to  the  scope  and  meaning  qf 
the   terms  used.     He  did  say  in  substance,  in  reply  to  the  inquiry  of  Mr. 
Cambon  as  to  whether  the  United  States  had  prejudged  the  matter  of  the 
Philippine  Islands  and  the  rights  to  be  acquired  therein  by  the  United  States, 
that  the  case  had  not  been  prejudged  either  as  to  the   United  States  or  as  to 
Spain.     The  whole  matter  would  be  left  to  the  Commission  for  negotiation, 
and  to  be  settled  by  the  treaty  of  peace.     In  the  meantime,  the  United  States 
would  insist  upon  holding  Manila  as  laid  down  in  the  note,  and  its  disposition 
thereafter  would  depend  upon  the  terms  of  the  treaty.     This  is  reported  in 
the  quotation  in  the  Spanish  note  as  the  utterance  of  the  President  that  "the 
Madrid  government  can    rest  assured  that  up  to  now  nothing  is  decided  a 


7i2    '  THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE. 

priori  in  my  own  mind  against  Spain,  nor  do  I  consider  anything  decided  by 
it  against  the  United  States."  This  may  not  be  an  unfair  interpretation, 
though  not  the  exact  words  used  by  the  President.  It  shows  clearly  that  he 
did  not  regard  the  United  States  as  limited  to  'advantages  in  the  Philippines/ 
but  the  whole  matter,  being  undecided  in  the  President's  mind,  was  left  open 
in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the  note.  The  case  was  not  decided  in 
advance  in  any  of  its  aspects  either  for  or  against  either  government 

Great  stress  was  laid  in  the  Spanish  memorandum  upon  the  allegation 
that  the  President  had  not  then  determined  to  take  the  Philippine  group,  and 
indeed  did  not  intend  to  do  so.  It  is  utterly  immaterial  to  inquire  as  to 
what  either  government  would  then  have  insisted  upon.  There  was  a  mutual 
agreement  that  the  question  should  not  then  be  decided.  Opportunity  for 
full  investigation  was  reserved,  the  final  conclusion  to  be  arrived  at  as  the 
result  of  the  negotiations  then  in  progress,  in  the  treaty  of  peace  to  be  con 
cluded. 

Further  conversation  as  to  the  number  of  Commissioners,  the  place  of 
meeting,  et  cetera,  terminated  the  interview. 

On  the  afternoon  of  August  9,  Mr.  Cambon,  having  received  the  note  of 
August  7  sent  by  the  Duke  of  Almodovar,  called  by  appointment  at  the 
Executive  Mansion  in  Washington,  at  which  interview  were  present  the  same 
parties  as  at  the  last  meeting.  The  part  of  that  note  which  relates  to  the 
Philippines,  in  the  exact  terms  in  which  it  was  then  presented  in  English  text 
by  the  French  Ambassador  to  the  President  of  the  United  States,  is  as 
follows : 

"The  terms  relating"  to  the  Philippines  seem,  to  our  understanding,  to  be 
quite  indefinite.  On  the  one  hand,  the  ground  on  which  the  United  States 
believe  themselves  entitled  to  occupy  the  bay,  the  harbor  and  the  city  of 
Manila,  pending  the  conclusion  of  a  treaty  of  peace,  cannot  be  that  of  con 
quest,  since  in  spite  of  the  blockade  maintained  on  sea  by  the  American  fleet, 
in  spite  of  the  siege  established  on  land  by  a  native  supported  and  provided 
for  by  the  American  Admiral,  Manila  still  holds  its  own,  and  the  Spanish 
standard  still  waves  over  the  city.  On  the  other  hand,  the  whole  Archipelago 
of  the  Philippines  is  in  the  power  and  under  the  sovereignty  of  Spain. 
Therefore,  the  government  of  Spain  thinks  that  the  temporary  occupation  of 
Manila  should  constitute  a  guaranty.  It  is  stated  that  the  treaty  of  peace 
shall  determine  the  control,  disposition  and  government  of  the  Philippines; 


THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE.  7M 

but  as  the  intentions  of  the  Federal  government  by  regression  remain  veiled, 
therefore  the  Spanish  government  must  declare  that,  while  accepting  the  third 
condition,  they  do  not  a  priori  renounce  the  sovereignty  of  Spain  over  the 
Archipelago,  leaving  it  to  the  negotiators  to  agree  as  to  such  reforms  as  the 
condition  of  these  possessions  and  the  level  of  culture  of  their  natives  may 
render  desirable. 

"The  government  of  Her  Majesty  accepts  the  third  condition,  with 
the  above  mentioned  declarations. 

"Such  are  the  statements  and  observations  which  the  Spanish  govern 
ment  has  the  honor  to  submit  in  reply  to  your  Excellency's  communication. 
They  accept  the  proffered  terms,  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  Cortes  of  the 
Kingdom,  as  required  by  their  constitutional  duties. 

"The  agreement  between  the  two  governments  implies  the  irremeable 
suspension  of  hostilities  and  the  designation  of  Commissioners  for  the  purpose 
of  settling  the  details  of  the  treaty  of  peace  and  of  signing  it,  under  the  terms 
above  indicated." 

It  is  translated  in  the  memorandum  of  the  Spanish  Commissioners  in 
language  differing  somewhat  from  the  terms  of  the  note  as  presented  to  the 
President.  In  the  translation  in  the  memorandum  it  is  said  that  the  treaty 
shall  determine  "the  intervention,  disposition  and  government  of  the  Philip 
pine  Islands."  In  the  note  as  presented  to  the  President  it  reads,  "It  is  stated 
that  the  treaty  of  peace  shall  determine  the  control,  disposition  and  govern 
ment  of  the  Philippines."  The  word  "entire"  precedes  "sovereignty"  in  the 
translation  embodied  in  the  Spanish  note. 

It  is  true  that,  taking  these  words  of  the  Duke  of  Almodovar  either  as 
they  were  conveyed  to  the  President  of  the  United  States,  or  as  they  were 
quoted  in  the  Spanish  proposition,  it  may  be  argued  that  they  did  no  more  than 
reserve  to  Spain  the  right  to  maintain  that  she  did  not  in  advance  of  the 
negotiations  for  peace  renounce  her  sovereignty  over  the  Archipelago.  She 
did  this,  by  her  own  declaration,  for  the  reason  that  the  intentions  of  the 
United  States  were  "veiled";  clearly  perceiving  that  by  the  terms  of  the 
demand  the  United  States  would  have  the  right,  if  it  saw  fit  to  exercise  it,  to 
ask  that  she  yield  her  sovereignty  over  the  group,  and  that  her  sovereignty 
was  thus  put  in  jeopardy,  she  took  the  precaution  to  say  that  she  did  not 
intend,  in  assuming  the  chance  of  such  a  demand,  to  concede  it  in  advance. 

The  American  Commissioners  did  not  deny  that  this  might  be  a  fair  con- 


7i4  THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE. 

struction  of  this  particular  paragraph  of  the  Duke's  note.  The  representa 
tives  of  the  United  States  were  not  willing,  however,  to  leave  anything  to 
construction.  When,  therefore,  the  Duke's  answer  was  read  to  the  President 
it  was  immediately  objected  to  by  him  and  the  Secretary  of  State,  in  that  it 
was  vague  and  indefinite,  purporting  to  accept  the  terms  laid  down  in  the  note 
of  the  United  States,  while  .requiring  some  modification.  In  referring  to  the 
Philippines,  while  in  one  paragraph  it  stated  the  acceptance  of  the  terms,  in 
another  it  seemed'  to  retain  the  full  right  of  sovereignty,  with  such  reforms, 
etc.,  as  that  government  might  see  fit  to  grant.  The  unsatisfactory  character 
of  this  answer  is  more  clearly  shown  when  in  the  subsequent  part  of  the  same 
note,  not  quoted  in  the  memorandum  of  the  Spanish  Commissioners,  it  was 
said  without  qualification  that  they  (the  Spanish  government)  accepted  the 
proffered  terms,  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  Cortes  of  the  Kingdom,  as 
required  by  their  constitutional  duties.  In  the  part  of  the  note  referred  to 
above  it  is  said  'the  Spanish  government  must  declare  that,  while  accepting 
the  said  condition,  they  do  not  a  priori  renounce  the  sovereignty  of  Spain 
over  the  archipelago,  leaving  it  to  the  negotiators,  etc. '  These  contradictory 
statements  were  called  to  the  attention  of  Mr.  Cambon,  and  made  the  note,  as 
was  said  to  him,  unsatisfactory  to  the  United  States. 

It  is  to  be  observed,  as  has  already  in  effect  been  pointed  out,  that  even 
the  terms  of  this  note  were  inconsistent  with  the  claim  later  put  forward  that 
Spanish  sovereignty  should  not  be  interfered  with,  for  the  length  to  which  the 
statement  went  in  the  note  is  that  the  Spanish  government  does  not  a  priori 
relinquish  entire  sovereignty  over  the  Philippine  Archipelago,  thus  leaving  it 
clearly  to  be  inferred  that  the  Spanish  government  recognized  that  the 
negotiations  resulting  in  a  treaty  might  require  a  relinquishment  of  Spanish 
sovereignty  consequent  upon  such  negotiations. 

Mr.  Cambon,  having  heard  the  objections  raised  by  the  American 
representatives  to  the  note,  asserted  that  allowance  must  be  made  for  different 
translations  which  the  note  had  undergone  in  course  of  transmission,  and  to 
the  desire  of  the  Spanish  government  to  express  regret  at  the  loss  of  its 
colonies;  and  he  was  very  confident  that  it  was  the  intention  to  accept  the 
terms  of  the  United  States.  It  was  then  suggested  by  the  American  repre 
sentatives  that  if  this  was  true,  and  the  note  was  to  be  regarded  as  a  full 
acceptance,  the  best  way  to  settle  the  matter  was  to  put  the  terms  in  the 
shape  of  a  definite  Protocol,  which  the  President  would  authorize  the  Secre 


THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE.  7'5 

tary  of  State  to  sign  for  the  United  States,  Mr.  Cambon  to  submit  to  the 
Spanish  government  the  exact  terms  of  the  Protocol,  to  which  an  answer  Yes 
or  No  could  be  had;  and  if  the  Spanish  government  accepted  the  Protocol, 
that  would  end  the  controversy.  Mr.  Cambon  concurred  in  this  view,  and 
said  if  the  Protocol  was  drawn  up  in  proper  form  he  would  submit  it  to  the 
Spanish  government,  and  if  authorized  would  execute  it  on  its  part. 

On  that  evening,  August  9,  the  Protocol  was  prepared  in  the  State 
Department  at  Washington,  and  taken  to  the  Executive  Mansion,  where  it 
was  submitted  to  the  President  and  members  of  the  Cabinet  there  present. 
On  the  morning  of  August  10  Mr.  Cambon  called  at  the  State  Department  at 
Washington,  a  draft  of  the  Protocol  was  submitted  to  and  approved  by  him, 
and  put  into  French  by  Mr.  Thiebault,  Secretary  of  the  French  Embassy  at 
Washington,  and  experts  in  the  State  Department.  It  was  carefully  com 
pared  with  the  English  text,  and  then  telegraphed  by  Mr.  Cambon  to  the 
Spanish  government.  On  the  same  day,  August  10,  the  note  of  the  Secre 
tary  of  State  enclosing  the  Protocol  was  sent  to  Mr.  Cambon  in  Washington. 
This  note,  it  is  said,  contained  the  admission  of  the  Secretary  of  State  of  the 
United  States  that  the  note  of  the  Duke  of  Almodovar  of  August  7  "contained 
in  its  spirit  the  acceptance  by  Spain  of  the  conditions  proposed  by  the  United 
vStates. "  The  best  answer  to  this  obvious  misconstruction  of  the  terms  of  the 
note  of  the  Secretary  of  State  is  in  the  text  of  the  note  itself,  which  is  as  follows: 
"Department  of  State,  Washington,  August  10,  1898. 

"Excellency:  Although  it  is  your  understanding  that  the  note  of  the 
Duke  of  Almodovar,  which  you  left  with  the  President  on  yesterday  after 
noon,  is  intended  to  convey  an  acceptance  by  the  Spanish  government  of  the 
terms  set  forth  in  my  note  of  the  3oth  ultimo  as  the  basis  on  which  the  Presi 
dent  would  appoint  Commissioners  to  negotiate  and  conclude  with  Com 
missioners  on  the  part  of  Spain  a  treaty  of  peace,  I  understand  that  we  concur 
in  the  opinion  that  the  Duke's  note,  doubtless  owing  to  the  various  transfor 
mations  which  it  has  undergone  in  the  course  of  its  circuitous  transmission  by 
telegraph  and  in  cipher,  is  not,  in  the  form  in  which  it  has  reached  the  hands 
of  the  President,  entirely  explicit. 

"Under  these  circumstances,  it  is  thought  that  the  most  direct  and  certain 
way  of  avoiding  misunderstanding  is  to  embody  in  a  Protocol  to  be  signed  by 
us  as  the  representatives,  respectively,  of  the  United  States  and  Spain,  the 
terms  on  which  the  negotiations  for  peace  are  to  be  undertaken. 


716  THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE. 

"I  therefore  enclose  herewith  a  draft  of  such  a  Protocol,  in  which  you  will 
find  that  I  have  embodied  the  precise  terms  tendered  to  Spain  in  my  note  of 
the  3oth  ultimo,  together  with  appropriate  stipulations  for  the  appointment  of 
Commissioners  to  arrange  the  details  of  the  immediate  evacuation  of  Cuba, 
Porto  Rico,  and  other  islands  under  Spanish  sovereignty  in  the  West  Indies, 
as  well  as  for  the  appointment  of  Commissioners  to  treat  of  peace. 

"Accept,  Excellency,  the  renewed  assurance  of  my  highest  consideration. 

"(Signed)  WILLIAM  R.  DAY. 

"His  Excellency,  M.  Jules  Cambon,  etc." 

In  this  note,  so  far  from  saying  that  the  Secretary  of  State  of  the  United 
vStates  understood  that  the  note  of  the  Spanish  government  of  August  7 
accepted  the  American  terms,  it  is  distinctly  said:  "Although  it  is  your  (Mr. 
Cambon's)  understanding  that  the  note  of  the  Duke  of  Almodovar  is  intended 
to  convey  the  acceptance  by  the  Spanish  government  of  the  terms  set  forth  in 
my  note  of  the  3oth  ultimo,  ...  I  understand  that  we  concur  in  the 
opinion  that  the  Duke's  note,  doubtless  owing  to  the  various  transformations 
which  it  has  undergone  in  the  course  of  its  circuitous  transmission  by  tele 
graph  and  in  cipher,  is  not,  in  the  form  in  which  it  reached  the  hands  of  the 
President,  entirely  explicit." 

Here  it  is  distinctly  stated  that  the  Secretary  of  State  and  Mr.  Cambon 
concurred  that  the  note  was  not  entirely  explicit.  Was  it  then  to  be  expected 
after  all  this  careful  negotiation  that  a  note  which  the  American  representatives 
contended  did  not  accept  the  terms  of  the  United  States,  and  which  both 
negotiators  agreed  was  not  explicit,  was  to  be  received  as  a  satisfactory 
answer  to  the  American  demand?  Not  so. 

"Under  these  circumstances  it  was  thought  that  the  most  direct  and  cer 
tain  way  of  avoiding  misunderstanding  was  to  embody  in  a  Protocol,  to  be 
signed  by  the  representatives,  respectively,  of  the  United  States  and  Spain, 
the  terms  on  which  the  negotiations  for  peace  were  to  be  undertaken." 

This  is  a  most  emphatic  and  definite  declaration  that  the  note  of  August 
7  was  not  satisfactory,  and  that  it  was  the  purpose  of  the  United  States  to 
leave  nothing  open  to  misunderstanding,  but  to  embody,  in  a  contract  so  plain 
that  dispute  would  be  forever  foreclosed,  the  exact  terms  upon  which  negotia 
tions  for  peace  would  be  undertaken.  The  note  goes  on  to  say:  "I  therefore 
enclose  herewith  a  draft  of  such  a  Protocol,  in  which  you  will  find  that  I  have 


THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE.  717 

embodied  the  precise  terms  tendered  to  vSpain  in  my  note  of  the  3oth  ultimo, 
together  with  appropriate  stipulations  for  the  appointment  of  Commissioners, 
etc."  What  does  this  note  mean?  Does  it  admit  the  construction  that  the 
proposal  was  intended  to  embody  the  acceptance  of  August  7,  reserving  Span 
ish  sovereignty?  It  is  definitely  settled,  as  a  perusal  of  the  document  will 
show,  that  the  Protocol  embodied,  not  the  uncertain  and  equivocal  terms  of 
the  note  of  August  7,  but  the  precise  terms  stated  in  the  note  of  the  American 
government  of  July  30.  This  note  to  Mr.  Cambon  enclosed  the  Protocol  just 
as  it  was  written  and  just  as  it  was  signed  by  the  parties.  It  would  seem,  if 
ever  an  attempt  was  fairly  made  to  have  a  clear  understanding,  if  ever  all 
precautions  were  taken  which  could  leave  no  room  for  misunderstanding, 
such  was  the  course  pursued  in  this  case. 

It  is  thus  seen  how  utterly  groundless  was  the  declaration  in  the  Spanish 
"proposition"  that,  in  order  to  determine  the  meaning  of  the  Protocol,  it  is 
necessary  to  "bear  in  mind  .  .  .  the  negotiations  carried  on  between  the 
two  parties  which  culminated  in  this  agreement,  and  in  which  the  interpreta 
tion  of  the  latter  had  been  given  beforehand  and  officially!"  In  the  corre 
spondence  thus  invoked  by  the  Spanish  Commissioners  as  an  interpretation  of 
the  Protocol,  the  two  governments  did  not  contemplate  the  execution  of  such 
an  instrument;  and  if  the  response  of  the  Spanish  government  to  the  Ameri 
can  demands  had  taken  the  form  of  a  simple  acceptance,  no  Protocol  would 
have*been  made.  The  first  suggestion  of  such  an  instrument  was  that  made 
in  the  interview  in  which  the  Spanish  response  was  declared  to  be  unsatisfac 
tory.  It  was  because  the  Spanish  response  was  unacceptable  that  the  United 
States  demanded  a  Protocol.  And  it  was  upon,  this  rejected  response  that  the 
Spanish  argument  for  the  limitation  of  the  clear  scope  and  meaning  of  the 
Protocol  was  built. 

If  further  proof  of  the  soundness  of  the  position  of  the  United  States 
were  needed,  it  would  be  found  in  a  most  convincing  form  in  the  telegram 
sent  by  Mr.  Cambon  to  the  French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  See  the 
French  'Yellow  Book'  referred  to  in  the  Spanish  memorandum,  telegram 
number  9,  Mr.  Cambon  to  the  French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

"No.  9. — M.  Jules  Cambon,  Ambassador  of  the  French  Republic  at 
Washington,  to  M.  Delcasse",  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

"Washington,  August  10,  1898. 
"The   Federal  government  has  decided  to  state  precisely  (pre*ciser),  in  a 


7i8  THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE. 

Protocol,  the  bases  upon  which  the  peace  negotiations  must,  in  its  judgment, 
be  entered  upon. 

44 1  send  you  herewith  this  document,  which  I  shall  thank  you  to  transmit 
to  the  Spanish  government.  (Signed)  J.  CAMBON." 

In  this  telegram,  which  wras  immediately  communicated  to  the  Spanish 
government,  and  which  led  to  the  telegram  to  Mr.  Cambon  authorizing  him  to 
sign  the  Protocol,  followed  by  full  power  from  the  Queen  Regent  to  Mr. 
Cambon  to  that  effect,  Mr.  Cambon  distinctly  says,  not  that  the  American 
government  had  accepted  the  note  of  August  7,  or  in  any  wise  agreed  to  such 
reservations  as  were  contained  therein,  but  that  "the  Federal  government  has 
decided  to  state  precisely  (precise r),  in  a  Protocol,  the  bases  upon  which  the 
peace  negotiations  must,  in  its  judgment,  be  entered  upon." 

It  thus  clearly  appears  that  the  bases  of  peace  negotiations  were  to  be 
determined  by  the  instrument  which  was  enclosed,  and  which  it  was  under 
stood  put  in  definite  terms  the  ultimate  agreement  of  the  parties. 

It  was  because  the  answer  made  in  the  note  of  August  7  was  rejected  by 
the  United  States,  and  for  this  reason  alone,  that  hostilities  were  not  upon 
the  receipt  of  that  note  declared  to  be  suspended;  and  it  remained  for  the 
Spanish  Commissioners  in  their  '"proposition"  to  advance  for  the  first  time  in 
behalf  of  their  government  the  suggestion  that  such  a  declaration  should  then 
have  been  made.  It  was  not  so  made  because  that  note  was  not  received  as 
an  acceptance  of  the  American  demands.  Hostilities  were  declared  to  be  sus 
pended  only  upon  the  signature  of  the  Protocol. 

The  correspondence  quoted  in  the  French  "Yellow  Book,"  no  less  than 
the  subsequent  communications  from  Mr.  Cambon  to  the  American  govern 
ment,  shows  distinctly  that  with  the  exact  terms  of  this  Protocol  before  it,  the 
Spanish  Government,  on  the  nth  instant,  and  subsequently  by  full  power  of 
the  Queen  Regent,  authorized  Mr.  Cambon  to  execute  the  Protocol  in  behalf 
of  Spain.  Observe  the  language  of  the  note  of  Mr.  Cambon  to  the  American 
Secretary  of  State  of  August  12,  1898: 

"Embassy  of  the  French  Republic  in  the  United  States, 

"Washington,  August  12,  1898. 

"Mr.  Secretary  of  State:  I  have  the  honor  to  inform  you  that  I  have  just 
received,  through  the  intermediation  of  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  at 
Paris,  a  telegram,  dated  Madrid,  August  n,  in  which  the  Duke  of  Almodovar 


THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE.  719 

del  Rio  announces  to  me  that,  by  order  of  Her  Majesty  the  Queen  Regent, 
the  vSpanisli  government  confers  upon  me  full  powers  in  order  that  I  may 
sign,  without  other  formality  and  without  delay,  the  Protocol  whereof  the 
terms  have  been  drawn  up  by  common  accord  between  you  and  me.  The 
instrument  destined  to  make  regular  the  powers  which  are  thus  given  to  me 
by  telegraph  will  be  subsequently  addressed  to  me  by  the  post. 

"His  Excellency  the  Minister  of  State  adds  that  in  accepting  this 
Protocol,  and  by  reason  of  the  suspension  of  hostilities  which  will  be  the 
immediate  consequence  of  that  acceptance,  the  Spanish  government  has  pleas 
ure  in  hoping  that  the  government  of  the  United  States  will  take  the  neces 
sary  measures  with  a  view  to  restrain  (empecher)  all  aggression  on  the  part  of 
the  Cuban  separatist  forces. 

"The  government  of  the  Republic  having,  on  the  other  hand,  authorized 
me  to  accept  the  powers  which  are  conferred  upon  me  by  the  Spanish  govern 
ment,  I  shall  hold  myself  at  your  disposition  to  sign  the  Protocol  at  the  hour 
you  may  be  pleased  to  designate. 

"Congratulating  myself  upon  thus  cooperating  with  you  toward  the 
restoration  of  peace  between  the  two  nations,  both  friends  of  France,  I  beg 
you  to  accept,  Mr.  Secretary  of  State,  the  fresh  assurances  of  my  very  high 
consideration.  (Signed)  JULES  CAMBON." 

In  the  light  of  these  facts,  it  appears  there  was  absolutely  no  foundation 
for  the  claim  that  the  American  government  accepted  the  Spanish  reservations 
so  far  as  they  are  contained  in  the  note  of  the  Duke  of  Almodovar  of  August 
7.  Had  that  note  been  only  a  distinct  and  unqualified  acceptance  of  the  terms 
as  contained  in  the  American  note  of  August  30,  it  would  have  been 
unnecessary  to  require  that  all  uncertainty  and  doubt  would  be  removed  by 
reducing  into  few  and  simple  terms,  which  it  was  believed  could  never  be 
misunderstood,  the  final  agreement  of  the  parties.  So  far  from  remaining 
unanswered,  the  note  of  August  7  was  declared  unsatisfactory  when  pre 
sented  to  the  President.  Thus  ended  the  attempt  to  come  to  an  agreement 
by  correspondence ;  and  it  was  decided  that  a  Protocol  should  embody  the 
ultimate  terms. 

The  Spanish  government  telegraphed  the  amplest  authority  to  Mr. 
Cambon  to  execute  it.  We  were  then  remitted  to  the  terms  of  the  Protocol 
itself. 


72o  THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE. 

The  American  government  was  at  a  loss  to  know  how  stronger  terms  could 
have  been  used  to  evidence  the  purpose  of  the  President  to  keep  open  the 
most  full  and  absolute  right  to  deal  with  and  determine  the  dominion  over  the 
Philippine  Islands.  This  was  the  purpose  of  inserting  the  third  article  of  the 
Protocol,  which  embodied  the  terms  of  the  third  demand  of  the  United 
States,  as  set  forth  in  the  note  of  July  30  of  the  American  government  to  the 
Duke  of  Almodovar,  wherein  it  is  said:  "Third.  On  similar  grounds  the 
United  States  is  entitled  to  occupy  and  hold  the  city,  bay  and  harbor  of  Manila 
pending  the  conclusion  of  a  treaty  of  peace  which  shall  determine  the  con 
trol,  disposition  and  government  of  the  Philippines." 

What  are  these  similar  grounds?  They  are  to  be  found  in  the  next 
preceding  paragraph  of  the  note  of  July  30,  in  which  the  President  says  that, 
though  not  then  making  any  demand  for  pecuniary  indemnity,  nevertheless 
he  could  not  be  insensible  to  the  losses  and  expenses  of  the  United  States  inci 
dent  to  the  war,  or  to  the  claims  of  our  citizens  for  injuries  to  their  persons 
and  property  during  the  late  insurrection  in  Cuba.  He  must,  therefore, 
require  the  cession  to  the  United  States,  and  the  immediate  evacuation  by 
Spain,  of  the  Island  of  Porto  Rico,  etc.  On  similar  grounds,  to  wit,  among 
others  the  right  of  the  United  States  to  havre  indemnity  for  its  losses,  the 
United  States  would  hold  the  city,  bay,  and  harbor  of  Manila  pending  the  con 
clusion  of  a  treaty  of  peace,  which  should  determine  the  control,  disposition 
and  government  of  the  Philippines. 

How  could  the  United  States  receive  indemnity  in  whole  or  in  part  from 
the  control,  disposition  and  government  of  the  Philippines,  if  Spanish 
sovereignty  was  not  to  be  touched?  It  is  difficult  to  conceive  what  terms 
could  have  been  used  which  would  more  clearly  have  evidenced  the  purpose 
of  the  parties  to  afford  the  fullest  latitude  in  dealing  with  the  Philippine  ques 
tion.  The  treaty  was  to  determine  not  alone  the  control,  disposition  and 
government,  but  at  the  same  time  had  full  power  to  determine  all  that  is 
implied  in  control,  disposition  and  government.  Certainly  the  word  "control" 
was  not  used  here  in  the  sense  of  "register"  or  "inspection,"  but  in  its  broader 
sense  of  "authority  or  command;  authority  over;  power  over;  the  regulation 
or  rule  of." 

What  word  could  be  broader  than  "disposition,"  which  has  practically  the 
same  meaning  in  both  the  French  and  English  languages?  "The  disposal  of; 
distribution  of;  alienation  of;  definite  settlement  of;  ultimate  destination." 


THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE.  ?2I 

We  have  in  these  two  words,  then,  authority  over,  dominion  of,  final  and 
ultimate  destination  of  the  subject  matter.  What  is ''government"  but  the 
right  of  administration,  or  exercising  sovereignty,  the  direction,  the  political 
management  of  a  state?  Either  of  these  terms  implies  power  of  interfering 
with  sovereignty.  Taken  together,  they  give  the  fullest  scope  in  dealing  with 
all  power,  governmental,  territorial  and  administrative. 

It  is  not  argued  in  the  Spanish  "proposition"  that  these  words  should 
have  a  narrow  meaning  so  far  as  disposition  and  government  are  concerned, 
but  transcribed  into  the  French  language  it  is  sought  to  give  a  narrower 
meaning  to  the  word  "control. "  It  must  be  construed  in  the  connection  in 
which  it  is  found  in  the  Protocol,  in  its  broader  sense  of  power  or  dominion. 
"Noscitur  a  sociis"  is  a  legal  maxim  which  applies  to  the  discussion  or 
determination  of  the  meaning  of  phrases.  "Control"  associated  with  disposi 
tion  and  government  of  territory  might  have  a  very  different  significance 
when  used  in  another  relation  in  its  less  familiar  meaning  of  "inspection  or 
register."  The  word  "disposition"  used  in  another  association  might  have  an 
entirely  different  meaning,  and  a  meaning  which,  in  connection  with  govern 
ment  and  control,  would  deprive  it  of  all  sense. 

The  American  government,  then,  felt  itself  amply  supported  in  its 
right  to  demand  the  cession  of  the  Philippines  with  or  without  concessions, 
relying  upon  either  the  exact  terms  of  the  Protocol,  or  those  terms  interpreted 
in  the  light  of  negotiations,  oral  and  written,  which  led  to  its  execution. 

The  Commissioners  of  the  United  States  noticed  with  regret  that  an 
attempt  had  been  made  in  the  memorandum  of  the  Spanish  Commissioners  to 
invoke  the  high  authority  of  the  French  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  in  the 
interpretation  of  the  Protocol,  so  as  to  exclude  therefrom  all  mention  of  the 
right  of  the  treaty  to  deal  with  the  control,  disposition  and  government  of 
the  Philippines.  In  the  French  "Yellow  Book"  cited  by  the  Spanish  Com 
missioners,  it  is  apparent  that  as  early  as  the  loth  of  August  the  French 
government  was  in  possession  of  the  exact  terms  of  the  Protocol,  transmitted 
in  the  note  of  that  date  of  its  Ambassador,  Mr.  Cambon.  Would  anybody 
believe  that  in  summing  up  this  note  the  Minister  would  intentionally  omit 
one  of  the  most  essential  parts  of  the  Protocol? 

The  note  No.  19,  referred  to,  is  no  part  of  the  negotiations;  its  purpose 
was  merely  to  advise  the  Ambassadors  of  the  French  Republic  at  London, 
St.  Petersburg1,  Berlin,  Vienna,  etc.,  of  the  result  of  the  action  of  the  repre- 


722  THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE. 

sentative  of  France  in  bringing  about  a  suspension  of  hostilities,  and  the 
preliminary  agreement  as  to  peace,  between  two  nations  toward  which  the 
French  government  was  actuated  by  feelings  of  humanity  and  mutual  friend 
ship.  In  this  note  it  is  said  that  the  points  upon  which  both  parties  had 
reached  an  agreement  were  set  forth  in  a  Protocol.  In  stating  the  contents  of 
that  instrument,  doubtless  through  inadvertence,  it  was  not  stated  that  the 
treaty  should  determine  the  control,  disposition  and  government  of  the 
Philippines. 

The  attention  of  the  Minister  being  called  to  this  matter  by  the  Ameri 
can  Ambassador  in  Paris,  he  very  promptly  corrected  any  misapprehension 
which  might  exist  as  to  his  despatch.  This  appears  in  the  following  letter 
from  the  American  Ambassador,  which  was  received  by  the  American  Com 
missioners  : 

v 

"Ambassade  des  Etats-Unis,  18,  Avenue  Kleber, 

"Paris,  November  5,  1898. 

.  "Dear  Sir:  I  beg  to  inform  you  that  I  saw  the  French  Minister  of  For 
eign  Affairs  in  regard  to  that  portion  of  the  reply  of  the  Spanish  Peace  Com 
missioners  in  which  they  refer  to  a  letter  sent  by  him  to  the  French 
Ambassadors  dated  August  15,  1898,  which  appears  in  the  French  'Yellow 
Book,'  and  attempt  to  construe  the  language  used  therein  as  an  interpretation 
of  the  French  Minister  of  the  meaning  of  the  Protocol,  and  speak  of  the 
unquestionable  moral  weight  of  the  testimony  therein  given  by  him  regard 
ing  that  instrument.  He  assured  me  emphatically  and  unreservedly  that  the 
letter  [referred  to  was  intended  to  be  simply  a  brief  resume  of  the  general 
features  of  the  preliminary  peace  negotiations  carried  on  between  the  two 
belligerents,  and  that  he  did  not  attempt  to  quote  the  precise  language  of  the 
Protocol.  He  disclaimed  any  intention  of  giving  any  views  of  his  own 
regarding  it,  having  no  authority  for  so  doing,  and  declared  that  the  brief 
mention  contained  in  his  letter  could  in  no  wise  be  construed  as  an  interpre 
tation  by  him  of  the  terms  or  meaning  of  that  instrument.  He  promised  that 
he  would  at  once  send  to  the  French  Ambassadors  the  full  text  of  the  Protocol 
in  order  that  they  might  be  informed  of  its  conditions  in  extenso,  and  that 
there  might  be  no  ground  for  misapprehension  as  to  its  terms. 

"The  Minister  repeated  what  he  had  said  several  times  before,  and 
which  I  know  to  be  true,  that  he  and  his  government  had  all  along  observed 
a  strict  and  impartial  neutrality  between  the  two  powers  which  were  negotiat- 


THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE.  723 

ing,  being  equally  friendly  to    both,   and  that  he  intended  to  continue  the 
observance  of  such  neutrality.  Very  truly  yours, 

"(Signed)   HORACE  PORTER. 
Hon.  William  R.  Day, 

"President  of  the  American  Peace  Commission,  Paris." 

It  was  stated  that  the  occupation  of  Manila  was  to  be  only  temporary. 
The  Protocol,  so  far  as  it  relates  to  the  Philippines,  is  itself  provisional. 
It  expressly  provides  for  the  doing  of  certain  things  pending  the  conclusion 
of  a  treaty  which  is  in  this  particular  to  supersede  it.  Had  it  provided  for 
the  permanent  occupation  of  Manila  by  the  United  States,  it  would  have 
withdrawn  the  Philippines  to  that  extent  from  the  sphere  of  future  negotia 
tion. 

The  most  presentable  and  seemly  of  the  pleas  of  the  Spanish  commission 
for  shouldering  the  Cuban  debts  upon  the  United  States  as  an  obligation  of 
the  transferred  sovereignty,  to  be  handed  over  to  the  Cubans  if  they  became  a 
nation,  was  this: 

"In  the  memorandum  which  we  are  now  answering,  the  singular  affirma 
tion  is  made  that  the  mortgage  created  by  the  two  issues  above  named  can 
be  called  more  properly  a  subsidiary  guarantee,  and  that  the  party  principally 
bound  to  pay  is  the  Spanish  nation.  Undoubtedly  the  American  Commission 
in  making  this  affirmation  had  not  before  its  eyes  Article  II.  of  the  Royal 
Decree  of  May  10,  1886,  authorizing  the  issue  of  1,240,000  hypothecary  bonds 
of  the  Island  of  Cuba,  or  the  2d  paragraph  of  Article*  II.  of  the  Royal  Decree 
of  September  27,  1890,  authorizing  the  issue  of  1,750,000  hypothecary  bonds 
of  the  same  island.  Both  texts  read  literally  the  same  thing,  and  it  will  be 
sufficient  for  us  to  transcribe  one  of  them.  Their  language  is  as  follows: 
'The  new  bonds  shall  have  the  direct  (especial)  guarantee  of  the  customs 
revenue,  stamp  revenue  of  the  island  of  Cuba,  direct  and  indirect  taxes  now 
levied  or  to  be  levied  there  in  the  future,  and  the  subsidiary  (general)  guar 
antee  of  the  Spanish  nation.  They  shall  be  exempt  from  all  ordinary  and  ex 
traordinary  taxes,  etc.'  " 

Unquestionably,  from  the  accustomed  foundations  for  the  building  of 
nations,  in  material  facts,  it  would  have  been  simpler  and  stronger  for  the 
President  to  have  demanded  the  cession  of  Cuba  as  of  Porto  Rico,  but  the  effu 
sion  of  Congress  when  it  rushed  to  war  had  made  difficulty  in  that  direction, 
and  the  President  had  deftly  and  sturdily  resisted  the  torrent  that  was  driving 


724  THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE. 

him  upon  the  rock  of  the  recognition  of  the  national  character  of  the  Cuban 
faction  that  had  monopolized  the  functions  of  the  ancient  Spanish  Junta  system, 
and  the  notorious  Key  West  bureau  of  misinformation.  The  President  was 
greatly  wise  in  this,  and  in  referring  the  Philippine  question  to  the  sober 
second  thought  of  the  people  of  the  United  States.  He  did  not  exert  to  the 
utmost  the  expression  of  his  tremendous  power,  for  that  might  have  been 
mistaken  for  imperialism.  He  followed  the  high  and  holy  traditions  of  our 
form  of  republicanism,  and  has  been  the  faithful  embodiment  of  the  will  of 
the  people;  and  more  than  that,  he  has  sought  to  know  their  will. 

He  had  faith  in  the  people  of  Cuba,  taught  in  schools  of  sorrow  to  take 
their  part  in  a  system  of  self-government,  but  he  has  not  confounded  the 
Cubans  in  the  United  States  engaged  in  finance  with  credit  based  upon  the 
ashes  of  the  conflagration  kindled  by  Gomez  with  the  people  of  Cuba,  who 
would  restore  the  opulent  industries  of  the  island.  A  people  of  Cuba  exist, 
and  they  are  not  entirely  or  principally  those  who  have  appeared  in  the  phan 
tom  armies  that  ambuscaded  and  terrorized  the  Spanish  columns  with  agility 
and  mystery. 

The  people  of  Cuba  are  not  those  who,  after  applying  the  torch  to  the 
cane  fields  and  the  tobacco  leaves,  that  come  visible  wealth  from  the  red  and 
black  soil  and  the  indigo  sky  of  the  island,  have  mustered  under  the  banner 
of  the  torch  of  San  Domingo,  ready  for  the  American  pay-roll,  and  also  to 
make  war  for  the  poor  plunder  the  island  affords  after  the  visitation  of  fire, 
that  impoverished  Cub'a  rather  than  the  Peninsula  of  Spain.  It  is  true  that 
the  deliberation  of  the  President  and  people  of  the  United  States  and  the 
characteristic  delays  associated  with  the  dignities  of  the  Senate,  allowed  the 
Tagalos  of  Luzon  to  strike  for  a  rule  despotic  and  superstitious  dictatorship 
of  their  own  under  a  man  who  may  be  a  soldier  but  is  not  a  statesman ;  and 
this  is  in  harmony  with  the  stated  courses  of  the  methods  of  the  people  who 
do  govern  themselves. 

It  would  have  been  happy  if  the  Senate  had  ratified  at  once  the  splendid 
treaty  with  Spain,  the  fitting  crown  of  a  war  of  triumphs,  but  time  is  needed 
for  obtaining  the  consensus  of  a  multitude  of  wills  trained  in  the  individu 
alities  of  free  politics  under  popular  dominion.  The  delay  was  mischievous, 
but  the  recompense  is  in  the  greater  strength  that  comes  at  last,  indicating 
one  of  the  primary  and  grander  truths  of  republicanism,  that  it  is  stronger 
than  the  imperialism  that  rests  upon  despots  and  dynasties  that  are  degenerate. 


THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE.  725 

The  country  is  indebted  no  less  to  the  military  energy  of  General  Mer- 
ritt  than  to  the  brilliant  ability  and  tenacity  of  Admiral  Dewey,  for  the 
victories  in  which  but  little  of  the  blood  of  the  victors  was  spilled,  for  bur 
possession  of  the  capital  of  the  Philippine  Archipelago.  General  Merritt 
forced  the  fight,  and  Admiral  Dewey  smashed  the  defense  by  the  seaside  of 
Manila  so  that  the  storming-  of  the  town  became  a  spectacle  rather  than  a 
combat,  and  he  was  just  in  time.  Neither  the  Spanish  nor  the  American 
Commission  seemed  to  have  been  perfectly  informed  or  quite  ingenuous  in 
their  information  and  use  of  the  cable,  the  disability  of  which  at  one  time 
caused  delay,  and  at  another  hastened  conclusion. 

The  cable  was  cut  by  Dewey  after  the  Spaniards  had  refused  to  neutralize 
its  service,  and  a  piece  was  taken  out  of  it,  the  operators  were  scattered  and  the 
instruments  gone,  so  that  if  both  sides  had  been  agreed  some  time  must  have 
elapsed  before  resumption  of  business.  And  things  that  might  readily  have 
happened  would  have  vastly  changed  the  Philippine  situation — if  Dewey  had 
departed  after  destroying  the  Spanish  fleet,  and  if  Merritt  had  not  rushed  the 
American  army,  the  smaller  of  the  three  forces  in  and  about  the  city,  so  that 
he  had  the  Spanish  army  captives  in  the  walled  city,  and  the  Filipino  forces 
relegated  to  the  country,  before  the  peace  Protocol  was  announced. 

The  Spanish  Commissioners'  solemn  sentences  became  grotesque  touching 
this  phase  of  the  subject,  and  the  American  people  took  their  time  and  way  to 
find  their  sovereign  will  and  pleasure,  as  to  the  disposition  of  the  Philippines, 
and  their  commandments  will  henceforth  be  executed  both  in  the  East  and 
the  West  Indies. 

CEREMONIES    CONCLUDING   THE   WAR   WITH    SPAIN. 

Actually,  the  war  with  Spain  that  began  with  the  battle  of  the  bay  of 
Manila,  May  i,  concluded  August  13,  with  the  capitulation  of  the  city  of 
Manila,  the  Protocol  of  Peace  having  been  signed  in  Washington  two  days 
before,  the  fact,  in  the  broken  condition  of  the  cable,  not  being  known  in  the 
Philippines  until  transmitted  in  dispatch  boat  from  Hongkong.  The  declara 
tion  of  war  by  the  United  States  was  on  the  2ist  of  April.  The  official  close 
of  the  war  was  on  April  u,  the  period  of  a  legal  state  of  hostilities  lacking 
ten  days  of  a  year.  The  importance  of  fixing  the  date  is  in  the  effect  the 
formal  end  of  the  war  has  upon  the  terms  of  enlistment  of  our  volunteers. 
The  ceremony  of  the  restoration  of  a  state  of  peace  under  the  law  was  the 


726  THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE. 

exchange  of  ratifications  in  the  reception  room  of  the  White  House.  The 
exact  time  was  April  u,  3  p.  m.  Among  the  witnesses  attracted  by  the  his 
toric  character  of  the  event  were  many  members  of  the  Cabinet  and  officials 
prominent  in  the  Administration  gathered  at  the  White  House.  These 
included  Secretaries  Hay,  Wilson  and  Hitchcock;  Senator  Davis,  one  of  the 
Peace  Commissioners  who  negotiated  the  treaty;  Assistant  Secretaries  Hill, 
Adee  and  Cridler,  of  the  State  Department;  Acting-Secretary  of  War  Meikel- 
john,  Adjutant-General  Corbin,  Solicitor-General  Richards,  Hon.  Wayne 
MacYeagh,  and  Mr.  Sidney  Smith,  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Diplomatic  Cor 
respondence,  State  Department,  who  had  prepared  the  American  copy  of  the 
treaty.  A  few  minutes  in  advance  the  French  Ambassador,  M.  Cambon, 
arrived,  in  company  with  M.  Thiebaut,  the  First  Secretary  of  the  Embassy, 
the  latter  bearing  the  Spanish  copy  of  the  peace  treaty.  Mr.  McKinley 
cordially  greeted  the  Ambassador,  and,  after  a  brief  exchange  of  well-wishes, 
the  formal  ceremony  began.  The  President  stood  back  of  the  large  desk 
presented  to  the  government  by  Queen  Victoria,  while  Secretary  Hay  and 
Ambassador  Cambon  occupied  places  at  the  desk.  Around  this  central  group 
were  ranged  the  Cabinet  officers  and  others,  and  officials  of  the  household. 
The  powers  of  M.  Cambon  and  Secretary  Hay  were  examined,  a  protocol  con 
cerning  the  day's  ceremony  signed,  and  other  formalities  concluded.  These 
preliminaries  took  some  time,  so  that  it  was  nearly  3:30  before  the  actual 
exchange  began.  The  signing  of  the  protocol  of  exchange  occurred  at  3:  28 
p.  m.,  Ambassador  Cambon  signing  for  Spain,  and  Secretary  Hay  for  the 
United  States.  The  protocol  was  in  French,  and  briefly  recited  the  circum 
stances  leading  up  to  the  exchange.  This  cleared  the  way  for  the  exchange 
itself,  constituting  the  final  act.  The  President  took  from  the  desk  the 
American  copy  of  the  treaty,  handsomely  engrossed,  bound  in  dark  blue 
morocco,  and  encased  in  a  black  morocco  portfolio,  and  handed  it  to  M. 
Cambon.  At  the  same  time  M.  Cambon  handed  to  the  President  the  Spanish 
copy  of  the  treaty,  also  engrossed,  bound  in  morocco  and  encased  in  a  maroon- 
colored  morocco  box.  There  were  deferential  bows  as  each  received  from  the 
other  this  final  pledge  of  peace.  This  exchange  of  ratifications  occurred  at 
3:35  p.  m.  The  President  was  the  first  to  speak.  "Mr.  Ambassador,"  said 
he,  "I  will  issue  my  proclamation  at  once." 

M.  Cambon  thanked  the  President  for  the  promptness  with  which  the 
proclamation  followed.     This  ended  the  ceremony,  and  after  brief  felicitations 


SIGNATURES  OF  AMERICAN  AND  SPANISH  PEACE  COMMISSIONERS  TO  TREATY  OF  PEACE, 
'hotograph  Taken  by  Signal  Service  Officers  Express! 
by  Permission  of  State  Department  at  Washington. 


Reproduced  from  Photograph  Taken  Jay  Signal  Service  Offirers  Kxpn-ssly  for  This  History, 


THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE.  729 

the  Ambassador  and  other  officials  withdrew.  Secretary  Hay  took  with  him 
the  Spanish  copy  of  the  treaty  and  deposited  it  in  the  archives  of  the  State 
Department.  M.  Cambon  cabled  the  Spanish  government  of  the  final  restora 
tion  of  peace,  and  made  known  that  the  American  copy  of  the  treaty  would  be 
forwarded  through  the  French  Foreign  Office. 

PRESIDENT'S   PROCLAMATION. 

After  the  ceremony  connected  with  the  exchange  of  the  ratification  of  the 
peace  treaty,  President  McKinley  issued  the  following  proclamation : 

Whereas,  A  treaty  of  peace  between  the  United  States  of  America  and 
Her  Majesty,  the  Queen  Regent  of  Spain,  in  the  name  of  her  august  son,  Don 
Alfonso  XIII,  was  concluded  and  signed  by  their  respective  plenipotentiaries 
at  Paris  on  December  10,  1898,  the  original  of  which  is  in  the  "Spanish  lan 
guage,  is  word  for  word  as  follows : 

(Here  full  text  of  treaty  is  included.) 

And,  whereas,  The  said  convention  has  been  duly  ratified  on  both  parts, 
and  the  ratifications  of  the  two  governments  were  exchanged  in  the  city  of 
Washington  on  April  n,  1899;  now,  therefore, 

Be  it  known,  That  I,  William  McKinley,  President  of  the  United  States 
of  America,  have  caused  the  said  convention  to  be  made  public,  to  the  end 
that  the  same  and  every  article  and  clause  thereof  may  be  observed  and  ful 
filled  with  good  faith  by  the  United  States  and  the  citizens  thereof. 

In  witness  whereof  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand  and  caused  the  seal  of 
the  United  States  to  be  affixed. 

Done  at  the  city  of  Washington,  April  n,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  1899, 
and  of  the  independence  of  the  United  States  123. 

WILLIAM    McKINLEY. 

By  the  President:  JOHN  HAY,   Secretary  of  State. 

There  is  something  in  the  documents  exchanged  that  is  characteristic  of 
the  two  countries.  The  Spanish  copy  now  in  our  possession  is  handsomely 
engrossed  on  parchment  in  old  English  script,  with  wide  double  columns,  one 
in  Spanish  and  the  other  in  English.  Its  binding  is  of  red  morocco,  heavily 
embossed  in  gold,  which  gives  the  effect  of  the  yellow  and  red  colors  of 
Spain.  The  United  States  copy  held  by  Spain  is  neat  and  simple,  the  text  in 
parallel  columns,  the  left  in  English  and  the  right  in  Spanish,  surrounded  by 


73o  THE    TREATY    OF    PEACE. 

a  narrow  border  of  the  national  colors.  The  document  is  enclosed  in  a  cover 
of  dark  blue  morocco,  with  the  great  seal  of  the  United  States  upon  the  face 
and  a  decorative  design  in  gilt. 

The  Official  Gazette  of  Madrid  of  April  16  contains  a  royal  decree 
appointing  the  Duke  de  Arcos  to  be  Spanish  Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Min 
ister  Plenipotentiary  to  the  United  States.  The  decree  also  creates  consulates 
at  Havana,  Manila,  Iloilo,  San  Juan  de  Porto  Rico,  and  Cienfuegos. 

Senor  Larrea,  now  Spanish  Consul  at  Antwerp,  is  transferred  to  Havana; 
Senor  Bouila,  now  at  Shanghai,  is  appointed  to  Manila,  and  Senor  Uriarte  goes 
to  Antwerp.  The  Hon.  Bellamy  Storer,  Minister  of  the  United  States,  has 
been  chosen  to  represent  the  United  States  at  the  Spanish  court. 

General  orders  of  the  date  of  April  12  look  to  the  disbandment  of  the 
volunteer  forces.  The  War  Department  makes  this  announcement : 

"To  be  continued  in  service  or  appointed  under  Section  13  of  the  Act  of 
March  2,  1899,  which  authorizes  the  President  to  appoint  or  continue  in  serv 
ice  Brigadier-Generals  not  exceeding  one  for  every  4,000  enlisted  men  actually 
in  service  and  Major-Generals  not  exceeding  one  for  every  12,000  enlisted 
men: 

"General  officers  of  Volunteers — Maj.-Gen.  William  R.  Shafter,  Maj.- 
Gen.  Ehvell  S.  Otis. 

"Brigadier  Generals — James  H.  Wilson,  Fitzhugh  Lee,  Joseph  Wheeler, 
John  C.  Bates,  Samuel  B.  M.  Young,  H.  W.  Lawton,  Adna  R.  Chaffee,  Wil 
liam  Ludlow,  Leonard  Wood,  George  W.  Davis,  Theodore  Schwan,  Robert 
H.  Hall,  Loyd  Wheaton,  Frederick  D.  Grant. 

"To  be  continued  in  service  under  the  clause  of  Section  15  of  the  act  of 
March  2,  1899,  which  authorizes  the  President  to  enlist  temporarily  in  service 
for  absolutely  necessary  purposes  in  the  Philippine  Islands  volunteers,  officers 
and  men,  individually  or  by  organizations,  now  in  those  islands: 

"General  Officers  of  Volunteers — Maj.-Gen.  H.  W.  Lawton,  Maj.-Gen. 
Arthur  Mac  Arthur,  Brig. -Gen.  Charles  King,  Brig. -Gen.  Robert  P.  Hughes^ 
Brig. -Gen.  Samuel  Ovenshine,  Brig. -Gen.  Irving  Hale." 

It  would  be,  now  that  peace  is  declared,  a  great  saving  to  the  government 
and  relieve  the  Department  of  the  necessity  of  sending  more  troops  to 
the  Philippines  if  the  volunteers  there  could  be  largely  retained.  Under  the 
law  the  service  of  the  volunteer  organization  terminated  with  the  declaration 
of  peace,  but  the  act  of  Congress  provided  that  volunteer  organizations  might 


THE    TREATY 


PKACE. 


731 


remain  in  the  volunteer  service  six  months  thereafter  if  they  so  desired.  At 
the  end  of  that  time,  however,  they  were  to  be  mustered  out  whether  they  so 
desired  or  not.  The  volunteers  now  in  the  Philippines  have  gained  so  much 
experience  in  the  field  and  have  become  so  well  adapted  to  the  service 
required  against  the  insurgents  that  it  has  been  thought  important  to  induce 
them  to  reenlist  in  the  regular  service,  either  at  the  present  time  by  demand 
ing  their  discharge  from  the  volunteer  army,,  or  to  do  so  at  the  expiration  of 
the  six  months  after  the  declaration  of  peace. 

Volunteer  organizations  enlisted  in  the  regular  army  as  organizations 
would  therefore  bring  with  them  their  officers  as  now  assigned.  As  an 
inducement  to  the  volunteers  to  reenter  the  service  of  the  government,  it  has 
been  proposed  to  pay  to  all  reenlisting  their  full  travel  allowance  for  land 
and  sea  travel  from  place  of  discharge  to  place  of  previous  enlistment. 

The  adjournment  of  Congress  by  limitation  on  the  4lh  of  March  pre 
vented  the  accomplishment  of  an  adequate  establishment  of  the  army.  If  it 
had  not  been  for^  this  incompetency  there  would  have  been  no  anxiety  to 
extend  the  terms  of  volunteer  enlistments.  Fighting  men  enough,  however, 
will  be  found  to  take  care  of  the  property  and  the  honor  of  the  country, 
naval  and  military. 


CHAPTER   XXXI. 

Review  of  the  War  and  the  Commission   on  ttie   Conduct  of  the 

War  Department. 

Importance  of  a  Day  Lost  or  Gained — The  Protocol  Was  the  Treaty — Military  Commissions  to 
Arrange  the  Spanish  Evacuation  of  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico — Appearance  of  the  Cuban 
Army — Narrow  Margins  on  Which  the  War  Was  Ended  so  Speedily — Inspiration  of 
Dewey's  Victor}7 — Energy  in  Following  It  Up — Outbreak  of  Criticism  on  the  Conduct  of 
the  War  as  Soon  as  it  Was  Over — The  Commission  of  Investigation  Appointed  by  the 
President— Extraordinary  Interest  in  the  Action  of  the  Commission  and  Its  Authoritative 
Report — Weaknesses  in  Systems  and  Persons  not  Spared — Origin  and  Extent  of  the 
Canned  Meat  Controversy — Fault  Found  in  High  Places — The  Army,  Regular  or  Volun 
teer,  of  and  for  the  People.  * 

One  loses  a  day  on  the  way  from  Washington  City  to  Manila.  The  line 
on  which  going  westward  we  must  correct  the  almanac,  by  dropping  a  day,  is 
the  iSoth  meridian.  When  it  is  midnight  in  London  it  is  noon  of  the  same 
day  on  longitude  180  degrees  west,  or  half-way  around  the  world.  Whatever 
time  the  magic  iSoth  degree  is  struck  going  west,  the  next  day  is  sponged  off. 
If  you  get  there  Tuesday,  there  is  no  Wednesday  that  week.  And  going  east 
there  are  two  of  the  days  on  which  the  mysterious  meridian  is  encountered. 
The  point  of  this  in  association  with  the  war  is  that  if  we  count  time  to  China 
as  we  find  it  coming  east,  the  order  of  Admiral  Dewey  to  destroy  the  Spanish 
fleet  was  just  a  little  too  sharp  on  time  for  the  actual  declaration  of  war,  but 
if  we  count  on  the  westward  course,  the  declaration  was  in  time  to  fairly  cover 
the  direction  to  sink  the  Spaniards.  Either  way  we  go,  there  was  no  time 
lost.  It  was  103  days  from  the  naval  battle  before  Manila  to  the  signing  of 
the  Protocol  August  12.  Our  war  with  Spain  was  for  100  days,  with  a  margin 
of  two  days,  counted  as  the  sun  keeps  time.  It  was  hard  to  realize  for  a  while 
that  the  Protocol  was  truly  the  Treaty  of  Peace — that  the  rest  was  debate  on 
details,  and  painstaking  to  weigh  and  measure  and  adjust  points  of  difference 
and  formulate  the  settlement.  When  Santiago  surrendered,  Spain  was  van 
quished.  Her  fate  was  declared  the  day  it  was  determined  that  she  could  not 

732 


REVIEW    OF    THE    WAR.  733 

contest  with  us  the  command  of  the  sea.  It  was  impossible  to  defend  Porto 
Rico  and  Cuba  if  the  Spanish  armies  in  those  islands  were  isolated,  for  the 
power  to  overcome  them  was  in  the  United  States,  and  would  be  employed. 
As  to  the  signing-  of  the  treaty  at  Paris,  or  its  ratification  at  Washington  and 
Madrid,  those  formalities  were  needful  to  legalize  action  taken.  The  Protocol 
was  actual  peace,  but  there -was  a  legal  continuation  of  a  state  of  war;  and  in 
the  first  hundred  and  ten  days  of  this  situation  there  had  been  mustered  out 
and  discharged  from  the  military  service  an  average  of  one  thousand  men  per 
day.  The  order  to  muster  out  one  hundred  thousand  men  was  issued  on  the 
1 8th  of  August,  less  than  a  week  after  the  proclamation  announcing  the  pro 
tocol  and  suspending  hostilities.  The  administration  was  as  prompt  to  take 
advantage  of  peace,  when  the  war  was  over,  as  it  had  been  swift  to  execute 
the  mandate  of  war  at  the  beginning.  Military  committees  to  superintend  the 
evacuation  of  Cuba,  Porto  Rico  and  the  adjacent  islands  were  forthwith 
appointed;  for  Cuba,  Major-General  James  F.  Wade,  Rear- Admiral  William 
T.  Sampson,  Major-General  Matthew  C.  Butler;  for  Porto  Rico,  Major-Gen 
eral  John  C.  Brooke,  Rear-Admiral  Winfield  S.  Schley,  Brigadier-General  W. 
Gordon — who  soon  afterwards  met  the  Spanish  commissioners  at  Havana  and 
San  Juan  respectively.  Porto  Rico  was  evacuated  and  the  American  flag  was 
up  on  August  1 8th.  The  task  of  evacuating  Cuba  proceeded  slowly.  The 
American  flag  was  raised  on  Morro  Castle  and  the  Governor  General's  palace, 
January  ist,  at  which  time  twenty-two  thousand  Spanish  troops  remained 
in  the  vicinity  of  Cienfuegos. 

While  the  \var  was  on  there  was  general  solicitude  that  the  freedom  of 
speech  and  facility  of  the  press  should  not  be  abused  to  harm  the  cause  of  the 
country.  There  was  a  great  deal  of  eccentricity  in  the  press,  but  it  consisted 
in  excessive  military  energy,  with  the  accustomed  "instructions"  to  the  com 
manders  of  the  active  fleets  and  armies.  There  was  a  steady  flight  of  accusa 
tions  of  favoritism,  those  whose  chosen  ones  were  not  favored  opening  fire  on 
the  others  who  were  at  the  front,  as  a  personal  favor,  it  was  said.  The  harm 
done  was  not  considerable.  The  journal  that  might  have  reported  the  pres 
ence  of  Cervera's  fleet  in  Santiago  Harbor,  when  he  could  only  go  there  to  be 
bottled  up,  would  have  been  forgiven,  even  by  admirals  on  the  look-out,  for 
audacity  of  pushing  in  and  pointing  to  the  enemy.  The  usually  season 
able  vehemence  of  partisans  skirmishing  for  position  in  future  civil  campaigns 
was  reduced  to  inoffensiveness  while  the  fighting  was  going  on,  and  the  Presi- 


734  REVIEW    OF    THE    WAR. 

dent's  cares  were  lessened  by  the  loyal  moderation  of  the  great  mass  of  his 
countrymen  who  had  not  lined  up  with  him  in  national  affairs  until  the  bugles 
called  for  the  blue  and  the  gray  to  put  on  the  uniform  of  the  country  and 
keep  step  to  the  national  music.  The  naval  victories  without  loss  of  life,  and 
the  undervaluation  of  Spanish  soldiers  as  fighting  men,  on  a  defensive  line, 
caused  the  casualty  lists  of  our  troops  engaged  in  the  Santiago  battles  to  be  a 
surprise  that  shocked  the  country,  and  the  illness  of  General  Shafter  was 
charged  to  his  stoutness,  and  the  frank  statements  he  made  of  his  depressions 
and  misgivings  were  so  distressing  to  the  people  that  the  great  results  attained 
were  not  regarded  as  compensation  for  loss,  though  the  extraordinary  success 
gained  will  have  a  permanent  place  in  the  records  of  decisive  battles.  The 
sweeping  naval  victories  of  the  Americans  from  .Cavite  to  Santiago,  ninety- 
five  days,  were  so  uniform  hi  character,  there  was  a  feeling  that  the  Spaniards 
were  unworthy  to  be  considered  steady  enough  to  furnish  a  test  of  our  high 
quality,  and  soon  there  was  much  said  by  the  perverse  about  the  feebleness 
of  the  foe.  It  is;  however,  the  established  truth  that  the  Americans  were  well 
commanded,  fought  in  the  highest  form  on  all  occasions,  and  in  addition  to 
good  conduct  were  attended  by  good  fortune.  If  the  regular  army  had  not 
been  massed  at  Tampa  to  strike  the  southern  coast  of  Cuba,  in  spite  of  the 
rainy  and  fever  seasons,  the  volunteers  must  have  been  held  in  camps  of 
instruction  until  there  was  frost  on  the  cotton  fields,  or  suffered  from  the 
Cuban  soil  and  climate  immense  losses;  and  military  operations  against 
Havana  on  a  very  large  scale  would  have  been  frightfully  costly.  When, 
however,  the  volunteers  were  engaged,  they  would  have  been  so  prepared 
and  disciplined  that  they  could  have  closed  the  campaign  quickly.  One  of 
the  reasons  why  Admiral  Schley  was  strongly  of  the  opinion  that  Cervera 
would  put  into  Cienfuegos  was  because  he  knew  that  port  was  less  than  two 
hundred  miles  from  Havana,  and  that  with  the  railroad  all  the  available 
troops  of  the  west  end  might  be  rapidly  gathered  to  meet  invaders.  If  Cervera 
had  been  in  Cienfuegos  instead  of  Santiago  the  regular  army  of  the  United 
States  would  have  been  unable  to  do  the  work  they  accomplished  at  Santiago, 
which  was  isolated,  and  yet  we  had  no  strength  to  spare  in  forcing  the  sur 
render.  One  Spanish  column  of  less  than  three  thousand  had  a  sharp  struggle  in 
getting  to  Santiago  just  too  late  to  hold  lines  the  loss  of  which  was  irretriev 
able.  At  Cienfuegos,  the  concentration  of  forces  on  both  sides  must  have 
amounted  to  fifty  thousand  men  on  each  side,  and  the  war  would  have  been 


REVIEW    OF    THE    WAR.  735 

protracted.     It  was  one  of  the  things  carrying  conviction  in  the  first  place 
that  Cervera,  at  liberty  to  make  choice,  would  prefer  Cienfuegos  to  Santiago, 
unless  he  might  have  ^believed  the  very  assurance  of  preference  could  make 
the  latter  port  for  the  Spanish  service  dangerous,  as  any  American  commander 
would  naturally  be  on  the  watch  at  -that  place.     Sampson  and  Schley  were 
agreed  about  this  for  a  time,  and  it  is  possible  Cervera  gave  himself  the  bene 
fit  of  the  idea.     The  retreat  of  Cervera  into  Santiago  was  an  admission  of  the 
naval  incapacity  of  Spain,  unless  we  can  believe  that  he  ran  for  coal  where  he 
thought  Americans  were  unlikely  to  look  for  him,  and  when  he  was  located 
the  American  forces  followed.     Frequently  in  the  congressional  debates,  ban 
quet  and  platform  speeches,  and  comments  of  the  press,  the  idea  is  advanced 
that  the  military  lesson  of  the  war  is  that  the  regular  army  should  be   rigor 
ously  reduced  to  a  scanty  force,  as  the  fact  of  efficiency  of  volunteers  devel 
oped  in  a  few    months  proves  their  reliability.      No  American   who   knew 
enough  of  his  country  to  warrant  him  in  views  of  her  resources  in  war  ever 
disparaged  volunteers.     The  truth  is  we  must  depend  upon  them  in  great 
wars,  but  we  require  enough  regulars  to  handle  a  sharp  sword  promptly,  to 
avoid  the  necessity  for  hurried  and  therefore  exceedingly  exhaustive  prepara 
tions.     We  happened  to  have  regulars  enough,  such  was  the  ease  with  which 
men  were  assembled  from  remote  posts,  to  deliver  a  blow  that  ended  the  war 
before  the  mustering  corps  of  volunteers  could  be  provided  with  that  which 
they  must  have  to  fortify  themselves  to  take  the  field,  and  it  will  always  be  to 
the  credit  of  the  volunteers  that  the  surrender  at  Santiago  was  not  so  much 
the  result  of  what  had  occurred  as  the  visible  evidence  that  the  winners  of  San 
Juan  and  El  Caney  were  but  the  advanced  guard  of  the  grand   armyof  the 
United  States.     There  was  no  doubt  of  the  ultimate  result.     Loss  of  time  was 
loss  of  life.     The  army  that  did  the  fighting  was  almost  disbanded  in  the 
moment  of  victory.     As  there  were  but  five  hundred  and  twenty  defenders  of 
El  Caney,  it  is  clear  that  if  Escario's  column  of  nearly  three  thousand  effec 
tives  had  arrived  three  days  earlier  the  army  of  Shafter  could  not  have  carried 
the  hills  that  were  so  stoutly  held.     That  would  have  meant  waiting  for  rein 
forcements,  and  by  every  hour  of  detention  the   sacrifice  of  scores  of  brave 
men.     The  plan  of  campaign  that  was  to  deal  the  crushing  blow  with  the 
regular  arir^  without  waiting  for  the  thorough  equipment  of  the  volunteers 
in  great  force,  could  not  have  succeeded  if  Spanish  reinforcements  had  got  in, 
until  the  Americans  were  also    strengthened,   and    the    failure  to    give  the 


736  REVIEW    OF    THE    WAR. 

decisive  stroke  then  would  have  made  certain  the  loss  of  thousands  of  our 
men  where  hundreds  sufficed.  Each  week's  delay  implied  disaster  for  us. 
On  the  critical  night  of  the  Santiago  campaign,  when  General  Wheeler  was  on 
the  long,  thin  line  held  by  not  more  than  three  thousand  men,  all  extremely 
weary,  needing  precisely  the  encouragement  the  game  old  confederate  gave 
them,  that  the  Spaniards  were  whipped  and  dared  not  assume  the  aggressive, 
for  their  losses  were  greater  in  proportion  than  ours,  and  their  exhaustion  and 
privation  equal — if  the  Spaniards  could  then  have  had  Escario's  column 
massed  and  sent  it  forward,  the  chances  were  largely  in  favor  of  driving  us, 
and  regaining  the  water  supply  of  the  city  and  access  to  the  country  for  food 
supplies  to  supplement  rations  exclusively  of  rice.  It  is  a  close  question 
whether  the  continued  presence  of  Cervera's  fleet  might  not  alone  have  post 
poned  the  surrender  of  the  city  and  province  of  Santiago  for  an  additional 
month  and  greatly  reduced  the  moral  effect  of  the  final  victory  of  our  arms — 
the  deadly  climate  and  the  pestilential  fevers  sweeping  away  our  heroes  by 
thousands.  We  then  should  have  won  Santiago  as  the  British  did  Havana  in 
1762,  and  with  like  losses.  More  than  half  the  British  and  Provincial  army 
perished.  After  the  loss  of  two  fleets  and  two  armies  by  the  Spaniards — it 
was  as  clear  to  all  Europe  as  to  ourselves  that  the  Spanish  army  in  Manila 
could  not  escape,  but  must  be  captives.  After  the  fleet  that  was  essential  to 
its  support  was  annihilated  and  our  troops  on  the  way  arrived,  the  continu 
ance  of  the  war  under  those  misfortunes  was  impossible  for  Spain;  and 
she  sued  for  peace,  accepting  subsequently  the  terms  of  unconditional  sur 
render.  The  debates  at  Paris  were  able,  but  not  essential.  The  policy  of  the 
Protocol  was  after  the  fall  of  Santiago.  That  depended  upon  the  conclusive 
triumph  with  the  regular  army.  The  event  trembled  in  the  balance.  We 
refer  to  the  regulars  especially  and  distinctively,  for  the  military  policy  of  the 
President  turned  upon  the  blow  that  might  be  delivered  by  them.  Only  three 
volunteer  regiments  were  at  the  front  at  Santiago.  The  transportation  was 
limited,  and  the  movement  on  the  ragged  edge  of  critical  circumstance.  The 
volunteers  were  eager  for  the  fray,  but  none  knew  better  than  themselves  that 
they  needed  time  to  be  educated  up  to  the  requirements  of  the  high  standard 
they  hold  in  history. 

The  Aguinaldo  war  around  Manila  has  but  repeated  the  experiences  that 
give  confidence  in  the  volunteer  system,  but  the  objection  to  it  is  that  it  can 
never  be  ready  to  meet  the  grave  and  sudden  emergencies.  Time  is  the  most 


REVIEW    OF    THE    WAR.  r>7 

expensive  item  in  war  and  the  appropriation  of  money  and  manhood  for  the 
regular  army  making-  it  equal  to  abrupt  occasions  would  be  economical. 
There  was  good  fortune  as  to  the  time  and  place  of  the  decision  of  the  war  in 
Cuba.  If  Cervera  had  been  able  to  fill  his  coal  bunkers  within  a  few  days 
after  arriving  in  West  India  waters  he  might  have  entered  Havana  Harbor, 
and  that  would  have  forced  us  to  attack  the  city,  a  work  too  extensive  for  the 
regulars— indeed,  involving  several  corps  of  volunteers.  It  was  the  inspiration 
of  the  May-day  victory  of  Admiral  Dewey  that  caused  the  inauguration  of 
the  Santiago  campaign,  and  in  this  relation  the  beginning  and  end  of  the 
war  are  closely  linked.  The  President  said,  in  his  annual  message,  of  Dewey 's 
battle: 

"The  effect  of  this  remarkable  victory  upon  the  spirit  of  our  people  and 
upon  the  fortunes  of  the  war  was  instant.  A  prestige  of  invincibility  thereby 
attached  to  our  arms,  which  continued  throughout  the  struggle.  Reinforce, 
ments  were  hurried  to  Manila  under  the  command  of  Major-General  Merritt, 
and  firmly  established  within  sight  of  the  capital,  which  lay  helpless  before 
our  guns."  The  "prestige  of  invincibility"  was  the  thing,  and  the  glory  of 
Dewey  is  not  so  much  in  the  fact  that  when  he  came  within  range  of  the 
Spanish  fleet  he  destroyed  it,  because  he  took  all  the  chances  of  torpedoes 
and  mines,  land  batteries  and  of  the  disabilities  that  might  be  inflicted  upon 
his  ships,  seven  thousand  miles  from  a  home  port.  He  found  the  torpedoes 
harmless.  Fortune  favored  the  brave.  If  a  torpedo  had  blown  up  the  Olym- 
pia  or  one  or  two  of  the  cruisers,  the  result  of  the  day  might  not  have  been  so 
influential.  If  several  vessels  had  been  disabled,  the  situation  of  the  admiral 
could  not  have  been  described  by  any  softer  term  than  precarious.  The  dis 
tinguishing  points  of  the  war  stand  out  like  mountains.  It  is  easy  to  trace  the 
impulses  behind  the  actions  closing  in  successes  that  ended  the  combat.  The 
reinforcements  for  Dewey  were  sent  with  energetic  celerity,  and  the  fall  of 
Manila  two  days  after  the  Spanish  surrendered  in  the  Protocol,  an  event 
unknown  to  the  combatants,  was  due  to  the  animation  with  which  the  War 
Department  pressed  all  advantages.  The  official  statement  of  the  President, 
giving  the  facts  of  supporting  the  navy  by  the  army  at  the  most  remote  scene 
of  the  warfare,  is  in  these  terms: 

"On  the  yth  day  of  May  the  government  was  advised  officially  of  the  vic 
tory  at  Manila,  and  at  once  inquired  of  the  commander  of  our  fleet  what 
troops  would  be  required.  The  information  was  received  on  the  1 5th  of  May, 


738  REVIEW    OF    THE    WAR. 

and  the  first  army  expedition  sailed  May  25   and  arrived  off  Manila  June  30. 
Other  expeditions  soon  followed. ' ' 

When  the  war  was  over,  the  good  management,  vigilance,  precision  and 
strong  grasp  upon  affairs  first  in  order  became  first  in  the  minds  and  hearts  of 
the  people,  and  of  moment  to  every  fireside,  but  extensively  held  to  be  the  • 
commonplace  consequence  of  the  lavish  use  of  the  resources  of  the  country; 
and  there  followed  a  flood  of  turbid  accusation.  The  banners  bright  with 
victory  were,  clouded  with  fogs.  The  origin  of  these  was  our  unprepared 
state  and  the  confusion  was  unavoidable.  There  was  also,  owing  to  impera 
tive  haste,  a  great  deal  of  \vaste, — and  yet  the  official  history  of  the  war  can 
never  be  read  by  a  citizen  of  intelligence  and  temper  of  justice  without  sur 
prise  that  in  all  departments  so  much  was  done  so  well. 

There  never  was  a  war  more  speedily  conducted  to  a  successful  and  satis 
factory  end  than  that  of  the  United  States  with  Spain;  and  yet  when  it  was 
done  there  was  an  epidemic  of  complaint,  and  the  President  answered  the 
clamor,  which  was  loud  and  long  enough  to  show  a  serious  public  interest,  by 
appointing  a  commission.  General  Dodge  was  chosen  president.  The  follow 
ing  were  the  members : 

General  Grenville  M.  Dodge,  Iowa,  President;  Col.  James  A.  Sexton, 
Illinois;  Col.  Charles  Denby,  Indiana;  Capt.  Evan  P.  Howell,  Georgia; 
Ex-Governor  Urban  A.  Woodbury,  Vermont;  Brig-Gen.  John  M.  Wilson, 
Chief  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  A.;  Gen.  James  A.  Beaver,  Pennsylvania;  Maj.- 
Gen.  Alexander  McD.  McCook,  U.  S.  A.;  Dr.  Phineas  S.  Conner,  Ohio; 
Richard  Weightman,  Secretary;  Lieut. -Col.  F.  B.  Jones,  Chief  Quartermaster 
of  Volunteers,  Disbursing  Officer;  Maj.  Stephen  C.  Mills,  Recorder. 

The  specific  duty  of  this  body  was  "to  investigate  the  conduct  of  the  War 
Department  in  the  war  with  Spain."  A  great  mass  of  testimony  was^ taken, 
and  there  were  many  precautions  to  get  witnesses  who  would  give  all  the 
information  they  possessed,  and  to  find  those  who  could  speak  from  personal 
knowledge.  Three  press  associations  were  represented  in  the  reporters  pres 
ent  during  the  proceedings.  The  Secretary  of  War,  the  Adjutant-General, 
the  Quartermaster-General,  and  the  Surgeon-General  were  requested  to 
transmit  all  the  complaints  received  by  them  touching  the  administration  of 
their  respective  departments.  This  was  promptly  done.  Public  invitation 
was  given  September  27th  to  all  persons  "having  knowledge  or  belief  of  any 
official  wronger  dereliction"— a  most  sweeping  call — to  submit  their  state- 


REVIEW    OF    THE    WAR. 


739 


ments  in   writing-,  accompanied   by   such   collateral   proof  or   information    as 
might    be  at    their    disposal.       This   call   met   with   a    remarkable  response. 
Hundreds  of    affidavits,   letters,   newspaper  clippings,   editorial   artioles,   and 
sermons  were  received,  all  of  which  were  thoroughly  and  laboriously  exam 
ined.      The  strong  purpose  of  the  commission  to  get  all  the  facts  appears  in 
the  determination  that  in  the  examination  of  witnesses  the  strict  rules  of  evi 
dence  as  applied  in  legal  proceedings  should  not  be  adhered  to,  but  consider 
able  latitude  allowed.      The  way  investigation  of  the  whitewashing  fashion  is 
conducted  is  by  rigid  adherence  to  the  rules  of  evidence,  the  question  perpetu 
ally  pressed  being:  What  do  you  know  of  your  own  knowledge?     That  is  a 
tight  stopper  upon  any  expression  that  is  excellent  in  suggestion  but  not  in 
legal  form.      There    were  nearly  five    hundred   witnesses    examined.      The 
report  of  the  commission  has  disposed  of  the  frivolous  fad  for  a  time  prev 
alent  of  challenging'  the  good  faith   of  the  members.     The  commission  finds 
that  there  was  too  much  "red  tape"  in  the  departments,  too  much  "paper 
work,"  and  recommends  that  there  should  be  more  preparation  for  future 
wars  by  Congress,  and  also  suggests  retired  officers  might  be  utilized.     Sum 
ming  up  the  results  of  the  war,  the  commission  gives  the  official  figures  of  23 
officers  and   250  men  killed,  and   113  officers  and   1,464  men   wounded  in  the. 
field,  while  the  deaths  from  all  causes  from  May  i  to  September  30,  a  period 
of  five  months,  were   107  officers  and  2,803  men.     The  total  strength  of  the 
army  was  274,717,  so  that  the  death  rate  was  a  fraction  over  i  per  cent. 

The  commission  says  in  the  official  report  of  its  labors  and  findings: 

"No  man  or  woman  who  has  stated  to  us  that  he  or  she  had  any 
material  matter  touching  the  subject  of  our  inquiry  to  communicate  has 
been  refused  a  hearing,  and  there  has  been  no  evidence  before  us  that  any 
one  in  or  connected  with  the  War  Department  has  dishonestly  received 
a  dollar. 

"We  have  made  persistent  efforts  to  secure  the  attendance  of  persons  to 
whose  names  rumor  has  attached  an  allegation  that  they  knew  of  corruption 
of  officials  in  the  War  Department,  but  these  men  have  either  denied  the 
statements  attributed  to  them,  or  have  maintained  silence  when  invited  to  tell 
what  they  know." 

This  criticism  and  recommendation  are  important:  "The  routine  work  in 
the  departments,  in  our  opinion,  is  far  beyond  what  is  necessary,  and  each 
year  seems  to  increase  it.  The  methods  employed  make  it  almost  impossible 


740  REVIEW    OF    THE    WAR. 

to  transact  business  promptly.  The  heads  of  all  departments,  officers  of  large 
depots,  chiefs  of  staff  departments,  corps  and  divisions  have  necessarily  been 
obliged  to  give  attention  to  details  which  should  have  been  given  to  matters 
of  larger  moment.  No  well-regulated  concern  or  corporation  could  transact 
business  satisfactorily  under  such  regulations  as  govern  the  staff  departments, 
and  the  fact  that  every  officer  of  each  of  the  staff  departments  holding  a 
responsible  position  has  been  forced  to  ignore  routine  demonstrates  the  neces 
sity  of  a  new  form. " 

A  significant  utterance  is  the  following:  "For  many  years  the  divided 
authority  and  responsibility  of  the  War  Department  has  produced  friction,  for 
which,  in  the  interest  of  the  service,  a  remedy,  if  possible,  should  be  applied. 
The  constitution  makes  the  President  commander-in-chief  of  the  army,  and 
he  cannot  transfer  that  authority  to  any  other  person.  The  President  selects 
the  secretary  of  war,  who  has  his  confidence  and  is  his  confidential  adviser. 
The  commanding  general  is  assigned  to  duty  as  such  by  the  President,  and 
under  the  miltary  laws  of  the  United  States  his  duties  are  defined  as  follows: 

"The  command  exercised  by  the  commanding  general  of  the  army,  not 
having  been  made  the  subject  of  statutory  regulation,  is  determined  by  the 
order  of  assignment.  It  has  been  habitually  composed  of  the  aggregate  of 
the  several  territorial  commands  that  have  been  or  may  be  created  by  the 
President.  The  military  establishment  is  under  orders  of  the  commanding 
general  of  the  army  in  that  which  pertains  to  its  discipline  and  military  con 
trol.  The  fiscal  affairs  of  the  army  are  conducted  by  the  secretary  of  war 
through  the  several  staff  departments.  .  (Par.  187,  A.  R.,  1895.) 

"All  orders  and  instructions  from  the  President  or  secretary  of  war  relat 
ing  to  military  operations  or  affecting  the  military  control  and  discipline  of 
the  army  will  be  promulgated  through  the  commanding  general.  (Par.  188, 
A.  R.,  1895.)" 

Lieutenant-General  Schofield,  who  has  probably  had  as  much  experience 
and  given  the  question  as  much  thought  as  any  one  in  our  country,  says  in 
substance : 

"Recent  experience  has  served  to  confirm  all  the  results  of  my  lifelong 
study  and  large  experiences  that  the  proper  position  for  the  senior  officer  of 
the  army  on  duty  at  Washington  is  not  that  of  the  commanding  general,  a 
position  which  is  practically  impossible,  but  that  of  commander-in-chief, 
which  means,  in  tact,  chief  of  staff  to  the  President.  The  title  of  general-in- 


REVIEW    OF    THE    WAR.  74, 

chief  was  a  permanent  one  during  the  entire  history  of  the  country  up  to  the 
time  when  General  Grant  became  lieutenant-general. 

"When  I  became  commanding  general  I  addressed  to  the  President  a 
letter  in  which  I  pointed  out  to  him  what  had  been  the  result  of  my  study  and 
experience,  and  saying  that  the  only  way  was  to  abandon  entirely — which  I 
did  during  my  seven  years  of  service — all  pretenses  of  being  the  commanding 
general,  and  to  content  myself  with  acting  as  the  chief  of  staff  of  the  army 
under  the  secretary  of  war  and  the  President.  The  result  was  that  perfect 
harmony  prevailed  during  my  time,  and  I  did  exercise  a  legitimate  influence 
in  command  of  the  army,  this  because  I  did  not  claim  to  exercise  anything 
that  the  law  did  not  give  me. 

"The  President  must  have  the  same  power  of  selection  of  his  general- 
in-chief  as  he  has  of  his  secretary  of  war.  Without  this  there  can  be  no 
guaranty  that  he  will  give,  or  that  the  secretary  of  war  will  place  in  the 
general-in-chief  that  confidence  which  is  necessary  to  perfect  harmony. 

"Neither  the  President  nor  the  secretary  of  war  should  have  in  the 
command  of  the  army  an  officer  who  is  not  working  in  harmony  with 
him." 

The  work  of  General  Corbin  attracts  the  attention  of  the  commissioners. 
His  services  were  of  the  greatest  importance.  He  was  the  engineer  of  order, 
the  fireman  who  kept  the  furnace  roaring,  raised  steam  power,  and  strove 
with  a  giant's  strength  to  subjugate  chaos.  The  report  says  of  him: 

"The  adjutant-general  testifies  that  there  had  not  been  a  deficiency  of  one 
dollar  reported  on  the  part  of  a  volunteer  staff  officer,  and  that  he  wished  to 
make  it  a  matter  of  record  that  in  the  distribution  of  many  millions  of  dollars 
during  this  war  there  was  yet  to  be  made  the  first  charge  of  defalcation 
against  an  army  officer,  regular  or  volunteer." 

The  remarks  upon  the  War  Department,  referring  directly  to  the  Secre 
tary  of  War,  are : 

"The  records  of  the  War  Department,  which  have  been  laid  before  us, 
show  that  the  Secretary  of  War  extended  to  all  chiefs  of  bureaus  cordial  and 
full  support,  and  promptly  responded  to  every  proper  demand  made  upon  him 
by  commanding  officers. 

"No  testimony  has  been  presented  showing  intentional  neglect  of  duty  or 
any  attempt  to  serve  personal  interests. 

"The  charges  made  that  the  Secretary  of  War  was  pecuniarily  interested 


74-'  REVIEW    OF    THE    WAR. 

in  contracts,  purchases  and  other  transactions  of  the  War  Department  have 
been  thoroughly  investigated  and  found  baseless.' 

"In  the  judgment  of  the  commission  there  was  lacking  in  the  general 
administration  of  the  War  Department  during  the  continuance  of  the  war 
with  Spain  that  complete  grasp  of  the  situation  which  was  essential  to  the 
highest  efficiency  and  discipline  of  the  army. 

"The  commission  has  refrained  from  criticising  certain  of  the  heads  of 
bureaus  for  not  having  acted  with  foresight  in  preparing  their  various  depart 
ments  for  active  war  before  war  was  declared,  because  it  has  appeared  that 
the  national  defense  fund  provided  by  the  act  of  March  9,  1898,  was  not  made 
available  for  use  except  for  the  navy  and  for  coast  defenses  and  the  expendi 
tures  incident  thereto  until  after  the  declaration  of  war." 

The  commission  has  not  spared  the  weak  places  in  the  War  Department, 
beginning  with  paper  work,  asking  for  the  strengthening  of  the  administra 
tion  by  the  employment  of  retired  officers,  many  of  whom  are  among  the  most 
capable  in  the  country  and  as  well  fitted  in  the  sixties  for  the  higher  responsi 
bilities   and  peiformance  of    the  tasks  of    elucidation    and   the    removal  of 
entanglements  as  the  active  service  officers  between  forty  and  sixty  years  of 
age.     The  sudden  multiplication  of  the  numerical  force  of  the  army  by  ten, 
and  the  requisition   for  supplies  in  the  same  proportion,  the  material  to  be 
discovered  if  not  created,  necessarily  involved  occasional  gorges  in  the  chan 
nels,  such  as  occur  in  rivers  that  are  choked  with  ice  or  timber.     One  of  the 
worst  was  the  gorge  at  Tampa,  and  with  all  the  high  rank  and  gilded  talent 
gathered  there,  the  man  to  clear  the  way  was  not  found,  and  we  hear  from 
the  commanding  general  of  the  army,  himself  present,  that  his  remedy  for 
improper  rations  of  meat  was  to  have  droves  of  cattle  shipped  to  the  seat  of 
war.     If  this  had  been  done  it  would  have  been  necessary  to  have  se.nt  the 
steers  to  Cuba  and  left  the  soldiers  in  Florida  to  overcome  by  perfect  rest  on 
the    sand  the    waste    of    physical    force    by   the  debilitating    atmosphere  of 
the  floral  peninsula.     The  commission  spares  not  the  lack  of  transportation, 
the  nerveless  slump  into  a  bottomless  pit  of  disorder  that  prevented  prompt 
ness  in  embarkation,   reduced  dangerously  the  strength  of  Shafter's  army, 
notified  the  Spaniards  of  our  plans  and  incapacities,  and  nearly  spoiled  the 
expedition,  upon  which  depended  the  grave  decision  whether  we  would  have 
to   wait  for  winter  or   force   the   fighting.      The   commissioners   say  with   a 
moderation  of  language  that  stings  where  epithets  would  be  found  totally 


REVIEW    OF    THE    WAR.  743 

insufficient,  that  "the  condition  of  the  railroad  congestion  during-  the  early 
portion  of  the  time  Tampa  was  occupied  by  troops  seems  unparalleled,  show 
ing  an  almost  inexcusable  lack  of  executive  ability  on  the  part  of  those  charged 
with  the  loading,  unloading  and  handling  of  the  trains." 

It  is  the  judgment  of  the  commissioners  that  ships  should  have  been 
"seized,"  because  when  the  transports  had  been  assembled,  supposed  to  be 
equal  to  carrying  25,000  men,  it  was  found  that  their  capacity  had  been  largely 
overrated,  and  it  was  impossible  to  carry  on  them,  without  great  discomfort 
and  danger,  more  than  16,000  men,  with  their  equipments,  artillery,  ammuni 
tion,  subsistence,  medical  supplies,  and  2,295  animals,  for  a  voyage  of  1,000 
miles.  It  is  not,  however,  even  hinted  by  the  commission  that  a  fleet  ought  to 
have  been  impressed  to  bear  burdens  of  living  beef  to  be  cast  ashore  as  wanted 
by  the  army!  The  following  from  the  commissioners'  report  is  full  of  phrases 
that  imply  more  than  they  express: 

"In  spite  of  the  efforts  of  the  quartermaster's  department,  many  of  these 
vessels  were  poorly  equipped  with  speeding  accommodations;  the  sinks  in 
many  instances  were  inconvenient  and  insufficient,  and  some  of  the  vessels 
were  badly  ventilated  and  filled  with  disagreeable  odors.  It  has  been  stated 
that  had  the  fleet  encountered  a  severe  storm  while  en  route  for  Cuba  the  dis 
comfort  would  have  been  intense,  and  there  might  have  been  loss  of  life. 

"The  quartermaster's  department  ought  to  have  been  able  to  more 
thoroughly  equip  these  vessels,  and  surely  it  should  have  been  more  certain  of 
their  carrying  capacity. 

"It  has  been  noticed  that  the  shi-ps  were  not  loaded  systematically,  as  for 
example,  a  battery  with  its  guns  and  horses  would  be  placed  on  one  vessel, 
and  its  ammunition  on  another.  The  Second,  Seventh  and  Seventeenth 
Regular  Infantry  were  each  divided  up,  and  portions  in  each  case  sent  on 
three  different  vessels." 

The  expedition  was  detained  until,  if  we  had  been  opposed  by  a  keen  and 
enterprising  enemy,  we  could  hardly  have  escaped  the  misfortunes  so  con 
spicuously  invited.  The  horrible  bungling  extended  to  the  handling  of  the 
medical  supplies,  and  yet  in  that  department,  in  spite  of  manifest  omissions, 
"a  vast  deal  of  good  work  was  done  by  medical  officers,  high  and  low,  regular 
and  volunteer,  and  there  were  unusually  few  deaths  among  the  wounded  and 
sick."  At  last  Shafter  sailed,  got  away  from  the  sphere  of  false  and  foolish 
rumor,  Spanish  war  ships  flitting  like  the  Flying  Dutchman,  and  the  stcair. 


744  REVIEW    OF    THE    WAR. 

launches  and  lighters  to  land  the  troops  and  stores,  frightfully  deficient  at 
the  start,  lost  by  the  way.  The  commission  points  to  the  facts  at  the  bottom 
of  the  muddy  pool  in  this  trenchant  paragraph: 

"That  the  shortcomings  in  administration  and  operation  may  justly  be 
attributed,  in  large  measure,  to  the  hurry  and  confusion  incident  to  the 
assembling  of  an  army  of  untrained  officers  and  men,  ten  times  larger  than 
before,  for  which  no  preparation  in  advance  had  been  or  could  be  made, 
because  of  existing  rules  and  regulations." 

If  Captain-General  Blanco  had  been  a  man  of  aptitudes  and  initiative 
equal  to  decisions  in  a  few  hours,  and  to  stimulating  the  disturbance  of  the 
sullen  lethargy  of  his  countrymen,  and  had  possessed  the  quality  of  illu 
mination  from  his  own  brain,  he  would  have  acted  upon  the  safe  presump 
tion  that  Santiago  was  the  objective  point  of  the  American  army.  The  move 
ment  of  our  war  ships  had  revealed  that  to  the  observant,  and  he  should  have 
hurried  his  best  troops  to  the  rescue,  and  seen  to  it  that  the  landing  of 
Shafter's  army  was  resisted  to  the  last  extremity  of  the  defenders.  That  was 
the  Spaniards'  chance.  Such  a  policy  would  have  given  the  army  tumbled 
upon  unfit  vessels  infinite  trouble,  and  made  the  advance  upon  the  land 
defenses  of  Santiago  for  some  time  impossible.  We  owe  a  great  debt  to  the 
stolidity  that  amounts  often  to  stupidity  in  the  Spanish  commanders.  The 
quality  of  Spaniards  who  wait  to  be  attacked,  if  there  are  officers  who  stay 
with  the  men  when  the  fire  storms  beat  upon  them,  is,  as  our  troops  found  on 
the  Santiago  hills,  as  good  as  that  the  infantry  of  Spain  celebrated  in  the 
middle  ages.  The  march  of  Escario's  -column  that  reached  Santiago  a  few 
hours  too  late  makes  known  that  if  the  young  Spaniards  are  bravely  led  they 
will  go  far,  clearing"  their  way  through  ambuscades  swarming  with  sharp 
shooters.  The  manifestations  of  the  manliness  of  the  Peninsulars  mean  that 
there  is  still  hope  for  Spain  in  her  people. 

As  soon  as  we  have  a  congress  elevated  to  the  understanding  of  the 
economy  in  the  efficiency  of  the  army  as  well  as  of  the  navy,  and  the  necessity 
of  preparation  for  war  in  time  of  peace,  it  will  appear  in  the  halls  of  national 
legislation  that  the  work  of  the  commission  of  investigation  of  the  conduct  of 
the  War  Department  during  the  war  is  a  document  of  extraordinary  nature, 
full  of  information  that  should  be  the  basis  of  reforms  that  will  amount  to 
reconstruction.  The  time  will  certainly  come  when  this  will  be  done,  and  the 
longer  the  delay  the  greater  price  we  must  pay  for  the  indispensable  re  forma- 


REVIEW    OF    THE    WAR.  745 

tion.  In  one  matter  the  commission  does  not  seem  to  have  been  as  incisive, 
critical  and  certain  in  its  work,  or  as  comprehensive  and  accurate  in  its  sug 
gestions  as  in  general.  We  refer  to  the  "embalmed  beef."  There  must 
have  been  present  in  the  minds  of  the  commissioners  on  that  subject  a  con 
sciousness  of  the  prejudiced  motives  and  questionable  methods  of  the  accusers, 
in  regard  to  the  "roast  beef"  thrown  upon  the  army  and  thrown  into  the  sea, 
that  imparted  a  certain  reluctance  to  say  anything  that  would  palliate  the 
impropriety  apparent  in  the  noisy  aggressiveness  that  sought  to  inflict  per 
sonal  injuries  and  promoted  reckless  exaggerations,  detrimental  to  the  public 
service  and  hostile  to  a  great  American  industry,  thereby  giving  aid  and  com 
fort  to  factions  at  home  that  cannot  be  respected  as  animated  by  sincerities, 
and  enemies  abroad  of  our  export  commerce,  or  those  careless  of  hurting 
business  reputation.  The  cautiousness  of  this  temperament  of  care  in  the 
commission  is  to  be  accepted  as  far  as  it  goes,  but  the  expression  following 
does  not  cover  the  case : 

"Many  samples  of  refrigerated  beef  furnished  to  the  army  have  been  sent 
by  the  commission  to  the  chemists  of  the  Agricultural  and  Interior  depart 
ments  for  careful  chemical  examination.  The  result  of  the  analysis  has  been 
reported  to  us  in  twenty-nine  cases,  and  in  no  specimen  examined  has  either 
boric  or  salicylic  acid  or  other  deleterious  chemicals  been  found.  In  view  o£ 
the  facts  set  forth,  the  commission  is  of  the  opinion  that  no  refrigerated  beef 
furnished  by  contractors  and  issued  to  the  troops  during  the  war  with  Spain 
was  subjected  to  or  treated  with  any  chemicals  by  the  contractors  or  those  in 
their  employ."  The  veracity  of  this  statement  is  not  to  be  questioned,  for  it 
has  obviously  limitations  of  applications,  but  that  it  is  misleading  is  shown  in 
the  headline  under  which  it  appears  in  a  reputable  journal — this: 

"WAR    COMMISSION    HOLDS    ARMY    REFRIGERATED    BEEF    TO 

BE  PURE." 

The  word  "pure"  should  be  more  carefully  guarded,  and  held  too  precious  for 
doubtful  employment. 

The  commission  says  of  the  canned  beef:  "Occasionally  an  inferior 
article  was  found.  But  the  records  of  the  army  prove  that  canned  beef  has 
been  used  for  many  years."  The  commissioners  attempted  to  confine  them 
selves  in  the  public  regard  to  their  actual  and  not  constructive  findings  in 
these  terms:  "In  considering  questions  concerning  canned  meats  it  is  not  the 


746  REVIEW    OF    THE    WAR. 

duty  of  the  commission  to  inquire  into  the  character,  kind  or  condition  of  the 
canned  meats  that  may  be  in  use  in  this  country.  Our  specific  duty  is  to 
give  an  opinion  as  to  the  quality  of  those  furnished  the  soldiers  during  th 
recent  war  with  Spain."  Delicacies  of  distinction  are  not,  however,  a  notice 
able  feature  in  the  work  of  the  press,  exploited  with  the  headlining  that  adver 
tises  news  highly  seasoned,  and  presented  in  a  style  believed  to  be  alluring, 
and  certainly  for  sale.  A  letter  is  presented  showing  that  the  boiled  or  roast 
canned  meat  question  was  not  up  in  the  army  during  the  Spanish  war  for  the 
first  time.  The  date  is  October  18,  1897,  and  the  document  as  follows: 

War  Department,  Adjutant-General's  Office, 

Washington,  D.  C.,  Oct.  19,  1897. 
W.  Clarke  Marshall,  Produce  Exchange,  6646  Wentworth  Ave.,  Chicago. 

Sir:  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  communication 
of  the  1 9th  ultimo  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  giving  information  regarding  the 
proper  food  to  be  taken  to  the  sufferers  in  Alaska,  and  also  for  the  subsistence 
of  the  troops  there,  and  ascribing  the  sickness  in  that  locality  to  the  use  of 
salt  meats,  and  in  reply  thereto  the  Secretary  of  War  desires  me  to  call  atten 
tion  to  the  following  remarks  of  the  Medical  Department  of  the  army,  in 
which  the  major-general  commanding  the  army  concurs: 

<4  Canned  meats  put  up  by  reputable  firms  are  wholesome  and  have  the 
full  nutritive  value  of  the  meat  contents,  and  in  the  absence  of  fresh  meat  are 
to  be  preferred  to  any  of  the  three  substitutes  suggested  by  the  writer.  Meat, 
when  salted,  loses  a  certain  proportion  of  its  albuminoids  and  extractives,  but 
what  remains  is  valuable  as  food,  and  has  no  specific  influence  in  the  produc 
tion  of  scurvy.  With  hard  bread,  bacon,  pea  meal,  and  an  occasional  issue  of 
fresh  beef,  or  in  its  absence  canned  meat,  a  dietary  of  a.  satisfactory  force 
value  can  be  provided.  To  these  there  should  be  added  for  the  prevention  of 
scurvy  occasional  issues  of  potatoes,  onions  or  canned  vegetables,  or  in  their 
unavoidable  absence,  dessicated  vegetables  and  dried  fruit." 

Very  respectfully, 

W.  H.  CARTER, 
Assistant  Adjutant-General. 

All  the  above  in  quotation  is  the  indorsement  upon  the  letter  of  Mr. 
Marshall,  signed  by  C.  Smart,  deputy  surgeon-general,  U.  S.  A.  The 
indorsement  of  the  major-general  commanding  is  in  the  following  words: 


REVIEW    OF    THE    WAR.  747 

Headquarters  of  the  Army,  Washington,  D.  C.,  Oct.,  18,  1897. 
The  major-general  commanding  concurs  in  the  remarks  of  the  deputy 
surgeon-general,  fourth  indorsement.  J.  C.  GILMORE, 

Assistant  Adjutant-General. 

The  ''major-general  commanding"  here  referred  to  is  Major-General 
Nelson  A.  Miles. 

The  commission  reports: 

"On  the  2ist  day  of  December  last  Major-General  Nelson  A.  Miles,  upon 
the  written  request  of  the  president  of  this  commission,  appeared  before  it. 
He  refused  to  be  sworn,  as  all  other  witnesses  had  been  except  one,  who 
affirmed,  stating  that  he  would  make  his  statements  without  being  sworn  and 
was  responsible  for  what  he  said.  He  proceeded,  and  for  the  first  time  in  the 
history  of  this  investigation  the  allegation  was  made  that  refrigerated  beef 
issued  to  the  troops  had  been  chemically  treated. 

"In  the  statement,  revised  by  himself,  General  Miles  said: 

"  'There  was  sent  to  Porto- Rico  337  tons  of  what  is  known  as  so-called 
refrigerated  beef,  which  you  might  call  embalmed  beef. ' 

"He  proceeded  to  read  a  communication  from  Dr.  W.  H.  Daly,  major  and 
chief  surgeon,  United  States  volunteers,  on  his  staff,  bearing  date  of  Septem 
ber  21,  1898,  wherein  Dr.  Daly  stated  that: 

"  'In  several  inspections  I  made  in  the  various  camps  and  troopships  at 
Tampa,  Jacksonville,  Chickamauga  and  Porto  Rico,  I  found  the  fresh  beef  to 
be  apparently  preserved  with  secret  chemicals,  which  destroy  its  natural 
flavor,  and  which  I  also  believe  to  be  detrimental  to  the  health  of  the  troops. ' 

"Although  Dr.  Daly  swears  that  he  informed  General  Miles  about  the  ist 
of  August,  1898,  that  he  suspected  that  the  refrigerated  beef  was  chemically 
treated,  it  does  not  appear  that  the  general  informed  the  War  Department  that 
an  officer  of  his  staff  had  made  this  discovery,  nor  does  it  appear  that  he  at 
the  time  ordered  any  of  the  officers  under  his  command  to  probe  to  the  bottom 
an  allegation  which,  if  true,  concerned  the  health  of  275,000  soldiers  of  the 
United  States.  It  appears  from  the  report  of  Dr.  Daly,  which  he  handed  to 
General  Miles  October  21  last,  that  he  then  specifically  stated  that  the  refriger 
ated  beef  furnished  to  the  troops  was  'apparently  chemically  treated.' 

"It  does  not  appear  that  when  this  charge  was  made,  October  21,  it  hav 
ing  been  already  made  to  him  in  August,  1898,  that  General  Miles  communi- 


74*  REVIEW    OF    THE    WAR. 

cated  to  you  or  the  Secretary  of  War  or  to  the  commissary  general  the  belief 
or  suspicion  entertained  by  him  that  refrigerated  meat,  dangerous  to  health, 
was  issued  every  day  to  the  troops,  in  failure  to  do  which  there  was  dereliction 
of  duty.  It  is  true  that  on  September  20  he  had  directed  that  an  order  should 
be  issued  asking  for  reports  relative  to  meats  issued,  but  the  order  specifically 
mentions  'canned  fresh  roast  beef,'  and  nothing  else,  and  it  was  the  reports 
received  in  answer  to  this  that  were  presented  in  abstract  by  the  general  at 
the  time  of  his  appearance  before  the  commission  and  since. 

4 'In  his  report  Dr.  Daly  does  not  make  the  all-important  statement  that 
he  had  already  chemically  analyzed  any  meat,  although  he  suggests  that  such 
analysis  should  be  made.  He  does  state  that  in  the  several  inspections  made 
by  him  at  Tampa,  Jacksonville,  Chickamauga  and  Porto  Rico  he  'found  the 
fresh  beef  to  be  apparently  preserved  with  secret  chemicals.'  He  said  that  at 
Ponce  the  beef  he  examined  'was  also  of  the  same  character,  being  appar 
ently  preserved  by  injected  chemicals.' 

"For  months,  as  it  appears,  Dr.  Daly  concealed  the  commission  of  a  crime 
affecting  men  under  his  charge,  whom,  as  an  officer  and  a  physician,  he  was 
bound  to  protect." 

After  setting  forth  in  full  force  the  miscellany  of  mistakes  and  the  genius 
displayed  for  blunders  so  gross  as  to  add  an  additional  sense  of  misery  to  the 
lot  of  mankind,  in  the  embarkation  of  the  Shafter  expedition,  the  commission 
states  the  result  that  closed  the  scenes  of  that  decisive  movement,  with  this 
paragraph : 

"The  result  of  the  Santiago  campaign  was  the  complete  realization  of  the 
several  objects  contemplated — the  capture  of  the  city  with  its  fortifications  and 
munitions  of  war,  together  with  immense  supplies  of  foodstuffs  and  ammuni 
tion  (the  former  estimated  by  General  Wood  at  1,200,000  rations) ;  the  sur 
render  of  the  entire  province  of  Santiago  de  Cuba,  with  all  the  troops 
garrisoning  the  same,  amounting,  as  already  stated,  to  between  23,000  and 
24,000;  the  destruction  of  the  navy  of  Admiral  Cervera's  fleet  after  its 
departure  from  the  harbor,  and  general  demoralization  of  the  Spanish  forces 
and  the  discomfiture  of  the  Spanish  government  and  people,  leading  almost 
immediately  to  overtures  for  peace  by  Spain."  There  is  nothing  in  the 
splendid  story  of  American  soldiers  that  exceeds  this,  telling  how  the  valor 
and  fortitude,  the  patience  under  privation  and  hardihood  of  endurance, 
tenacious  of  duty,  overcomes  even  that  solid  but  diversified  stupidity 


REVIEW    OF    THE    WAR.  749 

against  which,   it   is  a   saying  of  ancient   acceptance,  even   the   gods  fight   in 
vain. 

The  commission  reports  in  closing  that  "notwithstanding  the  haste  with 
which  the  nation  entered  upon  the  war  with  Spain,  the  resulting  and  almost 
inevitable  confusion  in  bureau  and  camp,  the  many  difficulties  of  arming, 
assembling  and  transporting  large  bodies  of  hitherto  untrained  men,  the 
carrying  on  of  active  operations  in  two  hemispheres,  the  people  of  the  United 
States  should  ever  be  proud  of  their  soldiers,  who,  cooperating  with  their 
sailors,  in  less  than  three  months  put  an  end  to  Spanish  colonial  power 
enfranchised  oppressed  peoples,  and  taught  the  world  at  large  the  strength 
and  nobility  of  the  republic." 

There  was  taken  in  the  investigation  of  the  varieties  of  beef  prepared 
with  a  view  of  preservation,  statements  that  increased  the  public  feeling  about 
the  wrong  done  soldiers  in  supplying  them  with  food  that  was  unwholesome. 
In  handling  the  subject  there  were  introduced  remarks  supposed  to  be  humor 
ous,  to  the  effect  that  the  rregular  soldiers  were  so  accustomed  to  imperfec 
tions  in  rations  that  their  stomachs  were  prepared  for  anything,  and  there 
were  jocose  imputations  that  the  volunteers  would,  as  they  became  veterans, 
cease  to  strive  against  the  diet  demanded  by  the  "paper  work"  that  is  obstruc 
tive  and  establishes  conditions  of  famine  in  a  land  of  plenty  and  the  midst  of 
abundance.  The  complaints  of  soldiers  that  were  not  fairly  dealt  with  were 
very  often  put  in  this  effective  way:  "We  know  that  Uncle  Sam  pays  for  the 
things  we  ought  to  have,  but  that  there  is  a  way  of  getting  the" freight  cars  on 
the  side  track  as  at  Tampa,  and  sailing  away  without  the  necessaries  of  life." 
There  will  sometime  be  traced  to  the  investigation  of  the  conduct  of  the  War 
Department  in  war,  and  the  report  of  the  commission,  the  existence  of  laws 
and  regulations  promoting  the  welfare  of  our  citizens  who  bear  arms  for  the 
country.  The  commission  does  not  state  along  with  the  notice  of  the  use  of 
canned  beef  in  Alaska,  commended  on  the  authority  of  General  Miles,  notice 
of  the  decisive  distinction  between  the  arctic  and  the  tropical  climates.  It 
is  to  be  remembered  there  is  no  great  care  necessary  for  the  preservation  of 
meat  in  Alaska.  There  is  no  trouble  about  refrigeration.  The  northern  end 
of  the  earth  is  extremely  frozen.  It  is  different  in  the  Indies.  It  has  come 
to  pass  that  the  word  "experiment"  as  applied  to  keeping  meat  fresh  is  a 
terror.  Wrhat  "experiment"  with  the  meat  of  the  boys  in  blue,  white 
or  yellow!  One  might  as  well  "experiment  with  the  bread  and  butter 


7so  REVIEW    OF    THE    WAR. 

of  the  people!"  However,  experiments  relate  closely  to  experience,  and 
the  lamps  by  which  wise  men  find  the  paths  of  safety  and  keep  in  them 
are  those  that  have  been  tried,  that  is,  experimented  with.  The  canned  meats 
that  were  good  in  Old  England  and  New  England,  excellent  on  the  European 
continent,  were  "unfit"  in  our  new  possessions  of  the  tropics.  The  fresh 
meat  in  Porto  Rico — the  island  abounds  in  cattle — was  complained  of  because 
it  was  "too  fresh. "  It  had  to  be  eaten  almost  as  soon  as  the  life  was  out  of  the 
carcasses,  or  not  at  all,  for  there  was  no  way  of  cooling  it.  General  Miles  could 
not  take  refrigerator  cars  along  with  him.  In  a  few  hours  after  the  butcher 
had  pursued  his  profession  the  fresh  meat  was  spoiled.  The  way  the  flies 
pitched  upon  it  to  deposit  their  eggs  was  something  surprising.  There  were 
"experiments  with  beef" — awful  as  it  appears  in  the  newspapers,  the  fact  is 
substantially  undeniable — to  cure  it  so  that  it  would  be  "fit"  for  seventy  hours. 
That  was  all  claimed  for  the  stuff  that  at  the  end  of  twenty-four  hours  had  to 
be  turned  into  the  sea.  The  War  Department  did  not  order  it.  General 
Egan  reported  against  it.  If  General  Miles  got  a  whiff  of  it  the  fact  is  with 
out  official  celebration,  or  any  sort  of  good  and  regular  standing.  It  is  not 
surprising  that  there  was  general  confidence  in  the  canned  meat  of  well-known 
brands,  but  that  failed  fast  under  the  tropical  test.  The  notorious  investiga 
tions  into  the  processes  in  this  country  of  canning  meats  will  ultimately  have 
a  favorable  influence  in  marketing  them,  for  there  will  be  no  experiments  of 
preservation  untried,  and  American  manufacturers  will  rise  to  the  occasion  in 
the  canning  of  meats  and  vegetables  good  in  all  climates.  The  people  of  the 
tropics  have  the  advantage  over  us  in  their  habits  of  nourishing  themselves. 
They  are  but  light  consumers  of  meat,  and  a  portion  of  rice,  well  set  up  with 
garlic  and  pepper,  and  a  banana,  is  a  satisfactory  ration.  The  Cubans  and 
Filipinos  want  "hot  stuff"  rather  than  "heavy"  stuff,  and  do  not  find  out  that 
there  is  a  kind  of  both  hot  and  heavy  food.  Americans  in  the  tropics  have 
much  to  learn  in  the  accommodation  of  themselves  to  the  conditions  of  the 
country  so  as  to  be  comfortable.  The  thing  is  not  to  abandon  the  use  of 
meat,  but  to  reduce  the  quantity  of  it  consumed.  One  reason  for  this  is  the 
trouble  in  preservation  of  fresh  meat.  If  there  is  ever  found  a  deep  and 
healthful  solution  of  the  problem  it  must  be  done  by  Americans.  The  beef 
scandals  and  conundrums,  and  the  whole  long  list  of  our  recorded  trials  that 
were  made  sore  by  grievous  errors  that  ought  to  have  been  avoidable,  and  pro 
voking  incapacities — putting  our  armies  into  the  field  and  failing  to  provide  for 


REVIEW    OF    THE    WAR. 


751 


them  before  going  or  to  help  them  there,  as  should  have  been  done  on  behalf 
of  a  great,  liberal  and  loving  people — surely  that  which  has  been  revealed 
will  have  the  respectful  attention  of  the  people  and  of  the  Congress,  and  sub 
stantially  that  which  is  demanded  by  the  distinguished  commission  will  be 
done.  The  army,  regular  or  volunteer,  is  of  the  blood,  brain  and  bone  of  the 
people,  and  is  for  the  people. 


CHAPTER     XXXII. 

The  Occupation  of  Our  New  Possessions. 

The  Spanish  Peninsula  too  Narrow  to  Sustain  the  Crown  System  Over  Continental  Colonies — 
The  Loss  of  Her  Archipelagoes  Has  Been  the  Logic  of  Her  Experiences — Comparative 
Expansion  of  England  and  the  United  States — Our  Magnificent  Growth  across  the  Con 
tinent  the  Greatest  of  National  Triumphs — Our  Arms  Around  the  World — Our  Bugle  Call 
and  British  Drum-Beats,  Following  the  Course  of  the  Sun — The  Whispering  Wires  that 
Unite  the  Nations — The  Malay  Revolt  Against  Liberty  for  Tyranny — The  Ghastly 
Demagogy  that  Meddles  with  the  Army — Pleasing  Prospects  of  Our  Possessions  Except 
the  Philippines — The  Aguinaldo  Conspiracy  and  Tagalo  War — The  Motives  and  Malice  of 
It — American  Arms  without  Stain — Our  Soldiers  without  Reproach. 

The  logic  of  the  war  with  Spain  was  that  we  should  possess  her  American 
colonies  and,  of  course,  occupy  them.  She  had  ceased  for  a  generation  to 
hold  continental  land,  outside  the  western  peninsula  of  Europe,  so  long  con 
tested  by  the  great  tribes  of  adventurous  nations,  of  the  earliest  periods  of 
which  there  are  histories.  The  Carthaginians,  Romans,  Goths,  and  Moors 
successively  were  masters  of  the  extraordinary  resources  of  the  country,  with 
a  charming  climate  and  fertile  valleys,  mountains  rich  in  minerals,  rivers 
romantic  in  story  and  name,  that  became  the  home  of  one  of  the  most  enter 
prising  and  dominating  races  of  men.  The  tragedies  of  Spain  for  two  thou 
sand  years  have  exceeded  even  those  of  Italy.  There  came  to  her  through 
Columbus  the  greatest  of  new  possessions  that  ever  were  grasped  by  any 
people,  the  immeasurably  endowed  Americas.  Columbus  died  neglected  and 
poor,  for  the  greed  of  the  crown  of  Spain,  through  the  viceroys  and  their 
rapacious  followers,  did  not  spare  the  illustrious  discoverer  or  the  inoffensive 
races  that  were  to  have  been  converted  to  Christianity,  but  were  slaughtered 
by  taskmasters.  The  American  colonies  poured  wealth  into  the  Peninsula, 
but  the  system -of  governing  by  the  Crown,  so  that  neither  the  people  of  Spain 
nor  the  natives  of  the  new  land  they  occupied,  had  rights  that  were  respected, 
gave  up  the  priceless  fortunes  conquered  or  inherited,  to  favorites  of  the 
administrators  of  the  affairs  of  the  kingdom,  and  their  cruelty  and  profligacy 

752 


THE    OCCUPATION    OF    OUR     NEW    POSSESSIONS.          753 

prepared  the  way  for  the  horrible  wars  that  established  the  independence  of 
the  Spanish  American  States;  and  Spain  ultimately  gave  far  more  in  gold  and 
blood  for  the  lands  she  ruled  beyond  her  borders  than  she  gained  by  her 
mastery  of  the  most  opulent  portions  of  the  earth.  Before  we  of  the  United 
States  became  greatly  interested  in  the  decline  of  Spain  and  began  to  feel  that 
we  had  duties  and  destinies  involved  in  the  final  break-up  of  her  pretensions  of 
dominion  and  power,  the  American  continents  were  freed  from  her  rule,  and 
her  only  hold  upon  the  mainland  beyond  her  boundaries  between  the  Pyrenees 
and  the  Atlantic  was  a  penal  colony  upon  the  African  shore,  near  Gibraltar. 
She  still  held  several  archipelagoes,  the  Balearic,  Canary,  Philippine,  Caroline 
and  Ladrone  islands,  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico. 

If  the  war  had  lasted  another  hundred  days,  the  Americans  would  have 
taken  all  the  Spanish  islands,  those  European  and  African  as  well  as  Ameri 
can  and  Asiatic.  The  beautiful  groups  in  the  Mediterranean  and  the  Atlantic, 
off  the  coast  of  Africa,  would  have  been  possessions  for  our  people,  stripping 
Spain  down  to  the  bones  of  the  old  Peninsula.  The  fate  of  the  Spanish  colo. 
nies  is  not  quotable  as  an  example  for  nations  holding  lands  abroad,  for  it  is 
not  to  be  assumed  that  any  of  them,  the  United  States  least  of  all,  would  in  a 
system  of  administration  exclude  the  people,  both  at  home  and  abroad,  from 
all  rights  the  officials  of  the  government  and  their  classified  assistants  need 
regard.  Spain  of  old  was  too  narrow  a  basis,  both  in  land  and  people,  to  sup 
port  a  colonial  expansion  that  included  continents.  The  wonder  is  that  this 
pyramid  on  its  apex  stood  so  long.  If  we  had  confined  our  republic  to  the 
Atlantic  tide-water  region,  from  South  Carolina  to  Massachusetts,  and  had 
undertaken  to  colonize  Africa  and  Australia,  the  popular  contention  might 
well  have  been  that  we  were  attempting  a  task  beyond  our  strength.  We 
have  done  a  greater  work  of  expansion  that  any  other  nation  has  accomplished 
— in  our  increase  from  the  original  thirteen  colonies  of  England  to  the  repub 
lic  that  does  what  no  other  power  can  boast — occupies  the  whole  breadth  of  the 
American  continent  between  the  greater  oceans  of  the  globe.  If  there  are 
exceptions,  we  name  Mexico  and  Canada,  and  they  hardly,  extensive  and 
respectable  as  they  are,  can  be  classed  with  us.  We  have  also  the  entire 
northern  line  of  the  central  sea  of  the  Americas;  and  the  further  we  have 
moved  west,  the  more  rapid  our  growth  has  been  north  and  south.  There 
has  for  some  years  been  a  feeling  among  our  people  who  believe  themselves 
conservative  that  we  were  hasty  in  the  admission  of.  territories  as  states, 


754          THE    OCCUPATION    OF    OUR    NEW    POSSESSIONS. 

because  we  gave  some  thinly  inhabited  regions  disproportionate  power  in  the 
national  Senate.  The  specifications  of  evil  anticipated,  however,  passed  away 
and  the  fact  that  our  states  are  continuous  across  the  continent  must  be  hailed 
as  auspicious  because  the  majestic  links  of  statehood  make  an  incomparable 
bond  of  union.  There  is  another  bond  that  has  been  in  full  view  since  we 
assumed  the  responsibility  devolved  upon  us  by  the  victory -of  our  arms  in 
Asiatic  waters — the  sentiment  that  accords  with  a  gigantic  nationality  has  been 
developed  on  both  the  ocean  boundaries  of  the  republic  where  we  find  our 
selves  one  of  the  influences  that  shall  shape  the  future  of  Asia.  That  the  ages 
to  come  will  find  Asiatic  commerce  an  increasing  factor  in  the  progress  of  the 
world  there  is  reason  to  believe.  We  cross -the  Pacific  on  errands  to  our  new 
possessions,  in  less  time  than  our  grandfathers  occupied  in  Atlantic  voyages 
between  America  and  Europe ;  and  while  our  troops  on  the  way  to  Manila  are 
reviewed  on  parade  at  Malta,  our  warships  homeward  bound  through  the 
Mediterranean  exchange  salutes  with  the  remnants  of  the  Spanish  navy, 
where  the  thunder  of  the  guns  of  Trafalgar  was  heard.  The  Pacific  coast 
will  take  on  a  new  growth,  and  the  influence  of  the  states  on  the  Pacific, 
whatever  the  transitory  aberrations  of  miscalculating  men  may  be — the  Pacific 
influence  will  be  for  the  expansion  of  the  foundations  of  our  power  in  Asia. 
No  European  nation,  not  even  England  or  Russia,  is  so  marked  out  for 
domination,  according  to  our  wisdom  of  the  appropriation  of  opportunity,  as 
ourselves.  We  have  three  Pacific  states,  the  immense  territory  of  Alaska, 
the'  Aleutian  Archipelago,  that  stretches  westward  far  along  the  Siberian 
coast,  many  of  the  islands  most  valuable;  and  now,  beyond  all  question,  the 
Hawaiian  group,  a  splendid  acquisition,  a  part  of  the  Ladrones,  and  the 
Philippines,  equal  alone  to  all  the  West  Indies.  We  have  in  these  possessions 
the  potentiality  of  American  civilization  in  contact  with  that 'of  ancient  Asia. 
Marco  Polo  will  be  famous  forever  for  his  stories  of  the  glories  of  Japan,  and 
the  fancy  of  Columbus,  one  of  the  rare  adventurers  whose  imagination 
became  executive,  was  inflamed  by  him  to  sail  westward  in  search  of  the 
Indies.  Yet  he  missed  in  his  estimation  of  the  bulk  of  the  world  the  con 
tinents  and  islands  of  America.  The  West  Indies  were  found  by  ships  whose 
sails  were  filled  with  trade  winds  westward  blowing.  The  Indies  west  are 
eastward,  not  westward,  to  us.  The  East  Indies  were  named  in  the  same 
way,  for  it  was  known  in  the  huge  vagueness  that  wrapped  the  known 
and  the  unknown  in  the  same  clouds  that  south  and  east  of  Asia  were  the 


THE    OCCUPATION    OF    OUR    NEW    POSSESSIONS.  755 

indies.  The  caravans  carried  Indian  stones,  superstitions  and  merchandise 
across  the  Arabian  deserts.  Palmyra  was  a  green  island  in  a  sea  of  sand,  and 
sprung-  from  trade  that  found  a  channel  from  the  further  east.  The  northern 
Italian  cities  grew  from  this  golden  seed  grain,  and  flourished  when  the  prom 
ise  of  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  became  a  gorgeous  realization,  and  then  faded 
because  the  oceans  were  spread  not  to  divide  but  to  unite  the  great  divisions 
of  land.  London  and  Lisbon  profited.  England  took  unto  herself  the  empire 
of  India,  and  bearing  "the  white  man's  burden,"  became  sovereign  of  the 
mighty  waters,  master  of  colossal  shores  and  countless  millions,  feeding  her 
grandeur  with  a  colonial  system  that  made  her  capital  the  greatest  of  cities, 
and  her  trade  the  despair  of  the  nations.  She  was  enriched  by  the  expansion 
that  made  Spain  poor.  The  English  speaking  races  have  gained  the  gift  of 
colonization  that  the  Latin  nations  lost.  The  United  States  waited  long  to 
take  herself  consciously, — and  conspicuously  before  all  spectators,  the  world 
the  stage,  humanity  the  audience, — her  own  high  place  among  the  powers  of 
the  world-wide  affairs,  not  in  a  way  that  was  ostentatious,  but  with  the  simple 
directness  that  is  fitting  for  strength,  the  clear  purpose  power  warrants,  the 
majestical  graciousness  that  an  open,  honorable  purpose  yields  and  wields. 

An  order  was  cabled  two-thirds  of  the  way  around  the  world,  facing  the 
sun  from  Washington,  to  destroy  a  fleet  that  menaced  our  commerce,  and  in  a 
week  the  order  was  obeyed ;  and  that  was  literally  firing  guns  around  the 
world.  Since  that  day  we  have  sent  our  regiments  east  and  west,  steaming 
into  the  morning  skies  from  New  York,  and  into  the  sunsets  from  San  Fran 
cisco.  Our  troopships,  going  opposite  ways,  have  met  in  Manila.  Those  that 
departed  eastward  will  sail  on  until  they  come  home  from  the  west!  This  far 
exceeds  the  British  drumbeat  that  follows  the  sun.  The  American  bugles 
have  been  heard  morning  and  evening  on  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific,  the  Medi 
terranean,  the  Red  Sea,  the  Indian  Ocean  and  the  Sea  of  China.  The  boys 
are  upholding  the  faith  and  honor  of  the  army  and  the  navy,  carrying  the  flag 
of  America,  keeping  step  to  her  lofty  music,  extending  the  beneficence  of 
Americanism,  their  field  that  of  the  apostles, — the  world. 

The  campaign  for  suitable  legislation  in  Congress  to  meet  the  changed  rela 
tions  of  the  country  to  the  armed  nations,  was  like  that  at  Santiago  in  the  fact 
it  was  necessary  to  do  a  great  deal  of  arduous  work  within  strict  limitations  of 
time  or  make  costly  sacrifices.  Success  at  Santiago — and  there  was  a  meas 
ure  of  it  there,  striking  in  proportion,  for  there  were  many  chances  of  failure 


756 


THE    OCCUPATION    OF    OUR    NEW    POSSESSIONS. 


— the  American  victory  at  the  critical  point  and  certain  crisis  of  the  war, 
depended  upon  the  things  that  must  be  done  in  sharply  defined  hours,  or 
disastrous  expenditure  of  life  and  treasure  would  have  been  demanded,  in 
addition  to  that  which  sufficed.  Congress  expired  on  the  4th  of  March.  It 
was  important  not  to  have  that  body  convened  in  extra  session.  A  fashion  of 
extra  sessions  is  to  be  deprecated, "because  the  industrially  productive  people 
need  intervals  of  repose  from  heated  terms  of  politics,  when  the  National  cap 
ital  should  be  the  scene  rather  of  executive  labor  than  legislative  agitation. 
The  President  was  bound  by  his  convictions  of  what  the  public  prosperity  de 
manded,  to  call  an  extra  session,  a  fortnight  after  his  inauguration,  of  the  Con 
gress,  whose  house  was  elected  on  the  same  day  with  his  own  popular  election. 
There  were  decisive  reasons  why  it  was  undesirable  to  follow  the  precedent 
with  the  second  Congress  of  his  term.  The  protracted  debates  on  the  ratifica 
tion  by  the  Senate  of  the  treaty  with  Spain  were  injurious  in  the  mere  matter 
of  time  lost,  and  yet  more  unfortunate  because  the  nature  of  the  discussion 
raised  doubts  even  among  enlightened  peoples,  as  to  the  stability  of  the  pur 
pose  of  the  government  of  the  United  States  in  regard  to  the  new  posses 
sions,  while  the  Tagalo  conspirators  were  encouraged  to  believe  that  if  they 
made  war  upon  our  troops  we  would  be  persuaded  that  the  government  of  the 
Philippines  should  be  turned  over  from  the  Spaniards  to  the  martial  law  of 
Tagalo  tyrants,  burning  to  be  more  desperate  and  destructive,  avaricious  and 
violently  oppressive,  than  the  Spaniards.  The  world  is  a  neighborhood  of 
nations,  and  a  whispering  gallery  over  wires.  Dr.  Rizal,  the  ablest  and  most 
cultivated  of  Filipino  writers,  prepared  in  the  form  of  a  short  story  a  tale  of 
the  telephone,  the  leading  idea  of  which  was  that  long-distance  telephonic 
communication  was  established  between  Madrid  and  Manila  and  so  perfected 
that  the  priests  in  the  two  cities  talked  with  facility,  and  the  Spanish  priests 
at  home  were  wretched  to  find  that  the  friars  in  Luzon  were  so  unworthy,  and 
it  was  decided  by  the  priests  of  Spain  they  should  fast  and  pray  for  their 
brethren  at  the  other  end  of  the  wire  that  carried  their  voices  on  wings  of  fire. 
The  representatives  of  the  Tagalos  were  free,  while  in  Paris  in  attendance  on 
the  treaty  commission,  to  cable  by  way  of  Hongkong  whatever  representations 
they  saw  fit  of  the  attitude  of  the  Americans.  There  have  been  for  several 
years  centers  of  Philippine  hostility  to  Spain  in  Paris  and  Hongkong,  and 
some  of  those  finding  employment  in  planning  revolution  had  a  good  deal  of 
money,  were  liberally  educated,  and  employed  the  cables.  When  the  Treaty 


THE    OCCUPATION    OF    OUR    NEW    POSSESSIONS.  757 

of  Peace  was- signed  at  Paris  the  Filipino  commissioner  appeared  in  Wash 
ington,  and  of  course  was  still  using  cables  to  inform  Aguinaldo  by  way  of 
private  Hongkong  messages;  and  if  the  matter  sent  was  not  too  flagrant  and 
vicious  it  passed  direct  through  Manila  to  the  eastward  station  where  the 
committee  that  they  call  an  assembly  met.  That  Agoncillo  overestimated  the 
influence  of  the  Americans  opposed  to  our  ratification  of  the  Spanish  treaty, 
and  regarded  their  utterances  as  an  appeal  to  the  Filipino  army  to  take  the 
offensive,  and  destroy  the  steadfastness  of  the  American  people,  so  that  con 
gressional  and  other  incendiary  talk  fanned  the  embers  into  a  flame  to  be 
quenched  in  blood,  is  an  unexaggerated  statement  of  indisputable  fact.  The 
most  serious  and  incurable  difficulty  that  besets  us  when  we  are  anxious  to 
make  peace  with  the  swarming  Tagalos  is  that  they  have  no  comprehension  of 
our  solicitude  for  pacification,  other  than  that  we  are  preparing  the  way  for 
our  submission  to  them.  That  is  precisely  the  way  the  paths  to  peace  are 
obstructed.  The  very  proclamations  that  the  President  meant  to  give  assur 
ances  of  the  purpose  of  our  government  to  deal  liberally  and  generously  with 
the  Philippines,  and  the  orders  issued  by  General  Otis  pursuant  to  the  advices 
he  received  of  the  eminently  pacific  disposition  of  the  American  government, 
excited  the  Tagalos,  and  influenced  them,  just  because  the  President 
announced  his  sense  of  responsibility,  and  thereby  presumed  to  question  the 
dictatorship  of  Aguinaldo.  Further,  the  Filipinos  were  persuaded  that  they 
had  only  to  strike  a  blow  at  our  army  to  disturb  the  peace  of  this  country. 
The  President  had  shown  anxiety  to  avoid  bloodshed,  and  while  the  insurgents 
were  intrenching  themselves  and  mounting  guns  to  enfilade  our  lines,  our 
sentinels  were  subjected  to  the  grossest  insults  and  taunted  night  and  day. 
This  aggressive  effrontery  continued  until  the  attack  was  made  in  force,  and 
then  the  Tagalos  got  a  lesson  that  was  a  surprise  to  them.  They  had  been 
accustomed  when  they  thought  they  were  besieging  Manila,  to  open  fire  for  a 
few  hours,  and  then  to  rest,  regarding  the  proceeding  heroic  and  to  be 
resumed  at  pleasure.  The  Americans  rushed  for  them,  and  put  them  to  flight 
and  slaughter.  The  result  of  the  effervescence  of  factions  in  our  Congress  and 
country  after  the  war  was  over  except  in  a  legal  sense,  was  to  furnish  fire  for 
the  fuel  accumulated  with  false  pretenses  by  the  Tagalos,  and  substitute  a  war 
with  the  Filipinos  for  that  with  the  Spaniards,  and  at  the  same  time  cut  down 
and  put  aside  the  army  bills,  thus  encouraging  Indian  disorders,  and  other 
manifestations  of  hatred  and  contempt  for  the  authorities.  It  was  possible, 


758  THE    OCCUPATION    OF    OUR    NEW    POSSESSIONS. 

however,  to  save  for  a  time  the  regular  army  as  it  is  and  give  to  the  discretion 
of  the  President  power  to  raise  troops  enough,  as  appeared  to  Congress,  to  act 
on  the  defensive,  until  the  law-making  power  should  come  together  in  regular 
session  or  be  called  by  the  President,  if  that  seemed  the  lesser  evil.  Congress 
was  good  enough  to  provide  for  an  ad  interim  army.  The  President  was  not 
commanded — that  is,  not  yet — to  throw  away  the  weapons  the  constitution 
placed  in  his  hands.  There  is  hardly  enough  of  the  army  to  take  care  of  the 
military  property  accumulated  in  the  fortifications  and  camps,  seaside  and 
other,  and  thinly  occupy  our  vast  possessions  so  that  the  peace  and  dignity  of 
the  United  States  may  not  be  unfavorably  affected.  Fortunately  the  military 
arm  of  the  nation  does  not  need  to  be  strongly  displayed  in  Porto  Rico  and 
Hawaii,  and  it  is  a  coincidence  that  the  absence  of  insurgents  is  in  precisely 
those  places  in  which  our  authority  is  not  limited  as  to  time.  Porto  Rico  has 
been  ceded  to  us,  the  schools  opening  under  the  American  flag,  the  people 
shouting  in  joyous  response  to  the  salutes  with  which  the  flag  was  received, 
and  the  band  played  the  Star  Spangled  Banner.  We  annexed  Hawaii  in  spite  of 
the  outcries  of  those  who  had  profited  by  the  occupation  of  the  monarchy  that 
was  surrounded  by  as  many  rings  as  Jupiter  has  moons.  A  ship  of  war  or 
two  and  a  few  companies  of  regulars  are  enough  to  keep  order  there.  The 
people  accept  it  as  a  fact,  as  it  is,  that  the  annexation  is  irrevocable.  The 
way  to  cause  disturbance  is  to  question  that  fact,  but  it  will  not  be  questioned 
any  more  until  the  army  submits  to  the  mob.  It  will  be  the  duty  of  Congress 
to  make  liberal  appropriations  for  the  equipment  of  the  old  forts  at  the  prin 
cipal  ports  of  Porto  Rico,  with  modern  artillery, — and  as  the  naval  officers 
agree  that  the  eight  and  ten  inch  guns  are  great  enough  for  battleships,  and 
that  the  five-inch  and  small  rapid-fire  artillery  are  the  most  serviceable  afloat, 
we  will  have  and  to  spare  a  splendid  assortment  of  our  eleven,  twelve  and 
thirteen  inch  thunderers  to  mount  ashore.  Porto  Rico,  the  Pacific  coast  and 
Hawaii  should  absorb  them.  In  Cuba  we  were  fortunate  not  to  open  the 
war  with  Spain  by  accepting  as  fact  the  Key  West  fiction  about  the  repub 
lic  of  Cuba.  That  wonderful  oganization  was  apparently  gotten  up  expressly 
for  the  issue  of  bonds  and  postage  stamps.  There  was  a  coast-guard  and 
postal  system,  also  a  capital  city,  and  an  army,  accounts  of  which  reminded 
one  of  that  described  in  the  alliteration,  "An  Austrian  army  awfully  arrayed. " 
The  American  statesmen  who  have  used  Cuba  as  a  live  coal  on  their  brains, 
thought  it  important  to  have  the  republic  recognized  to  assist  in  placing  loans, 


THE    OCCUPATION    OF    OUR    NEW    POSSESSIONS.  759 

take  command  of  our  armies,  and  accept  rations  from  our  hands.  The  Cuban 
Assembly  was  like  that  in  the  Isle  of  Luzon,  representative  of  a  clique,  a 
/action,  a  gang,  not  at  all  of  the  people.  Both  gangs,  that  of  Cuba  and  that 
of  Luzon,  are  representative  only  of  Spanish  misgovernnicnt  and  the  deform 
ities  of  an  administration  by  royal  favorites  for  immigrant  stipendiaries.  In 
the  character  they  asserted  for  themselves,  that  of  representatives  of  the 
people,  they  were  self-evident  impostors.  It  was  held  to  be  high  public  policy 
to  disclaim  ambition  to  annex  Cuba  to  the  United  States,  and  it  seems  prob 
able  the  precaution  of  that  profession  was  wise,  for  it  does  much  to  smooth 
the  way  for  the  final  complete  absorption  of  Cuba  in  the  United  States.  In  no 
other  way  than  by  pursuing  the  path  of  American  reserve,  and  respect  for 
the  orderly  expression  of  the  Cuban  people  when  they  emerged  from  the 
chaos  of  war  and  made  themselves  felt,  could  the  Assembly  have  been  so  dis 
credited  as  it  is  by  its  own  acts.  That  body  was  so  wild  with  folly  as  to  take 
issue  with  the  one  man  whose  power  of  character,  will  and  fame  crush  them 
when  they  charge  him  with  their  own  faults.  They  are  shattered  by  the  col 
lision,  while  their  animosity  inflicted  no  scratch  or  stain  on  the  Cuban  chief. 
The  intelligence  and  high-toned  public  spirit  of  Martinez  Gomez  has  redeemed 
the  faults  of  his  campaigning,  which  was  that  of  fighting  Spaniards  with 
their  own  weapons,  and  burning  the  fairer  places  of  the  island  to  free  it  from 
woes  greater  than  poverty,  of  hopeless  strife  with  corrupt  and  venomous 
oppression.  The  stand  of  Gomez  for  the  freedom  of  the  people  from  false 
debts  was  full  of  the  dignity  of  heroic  devotion,  sympathy  with  those  really 
liberated  and  their  true  liberators,  and  scorn  for  all  who  would  convert  the 
cause  of  the  country  into  a  source  of  profitableness  for  pretenders.  The 
future  of  Cuba  too  largely  depends  upon  this  one-man  power,  for  Gomez  is 
old  and  worn.  The  people  of  the  island  have  acclaimed  him  one  of  them 
selves,  though  a  Dominican,  and  his  leadership  is  one  he  cannot  abdicate,  for 
there  is  no  hand  but  his  to  guide  the  sorely-stricken  Cubans  to  the  peace  of  a 
stable  government  that  the  people  may  voice  their  aspirations  with  authen 
ticity  and  efficacy. 

There  was,  in  the  Congressional  debate  on  the  army  bill  in  association 
with  the  current  events  of  the  Filipino  war,  many  things  said  by  the  opposi 
tion  that  would  be  entirely  deplorable  if  the  standard  of  intelligence  was  that 
of  the  Tagalos,  who  must  be  convinced  that  Americans  are,  in  view  of  the 
warfare  that  engages  their  attention  around  Manila,  about  to  engage  in  a  civil 


;6o  THE    OCCUPATION    OF    OUR    NEW    POSSESSIONS. 

v.  ar  at  home.  One  member  said  war  with  Aguinaldo  could  have  been  avoided 
if  the  President  had  stated  he  was  not  going  to  subjugate  them,  and  this 
congressman  had  "mused  much"  upon  the  "embattled  farmers"  who  "fired 
the  shot  heard  round  the  world,"  and  "wondered  if  there  was  anywhere  out 
along  the  firing  line  around  Manila  a  spot  that  looked  like  Concord  Bridge." 
This  is  a  direct  instigation  of  the  assassination  of  American  soldiers  doing 
their  duty  at  Manila.  This  incident  occurred  when  the  President  cabled 
within  three  weeks  of  the  naval  battle  of  Manila  that  it  would  be  the  duty  of 
the  commander  of  the  American  expedition  to  "publish  a  proclamation 
declaring  that  we  came  not  to  make  war  upon  the  people  of  the  Philippines," 
but  to  "protect  them  in  their  homes,  their  employments  and  in  their  personal 
and  religious  rights."  The  proof  is  perfect  that  Aguinaldo  was  false  and 
malicious,  a  conspirator,  hostile  all  the  while  to  Americans,  seeking  to  deceive 
and  make  use  of  them,  to  help  him  with  his  followers  to  take  the  place  of  the 
Spaniards  as  robbers  of  the  people,  and  tyrants  irresponsible  and  unappeas 
able.  Mr.  Wildman,  consul  at  Hongkong,  wrote  the  State  Department  that 
Aguinaldo  arrived  in  that  city  on  the  day  after  Dewey's  May-day  victory,  and 
added:  "It  was  May  loth  before  I  could  obtain  permission  from  Admiral 
Dewey  to  allow  Aguinaldo  to  go  by  the  U.  S.  steamer  McCulloch. "  It  was 
three  weeks  after  the  battle  when  Aguinaldo  arrived  at  Cavite.  Just  at  this 
time  a  proclamation  was  issued  at  Hongkong  by  the  Philippine  insurgents 
saying:  "Where  you  see  the  American  flag  flying,  assemble.  They  are  our 
redeemers!"  May  20,  Williams,  consul,  wrote:  "General  Aguinaldo  told  me 
to-day  that  his  friends  all  hoped  that  the  Philippines  would  be  held  as  a 
colony  of  the  United  States  of  America."  While  Aguinaldo  was  at  Hong 
kong  his  "compatriots"  there  busied  themselves  getting  up  statements  tender 
ing  their  allegiance  to  the  United  States.  Here  is  an  example: 

To  the  President  of  the  United  States  of  America: 

Claudio  Lopez,  merchant  and  proprietor  and  vice-consul  of  Portugal  at 
Iloilo,  native  of  the  Philippine  Islands,  emigrant  to  this  colony  of  Hongkong 
for  political  causes,  exposes  with  great  consideration : 

Having  known  the  history  and  constitution  of  the  noblest  liberal  and 
rightful  nation  of  the  United  States  of  America,  he,  for  the  present,  adheres 
to  the  Government  in  annexing  his  country,  and  considers  that  it  will  be  for 
him  a  great  honor  to  join  his  country  as  an  additional  star  to  the  always  vie- 


THE    OCCUPATION    OF    OUR    NEW    POSSESSIONS.  761 

torious  flag  of  the  United  States  of  America  and  to  count  him  as  one   of  its 
citizens. 

Hongkong,  9th  May,  1898.  (Signed)  CLAUDIO  LOPEZ. 

This  was  prepared  a  week  after  Aguinaldo's  arrival  at  Hongkong,  when 
the  news  of  Dewey's  victory  had  been  received,  and  a  week  before  he  gave 
permission    for  the  Malay  tribesman,   who  had   accepted   Spanish  money  to 
accept  a  Spanish  peace   for  his  people,  to  take  passage  in  a  United   States 
ship,  return  to  the  country  he  had  left  for  his  country's  good,  as  the  sequel 
shows.     There  was  a  struggle  without  intermission  to  get  the  State  Depart 
ment  and  Admiral   Dewey  to  consent  to  an  alliance  with  Aguinaldo  and  his 
"government."     This  was  persistently  the  policy  of  our  consuls  at  Hong 
kong,  Manila  and  Singapore,  who  were  active  in  the  presumed  management 
of  the  man  who  had  been  deported,   cash  in  hand,  as  the  Spanish  prom 
ised  to  reform  if  he  would  take  his  share  of  the  country  and  go  away.     He 
knew  as  well  then  the  nature  of   the   reforms   of  Spain   as   he   does   now. 
He  was,   until  the  American   admiral  allowed   him  to  appear  at   Cavite,   a 
professor  of  Americanism.     What   he   secured  through   the  intervention   of 
our  consuls  was  to  advertise  himself  under  the  auspices  of  the  United  States 
forces,   and    the    Tagalos    presumed    he  was    running    the    United    States. 
Very  soon  he  became  of  the  opinion  that  it  was  his  mission  to  permit  and 
direct  the  operation  of  our  fleet  and  army,  and  he  has  ever  since  been  violent 
as  an  "ally"  of  the  United  States,  whose  "dictatorship"  was  of  such  a  nature 
he  was  called  upon  to  "order  and  command"  all  manner  of  men.     The  State 
Department  of  the  United  States  several  times  by  cable  and  mailed  letters 
ordered  the  consuls  to  omit  negotiations.     This  was  before  the  war.     When  it 
was  in  the  air  after  the  war,  they  were  "cordial"  with  Aguinaldo  that  they 
might  "influence  him  for  good.  "     He  was  playing  upon  them  a  sinister  game. 
Mr.  Wildman,  however,  had  written  February  22,  1898,  that  the  Spanish  cap 
tain-general  at  Manila  was  asserting  he  had  pacified  the  islands,  so  that  he 
could  return  to  Spain  with  that  to  his  credit,  when  the  truth  was  "certain 
rebel  leaders  were  given  a  cash  bribe  of  §1,650,000  to  consent  to  public  depor 
tation  to  China.     This  bribe  and  deportation  only  multiplied  claimants,  and 
fanned  the  fires  of  discontent."     It  was  Aguinaldo  who  got  the  money.     The 
sort  of  peace  he  secured  was  described  by  his  friend,   Consul  Williams,  in 
these  words:     "On  Friday  morning,  March  25,  a  meeting  of  natives  was  being 


762          THE    OCCUPATION    OF    OUR    NEW    POSSESSIONS. 

held  near  my  consulate  in  Manila,  the  natives  being  unarmed.  The  building 
was  surrounded  by  police  and  military,  the  meeting  broken  up,  twelve  natives 
wantonly  shot  to  death,  several  wounded,  and  sixty-two  taken  prisoners. 
Saturday  morning,  March  26,  the  sixty-two  prisoners  were  marched  in  a  body 
to  the  cemetery  and  shot  to  death,  although  it  was  shown  that  several  were 
chance  passers-by  or  employes  in  ships  adjoining,  not  being  in  attendance  at 
the  meeting."  We  quote  again  from  Mr.  Williams:  "I  was  in  Hongkong 
September,  1897,  when  Aguinaldo  and  his  leaders  arrived  under  contract  with 
the  Spanish  government.  They  waited  until  the  ist  of  November  for  the  pay 
ment  of  the  promised  money  and  the  fulfillment  of  the  promised  reforms. 
Only  $400,000,  Mexican,  was  ever  placed  to  their  credit  in  the  banks."  It 
was  on  the  3d  of  November  Mr.  E.  Agoncillo,  "late  minister  of  foreign  affairs 
in  Aguinaldo's  cabinet,"  tried  to  make  a  secret  bargain  with  the  United 
States  for  arms,  and  was  willing  the  United  States  should  make  some  money. 
"There  has  been  a  systematic  attempt  to  blacken  the  name  of  Aguinaldo  and 
his  cabinet,"  Mr.  Williams  wrote  later,  "on  account  of  the  questionable 
terms  of  their  surrender  to  Spanish  forces  a  year  ago  this  month."  Mr.  Wil 
liams  proceeded  to  argue  that  Aguinaldo  had  not  sold  himself.  This  was  a 
part  of  the  "diplomatic  dealing"  with  the  conspirator  who  was  at  work  to  use 
the  Americans,  civil  and  military,  to  further  his  plan  for  setting  up  a  dictator 
ship.  Aguinaldo  was  like  the  frozen  reptile  in  the  fable,  found  by  a  wood 
man,  and  warmed  before  the  fire,  stung  his  benefactor.  This  preposterous 
Tagalo  serpent  began  to  show  his  fangs  at  an  early  date.  The  first  United 
States  troops,  under  General  Thomas  Anderson,  arrived  at  Manila  to  rein 
force  Dewey  June  3oth,  and  the  second  expedition,  under  General  Green,  July 
22d.  July  28th  Aguinaldo  wrote  Anderson: 

"I  consider  it  my  duty  to  advise  you  of  the  un4esirability  of  disembarking 
North  American  troops  in  the  places  conquered  by  the  Filipinos  from  the 
Spanish,  without  previous  notice  to  this  government,  because,  as  no  formal 
agreement  yet  exists  between  the  two  nations,  the  Philippine  people  might 
consider  the  occupation  of  its  territories  by  North  American  troops  as  a  viola 
tion  of  its  rights. 

"I  comprehend  that  without  the  destruction  of  the  Spanish  squadron  the 
Philippine  revolution  would  not  have  advanced  so  rapidly.  Because  of  this  I 
take  the  liberty  of  indicating  to  your  excellency  the  necessity  that,  before  dis 
embarking,  you  should  communicate  in  writing  to  this  government  the  places 


THE    OCCUPATION    OF    OUR    NEW    POSSESSIONS.  763 

that  are  to  be  occupied  and  also  the  object  of  the  occupation,  that  the  people 
may  be  advised  in  due  form  and  [thus]  prevent  the  commission  of  any  trans 
gression  against  friendship." 

There  could  not  have  been  anything  more  insolent  than  this  imagined, 
but  Aguinaldo  was  soon  able  to  surpass  it,  expressing  astonishment  that 
Americans  wanted  wood,  horses  and  cattle,  and  meant  to  take  them  if  not  sold 
at  a  fair  price.  Presently  the  snaky  conspirator,  who  sought  to  absorb  all  the 
offices  of  tyranny,  claimed  it  as  a  virtue  that  he  had  "permitted"  the  Ameri 
cans  in  Manila  to  obtain  pure  water,  and  he  began  his  openly  aggressive 
course  that  culminated  in  the  war  he  forced.  It  was,  he  held,  a  condescension 
to  say  that  the  Americans  had  hastened  the  revolution  by  destroying  the 
Spanish  fleet!  As  for  himself,  he  and  his  14,000  men,  which  he  represented 
as  37,000,  did  nothing  toward  taking  Manila.  The  American  fleet  silenced 
the  fort  by  the  seashore  that  was  the  key  of  the  city,  and  the  American  col 
umns,  the  line  of  defense  broken,  entered  with  slight  loss.  Then  because  the 
Tagalos  were  not  allowed  to  jointly  occupy  the  place  they  had  not  contributed 
to  conquer,  there  was  the  claim  that  we  had  ill-treated  our  "ally."  The 
President  telegraphed  Admiral  Dewey,  May  26:  "You  must  exercise  discre 
tion  most  fully  in  all  matters,  and  be  governed  according  to  circumstances 
which  you  know  and  we  can  not  know.  You  have  our  confidence  entirely. 
It  is  desirable,  as  far  as  possible  and  consistent  for  your  success  and  safety, 
not  to  have  political  alliances  with  the  insurgents  or  any  faction  in  the  islands 
that  would  incur  liability  to  maintain  their  cause  in  the  future."  This  was  the 
product,  of  course,  of  the  consular  correspondence  which  had  gone  far  in 
sympathy  and  flattery.  The  Admiral  replied : 

"I  thank  the  Department  for  the  expression  of  confidence.  Have  acted 
according  to  the  spirit  of  the  Department's  instructions  therein  from  begin 
ning,  and  I  have  entered  into  no  alliance  with  the  insurgents  or  with  any  fac 
tion.  This  squadron  can  reduce  the  defenses  of  Manila  at  any  moment,  but 
it  is  considered  useless  until  the  arrival  of  sufficient  United  States  forces  to 
retain  possession.  DEWEY.1 

August  isth  Consul  Wildman  telegraphed  State  Department: 
"The  Spanish  consul  received  dispatch  Sunday  ordering  the  surrender  of 
Manila.     Shall  I  offer  to  deliver  personally  and  save  more  delay?     Believe  can 
be  of  service  to  Dewey,  should  Aguinaldo  make  trouble.          WILDMAN." 


764  THE    OCCUPATION    OF    OUR    NEW    POSSESSIONS. 

This  telegram  from  Wildman  was  thus  answered  by  the  Secretary: 
"Spanish  consul  should  deliver  dispatch  in  his  own  way.     Take  no  action 
**especting  Aguinaldo  without  specific  directions  from  this  Department." 

Mr.  Wildman  finally  discovered  that  Aguinaldo,  with  whom  he  had 
labored  hard  and  long,  was  treacherous,  and  wanted  to  take  possession  of  the 
country  and  be  the  reigning  tyrant  vice  the  Spaniards,  and  at  last  in  ignorance 
and  vanity  mistaking  the  character  of  the  American  army  and  people,  made 
war  with  the  swarm  of  deluded  men  of  his  tribe,  not  for  liberty,  but  to  set  up 
a  personal  despotism.  We  have  to  liberate  the  people  of  the  Philippines 
twice,  from  the  Spaniards  and  from  the  Tagalos.  The  American  arms  have 
not  been  tarnished  in  either  conflict,  but  brightened  and  glorified  in  the  same 
good  cause,  keeping  clear  and  shining  on  high,  the  faith  and  honor  of  the 
army  and  navy  of  the  United  States  and  the  absolute  integrity  of  the  national 
government.  It  was  not  possible  to  avoid  the  war  with  a  tribe  of  Malays  who 
answered  generosity  with  resentment,  charity  with  malice,  and  forbearance 
with  vindictiveness.  They  are  not  fighting  for  personal  or  public  rights,  but 
for  a  savage  sovereignty,  that  they  may  spoil  and  slay  for  the  sake  of  robbery 
and  revenge.  No  reproach  rests  upon  Americans  for  their  conduct  at  Manila. 
Under  difficult  circumstances  they  have  been  admirable.  There  has  not  been 
a  day  since  May  i,  1898,  when  they  could  have  left  the  Philippines  with  honor, 
for  they  could  not  provide  for  peace  except  by  force.  The  degradation  of 
submissiveness  suggested — the  abandonment  of  duty  and  decency — it  is 
impossible  to  conceive  of  our  countrymen. 


H  E  E        c  H  A  N  $  E 

•',  BABHEE  ISLANDS 
0 


PHILIPPINE 
ISLANDS. 


Engraved  especially  for  this  pub-    C'Bo; 


lication  from  latest  surveys. 


INDEX. 


PACK 

Abarznza,  Don  Buenaventura 083 

"Abondanar"  and  "Renunciar"  quibble  over  terms 689 

Almodovar,  Duke  of  71-5 

Ambiguity  avoided  in  preparing  Peace  Protocol 7I  i 

American  plenipotentiaries;  their  powers 682 

American  Commissioners  not  offended  by  Spanisn  memorandum  regarding  Indian  rebel 
lions  and  seceding  Southern  States 702 

American  Commissioners  uphold  Merritt 706 

American  Government  accepted  no  Spanish  reservations 719 

American  Secretary  of  State's  correspondence  with  Marshal  Prim 55 

American  Proposal  to  purchase  Cuba 56 

American  Minister  to  Spain 74 

American  appeal  to  European  Powers  proves  inadequate 90 

Americans  not  believed  warlike  by  Spaniards  125 

Americans  arrested  and  charges 137 

American  citizens  of  two  kinds  in  Cuba 198 

American  prisoners  in  Cuba  released 204 

American  eagle  flew  high  on  the  Fourth  of  July 411 

American  troops  had  a  line  "which  was  very  thin" 414 

American  army  receives  grateful  letter  from  defeated  Spaniards  584 

American  army  at  Santiago  small  and  poorly  furnished 489 

Americans'  handsome  behavior  according  to  Cervera 514 

Americans'  occupy  Jamaica  and  Ponce 570 

American  fire  from  fleet  "one  prolonged  thunder" 624 

After  the  May-day  battle  in  Manila  Bay 309 

After  the  fighting  was  over  in  Cuba 581 

Alleged  American  citizens 137 

Administrations,  conservative,  of  Grant,  Cleveland  and  McKinley 194 

Advance  of  the  first  of  July 4^4 

Agoncillo,  Don  Felipe 665 

Aguinaldo  calls  on  Dewey 312 

773 


774  INDEX. 

PAGE 

Aguinaldo  organizes  army  under  protection  of  Dewey's  guns 314 

Aguinaldo,  according  to  Dewey,  unable  to  capture  Manila 314 

Aguinaldo  proclaims  himself  President 318 

Aguinaldo  becomes  aggressive 319 

Aguinaldo  and  General  Merritt 554 

Aguinaldo  described  by  Major  Bell 665 

Aguinaldo,  Baldamero,  Secretary  of  War 665 

Aguinaldo's  treachery 761 

Aguira,  seat  of  Cuban  Government , 188 

Aguirri,  General,  at  Cienfuegos,  is  ordered  by  Blanco  to  congratulate    Cervera  on  his 

victory 44& 

Aguacate  Hill,  where  Cubans  made  a  valiant  stand 661 

Alger,  R.  A.,  Secretary  of  War,  directs  that  graves  be  properly  and  surely  marked 440 

Alger,  General,  urges  Shafter  to  hold  his  own .-. 409 

Alger  urges  joint  action  of  Army  and  Navy 41? 

Alger,  Secretary,  thanked  by  Clara  Barton 583 

Arevella,  Captain,  dentist,  soldier 667 

Annexation  of  Cuba  the  correct  policy no 

Anxiety  for  latest  news  from  Shafter's  headquarters 454 

Army  of  the  United  States  should  have  most  approved  arms 329 

Army  seizes  prizes  in  harbor  claimed  by  Navy 536 

Army  of  the  United  States 630 

Army  corps,  officers  and  men 633 

Arm}'  rifle,  Krag-Jorgensen,  its  excellence 644 

Arellano,  Cayetano  S.,  avowed  annexationist 665 

Art  in  handling  modern  rifle 329 

Artillery  and  its  great  effect 480 

Assaults  believed  to  have  been  impossible  under  modern  conditions 479 

Authorization  of  the  Spanish  Peace  Commissioners 682 

Azpeztequia  fortifies  his  estate 182 

Bombardment  of  American  ports  suggested .*. 103 

Brice,  A.  C.,  Consul  at  Matanzas,  writes  of  starvation 232 

Barker,  Walter  B.,  Consul  of  Sagua  la  Grande,  tells  of  inability  to  grind  sugar  crop 238 

Baranger,  General,  sure  of  Spain's  success 277 

Brumby,  T.  M.,  Lieutenant,  commended  by  Dewey 2S3 

Bombardment  of  San  Juan,  Po:lo  Rico 368 

Blanco  says  withdrawal  of  Cervera's  fleet  would  mean  loss  of  Cuba 434 

Blanco  orders  Cervera  to  land  marines 437 

Blanco  asks  authority  over  Cervera 437 

Blanco  advises  Cervera  when  to  escape 437 

Blanco  orders  Cervera  out  of  harbor v 439 


INDEX.  775 

PAGE 

Blanco  postpones  fleet's  "departure" %  443 

Blanco  orders  Cervera  to  leave 444 

Blanco  advised  by  Cervera  withdrawal  of  his  sailors  would  mean  loss  of  Santiago 445 

Blanco  gives  Cervera  twelve  hours  to  leave  Santiago 445 

Blanco  advised  of  Cervera's  departure  and  loss  of  two  torpedo  boats 445 

Blanco   orders    General   Guirri    at    Cienfuegos    prepare    to    receive    Cervera   and    con 
gratulate  him  on  his  "distinguished  victory" 446 

Blanco  tells  Madrid  fate  of  Cervera's  squadron 447 

Blanco  receives  report  of  Cervera  of  his  capture 447 

Blanco  tries  to  shift  blame  for  Cervera's  defeat 447 

Blanco  advises  Madrid  to  hold  out  against  Americans 448 

Blanco's  tribute  of  admiration  to  Cervera 448 

Blanco  appealed  to  by  Sagasta  for  help  towards  peace  449 

Blanco  has  Madrid's  position  explained  to  him  by  Correa 449 

Blanco  demands  of  Sagasta  continuation  of  the  war  451 

Blanco  cables  Cervera  can't  fight 429 

Blanco  advises  Correa  army  still  wants  to  fight 451 

Breckenridge  on  need  of  regular  officers  among  volunteers .' 387 

Breckenridge,  General}.  C.,  his  military  intelligence 474 

Breckenridge,  and  what  should  be  done  with  the  volunteers 477 

Breckenridge  tells  of  landing,  Daiquiri 478 

Breckenridge's  story  of  the  fighting  at  Santiago  479 

Breckenridge 's  account  of  El  Caney 483 

Breckenridge's  account  of  Cubans  484 

Burss,  Fireman  J.,  wounded  on  Brooklyn  in  fight  with  Cervera  504 

Brooklyn  hit  many  times  504 

Brooklyn  most  dreaded  by  Spaniards 513 

Black  powder  and  its  dangers 483 

Bravery  of  the  Spaniards 484 

Baltimore  struck  five  times 295 

Biddle,  Captain  W.,  U.  S.  M.  C.,  performed  valuable  services 283 

Belief  in  her  navy  accounts  for  Spain's  determination  to  fight 278 

Boker,  Geo.  H.,  Minister  to  Russia,  writes  of  sympathy  there 129 

Burning  of  houses *87 

Bureau  of  Ordnance — additional  guns 6oS 

Bureau  of  Construction  and  Repair,  report  of 614 

Bombardment  by  Sampson  according  to  Santiago  Spaniards  628 

Belief  in  Santiago  that  Cervera  had  escaped 626 

Battleship,  its  supremacy 62? 

Boynton,  General  H.  V.,  on  water  supply  at  Chickamauga  Park 646 

Beef  supplied  army,  and  scandal ^47 


776  INDEX. 

PAGE 

Beef  and  the  truth  about  it 647 

Banquero,  Colonel,  his  bravery  652 

Bustemente,  Captain,  fights  valorously  for  Spain 652 

Bell,  Major  J.  F.,  catalogues  Philippine  leaders 664 

Centennial  Exhibition  and  relations  between  the  two  Governments 54 

dishing,  Caleb,  as  a  newspaper  reader 75 

Cushing's  indictment  of  Spain  and  Spaniards 94 

Gushing,  Caleb,  studies  of  Spanish  character  explained  108 

Cushing's.  Caleb,  state  papers  and  their  importance  114 

Cushing's,  Caleb,  views  as  to  obeying  the  letter  of  his  instructions 124 

Cushing,  Caleb,  put  diplomatic  facts  with  a  lawyer's  impartiality 131 

Carlist  war  made  Europe  slow  to  intervene  in  Cuba 101 

Campos,  Martinez,  negotiates  Peace  of  Zanjon  133 

Campos,  Martinez,  attempts  to  quell  outbreak  of  hostilities  in  1895 133 

Campos,  Martinez,  replaced  by  General  Weyler 134 

Claims  stacked  in  State  Department  and  damages  asked 147 

Conduct  of  Cuban  troops  as  witnessed  by  G.  B.  Rea 165 

Concentration  of  peasantry  described  by  Stephen  Bonsai,  journalist  178 

Camaguey  filled  with  cattle 189 

Consulate  at  Havana 198 

Caldwell,  Ensign  H.  H.,  volunteer,  commended  by  Dewey 288 

Calkins,  Lieutenant  C.  G.,  navigator  of  Olympia,  stood  on  bridge  with  Dewey.     Highly 

commended  by  him 288 

Coghlan,  Captain  J.  B.,  of  the  Raleigh,  on  Manila  victory 293 

Cubans  inferior  to  Filipinos,  according  to  Dewey 314 

Cuban  Government  at  Key  West  657 

Cuban  Government  at  New  York  657 

Cuban  army  on  the  pay-roll  •. 660 

Cuban  question  thrashed  over  during  Ten  Years'  War 109 

Cuban  Republic  at  Key  West  and  New  York  affair no 

Cubans  according  to  General  Breckenridge 484 

Cuban  cavalry  on  the  coast  guard  did  not  muster  in  force 372 

Cuba's  one  great  aid 661 

Cuba  and  her  expenses 696 

Cuba  is  freed 672 

Cuba  should  have  been  ceded  as  Porto  Rico  was 723 

Cuban  debt  related  by  commissioners 695 

"Cuban  War  Emergency  Loan"   696 

Clark,  Captain  C.  E.,  assumes  command  of  Oregon 334 

Clark,  Captain  of  the  Oregon,  warned  of  Cape  de  Verde  fleet 336 

Clark,  Captain,  cables  could  beat  off  and  cripple  Spanish  fleet 336 


INDEX. 


Captain  Clark  at  Rio  de  Janeiro  warns  Captain  in  command  of  the  Brazilian  flagship  that 

he  would  blow  up  Spanish  torpedo  boat  in  the  harbor  if  she  approached  the  Oregon  ...  337 
Captain    Clark    acknowledges  congratulations    received  by  crew  with  "enthusiasm  and 

spontaneous  cheers"  337 

Captain  Clark  of  the  Oregon  tells  of  his  ship  in  action 509 

Correspondence  of  the  Department  of  War 353 

Camps  in  Florida 359 

Cervera  reported  at  Santiago  r 368 

Cervera  reported  ordered  to  shell  Santiago  when  Americans  got  possession  406 

Cervera's  position  at  Santiago  is  understood  by  the  Spanish  Government  431 

Cervera  warned  against  being  bottled  up.., 433 

Cervera's  marines  ordered  to  land 437 

Correa  advises  chance  for  Cervera's  escape 438 

Cervera  told  of  a  good  time  to  escape  437 

Cervera  says  attempt  to  escape  would  mean  loss  of  squadron  and  men 438 

Cervera  advises  Blanco  he  is  under  his  orders 438 

Cervera  tells  of  bad  condition  of  his  ships 439 

Cervera  ordered  out  of  harbor  by  Blanco 439 

Cervera's   pathetic    telegram    requesting   positive    orders   from    Blanco   before    leaving 

Santiago 440 

Cervera  pressed  by  Madrid  to  escape 443 

Cervera's  departure  postponed  by  Blanco 443 

Cervera  accepts  his  doom 444 

Cervera  ordered  to  leave  by  Blanco 444 

Cervera  seeks  delay 444 

Cervera  advises  Blanco  withdrawal  of  sailors  would  mean  loss  of  Santiago 444 

Cervera  given  twelve  hours  to  leave 445 

Cervera  reports  to  Blanco  his  capture  447 

Cervera  paid  tribute  of  admiration  by  Blanco 44§ 

Cervera's  report  of  his  defeat 5*3 

Cervera  sails  from  Cape  Verde  Islands 3f)S 

Cervera  famished  for  coal f)21 

Cervera's  fleet  as  seen  in  Spanish  eyes  before  the  disaster  of  Santiago 278 

Cervera  reports  his  arrival  at  Santiago 429 

Cervera  at  crucial  moment t>2h 

Corbin,  Adjutant-General,  telegraphs  re-inforcements  are  coming .  4™ 

Corbin,  H.  C.,  sends  remarkable  telegram  to  Shatter  about  entering  harbor  with  transport 

armored  with  baled  hay • 45^ 

Chancom  transported  and  installed  torpedoes  in  Cuba 

Corruption  in  Spanish  army  and  navy II2 

Correspondence  of  the  Department  of  War 357 


778  INDEX. 

PAGE 

Cambon,  Ambassador  from  France,  his  conversations  with  President 704 

Cambon,  Don  Julio,  French  Ambassador,  negotiates  peace  for  Alphonso  XIII  66S 

Cambon  and  Day  concurred  in  believing  note  explicit 716 

Cambon's  instrument  of  authorization 670 

Cadiz  fleet  starts  for  Manila 323 

Captain  Cook  of  the  Brooklyn  tells  story  of  the  naval  battle 508 

Capitulation 527 

Casualties  in  the  army  operating  against  Spaniards  in  Manila 565 

Casualties  at  Santiago 581 

Clara  Barton  thanks  Secretary  Alger 583 

Cabellra,  Lieutenant,  tells  of  the  destroyer's  destruction 512 

Canovas  del  Castillo  shipped  torpedoes  to  Cuba 277 

Correa  explains  to  Blanco  Madrid's  unfortunate  position 449 

Conference  interrupted  by  Cervera's  departure 461 

Cavalry  dismounted  and  its  work 479 

Chaparral  about  Santiago 480 

Cable  cut  by  Dewey  gave  us  Philippine  archipelago  725 

Carter,  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  Letter  from 746 

Corruption  of  Spanish  contractor 621 

Casualties 636 

Casualties  in  Santiago 636 

Casualties  in  Porto  Rico 640 

Casualties  in  Manila 640 

Camps  of  United  States  troops 642 

Chickamauga  Park  and  water  supply 646 

Craig,  Dr.  C.  F.,  analyzes  Chickamauga  water 647 

Constitution,  twenty-ninth  Spanish  regulars  crack  fighters 653 

Conclusion 725 

Congressional  effusions  make  great  trouble 723 

Country's  debt  to  General  Merritt 725 

Country  indebted  to  Admiral  Dewey 725 

Ceremonies  Concluding  the  War  with  Spain 725 

Commission  to  Investigate  the  Conduct  of  the  War  Department 738 

Derby,  Lord,  and  Gen.  Schenes  meet 74 

Death  of  Marti 109 

Death  of  colonial  system  of  Spain 113 

Duty  of  fair  play  to  the  Spaniards  of  the  Peninsula  and  Cuba 131 

Diaz,  Don  Jose  Garnica  y 683 

Diaz,  Rev.  A.  J.,  tells  of  immense  armies  of  Gomez  and  Maceo  152 

Death  to  those  helping  Spaniards 169 

Defeat  called  victory  by  Cubans 173 


INDEX.  779 


PACJE 

Dr.  Danfortti  describes  Cuban  capital iSS 

Death  in  Cuba 2II 

Different  character  in  explosions  of  the  Maine 217 

Day,  Secretary,  telegraphs  Consul-General  Lee 215 

Declaration  of  War,  President'places  issue  with  Congress 245 

Day,  Secretary,  splendidly  replies  in  the  name  of  the  President 668 

Day  to  Woodford 248 

Day  states  substantially  points  of  protocol 668 

Day  to  Woodford,  Telegram  in  Cipher 249 

Day  Lost  or  Gained,  Importance  of  in  Closing  the  War 732 

Dewey's  splendid  victory 277 

De\vey  charters  British  steamer 280 

Dewey  purchases  British  steamer  Zafiro  280 

Dewey  announces  departure  for  Manila 283 

Dewey  threatened  with  Cervera's  squadron 308 

Dewey's  simple  announcement  of  his  victory  over  Spanish  fleet .  283 

Dewey  congratulated  by  President  and  Secretary  of  the  Navy 284 

Dewey  announces  securing  naval  station  at  Cavite 284 

Dewey  congratulated  in  the  name  of  American  people 284 

Dewey  made  Rear-Admiral 285 

Dewey  sends  correct  list  of  Spanish  vessels  destroyed 285 

Dewey  announces  raising  and  docking  three  Spanish  vessels 285 

Dewey's  official  report  of  the  engagement  of  his  squadron  with  the  Spanish  fleet 285- 

Dewey  happy  to  report  none  killed — squadron  but  slightly  damaged 287 

Dewey's  praise  of  officers  and  men  288 

Dewey  doubts  if  any  Commander-in-Chief  was  ever  served  by  more  loyal  and  gallant 

captains 288 

Dyer,  Captain,  of  the  Baltimore,  makes  a  most  interesting  report 294 

Defeated  Spaniards  give  first  account  of  action  in  Manila  Bay 3<x; 

Dewey  cuts  cable,  after  first  proposing  to  preserve  the  line  for  the  use  of  both  Americans 

and  Spaniards,  which  was  rejected  by  the  enemy 3°9 

Dewey  thanks  President  for  promotion,  and  recommends  advancement  on  list  of  his 

commanding  officer 3IQ 

Dewey's  estimate  of  troops  necessary  to  control  Philippine  Islands 311 

Dewey  sends  warning  troops  should  be  provided  for  extremely  hot,  moist  climate 311 

Dewey  cabled  if  attacked  by  superior  force  squadron  would  endeavor  to  give  good  account 

of  itself 3" 

Dewey  asks  for  whereabouts  and  strength  of  possible  Spanish  expedition  against  him 312 

Dewey  receives  call  from  Aguinaldo 312 

Dewey's  high  commendation  of  Captain  Daniel  B.  Hodgson 313 

Dewey  allows  Aguinaldo  to  organize  his  army  under  the  protection  of  his  guns 314 


78o  INDEX. 

PAGE 

Dewey  doubts  Aguinaldo's  ability  to  capture  Manila 314 

Dewey  believes  Filipinos  more  capable  of  self-government  than  Cubans 314 

Dewey's  anxiety  for  arrival  of  monitors 318 

Dewey  announces  arrival  of  United  States  troops •. 318 

Dewey's  duty  at  Manila 547 

Dewey  sustained  by  the  President 566 

Dewey  feared  by  Spaniards 5o3 

Dewey's  trust  in  monitors 627 

Dewey  announces  arrival  of  General  Merritt 319 

Dewey  announces  Aguinaldo  is  becoming  aggressive 319 

Dewey  receives  announcement  of  Peace  Protocol .- 320 

Dewey's  dispatches  are  characteristic  and  historical. 320 

Dewey  entered  into  no  alliance  with  Philippine  insurgents 323 

Dewey  believed  could  beat  Cervera  with  addition  of  two  monitors 323 

Dewey  in  few  words  tells  President  all  about  Philippines 325 

Dewey,  his  country's  indebtedness  to  him 725 

Difficulty  in  loading  transports  for  Santiago 376 

Daiquiri  landing  unopposed 388 

Difficulties  in  the  Santiago  campaign 399 

Departure  of  American  fleet  told  to  Blanco 430 

Destroyers  destroyed  at  Santiago 512 

Destruction  of  the  Maine :. 210 

Diminutive  forces  of  Cuba  according  to  G.  B.  Rea 160 

Daiquiri  and  the  landing  there 478 

Day  of  doom  for  Cervera's  fleet 483 

De  la  Rama,  One  Estefan,  described 665 

Dedios,  Lieut.-Gen.  Emiliano,  Military  Governor  Cavite 666 

Del  Pilar,  Brigadier-General 666 

Destruction  of  Cervera's  fleet  as  seen  from  s*hore 625 

Deference  to  Spanish  Commissioners 694 

Dictionary  and  interpretation  of  Peace  Protocol 694 

"Disposition"  and  "possession,"  President's  change  of  wording 707 

Duke  de  Arcos  appointed  Spain's  Minister  to  the  United  States 730 

European  press  comment  on  Cuban-Spanish-American  situation  in  1876 98 

European  powers  hold  off  during  war  of  1898 , 113 

European  monarchies  relied  on  by  Spain 126 

Exodus  Cubans  through  dread  of  Weyler : 134 

Experience  and  sentiments  of  the  people  of  Cuba 206 

Events  immediately  preceding  the  blowing  up  of  the  Maine 214 

Extra  territoriality  of  foreign  war  vessel  prevented  Spaniards  investigating  Maine  disaster  217 
El  Caney  and  General  Ludlow 480 


INDEX.  78i 

PAGE 

El  Caney  according  to  Breckenridge 483 

European  powers  addressed  by  American  Government  regarding  intervention 76 

Evans,  J.  C.,  brave  conduct  at  Manila ^  288 

Evans,  Captain  Bob,  on  the  Iowa's  performance 511 

Ellis,  Chief  Yeoman  G.  LL,  killed  on  Brooklyn  in  fight  with  Cervera 504 

Eaton,  Commodore,  of  the  Resolute,  on  the  naval  fight 510 

Exterior  explosion  the  verdict 210 

Eyermann,  Emilio  de  Acosta  y,  killed  on  Mercedes 624 

Embalmed  beef 648 

Eighth  (Philippine)  corps 634 

Expeditions  to  Philippines 635 

Escario's  column  delayed  by  Cubans 661 

Escario's  desperate  advance  to  gain  Santiago 661 

Escario's  delay,  according  to  Spaniards,  lost  Santiago 663 

Escamillo,  Aguinaldo's  secretary  665 

Estrella,  General 666 

Exact  terms  of  note  relating  to  Philippines 712 

Evacuation  of  Porto  R ico 733 

Evacuation  of  Cuba .- 733 

Fish,  Secretary  of  State  Hamilton,  on  former  Cuban  insurrection 54 

Filibuster  expeditions  intended  to  rush  United  States  into  war ". 125 

Fish,  Hamilton,  instructed  in  English  by  London  Times 128 

Fish,  Hamilton 194 

Firebrand  and  Freedom 183 

Five-dollar  Spanish  gold  piece  sent  private  letter  to  United  States 206 

Florida  Literary  Bureau 207 

Field  Fighting  for  Santiago 4°7 

Foreign  countries  closely  studied  Santiago  expedition 477 

Fifth  Army  Corps  and  its  lesson  to  the  whole  army 477 

"Fill  up  with  coal — the  best  to  be  had" 544 

Fleet  and  army  cooperate  at  Manila 446 

Filipinos  more  capable  of  self-government  than  Cubans,  according  to  Dewey 314 

Filipino  Commission  in  Washington 757 

Filibusters  accused  of  responsibility  for  Cuban  insurrection 85 

Famine  in  Santiago 622 

Flagler,  Gen.  D.  W.,  Chief  of  Ordnance,  on  magazine'rifle 644 

Fight  at  El  Caney  and  Spanish  version 649 

Fight  at  San  Juan  and  Spanish  version 649 

Fourth  Corps 634 

Fifth  (Santiago)  Corps 634 

Free  exercise  of  religion 678 


782  INDEX. 

PAGE 

Former  colonies  of  Spain  and  their  independence  in  relation  to  the  treaty 693 

Great  Britain's  attitude  in  the  Ten  Years'  War 74 

Guerrilla  tactics  and  length  of  Cuban  War 89 

General  Grant  was  conservative - 97 

Grant's  third  term  desire  alleged  to  cause  America's  proposed  intervention 102 

Gomez,  Gen.  Maximo,  his  annihilation  of  Cuban  industries 104 

Gomez  and  the  torch no 

Gomez's  two  objects  in  firing  fields 659 

Gomez  attacks  American  Government,  press  and  President 174 

Gomez's  letter  to  Gen.  Lee  claiming  insurgents  kept  no  one  from  earning  a  living 229 

Gomez's  address  to  planters  and  cattle  ranchers 367 

Gridley,  Captain,  his  report  of  the  Olympia 290 

General  Greely  on  Signal  Service 645 

Guantanamo  and  splendid  behavior  of  the  Marines 628 

Guantanamo  Bay  filled  with  mines 628 

Grant's  poor  opinion  of  Cuban  war-making , 125 

Greene,  Gen.  Frank  V.,  wins  Merritt's  highest  praise 663 

Greene's  fear  of  anarchy  in  the  Philippines 663 

Garcia,  Pantelon,  Major-General 666 

Garcia,  Gen.,  his  troops  do  good  work  in  retarding  Spaniards 662 

"Honor"  of  Spain  stood  in  the  way  of  peace  during  Ten  Years'  War 66 

Helping  Spaniards  meant  death -. 169 

Hogs  easy  to  catch  in  Cuba 190 

Hyatt,  Pulaski  F.,  Consul  at  Santiago,  writes  regarding  annexation 233 

Hyatt,  Consul,  writes  of  distress  due  to  Gomez's  order  forbidding  grinding  of  sugar  crop  ...  237 

House  of  Representatives  resolves  for  immediate  intervention 245 

Hughes,  Lieutenant,  reports  Battle  of  Manila 288 

Howe,  J.  A.,  praises  officers  and  men  in  naval  engagement  at  Manila 298 

Hodgson,  Capt.  Daniel  B.,  highly  commended  by  Dewey 313 

Humanity  in  withholding  bombardment  of  Santiago 413 

Hobson,  Lieutenant,  and  men  exchanged 414 

Humphrey,  Colonel,  Chief  Quartermaster  at  Tampa,  on  the  Santiago  transports 398 

History  of  the  war  in  a  few  words 342 

"History  points  to  no  greater  achievement" 293 

Intervention  of  European  Powers 76 

Investigation  by  Congressional  Committees 150 

Isle  of  Pines  and  General  Miles'  plan  of  capture 405 

Intrenching  tools  should  be  regular  part  of  equipment  of  troops 477 

Intervention 203 

Insurgents  of  Cuba  and  the  Philippines  in  arms 658 

Indemnity  claims  mutually  relinquished  by  United  States  and  Spain 676 


INDEX.  783 

PAGE 

Interview  between  President  and  Ambassador  Cambon 708 

Junta's  divinely  appointed  ruling  class IQI 

Joint  work  of  Army  and  Navy  at  Manila 544 

Joint  resolution  demanding  that  Spain  relinquish  its  authority  in  Cuba 250 

Jurisdiction  of  the  courts 678 

Koop,  C.  F.,  of  Boston,  describes  brutality  of  Spanish  officers KJI 

Killed  wounded  Cubans • 188 

Kindelberger,  C.  P.,  assistant  surgeon  of  the  Olympia,  volunteered,  was  attached,  com 
mended  414 

Key  West  and  shortness  of  water 360 

Key  West  Bureau  of  Misinformation 724 

"Keep  full  of  coal" 270 

London  Times  claims  United  States  departed  from  political  traditions 101 

London  Times  dares  to  give  lessons  in  English  to  Hamilton  Fish 128 

Lawrence,  Frederic  W.,  on  number  of  insurgent  troops 150 

List  of  officers,  sailors  and  marines  killed  in  the  Maine  disaster 221 

Logan,  Gen.,  his  division  carries  El  Caney 257 

Linare's  impression  of  Cervera's  fleet 430 

Linares  telegraphs  Blanco  can't  give  up  Cervera's  help 429 

Linares,  General,  defense  of  his  line 649 

Lesson  for  the  country  of  the  hills  of  Santiago 474 

Lessonsof  the  War 

Las  Guasimas  and  the  fighting  there  as  told  by  Gen.  Breckenridge 479 

Ludlow's  Brigade  at  El  Caney 480 

Lawton  highly  commended  by  Breckenridge 486 

Long's  telegrams  to  naval  officers  scattered  about  the  world 268 

Long,  Wm.,  Pay  Clerk,  performed  active  service,  commended 268 

Long,  Secretary,  cables  Dewey 279 

Long  notifies  Dewey  war  has  begun 

Long  telegraphs  Oregon  to  get  ready 

Long  to  Schley 

Long  anxious  to  know  if  all  Cervera's  fleet  are  at  Santiago 

Lamberton,  Commander  Chief  of  Staff  B.  P.,  volunteered  and  praised  by  Dewey... 

Luneta  battery,  Manila,  use  Krupp  guns 

List  of  the  sick  and  dead  of  the  American  fleet  at  Manila...  ,.  328 

Lee,  Consul-General,  telegraphed  by  Day... 

Lee's  Consul-Generalship 

Lee's  eminent  fitness 

Lee's  letter  to  Secretary  Day  regarding  situation 

Las  Guasimos  Spaniards  make  desperate  resistance  .., 

Long's  high  attainments 


784  INDEX. 

PAGE 

Lopez.  Miguel,  Cervera's  pilot,  tells  of  departure  from  harbor 626 

Ludington,   Quartermaster-General  M.   J.,   shows  magnitude  of  problem   supplying  big 

army ••••  642 

Limit  to  the  honor  of  arms 657 

Logic  of  the  War  with  Spain 752 

Maceo's  death  and  the  truth 107 

Marti's-death - I09 

Maceo  breaks  through  trocha 136 

Maceo's  death  according  to  Cubans  and  Spaniards 136 

Money  of  Cuban  treasury  sent  to  New  York 190 

Manner  of  forcing  Spanish  soldiers  into  the  brush 188 

Malignance  on  both  sides  in  Cuba 209 

Maine  destruction 210 

Maine  sent  to  Havana 216 

Maine  disaster,  those  killed 221 

McGarr,  Owen,  Counsel  at  Cienfuegos,  writes  of  cane  grinding  and  attempts  to  fire  fields  234 
Message  from  the  President  transmitting  correspondence  between  Spain  and  the  United 

States 246 

Montijo,  Admiral,  reports  his  defeat 298 

Manila  falls 325 

Manila  fleet  resumes  regular  target  practice  in  captured  bay 328 

Mahan,  Captain,  taught  English  significance  of  "sea  power"....-. 331 

McCormick,  Capt.  D.  J.,  condemned  by  Medical  Survey,  relieved  of  command  of  Oregon  333 

Miles,  Major-General  Nelson  A.,  reports  on  work  done  by  bureaus  and  officers 268 

Miles  and  his  ideal  campaign 342 

Miles  believed  in  a  big  Cuban  army 344 

Miles'  unfortunate  reference  to  Bull  Run 352 

Miles  plans  to  capture  Santiago 375 

Miles  pulls  steadily  in  the  harness  and  is  ready  with  suggestions 384 

Miles  telegraphs  Spanish  General  to  surrender 471 

Miles  appears  at  Santiago 523 

Miles  and  Shafter  get  together 523 

Miles  believed  in  Cuban  Army  which  failed  to  materialize 523 

Miles  arrives  at  Shafter's  headquarters 524 

Miles'  coming  impresses  Spaniards  524 

Miles'  plans  and  movements  in  Porto  Rico  campaign 551 

Miles  sails  for  Porto  Rico 569 

Miles  desires  cooperation  of  navy  at  San  Juan,  Porto  Rico  570 

Miles  changes  his  plans  at  sea  owing  to  leak  of  information 573 

Miles'  completeness  of  information 573 

Miles'  sonorous  proclamation  to  Porto  Ricans 574 


INDEX.  785 

PAGE 

Miles'  idea  of  Cuban  aid. 659 

Miley,  Lieutenant,  raises  flag  over  Santiago 532 

Merritt's,  General,  fight  after  protocol  was  signed  704 

Merritt  upheld  by  American  Commission 706 

Merritt,  country  indebted  to  him 72  = 

Merritt  decides  time  to  strike 560 

Merritt  and  Aguinal do 554 

Merritt's  proclamation  to  Filipinos 566 

Merrimac  follows  up  Cervera 253 

Merrimac  did  not  obstruct  channel 437 

Merrimac,  her  sinking  a  mystery  to  Spaniards 623 

Mauser  rifle 644 

Monitors  slightingly  spoken  of  by  Puddeman...., 627 

Marietta  ordered  to  join  Oregon  ..  .t 333 

Marine  Corps  and  its  work 627 

M ines  that  did  not  explode 628 

Marksmanship  of  trained  soldiers  compared  to  that  of  the  volunteers 479 

Map  of  positions  of  vessels  on  blockade  duty 518 

Malay  as  a  factor  in  the  Philippines 659 

Malabani,  Counsellor,  described 665 

Montenegro,  Colonel 660 

Manterola 421 

Madrid  presses  Cervera  to  escape 443 

Madrid's  "Great  Joy,"  believing  Cervera's  escape 448 

Madrid  hears  of  Santiago's  fall 457 

Merchant  vessels  of  both  countries  receive  same  treatment 675 

Moore,  John  Bassett,  Secretary  to  the  Commission 685 

Military  Committees  to  Superintend  the  Evacuation  of  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico 733 

Minister  to  Spain  Appointed 730 

Newspaper  correspondents  at  Havana 198 

Naval  Court  of  Inquiry  reports  on  Maine  disaster 217 

No  effort  spared  by  the  Government 399 

Naval  officers,  their  vigilance  and  studious  observation  554 

Nunez,  Lieutenant-Col.  Frederico,  hangs  five  Spanish  captives 170 

Nunez  reproved  by  Maceo 171 

N oriel/  General 666 

Origin  of  the  war  between  the  United  States  and  Spain 53 

Old,  old  story  of  Spain 98 

Olney,  Secretary 194 

Oregon,  object  lesson  of  voyage 329 

Oregon,  telegraphed  to  get  ready 332 


786  INDEX. 

BAGE 

Oregon  commanded  by  Capt  C.  E.  Clark 333 

Oregon  leaves  San  Francisco 333 

Oregon's  coal  contracted  for  at  Callao 333 

Oregon  reaches  Callao 334 

Oregon  warned  of  Spanish  torpedo-boat  Temerrario 334 

Oregon  meets  a  storm 335 

Oregon  reaches  Port  Tamar 335 

Oregon  learns  war  declared  at  Rio  Janeiro 336 

Oregon  delayed  by  Marietta  Nictheroy 336 

Oregon  at  Rio  Janeiro,  Brazilians  become  vigilant 337 

Oregon  arrives  at  Jupiter  Inlet,  Fla 337 

Oregon  Congratulated  by  Secretary  Long 337 

One  American  killed  in  naval  battle  of  Santiago 504 

Overcrowding  transport  Mobile 583 

Oregon's  splendid  performance  at  Santiago 594 

Organization  and  numbers  of  United  States  army 630 

Officers  killed  and  wounded 636 

Officers  continued  in  service 730 

One  of  the  Ladrones  ceded 669 

Our  Pacific  Possessions 754 

Prim,  Marshal,  foresaw  end  of  Spain's  colonial  possessions... 54 

Prim's  correspondence  with  American  Secretary  of  State 55 

Prim  and  Sickles  confer 59 

Pall  Mall  Gazette  claims  United  States  proposed  intervention  due  to  General  Grant's 

desire  for  third  term , 102 

Peace  of  Zanjon 133 

Peace  conference  meets  at  Paris 6So 

President  Cleveland  and  state  papers  of  Secretary  Olney 194 

President  Grant,  Secretary  Fish,  Daniel  Sickles  and  Caleb  Gushing 194 

President  McKinley,  Gen.  Fitzhugh  Lee : 194 

President's  Message  to  the  4$th  Congress 200 

President's  message  asking  powers  to  terminate  hostilities  between  Spain  and  Cuba 211 

Pesident's  proclamation  regarding  Maritime  law 261 

President's  proclamation  calling  for  volunteers 262 

President's  proclamation  extending  blockade 263 

President  asked  information  from  Dewey  as  to  the  value  of  the  Philippine  Islands 324 

President  approves  war  resolution  of  Senate  and  House 246 

President's  proclamation  blockading  Cuban  ports 254 

President  praises  army  for  work  of  July  ist 468 

President  thanks  General  Shafter  and  his  army 274 

President  offers  brave  adversary  "generous  terms  of  peace" 670 


INDEX.  787 

PAGE 

President's  commissions  to  Peace  Commissioners 680 

President  misrepresented  by  Spanish  Commissioners  600 

President's  words  with  Ambassador  Cambon  704 

President's  open-mindedness  as  to  Philippines 704 

President's  part  in  preparation  of  Peace  Protocol 706 

President  and  cabinet  meet  French  Ambassador 715 

President  was  greatly  wise 724 

President  instructs  Shafter  to  accept  nothing  but  unconditional  surrender 338 

President  congratulates  Sampson  and  navy  at  Santiago 494 

President's  proclamation  of  July  18  showing  policy  of  Government  toward  Cuba 538 

President  sustains  Dewey 549 

President's  Message  on  Dewey's  battle " 737 

Preparations  to  strike  Spaniards  in  East  Indies 544 

Policy  or  expansion 550 

Philippines  and  their  boasting 550 

Porto  Rico  campaign 568 

Porto  Rico  ceded 669 

Porto  Rico  is  ceded  to  the  United  States 672 

proclamations  of  the  President  relating  to  war  with  Spain 257 

Plot  to  smash  Dewey 434 

Passport  handed  Spanish  minister 252 

Philippine  insurgents  demand  joint  occupation  of  Manila 326 

Phantom  fleets  of  Spain  in  Cuban  waters 244 

Palma,  T.  Estrada,  asks  for  rights  of  belligerents 230 

Palma  on  Gomez'  orders  relative  to  sugar  crop 230 

"People  of  the  island  of  Cuba  of  right  ought  to  be  free  and  independent" 245 

Pluddeman,  Rear  Admiral  German  Navy,  comments  on  naval  battle  at  Santiago 627 

Powder  and  its  supply 645 

Philippine  idea  of  "fixing"  custom  house  officers 660 

Philippines'  hatred  of  monastic  orders 664 

Philippine  Islands  are  ceded  to  the  United  States 672 

Philippines  and  the  Commissioners 703 

Passionate  dignity  of  Spaniards ..  701 

Porter,  Horace,  his  note  to  American  Commissioners 722 

Prisoners  are  released  by  United  States  and  Spain 676 

Property  rights 678 

Proclamation  of  Peace  by  the  President ..  729 

Quartermaster-General's    report    on    steamships    that    carried   Shafter 's    army    of    in 
vasion 394 

Quartermaster's  department  at  Tampa,  its  work 644 

Reforms  for  Cuba  proposed  in  1869 59 


7S8  INDEX. 

PAGE 

Risk  of  war  to  United  States  through  bombardment  of  American  sea-ports  pointed  out 

by  British  critics 103 

Recruits,  Cuban,  came  in  small  crafts  from  Hayti 136 

Rea,  George  Bronson,  examined 160 

Rea's  difficulties  with  Gomez 172 

Resources  of  Cubans 177 

Real  Cubans  would  join  United  States 207 

Report  of  Mr.  Davis' committee  on  foreign  relations 212 

Recognition  of  Republic  of  Cuba 214 

Rigney,  American  sugar  planter,  assaulted  by  Cubans  and  estate  damaged 233 

Recognition  of  independence  of  Republic  of  Cuba  defeated 245 

Regular  officers  needed  among  volunteers 387 

Reports  of  Sampson  and  Schley  and  their  contrast 508 

Rough  Riders  sick 529 

Reed,  Inspector  General,  writes  of  sick  soldiers 534 

Remarkable  letter  from  Spanish  soldiers  about  to  sail  for  Spain 584 

Rightmire,  W.  J.,  Fleet  Pay  Clerk,  performed  active  service,  commended 292 

Roosevelt,  Col.  Theodore,  his  famous  dispatch  to  Dewey 270 

Roosevelt,  Theodore,  his  brilliant  record  as  assistant  Secretary 544 

Read,  Gen.,  describes  raising  of  flag  over  Governor's  palace  530 

Reina  Mercedes'  creditable  work  621 

Regular  regiments  and  their  stations v 633 

Relations  and  responsibilities  for  insurgents 658 

Ruiz,  Colonel,  wounded  by  Cubans 661 

Real  people  of  Cuba 724 

Ratifications  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace  Exchanged  at  Washington 726 

Report  of  Commission  to  Investigate  the  Conduct  of  the  War  Department 739 

Report  on  Beef  by  Investigating  Commission 745 

Sampson  says  Schley  had  sufficient  coal 371 

Sampson's  army  delayed  by  phantom  fleets 381 

Sampson  arrives  at  Daiquiri 383 

Sampson  partially  explains  refusal  to  force  Santiago  harbor 455 

Sampson  explains  relations  with  Shafter 457 

Sampson  and  Shafter  were  to  consult  when  Cervera's  departure  interrupted 461 

Sampson's  plans  for  Shafter  to  take  forts  at  harbor  entrance  462 

Sampson  announces  destruction  of  Cervera's  fleet 492 

Sampson  congratulated  by  President  and  Secretary  of  Navy 492 

Sampson's  absence  on  duty  during  the  destruction  of  Cervera's  fleet 494 

Sampson's  preparations  in  event  of  attempt  to  escape 498 

Sampson  gives  reasons  for  ordering  Indiana  to  turn  back 510 

Sampson  failed  to  see  an  open  gate  to  glory 520 


INDEX.  789 

PAGE 

Sampson  agreed  with  Miles  rather  than  Shatter 524 

Sampson  did  not  sign  articles  of  capitulation -35 

Santiago  a  hard  nut  to  crack , _  -,78 

Santiago's  fall  reported  by  Blanco ^ 

Santiago's  situation  after  Spanish  fleet  was  gone 454 

Santiago  Harbor  open  to  Sampson  for  twenty-four  hours 654 

Santiago  plan  of  pacifying  American  custom-house  officers 660 

Sandico,  C.,  coadjutor  of  Aguinaldo (^ 

Sanitary  report  of  Santiago -  : 

San  Domingo  torch  in  aid  of  Cuban  rebellion 229 

San  Juan  de  Porto  Rico  key  to  the  situation 570 

Scoundrelism  in  Cuba 207 

Scott,  Ensign  W.  P. ,  commended  by  Dewey  288 

Schley  telegraphed  to  locate  Cervera 371 

Schley  disobeys  orders  370 

Schley  ordered  to  remain  off  Santiago 3 70 

Schley  reports  to  Long  that  enemy  is  at  Santiago  371 

Schley's  departure  cabled  from  Canada  to  Madrid  and  Cuba 431 

Secretary  of  War's  report 341 

Seventy-first  New  York  with  men  who  had  never  fired  a  gun 365 

Searchlight  special  feature  of  blockade 496 

Service  of  Spanish  fleet  at  Santiago 622 

Secon d  corps 634 

Seventh  corps 634 

Shafter  directed  to  seize  and  hold  Mariel 357 

Shafter  directed  to  assume  troops  at  Tampa 360 

Shafter  recommends  army  formation  by  brigades , 365 

Shafter's  executive  statements  and  sagacity — "First  battle  will  be  the  decisive  one" 367 

Shafter  ordered  to  proceed  to  Santiago 374 

Shafter  in  need  of  help 391 

Shafter  and  his  army  thanked  by  the  President 400 

Shafter  reports  casualties 405 

Shafter  urges  Sampson  to  force  the  entrance  of  the  harbor 409 

Shafter  suggests  a  retreat 409 

Shafter's  resignation  suggested 410 

Shafter  improves  in  health  4" 

Shafter  demands  surrender  of  Santiago 412 

Shafter  insists  navy  enter  harbor 455 

Shafter  explains  relations  with  Sampson 457 

Shafter  announces  to  Sampson  he  will  attack  Santiago,  and  wishes  fleet  to  aid  attacking 
Aquadores 458 


79o  INDEX. 


PAGE 

Shatter's  compliments  to  Sampson 458 

Shafter  advises  Sampson  of  terrific  fighting  and  wants  his  aid 458 

Shafter's  idea  Sampson  must  force  harbor 462 

Shafter's  Fourth  of  July  greeting  to  Sampson 462 

Shafter  notifies  Washington  of  scarcity  of  medicines , 467 

Shafter  notifies  Government  of  the  appearance  of  yellow  fever 469 

Spanish  officers  to  surrender  Santiago 471 

Shafter's  serious  position  before  Santiago 472 

Shafter  reports  on  Cuban  and  Immune  regiments " 533 

Shafter  displeased  with  Immunes 533 

Shafter  at  Camp  Wycoff.. 587 

Shafter's  change  of  plans  in  relation  to  his  difficulties  with  Sampson 629 

Sherman  to  Woodford 247 

Sherman  to  Woodford 249 

Sherman  to  Spanish  Minister 250 

Sherman  to  Spanish  Minister , 251 

Sherman  to  Woodford  announcing  Spanish  Minister  given  passport 252 

Schenck,  Gen.,  and  Lord  Derby  meet 74 

Sharp  strain  of  the  struggle  at  Santiago ; 384 

Shafter  characterized  by  Breckenridge 486 

Schley's  report  of  victory 502 

Shafter's  explanation  of  his  refusal  to  allow  a  naval  officer's-  signature  on  capitulation 

agreement 538 

Scandal  about  beef 647 

Sagasta  appeals  to  Blanco  to  help  towards  peace 449 

Shafter  wants  to  know  why  navy  cannot  work  under  fire  like  army 458 

Shafter  cheered  by  his  soldiers 533 

Shells  not  sensitive  enough 629 

Ships  chartered  on  Pacific  coast ; 643 

Shower  of  telegrams  soliciting  chance  to  serve  in  war 588 

Sickles  and  Prim  confer 59 

Sickles,  Daniel 194 

Sicard,  Rear  Admiral,  seeks  for  secrecy  as  to  army  movements 376 

Siboney,  the  heavy  engagement  there 404 

Signal  service 645 

Smith,  D.  A.,  Pay-Inspector,  active  service,  commended 418 

Spain  would  not  confer  until  Ten-year-war-Cubans  laid  down  arms 58 

Spain  sends  more  troops  to  Cuba 69 

Spain  explains  that  length  of  war  is  due  to  the  guerilla  tactics  of  Cubans : 89 

Spain's  losses  in  Cuba 109 

Spain's  fear  of  a  second  San  Domingo 109 


INDEX.  79I 

PAGE 

Spain  longed  for  foreign  war  during  Carlist  conquest IIQ 

Spain's  belief  in  her  navy  during  Ten  Years'  War ng 

Spain's  finances  in  1875 I2o 

Spain  confident  of  triumph  with  her  naval  force 404 

Spain's  character  impaired  by  injustice  to  her  colonies 452 

Spain  pleads  for  peace  through  France 668 

Spain  would  spare  Cuba : 668 

Spain  gives  up  Cuba  669 

Spain  cedes  Porto  Rico 669 

Spain  stripped  of  "last  memory  of  a  glorious  past" 669 

Spain  is  paid  twenty  million  dollars 675 

Spain  cedes  Porto  Rico  to  the  United  States 672 

Spain  relinquishes  all  claim  of  sovereignty  over,  and  title  to  Cuba 672 

Spain  cedes  to  the  United  States  the  archipelago  of  the  Philippine  Islands 672 

Spain's  commercial  rights  in  Philippine  Islands 675 

Spain  releases  prisoners 676 

Spain  wished  United  States  to  pay  her  debts 687 

Spain's  claim  that  United  States  erred  in  believing  Cuban  cause  just   698 

Spain's  pitiful  plea 700 

Spain's  Minister  to  the  United  States  appointed 730 

Spain  too  weak  to  maintain  a  Colonial  System 752 

Spaniards  did  not  believe  Americans  warlike  people 125 

Spaniards  relied  upon  European  monarchies 126 

Spaniards  at  Manila  signaled  approach  of  American  fleet  shortly  after  midnight 293 

Spaniards  surrender  at  Manila 211 

Spaniards  testify  to  valor  of  American  troops 650 

Spanish  volunteers  hung  by  Cubans 168 

Spanish  manner  of  seeking  hospitals  to  kill  wounded 188 

Spanish  wish  to  investigate  Maine  wreck 217 

Spanish  claim  electoral  machinations  make  United  States  hostile 78 

Spanish  inability  to  conquer  Cuba  explained  by  Gushing 108 

Spanish  Minister  to  Sherman 251 

Spanish  squadron  defeated  at  Manila,  officers  and  men 290 

Spanish  fleet  and  its  mystery 353 

Spanish  phantom  fleet  reported  to  General  Miles 364 

Spanish  cruisers  reputation  for  speed 

Spanish  war  secrets  revealed  through  secret  cablegrams  41? 

Spanish  general  agreed  to  surrender 524 

Spanish  sharpshooters  and  their  bravery 484 

Spanish  defenders  of  Santiago 650 

Spanish  block  houses 4^5 


792  INDEX. 

PAGE 

Spanish  story  of  El  Caney  and  San  Juan , 649 

Spanish  trenches 485 

Spanish  casualties 653 

Spanish  claim  President  had  not  determined  to  take  Philippines 712 

Spanish  Commission  protests 697 

Spanish  plenipotentiaries;  their  names  and  titles 683 

Spaniards  attempted  to  divert  object  of  commission...^. 685 

Spaniards  objected  to  General  Merritt 705 

Spanish  soldiers  sent  back  to  Spain  through  Treaty  of  Peace 675 

Spaniards  in  conquered  territory  may  preserve  allegiance  to  crown  of  Spain 677 

Springfield  arsenal 645 

Straightforwardness  of  three  administrations 194 

Statistics  of  death-rate  at  Santa  Clara 217 

Starvation  due  to  burning  policy  238 

Story  of  Santiago  as  cabled  from  Dedemonte  to  Admiral  Ventura  Mantelora 421 

Strain  on  courtesies  between  Shafter  and  Sampson  ...  535 

Stars  and  Stripes  popular  in  Porto  Rico 576 

Staff  organization 632 

Strange  story  of  the  official  secret  cipher  of  Spain 417 

Strength  of  regular  and  volunteer  armies 631 

Stars  and  Stripes  over  Santiago 53° 

Stickney,  J.  L.,  Correspondent  New  York  Herald,  rendered  "valuable  service  to  Dewey"  388 

Sugar  producers  paid  tribute  to  Cubans  and  Spaniards 181 

Superior  accuracy  of  fire  won  naval  battle  of  Santiago 498 

Smallness  of  American  army  at  Santiago 489 

San  Juan  according  to  General  Breckenridge 483 

Sampson  refuses  to  enter  Santiago  harbor  until  mines  are  removed 458 

Santiago  and  its  supplies  during  siege 649 

Status  quo  bothered  Spaniards 685 

Senate  created  trouble  through  slowness  to  ratify 724 

Storer,  Bellamy,  appointed  Minister  to  Spain 730 

Torch,  and  its  awful  cost  to  Cuba in 

Ten  Years'  War  in  Cuba 112 

Two  sorts  of  Spaniards  in  Cuba 177 

Treatment  of  alleged  American  citizens  in  Havana  Consulate 198 

"To  intervene  with  force" 203 

Transportation  of  Spanish  or  insurgent  officers  at  regular  rates  according  to  rank 206 

Telegrams  that  made  necessary  sending  of  Maine  to  Havana 216 

Target  practice  at  Manila 331 

Transports,  their  cost  of  purchase,  tonnage  and  carrying  capacity  of  officers  and  men 397 

Toral,  Gen.  Jose,  sends  foreigners  out  of  the  city 412 


INDEX.  793 

PAGE 

Telegraph  operators  in  Cuba  opposed  to  Spanish  cause 418 

Toral  advises  Blanco  of  capture  of  Cervera's  squadron,  and  loss  of  two  torpedo  boats 445 

Toral  sends  Blanco  first  news  of  Cervera's  squadron's  destruction 446 

Toral  ready  to  surrender  if  army  allowed  to  go  out  of  city  with  arms  and  baggage 470 

Texas  hit  by  big  shells 509 

Tejeiro,  Lieutenant  Jose  Muller  y,  tells  of  removal  of  mines  from  Santiago  harbor 519 

Taggart,  Capt.  E.  F.,  tells  of  sustenance  Spaniards  had 533 

Table  giving  assignment  of  secondary  batteries 608 

Tejeiro,  Lieutenant  Jose  Muller  y,  on  Spanish  artillery 618 

Tejeiro  on  Spanish  belief  in  their  fleets 621 

Tejeiro  attempts  to  interview  Hobson 623 

Tejeiro  tells  of  terrible  Vesuvius 625 

Tejeiro  gives  example  of  Cuban  usefulness  to  United  States 661 

Table  giving  grand  total  of  casualties ; 641 

Table  showing  sending  home  of  Spanish  prisoners 641 

Table  showing  peace  and  war  figures  on  army  goods 643 

Table  showing  strength  of  regular  and  volunteer  armies 631 

Table  giving  strength  and  distribution  of  troops 635 

Transportation  furnished  soldiers 644 

Telegrams  connecting  President  and  armies  in  the  field 646 

Trias  Mariano  described 665 

Terms  relating  to  Philippines  indefinite,  according  to  Spaniards 669 

Text  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace  with  Spain 671 

Twenty-ninth  Spanish  regiment,  its  valor 653 

Treaty  of  Peace 668 

Treaty  of  Peace:  Articles  I,  II,  III 672 

Treaty  of  Peace:  Articles  IV,  V 675 

Treaty  of  Peace:  Articles  VI,  VII,  VIII 676 

Treaty  of  Peace:  Article  IX 677 

Treaty  of  Peace:  Articles  X,  XI,  XII,  XIII 678 

Treaty  of  Peace:  Articles  XIV,  XV,  XVI,  XVII 679 

United  States  to  send  back  Spanish  soldiers 675 

United  States  gives  Spain  commercial  rights  in  Philippine  Islands 675 

United  States  pays  Spain  twenty  million  dollars 675 

United  States  releases  prisoners 676 

United  States  did  not  pay  Great  Britain  to  extinguish  colonial  debts 702 

Valmaseda's  brutal  proclamation 71 

Virginius  case IT7 

Volunteers  force  out  Campos 134 

Volunteers  praised  by  General  Breckenridge 349 

Vegetable  food  of  Cubans 189 


794  INDEX. 

I'AGF. 

Views  of  minority  asking  immediate  recognition  of  Republic  of  Cuba 214 

Valparaiso  authorities  careful  in  their  treatment  of  American  ships 335 

Vessels  and  the  assignment  of  secondary  batteries 608 

Vesuvius  dynamite  shells  terrified  Spaniards 625 

Valor  of  American  troops  testified  by  Spaniards 650 

Vara  del  Rey,  General 651 

Vara,  Leandro  y,  described 665 

Villa,  de — Urrutia,  Don  Wencesnao  Ramirez 683 

Volunteer  System,  The 736 

Way  the  war  business  was  handled , 243 

Woodford's  reply  to  Day  249 

Woodford  to  Sherman,  announcing  that  he  had  asked  for  passport 253 

Woodford  to  Sherman,  giving  official  note  from  Spanish  Minister  of  State 253 

Woodford  to  Sherman,  text  of  official  note  from  Spanish  Minister  of  State,  and  Woodford's 
instruction  to  United  States  consular  representatives  to  turn  over  consulates  to  British 

consuls  254 

"Where  every  officer  and  man  did  his  whole  duty  there  is  only  room  for  general  praise"...  292 

Wakler,  Capt.  Asa,  of  the  Concord,  tells  of  the  Manila  fight 293 

Wood,  Commander  E.  P.,  of  Petrel,  reports..., 293 

Wilder,  Captain,  of  the  Boston,  makes  a  model  report  for  brevity  and  prose 297 

What  it  would  have  cost  to  have  attacked  Blanco  at  Havana 393 

Wheeler,  General,  praises  gallantry  of  the  troops % 389 

Wheeler  seriously  ill 409 

Wheeler  to  succeed  in  command  if  Shafter  continued  sick 413 

Wheeler  shakes  off  his  illness 414 

Weyler,  General,  succeeds  Campos 134 

Weyler's  reputation 134 

Weyler's  remorseless  policy 135 

Weyler's  attempt  to  pen  Maceo 136 

Winn,  Dr.  F.  B.,  tells  of  insurgents  and  concentrados 184 

Williams,  Raymon  O.,  Consul  General  at  Havana 198 

Wilson,  Major-General,  arrives  in  Porto  Rico 574 

Wounded 639 

Yellow  fever  at  Siboney '469 

Yellow  fever  prevalent 581 

Young  commanders  needed 478 

Yara  River,  fight  there ..  661 


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